ON THINGS CALLED TOWARD SOMETHING

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

1. On things called toward something which, as such, are said to be of another thing, or toward something else in some other way. Cf. Aristotle, Cat., ch. 7 (6a 366b 11) (tr. B.A.M.):
But those things are called toward something which, as such, 1 are said to be of another thing, or toward something else in some other way.2 For instance, the greater as such is said of another thing; for it is called greater than something; and the double as such is said of another thing; for it is called the double of something. It is the same with whatever other things are of this sort. And the following are toward something as well: for instance, habit, disposition, knowledge, sensation, position. For all the things mentioned are, as such, said to be of another thing, or toward something else in some other way, and not anything else. For a habit is called a habit of something, and knowledge [5] the knowledge of something, and position the position of something, and likewise with the others. Accordingly, toward something are whatever are, as such, said to be of another thing, or toward something else in some other way. For instance, a large mountain is said toward [= with regard to] something else. For it is called large toward [= with regard to] something. [10] And the similar is called similar to something. And likewise all such things are called toward something.

Cf. Aristotle, Cat., ch. 7 (8a 29-37) (tr. B.A.M.):

If, therefore, the definition of those things which are toward something were adequately assigned, it is extremely [30] difficult or impossible to show that no substance is said toward something. If, however, it were not adequately <assigned>, but rather toward something are those things for which the being is the same as holding themselves 3 toward something in some way, perhaps something might be said [in answer] to these [difficulties]. The earlier definition does indeed follow closely upon4 [35] all the things toward something, but for [each of]5 the things toward something the being is not the same as being said, as such, of another thing.

Cf. Aristotle, Top., VI, 8, (146b 3) (tr. B.A.M.):

For of all the things toward something the essence <consists in being> 6 toward another thing, since for each of the things 7 toward something the being is the same as holding itself toward something in some way.

as such, a(/per e)sti\n (Lat. inquantum sunt, inasmuch as they are, namely, what they are). On this translation, see the note below. 2 That is, those things are called relatives which, as such, are said to be of another thing, or are said with regard to something else in some other way. 3 holding (habitually maintaining) themselves, e)/xein (Lat. se habere, to have or hold themselves, having or holding themselves). On this translation, see the note below. 4 follow closely upon, parakolouqei= (Lat. prope sequitur). On this translation, see the note below. 5 I have added these words in view of the definition of relatives found in the Topics, where this exact phrase (namely, for each of the things) is found (see next excerpt). 6 Although the words in parentheses are not in the Greek, they are nevertheless required to complete the sense. 7 for each of the things, tau)to\n h)=n e(ka/st% (Lat. unicuique eorum).

Cf. Aristotle, Cat., 7 (6a 366b 11): Parallel translations:

(tr. E. M. Edghill) Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing. (anon. tr. of Boethiuss version) Such things are called relations which, in themselves, are said to be of other things, or else they are somehow said to be to other things.

For instance, the word superior is explained by For example, the greater, as such, is [6b] said to reference to something else, for it is superiority be of another, for it is said to be greater than over something else that is meant. something. Similarly, the expression double has this external reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant. So it is with everything else of this kind. There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in no other way. [text on double not included in translation]

And likewise with all things of this sort. And these are relations as well: habit, disposition, knowledge, sensation, and position. For all these just mentioned are, in themselves, said to be of other things, or else they are somehow said to be to other things, and they are not said otherwise. For a habit is said [5] to be a habit of something, and knowledge the knowledge of something, and a position the position with respect to something, and likewise with other things. Therefore all those things called relations are, as such, said to be of other things.

Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the preposition of or some other preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in compareson with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes have this external reference. (tr. H. G. Apostle) Things are called relative [or relations] if as such they are said to be of other things, or to be somehow referred to something else.

For example, a mountain is called big [10] compared to something else, for it is called big in relation to something, and a like thing is called like to something, and likewise all such things are said to be to something. (tr. R. Glen Coughlin) Those things are called relatives which are, just as such, said of others or in any other way in regard to another.

For example, the greater, as such, is said to be of something else, for it is said to be greater than some other thing, and the double, as such, is said to be [6b] of something else, for it is said to be double of some other thing. It is likewise with all others of this sort. Other examples of relatives are the following: possession, disposition, sensation, knowledge, and position; for each of these, as such, is said to be of something else and is not stated in any other way. For a possession is said to be a possession of something, knowledge is [5] said to be knowledge of something, a position is said to be a position of something, and similarly with all others. Accordingly, relatives are things which, as such, are said to be of something else or are referred to something else in some way or other. For example, a mountain is called great when it is related to something, for it is so called by being referred to something; [10] and that which is said to be similar is similar to some other thing, and all others of the sort are said to be relative in the same way.

For example, the larger just as such is said of another, for it is larger than something. And the double just as such is said of another, for it is said to be the double of something. So too in whatever other such things. Also among relatives are such things as habit, disposition, sensation, knowledge, and position. For all the things mentioned are, just as such, and not as something else, said of another. For a habit is called a habit of something, and knowledge, knowledge of something, and position, position of something {in regard to something}, and so too the others. Therefore, relatives are whatever are, just as such, said of others, or in any other way in regard to another. For example, a large mountain is said in regard to something, for the mountain is called large in regard to another, and the similar is said to be similar to something, and other such things are similarly said in regard to something.

Cf. Aristotle, Cat., 7, 6a 36-8b 24 (tr. E. M. Edgehill):

Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing. For instance, the word superior is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression double has this external reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant. So it is with everything else of this kind. There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the preposition of or some other preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes have this external reference. It is to be noted that

lying and standing and sitting are particular attitude, but attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid attitudes. It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives; double and triple have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term. It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. For like and unlike, equal and unequal, have the modifications more and less applied to them, and each of these is relative in character: for the terms like and unequal bear unequal bear a reference to something external. Yet, again, it is not every relative term that admits of variation of degree. No term such as double admits of this modification. All relatives have correlatives: by the term slave we mean the slave of a master, by the term master, the master of a slave; by double, the double of its hall; by half, the half of its double; by greater, greater than that which is less; by less, less than that which is greater. So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to express the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; by the perceptible, that which is apprehended by perception. Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states that a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two will not be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the original statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to the bird qua bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature. If, then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having reference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as being such because of its wings. Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we define a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our definition will not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have this reference to a boat qua boat, as there are boats which have no rudders. Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally, for the word boat cannot be said to find its explanation in the word rudder. As there is no existing word, our definition would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like ruddered as the correlative of rudder. If we express ourselves thus accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the ruddered thing is ruddered in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all other cases. A head will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that which is headed, than as that of an animal, for the animal does not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head. Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the first is reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived the word winged from wing and from rudder. All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I add this condition because, if that to which they are related is stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there will be no interdependdence if one of the two is denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of irrelevant significance. The term slave, if defined as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which it is defined, for the statement is not exact. Further, if one thing is said to be correlative with another, and the terminology used is correct, then, though all irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute left in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the

correlative of the slave is said to be the master, then, though all irrelevant attributes of the said master, such as biped, receptive of knowledge, human, should be removed, and the attribute master alone left, the stated correlation existing between him and the slave will remain the same, for it is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave. On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, when all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the stated correlation will be found to have disappeared. For suppose the correlative of the slave should be said to be the man, or the correlative of the wing the bird; if the attribute master be withdrawn from the man, the correlation between the man and the slave will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute winged be withdrawn from the bird, the wing will no longer be relative; for if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that the wing has no correlative. Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are interdependent. Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and the half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of that of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master; these are merely instances of a general rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no double it follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with that of its object. Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse of this is not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything to know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object does not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring of the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge, though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of knowledge. This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception. If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception does not cancel the existence of the perceptible. For perception implies a body perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now if that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if the body does not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to exist. Thus the annihilation of the perceptible involves that of perception. But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain. Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal. But the perceptible surely exists before perception; for fire and water and such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist before the animal is an animal at all, and before perception. Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists before perception. It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative, as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case of certain secondary substances. With regard to primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such possibility, for neither

wholes nor parts of primary substances are relative. The individual man or ox is not defined with reference to something external. Similarly with the parts: a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or head of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a particular person. It is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of secondary substances; the species man and the species ox are not defined with reference to anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so far as it is some ones property, not in so far as it is wood. It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there is a difference of opinion; thus, such terms as head and hand are defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a part, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative character. Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete, if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found. The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not make it essentially relative. From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative. Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows that some particular thing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of which relation to something is a necessary condition of existence, he knows that also to which it is related. For if he does not know at all that to which it is related, he will not know whether or not it is relative. This is clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man knows definitely that such and such a thing is double, he will also forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double. For if there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, he does not know at all that it is double. Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less beautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowledge. For if he does not know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also definitely to which it is related. Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related. It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus these are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be true to say that no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not without advantage.

Cf. idem, Cat. 7 (6a 36-8b 24) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin):

Those things are called relatives which are, just as such, said of others or in any other way in regard to another. For example, the larger just as such is said of another, for it is larger than something. And the double just as such is said of another, for it is said to be the double of something. So too in whatever other such things. Also among relatives are such things as habit, disposition, sensation, knowledge, and position. For all the things mentioned are, just as such, and not as something else, said of another. For a habit is called a habit of something, and knowledge, knowledge of something, and position, position of something {in regard to something}, and so too the others. Therefore, relatives are whatever are, just as such, said of others, or in any other way in regard to another. For example, a large mountain is said in regard to something, for the mountain is called large in regard to another, and the similar is said to be similar to something, and other such things are similarly said in regard to

something. And lying, standing, and sitting are certain positions, but position is among relatives. But to be lying, or to be standing, or to be sitting are not themselves positions, but are denominatively said from the positions mentioned. Contrariety belongs in relatives; e.g., virtue is contrary to vice, both of these being relatives, and knowledge to ignorance. But a contrary does not belong to every relative. For there is nothing contrary to double nor to triple nor to any such thing. It seems that relatives admit more and less. For similar is said more and less, and unequal is said more and less, each of these being a relative. For the similar is said to be similar to something and the unequal, unequal to something. But not all admit more and less. For the double is not said to be more double or less double, nor is any such thing. But all relatives are said in regard to something which reciprocates; e.g., the slave is called the slave of the master and the master is called the master of the slave; and the double, double of the half, and the half, half of the double; and the greater, greater than the lesser, and the lesser, lesser than the greater. So too in other cases. Except that sometimes they will differ according to speech by ending; as knowledge is called knowledge of the knowable, and the knowable, knowable by knowledge; and sensation, sensation of the sensible, and the sensible, sensible by sensation. Not that they will sometimes not seem to reciprocate, if the one giving [the relatives] does not properly give that in regard to which it is said, but errs. For example, if one should give the wing as of a bird, bird of a wing does not reciprocate. For the first thing, wing of a bird, is not properly given, for it is not as bird, as this, that the wing is said of it, but as winged. For there are wings of many other things, which are not birds. Whence, if it be given properly, it will also reciprocate; e.g., the wing is the wing of the winged, and the winged, winged by the wing. Sometimes it is necessary, perhaps, to make up a name, if there be not laid down a name in regard to which it would be properly given. For example, should one give the rudder of the boat, the giving is not proper. For it is not as boat, as this, that the rudder is said of it. For there are boats of which there are not rudders. Whence, it will not reciprocate. For the boat is not called the boat of the rudder. But perhaps the giving will be more proper if it somehow be given thus: the rudder is the rudder of the ruddered, or in whatever other way; for a name is not laid down. And it will convert if it be properly given. For the ruddered is ruddered by the rudder. So too in the other cases, e.g., the head would more properly be given as of the headed than being given as of animal. For it does not have a head as animal. For many animals do not have a head. Perhaps one would grasp those for which names are not laid down most easily thus, if one would put down, from the first things, the names for those in regard to which things reciprocate, as in the cases mentioned, winged from wing and ruddered from rudder. Every relative, then, if it be properly given, is said in regard to something which reciprocates, since, of it be given in regard to a chance thing and not in regard to that very thing in regard to which it is said, it will not reciprocate. I mean that none would reciprocate even among those which we agree are said in regard to something reciprocating, and which have names laid down for them, if one should give it in regard to something accidental and not in regard to that according to which it is said. For example, if the slave be given not as of a master, but as of a man or of a biped or any other such thing, it will not reciprocate. For the giving is not proper. Moreover, if that in regard to which it is said be properly given, if all other accidental things be removed, but that alone in regard to which it is given properly remain, it will always be spoken of in regard to that. For example, if slave is said in regard to master, whatever accidental things are in master being removed, e.g., being two-footed, receptive of knowledge, man, there remaining only being a master, slave will always be spoken of in regard to this. For the slave is said to be the slave of a master. But if whatever it is in regard to which it is said be not properly given, other things being removed and there only remaining that in regard to which it was given, it will not be spoken of in regard to that. For let the slave be given as the slave of a man, and the wing as of a bird, and let there be

removed from the man his being a master. For no longer will the slave be said in regard to the man, for there being no master, there is no slave. So too if being winged is removed from bird. For the wing will no longer be among relatives. Whence, one must give properly whatever it is in regard to which it is said. And if a name be laid down, the giving is easy; there not being one, it is perhaps necessary to make up a name. Being given thus, it is apparent that every relative is spoken of in regard to something which reciprocates. It seems that relatives are together by nature; and in most cases this is true. For the double and the half are together, and half being, double is, and slave being, master is. And the others are similar to these. And these destroy each other. For, double not being, half is not, and half not being, double is not. So too in other cases, whatever are like these. But it does not seem to be true in all the relatives that they are together by nature. For the knowable seems to be before knowledge. For in most cases we grasp knowledge of things which exist beforehand. In few cases or in none would one see the knowledge coming to be together with the knowable. Moreover, the knowable being destroyed, the knowledge is destroyed with it, but the knowledge [being destroyed], the knowable is not destroyed with it. For, if the knowable does not exist, knowledge does not exist, for there will no longer be knowledge of anything, but knowledge not being, nothing prevents the knowable being. For example, the squaring of the circle, if indeed it is knowable: knowledge of it is not yet, but it is itself knowable. Moreover, animal being destroyed, there is no knowledge, but many things among the knowables can be. The things in the case of sensation are disposed similarly to these. For the sensible seems to be before sensation. For, the sensible being destroyed, sensation is destroyed with it, but sensation [being destroyed], the sensible is not destroyed with it. For sensations are about body and are in body; the sensible being destroyed, body would be destroyed, for body is also among the sensibles, but body not being, sensation too is destroyed. Whence, the sensible destroys with it sensation. But the sensation does not [destroy with it] the sensible. For animal being destroyed, sensation is destroyed, but the sensible will be, e.g., body, hot, sweet, bitter, and all other things which are sensible. Moreover, sensation comes to be together with the sensitive, for animal and sensation come to be together. But the sensible is also before the sensation. For fire and water and such things, from which the animal is composed, are before the animal or sensation are at all. Whence, the sensible seems to be before sensation. There is a difficulty as to whether no substance is said among the relatives, as it seems, or this can be in the cases of certain second substances. For it is true in the case of first substances. For neither the wholes nor the parts are said in regard to something. For this man is not called someones this man, nor this ox someones this ox. So too in the case of the parts. For this hand is not called someones this hand, but someones hand, and this head is not called someones this head, but someones head. So too in the cases of second substance, for the most part. For example, man is not called someones man, nor ox someones ox, nor wood someones wood (but they are called someones property). In such cases, therefore, it is apparent that they are not among relatives, but in the case of some second substances there is a question. For example, the head is called the head of someone and the hand is called the hand of someone, and each such thing [is spoken of similarly]. Whence, these would seem to be among relatives. If, therefore, the definition of relatives was given sufficiently, untying so that no substance is said among relatives is either among things extremely difficult or among things impossible. But if not sufficiently, but relatives are those for which being is the same with being somehow relative to something, perhaps something could be said about these [difficulties]. The definition given before, however, closely follows all relatives, but their being said, just as such, of another, this is not being for relatives. From these things it is clear that if someone should determinately see something among the relatives, that thing in regard to which it is said will be seen determinately. This is therefore apparent from itself. For if one should see that this certain thing is among relatives, but being is, for relatives, the same with being somehow relative to something, he also knows that to

which it somehow is relative. For if he does not at all know that to which this is somehow relative, neither does he know whether this is somehow relative. And such a thing is clear in the particular cases. For example, if one knows determinately that this certain thing is double, he knows determinately right away that of which it is the double. For if he does not know it to be the double of any one of the determinate things, neither does he know that it is double at all. So too, if one knows that this certain thing is more beautiful, it is necessary, through these things, that he know determinately that than which it is more beautiful. He will not know indeterminately that this more beautiful than the inferior. For such a claim is opinion, not knowledge. For he will no longer know precisely that it is more beautiful than an inferior; for if it so happen, nothing is inferior to it. Whence, it is apparent that it is necessary that one know determinately that in regard to which what one knows determinately to be among relatives is said. But one can know determinately the head and the hand and each of such things (which are substances), just what they are, but it is not necessary [to know] that in regard to which they are said. But one cannot determinately know [by this knowledge alone] whose head or whose hand it is. Whence, these things would not be among relatives. But if they are not among relatives, it would be true to say that no substance is among relatives. Perhaps it is very difficult to make known such things without having looked into them often; still, to have raised difficulties about each of them is not useless.

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2. On things opposed as toward something, which are, as such, said of opposites, or in some other way toward those things. Cf. Aristotle, Categories, ch. 10 (11b 24-31) (tr. B.A.M.):
Accordingly, whatever things are opposed as toward something are, as such, said of opposites, or in some other way toward those things.8 For example, the double, as such, is said of another thing; for it is called the double of something. And knowledge is opposed to the knowable as toward something [as relatives], and [30] knowledge, as such, is said of the knowable. And the knowable, as such, is said toward [= with regard to] its opposite, i.e., toward [= with regard to] knowledge; for the knowable is said to be knowable by something, i.e., by knowledge. Whatever things, then, are opposed as toward something are, as such, said of another thing, or are said in some other way toward (= with regard to) each other.

