(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti. §


THE DIVISION OF THE ARTS ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE. 1. An overview of the arts in the Aristotelian tradition. Cf. Marcus Berquist, Good Music and Bad. Excerpt from a lecture given at St. Thomas Aquinas College, Ojai, California, Oct. 1991:
At the beginning of his Metaphysics, Aristotle divides art into three genera. 1 There are the arts which produce necessary and useful things, for example carpentry. These are called “servile” because they provide instruments of life and of the good life. Secondly, there are the arts which aim at recreation and delight, what we now call the “fine” arts. The poet and the musician seek to please, and yet this pleasure is not the end of life. Life is not for the sake of recreation and amusement. Thirdly, there are the arts whose end is knowledge, for example geometry. The proper end of geometry is to know about magnitude and figure. Such arts are called “liberal” because they befit a free man, having value in themselves, because in and of themselves they make us know something about something worth knowing. And knowing is, largely, the end of life. The difference between the first and the third of these genera is evident. In the first genus, knowledge is simply for the sake of the making. If we could have the product without the knowledge we would not bother about the knowledge. Whereas in the third case the end sought is the knowledge itself. But as regards the second genus, the fine arts, the contrast is not so clear. Middles, things in between, are always hard to define. But we can say this. The poet, the painter, and the musician, are like the carpenter in this respect at least: their knowledge is for the sake of some work. The art of the poet is for the sake of the poem that he composes or the play or the story, the art of the musician is for the sake of the composition that he makes, the art of the sculptor is for the sake of the statue, and so on. The end of these sciences is making, not knowing, and making is for the sake of the thing made. Nevertheless, when we consider the use of the products of these arts, the fine arts, we perceive a certain likeness to the liberal arts. For the use of the products is not “use” in the ordinary sense; it’s in being seen or being heard, that is to say, in some act of knowledge, and knowing something is not using it in the ordinary sense. Thus, when we listen to the poet or the musician, we are not using his product to bring about some further effect by means of it, but we are ourselves being affected. But this affecting is in the first instance a kind of knowing, involving maybe both sense and intellect. Thus we see why these arts are called “fine”, at least when compared with the servile arts. The use of the products, here, is a sort of knowing. Next, we ask what do these fine arts produce such that they should receive such a use? Aristotle, at the beginning of the Poetics, gives a kind of an answer. He says this: “Our subject being poetry, I propose to speak not only of the art in general, but also its species and their respective capacities”, and then he goes on a little bit further “Epic poetry and tragedy, as also comedy, dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation. But at the same time they differ from one another in three ways: either by a difference of kind in their means, or by differences in their objects, or in the manner of their imitation”. From the discussion that follows in Aristotle’s text, we see that Aristotle also regards painting and sculpture to be modes of imitation. Aristotle, then, regards this to be a most general and fundamental difference between the fine arts and the other arts. Accordingly, an artist of this sort is essentially a maker of imitation. And thus Aristotle goes on to differentiate among the fine arts on this basis. These arts differ from one another by a difference in the objects imitated, the means of imitation, and the manner of imitation.

Cf. I. 1 (981b 7—982a 35), given below. –ed.


Cf. Mortimer J. Adler, The Great Treasury of Western Thought. 16.1 The Realm of Art:
As used by almost all of the authors quoted, from the Greeks down to the end of the eighteenth century, the word “art” refers to skill in the making of anything—a shoe or a ship as well as a poem or a painting or, for that matter, a demonstration in mathematics or a political oration. The artist is a man who has a specific skill to some degree. Those who happen to make something without art do so entirely by chance. Since the word “art” is used to refer to the skill possessed by a maker; it is not used to refer to the thing he makes, the object he produces. That is a work of art. The terms thus used are not evaluative. They do not signify the achievement of excellence. Artists may have more or less skill; works of art may be more or less good. It is only in the last few centuries that the term “art” has become so restricted that it refers only to literary and musical compositions, paintings, and sculptures, and the like; it is even narrowed further in the familiar expression “literature, music, and the fine arts,” in which the last phrase refers exclusively to what hangs on walls, stands on pedestals, or is enclosed in cases. When the phrase “fine art” was coined (it makes its first appearance in the age of Immanuel Kant), it was used to distinguish one group of arts from all others, i.e., those arts the products of which are an end (Latin, finis) in themselves—to be enjoyed for what they are rather than used for some ulterior purpose. The basic points made in the discussion of art in general apply equally to the fine arts, the useful arts, and the liberal arts. Writers call our attention, for example, to the fact that a work of art may either have an enduring existence or be a transient process. A statue and a poem, like a house or a chair, endure in themselves after the artist has finished his work; not so the performance of an actor or a dancer on the stage, the speech of an orator, and the operation of a surgeon.

Cf. J.A. Oesterle, “Art,” The New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York, 1967). Vol. 1:
There is no simple yet comprehensive definition of art; the word has in fact many meanings. The Greek and Latin equivalents (techne, ars) can include broadly everything customarily grouped under the label of fine art, and servile and liberal arts as well. Even when narrowed to fine art, the word retains ambiguity in at least two important respects. First, whatever community of meaning the various fine arts share, distinctive differences among them prevent the name’s remaining exactly the same in meaning; poetry and painting, for example, are not art in a wholly identical sense. Current usage tends to limit the meaning of art to painting and sculpturing. Second, within the context of fine art, art may signify the product of art, the creative process itself, or the experience of appreciating a work of art, sometimes referred to as aesthetic experience. This article deals with art from a broad, philosophical point of view, considering its definition and division, the notion of fine art, and problems associated with the latter’s finality. Notion of Art. In the Western tradition, the original meaning of art is skill in making; the word was used by the ancient Greeks to refer, first of all, to the crafts that satisfy basic human needs. Throughout the dialogues of Plato and the writings of Aristotle, this meaning of art is the basic one employed to explain all other skills, whether physical or mental. Art was also early recognized as a sign of a certain excellence, testifying to man’s progress beyond what nature can provide. Aristotle accordingly points out that he who invented any art was naturally admired by men as being wise and superior to the rest. “But as more arts were invented, and some were directed to the needs of life, others to recreation, the inventors of the latter were naturally always regarded as wiser than the former, because their branches of knowledge did not aim at mere utility (Meta. 981b 16-19). Art as “the capacity to make


Art uses knowledge to produce a work. and thus pertains to a science. the understanding of nature in terms of art has been fruitfully pursued. This Greek conception of art dominated the Middle Ages and persists in modern times. knowing is for the sake of producing. readily lends itself to being shaped into a table. in the middle of the 18th century. and however much the understanding of one leads to an understanding of the other. It is equally evident that such making. Art also differs from prudence or practical wisdom. This division is basic. Plato and Aristotle in ancient times. But in the last 200 years the fine arts have been approached in a quite different spirit.according to sound reason” (Eth. 1140a 20) was accordingly extended to what we now call liberal and fine art. “art imitates nature. In such a view. even though both arise from the human mind. for although both involve reason. The history of the meaning of art is the history of man’s progress from making products immediately necessary for living to making things ordered to knowledge or enjoyment. prudence is a moral as well as an intellectual quality in man. however much art and nature resemble each other. The most obvious type of makeable object is one that exists in external physical matter. The development of art in the Renaissance undoubtedly accelerated this tendency. existing independently of the human mind. initially at least. there is a distinct world of fine art and aesthetic experience. the work produced. The narrowing of the meaning of art to fine art. from nature. In science. In art. a chair or a bed. and the corresponding resolution of a theory of art to aesthetics is a relatively modern contribution. wood. we seek to understand that something is so or why it is so. made major contributions to what is now regarded as a philosophy of fine art. they remain quite distinct. Aristotle appeals to the making of a statue or a bed to help understand how natural change takes place. referring as it does to a difference in the work to be made. Art and Prudence. figures are constructed in mathematics. It is in this context of making as resembling natural processes that Aristotle’s often misunderstood dictum. True enough. is generally regarded as the first to try to construct a systematic aesthetics in the modern sense. Both art and science are knowledge.” should first be grasped before it is applied to fine art. for example. Nevertheless. as the writings of Galen and Harvey show. medicine. therefore. Craftsmanship enabled man to attain a grasp of the operations of nature. they are concerned with distinct kinds of activity: work and behavior. Alexander Baumgarten. a special creative imagination and sensibility are thus required to appreciate the distinctive values found in such works. emphasizing an association of art and beauty and stressing the autonomy of fine art. preexists in some other natural object. This distinction does not prevent some disciplines from being both art and science. The common notion of art as skill also distinguishes art from science. but the man himself comes from another man. is the result of 4 . Art and Nature. For example. and thus there is both knowledge and production. In another area. In the Physics. and various writers in the Middle Ages. Kinds of Art. Nic. the form of a living natural object. for such matter is susceptible to receiving an artificial form. while still viewing nature as a work of divine art. but art is ordered to something apart from knowledge itself. Art has been traditionally divided into liberal and servile. Much of Plato’s Timaeus seeks to render the pattern of the universe intelligible by comparison with man’s own making. The likeness of the work of art exists first in the mind of the maker. A chair comes from a man’s mind. Art and Aesthetics. for he soon noted strong resemblances between the way he produces something and the way in which nature works. Prudence therefore involves the moral order in a way that art does not. prudence uses knowledge to deliberate well and to arrive at decisions regarding what is to be done to ensure right behavior. namely. at the same time what is produced is a subject of demonstration. Art and Science. consequently.

The useful arts pro-duce things to be enjoyed not in and for themselves.g. order is brought into man’s thinking when he establishes what a proposition is or how we reason in a valid way. There is. for example. is secondary. another division must be considered. We see also that although the name “art” first signifies manual craft. we are familiar also with the traditional division of the liberal arts into the trivium (logic. any functional value it might have. that is. and not just spontaneously. there is an indetermination in the mind of man requiring that he set in order his means of knowing. considering the work produced. art is further divided into useful and fine. is something we construct deliberately. The object of a wholly liberal art.bodily effort on the part of the maker. and the church in stone or brick. Liberal art is less evidently art because the making involved is not a transitive action. for example. whereas poetry as such in no way is a liberal art. such as a shovel. is art in a less obvious sense. Liberal Art. grammar. 5 . terminates outside the agent in some product that comes to exist in physical matter. grammar. though originating in an agent. Further. Though the distinction of servile and liberal is basic. that the name “art” refers primarily to servile art. the fact that poetry has never been classified as a liberal art suffices. 2 Music. understood as a liberal art. in fact. yet proportionally. and rhetoric could be termed useful in the sense they are not ends in themselves. for the poet and composer produce their works primarily by immanent action. for example. and this feature characterizes such art as servile. Such constructions enjoy existence in the mind and imagination. that has a kind of significance inciting enjoyment of a form wholly lacking to a merely useful product. not a priority of perfection. see the additional excerpt from Marcus Berquist below. with respect to the latter. an activity which.. liberal art is primary. On the former. is entirely distinct from the composing art which comes under poetica. Liberal art. adequate expression. but for some other good. forming the agent rather than some external physical object. The painting is viewed primarily for itself. geometry. but immanent activity that both originates and terminates within the agent. therefore. e. it is not particularly revealing in regard to fine art which. provided that beauty is taken in a properly aesthetic sense. moreover. The servile arts would here be classified as useful. and rhetoric) and the quadrivium (arithmetic. To appreciate the distinctive character of fine art. or persuasion. From the standpoint of purpose. is immaterial. nevertheless. in the manner of a mathematical figure. since the subjects and purposes of these arts pertain to the mind of man whereby he is set free from lack of order. Liberal arts such as logic. Some fine arts are liberal. music and astronomy). A syllogism. The reason for this division can be shown in a painting. Fine Art. this priority is in the order of naming. the action involved in such making is transitive. for example. These characteristics of servile art indicate. Some prefer to make this point by saying that the end sought in the work of fine art is the contemplation and enjoyment of beauty. the statue in stone. would fall within the liberal division. found primarily in the mind or the imagination of the artist. We are nonetheless familiar with the extension of the name liberal art. and their works exist chiefly in the imagination. We thus see the reason for calling such arts liberal. therefore. thus the painting is embodied on canvas and paint. cuts across that division. Such an object does not involve making in the original sense. but are sought as indispensable aids for bringing about knowledge. as suggested earlier. The productions of fine art are contemplated and enjoyed for their own sake (which does not preclude their also being ordered to another extrinsic end). a distinctive and unique type of enjoyment that arises in the viewing or hearing of a work of fine art consequent upon the equally distinctive type of contemplation realized in appreciating the work.2 Other fine arts are servile in the sense that the objects made require external physical matter and labor for their existence. poetry and music. its location in a particular area.