3. Note on haper estin. In justification of my translation of haper estin, a notoriously problematic expression, consider the following argument. According to Metaphysics, VII, 4 (1029 b 14-16), the what it was to be or essence of each thing is what the thing is said to be kath auto, in virtue of itself or essentially. Hence, if someone were to ask you without qualification what you are, and you happen to play the guitar, it would be incorrect to reply a musician, because you are not a musician in virtue of yourself, but in virtue of something that belongs to you, namely, the art of music, which is an accident inhering in you. Likewise, if one were to ask what are the things called toward something said to be of, as what is a wing said to be the wing of, or a rudder said to be the rudder of, it would be inaccurate to answer, a wing is the wing of a bird, or a rudder the rudder of a boat, for it is not as such that a bird is winged, for there are winged things which are not birds, nor is a boat ruddered as such, for there are boats without rudders; but rather, a wing is the wing of the winged, and a rudder is the rudder of the ruddered, as Aristotle afterward explains (cf. Cat., 7, 6b 38 ff.). Moreover, as the Philosopher also says, if slave is said toward master, whatever accidental things are in master being removed, such as being two-footed, receptive of knowledge, and man, there remaining only being a master, slave will always be said toward [with regard to] this (ibid., 7a 35-37). Consequently, one must say that a wing, as such, is the wing of the winged, and a rudder, as such, is the rudder of the ruddered, and a slave, as such, is the slave of a master. Likewise, knowledge, as such, is of the knowable, and the knowable, as such, is known by the knowledge. And so those things are called toward something which, as such, are said to be of another thing, or are toward something else in some other way, as Aristotle says. 4. Note on echein and hexis. Echein and hexis are also terms notoriously difficult to translate. I have endeavored to explain my renderings elsewhere. Here, let it suffice to say that for some things to be habitually maintained requires an active effort on our part, as health or virtue demand of us certain ways of acting in order to acquire them, and, once acquired, to maintain them. With respect to its nature, it may be said in sum that a hexis or way of holding oneself is:

That is, those things are opposed as relatives which, as such, are said of opposite things, or are said in some other way with respect to opposite things.

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(1) an order possessed to something, that something being the nature of the thing; and (2) a disposition in the sense of an order of parts with respect to the form and species of the whole to which it belongs. 5. On parakoluthei. At Categories, ch. 7, 8a 35-36, Aristotle states that the earlier definition does indeed follow closely upon (parakoluthei) all those things which are toward some-thing. By the earlier definition, he means the definition he gave at the beginning of the chapter, where he stated that those things are called toward something which, as such, are said to be of another thing, or toward something else in some other way. By all those things which are toward something, he means the larger, the double, master and slave, as well as habit, disposition, knowledge, sensation, position, and the other examples he gives of things which are toward something; for, he goes on to say, all the things mentioned are, as such, said to be of another thing, or toward something else in some other way, and not anything else (ibid., 8b 4-7). But what does it mean for the earlier definition to follow closely upon all those things which are toward something? In order to understand what Aristotle is saying here, consider the following text from the Poetics, ch. 2 (1448a 3-5, ed. Kassel, tr. B.A.M.):
ta\ ga\r h)/qh sxedo\n a)kolouqei= mo/noij, a)ei\ tou/toij

...for character nearly always follows upon these alone, for by their vice or virtue all men differ according to character, (being) either better than us or worse or such <as we are>.

kaki/a? ga\r kai\ a)reth=? ta\ h)/qh diafe/rousi pa/ntej, h)/toi belti/onaj h)\ kaq h(ma=j h)\ xei/ronaj h)\ kai\ toiou/touj.

On this passage, the commentator on the Poetics, D. S. Margoliouth,9 remarks:

Clause 3 gives very little trouble when we have learned the meaning of akolouqei=n, which is not explained at all in Liddell and Scott, and is unsatisfactorily glossed by Bonitz. It is a technicality of logic, meaning to come after in the order of thought, i.e. to be the genus of a species1 or the species of an individual.2 Of these species only is character regularly the genus is an intelligible expression. Its meaning is only thus can character be regularly classified. Of any character we may say that it is relatively good or bad, but not necessarily anything else.
1

Defined in Sophistici Elenchi 181a 23, 24. e)/sti ditth\ h( tw=n e(pome/nwn a)kolou/qhsij h)\ ga\r w(j t%= e)n me/rei to\ kaqo/lou oi(=on a)nqrw/p% z%=on either as general to particular, e.g. animal to man. (The other is based on the Law of Contradiction.) This use pervades the logic, e.g. Topics 113b 31 t$= a)ndrei/a a)reth\ a)kolouqei= courage is a virtue. 128b 4 w(j ge/nouj tou= a)ei\ a)kolouqou=btoj . Numerous cases of it and e(/pesqai in Prior Analytics 43b 44a. 2 De Generatione Animalium 768b 13, pa=sin a)kolouqei= tou=to (to\ a)/nqrwpoj) toi=j kaq e(/kaston Man is the species of all the individuals.

Cf. D. S. Margoliouth, The Poetics of Aristotle. Translated from the Greek into English and from Arabic into Latin, with a revised text, introduction, commentary, glossary and onomasticon (London, New York, Toronto, 1911), pp. 33-34.

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Margoliouth here understands Aristotle to be saying that of the species virtue and vice, character is regularly the genus, and so character as the genus regularly comes after or follows upon virtue and vice. Likewise, the earlier definition of those things called toward something comes after or follows upon those things called toward something as being the definition 10 of the genus which is predicated of the species, and therefore of the individuals coming under it. According to this way of speaking, a species will come after the individuals belonging to it; but the genus (and hence its definition) will come after the species. It follows from this that the individuals coming under the species will themselves come after nothing. It appears that the meaning of after here goes with the third meaning of before which Aristotle enumerates in the Categories, namely, what is said to be before according to a certain order, as in the cases of sciences and discourses (cf. ch. 12, 14a 36ff., tr. Duane H. Berquist), or what is before in the discourse of reason. In sum, the genus comes after the species, the species comes after the individuals, but the individuals do not come after anything. Hence, the definition of the genus immediately follows upon the species coming directly under it, and so it will closely follow upon the individuals coming under the species. In conclusion, the foregoing interpretation may be applied to Aristotles claims about his definitions of toward something as follows: At this point in the chapter, the Philosopher is distinguishing between those relatives for which the being is to hold (or maintain) themselves toward something and those for which it is not. But the earlier definition, expressing as it does a nature common to both species, is for that reason applicable to both, and hence it follows closely upon all the things toward something that is, upon all relatives. But not everything called toward something is such as to have its very being be toward something else: for there are some things for which the being is to be a substance or a quality and the like, but which nonetheless have a relation following upon them, as is the case with knowledge and the knowable and all other things which are said toward something as the measurable is said toward a measure (cf. Meta., V, 15, 1020b 32; 1021a 30ff.)that is, with regard to the measurement of being and truth, as St. Thomas Aquinas says (cf. In V Meta., lect. 17, n. 3)and things of this sort belong to a category other than pros ti. Still, in virtue of the relation which follows on them, they are said toward something. But it must be remarked here that some commentators take Aristotles introduction of a second, amended definition of those things which are toward something as evidence that the Philosopher is here excluding this second kind of relative from the category of relation, apparently assuming that only those things are true relatives for which the being is to be toward another and nothing else; whereas things belonging to another category are for that reason excluded from this predicament, presumably because one and the same thing cannot belong to two different predicaments. But this interpretation cannot stand. In the first place, if Aristotle had wished to include only the first kind of relatives, he could have written the chapter beginning with the second definition, and then given appropriate examples of each and the properties following on them. He could then have remarked that those things which are called toward something include such things as habit, disposition, knowledge, sensation, position, but that these things are not true relatives because they belong to another category, being called toward something solely because they have a relation following upon them, not because they are essentially relations.
10

To be perfectly precise, it is rather a true description of the genus, inasmuch as a highest genus has no definition, properly speaking.

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The fact that he did not do this, but, to the contrary, explicitly included such things among the relatives, tells against such an interpretation. Furthermore, the assumptions underlying this view are mistaken. To begin with, the ten predicaments are distinguished not according to their being as such, but according to their being said of somethingthat is, according to the figures or modes of predicating. For, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains,
sciendum est quod ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta non univoce, sicut genus in species, sed secundum diversum modum essendi. modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi. praedicando enim aliquid de aliquo altero, dicimus hoc esse illud: unde et decem genera entis dicuntur decem praedicamenta. (In III Physic., lect. 5, n. 15, tr. B.A.M.) it must be understood that being is divided into the ten predicaments not univocally, as a genus into species, but according to a diverse mode of being. Now the modes of being are proportional to the modes of predicating. For in predicating something of some other thing, we say this is that. And for this reason the ten genera of being are called the ten predicaments.

It follows from this that both kinds of relatives belong to the predicament toward something, inasmuch as both are said of something. Further, in Chapter 10 of the Categories, where Aristotle defines those things which are opposed as relatives (cf. 11b 24-31), he gives as his second example knowledge and the knowable, a procedure which is inexplicable if he had excluded this kind of relative from the predicament of toward something. Finally, if these things are to be excluded on the basis of their being, then surely they should be excluded from a treatment of toward something in the science of being as being. Yet, as noted above, in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, Chapter 15, Aristotle includes as the third mode of those things which are said toward something this very kind of relative, apparently forgetting that he had excluded them in the Categories. It should also be remarked that, as we have seen, Aristotles second definition of relatives, which is of those things which are essentially relative and nothing else, leaves open the possibility of other things which are something else, but upon which a real relation follows. Implicit here is a distinction recognized by Scholastic philosophers and theologians and systematically explained by St. Thomas Aquinas as follows:
dicendum quod relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas habitudines relativas, ut dominus, servus, pater et filius, et huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa secundum esse. quaedam vero sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam habitudines, sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secundum dici. it must be said that certain relatives have been imposed in order to signify the relative habitudes themselves, such as Lord, servant, father, and son, and the like, and these are called relatives according to being. But some have been imposed in order to signify the things upon which certain habitudes follow, like mover and the thing moved, head and the thing having the head, and others of the sort, which are called relatives according to being said.

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(Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 7, ad 1, tr. B.A.M.)

In both cases there is a true relative, in the one case the name being placed upon the habitude or relationship itself; in the other, upon a thing upon which such a relationship follows. Hence, in both kinds something essentially relative is included, and so both are appropriately ordered under the predicament toward something. As for the difficulty occasioned by the objection that one and the same thing cannot belong to two different categories, it vanishes when it is considered that the second kind of relative may be placed in one category directly, and in another indirectly. In this way knowledge, considered in itself, comes directly under the third species of quality; but considered as having a relation following upon it, it comes indirectly under the category of toward something. It must also be recognized that the opposed position, by excluding this kind of relative from the predicament, thereby excludes the relations following upon them. But these things are called toward something univocally with the first kind, since their being is the same as being possessed as an order to something else, and therefore deserve to be included in the category of relation. 6. The relation of contrariety to relatives according to Cat., ch. 7 (6b 15-19) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin):
Contrariety belongs in relatives; e.g., virtue is contrary to vice, both of these being relatives, and knowledge to ignorance. But a contrary does not belong to every relative. For there is nothing contrary to double nor to triple nor to any such thing.

7. That contrary is said in two ways according to F 119 R 3 (Simplicius, Commentarius in Categorias 389.5-10) (In: The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes, p. 2428):
He [sc. Aristotle] in his book On Opposites says that justice is contrary to injustice, but that the just man is not said to be contrary, but to be contrarily disposed, to the unjust man. If these too are contraries, he says, contrary will be used in two ways: things will be called contraries either in themselves, like excellence and badness, movement and rest, or by virtue of sharing in contraries, e.g. that which moves and that which rests, or the good and the bad.

8. Note on the ways in which contrary is said and the case with regard to relation. According to the report of Simplicius, Aristotle held that contrary is used in two ways: in one way, things will be called contraries either in themselves, like excellence and badnessthat is, like virtue and viceor by virtue of sharing in contraries, like what moves and what rests. Now a similar distinction applies to the category of relation as such; some things being relatives secundum esse, and hence relative in themselves, while others are relatives secundum dici, and hence relative by virtue of something elsein this case, by virtue of having a relation follow upon them, as is the case with the mover and the thing moved or of the head and the thing having the head. 9. The foregoing distinctions in sum. contraries (things called contraries in themselves)

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excellence and badness (= excellence and defect, i.e. virtue and vice) movement and rest contrarily disposed (things called contraries by virtue of sharing in contraries) the good and the bad (that which is excellent and that which is defective) that which moves and that which rests relatives secundum esse movement and rest having a head and not having a head relatives secundum dici the mover and the thing moved the head and the thing having the head 10. On virtues and vices as relations according to Aristotle, Phys. VII, 3 (246a 30247a 28) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin):
[30] Indeed, neither is [alteration] in habits. For the habits are virtues and vices, and every virtue and vice is among the relatives, just as health is a certain [246b 20] balance of the hot and the cold, either of things within [the body] or in relation to what contains. So too good and strength are in relation to something. For they are certain dispositions of the best [thing] to the finest [action]. I call the best, however, what saves and is disposed in regard to nature. Since, therefore, the virtues and the vices are among [those things that are] related to something, and these [25] are not comings to be [generations], nor is there coming to be from these, nor, generally, is there alteration of these, it is apparent that there is no alteration at all in the case of habits. Nor, then, [is there alteration] in the case of virtues and vices of the soul. For virtue is a certain perfection. For each thing is most perfect when it happens upon its proper virtue and is most according to nature, just as the circle [246b 30] is most according to nature when it is most a circle. Vice, however, is the [247a 20] destruction and removal of these. The seizing of virtue and the throwing off of vice come to be, therefore, when something is altering, yet neither of these is alteration. It is clear, however, that something is altered [in these cases]. For virtue is either a certain impassivity or is being passive in a certain way, and vice is being passive or a passivity contrary to that of virtue. As a whole, moral virtue occurs with pleasures and pains. For it [25] either concerns pleasure according to act, or through memory, or from hope. If, therefore, [it concerns pleasure] according to act, the cause is sense; if through memory of from hope, it is from this same sense, for the pleasure is either by remembering such things as we suffered or by hoping we will suffer such things. [28]

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11. Aristotles definitions of toward something (pros ti). According to Cat., ch. 7 (6a 36-37): But those things are called toward something which are, as such, said to be of another thing, or toward something else in some other way.
Pro/j ti de\ ta/ toiau=ta le/getai, o(/sa au)ta\ a(/per e)sti\n e(te/rwn ei)=nai le/getai, h)\ o(pwsou=n a)/llwj pro\j e(/teron.

According to Cat., ch. 7 (6b 3-4): For all the things mentioned are, as such, said to be of another thing, or toward something else in some other way, and not anything else.
Pa/nta ga\r ta\ ei)reme/na au)ta\ a(/per e)sti\n e(te/rwn ei)=nai le/getai < , h)\

o(pwsou=n a)/llwj pro\j e(/teron > kai\ ou)k a)/llo ti.

According to Cat., ch. 7 (6b 6-8): Accordingly, toward something are whatever are, as such, said to be of another thing, or toward something else in some other way.
Pro/j ti ou)=n e)sti\n o(/sa au)ta a(/per e)sti\n e(terwn ei)=nai le/getai, h)\ o(pwsou=n a)/llwj pro\j e(/teron.

According to Cat., ch. 7, (8a 32-33): Rather toward something are those things for which the being is the same as holding (= habitually maintaining) themselves to something in some way.
a)ll ) e)/sti ta\ pro/j ti oi(=j to\ ei)=nai tau)to/n e)sti t%= pro/j ti pwj e)/xein.

According to Cat., ch. 7 (8a 29-37): The earlier definition does indeed follow closely upon all the things toward something, but for [each of] the things toward something the being is not the same as being said, as such, of another thing.
o( de\ pro/teroj o(rismo\j parakolouqei= me\n pa=si toi=j pro/j ti, ou) mh\n tau)to/n ge/ e)sti t%= pro/j ti au)toi=j ei)=nai to\ au)ta a(/per e)sti\n e(te/rwn le/gesqai.

According to Top., VI, 8 (146b 3): For of all the things toward something the essence <consists in being> toward another thing, since for each of the things toward something the being is the same as holding (= habitually maintaining) itself toward something in some way.
Panto\j ga\r tou= pro/j ti h( ou)si/a pro\j e(/teron, e)peidh\ tau)to\n h)=n e(ka/st % tw=n pro/j ti to\ ei)=nai o(/per to\ pro/j ti/ pwj e)/xein.

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12. Aristotles definitions of things opposed as toward something. According to Cat, ch. 10 (11b 24-25): Accordingly, whatever things are opposed as toward something are, as such, said of opposites, or in some other way toward those things.
(/Osa me\n ou)=n %(j ta\ a)nti/keitai, au)ta\ a(/per e)sti\ tw=n a)ntikeime/nwn le/getai h)\ o(pwsou=n a)/llwj pro\j au)ta/.

According to Cat., ch. 10 (11b 30-31): Whatever things, then, are opposed as toward something are, as such, said of another thing, or are said in some other way toward (= with regard to) each other.
o(/sa ou)=n a)nti/keitai w(j ta\ pro\j ti, au)ta\ a(/per e)sti\n e(te/rwn le/getai h)\ o(pwsdh/pote pro\j a)/llela le/getai.

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13. Definitions of toward something (ad aliquid) according to St. Thomas Aquinas. According to Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 8, art. 2, obj.; cf. In I Sent., dist. 33, q. 1, art. 1: Further, those things are called toward something whose being is to hold themselves to something else. Praeterea, ad aliquid dicuntur quorum esse est ad aliud se habere. Understood as what is relative secundum esse or according to being: (1) For sometimes a name is imposed in order to signify the relationship itself, as is the name lord and the like, which are relatives secundum esse. (In I Sent., dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2, c.) Aliquando enim nomen imponitur ad significandum ipsam habitudinem; sicut hoc nomen dominus, et hujusmodi, quae sunt relativa secundum esse. (2) Certain relatives have been imposed in order to signify the relative habitudes (or relationships) themselves, as are lord, servant, father, and son and the like, and these are called relatives secundum esse. (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 7, ad 1) Relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas habitudines relativas, ut dominus, servus, pater et filius, et huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa secundum esse. (3) Some name may imply a respect in two ways. In one way such that the name is imposed in order to signify the respect itself, as does the name father, or son, or fatherhood itself. (Qu. Disp. de Ver., q. 21, art. 6, c.) Aliquod nomen potest respectum importare dupliciter. Uno modo sic quod nomen imponatur ad significandum ipsum respectum, sicut hoc nomen pater, vel filius, aut paternitas ipsa. Understood as what is relative secundum dici or according to being said. (1) But sometimes a name is imposed in order to signify that upon which a relationship is founded, just as the name knowledge, a quality upon which follows a certain respect to a knowable thing. (In I Sent., dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2, c.)

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Aliquando autem nomen imponitur ad significandum illud supra quod fundatur habitudo, sicut hoc nomen scientia, qualitatem, quam consequitur respectus quidam ad scibile. (2) But some [names] have been imposed in order to signify the things upon which certain relationships follow, like mover and the thing moved, head and the thing having the head, and others of the sort, which are called relatives secundum dici. (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 7, ad 1) Quaedam vero sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam habitudines, sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secundum dici. (3) But some names are said to imply a respect because they signify a thing belonging to some genus which a respect follows upon, albeit the name is not imposed in order to signify the respect itself, just as the name knowledge has been imposed in order to signify a certain quality upon which a certain respect follows, but not in order to signify the respect itself. (Qu. Disp. de Ver., q. 21, art. 6, c.) Quaedam vero nomina dicuntur importare respectum, quia significant rem alicuius generis, quam comitatur respectus, quamvis nomen non sit impositum ad ipsum respectum significandum; sicut hoc nomen scientia est impositum ad significandum qualitatem quamdam, quam sequitur quidam respectus, non autem ad significandum respectum ipsum.