it cannot wholly escape reference to human experience of reality. From an Aristotelian point of view. for the mind and imagination of the artist is also a source. The use of music to accompany drama or motion pictures obviously manifests this. arousal and resolution. no matter how utilitarian they are. The word “imitation” is subject to easy misunderstanding (“representation” might serve better for a modern reader). Finality refers to a good or purpose. There is equal. and hence the division into useful and fine should not be understood too rigidly. The tendency to identify them may originate in the fact that the most evident instances of artistic imitation occur in the visual arts where imitation is associated too readily with natural or photographic likeness. originally expressed in the intonation of the human voice. do so more subtly and with more elaborate technique. What is peculiar to fine art is that imitation (and delight in imitation) is the immediate end sought in fine art. Artistic imitation by no means rests upon a complete dependence of the image upon some original in nature from which it proceeds. even the most “abstract” forms of musical composition. this consideration falls under the scope of prudence. it is not to be identified with more or less literal copying. 6 . very few products of human art. Analysis of Fine Art. As human beings. on the other hand. the artist may be working for a morally good or bad cause. It is realized also in proportionately different ways in other arts. more serious works. It is imitative in the sense that a work of art represents something other than itself. Even 20th-century music bears witness to such primal representational principles as tension and release. by means of tonal and properly musical progressions. We have already noted that in a sense all art imitates nature. It always involves some degree of abstraction. Though music is sometimes regarded as a non-imitative art. pleasing form. design. Music represents the flow of passion. the novel or the drama. dependence of the image upon man’s creative imagination and understanding. sometimes in operation. A shoe is clearly a product of a useful art. does not represent in a visual manner nor is it imitative in the sense that it copies natural sounds. Thus the artist can intend the work for propaganda or some other foreign end. and this is one way art and morality may be related. escape our passion for artistic enjoyment. and indeed a more significant one. this refers both to the purpose of the artist and to the work of art itself. Artistic imitation. what sets off fine art from either liberal or servile is imitation. therefore. the differences among the fine arts come from the manner and means of imitation. being some sort of sign or symbol. we project our desire for beauty of form onto objects around us as much as possible. One could say that the common object of all fine art is human action and passion. the facts of musical history belie this observation. Hence no artist merely reproduces some aspect of reality. Finality of Art. it thus has reference to some aspect of reality as we experience it. no matter how “abstract” or “nonobjective” the work of art.It is worth noting that man’s preoccupation with beauty. yet we find it both necessary and desirable that a shoe look good. The history of painting and sculpturing reflects this movement within these extremes. of course. We humanize our environment in precisely this way. over and beyond the good of art itself. In the poetic arts the object of imitation is the action and passion of men as reflected variously in the poem. In other words. in fact. if not more. carries over into many useful products of art. In any event. in art. Such imitation should therefore be understood as creative. and so on. Music. whereas imitation serves only as a means in liberal or servile art. is a broad notion ranging from the one extreme of approaching a somewhat literal representation of reality to the opposite extreme of retaining only a tenuous but still significant representation of some quality detected in reality. the expected and the unexpected. The artist then acts as man rather than as artist. sometimes in appearance. It is creative as well.

as artist. while not itself of a moral nature. image and concept. Most of all. such delight arises from seeing in a work of creative representation an object that is more expressly formed and more intelligible than the original referent. tragic. One end is the arousal and release of the emotions wherein lies the great appeal art has for man. however in that it disposes us for the ulterior end of artistic contemplation and delight. The artistic image. Artistic contemplation is a distinct kind of knowing. Art and Contemplation. and with whom the spectators can identify themselves. it is an imaginative reconstruction of some aspect of reality and life we are familiar with. intelligibility. So far as this can be summarized generally. As far as the relation of art and the moral order is concerned. the moral order enters into the work of art as a formal constituent.Morality of Art. The power of art lies in its simultaneous appeal to the senses and the understanding. and yet the work has its self-contained inevitability. the intrinsic end of art cannot be overtly moral. in fact. tone. There is the initial sense of delight accompanying the grasp of such qualities as color. an intrinsic relation between art and morality is evident in the following way. it is more intuitive than discursive. This is primarily so in poetic art and proportionally so in other arts. art suffers when used merely to propagandize morality. or of the order of elements in a work of sculpture or a drama. but in such a way that something universal is realized in it. the intelligibility and delight we find in a tragedy depend in great measure on grasping some moral grandeur in the action of the hero. the development of a musical composition images in tonal progression the movement of human passion at its finest. realized proportionately in the different arts. line. and beauty of much art. and chiefly in its moral character. and voluntary acts are moral acts. Hence it can be maintained that when a moral dimension enters into the construction of a work of art. can thus express man in some way acting as a moral agent. Consequently. Art and morality may also be related within the work itself. is twofold. It is one thing for a moral dimension to enter into the artistic representation. it is quite another to make the work of art specifically moral in its aim. The sound of music is better formed and more discerning than the sound of speech as normally expressive of passion. For example. for human action and passion are voluntary. and harmonic construction of a musical composition. or joyful. melodic. what should be excluded from good art is the artist’s representing what is morally good as evil and what is morally evil as good. then. Such a work of art images human nature in its various manifestations. and sound. Whatever is universal in art is realized in this sense medium. it is a knowledge of what need not be. The action of the play is more intelligible and more significant than human action ordinarily is. We are thus led to recognize a finality of art which. however. Moreover. It is knowledge especially appropriate to the human mode of knowing: an intimate union of sense and intellect. the artist. 7 . otherwise. Aristotle’s notion of catharsis manifests this point in relation to tragedy. has an obligation to represent as morally right what is morally right or what is morally wrong as morally wrong. the moral order contributes to the delight. is a type of man exemplified individually by his action. it bears on the singular. for art represents the flow of emotional tension and release more skillfully than our normal experience usually permits. the tragic hero. There is the intellectual delight attendant upon the grasp of order entering into the rhythmic. whether noble. rather than of what must be. imagination and understanding. Whenever the work of art creatively represents something of human action and passion. it must be both concrete and abstract. The cathartic end in art is instrumental. accompanied by a distinct type of delight. which is at once an action of sense and intellectual appetite. he will be unconvincing as an artist and will fail to move us in the manner that is appropriate to art. At the same time. Any work of art is an idea expressed by an image in the artist’s mind and in an appropriate sense medium. Therein lies the source of special delight that accompanies this contemplation. for example.

Ojai. a part of the quadrivium. But the work of mousike techne. but it is also dispositive. the consonances they make. 8 . contemplation with its ensuing delight. tantalizing the mind with promises of hidden meaning waiting to be uncovered. and the arts whose end is pleasure. music not only amuses and pleases. the imitative or fine arts. We see in music a kind of unity and harmony between the passions and reason. the following: Cf. is to produce an imitation naturally delightful to man by moving his passions in accordance with reason. in Book VI of Plato’s Republic. For in the final analysis. without a great deal of experience. the work of the liberal art of music is to apply formal number to sounds as matter in order to understand such things as intervals. is the liberal art of music. which is of political and social as well as familial concern. On the question of music as a liberal art distinguished from the poetic art of music. for new significance and vitality always emerge in enduring works of art. a doctrine which you have not derived from that subject matter. Therefore it pertains to ethics and politics to consider it. as a mode of imitation. in Book II of his Laws. and in Book VIII of Aristotle’s Politics. This is the easiest sort of order for us to see and appreciate. constantly fluctuating between an image and an original. it is a kind of recreation and rest from life’s effortful activities. the work of art is simply the worth of man himself as mirrored in his creative representations. never exhausts the significance set in motion by the initial experience of the work of art. The third consideration of music in the course of study is in ethics and political philosophy. these species mutually exclude one another. Thomas Aquinas College. This kind of order is a good thing to see at the beginning because it is proportioned to us. which examines music in the light of certain mathematical principles which it exhibits. Good Music and Bad. Even the young. which is perhaps a sufficient reason for its being. California. The next place that music would come up in the course of study is in a way analogous to Aristotle’s consideration of tragedy in the Poetics. It pertains to education. which is concerned with the acquisition of virtue. can apprehend an order of this kind. It has an effect on the soul for good or for ill. N. Such artistic finality. Oct. as well as the logical sciences. music is considered in terms of education. We find this.Artistic contemplation. which is imitation. in the opinion of Aristotle and Plato and many others. This is because. As we shall endeavor to establish below. The remarks of our author. for example. and from a consideration of its peculiarities. The unterminating character of this contemplation is the main reason we enjoy over and over again the same work. Here. are accordingly confused. As we explain at length elsewhere.B. constitutes the primary worth of art. 1991 (excerpt): There are three places in the course of study where music is considered. imitation of what? and by what means? We can contrast this with the kind of treatment you’d have in a liberal art where you are applying a doctrine which is abstract and general to a particular subject matter. cf. Lecture given at St. As Aristotle’s discussion at the outset of the Metaphysics makes clear. the art of music. the former comprehending what have come to be called the servile or mechanical arts. and the specific differences. The first in the order of learning. Marcus Berquist. The numerical ratios and proportions you study in harmony are common to music and other things as well. Here. but from a more general and abstract consideration. then. We are all concerned that citizens be good men. and the scales composed of them. This would be a thorough or definitive consideration in terms of the proximate genus. the first division of the arts is into those which have been found out for their usefulness and those which have not. we first see in the order of learning that music is characterized by a reasonable order.

The Promethean gift of fire to men. art is most readily associated with beauty. the sorter of the wool. Painting. If the liberal arts are praised as highest. it formed an integral part of social life. Seeing it also as the root of “artifice” and “artificial. 1952). he constantly turns to the productions of the cobbler and the weaver and to the procedures of the husbandman and the physician. In contemporary thought. the spinner. are supposed to constitute skills of mind. Lucretius. laws. We are acquainted with such phrases as “the industrial arts” and “arts and crafts” in which the reference is to the production of useful things.” This restricted usage has become so customary that we ordinarily refer to a museum of art or to an art exhibit in a manner which seems to assume that the word “art” is exclusively the name for something which can be hung on a wall or placed on a pedestal. In our thought the first connotation of “art” is fine art. The contraction of meaning has gone so far that the word “art” sometimes signifies one group of the fine arts – painting and sculpture – as in the common phrase “literature. The ancient and traditional meanings are all present in our daily vocabulary. roads. The prevalent popular association reflects a tendency in the 19th century to annex the theory of art to aesthetics. Even when Socrates analyzes the art of the rhetorician.” “beaux arts” or “Schöne Kunst” (arts of the beautiful). however defined or enumerated. and song. because the logician or rhetorician works in the medium of the soul rather than in matter. and Rousseau. the scribbler. Chapter 1. they are called arts “only in a manner of speaking” and by comparison with the fundamental arts which handle physical material. Adler. As Huizinga points out. as in the Gorgias. all life’s luxuries. We recognize that “art” is the root of “artisan” as well as “artist.Cf. yet its historical connections with utility and knowledge are probably more intimate and pervasive. in referring to the production of a woolen coat. with many others. This naturally led to the identification of art with one kind of art – the so-called “fine arts. of course. Rewards and pleasures. correct the assumption. I{I}. the dyer. writing in a line that goes from Homer through Thucydides and Plato to Francis Bacon.” As late as the end of the 18th century. the connections between art and fashion were closer than at present. music. Adam Smith follows the traditional usage which begins with Plato when. Our discussions of liberal education should require us to consider the liberal arts which. the wool-comber or carder.” In the first great conversation on art – that presented in the Platonic dialogues – we find useful techniques and everyday skills typifying art. and the fine arts. he says: “The shepherd. the weaver.” We thus discern the presence of skill in even the lowest forms of productive labor. The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World (Chicago. carried with it various techniques for mastering matter – the basic useful arts. We are not unfamiliar with the conception of healing and teaching as arts. the dresser. Vol. also Mortimer J. which raised them from a brutish existence. by reference to which all other skills are analyzed. and all the rest. arms. Smith. walls. in the thought of all previous eras the useful arts came first. and sculpture – these were taught 9 . farms. attributes the progress of civilization and the difference between civilized and primitive society to the development of the arts and sciences: Ships. “at the close of the Middle Ages. Art had not yet fled to transcendental heights. must all join their different arts in order to complete even this homely production. A moment’s thought will. “Art” (Introduction): Art THE WORD “art” has a range of meanings which may be obscured by the current disposition to use the word in an extremely restricted sense. the fuller.” we realize that art is distinguished from and sometimes even opposed to nature.

” Sometimes we use it to name the effects produced by human workmanship.Slowly. The fine arts and the speculative sciences complete human life. and man as regards his soul is free. on the other hand. We elliptically refer to works of art as art. in a fashion. we look upon the health or knowledge which results from healing or teaching as natural. “Metallurgy and agriculture. of course. as the mind Went forward searching. in being knowledge of how to make something or to obtain a desired effect. are called sciences simply. Science. Knowledge is sometimes identified with science.g. like science and moral action. are. in the other as the effect. The fine arts and the speculative sciences come last. art seems to be primarily in the mind and work of the cobbler or sculptor and only derivatively in the objects produced. it is distinct from both in aiming at production.” writes Aquinas. imagination and thought. but liberal arts. is knowledge that something is the case. What is effected is a certain ennoblement of matter. but only fragments of such a classification are ever explicitly presented. “were the two arts which produced this great revolution” – the advance from primitive to civilized life. a very little at a time. and not arts. or a fitting speech.” identifies it with making as distinct from doing and knowing. belongs to the mind and involves experience and learning. in order to distinguish them from those arts which are ordained to works done by the body. Aristotle tells us that is “why the mathematical arts were founded in Egypt. and cultivating the soil. inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul. They are not necessary – except perhaps for the good life. We might. e. or that a thing has a certain nature. We do not find art in them. “there is something by way of work. or the work of counting or measuring. which arts are. involving a true course of reasoning. those sciences which are not ordained to any suchlike work. 10 . in the progress of civilization. On the other hand.” says Rousseau. At the beginning of this progress Lucretius places man’s discovery of the arts of metalworking. too. So.” THERE IS ANOTHER ambiguity in the reference of the word “art. The leisure without which they neither could come into being nor prosper is found for man and fostered by the work of the useful arts. in defining art as a “capacity to make.” <…> THE DISCUSSIONS OF ART in the great books afford materials from which a systematic classification of the arts might be constructed. domesticating animals. as in navigation or military strategy. call a landfall or a victory a work of art. for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure. They are the dedication of human leisure and its best fruit. Sometimes we use it to signify the cause of the things produced by human work – that skill of mind which directs the hand in its manipulation of matter. There are many spheres of art in which no tangible product results. to the exclusion of art or skill. Art is both in the artist and in the work of art – in the one as cause. but rather in the skill of the healer or teacher who has helped to produce that result. Hence whatever habits are ordained to suchlike works of the speculative reason. but by his thought or knowledge. in medicine and teaching. called arts indeed. not first. servile. Hence even in the case of the shoe or the statue. “Even in speculative matters. Aristotle.. the making of a syllogism. By practice and by trial. but we tend rather to speak of the art of the navigator or the general. by a kind of comparison. The more generic meaning of art seems to be that of art as cause rather than as effect. a transformation produced not merely by the hand of man. Though art. but we depart from this narrow notion whenever we recognize that skill consists in knowing how to make something.

and logic (or dialectic) to parallel Plato’s consideration of arithmetic. The imitation merely indicates the use.” Aristotle’s treatise deals mainly with this art – poetry. without harmony. even though the arts of medicine and teaching may aid in their production. and the art of the play of sensations. the theory of art as imitation poses many questions which Aristotle left unanswered. quality. Aristotle’s principle also suggests questions about the useful arts. There is. and their ordered relation to one another. architecture. Fruits and grains would grow without the intervention of the farmer. RHETORIC. if ever.. with a view to communicating themselves to one another as completely as possible. for example. “are used as means by some . music. Apart from the issue of its truth. THE MOST FAMILIAR distinction between arts – that between the useful and the fine – is also the one most frequently made in modern discussion. in prose or in verse. “Color and form. particular liberal arts receive so rich and varied a discussion in the tradition of the great books that the consideration of them must be distributed among a number of chapters. . Quite apart from the problem of how they are ordered to one another. yet its divisions are seldom. and music. the protective function of calloused skin). The least familiar distinction among the arts is implied in any thorough discussion. nor is there any analysis of the relation of the first three arts to the other four – traditionally organized as the trivium and the quadrivium. These arts. . further. and the teacher imitate nature distinguish these three arts from the way in which a statue is an imitation. Are such arts as shoemaking and house-building imitations of nature in the same sense as poetry and music? Does the way in which the farmer.” he finds three corresponding fine arts: “the art of speech. of course. Health and knowledge are natural effects.” Since such expression “consists in word. . the products of the useful arts must be said to imitate a natural function (the shoe. in Augustine’s work On Christian Doctrine we have a discussion of these arts as they are ordered to the study of theology. stand in sharp contrast to those skills whereby man produces the useful things which. If there are answers in the great books. more fully discussed in the chapters on MEDICINE and EDUCATION. but for 11 . The principle that all art imitates nature suggests the possibility of distinguishing and relating the various arts according to their characteristic differences as imitations – by reference to the object imitated and to the medium and manner in which it is imitated by the poet. an art which imitates by language alone. and MATHEMATICS. is the means in the dancer’s imitations . painting and landscape gardening. A different principle of division is indicated in the opening chapters of Aristotle’s On Poetics. geometry. The principles of classification of the fine arts are laid down by Kant from “the analogy which art bears to the mode of expression of which men avail themselves in speech. Some of man’s productions are intended to be used. who imitate and portray many things by their aid. do not receive full explication. sculptor or painter. formative art. To describe them in terms of imitation. the seven liberal arts are enumerated by various authors. gesture. others to be contemplated or enjoyed. without harmony. been as frequently challenged as approved. rhetoric. LANGUAGE (for the discussion of grammar). such as LOGIC. or a house? The Aristotelian dictum about art imitating nature has. some arts work toward a result which can hardly be regarded as an artificial product. but their distinction from other arts.For example.. But in the products of the fine arts. or a poem. Rhythm alone. they are there by implication rather than by statement. There is no treatment of grammar. yet the farmer helps them to grow more abundantly and regularly. and the voice is used by others .” In these terms he analyzes rhetoric and poetry. named. the physician. and astronomy in The Republic. the imitation of the form. and tone.” Aristotle writes. or other aspect of a natural object is considered to be the source of pleasure. That orientation of the liberal arts is also the theme of Bonaventure’s Reduction of the Arts to Theology. The criterion of the distinction needs little explanation. sculpture. . it does not develop for the other fine arts the analysis it suggests. Within the sphere of useful art. and it is the use which counts. However. and musician.

is separated from poetry and sculpture.” Freud’s theory of sublimation of emotion or desire through art seems to connect with Aristotle’s theory of emotional catharsis or purgation. Logic. One. or to find some pleasure in such resemblances. But by other principles of classifycation. rather than imitation or communication. but not last. points out. In the one case. medicine. their “instinct of workmanship . According to Freud. as liberal from fine art. Nevertheless. according to Smith. music may simulate the tonal qualities and rhythms of the human voice registering the course of the emotions. We encounter this notion first. But there is also a conception of art which. The arts which cooperate with nature usually work with living matter. But Freud is attempting to account for the origin of art. . along with grammar. in the other. THERE ARE TWO OTHER major issues which have been debated mainly with respect to the fine arts. already mentioned. or at least its motivation. leaves it a mystery – the spontaneous product of inspiration. The distinction seems warranted and clear. as fine from useful art. Each raises a question about the nature of art in general and challenges any analysis of the arts to classify them and explain their peculiarities. however. On the question of state control over the production and 12 . the work of unfathomable genius. as in agriculture. than a desire to imitate nature. the poet or artist “forces us to become aware of our inner selves in which the same impulses are still extant even though they are suppressed. it is said. and the intelligibility of its principles. attempt to explain art. foregoing explanation.man’s work. They transform dead matter into commodities or tools. the arts of cooking and hunting. but whatever other use they may have. the motivation of artistic creation lies deeper. The opponents of imitation do not deny that there may be some perceptible resemblance between a work of art and a natural object. concerns the imitative character of art. and the mathematical arts. do not directly augment the wealth of nations. Veblen. like poetry or logic. It is worth noting. that a parallel problem of political regulation occurs in the sphere of the industrial arts. When the word “liberal” is used to state this last distinction. Yet it is cut across by Smith’s division of labor into productive and nonproductive. as before. A drama may remind us of human actions we have experienced. it is emotion or subconscious expression. and Aristotle is trying to describe an effect proper to its enjoyment. were free from matter. the industrial arts are of the second sort. or imitation. helping to create the ties of human brotherhood. could not effect their products except by shaping matter. it is the artist’s activity itself which imitates or cooperates with nature’s manner of working. its meaning narrows. of a divine madness. The work of agriculture is associated with industry in the production of wealth. which is the deepest spring of art. or arts concerned with processes of thinking and knowing. at least in the sense that they worked productively in symbolic mediums. This last division had its origin in the recognition that some arts. The theories of communication. must stand the test of questions about particular arts. poetry and sculpture are separated from logic and carpentry. It signifies only the speculative arts. For the most part.” If to the foregoing we add the division of the arts into liberal and servile. THE OTHER MAJOR controversy concerns the regulation of the arts by the state for human welfare and the public good. in Plato’s Ion. physicians and teachers. According to Tolstoy. rhetoric. . Here. disposes men to look with favor upon productive efficiency. The adequacy of any classification. like sculpture and carpentry. whereas some arts. and teaching. the arts of war and government. the fine arts (chiefly poetry and music) have been the focus of the debate. the things which the artist makes by operating on passive materials supplied by nature imitate natural forms or functions. expression. would be totally lacking. As another economist. the major traditional distinctions are covered. the arts serve primarily as a medium of spiritual communication. The great books frequently discuss the arts of animal husbandry and navigation.