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14. On ad aliquid according to St. Thomas Aquinas. (1) I reply that it must be said that among all Catholics it is certain that relations exist in the divine. But in the placing of relations [in God], diverse opinions of the doctors are found. Some, like the followers of Porretanus, said that relations in the divine are merely attached [assistentes]. But some said that relations in the divine are the Persons themselves, and that when they are signified in the abstract this is only on account of the manner of speaking, just as we say I beseech your benevolence, that is, you [to be] benign. And in the same way are to be explained all the expressions in which relations or properties are said in the abstract. Others say that relations are the Persons and are in the Persons according to the truth of the thing, and not only with regard to the manner of speaking. And all of these [doctors] have expressed something of the truth. Nevertheless, the last opinion contains the whole truth. In order to understand this, it must be understood that, as was said above (dist. 8, quaest. 4, art. 3), in relation, as in every accident, there are two things to consider, namely, its own being [esse suam], according as it places something in it [i.e. its subject], according as it is an accident; and its own account [ rationem suum], according to which it is referred to something else, on account of which it is located in a determinate genus. And from this account it does not entail the placing of something in that of which it is said, [unlike] all the other absolute forms [which] by reason of their very own accounts do entail the placing of something in that [of] which they are said. And so there are found certain relations placing nothing in that of which they are said. And some philosophers, paying attention to this, said that relation is not some one genus of beings, nor is it something in the nature of things, but it is merely a certain respect found here and there [ respersus] in all beings, and that relations are of second intentions [sunt de intentionibus secundis] which do not have being except in the soul, with which also the opinion of the followers of Porretanus appears to agree. But this is false, since nothing which is merely a being in the soul is located in a determinate genus. And so distinctions must be made between relations. For there are some which possess something in reality upon which their being is founded, as equality is founded on quantity. And relations of this sort are really something in the thing [i.e. of which they are said]. But there are some which do not have a foundation in the thing of which they are said, as right and left in those things in which these determinate positions do not exist according to nature, as they do in the parts of animals. For in that case, namely, in the animal, those relations really exist because they are founded in different virtues [powers] of the determinate parts; but in other things they do not exist except according to the account of a habitude [relationship] of one thing to another, and so they are called relations of reason. And this happens in four ways, namely, that they are relations of reason and not of the thing [sint relationes rationis, et non rei]. In one way, as has been said in this article just above, when a relation does not possess something in the nature of the thing upon which it is founded: and for this reason it sometimes happens that a relation is really in one thing and not in another, since in the one it has a certain motion upon which it is founded, which it does not have in the other; just as

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in all those relations by which God is referred to creatures, which, in fact, are really in creatures, but not in God. In a second way when the relation does not involve some real diversity between the extremes, as in a relation of identity; and so this places nothing with regard to the thing, but only with regard to reason, as when a thing is said to be the same as itself. In a third way when some relation of a being is designated [ designatur, i.e. referred] to a non-being, as when it is said that we are prior to those who are to come: for this priority is not some relation with regard to the thing, but only with regard to reason, since a real relation requires both extremes in act. In a fourth way when a relation is posited of a relation: for the relation itself is referred by itself [per seipsam] and not by another relation. And so in creatures fatherhood is not conjoined to a subject by some intermediate relation. And Avicenna gives these last two ways; but the first two may be drawn from the words of the Philosopher. Accordingly, since these relations, fatherhood and sonship, have some foundation in the thing, namely, the nature itself, which is shared according to a sharing of the nature, it cannot be denied that they really exist in God. And by reason of the simplicity they are the same as the Persons in which they exist, and by reason of the truth of relations they must be signified in another way. Therefore the first [group of men], paying attention in relations only to that which is toward another and not to the foundation which they have in the thing, said the relations are attached, as if coming from [advenientes] a habitude [relationship] belonging to another thing. The second, paying attention to the foundation belonging to the thing and to the divine simplicity, said that the relations are not in the Persons, but rather are the Persons themselves. But the third, considering both, said that they are in the Persons by reason of the true account of relation, and that nevertheless they are the Persons by reason of the simplicity, just as deity is in God, and nevertheless is God. ( In I Sent., dist. 26, q. 2, art. 1, c.) (2) I reply that it must be said that, having supposed that relations exist in the divine, it is necessary to say that they are the divine essence, otherwise one would have to hold that there is composition in God, and that relations in the divine are accidents, because everything inhering in something beyond its substance is an accident. It would also be necessary that some things be eternal which will not be the divine substance, all of which are heretical. Accordingly, to see that this is so, it must be understood that among the nine genera which are contained under accident, some are signified in accordance with the ratio of an accident: for the ratio of an accident is to be in; and so I maintain that those things are signified in the manner of an accident which are signified as inherent in another, like quantity and quality; for quantity is signified as belonging to that in which it is, and likewise quality. But toward something [ad aliquid] is not signified in accordance with the ratio of an accident: for it is not signified as something of [= belonging to] that in which it is, but as to that which is outside. And on this account the Philosopher also says that knowledge, insofar as it is a relation, is not of the knower, but of the knowable. And so some men, paying attention to the mode of signifying in relatives, have said they do not inhere in substances, as, so to speak, being attached to them [eis assistentia]: because they are signified as a sort of intermediate between the substance which refers, and that to which it refers. And from this it would follow that in created things relations are not 22

accidents, because the being of an accident is to be in. And so certain theologians, for instance, the followers of Porretanus, have extended an opinion of this sort even to the divine relation, saying that the relations are not in the Persons, but are, so to speak, attached to them [eis quasi assistere]. And because the divine essence is in the Persons, it would follow that relations are not the divine essence; and because every accident inheres, it would follow that they would not be accidents. And they understood in accordance with this the words brought in from Augustine, namely, that relations are not predicated of God with regard to substance, nor with regard to accident. But upon this opinion it follows that relation is not some thing, but only according to reason: for everything is either a substance or an accident. Wherefore some of the ancients also held that relations are of second things understood [esse de secundis intellectis], as the Commentator says in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics. And so it was also necessary for the followers of Porretanus to say that the divine relations do not exist except according to reason. And thus it would follow that the distinction of Persons will not be real, which is heretical. And so it must be said that nothing prevents something from being inhering, although it is not signified as inhering, as even action is not signified as in the agent, but as from the agent, and yet it is undeniable that action is in the agent. And likewise, although something is not signified as inhering, still it is necessary that it be inhering. And this is when the relation is some thing; but when it is merely according to reason, in that case it is not inhering. And just as there must be accidents in created things, so there must be substance in God, because whatever is in God is His substance. And so relations with regard to the thing [secundum rem, = in reality] must be the divine substance, which, nevertheless, do not have the manner of a substance, but have another manner of predicating from those things which are predicated in God. ( Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 8. art. 2, c.) (3) To the twelfth it must be said that since relation is an accident in creatures, its being is to be in [esse suum est inesse]; and so its being is not to have itself toward something else [ad aliud se habere]; but to be of this [sed esse huius, i.e. to belong to this] according as [it is] toward something [secundum quod ad aliquid], is to be an order possessed toward something else. (Qu. Disp. De Pot., q. 8, art. 2, ad 12) (4) But toward something [ad aliquid], even according to the account of the genus, does not imply any dependence on the subject; on the contrary, it is referred [ refertur] to something outside: and so it is found in the divine even according to the account of the genus. (In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 4, art. 3, c.) (5) Although relation is placed in God, it nevertheless does not follow that there is in God something having a dependent being. For in us relations have a dependent being since their being is other than the being of the substance. And so they have a proper mode of being according to a proper account, just as happens in the other accidents. For, since all the accidents are certain forms added onto the substance and caused by the principles of 23

the substance, their being must be added on over and above the being of the substance, and depending on it. And the more the being of each of them is prior or posterior, the more the accidental form, with regard to its proper account, will be nearer to the substance and more perfect. For this reason a relation really coming to a substance has a being both last in order [postremus] and most imperfect [imperfectissimum]: last in order, in fact, since not only does it require the being of the substance, but also the being of the other accidents by virtue of which [ex] the relation is caused, just as [being] one in quantity causes equality, and [being] one in quality [causes] likeness; but the most imperfect because the proper account of relation consists in the fact that it is toward another [ad alterum], and so its proper being, which it adds on to a substance, not only depends on the being of the substance, but also on the being of something exterior. (Summa Contra Gentes, III [IV], lect. 14, n. 12) (6) Further, the weaker in being something is, the more repugnant it is to the highest perfection. But among all the other beings relation has the weakest being, as the Commentator says. And so it is also founded on all the other beings, as equality is founded on quantity, and so on in the case of the others. Therefore, since relation is found in the divine, with much greater reason are the other predicaments [found there]. To the fourth it must be said that the weakness in being of relation is considered according to its inherence in a subject, the reason being that it does not place something absolute in the subject, but [it places something in the subject] merely through a respect to something else. And so that it come into the divine predication belongs to it from this because the less it adds, the less repugnant it is to the divine simplicity. ( In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 4, art. 3, obj. 4, ad 4) (7) To the sixteenth it must be said that, while the other genera, insofar as they are of this sort, place something in the nature of things (for quantity from the very fact that it is quantity bespeaks something [in the nature of things 11]), only relation, by the fact that it is of this sort, does not entail the placing of something in the nature of things, since it does not predicate something, but toward something. And so there are found certain relations which place nothing in the nature of things, but in reason alone, which, in fact, happens in four ways, as one may gather from the words of the Philosopher and Avicenna. In one way, as when something is referred to itself, as when it is said a thing is the same as itself; for if this relation were to place something in the nature of things in addition to that which is called the same, there would be a process to infinity in relations, since the very relation through which something would be called the same would be the same as itself through some relation, and so on to infinity. Second, when the relation itself is referred to something. For it cannot be said that fatherhood is referred to its subject by some intermediate relation, since that intermediate relation would also need another intermediate relation, and so on to infinity. And so that relation which is signified in the comparison of fatherhood to a subject does not exist in the nature of things, but in reason alone.
11

As, for instance, we speak of the size of Socrates, where of Socrates is a subjective genitive.

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Third, when one of the relatives depends on the other and not the other way around, just as knowledge depends on the object of knowledge and not the other way around; and so the relation of knowledge to the object of knowledge is something in the nature of things, but not the relation of the object of knowledge to knowledge, which exists in reason alone. Fourth, when being is compared to non-being, as when we say that we are prior to those who are to come after us in the future; otherwise it would follow that there could be infinite relations in the same thing, if generation were to be infinitely extended in the future. Accordingly, when all is said and done, it is apparent from two things that that relation of priority places nothing in the nature of things, but rather only in the understanding, both because God does not depend on creatures, and because such a priority bespeaks a comparison of being to non-being. And so from this it does not follow that there is some eternal truth other than in the divine intellect, which alone is eternal, and this is the first truth. (Qu. Disp. de Ver., q. 1, art. 5, ad 16) (8) I reply that it must be said that certain names implying a relation to the creature are said of God temporally and not from eternity. To see that this is so, it must be understood that some people held the opinion that relation is not a thing of nature, but rather of reason alone. This, indeed, appears to be false, from the fact that things themselves have a natural order and relationship to each other. Nevertheless, it must be understood that, since a relation requires two extremes, there are three ways in which it [an extreme] can stand in regard to being a thing of nature and of reason. For sometimes on either side it is of reason alone, when, namely, an order or relationship cannot exist between certain things except according to the apprehension of reason alone, as when we say that a thing is the same as itself. For according as the intellect apprehends some one thing twice, it establishes it as two; and thus it apprehends a certain relationship of it to itself. And the case is similar with all the relations which exist between being and non-being, which reason forms insofar as it apprehends non-being as a certain extreme. And it is the same with all the relations which follow upon an act of reason, like genus and species, and the like. But some relations, with respect to either extreme, are things of nature, which is the case when there is a relationship between some two things according to something really belonging to both. This is clear with all the relations which follow upon quantity, like large and small, double and half, and the like, for quantity exists in both extremes. And it is similar with relations which follow upon action and passion, as mover and mobile, father and son., and similar things. But sometimes the relation in one extreme is a thing of nature, but in the other is of reason alone. And this happens when the two extremes do not belong to one order. For instance, sensation and knowledge are referred to the sensible and the knowable, which, insofar as they are certain things existing in natural being, are outside the order of the sensible and the intelligible. And so in knowledge and in sensation there is a real relation, according as it is ordered to knowing or sensing a thingbut the things themselves considered in themselves are outside an order of this sort. And so in them there is not really some relation to knowledge and to sensation, but rather according to reason alone, 25

insofar as the intellect apprehends them as the terms of a relation to knowledge and to sensation. And so the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Metaphysics that they are not called relative because they are referred to other things, but because other things are referred to them. And likewise right is not said of a column except insofar as animal is placed to the right, and so a relation of this sort is not really in the column, but rather in the animal. Accordingly, since God is outside the whole order of creatures, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not the other way around, it is obvious that creatures are really referred to God Himselfbut in God there is not some relation of His to creatures, but rather according to reason alone, insofar as creatures are referred to Him. And so nothing prevents names of this sort implying a relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of a change in the creature, just as a column comes to be to the right of an animal with no change existing about it, but rather when the animal has passed. (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 7) 15. On relation as an order possessed toward something according to In III Physic., lect. 1, n. 6. The third division is of one genus of being, namely, what is toward something. For motion appears to pertain to this genus in some way, insofar as the mover is referred to the mobile. Accordingly, in order to understand this third division, one must consider that, since relation has the weakest being, because it consists solely in the fact that it holds itself toward something else [ad aliud se habere], it must be founded on some other accident; the reason for this being that the more perfect accidents 12 are closer to substance, and through their mediation the other accidents are in substance. Now relation is chiefly founded on two things, which possess an order to something else [quae habent ordinem ad aliud], namely, quantity and action: for quantity can also be a measure of something outside; but the agent pours out its action into something else. And so certain relations are founded on quantity, and especially on number, to which the first notion of measure belongs, as is clear in double and half, multiple and submultiple, and in other things of the sort. Moreover, the same and the like and the equal are founded on unity, which is the principle [beginning, starting point] of number. But the other relations are founded on action and passion: either according to the act itself, as heating [calefaciens] is said toward what is heated [ calefactum]; or according to that which has acted, as a father is referred to his son because he has begotten him; or according to the power of acting, as a lord [master] [is referred to] to a servant [slave] because he can compel him. The Philosopher explains this division clearly in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (V, 15, 1020b 26); but here he touches on it briefly, saying that one sort of toward something [relative] is according to excess and defect; which in fact is founded on quantity, as double and half: but the other is according to the active and passive, and the able-to-move and the mobile, which are referred to each other, as is clear through themselves.

12

St. Thomas refers to quantity and quality as the more perfect accidents because they are intrinsic and absolute, as he explains in many places.

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16. On the three ways in which one thing is ordered to another according to In V Meta., lect. 17, nn. 1-5. n. 1 Here the Philosopher determines about toward something: and with respect to this he does two things. First, he puts down the modes of those things which are towards something according to themselves [secundum se]. Second, [he gives the modes] of those things which are toward something by reason of another thing, at But those things because of their genera [are said toward something]. With respect to this he does two things. First, he enumerates the modes of those things which are said toward something according to themselves. Second, he proceeds (to treat) of them at, The first things, however. He therefore puts down three modes of those things which are said toward something, the first of which is with regard to number and quantity, like double to half, and triple to a third part, and the multipliedthat is, the multipleto a part of the multiplied that is, to the submultipleand the containing to the contained. But the containing is taken for what exceeds with regard to quantity. For everything exceeding with regard to quantity contains in itself what is exceeded. For it is this and more besides, just as five contains in itself four, and three cubits contains in itself two. n. 2 The second mode is according as some things are said toward something with regard to action and passion, or an active and passive potencyjust as what can heat [calefactivum] to what can be heated [calefactibile],13 which pertains to natural actions, and what can cut [sectivum] to what can be cut [sectible], which pertains to actions having to do with art, and universally, everything active with regard to the passive. n. 3 The third mode is according as what is measurable is said toward a measure. But a measure and what is measurable are taken here not with regard to quantity (for this pertains to the first mode, in which either one is said toward the other: for the double is said toward the half, and the half toward the double), but with regard to the measurement of being and truth. For the truth of knowledge is measured by the knowable. For from the fact that a thing is or is not, speech [about it] is known [to be] true or false, and not the other way around. And it is similar in the case of the sensible and sensation. And for this reason a measure is not said toward what is measurable mutually and conversely, as is the case in the other modes, but only what is measurable to the measure. And likewise also an image is said toward that of which it is the image, 14 as what is measurable to the measure. For the truth of an image is measured by the thing of which it is an image. n. 4 But the rationale of these modes is this. For, since a relation which is in things15 consists in a certain order of one thing to another, there must be as many modes of this sort of relation as there are ways in which one thing happens to be ordered to another. But one thing is ordered to another either with regard to being, according as the being of one thing depends on another, and thus there is the third modeor with regard to an active and passive virtue, according as one thing is received from another or contributes
13

What can heat being an active, what can be heated a passive power, the action proceeding from the former being heating, the passion proceeding from the latter, being heated. 14 That is, the exemplar, as St. Thomas will explain below. 15 That is, a real relation, as opposed to a relation of reason.