Aristotle stands on Plato’s side in many particulars. in the first text excerpted above. which by common consent have ever been deemed the best. and that these are not coextensive with the imitative arts. As we have seen. Smith and Marx represent extreme opposites. Charles De Koninck: To the first [I answer] that the property of the art of imitating delightfully is not preserved in a beautiful work of art as such. or the arts of the beautiful.” (NOTULA IN IA PARTIS Q. not law and the reason of mankind. but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State. 1. and J. Marcus Berquist.” Such a view presupposes a certain theory of the fine arts and of their influence on the citizens and the whole character of the community. A. AD 1) It is clear from this statement that De Koninck understood the term “fine arts” to be the same as the beaux arts. going on to cite Aristotle as his authority for concluding that they all agree in producing an imitation. IX. § N. identifies them with “what are now called the ‘fine’ arts”. as Milton and Plato are poles apart on the question of the state’s right to censor the artist’s work. Mill with Milton. In this debate. but in a delightful imitation. compare the following remark from his teacher. And so arts of imitating delightfully are abusively equated with those which are called “fine arts. Plato argues in The Republic that all poetry but “hymns to the gods and praises of famous men” must be banned from the State. they do not see any reason in individual liberty for the state to refrain from interfering with the rights of the artist for the greater good of the community. But how did he conceive the relationship between the two? Which was the genus and which the species? 13 . The problem of censorship or political regulation of the fine arts presupposes some prior questions. either in epic or lyric verse.distribution of wealth. In this regard. S.B. Yet because both Plato and Aristotle judge that influence to be far from negligible. speaking of the arts which “aim at recreation and delight”. “for if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter.

983a) (tr. and similarly in the case of Socrates and in many individual cases. but really science and art come to men through experience . But while the lifeless things perform each of their functions by a natural tendency. but act without knowing what they do. he will often fail to cure.2. and actions and productions are all concerned with the individual. [980b] Therefore the former are more intelligent and apt at learning than those which cannot remember. Now art arises when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgement about a class of objects is produced. and men of mere experience cannot. and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience (which implies that wisdom depends in all cases rather on knowledge). For even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves. 14 . but to judge that it has done good to all persons of a certain constitution. And in general it is a sign of the man who knows and of the man who does not know. but even when we are not going to do anything. that the former can teach.g. but Callias or Socrates or some other called by some such individual name. (We think the manual workers are like certain lifeless things which act indeed. [981a] Experience seems pretty much like science and art. The physician does not cure man. and any other race of animals that may be like it). we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. while the others know the ‘why’ and the cause. Malcolm Heath): [980a20] All men by nature desire to know. but the human race lives also by art and reasonings. but the latter do not.) Thus we view them as being wiser not in virtue of being able to act. for not only with a view to action. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses. and recognises the universal but does not know the individual included in this. Aristotle’s consideration of the arts: their place in the rise of first philosophy. and above all others the sense of sight. 1-2 (980a 20. Hence we think also that the masterworkers in each craft are more honourable and know in a truer sense and are [981b] wiser than the manual workers. and have but little of connected experience. though not in others. a man has the theory without the experience. For artists can teach.’ as Polus says.for ‘experience made art. Now from memory experience is produced in men. For men of experience know that the thing is so. who happens to be a man. The reason is that this. for it is the individual that is to be cured. and therefore we think art more truly knowledge than experience is. If.g. is a matter of experience.) But yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to experience. but do not know why. except in an incidental way. then.this is a matter of art.. and related matters. and men of experience succeed even better than those who have theory without experience. and those which besides memory have this sense of hearing can be taught. marked off in one class. By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation. ‘but inexperience luck’. the labourers perform them through habit. Metaph. The animals other than man live by appearances and memories. and from sensation memory is produced in some of them. those which are incapable of hearing sounds are intelligent though they cannot be taught (e. and this because the former know the cause. to phlegmatic or bilious people when burning with fevers) . makes us know and brings to light many differences between things. for the several memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience. because they know the causes of the things that are done. Aristotle. the bee. but of having the theory for themselves and knowing the causes. With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to art. most of all the senses. For to have a judgement that when Callias was ill of this disease this did him good. as fire burns. the definetion of art. Cf. art of universals. when they were ill of this disease )e. I. (The reason is that experience is knowledge of individuals.

for by reason of these. and the superior science is more of the nature of wisdom than the ancillary. and some were directed to the necessities of life. At first he who invented any art whatever that went beyond the common perceptions of man was naturally admired by men. in every branch of knowledge. then.Again. [982a] and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of wisdom than the productive. for they are farthest from the senses. that he who can learn things that are difficult. e. We suppose first. and from these. as has been said before. which we have about wisdom and the wise. in a higher degree. but the less wise must obey him. 15 . that which is desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of wisdom than that which is desirable on account of its results. and the first principles and the causes are most knowable.g. the masterworker than the mechanic. the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any sense-perception whatever. We have said in the Ethics what the difference is between art and science and the other kindred faculties. again. this might perhaps make the answer more evident. the knowledge of which is wisdom. but the point of our present discussion is this. and more authoritative than any ancillary science. Now of these characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge.g. and this end is the good of that thing. for he knows in a sense all the instances that fall under the universal. but because he was thought wise and superior to the rest. so that. as far as possible. And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences. But they do not tell us the ‘why’ of anything . This is why the mathematical arts were founded in Egypt. also. Clearly then wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes. and not easy for man to know. Hence when all such inventions were already established. And the most exact of the sciences are those which deal most with first principles.e. are on the whole the hardest for men to know. yet surely these give the most authoritative knowledge of particulars. and not these by means of the things subordinate to them. the sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or at the necessities of life were discovered. that he who is more exact and more capable of teaching the causes is wiser. because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility. the most universal. [1. the artist wiser than the men of experience. we must inquire of what kind are the causes and the principles. and such is the knowledge of that which is most knowable). and first in the places where men first began to have leisure. not only because there was something useful in the inventions. we do not regard any of the senses as wisdom.2] Since we are seeking this knowledge. Such and so many are the notions. why fire is hot. that all men suppose what is called wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things. for the people who instruct us are those who tell the causes of each thing. others to recreation. all other things come to be known. arithmetic than geometry. although he has not knowledge of each of them in detail. is wise (sense-perception is common to all. But as more arts were invented. that the wise man knows all things. and he must not obey another. and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. for the wise man must not be ordered but must order. then. they only say that it is hot. and therefore easy and no mark of wisdom). and that of the sciences. But the science which investigates causes is also instructive. the inventors of the latter were naturally always regarded as wiser than the inventors of the former. And understanding and knowledge pursued for their own sake are found most in the knowledge of that which is most knowable (for he who chooses to know for the sake of knowing [982b] will choose most readily that which is most truly knowledge. for those which involve fewer principles are more exact than those which involve additional principles. If one were to take the notions we have about the wise man. for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure. And these things. secondly.

g. or God above all others. But we must end in the contrary and. for (i) God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle. for there is nothing which would surprise a geometer so much as if the diagonal turned out to be commensurable. as we said. 16 . then. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (for this reason even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom. for it was when almost all the necessities of life and the things that make for comfort and recreation had been secured. Evidently then we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage. so we pursue this as the only free science. and about the genesis of the universe. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and of the stars.Judged by all the tests we have mentioned.): [1140a] The class of things that admit of variation includes both things made and actions done. 5 (1140a 1-24) (Oxford tr. but as the man is free. that there is a thing which cannot be measured even by the smallest unit. the end. the better state. for doing is not a form of making. Nicomachean Ethics. most divine. Yet the acquisition of it must in a sense end in something which is the opposite of our original inquiries. but none is better. For all men begin. by wondering that things are as they are. the name in question falls to the same science. Hence the rational quality concerned with doing is different from the rational quality concerned with making. On the definition of art. evidently they were pursuing science in order to know. and so is any science that deals with divine objects.e. and all who excelled in this knowledge would be unfortunate. as they do about self-moving marionettes. indeed. We have stated. what is the nature of the science we are searching for. ‘bards tell a lie’). But the divine power cannot be jealous (nay. there is something in what the poets say. nor making a form of doing. for it seems wonderful to all who have not yet seen the reason. nor should any other science be thought more honourable than one of this sort. are more necessary than this. that such knowledge began to be sought. Aristotle. For the most divine science is also most honourable. for the good. and (ii) such a science either God alone can have. and this science alone must be. cf. For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophise. e. VI. and what is the mark which our search and our whole investigation must reach. for it alone exists for its own sake. in two ways. or about the solstices or the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with the side. for the myth is composed of wonders). and jealousy is natural to [983a] the divine power. so that according to Simonides ‘God alone can have this privilege’. All the sciences. That it is not a science of production is clear even from the history of the earliest philosophers. For in many ways human nature is in bondage. then. And this is confirmed by the facts. nor is one of them a part of the other. who exists for his own sake and not for another’s. this must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes. then. and not for any utilitarian end. we say. But making is different from doing (a distinction we may accept from extraneous discourses). If. is one of the causes. they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties. i. according to the proverb. as is the case in these instances too when men learn the cause. For the science which it would be most meet for God to have is a divine science. it would probably occur in this case above all. and this science alone has both these qualities. and it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him. Hence also the possession of it might be justly regarded as beyond human power. according to the proverb. therefore since they philosophised order to escape from ignorance. then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters.