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something to another, and thus there is the second modeor according as the quantity of one thing can be measured by another, and thus there is the first mode. n. 5 Now the quality of a thing, as such, looks to nothing except the subject in which it exists. And so with regard to it, one thing is not ordered to another except insofar as a quality takes on the character of a passive or an active power, insofar as it is the starting point of an action or a passion. Or [one thing is ordered to another] by reason of quality, or of something pertaining to quality, just as something is called whiter than another, or just as that which has some one quality is called like [another thing which has the same quality]. But the other genera follow on a relation rather than being able to cause a relation. For [the predicament] when consists in some relation to time. But where, to place. But position implies an order of parts. But habit [possession], a relation of the one having to the thing had. 17. The three meanings of being and the definition of toward something or relation according to In I Sent., dist. 33, q. 1, art. 1 ad. 1. To the first it must be said that these relations are not only toward something according to being said,16 but also according to being. But it must be understood that being is said in three ways. In one way being means the very whatness or nature of a thing, just as it is said that a definition is speech signifying what the being is; for a definition signifies the whatness of a thing. In another way being means the act itself of the essence, just as living, which is being to living things, is an act of the soulnot second act, which is an operation, but first act. In a third way being means what signifies the truth of a composition in propositions, according as is means the copula: and in this respect it is in the intellect composing and dividing with respect to its completionbut it is founded in the being of the thing, which is the act of the essence, just as above it was stated of truth (dist. 19, quaest. 5, art. 1). I say, therefore, that when it is said: toward something are those things the being of which is to hold themselves toward something else , it is understood of the being which is the whatness of the thing, which is signified by the definitionthe reason being that the very nature of relation through which it is constituted in such a genus, is to be referred to something else, and it is not understood of the being which is the act of the essence, for relation has this being from the things which cause it in the subject, according to which being it is not referred to something else but to a subject, as is the case with any accident. 18. On toward something with respect to naming. (1) The kind of name that is apt for being imposed on later meanings is one the most formal (or most proper) part of whose first meaning is not too bound up in some proper matter. E.g. in I Q28 A1, St Thomas says that relation can be extended to a new meaning as said of God, since what is formal in the old meaning is not that it is in something as in a
16

Here secundum dici is taken largo modo to include both secundum dici and secundum esse.

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subject (since it has this in common with all the other accidents), but that it is toward another. (Michael A. Augros, Scrapboo. 2, Logic, n. 6) (2) Some names are for things so bound up in matter or in some particular thing, that even what is formal in the meaning of the word signifies that thing, and so makes the word inapt to be reasonably imposed on another thing not having that formality. E.g. rock has even what is formal to it the notion of matter, since it is hard, etc. Hence, it cannot be imposed upon God properly, since God has no matter at all, and His indestructibility and endurance stem precisely from His immateriality. But relation has only in what is material to it that it is an accident, something of another (since it has this in common with other genera as well), but what is formal to it is that it is to another, for which reason this word is apt to be imposed on the distinction of persons in the divine nature (as St Thomas does in the treatise on the Trinity). (Michael A. Augros, Scrapboo.2, Logic, n. 13) 19. On the being of a relation in sum. According to the foregoing texts, the being of a relation is not to hold itself toward something else simply; but it is to be of this (i.e. of its subject) according as it (namely, the subject) is toward something elsethat is, the being of a relation is to belong to something according as that thing is toward something else. Now it is toward something else when it is possessed as an order to it; but one thing is possessed as an order to another either with regard to being, according as the being of one thing depends on another; or with regard to an active and passive virtue, according as one thing is received from another or contributes something to another; or according as the quantity of one thing can be measured by another (cf. In V. Meta., lect. 17, n. 4). In the first two cases, where the relatives are secundum esse, the term of the relation is required to exist at the same time as its foundation exists in its subject, but not in the third, where the relatives are secundum dici. But, assuming it is real, a relation is in a subject by virtue of the being of the subject in which it inheres: for there are, of course, some relations which place nothing in a thing, their existence depending solely on the consideration of the mind, for which reason they are called relations of reason. Unlike every other accident, then, in order to be, a relation secundum esse depends on the simultaneous existence of its term, and therefore places in its subject only a respect to something outside, and not something absolute. (Another way of saying this is to say that a relation does not predicate something, but toward something, as is further explained below.) And it is for this reason that a relation is said to have the weakest being. In light of this unique nature, therefore, with respect to its mode of signifying a relation signifies not as in that in which it inheres (which is its own being), but as toward that which is outside (which is its own account) (cf. In I Sent., dist. 33, q. 1, art. 1 ad. 1); as, for instance, we say knowledge is of the knowable and not of the knower, and hence the name of the relative signifies not as of its subject, but as toward its term. 20. On predicating something vs. predicating toward something (cf. Qu. Disp. de Ver., q. 1, art. 5, ad 16). 29

To predicate something is to place something absolute in a subject. But to predicate toward something is to place something relative in a subjectthat is, it is to place in a subject only a respect to something else. To take some examples: To say Socrates is six feet tall (which is to predicate something of Socrates, namely, six feet tall) is to place something absolute in Socrates, namely, a quantity. To say Socrates is the husband of Xanthippe (which is to predicate toward something with respect to Socrates, namely, being the husband of Xanthippe) is to place something relative in Socrates, namely, a respect to something else. 21. The division of toward something according to its foundation. (1) Some things are said toward something ( pros ti)17 according to themselves, like double and half, and triple to a third part, and in general what is multiplied to a part of what is multiplied, and what exceeds to what is exceeded. And in another way, as what heats to what can be heated, and what cuts to what can be cut; and in general everything active to everything passive. And in another way, as what is measurable to a measure, and what is knowable to knowledge, and what is sensible to sensation. (Aristotle, Meta., V, ch. 15, 1020b 2632, tr. John P. Rowan, rev. B.A.M.) (1) Further, those things are called toward something the being of which is to be an order possessed toward something else.18 Understood as what is relative secundum dici or according to being said, (1) A name imposed in order to signify that upon which a relationship is founded.19 (2) But some [names] have been imposed in order to signify the things upon which certain relationships follow.20 (3) But some names are said to imply a respect because they signify a thing belonging to some genus which a respect follows upon.21

17 18

That is, Aristotle determines about the things which we call relatives. Praeterea, ad aliquid dicuntur quorum esse est ad aliud se habere . (St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 8, art. 2, obj. 12 tr. B.A.M.; cf. In I Sent., dist. 33, q. 1, art. 1). 19 Nomen imponitur ad significandum illud supra quod fundatur habitudo . (St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2, c., tr. B.A.M.) 20 Quaedam vero sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam habitudines . (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 7, ad 1, tr. B.A.M.) 21 Quaedam vero nomina dicuntur importare respectum, quia significant rem alicuius generis, quam comitatur respectus. (St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Ver., q. 21, art. 6, c, tr. B.A.M.)

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Understood as what is relative secundum esse or according to being, (1) A name is imposed in order to signify the relationship itself.22 (2) Certain relatives have been imposed in order to signify the relative habitudes (or relationships) themselves.23 (2) A name imposed in order to signify the respect itself.24 22. On things called toward something (pros ti legetai, ad aliquid dicuntur) which, as such, are said to be of another thing, or toward something else in some other way. (1) But those things are called25 toward something26 which, as such,27 are said to be28 of another thing, or toward something else29 in some other way. For instance, the greater as such is said of another thing; for it is called greater than something; 30 and the double as such is said of another thing; for it is called double of something. It is the same with whatever other things are of this sort. And the following are toward something as well: for instance, habit, disposition, knowledge, sensation, position. For all the things mentioned are, as such, said to be of another thing, or toward something else in some other way, and not anything else. 31 For a habit is called a habit of something, and knowledge the knowledge of something, and position the position of something, and likewise with the others. Accordingly, toward something are whatever are, as such, said to be of another thing, or toward something else in some other way. For instance, a large mountain is said toward (with regard to) something else. For it is called large toward (with regard to) something. [10] And the similar is called similar to something. And likewise all such things are called toward something. (Categories, 7, 6a 366b 11, tr. B.A.M.) (2)
22

Nomen imponitur ad significandum ipsam habitudinem . (St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2, c., tr. B.A.M.) 23 Relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas habitudines relativas . (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 7, ad 1, tr. B.A.M.) 24 Nomen imponatur ad significandum ipsum respectum . (St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Ver., q. 21, art. 6, c, tr. B.A.M.) 25 are called, le/getai (Lat. dicuntur). 26 toward something (or with respect to something, or to something, etc.), pro/j ti (Lat. ad aliquid). 27 as such, a(/per e)sti\n, lit. insofar as they are (Lat. inquantum sunt). 28 are said to be, ei)=nai le/getai (Lat. esse dicuntur). 29 toward something else, a)/lloj pro\j (Lat. ad aliud). 30 In the original Greek, Aristotles example is expressed in the genitive case, whereas in the equivalent English expression the preposition of is not used: for we say that something is greater than another thing, not that it is greater of it. Aristotles second example, however, does work in English in this regard, for we do say the double is double of something. Hence, in order to illustrate Aristotles two cases, all one need do is reverse the order of his examples. 31 Does this mean that the kinds of relatives mentioned are all there are?

31

If, therefore, the definition of those things which are toward something were adequately assigned, it is extremely [30] difficult or impossible to show that no substance is said toward something. If, however, it were not adequately (assigned), but rather toward something are those things for which the being32 is the same as holding (maintaining) itself 33 toward something in some way, perhaps something might be said (in answer) to these (difficulties). The earlier definition does indeed follow closely upon 34 [35] all the things toward something, but for [each of]35 the things toward something the being is not the same as being said, as such, of another thing. (Categories, 7, 8a 29-37, tr. B.A.M.) (3) For of all the things toward something the essence (consists in being) toward another thing, since for each of the things toward something the being is the same as being an order a thing has to something in some way. (Top., VI, 8, 146b 3, tr. B.A.M.)

32 33

for which the being, to\ ei)=nai tau)to/n. holding (maintaining) itself e)/xein (Lat. se habere). 34 follow closely upon, parakolouqei=. 35 I have added these words in view of the definition found in the Topics, where this exact phrase (namely, for each of the things which) is found.

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Supplement: Duane. H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories. Cf. (CAT.6) 6/24/96: Lets turn now to the frightening Chapter 7. I think we should try to understand Chapter 7 by itself before we try to understand why it is before Chapter 8. I might mention at this point that when he takes up quantity, quality, and relation in the Metaphysics, the order is just that: quantity, quality, relation or toward something. Its not the same order as here. Lets save that question about the order until we have gone through the chapter itself, which will take us most of today. The division of Chapter 7 is somewhat like the divisions of substance and quantity. You talk about relation itself, and then you talk about the properties of it. But, in a way, he does this twice. He gives a first definition of toward something, or relation, and then he gives about four properties. You say O.K., this is the same thing he does in the other chapters more or less. But then theres a second part which begins with a difficulty with the definition he had been using up to this point, and then he solves the difficulty by another definition, a new definition of toward something. And he very briefly compares that new definition with the old one in terms of universality. Then after the second definition of toward something, he brings in one more property, which is more clearly seen after the second definition. Then he ends the chapter with a kind of warning that one shouldnt be too emphatic or too affirmative about these things without having considered them many times, as if hes leaving a few things up in the air more so than in some of the other chapters. Well touch upon what he leaves up in the air. The first thing you have to understand is not so much the properties, but the difference between the two definitions, and the distinction among relations that is involved in the two definitions. The distinction in the two definitions seems to be like one of the universal distinctions that Thomas Aquinas makes in regard to relations. There are two universal divisions or distinctions that Thomas Aquinas makes of all relations. We should compare them a bit with what we have here. What Ive done on the left side of the board, here, is translated carefully the first definition, which is at the very beginning of the chapter, and then the second definition that he gives after he raises the problem that according to this first definition even hand and foot would be relations. [1] Those are said to be toward something which, as regards what they are, are said to be of another or in some other way toward another. [2] Those are toward something whose being is toward something in some way. There are some key words in these definitions, and because of those key words, people think that the difference between the two definitions might be the same as one that Thomas Aquinas makes. Thomas speaks of the relativa secundum dici, relatives in terms of speaking. But what does that mean? Ill warn you right now, that is commonly misunderstood. In fact, in some places hell mention this common misunderstanding in answer to objections. But Ill give you first the names that Thomas uses: relativa secundum dici and relativa secundum esse. In one case you say dici and in another case you say esse, and people say this seems like the same thing that Aristotle is doing in Chapter 7. And certainly there is a likeness in the words, and as 33

well see, theres a connection between the two. But its not exactly the same, and Ill explain the difference after weve talked about this division. Now, theres a second division of all relations. The second division is even more difficult: all relations are either real relations, or relations of reason. Some people hear of this, and say This is the same as the other division Thomas makes. They say in one case youre talking about esse, and here youre talking about real, and doesnt that mean the same thing. And in the one case youre talking about dici, being said, and isnt that something like relation of reason? Well Thomas in many places has to warn you: no. The first distinction has nothing to do with the second distinction. The first distinction, between the relatives secundum esse and secundum dici, doesnt tell you whether its a real relation or a relation of reason. And the second distinction, between real relations and relations of reason, doesnt tell you whether its a relation secundum esse or secundum dici. These are two entirely different divisions, although both are universal. They are divisions or distinctions of all relations. An example of a relation of reason would be to say that Socrates is the same as himself. Lets put up a square of examples to show you that these are not the same: double and half father and son knowledge power Socrates is same as himself genus and species relativa secundum esse, real relations relativa secundum dici, real relations

relativa secundum esse, relation of reason

[NB. The fourth combination, relativa secundum dici, relation of reason, is impossible since every relation of reason is secundum esse by definition, there being no ens reale in ens rationis.] With the genus and the species, youre thinking of the relation of man to Socrates and Plato and Aristotle, or the relation of animal to man and dog and cat. What would be an example of the last case, in which something is relativa secundum dici, but also a relation of reason? It is harder to find an example there. But from the examples we have, we see that the distinction between the relativa secundum esse and the relativa secundum dici doesnt tell you whether its a real relation or a relation of reason. Now, what is the distinction between the relativa secundum dici and the relativa secundum esse? When Thomas explains that, he does so in terms of names. Here is one particular text which is quite clear about this. Its from the De Potentia, Question 7, Article 10, Ad11: This distinction of relatives according to esse and secundum dici, makes nothing to this that it be a real relation, for some things are relative secundum esse, which are not real. Such as right and left in the column. And some are relative secundum dici, which nevertheless imply real relations, such as scientia and sense.

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So he first of all has to warn you its not the same division as the other one into real and of reason. And he says They are said to be relatives secundum esse when the names are imposed to signifying the relations themselves. Relatives secundum dici when the names are imposed to signifying qualities or something of this sort chiefly, to which nevertheless there follows relations. This is going to be very important later on when we try to resolve why the chapter on relation comes before the chapter on quality. Hes distinguishing these in terms of the names. In the case of the relatives secundum dici the name is placed chiefly upon something other than a relation, something that is chiefly a quality, or perhaps something else, but he mentions quality in particular. So knowledge, for example, is going to be in the first species of quality, episteme in the Greek, or scientia in the Latin. Power is in the second species of quality. But there is some kind of relation that follows upon these things. It is the power to do something, it is the knowledge of something. And that relation is something real about it; you really have the power to do something. But the name is chiefly placed upon the quality itself. But in the case of relatives secundum esse, the name is being placed chiefly upon or only upon the relation itself, whether it be a real relation or a relation of reason. Now father is not a relation secundum dici even though it names a substance in some way, since father is not meant to name, chiefly, my being a man. And so I use the word father or mother even of the other animals, and I use the word father even of God. Its placed upon the relation itself, while the relativa secundum dici are placed upon something that is chiefly a quality but it has relation following upon itself necessarily. So knowledge is knowledge of something, but the word knowledge basically names a disposition of my mind or reason. My mind has been formed, you might say, by the knowledge. Thats the way Thomas puts it: nomina sunt imposita ad significandas qualitates, vel aliquid huiusmodi principaliter, ad quae tamen consequuntur relationes. Thats the distinction he makes. The name knowledge is placed chiefly upon a quality in my mind. And so youre going to put knowledge in quality, but the relation following upon it you might say that pertains to the category of toward something. These are the terms youll find in Thomas, and thats the distinction hes making, and it will have something to do with the difference between the two definitions in Aristotle. But it wont be exactly the same, well see. Ill give a couple of texts where he touches upon this. Another place, where hes talking about scientia, is in the first book of the Sentences Distinction 30 Question 1 Article 2 Solution. Hes talking about the name scientia, science, knowledge, the same one Aristotle has in the text. Whence such [namely things like scientia] are not relativa secundum esse, but only secundum dici. Whence these give chiefly to understand a thing of another predicament. And consequently they imply a relation. So chiefly youd put scientia in quality. Now a third text, where he gives again the example of scientia, but also the example of potentia. This is in the De Potentia Question 2 Article 2, the Body: Although the ratio of being a principle [or a beginning] which is in the genus of relation, although that belongs to potentiae, to power, nevertheless, that

35

which is the beginning of action or of passion is not a relation, but aliqua forma absoluta. Is your ability to do something a relation? Or is it something absolute and in itself? And hence it is that the Philosopher places power not in the genus of relation but of quality, just as also knowledge, although some relation happens to both. So do you see the distinction between those two kinds? So thats the distinction he makes between these two, but he warns you that it doesnt tell you whether the relation is real or of reason. Now, the distinction between real relations and relations of reason is much more difficult. It goes beyond this course. Its more proper to the wise man, the metaphysician, to talk about it. But lets talk about it a little bit, because it is sometimes confused with the last division, and it does have some relevance to what were talking about in the category of relation, the category toward something. The key text for this is in the De Potentia Question 7 Article 11 the Body. Its a text which I recommend highly, because it is the most complete text I know of in Thomas as far as distinguishing the various relations of reason. There are many kinds of those. At the same time, we can figure out from the text (with some other texts) what is required for a real relation. Im going to make a kind of conflation from what he says there and in some other places when he talks about real relations. At the same time, well see what this distinction means. To begin with, to have a real relation, you have to have two things existing outside the mind, and second they must be really distinct from each other, and third they must be really able to be ordered to each other in some way. Thomas will give the example of a relation and how it is related to its subject. Well, if you have a relation by which a relation is related to its subject, then you have a relation by which that relation is related to its subject, and so on forever. Relation is not ordered, it is really an order itself. The fourth requirement is that you have to have a foundation in the thing itself for this relation. A relation is not real because it is toward something; it has to have a foundation in the thing. Now let me go through each of those, showing you a relation that is not real. Thomas says if you say, for example, in this week, Tuesday is before Wednesday. Is that a real relation, Tuesday being before Wednesday? Its not a real relation because Tuesday and Wednesday dont both exist outside the mind. Sounds very strange, but thats what he says. How can there be a real relation between two things when either one or both of them do not exist? Thats the strange thing about time, that time would not fully be, he says in the fourth book of the Physics, without the numbering soul. So you have to have two things existing outside the soul. The second thing you have to have is that they are really distinct. I can say that Socrates is the same as Socrates. I have to admit that; I couldnt say that Socrates is other than Socrates. You are yourself, you are the same as yourself; you couldnt be other than yourself. But is that a real relation that I have to myself? Im the same as Duane Berquist, Im just like Duane Berquist, is that a real relation? No: there arent really two people there. You cant have a real relation between two things if you dont have two really distinct things in reality. For the third thing, that the one thing must be able to be ordered to the other, Thomas simply gives the example that a relation doesnt have a relation to its subject. It is not able to be ordered; it is the order there. Hes very brief there, he just gives the example of how a relation doesnt have a relation to its subject, it is the relation. The fourth thing that he says 36

about it is that it must have a foundation in things. Now what does that mean? Well, take the real relation that is most known to us that Aristotle talked about in the examples. Is there a foundation in me for my being taller than some of you or shorter than some of you? Yes, my quantity, my size. Is there something in the father by which he is toward his children? Is there some foundation? But now Thomas takes the example of left and right. Is there some foundation in me for the distinction of left and right? In the case of an animal, there is a real distinction there; Im right-handed, for example. Then Thomas gives the example of the column. If I say the column is on my left, and so I say I am to the right of the column, do you really have a left and a right in the column? I am to the columns right. Do right and left really have a foundation in the column? No. So that is not a real relation. So there is a basis in the animal for this distinction, a foundation for it, but in the case of the column there is no basis for it. So thats what you require for a relation to be real. And Thomas will say that a relation is not real because it is toward something. Its not even an accident because it is toward something. Its an accident, and it really exists, because it has a foundation in the thing. And thats the way it gets its existence. Thats very hard to see. And Aristotle is not really talking about that distinction, but nevertheless it has some relevance to what we are discussing. Then when Thomas comes to talk about relations of reason, this really gets difficult. He gives some division in the De Potentia. He talks about one kind of relation of reason that is not really said of the thing, but another kind of relation of reason that is attributed to the thing. That sounds very strange. The first kind of relation hes thinking about, is the relation, he says, that reason introduces into things understood in the state of being understood. Hell say in one way, as this order is introduced [ or found] by the intellect, and attributed to that which is relatively said. And these are the relations which are attributed by the understanding to things understood insofar as they are understood, as the relation of genus and species. And the reason introduces [or finds] these relations by considering the order of that which is in the understanding to things which are outside, or also the order of things understood to each other. Those kind of relations are not attributed to things outside the mind. The relation of species to individual, species to genus, genus to species, are not attributed to things outside the mind. So I see several men, I remember them, and I compare them, and I separate out what they have in common, and now I have a universal thought of what a man is. Now, if I compare man, this universal that I have in my head, to you individuals, and talk about the relation of this universal to you, and say its a species or a lowest species, that is a relation of reason. It belongs to man only in the reason; I dont say that outside reason there is a universal man walking around, unless Im a Platonist. Suppose I do the same thing with dog and horse and so on, and then I separate out what man and dog and horse have in common, namely animal, and I talk about the relation of man and dog and horse to animal, and I call that species, too, and then I talk about the relation of animal to man and dog and cat and I call that genus. These are relations of reason. They belong to things understood in the state of being understood, and they are not attributed to things outside. Youre relating either, as it were, one thing understood to another thing understood, or youre relating whats understood to whats out there. This is one group of relations of reason, and they are considered by the logician when he talks about genus and species and so on. These 37

are examples of one kind of relation of reason, genus and species. These are not attributed to the thing in itself: I would not say that you are a species or a genus. But in my mind, when I understand what you and other men have in common, and I compare that to you and other men, then I say it is to you as a lowest species. But when I compare it to animal, along with dog and horse and so on, I say its a species, too, but not a lowest species necessarily. But when I compare the more universal, like animal, to dog and cat and horse, I call it a genus. So these are relations introduced by the mind in understanding things and comparing what it understands to what is outside or one thing it understands to something else it understands. But theyre only in the mind; this is one group of relations of reason. Notice, theyve been touched upon a bit when we talked about genus and species and so on. But are those the relations you think Aristotle is interested in the chapter on relation or toward something? Or is he interested in real relations? Well, you might say, going back to Chapter 2 when he gave the division ton onton, the division of beings, he was implying that he is interested in real relations. We are interested in things; he is not really concerned with the relations of reason when hes dividing up the ten. Thats why, in the Metaphysics, when you distinguish the genera of beings by the genera of categories, thats considered to be a genera of real being. And all these relations of reason, they toss them in with being as true, which is of secondary concern to the wise man, because it is only in the mind. Now I come to the second group of relations of reason. This second group of relations of reason are attributed to things outside the mind. Thomas speaks of the second group as a result of reason understanding in an orderly way things that dont have any order. Theres a kind of necessity, he says, for doing this. Ill give you his words from that same text in De Potentia Question 7 Article 11, the Body: Another way, according as these relations follow upon the way of understanding. That is to say, that it understands something in order to another, although the intellect or the understanding does not introduce that order, but rather our way of understanding follows upon a certain necessity. Relations of this sort the understanding does not attribute to that which is in the understanding but to that which is in the thing. And this happens according as some things not having order as such are understood in an orderly way. Although the understanding does not understand them to have an order, because thus it would be false. And then he gives the ones we were talking about before: Sometimes the understanding takes two things as beings, of which one of them, or neither, is a being, just as when it takes two futures, or one thing present and another future, and it understands one with order to the other, saying that the one is before the other. Whence these relations are of reason only, as following upon the mode of understanding. Thats very difficult. I think youll find the distinction in our speech, but it still sounds somewhat strange. In a way, youd be talking about the thing: today really comes before tomorrow. But todays being before tomorrow is not a real relation. This is opposed to the other kind of relation of reason: I wouldnt want to say that you are a species, or you are a genus, I wouldnt want to attribute such a relation to the thing itself.

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Sometimes it takes one as two, and it understands them with a certain order, as when it says that something is the same as itself. And such a relation is of reason only. So, when I say Socrates is the same as himself, there is no real relation between Socrates and himself. Socrates really cant be towards himself, because that would imply that theres a real distinction between Socrates and himself. Nevertheless, I would probably say that Socrates really is the same as himself. You can see that Im attributing it to the thing, even though there is not a real relation. But I wouldnt say Socrates is a man man is a species Socrates is a species

therefore

I wouldnt attribute that to Socrates. So this is a very subtle distinction, very hard to understand. It is really a distinction proper to the wise man to make, not to the logician. Thomas goes on: Sometimes it takes two things as able to be ordered to each other, between which there is not a middle order, nay, one of them is essentially order, as when it says that relation happens to the subject. Whence the relation of relation to anything else is of reason only [ thats hard to see]. Sometimes it takes something with order to another insofar as it is the term or limit of the order of another to it, even though it itself is not ordered to that, as when it takes the knowable as the term of the order of knowledge to it. The name of knowable signifies relatively, and it is a relation of reason only. And likewise some relative names our understanding attributes to God, insofar as God is the term of the relation of creatures to him. Whence such relations are of reason only. Thomas will always deny that there is a real relation of God to us. Theres only a real relation of the creature to God, and thats very hard to understand. But the reason for that is that there is a real foundation for saying that the creature has a relation to God, but there is no foundation in God, hes in no way changed by creation. But when we understand the creature in reference to God, we naturally understand God in reference to the creature. As he says in the earlier text, consequatur modum intelligendi. Very difficult. But Aristotle will touch upon that when he comes to the text on whether or not relations can be turned around, he talks about the knowable. Thats very difficult, but he talks about it a bit, he just touches upon it. Its not until the Metaphysics, when he gets to the chapter on relation, that he makes the distinction that Thomas has here. So you can see why at the end of the chapter he says, or as we would say it nowadays, one shouldnt be too dogmatic about these things, one shouldnt be too quick to affirm until one has considered these things many times. Thats kind of a hint that something is not being fully explored here. Its going to be explored somewhere else, in a later science. So again Thomas distinguishes two kinds of relations of reason. One is not attributed to the thing, and the other is attributed to the thing, said of the thing, but reason doesnt say that it is really in the thing (unless it is going to be mistaken). So if you understand the creature as related to God, then youre forced, in a way, to understand God as towards us. But if we make that a real relation of God to us, then we are really adding something to God, and 39

that gets us into a contradiction, because God is pure act; he cant receive anything, he cant change. He cannot acquire something in time. But if we acquire something, if we come into existence, theres been a change in us. So theres a foundation in us to be related to God. But theres no change in him, nor could something be added to him. There is nothing added to God when he creates us. Nor is he in time; its not as if God were sitting around for a number of years and said I think Ill make something, and then he suddenly does something hed never done before; there is absolutely no change in God. So there is absolutely no foundation in God for saying that he has become related to us. But we really do depend on him. Still the relation of God to us, though of reason only, is one attributed to the thing itself; its not like genus and species. So there cannot be a real relation of God to us, but, as Thomas says, it follows from the way we understand relation: if we understand this to be related to that, we naturally understand that as being related to this. But in understanding that as related to this, it may not be anything real in that thing. This is what Aristotle first brought out; not with respect to God, but with respect to things like knowledge and sensation. When I know something or I see something, is that thing really being changed and affected? Does anything really happen to the thing when it gets known? No. There seems to be no foundation for saying that it has acquired a relation to me. But I have been changed. My mind, once Ive learned geometry, is now well disposed to think about the triangle. So I have a real relation following upon my knowledge toward the thing I know. But the relation of the thing I know to me is only a relation of reason. But if, in thinking about my knowledge, I understand it as being knowledge of something, if I understand it in relation to something else, then, by a kind of necessity Thomas says, I have to think of that other thing as being towards me. So just as I have knowledge of the knowable, so the knowable is knowable by knowledge. It refers back to me. But on the one side its a real relation, on the other side its not a real relation. Its better, of course, to take a less difficult example than the one of God. When Thomas talks about God, he always goes back to the fifth book of the Metaphysics, where Aristotle uses the one of the knowledge and the knowable. Suppose one day I decide to think about the right angled triangle, and I learn all about the Pythagorean theorem and so on. I have been changed. I have a real relation to the right angled triangle. But has the right angled triangle been changed by my thinking about it? No; it has not been acted upon. So the right angled triangle doesnt really have a relation to me. But I cant really think of my being related to the triangle without at the same time thinking of it towards me. Notice the language that Thomas uses there: ex quadam necessitate, from a certain necessity it follows upon the mode of understanding. Naturally, when I think of my being related to the thing I know, I think of the thing I know as being reversely related to me. But that reverse relation is not a real relation; its only on one side. Thomas says sometimes you have a real relation on both sides, like double and half, father and son, sometimes you have a real relation on neither side, but sometimes you have a real relation on one side, and on the other side you have a relation of reason. Again, drawing from this text, which is the most complete even though you have to fill in a few things, Thomas seems to be indicating at least four things that are involved in a real relation. You have to have two things existing outside the mind, they have to be really distinct one from the other, they must be able to be ordered to each other (and the only thing he takes as an example of what is excluded by this is a relation to a relation, because that is essentially order; you dont order order, as Socrates argues in the Phaedo that you cant harmonize harmony. You dont order order, it is order. If I go into the garage and I say tune up my automobile, and they tune it up, and then I say now tune up the tune up, well, maybe you can tune up the automobile more finely, but you cant tune up the tune up. Or if I say order these things, and then I say now order the order, can you do that? No. They are 40

not able to be ordered to another; thats order itself.) The fourth one, which Thomas talks about a lot, is that you have to have a foundation in the thing for the relation. Youre taller than me, and Im shorter than you, and there is a foundation in both of us for the relation; not just in you, but there is also in me. Because of my size, I am, towards you, shorter. Because of your size, you are, to me, taller. In the case of father and mother and the offspring, is there a foundation in the man and the woman for being the father and mother of this child? Yes. They generated this child. That act was something that made them father and mother. But vice versa, is the child really related to mother and father? Yes. By being generated by them; you really were generated by your mother and your father. So thats a real relation on both sides. I dont expect you to be masters of this at all. I just want to ask whether this distinction of real and of reason the same as the distinction of secundum esse and secundum dici? No. But some people get carried away because esse seems to be similar to real, and if a relation is dici, is just said, then it isnt real. People get these two divisions mixed up, and thats a most serious mistake. They are two entirely different divisions. Peter Kay: For the completeness of the examples, are any relations of reason relations secundum dici? Give me time to think about it. Sean Murray: What about a thing to a knower? Would that be an example? The ability to be known, you mean? Thats interesting. If there is such a name, its knowability, are we placing the name on something other than the relation? Perhaps we are placing the name directly upon an ability and not upon the relation, and there is a relation that follows upon it. Perhaps that makes some sense. Now, what is the distinction Aristotle is making with the two definitions? Is it closer to the distinction of real and of reason or the distinction of secundum dici and secundum esse? The second. Because if you go through his examples, hell go from examples such as knowledge to examples such as double and half, and later on hell want to put things such as knowledge more in quality, because the name chiefly signifies quality, although there is a relation that follows upon that quality. But in the case of the secundum dici [LEGE ESSE] the name is put chiefly, or perhaps we could even say only, upon the relation. Aristotles second definition of relation is really the same as the relation secundum esse. To see that, you have to know what you mean by esse. But the first definition actually includes both the relations secundum dici and the relations secundum esse, which is why I say the two different definitions are not exactly the same as the distinction between relations secundum dici and relations secundum esse. The first definition includes both. But the second definition is meant to exclude relations secundum dici from being chiefly in the category of toward something. Those will be chiefly, as Thomas said in that text we looked at earlier, a thing of another predicament. So the second definition is connected with the distinction, since it is meant to exclude the secundum dici, but the first definition can be said of relations both secundum esse and secundum dici. Well see that when we go through the text, when Aristotle refers to the first definition after the second definition, saying the first one belongs to all, and the second, we see, belongs just to relatives secundum esse. But why should the distinction of secundum dici and secundum esse be a distinction more appropriate to logic than the distinction between the real relations and relations of reason? Because the first distinction is concerned with naming things. In the text where Thomas defines relations secundum dici and those secundum esse, he says in the case of the 41

secundum dici the names are placed chiefly upon something other than relation, although some relation follows upon it. In the case of the secundum esse, Thomas says the name is placed upon the relation itself, and perhaps you could say only upon the relation; theres nothing but a toward something, there. If I say double and half, what is double apart from toward something? Is it 4 or 8? There is nothing absolute there, is there? You are placing the name upon a relation, the relation itself. But with the secundum dici, youre not placing the name upon itself, certainly not chiefly upon the relation itself. Youre placing it chiefly upon the quality or something that belongs to some other category, but he singles out quality. And this, as you might suspect, is going to be connected with why we have the chapter on relation before the chapter on quality. Because so long as you had only this first definition, which as I said goes back to Plato, youve got names that are names chiefly of qualities put together with names that are names of relations themselves. Because both of them are fit by the first definition. And so you can see how the first definition is more universal than relations secundum dici; it fits both secundum esse and secundum dici. So Aristotle has to separate those two. The second definition will separate those things that are only relations from those things that are chiefly something else, even though they are said to be of another. [Ten minute break] Coming back for a moment to the completeness of our examples, maybe we have an example of a relation of reason which is secundum dici in a name. If you put name in our first examples of relations either secundum esse or secundum dici and either real or of reason, where would you put name? What are you naming? Are you naming a relation when you use the word name, or are you naming something absolute that has a relation following upon it? A name is a vocal sound, as Aristotle defines it in the Perihermeneias, a vocal sound signifying by human agreement, and you know the rest of the definition. Where would you put sound? That would be under quality, under the third species. But maybe theres a relation connected with this; it signifies something. Its a vocal sound signifying. So maybe a name is a relative secundum dici. But if that sound signifies by human agreement, its not exactly like knowledge, is it, the kind of relation we attribute to it. Maybe it goes under the secundum dici which is a relation of reason. Maybe. But thats very difficult stuff; Im not going to ask you anything like that on the exam. But what I see in the text of Thomas is that when he distinguishes the relativa secundum dici and the relativa secundum esse, hes always got an objection there where someone is confusing that distinction with the distinction between real relations and relations of reason. The probable cause is that the words seem to have some connection. But even after clearing that up, then you tend to say isnt the distinction between the first and second definition Aristotle gives the same as the distinction between relativa secundum dici and relativa secundum esse. Well, its not exactly the same, but its connected with it. Look at the first definition: Those are said to be toward something which, as regards what they are, are said to be of another or in some other way toward another. So knowledge is said to be of another, its knowledge of something, double is said to be double of something, so this first definition that he begins the chapter with covers both, its true of both relatives secundum dici and relatives secundum esse. So you cant say that the first definition is the same as relatives secundum dici. Relatives secundum dici are more particular than that first definition. Now in the second definition Aristotle gives, namely 42

those are toward something whose being is toward something in some way the word being, there, is what fouls you up. I know for years I was fouled up about what the word being meant there. Is it being in the sense of existence? Is that what hes talking about? Is it the being you have in mind when you say man is an animal? Is it the being that you have in mind when you use a copula, as they call it, the is? No. There are a number of texts where Thomas distinguishes three meanings of the word esse or einai. One meaning he gives of esse or einai is the existence of a thing. When Thomas uses the word esse in Latin, he almost always uses it in the sense of existence. Another is tied up with the proposition. The third use of it, he says, is to mean the nature of a thing. And this is the sense that Aristotle has in mind here. In one of these texts, Thomas actually applies it to this definition. This is from the first book of the Sentences Distinction 33 Question 1 Article 1, reply to the first objection: It should be known that esse is said in three ways. In one way esse is said the quiddity or the nature of the thing, as when it is said that a definition is oratio significans quid est esse, the definition signifies the quiddity of the thing, the nature of the thing, its essence. In another way, esse is said the actus essentiae as vivere, quod est esse viventibus est animae actus, not the second act, which is operation, but first act. The third way esse signifies the truth of a composition in propositions, according as est is said to be the copula, and according to this it is in the intellect composing and dividing. I say therefore that when it is said ad aliquid [thats the Latin for pros ti, toward something] sunt quorum esse, whose being est ad aliud se habere, this is understood of the quiddity of a thing, the nature of a thing which is signified by the definition, because the very nature of relation, by which it is constituted in such a genus, is to be referred to another. And it is not understood about the being which is the act of the essence. For this kind of being relation has from those things which cause it in the subject, according as being is not referred to another, but to the subject. Thats what I was talking about with taller and shorter than. Thats a strange use of the word esse, but youll find Aristotle using the word einai to mean nature or what it is. That used to always puzzle me. Why does he do that? I used to wonder, is it a contraction of quod quid erat esse, to ti en einai? Thats how I used to explain this weird use, I thought he was trying to confuse us or something. But Thomas, when he talks about this in one of these texts, gives a nice explanation of it, a nice analogy, in fact. He says just as we sometimes give the same name to the act and to the habit and to the power, because they are in some way the source of it, so likewise we sometimes give the name esse to essentia, because that is the beginning of it in some way. You have the word understanding which names an act, but the power of understanding is sometimes called the understanding, and the first habit in reason or the understanding I sometimes call natural understanding, but in Latin they just call it intellectus, and in Greek they just call it nous. So sometimes the name of the act is given to its source, to the habit or to the power. Likewise, then, the name esse is sometimes given to essentia, because essentia is the beginning of esse, just as the power to understand is the beginning of the act of understanding. You see that many times. The word taste well use for the sense itself, or for the act. So hes not talking, then, about the existence of the relation. It doesnt have existence because its towards another. It has existence because it has a foundation in the 43