In this particular as in some others the Lacedaemonians are to be praised.2 2 That education should be regulated by law and should be an affair of state is not to be denied. and Art of Chance. and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole. and make education the business of the state. it is manifest that education should be one and the same for all. Aristotle. cf. Neither must we suppose that any one of the citizens belongs to himself. and are each of them a part of the state. On the difference between liberal and illiberal occupations.1 For each government has a peculiar character which originally formed and which continues to [15] preserve it. nor any such quality which is not an art. since these have their efficient cause in themselves.not as at present. Politics. Again. is not concerned with doing. The character of democracy creates democracy. 1-3 (1337a 8—1338b 7) (tr. that reasons truly. that reasons falsely. concerned with making. for Art does not deal with things that exist or come into existence of necessity. for the exercise of any faculty or art a previous training and habituation are required. that reasons truly. All Art deals with bringing some thing into existence. being concerned with making. x. And in a sense Art deals with the same objects as chance. and to pursue an art means to study how to bring into existence a thing which may either exist or not. is a rational quality. is a rational quality. For mankind are by no means agreed about the things to be taught. Both deal with that which admits of variation. It follows that an art is the same thing as a rational quality. and gives them separate instruction of the sort [25] which he thinks best. Nic. and how young persons should be educated. concerned with making. this public education. there is [35] disagreement about the subjects. as Agathon says: Chance is beloved of Art. clearly therefore for the practice of virtue. when every one looks after his own children separately. and it is also a rational quality concerned with making. the better the government. Jowett): 1 No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention above all to the education of youth. [20] Art. and not private. for they all belong to the state. 1180a 24. Lack of Art. but what should be the character of 1 Cp. and that it should be public. for the neglect of education does harm to the constitution The citizen should be molded to suit the form of government under which he lives. Its opposite. and always the better the character. 2 Cp. therefore. nor is there any art which is not a rational quality concerned with making. whether we look to virtue or the best life. are questions which remain to be considered. But as doing and making are distinct. B. concerned with making. VIII.Now architectural skill. the training in things which are of common interest should be the same for all. [20] And since the whole city has one end. or according to nature. v. for instance. Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned with intellectual or with 17 . and the character of oligarchy creates oligarchy. it follows that Art. is an art. 1310a 12-36. and the efficient cause of which lies in the maker and not in the thing made. Eth. for they take the greatest pains about their children. As things are. as has been said.

whereas occupation is always accompanied with exertion and effort). art. and gymnastic exercises are thought to infuse courage. VIII. however. With respect to the latter. what ought we to do when at leisure? Clearly we ought not to be amusing ourselves. Pol. for the emotion which they create in the soul is a relaxation. the first principle of all action is leisure. Concerning music a doubt may be raised– in our own day most men cultivate it for the sake of pleasure. for. and from the pleasure we obtain rest. 3 The customary branches of education are in number four. but if done for the sake of others. but to use leisure well. 18 . and they should be our medicines. 3 Cf. 3 4 a Cp. be the [1337b] aim of our training. or with a view to excellence the action will not appear [20] illiberal. and if he attend to them too closely. my brief discussion at the end of this paper. but by those who have leisure. and therefore the question must be asked. cf. 1277b 3. wherefore we call those arts vulgar which tend to deform the body. for different persons. the same evil effects will follow. and springs from the noblest sources.4 requires that we should be able. Both are required.moral virtue. 7 (1341 a 32 ff. [15] There are also some liberal arts quite proper for a freeman to acquire. The received subjects of instruction. But if this is inconceivable. and amusement is needed more amid serious occupations than at other times (for he who is hard at work has need of relaxation. but only in a certain degree. we should introduce amusements [40] only at suitable times. iii. in order to attain perfection in them. but leisure is better than occupation and is its end. and likewise all paid employments. 39-b3. which makes the body or soul or mind of the free-man less fit for the practice or exercise of virtue. The existing practice is perplexing. [40] no one knows on what principle we should proceed– should the useful in life. and amusement gives relaxation. since all men [5] deem it to be accompanied with pleasure and not with pain. 4 are partly of a liberal and party of an illiberal character. [35] for then amusement would be the end of life. for they absorb and degrade the mind. The object also which a man sets before him makes a great difference. if he does or learns anything for his own sake3 or for the sake of his friends. For he who is occupied has in view some end which he has not attained. 5 (1340a 1-12) and VIII. all three opinions have been entertained. the very same action will be thought menial and servile. and varies according to the habit of individuals. and to young children should be imparted only such kinds of knowledge as will be useful to them without vulgarizing them. they are– (1) reading and writing. starting with different ideas about the nature of virtue. Again. the pleasure of the best man is the best. or science. There can be no doubt that children should be taught those useful things which are really necessary. Of these. is regarded differently by different persons. (2) gymnastic exercises. to [25] which is sometimes added (4) drawing. reading and writing and drawing are regarded as useful for the purposes of life in a variety of ways. not only to work well. naturally disagree about the practice of it. as well the related ends of education and katharsis. which treats of this end. but originally it was included [30] in education. but happiness is an end. And any [10] occupation. as I have already remarked.). or should the higher knowledge. not by the busy man. as I must repeat once again. for occupations are divided into liberal and illiberal. which are experienced. but not all [5] useful things. or should virtue. This pleasure. (3) music. is vulgar. as has been often said. because nature herself. about the means there is no agreement. 3 But leisure of itself gives [1338a] pleasure and happiness and enjoyment of life.

must hereafter be determined. useful for a more correct judgment of the works of artists. 383 7 Od. then. in the acquisition of knowledge and in political life. whereas those kinds of know-ledge which are useful in business are to be deemed necessary. “But he who alone should be called6 to the pleasant feast. who creates in them the roper habit of body. Xvii. [20] for neither of these is to be gained from music. the use of music for intellectual enjoyment in leisure. but because it is liberal or noble. but also because many other sorts of knowledge [40] are acquired through them. Xvii. Od. and to the wrestling-master. [15] which are useful in money-making. which is in fact evidently the reason of its introduction. Further. [35] that the ancients witness to us. and if so. for their opinion may be gathered from the fact that music is one of the received and traditional branches of education. And therefore our fathers admitted music into education. 385. With a like view they may be taught drawing. or in order that they may not be imposed upon in the [1338b] buying or selling of articles. it is clear that children should be instructed in some useful things– for example. and how they are to be imparted. for it is not necessary. and these are to be valued for their own sake. § 19 . 8 9 Od. but in Aristotle’s text it probably came instead of. 525 ff. in reading and writing– not only for their usefulness. not to prevent their making mistakes in their own purchases. nor indeed useful in the same manner as reading and writing. and therefore boys should be handed over to the trainer.”8 [30] It is evident. There remains. Rep. 9 Thus much we are now in a position to say. Plato. sitting in order. this being one of the ways in which it is thought that a freeman should pass his leisure. and the body be trained before the mind.” [25] and afterwards he speaks of others whom he describes as inviting “The bard who would delight them all. To be always seeking after the useful does not become free and exalted souls. then. Whether this is of one kind only. which gives health and strength. Ix. and exist for the sake of other things. or after. in the management of a household. hear the voice of the minstrel. nor like drawing.It is clear then that there are branches of learning and education which we must study [10] merely with a view to leisure spent in intellectual activity. what they are. 10 Now it is clear that in education practice must be used before theory. that there is a sort of education in which parents should train their sons. or of more than one. nor again like gymnastic. who teaches them their exercises. 7. not as being useful or necessary. not on the ground either of its necessity or utility. 10 Cp.”7 The line does not occur in our text of Homer. 6 And in another place Odysseus says there is no better way of passing life than when men's hearts are merry and “The banqueters in the hall. but perhaps rather because it makes them judges of the beauty of the human form. as Homer says. An unfulfilled promise. vii.

that he has a comprehension. primo ostendit. First. Victor. 1. then. quantum ad investigationem differentiarum unius rei ad aliam. 31 (tr. ab aliis distinguentem. secundo respondet cuidam obiectioni. 6 I. et non propter utilitatem. differentem. but distinguishing with respect to the investigation of the differences of one thing from another. that is. and not because of their usefulness. First. the Nicomachean Ethics. In I Meta. Second. et circa hoc duo facit. and a discrimination of causes beyond the comprehension of other men. unde alia litera habet.6 But he shows the first thing he said by an argument of this sort.) In the Morals.A. B.3. Cf. as if to say. are more admirable and more worthy of the name of wisdom because of their more eminent comprehension. ibi. a judgment. and not on account of the usefulness of what he discovered. In any sciences or arts where one finds that on account of which men characterized by knowing are held in admiration or honor before other men.e. Or otherwise. p. illae scientiae sunt magis honorabiles. in moralibus. with respect to the subtlety of his inquiry into the causes of the thing he has discovered. a considering or “looking” art. quod ars speculativa magis est sapientia quam activa. he responds to a certain objection. et magis dignae nomine sapientiae. sapientem quidem.1 (tr. 62): “… [T]he practical may be called active. Cf. as it may be read passively. quasi in hoc ab aliis distinguatur. he shows that a speculative art is more wisdom than an active one. 20 . St. in quibuscumque scientiis vel artibus invenitur id propter quod homines scientes prae aliis hominibus in admiratione vel honore habentur.): LB1LC-1N. likewise ethical. Thomas Aquinas. n.31 deinde cum dicit primum quidem comparat artem activam speculativae. another text has “differently”.… he compares active art4 to speculative. propter hoc quod habet sensum et iudicium et discretionem causae ultra aliorum hominum sensum. he was distinguished in this from others. Certain sciences. in fact. indeed. For this reason. sicut sapientem et ab aliis distinguentem. ergo scientiae aliquae sunt magis admirabiles et magis dignae nomine sapientiae propter eminentiorem sensum. vel aliter. ut passive legatur. a practical or “doing” art. Jerome Taylor. moral. II.M. (where he says. et non propter utilitatem illorum quae invenit: sed magis admiramur.32 4 Then when he says. those sciences are more honorable and more worthy of the name of ‘wisdom’. Now any discoverer of an art is held in admiration on account of this. tali ratione. distinguishing from other things. quilibet autem inventor artis habetur in admiratione. That is. But we admire him rather as wise and distinguishing from other things. from the fact that morals consist in good action”. Didascalicon.. there. ostendit autem quod primo dictum est.5 And with respect to this he does two things. Hugh of St. St. Thomas Aquinas on certain matters pertaining to the arts. 5 That is. Wise. LB1LC-1N. lect. quantum ad subtilem inquisitionem causarum rei inventae: distingueentem vero.

vel ad voluptatem. a sacerdotibus. sicut etiam legitur in genesi. of which sort are the speculative sciences. or for pleasure. just as we also read in Genesis. like the logical sciences. and who were kept at the public expense.” i. necessity or pleasure]. like the mechanic. sicut scientiae logicales: illi artifices dicendi sunt sapientiores. many arts had been discovered for their usefulness. quae sunt maxime speculativae. sicut artes quae sunt ordinatae ad hominum delectationem: When. those artisans were called wiser whose sciences were not discovered for their usefulness.e. that is. speculativae non sunt propter huiusmodi the speculative ones have been discovered not repertae. qui sunt concessi studio vacare. id est acquisitis vel repertis omnibus huiusmodi. ubi primo homines studuerunt circa talia. acquired or discovered. And so the mathematical arts. et quod non sint ad utilitatem inventae. cuiusmodi sunt scientiae speculativae. but on account of the very knowing. in locis enim illis primo repertae sunt. abounding in necessary things. LB1LC-1N.33 et quod speculativae scientiae non sint inventae ad utilitatem. iam partis. et de publico expensas habebant. as are the arts ordained for man’s delight. sicut mechanicae. resting from effort they were free from other occupations. as if to say. patet per hoc signum: quia. 21 . to whom it was permitted to be free from labor.cum igitur plures artes sint repertae quantum ad utilitatem. quaedam vero ad introductionem in aliis scientiis. unde et circa aegyptum primo inventae sunt artes mathematicae. of which certain ones are for the necessities of life. were first discovered by the priests in the vicinity of Egypt. And that the speculative sciences were not discovered for their usefulness is clear through this sign: since in everything of this sort already brought forth. Another text has. alia litera habet. patet ex loco quo inventae sunt. but for the sake of themselves [that is. et primum his locis ubi vacabant. id est ab aliis occupationibus quiescentes studio vacabant quasi necessariis abundantes. sed propter seipsas. quarum quaedam sunt ad vitae necessitatem. which can serve for leading into the sciences. for the sake of this sort [of end. And that they were not discovered for their usefulness is clear from the place where they were discovered. vel ad necessitatem vitae. therefore. or for the necessities of life. for their own sakes]. sed propter ipsum scire. but some for an introduction [or a leading] into the other sciences. which are the most speculative. For those [sciences] were first discovered in the place where men first were eager in the pursuit of such things. quae possunt esse ad introductionem in scientiis. “and first in those places where they were free from labor. quorum scientiae non sunt ad utilitatem inventae.