subject. And from being towards another, it might or might not be a real relation. Its not even an accident because its toward another. Its real because it has a foundation in the thing, or because, as Thomas says for the Trinity, its the same as the thing. But not because its toward something. So youre thinking about the nature of the thing, you could say perhaps more explicitly that its whole nature is to be toward something. You wouldnt say that the whole nature of knowledge or power is to be toward something. In fact, chiefly, its nature is not to be toward something, chiefly its nature is to be a quality. And there is a relation following upon that. So he wants to exclude relatives secundum dici by this second definition. You see why I say its not exactly the same, but connected? Thomas doesnt say this, but theres a certain way in which one of these gives its name to the other. Perhaps its a bit like when you have a genus and one species keeps the name, and another one gets a new name. For example, sometimes youll see the first species of quality divided like this: disposition, the first species of quality, is divided into disposition and habit. Habit is a firm disposition, so it adds something very significant, so the firm disposition gets a new name, and the disposition easily lost keeps the name disposition. Now look at the first definition, common to both of these (relativa secundum dici and relativa secundum esse), for which Aristotle gives examples like double and half and knowledge to exemplify what hes defined by the first definition. The second definition adds something, namely that the name which is said of something or toward something is placed upon something that is a relation itself, thats its nature, while in the case of the relativa secundum dici its been placed upon something that is chiefly a quality, not a relation. So the second definition adds something to just being said of something, and so it gets the new name. That explains a bit why you get this way of naming this part of the first definition. Still, you must be careful: relativa secundum dici is more particular than what hes defined in the first definition, which will cover both the relatives secundum dici and the relatives secundum esse. But the second definition separates the relativa secundum esse from the relativa secundum dici. So again we have a confirmation that logic is about names. When Thomas distinguished between the real relations and relations of reason, its not done in terms of names. Those things have names, but the distinction is not based so much on what youre placing the name upon. Lets go through the chapter more (weve done the worst part already). The chapter is divided into two parts, and the first part has the first definition, and then properties that follow upon it. The second part begins with a difficulty in the first definition and leads to the second definition, and eventually to one more property that follows upon it more clearly. At the very beginning of Chapter 7 he gives his first definition which Ive retranslated for you: Those are said to be toward something, which as regards what they are, are said to be of another or in some other way toward another. So knowledge, by reason of what it is, is said to be knowledge of something. But its whole nature is not to be toward something. In fact chiefly its nature is to be a quality. But those distinctions are not being made here yet. Notice the first examples he gives: they are again the ones taken from quantity. The greater is said to be of another, what is greater than something, and the double is said to be of another, for it is said to be double of something. Those are in fact examples of relativa secundum esse, but he doesnt say that. Then he says likewise whatever others are such, saying such as knowledge, habit and so on, as if they were such of another kind. Perhaps its a little more explicit in the Greek than in the English, but notice the way the text goes: 44

So too whatever other such things. Also among things which are towards another are such things as ... as if these were different kinds of examples, although he doesnt say what they are, but they are in fact examples, in Thomass division of relatives secundum dici. Both groups seem to be real relations, but he doesnt emphasize that. These are names of things. So if youre naming relations youre naming real relations, not relations of reason. The examples are very significant. He gives examples of the second kind, and they are also said to be of something else. A little later on, there is again significance in the examples. He comes back to quantitative examples, and what does he give as another kind of example? He says therefore these things are toward another which are just as such said of others or in any other way in regard to another, for example a large mountain is said in regard to something for the mountain is called large in regard to another and then he says that the similar is said to be similar to something. Whats the difference between that example and the example of the large mountain? This is like that, to use the English word for similar, and this is larger than that or this is equal to that. What category is presupposed to larger than [? Quantity], but quality to like. And thats the order in which the categories were enumerated: Substance, quantity, quality, and then toward something. In that sense, quality seems to underlie the relation of being like something. We say things are alike because they have some quality in common. That makes you wonder why, if relation or toward something is based upon quality as well as quantity, why is he taking up relation before? Well, its because of this confusion in the first definition. You have included in the first definition things that should be put chiefly in quality. Now he starts the properties. He gives, before he gets to the problem about the definition, 4 properties. The first two I call the weaker properties, properties in the weaker sense, they are less proper to this category, and then the stronger properties. And the weaker properties are that it has a contrary in some way, and that its said more or less. And then of the stronger properties, that are more peculiar to this category, one is that they are said in return with one another, said reciprocally (and he spends a long time manifesting that), and the other property is that they are together by nature. ama. These things will have a few qualifications, of course. Notice that when he says that contrarieties exists in toward something he gives the example of virtue and vice and so on. Are those chiefly relations or qualities? Qualities. And they are qualities of the first species. And it is the qualities of the first and third species that especially have contrariety, not the second and the fourth. And knowledge to ignorance. So its more in those relations that seem to be chiefly qualities that there is contrariety, although we speak of it a little bit in the other ones. Then he says this doesnt seem to be so in all things that are toward something. So he mentions double and half. And those are relations secundum esse, ones which follow upon quantity where there is no contrariety. When we get to the chapter on opposition, well see that toward something is a different kind of opposition from contrariety. Now he talks about more and less, which seem to go with contrariety. In the first example he admits more or less, namely in the similar and dissimilar, which are based on quality. Lets say courage admits of more or less, or white admits of more or less, then I can be more or less like somebody in courage, more or less like somebody in whiteness, or heat, 45

or some other thing like that. Its significant that he takes the relation that follows upon quality. Then he takes unequal, and thats from quantity. notice its not like double and half. Its more vague a relative. We saw before that when he first exemplified these things he took double and half and greater. You notice how Euclid says sometimes that this is greater than that, and then says something else is much greater. Because of the vagueness of greater, we can speak that way. So he points out that like and unequal are toward something. But he goes back and says we dont do this always: if you take a definite relation of quantity, youve got, for example, double and half. Then is one thing more double than another? Is 6 more double of 3 than 4 is double of 2? No. You can see how theres a kind of opposition between quantity and more or less. But he admits it a little bit, because you can say something is more or less unequal. But he seems to admit more or less more in the relations that follow upon quality than in the ones that follow upon quantity; he qualifies it for the ones that follow upon quantity. If you take a general relation, like unequal or less than, you might tend to say theres a little bit more or less, but if you take a definite particular one, like double or half, you cant say more or less. Thats significant. In the case of quality, you can take a very particular kind of quality like hot, or white, and you can have more or less similarity in respect of these, but you dont have more or less with double and half, triple and so on. Now he goes to the first of the stronger properties, which is that these things are said in a reciprocal way. He points out that sometimes we speak reciprocally in exactly the same way. Id say this is double of that, and that is half of this. Other times you change a bit when you say the other reciprocally. I say I have knowledge of something, but I dont say the knowable is knowable of something, but that it is knowable by knowledge. I refer it back with a different kind of grammar. Knowledge of the triangle, but the triangle is knowable of knowledge? You wouldnt say that. The father of a son, the son of a father, the double of the half, the half of the double. But with knowledge, we say knowldge of, but not knowable of; we say knowable by. Then he makes an objection that sometimes they dont seem to be reciprocal. And why is that? Because we dont always have words for the right correlative, or if we do, we dont always use the right word. They used to say I now pronounce you man and wife. But have you really given the correlative of wife? No. So it might not seem to be reciprocally said. But you should take husband: the husband is the husband of the wife, and the wife is the wife of the husband. You have now assigned them correctly. That case is not a lack of name, in some cases you might lack a name, but in this case we had a name, we just didnt assign it to the correct one. If you said man and slave (not referring to the wife, now), is that properly related? No. In some cases you might have to coin a word to avoid the problem. What about teacher and student as an example? What is the correlative of teacher? Learner is better to say than student, because student means youre eager to know, youre studious, but it doesnt really say youre something towards a teacher. Learner might be closer. But sometimes learner just means someone who is coming to know something (even if discovering by himself). So maybe you would have to coin a word to avoid all problems, teachable or something of that sort. Take brother, whats that relative to? If you say brother is to brother, the problem is that sometimes you have a brother who has no brother, but only a sister. You can be a brother and not have a brother. So what is brother relative to? In a sense, you can say what is the foundation of the relation of brother to brother or sister to sister? Is it really a different foundation? No. The reason for it is that you are both generated by the same parents. You might want to use the word sibling, or some such thing, or you might have to invent a word. And if you do that, then you see that one is said in reversal with the other. If you have a head, what is it a head of? The headed. And is the rudder of the ship? Not exactly, since there might be a ship without a rudder, but rather its 46

the rudder and the ruddered. So if you find the right name or invent a name for what it is really towards, then they will be reciprocal. Thats a property that seems to be very characteristic of relation. Whats the second of the stronger properties? That they are ama, together, at once. Can the double come to be before or after the half? No: they have to come to be together. What about father and son? You have a little problem with whether or not you have named the proper correlative for father, a similar problem with brother (since one can be a father without a son, i.e. by having a daughter), but bypassing that, can someone be a father before the son? Or the son before the father? The man who becomes a father could be before, but then hes not a father. Is he a father before, in time, his son is a son? No. Is a mother a mother before, in time, her son or daughter is a son or daughter? No. They are ama by nature. But then he raises a problem. Is this always so? He takes knowledge and then knowable as an example, and also with sensation and the sensible, and these are examples involving relations of reason. It seems that the knowable is before knowledge. There were many things that were knowable before man knew them. Aristotle says there would be knowable things even if man didnt exist, but there would be no knowledge of those things. The same thing would be said about sensation: there could be sensible things, like the four elements (as he says), earth, air, fire, and water, before there is sensation of them. And if there are no animals, there could still be the four elements. So the sensible could be without the senses. But notice there is probably more than one reason why Aristotle is saying what hes saying here, and more than one thing you might want to say in reply to this. And this is partly why at the end of the chapter he says one shouldnt be too affirmative until one has thought about these things many many times. Somebody might say what do you mean that something is sensible before you have sensation or senses? Are you talking about the sensible in ability or the sensible in act? But thats a distinction we make in the second book of the De Anima, and Aristotle himself, when he talks about causes in the Physics, says that causes and effects in ability are not together, ama, but in act they are. But hes not going to make that distinction here. Why not? Its proper to the natural philosopher to distinguish between ability and act (even the wise man, when he distinguishes ability and act, starts from motion), and to distinguish between the sensible in act and the sensible in ability. There might be a way in which even those things are ama; I cant be actually sensing without something being actually sensed. So we might say Are you assigning the proper correlative? You have to put ability with ability and actual with actual. But he passes over those distinctions as if it is more proper for the natural philosopher to make them. In some way there is something knowable before there is knowledge of it. And so he hints at the end of the chapter that there are things left here that should be further explored. The very last sentence of Chapter 7 is Perhaps it is very difficult to make known such things without having looked into them often. Still, to have raised difficulties about them is not useless. I think hes giving us a warning about this chapter, that there are things that are too difficult and maybe not altogether proper for the logician to resolve, and yet they somehow come in. Because you try to assign the properties of these things and it seems that relatives have to be reciprocal, and then a problem comes up. Part of that problem maybe can be cleared up by distinguishing ability and act, the sense in act and the sensible in act and the two of them in ability. Perhaps part of it is due to the fact that youre talking about relations that are real on one side and not real on the other side. And thats a little bit different from double and half. This man cant really be taller than I am before Im shorter than he is. But these are both real relations, whereas with knowledge and the knowable, one way there is a real relation, and the 47

other is only a relation of reason (as we learn in the fifth book of the Metaphysics). But thats too difficult and too profound, and its really proper to the wise man to make those distinctions. But he is raising some problems. What occurs to my mind in thinking about that is those two things: youre not making a distinction between ability and act, and so maybe youre not assigning the proper correlative if youre thinking about the sensible in ability and what actually has senses or what is actually sensing, and youre not distinguishing between a real relation and a relation of reason. None of those distinctions are being made. So is the problem about that property to be cleared up by those things? Certainly not here in logic. Although, as he says, its useful to have raised these problems about relation even here. So the next time youre in the De Anima, and Aristotle is saying we have to distinguish between the sense in ability and the sense in act, and between the sensible in ability and the sensible in act, hell start to clear things up. It is proper to do it there. Or when we distinguish between a cause in ability and a cause in act, like he does in the Physics. Or like when we distinguish between real relations or relations of reason. Now, as if it werent bad enough, he has to go and raise an objection to the first definition. Hell give a property after the second definition, which is that if you know one correlative, you know the other. That comes under the famous proposition that there is the same knowledge of opposites. If you have a hand, you can know it without knowing what it is the hand of, as the archaeologist who finds a hand. But you couldnt really find a double without finding a half. That last property is very tied up with the second definition. But he raises the second definition more in terms of the problem which the first definition, if we accept it as being the truth about the nature of relation, gives us with substance, moreso than any problems we might have with quality. I think he does that because its more serious if substance should turn out to be nothing but toward something. There would in fact be no substance there, because toward something isnt real unless it has a foundation. I wouldnt really be shorter than this man over here if I didnt really have a foundation in me for being shorter than him, namely my size. And he wouldnt really have towards me the relation of being taller than if he didnt really have a foundation in him for being taller towards me, which is his size. But whats the most fundamental thing of all, whats the foundation for everything else? Substance. So if you turn substance into a bunch of toward somethings, then theres no foundation for them at all. The whole of reality is gone! This is extremely serious. Aristotle criticizes Plato at some length in the last book of the Metaphysics (1088a21-1088b4) for turning matter into the large and the small, its precisely on those grounds: youve taken away the substance of things, which is awful in the science of substance. Aristotle points out that toward something has the least being; it doesnt have any being at all unless it have some sort of foundation in the subject. And Plato is making substance into toward something. We are more apt to mix up qualities, like knowledge, with relations, like father and double, than we are to mix up substance with relations. And thats why Thomas, when he talks about relativa secundum dici, hell usually give examples from quality. That clears up the confusion about why this chapter comes before the other ones. But, in order to show the absurdity of saying that the first definition gives the whole nature of these things, or that they have the nature of toward something because they are said to be of something, well then even the arm and the leg of a man is said to be the arm of a man, the leg of a man, and so youre going to turn the parts of substance into toward something, with no foundation below them. Thats more absurd than to turn qualities into mere relations; you want to get the most absurd thing that follows from what you say, and thats what he does. After he says its really hard to solve that if the first definition is really what you mean by relation. And so he says we have to change the definition. Look at his words:

48

If, therefore, the definition of things which are toward another was given sufficiently [by that first definition Ive put on the board], untying this knot that substance turns out to have substance at all, so that no substance is said to be among things which are toward another, is either among things which are extremely difficult [to say the least] or among things impossible. But if it was not sufficiently given [if we did not define correctly, but too broadly ], but those are toward something whose being is toward something in some way [whose very nature is to be toward something, not just said to be of something or have a relation following upon them, but the very nature, the whole nature you could say is toward something ], perhaps something could be said about these difficulties. Thats philosophical modesty; you could in fact solve these. But notice what he points out in that last sentence, that the definition given before, however, closely follows all things that are toward another The Greek, of course, doesnt have the word thing, there. He says the former definition, ogar poteras orismos, meaning the first definition I have on the board, follows pasai, all the toward something. He doesnt use the word thing there. Again, the first definition is not exactly the same as relativa secundum dici, because relativa secundum dici are something more particular. What are relativa secundum dici? Thomas says that in their case you have names placed upon something which chiefly belongs in some other category than toward something, although there is some relation following upon it, and he gives the example of knowledge and of power. They chiefly signify something absolute in the first or second species of quality, which have relation following upon them. But Aristotle is saying explicitly there that the first definition follows all toward something, pasei pros ti. So the first definition is not as particular as the relativa secundum dici. But the second definition separates the relativa secundum esse from the relativa secundum dici in the larger grouping of the first definition. So the problem with the first definition is not that it isnt true of the things you want to talk about, but that its too general. Its as if I were to begin the chapter on man, and I said man is a living body with sensation. Thats true that man is a living body with sensation. But later on I say, if we have defined correctly what man is, its hard to avoid saying that a dog, or a cat, or a horse, is a man, because they are living bodies with sensation. Well, if thats absurd, that a dog and a cat and a horse are a man, then we havent defined man properly. We have to say he is a living body with sensation and reason, or something that will separate man from the other animals. So if we had properly defined what pertains to the category of relation in the first definition, then we cant avoid having qualities and even substances in that category, and if thats absurd, then we have defined to broadly. So we have to define more narrowly, and the more narrow definition corresponds to the relativa secundum esse, and it separates them from the relativa secundum dici under the first and broader way of speaking. Notice how this fits in with what the Greek commentators said, namely that were talking about names. From that we can solve the difficulty about why the chapter on relation came before the chapter on quality. Now the last property that follows upon the second definition is that if one knows one toward something definitely, he knows the other. So I cant really know that this is double without knowing something else as being half. Can you know one without knowing the other? No. He doesnt think that you know such things like you know the premises of a syllogism, 49

the way Meno knows them or the slave boy knows them, and then you put them together, and you come to know something else through them. Thats not the way you come to know two relatives, that you know one relative, and through that you come to define or to reason out or come to know in some way the other one. You have to know both at the same time. Suppose I say I know that Mozarts music is better than all other music, but Ive never heard any other music in my life. Do I really know Mozarts music is better without knowing what it is better than? No. Thats the point hes making. We know these simultaneously. To make a theological footnote, when they argue that with God the Father and God the Son one cant be before the other in knowledge, its because they are towards one another. Incidentally, you know the beginning of the gospel of St. John. When I grew up I learned it in English, and it says In the beginning was the Word And the Word was with God And the Word was God And this was in the beginning with God What is the Greek for with? It is pros, en arche en ho logos, en arche en pros ton theon . So its very clear that its toward something, which is the way Augustine and Boethius and Thomas will distinguish the Father and the Son, by the relations (subsistent relations, something quite different from what you have in the creature, but nevertheless relations). The man who knew Aristotles chapter on pros ti (he doesnt call it relation, he calls it pros ti, toward something), when he picked up St. John, he would think St. John had read it or the Holy Spirit had suggested the right word, but the connection is crystal clear. It isnt in the English with the word with; that doesnt really capture the Greek word. Where this fisherman learned the Categories I dont know. Maybe from Christ, or the Holy Spirit. But the point is the word is exactly the word Aristotle has here. Now, at the end of the chapter he raises, as I said before, the question of whether there are some things left unsettled. These things have to be considered more. Its amazing that he says that. He doesnt say that at the end of any of the other chapters. He does not say that at the end of the chapter on quantity, not even at the end of the chapter on substance. But here he did, and you can see part of the problem. He just touched in some way upon real relation and relation of reason when he talks about sensation. He doesnt make the distinction here, but he does make it in the fifth book of the Metaphysics where he talks about relatives. Lets come back to the question about the order of the chapters. Let me give you a little bit of what Albert the Great says, and what Cajetan says. I find what they say insufficient to explain the order. Cajetan especially has a problem since he says that the Categories is about things rather than about names. He says: After the predicament of quantity, immediately he treats of the genus towards something, since towards something most of all follows upon quantity, and because in the predicament of quantity there was some speech where already he began to speak about toward something, when he disputed about the large and the small, and again in the predicament of quality, there will be speech about it, although in the order of nature it is after quality. So hes saying that Aristotle started to say a few things about relation in the chapter on quantity, hes going to say some more things about it later, so its like he stuck the chapter about it here in between. That doesnt seem to me to be as strong as it should be. But if you 50

think of the Categories as being about things, and quantity and quality are more fundamental things than toward something, there would be no reason to take up relation or toward something in between these two. And, in fact, in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, where youre more interested in the things, its quantity, quality, relation, the order of things. But if you say with the Greek commentators, as opposed to Cajetan, that youre talking about names as signifying things through thoughts, then you see how the first definition of toward something is very much tied up with the way something is said. And because they are both said to be of something or toward something, youre going to have a confused knowledge of what youre talking about. It has to be cleared up by the second definition, so you wont mix up the things that should be placed chiefly in quality with the things that are placed only in toward something, because theyre both said to be of something. Youre starting from the words and the ways things are said. That makes a lot of sense. The first thing you see is that these things are said to be of something or toward something in some way. Thats the first thing you see, whether they be like knowledge or like double and half. Then later on you will go from the confused to the distinct. You will begin with something confused, starting from the way you speak. That fits in, too, with Thomass distinction of relativa secundum dici and relativa secundum esse using names. What is the name being placed on? Is it being placed upon relation? Or is it being placed chiefly upon a quality upon which there follows some relation. He objects to the first definition because of the absurd consequences that follow from it. The more absurd and unacceptable those consequences are, the better the refutation of the first definition. Its much worse for us that substance should evaporate into nothing, into being toward something without any foundation so that it cannot even be real, than that quality should be turned into toward something etc. But as far as distinguishing these two (the relatives secundum dici and secundum esse), were more apt to speak of the quality as being toward something. And so when he gets to the chapter on quality he will place knowledge and things of that sort in the first species, power in the second species of quality, and at the end of the chapter on quality, hell say there is a relation following upon them, and hell say in a way they are in two categories, but the quality chiefly in quality, and the relation following upon it you might say belongs in relation. In that sense, knowledge would be in two categories, but chiefly in quality. But double and half is only in toward something; its nature is absolutely nothing but toward something. What is double? Is it 4, 6, or 8? You cant say anything absolute. Its whole nature is toward something. Now lets look at what Albert says when he talks about this. This is from his De Praedicamentis, Tractatus 4, when hes talking about the predicament ad aliquid, Chapter 2: From this is further clear the reason for the order, that after the predicament of quantity, among the genera of accidents this predicament of ad aliquid should be ordered. Since quantity is closest to substance, it ought to be ordered with substance. Then he talks about mathematics not having sensible matter and so on. Then the other ones concern what is not in any way like substance, and the most accidental of them all is relation, so that comes first: And they have more of accidentalness, and they approach less to substance, and since among them towards something has more accidentalness [ which is what Aristotle says in the Metaphysics], its rightly placed before the rest.

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Notice what hes doing. Hes saying: Substance and accident. And the most substantial thing under substance, of course, is substance itself, and quantity is like substance. The rest really have no likeness to substance; theyre wholly accidental. And the most accidental of all is relation, so thats put first. But thats not the order in which Aristotle enumerates the ten, is it? Quality is put before relation, because it is closer to substance. So St. Albert cant have his cake and eat it, too. Its an ingenious thing hes saying, but it doesnt harmonize with the order that is given of the ten, which is in order of their proximity. With the truth, all things harmonize. If you put relation before quality, quantity itself is an accident. Anyway, he goes on: I say this salve pace Boetius [let Boethius rest in peace], who gives another cause of this ordering [hes referring to what Boethius says, and this is what Boethius says, apparently, at least the way Albert calls it:], for he says that because in the order of discrete quantity there is a first and a second, which speak of a relation or comparison, and because both in the predicament of substance as well as in the predicament of quantity there result genera and species which are relative [but theyre that other kind of relation, theyre relations of reason], therefore immediately after these two he lays down relation, although quality, according to the nature of quality, is before relation. Which reason is not sufficient, as is easily made clear to anybody considering well. So, at least according to Albert, Boethius says Aristotle talked about first and second in the order of discrete quantity, he talked about genus and species, so now he has to talk about relation. Again, I agree with Albert that it doesnt seem to be sufficient, but Alberts I dont find so either. The best is to go back to what the Greek commentators showed, that whats up front is the names. Thats the way the first definition starts: all these things are said to be of something or towards something in some way. In that definition all these things are jumbled together, and you have to sort them out a bit. Otherwise you end up by putting substances in this genus, and putting all these other things like qualities. But its especially important to separate these things when you want to talk about qualities. I think thats a better reason for putting the chapter on relation before. Its because of the confusion in the first definition, which goes back to Plato in the dialogues, which expresses a common understanding we have of what a relation is, that its relative to something. So anything thats relative to something or said to be toward something is a relation. There is some confusion especially if you start with the speech, that all these things are said to be of something or towards something. Things are mixed up in our speech, in the way we speak about these things. You want to distinguish between what is placed chiefly in quality and what would be placed only in toward something. The second definition will separate out those names that are placed upon relations as opposed to those names that are placed upon something other than a relation primarily or chiefly, which has some relation following upon it. Next time we are going to go on to quality and the unlawful division into four. Every law has some exceptions to it. Its difficult to make laws that are truly universal. Cf. ibid. (CAT.7) 6/25/96: In 89, till the end of the chapter, I consider that to be a third part of the whole chapter. Hes done something in the first part like hes done in the other chapters: quality in itself, its definition and species. Then he did quality in its properties. Now in the third part he asks 52

Didnt we talk about qualities back under toward something? Hes going to tie things together now. We distinguished between anything that is said to be of or toward something in some way, and something whose very nature is to be toward something. The very nature of double or half is to be toward something; its nothing absolute by itself. Double or half is just toward something, you cant say its four or six. Its double toward something only. But these qualities are something absolute in themselves, they are the disposition of substance, they limit substance in regard to its nature or its acting or its quantity. But some of them will have a relation consequent upon them. So knowledge is the name chiefly of a quality, of a disposition or a habit of my mind. But consequent upon this quality is a certain relation to the thing. That relation, which is really towards the thing, you could put with toward something. But the quality itself is going to be in the category of quality. That best explains why chapter seven came before chapter eight. What does the category of toward something really contain? What is put not only chiefly, but even only, in the category of toward something? Go back to the fourfold division, whats really put in there are real relations that are relativa secundum esse. What does that mean? You have a relation which is really in the thing, and the name (which is up front with the logician) is the name of the relation itself. Double is the name of a real relation, and so double is put in the category of toward something. But then you have these names that may imply some real relation, but the names are placed chiefly upon a quality. These are called relativa secundum dici, and they are put chiefly in another category. Power, although its the beginning of something, is something absolute, e.g. my power to digest. Its not just toward something. Likewise my knowledge is not just toward something, but its a disposition of my mind. So the name knowledge or the name power chiefly and principally name a quality, and so they will have to be put, therefore, in the genus of quality. But consequent upon that quality may be a relation to the thing which the knowledge is a knowledge of or to the thing which the power is the beginning of. And that relation consequent upon it, you could put that with toward something. But the quality itself, and the name of what is chiefly a quality, is going to be put under quality. You have to realize that the Greek commentators are right to say that the Categories is about names signifying things through thoughts; whats up front is the names, and therefore your way of speaking and the way of saying things. Especially given that the Platonists have already defined toward something or relation as whatever is said to be of something or toward something, you have lumped under that first definition of relation, which is the commonly accepted definition of relation, things which are only relations, and things which are chiefly and primarily qualities. You have to clear up the confusion in the very way of speaking. The second definition clears it up, and separates the real relations that are only in the category of toward something from the names of what is chiefly a quality. Its a confusion in the name of relation, or in the way we speak about relation. We know things in a confused way before distinctly. That first definition has confused everything that is said to be of something or toward something, whether that is its whole nature, where all it is is toward something, or whether thats something merely consequent upon its nature. A sign of that, as he says, is that as you go from the genus to the species, we speak of knowledge as being the knowledge of something, we can say that geometry is a knowledge of plane and solid figures, but when you get down to the species you dont say of anymore. You dont say geometry of plane and solid figures so much, meaning its relative to that. You have to go back to the genus and say its the knowledge of. Thats not true of the true relation: greater is greater than something, double (which is like one species of greater than) is double of something. Thats its whole nature. That confirms what the Greek commentators were saying, namely that the book is about names signifying things through thoughts. In the Metaphysics, the order is quantity, quality, relation, in the Categories its not, because of the confusion in the way we speak. But 53

thats where you have to begin. Its natural to begin with the confused. You can see that all of these are said to be of something, but you have them all lumped together. The logician, however, wants to know these things in order to knowing the natures of things. So sometimes when something is said to be of something else, that is getting at its whole nature, other times its not bringing out that what you really have there is essentially a quality, and the relation is merely something consequent and following upon it. But when he enumerated them, he gave them in the order of nature, not in the order of teaching. Thats why I compared it to what Porphyry does. He seems to be imitating Aristotle. Like Socrates says, the best minds speak the best, write the best, they use words the best. In the proemium he enumerates genus, difference, species, property, accident, in the order of nature. The difference is, after all, the species-making difference, so its naturally before it. But when you define genus, you define it with reference to species, and species with reference to genus, and so they naturally are known together. And then when you define difference, and especially the second and third definitions of difference, difference is what separates species under the same genus, or difference is that whereby the species excels the genus, clearly you have to know genus and species before you can understand those two definitions. So in the order of learning, species comes before difference. When you get to the postpredicament of before, then you see different senses of order. Then you can look back on all of this, or on the whole of philosophy for that matter, and youd see that quality is before relation by nature, but when you are knowing things, especially if you are starting from their names and how we speak, then we know relation in this confused way where qualities are mixed up, so in the order of learning, you have to distinguish those things that are said of and thats their whole nature, and those things that are said of and are chiefly something else and only have a relation following upon them. That going from the confused to the distinct takes place in going from the first definition to the second definition. There are all kinds of examples of that. If someone says to you, which comes before, the cause or the effect? You might say the cause naturally comes before the effect. But in our learning we usually know the effect before the cause. Theres no contradiction there. Nothing prevents me from knowing things in a different way than they are in reality. I know you, say, before I know your parents, even though your parents came before you in time and maybe they were even causes of you. One is the order in which I know, the other is the order in which the things came. So he is giving them in the order of nature first, and then in the order of learning, because of this confusion in the way we speak.

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APPENDIX: ON COORDINATE SPECIES AND RELATED NOTIONS 1. On coordinate species. Cf. The Thirteen Books of Euclids Elements . Translated from the Text of Heiberg, with Introduction and Commentary by Sir Thomas L. Heath. Second Edition Revised with Additions (New York: Dover Publications, 1956). From the Introduction, Chapter IX, pp. 148-149:
The third kind of vicious definition from that which is not prior is the definition of one of two coordinate species by means of its coordinate ( antidi$r$me/non), e.g. a definition of odd as that which exceeds the even by a unit (the second alternative in Eucl. VII. Def. 7); for odd and even are coordinates, being differentiae of [p. 149] number122. This third kind is similar to the first. Thus, says Trendelenburg, it would be wrong to define a square as a rectangle with equal sides.
122

Topics VI. 4, 142 b 7-10.

Cf. Aristotle, Topics VI. 4, 142 b 7-10ff:

8. (3) Again, see if he has defined one coordinate member of a division by another, e g. an odd number as that which is greater by one than an even number. For the co-ordinate members of a division that are derived from the same genus are simultaneous by nature and odd and even are such terms: for both are differentiae of number. 9. Likewise also, see if he has defined a superior through a subordinate term, e g. An even number is a number divisible into halves, or the good is a state of virtue. For half is derived from two, and two is an even number: virtue also is a kind of good, so that the latter terms are subordinate to the former. Moreover, in using the subordinate term one is bound to use the other as well: for whoever employs the term virtue employs the term good, seeing that virtue is a certain kind of good: likewise, also, whoever employs the term half employs the term even, for to be divided in half means to be divided into two, and two is even.

Cf. Aristotle, Cat., ch. 13 (14b 2415a12) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin):

123. Together {simultaneous} is said simply and chiefly [25] of that of which the coming to be is in the same time. For neither is before or after. These, however, are said to be together according to time. 124. Whatever things reciprocate according to the consequence of being, neither being in any way the cause of being of the other, are together by nature, as in the case of the double and the half. For these reciprocate [30] (if double is, half is, and if half is, double is), but neither is the cause of being for the other. 125. And the things of the same genus which are divided out against each other are said to be together by nature; those are said to be divided out against each other [35] which are according to the same division; e.g., the winged [is together] with the footed and the water dwelling. These things, being of one genus, are divided out against each other. For animal is divided into these, into the winged and the footed and the water dwelling. And no one of these is before or [15a] after, but such things seem to be together by nature.

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(Each of these, e.g., the footed and the winged and the water dwelling, may be again divided into species.) Those things will therefore be together by nature, whatever are from the same genus and according to the same division. But the genera are always [5] before the species. For they do not reciprocate according to the consequence of being. For example, if water dwelling exists, animal exists; but if animal exists, it is not necessary that water dwelling exist. 126. Therefore, whatever things reciprocate according to the consequence of being, are [10] together by nature, neither being in any way the cause of the being of the other, are together by nature, and also the things which are divided out against each other from the same genus. But those of which the coming to be is in the same time are simply together.

Cf. disparate - Collaborative International Dictionary of English v.0.48 : Disparate \Dispa*rate\, a. [L. disparatus, p. p. of disparare to part, separate; dis- + parare to make ready, prepare.] 1. Unequal; dissimilar; separate. [1913 Webster] Connecting disparate thoughts, purely by means of resemblances in the words expressing them. --Coleridge. [1913 Webster] 2. (Logic) Pertaining to two coordinate species or divisions. [1913 Webster] Cf. Outline of Aristotles Categories. PRIORITY AND SIMULTANEITY 12. One thing is called prior to another in four ways:

(i) [Most strictly] in respect of time (ii) What does not reciprocate as to implication of existence: one is prior to two (iii) In respect of some order: in demonstrative science the elements are prior to the constructions; and in grammar (iv) [Least properly] what is better: the better has priority. (v) A fifth way: when one thing is a cause of another. There being a man reciprocates with respect to existence with the true statement that there is a man. In this case the actual thing is a cause of the statements being true, and is thus prior. 13. (i) Things are most strictly simultaneous which come into existence at the same time. (ii) Things are simultaneous with respect to nature which reciprocate as to implication of existence, if neither is a cause of the others existence; example: the double and the half. (iii) Also coordinate species of the same genus are simultaneous with respect to nature; e.g. bird and beast and fish. (iv) But genera are prior to species since they do not reciprocate with respect to existence. Mortimer Adler, Problems for Thomists. The Problem of Species, Part One.

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129 Vd. Topics, VI, 6. Thus: A genus is always divided by differentiae that are coordinate members of a division, as, for instance, animal by the terms walking, flying, aquatic and biped (143). And: Animal (e.g.) is predicated of man or ox or other walking animals, not of the actual differentia itself which we predicate of the species (144a35). In sum: either one thing is before another or not two or more things are either found together in some way or not if one thing is not before another, and if they are found together in some way, then they are simultaneous things may be simultaneous with respect to time or with respect to nature among things which are simultaneous with respect to nature there are some found without reciprocating with respect to existence

2. On coordinate, superordinate, and subordinate species. Cf. H. W. B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic (1st ed. 1916; 2nd ed. revised 1925), pp. 116117:
A division may be carried through several stages, i.e. the species into which a genus is first of all divided may themselves be subdivided into speces; and this may be continued until the species reached no longer require subdivision. The species with which a division stops are called infimae species; the genus with which it starts, the summum genus; and the intermediate species, subaltern genera, i.e. genera (for they are genera in respect of the species next below them) subordinated to another genus. 1 The proximum genus of any species is that next above it in the series; and the words superordinate, subordinate, and co-ordinate are used to indicate respectively the relation of any genus to those below it, above it, or standing on the same level with it (i.e. having the same proximmum genus). The terms are also used in reference to a classification; for a classification when complete may be regard as a division and vice versa. The co-ordinate species into which a genus is
1

Cf. p. 107, n. 2 supra.... [remainder omitted] [116-117]

divided are sometimes called its constituent species,1 as together composing or making up the genus.
1

In Latin, membra dividentia, as the species are conceived to share the genus amongst them.

3. On what is simultaneous by nature. Cf. Aristotle, Cat., ch. 13 (14b 2415a12) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin):
123. Together {simultaneous} is said simply and chiefly [25] of that of which the coming to be is in the same time. For neither is before or after. These, however, are said to be together according to time. 124. Whatever things reciprocate according to the consequence of being, neither being in any way the cause of being of the other, are together by nature, as in the case of the double

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and the half. For these reciprocate [30] (if double is, half is, and if half is, double is), but neither is the cause of being for the other. 125. And the things of the same genus which are divided out against each other are said to be together by nature; those are said to be divided out against each other [35] which are according to the same division; e.g., the winged [is together] with the footed and the water dwelling. These things, being of one genus, are divided out against each other. For animal is divided into these, into the winged and the footed and the water dwelling. And no one of these is before or [15a] after, but such things seem to be together by nature. (Each of these, e.g., the footed and the winged and the water dwelling, may be again divided into species.) Those things will therefore be together by nature, whatever are from the same genus and according to the same division. But the genera are always [5] before the species. For they do not reciprocate according to the consequence of being. For example, if water dwelling exists, animal exists; but if animal exists, it is not necessary that water dwelling exist. 126. Therefore, whatever things reciprocate according to the consequence of being, are [10] together by nature, neither being in any way the cause of the being of the other, are together by nature, and also the things which are divided out against each other from the same genus. But those of which the coming to be is in the same time are simply together.