6 (tr. for this reason prudence is there called right reason about doable things. lest someone think all these names to be synonyms signifying entirely the same thing. in quo differant scientia et ars et sapientia et prudentia et intellectus. unde ibidem dicitur caput scientiarum. sapientia et scientia et intellectus sunt circa partem animae speculativam.LB1LC-1N. ars vero dirigit in factionibus. saying that this that is said. ibid. for which reason art is called right reason about makeable things. sed propter ipsam Then when he says. Cf. And they differ. n. It is made known.M. science. But because the name of ‘art’ was used. idest ad sextum ethicorum. understanding.34 sed quia usus nomine artis fuerat et sapientiae et scientiae quasi indifferenter. but science is of conclusions gathered from inferior causes. however . quod hoc quod dictum est. and understanding have to do with the speculative part of the soul. for prudence directs in actions which do not pass over to external matter. ne aliquis putet haec omnia esse nomina synonyma idem penitus significantia hanc opinionem removet. to the sixth book of the Ethics. i. science. quia intellectus est habitus principiorum primorum demonstrationis. as it were.. 3. wisdom. sicut aedificare et secare: unde dicitur quod ars est recta ratio factibilium. And (to put the matter briefly). lect. But they differ because understanding is the habit of the first principles of demonstration. namely. he proves the same thing through a sign. but for the sake of the know- 22 . quam ibi scientificum animae appellat. differunt autem. For this reason.e. that wisdom or philosophy is not sought for the sake of some usefulness. scientia vero est conclusionis ex causis inferioribus. But prudence and art have to do with the practical part of the soul. but are perfections of the agent. but wisdom considers the first causes. indifferently of both wisdom and science.A. prudence and art differ has been stated. prudentia vero et ars est circa animae partem practicam. B.): LB1LC-3N. he removes this opinion and refers to the book of Morals. quae est ratiocinativa de contingentibus operabilibus a nobis. But art directs in productions which pass over into exterior matter. which he there names the scientific soul. as to build and to cut. scilicet quod sapientia vel philosophia non sit propter aliquam utilitatem quaesita.-6 deinde cum dicit testatur autem probat idem per signum. where that in which wisdom. sed sunt perfectiones agentis: unde dicitur ibi quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. et ut breviter dicatur. ubi dictum est. dicens. et differunt: nam prudentia dirigit in actionibus quae non transeunt ad exteriorem materiam. et remittit ad librum moralium. in the same place it is called the head of the sciences. sapientia vero considerat causas primas. to which it belongs to reason about contingent things that can be done by us. quae in materiam exteriorem transeunt.

but as introductory to the other arts. because it is sought by all the other habits.scientiam. lect. Then when he says. etc. namely. For this reason.) Since house-building. but for its own sake. ledge itself. quae non propter se quaeruntur. ibi. et circa hoc tria facit. testatur accidens. i. sed propter seipsam. et quae sunt etiam ad eruditionem necessaria. and those which are also necessary for instructtion.. which consists in a certain repose of life. Thomas Aquinas. which are not sought for their own sakes. by the event. but for the sake of itself. First. tunc primo incoepit quaeri talis prudentia. determinat de habitibus qui perficiunt intellectum circa contingentia. those which are for the necessity of life.A.. idest ad voluptatem.. sed ut introductoriae ad alias artes. at which those inquirers of philosophy have arrived. however.M.-9 deinde cum dicit contingentis autem etc. quae in quadam vitae quiete consistit. idest sapientia.. for pleasure. St. however. It is clear from this that it is not sought for the sake of any necessity other than itself. wisdom. 23 . Cf. and those which are for leisure. first began to be sought. (where he says. And with respect to this he does three things. ex quo patet. that is. quod non quaeritur propter aliquam necessitatem aliam a se. Second. For when in them nearly the whole [of the arts and sciences] were in existence. unde. etc.) Concerning prudence. as are the logical sciences. patet quod non propter aliquid aliud ipsa quaesita est. secundo determinat de uno eorum. about art. there.): LB6LC-3N. tertio determinat de altero. he determines about the other one. however. sicut scientiae logicales. et quae sunt ad pigritiam. Third.. ibi: de prudentia autem sic utique etc. nam cum eis cuncta fere existerent. 9-19 (tr. 3. For no one will seek what he has. about prudence. there. sed propter seipsam: nullus enim quaerit hoc quod habetur. idest eventus. he determines about the habits by which the intellect is perfected with respect to contingent things. quia autem aedificativa etc. scilicet de arte. quae sunt ad necessitatem vitae. is made known by what has happened. In VI Ethic. etc. he shows that there are two habits concerned with contingent things. that is. scilicet de prudentia. B. n. he determines about one of them. That which can have itself otherwise. qui circa inquisitores philosophiae provenit. namely. then of such things prudence [ sophrosyne]. (where he says.e. primo ostendit duos esse habitus circa contingentia. quia omnibus aliis habitis ipsa quaesita est. it is clear that it is not sought for the sake of something other than itself.

Therefore. i. because something of it can be done.dicit ergo primo. sicut aedificare. is other than a making [or productive] habit which is with reason. and to cut. bespeaks an operation passing over into exterior matter for the sake of forming something from it. For doing bespeaks an operation remaining in the doer [or agent] himself.10 et his possumus assentire per rationes exteriores. quia neque actio est factio. Knowledge of contingent things. factio autem dicitur operatio transiens in exteriorem materiam ad aliquid formandum ex ea. nor making doing. which is art. in the ninth book of the Metaphysics. sicut neque actio et factio continentur sub invicem. scilicet prudentia. For they are distinguished by opposite differences. as is clear from what has been said. inasmuch as belongs to knowledge only. scilicet in ix metaphysicae. as to see. and something can be made. sit alius ab habitu factivo qui est cum ratione qui est ars. est autem utilis contingentium cognitio secundum quod est directiva humanae operati-onis quae circa contingentia est. neque factio est actio. just as neither are doing and making contained under each other. One must consider. And we can assent to this through exoteric accounts. contingentia praetermittuntur ab intellectu qui perficitur per cognitionem veritatis. since neither is doing making. what happens to have itself otherwise is divided into two. to burn. idest per ea quae determinata sunt extra istam scientiam. quod contingens aliter se habere dividitur in duo. that one is making [or production] and the other is doing [or action]. prudence. through those things which have been determined outside this science. however. consequens est quod habitus qui est activus cum ratione. that because knowledge of contingent things cannot have the certitude of truth.e. LB6LC-3N. distinguuntur enim oppositis differentiis. it follows that a habit which is doing [or active] with reason.11 est autem considerandum quod quia contingentium cognitio non potest habere certitudinem veritatis repellentem falsitatem. however. making. is useful according as it is directive of a human operation which is concerned with contingent things. namely. ideo quantum ad solam cognitionem pertinet. contingent things are passed over by the understanding which is perfected by knowledge of the truth. therefore. et quod unus eorum non contineatur sub alio. namely. nam actio dicitur operatio manens in ipso agente. ut ex dictis patet. ibi enim ostensa est differentia inter actionem et factionem. which indeed is known through this. however. driving out falsehood. urere et secare. to understand. for there the difference between doing and making has been shown. intelligere et velle. quia aliquid eius est agibile et aliquid est factibile. 24 . sicut videre. and that one is not contained under the other. and to will. quod quidem cognoscitur per hoc quod alterum est factio et alterum est actio. because habits are distinguished according to their objects. LB6LC-3N. He says therefore first. as to build a house. quia ergo habitus distinguuntur secundum obiecta.

determinat materiam artis. however. et primo de ipsa arte secundum se. secundo quae sit artis materia. ibi.12 deinde cum dicit: quia autem aedificativa etc. Then when he says: Since house-building. LB6LC-3N.. is. secundo de arte per comparationem ad oppositum eius. that. treating about the intellectual virtues only according as they are joined to human operations. however. et iterum quod est habitus quidam ad faciendum aliquid cum ratione.et ideo contingentia divisit tractans de intellectualibus virtutibus solum secundum quod subiiciuntur humanae operationi. scilicet cum ratione. that it is a certain habit for making something with reason. about art through a comparison with its opposite. And therefore he divides contingent things. ut supra dictum est. therefore. namely. ars quidem igitur etc. primo ostendit quid sit ars. there. etc. primum manifestat per inductionem. what the matter of art is. Speculative sciences.. Wherefore it is obvious that art is the same thing as a making habit with true reason. which is not an art. determinat de arte. with reason. et nulla ars invenitur cui hoc non conveniat. etc. Second. neither is there found such a making habit.13 deinde cum dicit: est autem ars etc.) Art indeed. est autem ars omnis etc. as was said above. Then when he says: Art is. He manifests the first through induction. videmus enim quod aedificativa est ars quaedam. qui non sit ars.. First. however. scilicet in particulari. are not concerned with contingent things except according to universal notions. unde manifestum est quod idem est ars et habitus factivus cum vera ratione. And first about art in itself according to itself. he shows what art is. he determines about art. etc. quod scilicet sit habitus factivus cum ratione. neque invenitur talis habitus factivus. circa primum duo facit. Wherefore only the practical sciences are concerned with contingent things inasmuch as they are contingent.. second. and again. he determines the matter of art. it be a making habit with reason. 25 . namely. (where he says.. ibi.. About the first he does two things. namely. unde et solae scientiae practicae sunt circa contingentia.) Every art. For we see that house-building is a certain art. (where he says. LB6LC-3N. And no art is found to which this does not belong. etc. scientiae autem speculativae non sunt circa contingentia nisi secundum rationes universales. there. inquantum contingentia sunt. in particular. however.