Cf. Aristotle, Cat., ch. 13:

1. The term simultaneous is primarily and most appropriately applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is simultaneous with that of the other; for in such cases neither is prior or posterior to the other. Such things are said to be simultaneous in point of time. Those things, again, are simultaneous in point of nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is the cause of the others being. This is the case with regard to the double and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, if there is a double, there is also a half, and if there is a half, there is also a double, while at the same time neither is the cause of the being of the other. 2. Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be simultaneous in nature. I mean those species which are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of division. Thus the winged species is simultaneous with the terrestrial and the water species. These are distinguished within the same genus, and are opposed each to each, for the genus animal has the winged, the terrestrial, and the water species, and no one of these is prior or posterior to another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be simultaneous in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial, the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into subspecies. Those species, then, also will be simultaneous point of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of differentiation. 3. But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being cannot be reversed. If there is the species water-animal, there will be the genus animal, but granted the being of the genus animal, it does not follow necessarily that there will be the species water-animal. 4. Those things, therefore, are said to be simultaneous in nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is in any way the cause of the others being; those species, also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed within the same genus. Those things, moreover, are simultaneous in the unqualified sense of the word which come into being at the same time.

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Cf. Aristotle, Topics Book 5 Part 3:

1. Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed either the actual subject whose property he is rendering, or any of its species: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For the object of rendering the property is that people may understand: now the subject itself is just as unintelligible as it was to start with, while any one of its species is posterior to it, and so is no more intelligible. Accordingly it is impossible to understand anything further by the use of these terms. Thus (e.g.) any one who has said that it is property of animal to be the substance to which man belongs as a species has employed one of its species, and therefore the property could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids introducing either the subject itself or any of its species: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a living creature to be compounded of soul and body has avoided introducing among the rest either the subject itself or any of its species, and therefore in this respect the property of a living creature would have been correctly rendered. 2. You should inquire in the same way also in the case of other terms that do or do not make the subject more intelligible: thus, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed anything either opposite to the subject or, in general, anything simultaneous by nature with it or posterior to it: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For an opposite is simultaneous by nature with its opposite, and what is simultaneous by nature or is posterior to it does not make its subject more intelligible. Thus (e.g.) any one who has said that it is a property of good to be the most direct opposite of evil, has employed the opposite of good, and so the property of good could not have been correctly rendered. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has avoided employing anything either opposite to, or, in general, simultaneous by nature with the subject, or posterior to it: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to be the most convincing conception has avoided employing anything either opposite to, or simultaneous by nature with, or posterior to, the subject; and so the property of knowledge would in this respect have been correctly stated.

Cf. Aristotle, Topics Book 6 Part 4:

5. Of the failure to use terms that are prior there are three forms: 6. (1) The first is when an opposite has been defined through its opposite, e.g. good through evil: for opposites are always simultaneous by nature. Some people think, also, that both are objects of the same science, so that the one is not even more intelligible than the other. One must, however, observe that it is perhaps not possible to define some things in any other way, e.g. the double without the half, and all the terms that are essentially relative: for in all such cases the essential being is the same as a certain relation to something, so that it is impossible to understand the one term without the other, and accordingly in the definition of the one the other too must be embraced. One ought to learn up all such points as these, and use them as occasion may seem to require. 7. (2) Another isif he has used the term defined itself. This passes unobserved when the actual name of the object is not used, e.g. supposing any one had defined the sun as a star that appears by day. For in bringing in day he brings in the sun. To detect errors of this sort, exchange the word for its definition, e.g. the definition of day as the passage of the sun over the earth. Clearly, whoever has said the passage of the sun over the earth has said the sun, so that in bringing in the day he has brought in the sun.

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8. (3) Again, see if he has defined one coordinate member of a division by another, e g. an odd number as that which is greater by one than an even number. For the co-ordinate members of a division that are derived from the same genus are simultaneous by nature and odd and even are such terms: for both are differentiae of number. 9. Likewise also, see if he has defined a superior through a subordinate term, e g. An even number is a number divisible into halves, or the good is a state of virtue . For half is derived from two, and two is an even number: virtue also is a kind of good, so that the latter terms are subordinate to the former. Moreover, in using the subordinate term one is bound to use the other as well: for whoever employs the term virtue employs the term good, seeing that virtue is a certain kind of good: likewise, also, whoever employs the term half employs the term even, for to be divided in half means to be divided into two, and two is even.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 7 (English Dominican Fathers):
Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally? Objection 1. It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name Lord is the name of power, which is the divine substance; and Creator signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but eternally. Objection 2. Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally. Objection 3. Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: I have loved thee with an everlasting love (Jeremiah 31:3). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as Lord and Creator, are applied to God from eternity. Objection 4. Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called Lord from the opposite relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally. Objection 5. Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false. Objection 6. Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus these names Lord and Creator are predicated of God from eternity, and not temporally.

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On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation Lord is applied to God temporally. I answer that, The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity. To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing the same as itself. For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between being and non-being formed by reason, apprehending non-being as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like. Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like. Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, on the right is not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal. Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal. Reply to Objection 1. Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as master and servant, father, and son, and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as Lord, and these do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, as Saviour, Creator, and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly.

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Reply to Objection 2. As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, to become or to be made are applied to God only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, Lord, Thou art become [Douay: hast been] our refuge (Psalm 89:1). Reply to Objection 3. The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as Saviour, Creator, and the like. Reply to Objection 4. Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it. Reply to Objection 5. Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to Him. Reply to Objection 6. To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary [by nature or otherwise] [of] <to know the> things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, Lord and servant, are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not Lord until He had a creature subject to Himself.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 42, art. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):
One proceeds to the third as follows. It seems that in the divine Persons there is no order of nature. For whatever exists in the divine is either the essence, or a person, or a notion. But an order of nature does not signify the essence, nor any person, nor a notion. Therefore there is no order of nature in the divine. Further, wherever there is an order of nature, one thing is before another, at least in nature and understanding. But in the divine Persons nothing is before and after, as Athanasius says. Therefore in the divine Persons there is no order of nature. Further, whatever is ordered is distinguished. But the nature in the divine is not distinguished. Therefore it is not ordered. Therefore there is no order of nature there.

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Further, the divine nature is its essence. But an order of essence is not said in the divine. Therefore neither is an order of nature. But to the contrary, wherever there is plurality without order there is confusion. But in the divine Persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius says. Therefore there is order there. I reply that it must be said that order is always said through a comparison to some principle. And so just as principle is said in many ways, namely, according to situation, as a point, according to understanding, as the principle of demonstration, and according to particular causes; so also order is said. But in the divine principle is said according to origin, without priority, as was said above. And so there must be an order according to origin there, without priority. And this is called an order of nature, according to Augustine, not that by which one thing is before another, but that by which one thing is from another . To the first, therefore, it must be said the an order of nature signifies the notion of origin in common, but not in particular. To the second it must be said that in created things, even when that which is from a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, still the principle is prior according to nature and understanding, if that which is a principle be considered. But if the very relations of cause and thing caused be considered, as well as principle and thing from a principle, it is obvious that relatives are simultaneous by nature and understanding, inasmuch as the one is in the definition of the other. But in the divine the relations themselves are Persons subsisting in one nature. And so neither on the part of the nature, nor on the part of the relations can one Person be before another, neither according to nature or understanding. To the third it must be said that order of nature means, not that nature itself is ordered, but that order in the divine Persons is looked at according to a natural origin. To the fourth it must be said that nature in some way implies the notion of a principle, but essence does not. And so an order of origin is better named an order of nature than an order of essence.

Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum (ap. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum and Selected Anonymous Treatises. Translated by Joseph P. Mullaley, Ph.D, p. 80):
Having spoken of the disjunctive conjunction or ( vel), we now treat of the copulative conjunction and which is called copulative not because it signifies a connection but because it signifies a comparison which exists simultaneously or according to simultaneity. And the connection follows from simultaneity just as exclusion naturally follows from my expression not with another. Hence when I say: Sortes and Plato are white, the conjunction and affirms their simultaneity and oneness in whiteness. And on that account it unites them in whiteness. It does not however indicate simultaneity in time, because this would be false: Adam and Noah were two men, because they did not exist at the same time; but nevertheless one correctly asserts: He ran yesterday and he is running today and he will run tomorrow, yet these acts of running do not exist at the same time. But primarily and essentially it affirms the simultaneity of many subjects in one accident insofar as it enjoys being or of many accidents in one subject, for example, Sortes and Plato are white and Sortes is seated and he also is arguing.

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4. How to divide a genus. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 18, art. 7 (tr. Eng. Dominican Fathers):
Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely? Objection 1. It would seem that the species of goodness derived from the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the object, as a species is contained under its genus; for instance, when a man commits a theft in order to give alms. For an action takes its species from its object, as stated above (2,6). But it is impossible for a thing to be contained under another species, if this species be not contained under the proper species of that thing; because the same thing cannot be contained in different species that are not subordinate to one another. Therefore the species which is taken from the end, is contained under the species which is taken from the object. Objection 2. Further, the last difference always constitutes the most specific species. But the difference derived from the end seems to come after the difference derived from the object: because the end is something last. Therefore the species derived from the end, is contained under the species derived from the object, as its most specific species. Objection 3. Further, the more formal a difference is compared to genus, as form to matter. But the species derived from the end, is more formal than that which is derived from the object, as stated above (06). Therefore the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as the most specific species is contained under the subaltern genus. On the contrary, Each genus has its determinate differences. But an action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained to an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to an infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the species derived from the end is not contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus. I answer that, The object of the external act can stand in a twofold relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself ordained thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to victory; secondly, as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to take what belongs to another is ordained accidentally to the giving of alms. Now the differences that divide a genus, and constitute the species of that genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12), divide that genus essentially: and if they divide it accidentally, the division is incorrect: as, if one were to say: Animals are divided into rational and irrational; and the irrational into animals with wings, and animals without wings; for winged and wingless are not essential determinations of the irrational being. But the following division would be correct: Some animals have feet, some have no feet: and of those that have feet, some have two feet, some four, some many: because the latter division is an essential determination of the former. Accordingly when the object is not of itself ordained to the end, the specific difference derived from the object is not an essential determination of the species derived from the end, nor is the reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species is not under the other; but then the moral action is contained under two species that are disparate, as it were. Consequently we say that he that commits theft for the sake of adultery, is guilty of a twofold malice in one action. On the other hand, if the object be of itself ordained to the end, one of these differences is an essential determination of the other. Wherefore one of these species will be contained under the other.

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It remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the other. In order to make this clear, we must first of all observe that the more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the more specific is the difference. Secondly, that the more universal an agent is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that the more remote an end is, the more universal the agent to which it corresponds; thus victory, which is the last end of the army, is the end intended by the commander in chief; while the right ordering of this or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower officers. From all this it follows that the specific difference derived from the end, is more general; and that the difference derived from an object which of itself is ordained to that end, is a specific difference in relation to the former. For the will, the proper object of which is the end, is the universal mover in respect of all the powers of the soul, the proper objects of which are the objects of their particular acts. Reply to Objection 1. One and the same thing, considered in its substance, cannot be in two species, one of which is not subordinate to the other. But in respect of those things which are superadded to the substance, one thing can be contained under different species. Thus one and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one species, i.e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume, under the species of sweet-smelling things. In like manner an action which, as to its substance, is in one natural species, considered in respect to the moral conditions that are added to it, can belong to two species, as stated above (1, 3, ad 3). Reply to Objection 2. The end is last in execution; but first in the intention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive their species. Reply to Objection 3. Difference is compared to genus as form to matter, inasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the genus is considered as more formal than the species, inasmuch as it is something more absolute and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts of a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is stated in Phys. ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is the formal cause of the species; and so much the more formal, as it is more universal.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 17, art. 5, c. (tr. Eng. Dominican Fathers):
Whether hope is a theological virtue? I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue. Now it has been stated above (1) that hope has the character of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that has God for its object, as stated above (I-II, 62, 1), it is evident that hope is a theological virtue.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 75, art. 7 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?

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Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is of the same species as an angel. For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature of its species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the end of the soul is the same as that of an angelnamely, eternal happiness. Therefore they are of the same species. Objection 2: Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest, because it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual nature. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate specific difference: therefore they belong to the same species. Objection 3: Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel except in its union with the body. But as the body is outside the essence of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species. Therefore the soul and angel are of the same species. On the contrary, Things which have different natural operations are of different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of an angel are different; since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), Angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering their knowledge of Divine things from visible things. Subsequently he says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the soul and an angel are not of the same species. I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that human souls and angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed that in these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as resulting from their free-will: as we have seen above (Question [47], Article [2]). But this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of nature; because, as they are not composed of matter and form, but are subsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a diversity of species. For a separate form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a single species; thus, supposing a separate whiteness to exist, it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness does not differ from another except as in this or that subject. But diversity of species is always accompanied with a diversity of nature; thus in species of colors one is more perfect than another; and the same applies to other species, because differences which divide a genus are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, are compared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof, as is written Metaph. x (Did. ix, 4). The same would follow if the aforesaid substances were composed of matter and form. For if the matter of one be distinct from the matter of another, it follows that either the form is the principle of the distinction of matter---that is to say, that the matter is distinct on account of its relation to divers forms; and even then there would result a difference of species and inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle of the distinction of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct from another, except by a distinction of quantity, which has no place in these incorporeal substances, such as an angel and the soul. So that it is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the same species. How it is that there can be many souls of one species will be explained later (Question [76], Article [2], ad 1). Reply to Objection 1: This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural end. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end. Reply to Objection 2: The ultimate specific difference is the noblest because it is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is nobler than potentiality. Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the noblest, because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees of intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible things are not of one species, so neither are all intellectual things of one species.

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Reply to Objection 3: The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that, properly speaking, not the soul alone, but the composite, is the species. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way requires the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is not united to a body.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 72, art. 5 (tr. Eng. Dominican Fathers):
Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species? Objection 1. It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when sin is divided into mortal and venial. For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the fault, according to Dt. 25:2: According to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be. Therefore venial and mortal sins are not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species. Objection 2. Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [Ex genere, genus in this case denoting the species], as murder and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sins differ specifically. Objection 3. Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as stated above (1, ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment. On the contrary, Those things that constitute a species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment. I answer that, In things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to be found save in different species, e.g. rational and irrational, animate, and inanimate: the other difference is consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to specific diversity, yet, in others, it may be found within the same species; thus white and black are consequent to the specific diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man. We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment, cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is accidental never constitutes a species; and what is outside the agents intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is outside the intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it.

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Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes the notion of sin. For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and another which, without destroying the principle of order, implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an animals body, the frame may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while, on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without turning away from God, there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas when a man sins without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, because the principle of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally. Reply to Objection 1. Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what they turn away from, not as regards what they turn to, viz. the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the species adultery the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin. Reply to Objection 2. From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may be found even in things of the same species, as stated above. Reply to Objection 3. The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails.

Cf. Lawrence Dewan, O.P., The Importance of Substance.

39. For this issue, cf. Thomas, CP [= In V Physic.] 5.3 (ed. Maggiolo #663-664) and In De Caelo 1.6 (ed. Spiazzi, #67). In the latter, we are told: ... there is not something contrary to substance, which is maximally evident in animals and plants (similarly, neither is there anything contrary to shapes and to relations... And: ... nothing is contrary to substance as regards the composite, nor as regards the matter, nor as regards the substantial form: nevertheless, there is something contrary to it as regards the proper disposition to such a form, as for example fire is said to be contrary to water by the contrariety of the hot and the cold. And such contrariety is required in all

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those things which are generated and corrupted. And the contrariety of the movements according to the heavy and the light follow upon such contrariety... In the former, Thomas seems to have trouble with the above line of thinking. There, he at first had put that solution this way: ... fire is the contrary of water in function of active and passive qualities, which are the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry; but not as regards substantial forms. For it cannot be said that heat is the substantial form of fire, since in other bodies it is an accident in the genus of quality. For what is in the genus of substance cannot be an accident for something. This he forthwith rejects: But this answer has an obvious difficulty. For it is evident that the proper affections are caused by the principles of the subject, which are the matter and the form. If, therefore, the proper affections of fire and water are contraries, since the causes of contraries are contraries, it would seem that the substantial forms are contrary. Furthermore, in Metaph. 10.8 (1058a11-22) [CM 10.10 (2122-2123)], it is proved that every genus is divided by contrary differences; but the differences are taken from the forms, as is established in book 8 of the same work (Metaph. 8.2 [1042b10-1043a29], and CM 8.2 in toto); it would seem, then, that there is contrariety in substantial forms. [664 (5)] Therefore, it is to be said that the contrariety of the differences, which is in all genera, is seen as regards the common root of contrariety, which is excellence and deficiency, to which opposition all contraries are reduced, as is had in the first book of this present work [CP 8.2]. For all differences dividing a genus stand in this relation, that one of them is in the role of the abundant, and the other in the role of the deficient relative to the first. For which reason Aristotle says in Metaph. 8 that the definitions of things are like numbers, whose species vary by addition and subtraction of unity. (Aristotle, Metaph. 8.3 [1043b34-1044a11]; Thomas, CM 8.3 [1722-1727]) Nevertheless, it is not necessary that in every genus there be contrariety according to the proper intelligible character of this or that species; but merely according to the common character of excellence and deficiency. For since contraries are [items] which are maximally distant [from each other], it is necessary that in any genus [where] there is found contrariety, there be found two terms maximally distant, in between which fall all those things which are of that genus. Nor will [even] that suffice for there to be movement in the genus, unless from one extreme to the other it happens that one continuously proceed. Therefore, in some genera these two conditions are lacking, as is clear in the case of numbers. For though all the species of number differ according to excellence and deficiency, nevertheless one cannot take two extremes maximally distant in that genus; for one can take a minimum number, viz duality, but not a maximum. Similarly, there is no continuity between the species of number: because any species of number is formally perfected by unity, which is indivisible and not continuous with another unity. And it is similar, also, in the genus of substance. For the forms of diverse species are different from each other according to excellence and deficiency, inasmuch as one form is more noble than another; and for that reason, from diverse forms diverse passions can

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be caused, as it was objected. Nevertheless, one specific form as regards its proper intelligible character is not contrary to another. First of all, [this is] because in substantial forms one does not find a maximum distance between some two forms, such that from one of them one does not come [to the other] in an orderly way save through intermediaries; but rather matter, when it is deprived of one form, can indifferently receive diverse forms without order. Hence, Aristotle says in De generatione 2, that when from earth comes fire, it is not necessary that it undergo a transit through intermediate elements. Secondly, because, since the substantial being of anything whatsoever is in some indivisible, one cannot find continuity in substantial forms, such that there be a continuous movement possible from one form into the other in function of the remission of the one and the intensification of the other. Hence, Aristotles proof, by which he proves that in substance there is no movement because there is no contrariety, is demonstrative, and not merely probable, as the Commentator [Averros] seems to imply. Though it is true that it can be proved by another argument that movement is not in [the genus of] substance; which [argument] he presented earlier: viz because the subject of substantial form is a being only in potency [ens in potentia tantum].

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