third. But the third is to constitute the work itself. with the constitution and completion of a work. et ideo dicit quod omnis ars est circa generationem. secunda autem est operari circa materiam exteriorem. id est circa operationem artis qua disponit materiam. in not being.. The second is that the principle of generation in artificial works is in the maker alone as extrinsic to them.) For neither about these things. and it is also about the consideration of how something may be made by art. et opus quod est per artem factum. About the matter of art. et secundum modum quemdam etc. but not in the thing made as intrinsic. quod quando fiunt incipiunt esse de novo. (where he says.) And in a certain way. quorum primum est quod ea quae fiunt per of which the first is that those things which are artem humanam sunt contingentia esse et non made by human art are contingent in being and esse. there.e. LB6LC-3N. however.e. tertio ostendit cum quo conveniat in materia.14 ex parte vero ipsius operis duo est considerare.et circa hoc tria facit: primo ponit artis materiam. prima quidem est considerare qualiter aliquid sit faciendum. which he puts first as the end of art: and it is also about contriving by art. tertia autem est constituere ipsum opus. he shows from what it differs according to its matter. sed non in facto quasi intrinsecum. etc. ibi. And therefore he says that every art is concerned with generation. The first indeed is to consider how something must be made. The second. from not having existed before]. he shows with what it agrees in matter. however. And about this he does three things: first. i.. about the operation [or working] of art which disposes its matter. id est circa constitutionem et complementum operis. that when they are made they begin to be de novo [i. there. (where he says. etc. the action itself of the artisan which is directed by art. secundo ostendit a quibus differat secundum suam materiam. and the work which is made by art. he puts down the matter of art. which is clear from this. there are two things to consider. quod patet ex hoc. 26 . namely. i.e. secundum est quod principium generationis artificialium operum est in solo faciente quasi extrinsecum ab eis. second. quod primo ponit tamquam finem artis: et est etiam circa artificiare. There is. scilicet ipsam actionem artificis quae per artem dirigitur. est autem triplex operatio artis.. But on the part of the work itself there are two things to consider. neque enim de his etc. is to work on exterior matter. circa materiam autem artis duo est considerare. et est etiam circa speculari qualiter aliquid fiat per artem. a threefold operation of art. ibi.

which are about those things which are. utraque enim est circa ea quae fiunt per intellectum.. ostendit cum quo conveniat ars in materia. of necessity.17 tertio ibi: quia autem etc. necesse est quod ars sit factionis directiva et non actionis. quae sunt secundum naturam.) neither about these things. et hanc convenientiam agathon designavit dicens.. (where he says. quae est de his quae sunt secundum naturam.. For those things which are according to nature have in themselves a principle of motion. etc.. fortuna sine ratione. quae sunt de his quae ex necessitate sunt vel fiunt. he shows its difference from natural science. LB6LC-3N. ostendit differentiam ad scientiam naturalem. primo quidem ad scientias divinas et mathematicas. it is necessary that art be directive of making and not of doing. of which prudence is directive. there. ut dictum est. ostendens differentiam artis ad tria. For neither about these things. showing the difference between art and three things. about which there is no art. quod non competit operibus artis. he shows the difference between art and prudence. or are made. habent enim ea. (where he says.LB6LC-3N. he shows with what art agrees in matter.15 deinde cum dicit neque enim de his etc. as they agree in matter. et dicit quod fortuna et ars sunt circa eadem secundum aliquem modum. insofar. as was said.. and luck art . quod ars dilexit fortunam. he manifests what was said. saying that art loves luck. And he says that luck and art are concerned with the same thing in some way. which does not befit works of art. LB6LC-3N. however. as is said in the second book of the Physics. et dicit. And this agreement Agathon pointed out. about which there is no art.18 deinde cum dicit: et secundum modum quendam etc. but art with reason.19 Then when he says: And in a certain way. cuius est directiva prudentia. etc. And he says that because doing and making are different from each other. LB6LC-3N. de quibus non est ars. Second. luck without reason. namely. for each is about those things which are made through understanding.. Third.. manifestat quod dictum est. there. First indeed.) Because. 27 . inquantum scilicet in materia conveniunt.16 secundo ibi: neque de his etc. et fortuna artem. de quibus non est ars. etc. in seipsis principium motus. [the difference between art and] divine science and mathematics. LB6LC-3N. Then when he says. ostendit differentiam artis ad prudentiam. sed ars cum ratione. ut dicitur in ii physicorum. etc. quod quia actio et factio sunt altera invicem.

q. Therefore. 33. B. ergo sicut prudentia inter virtutes morales ponitur cardinalis virtus. Thomas Aquinas. 23. ita et ars. ut dicitur in 6 ethic. cf.. St. secundum quod transit in exteriorem materiam transmutandam. according as it passes over into the exterior matter to be transmuted. But as is said in the sixth book of the Ethics. and so prudence. determinat de arte per comparationem ad eius oppositum. ut dictum est. according as one’s operations and passions are modified. dist. quod fit per virtutes morales. 4a. 28 . On the mechanic arts. et ideo prudentia. (tr. To the fourth it must be said that in the consideration of the true there is a certain operation of the intellect to which the intellectual power is ordered: but the habits which are called ‘operative’ are ordered last to an exterior operation which is called ‘making’. Cf. as has been said. q. et dicit. art. as was said before.A. est quidam habitus factivus cum vera ratione. is called in the sixth book of the Ethics ‘right reason in things to be done’. recta ratio agibilium. e contrario est habitus factivus cum ratione falsa circa contingens aliter se habere. Thomas Aquinas. therefore. ad quam virtus intellectualis ordinatur: sed habitus qui operativi dicuntur.): DS23 QU1 AR4A RA4 ad quartum dicendum. art. quod contingit in operibus virtutum moralium. ita et ars mechanica poni debet. id est inertia. sicut prudentia est perfectio rationis practicae. so is art. etc.. ordinantur ulterius ad exteriorem operationem quae dicitur factio. 6. but mechanic art. In III Sent. Further. ad 6. the rightness of practical reason consists in conformity to right appetite. In III Sent.deinde cum dicit: ars quidem igitur etc. which happens in works of moral virtue. ‘right reason about makeable things’. which is produced by the moral virtues. just as prudence is placed among the cardinal virtues. ut praedictum est. quae in eis dirigit. is a certain making habit with true reason. on the contrary. Then when he says: Art indeed. secundum quod sistit in operante. 1. ita athennia..): DS33 QU2 AR1C AG6 praeterea. as is clear in mechanic works: and it is called action according as it exists in the one operating. in conformitate ad appetitum rectum. dicitur in 6 ethic. obj. 2. B. ars vero mechanica recta ratio factibilium. so atechnia. quod consideratio veri est quaedam operatio intellectus. And he says that just as art.e. which directs in them.M. St..A. ad 4 (tr. i. is a making habit with false reason about something happening to have itself otherwise. prout ejus operationes et passiones modificantur. just as prudence is a perfection of practical reason. dist.M. he determines about art through a comparison to its opposite. sed rationis practicae rectitudo et veritas consistit. ut patet in operibus mechanicis: et dicitur actio. quod sicut ars. so mechanic art ought to be put there. 1. unskillfulness..

prudence] is reckoned among the moral. 6. called ‘right’ in two ways. judging. secundum quod ea quae in appetitu sunt. Thomas Aquinas. and so about this there should be prudence.DS33 QU2 AR1C RA6 ad sextum dicendum. eo quod ad prudentem pertinet bene se habere circa consilia. et praecipiendo. according as those things which are in the appetite are ordered: and this rightness makes moral virtue. 2. B. unde etiam circa hoc oportet prudentiam esse. But this consists in the perfection of the soul. ideo cum moralibus virtutibus in materia communicat. propter quod inter morales computatur. cujusmodi est rectitudo quae est in artificiatis.. consiliando. inasmuch as. cujus ultima perfectio est debita operatio potentiarum animae.A. I reply that it must be said that prudence concerns those things about which there is counsel. uno modo in se. art. inquantum scilicet tendit in aliquid rectum extra se faciendum. and giving precepts. and this is [said] materially. hoc autem consistit in animae perfectione. 29 . obj. Now counsel regards contingent things which can be done by us. In one way in itself. it is necessary that there be counsel about those things which are ordained to man’s good simply. and because prudence conforms practical reason to appetite thus directly. ordinata sunt: et hanc rectitudinem facit virtus moralis: et quia prudentia conformat rationem practicam appetitui sic directo. oportet quod consilietur de his quae sunt ordinata ad bonum hominis simpliciter. et sic conformat rationem appetitui recto ars mechanica. et in eamdem operationem concurrit. namely. Cf. and so it is not reckoned among the moral virtues. et quia prudens dicitur bene consiliativus simpliciter. 33. alio modo dicitur appetitus rectus a rectitudine quae est extra ipsum. 1. by reason of the fact that it pertains to prudence to have oneself rightly about counsel by counseling.M. dist. But in another way the appetite is called “right” by a rightness which is outside itself. of which sort is the rightness which is in things made by art. q. And because the prudent man is said to good at counseling simply. on this account it [i. ideo non computatur inter morales virtutes. quod appetitus dicitur To the sixth it must be said that appetite is rectus dupliciter. et hoc est materialiter. In III Sent. c (tr. St.e. consilium autem est de contingentibus operabilibus a nobis. it tends into something right in things to be made outside itself. quod prudentia circa illa est de quibus est consilium. therefore when moral virtues communicate in matter and concur in the same operation. ad 6. the ultimate perfection of which is a due operation of the powers of the soul.): DS33 QU2 AR2A CO respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem. and thus mechanic art conforms reason to right appetite. judicando.

sunt propria materia prudentiae. existing in the one operating himself. and for this reason in this respect one is not called prudent simply. For this reason according to the Philosopher to act properly means an operation which is commanded by the will. 30 . but prudent in this. except per accidens. inquantum scilicet utitur eis quae facit: sed hoc accidit arti. circa agibilia dicuntur. which is the operation of mechanic art. lect. Cf. non est bene consiliari simpliciter. In Isaiam cap. c. inasmuch as one uses what he makes: but this happens to art. 1. And so things that can be done according as they are subject to counsel are the proper matter of prudence To the second it must be said that the activities of the mechanic art are ordered to the perfection of exterior matter. quod operationes artis mechanicae ordinantur ad perfectionem exterioris materiae. secundum quod sunt consiliabilia. 1 (tr. not passing over into exterior matter to be transmuted. B. ergo agibilia.M. and so counseling well in these matter is not counseling well simply. 3. et propter hoc secundum hoc non dicitur aliquis prudens simpliciter. but for some end. because this would be ‘to make’ [or ‘making’]. vel ad expediendum dubia negotia. And so prudence concerns those things in which the good of the doer consists. dicuntur factiones magis quam actiones. in ipso operante consistens.): DS35 QU1 AR1. St. For those things which pass over into exterior matter in order to perfect it are called ‘makings’ rather than actions. or for expediting a doubtful business. DS33 QU2 AR2A RA2 ad secundum dicendum.CO unde secundum philosophum agere proprie dicitur operatio quae est a voluntate imperata. art. sed ad finem aliquem.): CP3LC1 utiles autem sunt aliqui principibus ad regimen populi. et haec agibilia dicuntur.A. ea enim quae transeunt in exteriorem materiam ad perficiendum eam. For the moral virtues which perfect in the active life are said about things which can be done. Now there are certain principles useful for the rule of the people. and not to the perfection of the one doing them. et ideo bene consiliari de his. q. et circa eas est ars mechanica praedicta. et non ad perfectionem operantis. dist. sed prudens in hoc. and concerning these there is the aforesaid mechanic art. Thomas Aquinas.A. est prudentia. 1. Thomas Aquinas. St. morales enim virtutes quae in vita activa perficiunt. and these are called ‘doable’.. In III Sent. (tr.M.et ideo de his in quibus bonum operantis consistit. B. Cf. quod est operatio mechanicae artis. nisi per accidens. 35. non in materiam exteriorem transmutandam transiens: quia hoc esset facere.

” Now. is said in two ways. Now wisdom. The most universal wisdom is that which is the last degree in all the arts and sciences. substantiarum scilicet separatarum. which is prince. and so on in the other cases. cap. et sic de aliis. 8:7). and according us. Defining it in particular he says that it is the virtue by which a man is placed in the last degree of each art. 1: Chapter 1 THE OFFICE OF THE WISE MAN “My mouth shall meditate truth. according to the Philosopher. since the end of each thing is its good. the Philosopher includes the notion that “it belongs to the wise man to order. of separated. namely. is metaphysics. and likewise the wise craftsman. substances. ‘Architect’ means the principal artificer. secundum considerationem finis cujus scientiam habet in usu vel ratione. theology. qui praecipit artificibus inducere formam. For. universally and in particular. with an Introduction and Notes by Anton C. est metaphysica. and with respect to this he says. architector dicitur principalis artifex. and principally of the mechanic arts. ut medicinae: et dicitur sapiens medicus qui est certissimus in his quae sunt medicinae. and to prepare the matter. scilicet universalis et particularis. according to the consideration of whose end he has science in use or in reason. sapientia autem. from archos. the wisdom of the architect. has commonly held that they are to be called wise who order things rightly and govern them well. secundum philosophum. quod est ars. Hence. secundum philosophum. Thomas Aquinas. St. et haec. a thing is then best disposed when it is fittingly ordered to its end. 31 . among other things that men have conceived about the wise man. [1] The usage of the multitude. consiliarium: vel ad facienda aedificia. ab archos. Cf. Pegis (Notre Dame. et similiter sapiens faber. dicitur dupliciter. vel spiritualium. And so we see among the arts that one functions as the governor and the ruler of another because it controls its end. And in this way it is taken here. and this is that by which man is placed in the knowledge of the noblest things. 1975). And this. according to the Philosopher. particularem definiens dicit. et techne.et quantum ad hoc dicit. who gives precepts to the workmen to introduce the form. the rule of government and order for all things directed to an end must be taken from the end. Summa Contra Gentiles Book I: God. et praeparare materiam. as in in medicine: and the doctor is called wise who is most certain about those things which belong to medicine. of counsels: or for making buildings. and my lips shall hate impiety” (Prov. universalis sapientia est quae est ultimum in omnibus artibus et scientiis. et ista est per quam homo ponitur in cognitione nobilissimarum rerum. et hoc modo sumitur hic. and techne. Translated. et praecipue mechanicarum. quod est princeps. sapientem de architectis. or spiritual. quod est virtus per quam homo ponitur in ultimo cujuscumque artis. which according to the Philosopher is to be followed in giving names to things. which is art. et secundum nos theologia.

That is why. But he attributes this not to his own power but to God’s grace.” for planting is related to plants as the foundations to buildings. though he himself will be saved. which is also the origin of the universe. This is why he compares himself to a wise architect. 11 For no other foundation can any one lay than that which is laid. consequently. 148: 3-2 1 Cor 3:8b-15 8b And each shall receive his wages according to his labor. 15 If any man’s work is burned up. Consequently. who are called master artisans. it belongs to the wise man to consider the highest causes. because he considers the principal cause of the building. That is why the artisans devoted to these arts. as being the ruling arts. hay. he will receive a reward. the art of medicine rules and orders the art of the chemist because health. in which sense it is said that “as a wise architect. not where Christ was named. is called the chief artisan. 12 Now if any one builds on the foundation with gold. which is Jesus Christ. But Paul himself laid the foundation of the spiritual edifice for the Corinthians. I have laid a foundation. lest I should build upon another man’s foundation” (Rom 15:20). for the Day will disclose it. with which medicine is concerned. since these artisans are concerned. in each case. because it will be revealed with fire. (paragraphs 987-1046 trans. especially of a building. he is called wise in building. The name of the absolutely wise man. its end and arranges what is to be done by the subordinate artisans to realize the end . – In regard to the first he does two things: first. Here it should be noted that an architect. however. Trans. 3:10).Thus.P. Cf. 9 For we are God’s fellow workers. Fabian Larcher. yet not I but the grace of God with me” (1 Cor 15:10). The arts that rule other arts are called architectonic. 2. Let each man take care how he builds upon it.e. n. Commentary By Saint Thomas Aquinas On the First Epistle to the Corinthians. as a wise architect. is the end of all the medications prepared by the art of the chemist. saying: according to the commission of God given to me. (emphasis added) § 32 . precious stones. by Daniel Keating) (n. and another man is building upon it. 148. A similar situation obtains in the art of ship navigation in relation to shipbuilding. according to the Philosopher. straw— 13 each man’s work will become manifest. you are God’s field. O. abandoning the simile based on agriculture. wood. which is brought to completion by the activities of the manual laborers. because both signify expressly the first preaching of the faith: “I have preached this gospel.). and in the military art with respect to the equestrian art and the equipment of war. inasmuch as it is his duty to comprehend the entire arrangement of the whole work . 14 If the work which any man has built on the foundation survives. and the fire will test what sort of work each one has done. Now it is obvious that the entire structure of a building depends on the foundation. i. he describes his own labor under the likeness of a building. hence he said above.d. which is what he says: according to the grace of God given to me.. is reserved for him whose consideration is directed to the end of the universe. God’s building. silver. with the ends of certain particular things. They are therefore said to be wise with respect to this or that thing. “I have planted. But. I have laid the foundation” (1 Cor. 10 According to the grace of God given to me. like a skilled master builder I laid a foundation. it pertains to a wise architect to lay a solid foundation. but only as through fire. appropriate to themselves the name of wise men. they do not reach to the universal end of all things. 3. Who made me fit and worthy for this ministry: “I have labored more abundantly than all they. he will suffer loss.

or quadrivium. were discovered for their usefulness. as well as St. 1-2. or trivium. 5. the first division of the useful arts is into ‘productive’ and ‘not productive’. with additions from the Poetics. inasmuch as the logical arts compromising the threefold way. along with music and astronomy. Now those arts which were not discovered for the sake of their usefulness but on account of the very knowing or the knowledge itself aim at the honorable good. = the imitative arts) the figurative or plastic arts the poetic arts necessary for instruction (the logical sciences) (scientias logicales) 7 In regard to this division. Thomas’ treatment of logic and the liberal arts). coming under the fourfold way. On the principle of Aristotle’s division. 33 . form the quadrivium. go with the mathematical to form the liberal arts. the first two of these arts may be grouped together as ‘productive’. VII. Accordingly. Liberal Education. The division according to Aristotle and St. whereas the third. were not. Of course. Thomas Aquinas (Metaphysics. whether servile or fine . Since the arts aim at some good. for leisure or recreation. which is defined as that which is chosen for its own sake. What is the principle of Aristotle’s division of the arts in the Metaphysics? It is not difficult to determine. I. Its Parts and the Order among Them) (emphasis added) 8 Note that. it follows that as the good is divided.4. arts have been found out either for their usefulness or not: arts found out for their usefulness for the necessities of life: the mechanic or servile arts for pleasure—that is. sec. necessitating a recourse to a distinct principle to account for their being grouped together. so will be the arts. for man’s delight: the arts of imitation (now called by some the fine arts) as an introduction to the sciences: the logical sciences (= the arts of the trivium)8 arts not found out for their usefulness but for the sake of knowing the mathematical sciences: arithmetic and geometry (which. but his knowledge will be that of a judge rather than a producer. and the useful. whereas the mathematical sciences. as the text cited in the previous footnote makes clear.7 It is therefore evident that the so-called liberal arts (for which see my separate treatment) cut across the foregoing division. consider also the following: “ The productive arts. together with the trivium comprising the liberal arts) for their necessity to life (the servile or mechanical arts) house-building carpentry [other arts. ancient and modern] for pleasure (that is. are clearly no essential part of a free man’s education.” ( A Proposal for the Fulfillment of Catholic Liberal Education (Thomas Aquinas College Blue Book). But the good is threefold: the honorable. But the arts which were discovered for the sake of their usefulness aim at either the useful or the pleasing good. the pleasing. the logical sciences. he should be able to recognize and appreciate the various kinds of artifacts.

pertaining to the first act of the intellect (cf. the Predicamenta) pertaining to the second act of the intellect (cf. the De Interpretatione) pertaining to the third act of the intellect (cf. the division given below) the trivium or arts concerned with words (trivium seu artes sermocinales) grammar (grammatica) logic (logica) rhetoric (rhetorica) arts necessary for instruction (ad eruditionem necessaria) the logical sciences pertaining to the third act of the intellect apodictic or demonstrative science (apodictica seu demonstrativa scientia)9 dialectic or topic (dialectica seu topica) rhetoric (rhetorica) poetic (poetica) sophistic (sophistica) 6. The division of imitative art. imitative art (ars imitandi) figurative or plastic art (ars figurandi)10 poetic art (ars poetica) 7. The division of figurative or plastic art. in two dimensions: graphike (Gk) drawing, or graphic art ars pingendi (pictoria) (painting) in three dimensions: ars fingendi sculptura (sculpture) statuaria (statuary) [various other arts, such as wood-carving and modeling in clay] 8. The division of the poetic art. the species of the poetic art (cf. Poetics ch. 1; Bywater tr.)
epic poetry tragedy comedy dithyrambic poetry most flute-playing and lyre-playing

This member also involving a distinction between the form of reasoning and its matter; the former being treated by Aristotle’s Prior Analytics; the latter, by his Posteriora. 10 Cf. Peter of Auvergne, In VIII Politic. L. 1. 1, n. 1270 (tr. B.A.M.): “…and the ars figurandi which is common to painting and sculpture…. ( et artem figurandi quae communis est pictoriae et sculpturae ….)”. Note that this is Peter’s gloss on Pol. VIII, 3 (1337a 24-27), where Aristotle is speaking of graphike. So far as I have been able to determine, the latter is not synonymous with figurative art, understood as including sculpture (and, by extension, statuary), but rather extends solely to drawing and painting.


the species of the poetic art are determined by differences in the means (that in which) the object (that of which) the manner of imitating (the means by which) the means of imitating rhythm harmony speech (these being used either separately or mixed) 9. The division of the poetic art according to the means of imitating. the poetic art imitates by means of rhythm and harmony (instrumental music) rhythm alone (dance) bare speech alone, without harmony without metre (mimes, dialogues) with metre the poetic art imitates in rhythm and speech without harmony either with metre, or without metre without metre mimes Socratic discourses (dialogues, as of Plato) [modern forms, romance, novel, short story, etc.] with metre epopoeia (epic poetry) rhapsody [other such forms, ancient and modern] poetic art that imitates in rhythm, speech and harmony tragedy comedy dithyrambic poetry nome [other forms, ancient and modern] 10. The division of the poetic art according to differences in the object imitated. the object imitated the serious the laughable 11. The division of the poetic art according to differences in the manner of imitating. 35

the manner of imitating11 narrative (poet speaks in own person as narrator) dramatic (poet represents the agents as acting out their roles) mixed (the poet at times narrates the action and at times assumes the person of the agents of the action and so is narrative and dramatic by turns) N.B. Since they are less well known than the objects imitated by the poetic art, cf. also the following: (a) the object of imitation in music: Music imitates the audible, to akouston, or ‘what is heard’ (Aristotle, Prob. XIX.27, 2636); that is to say, it imitates the sound produced by the voice (whether human or belonging to an inanimate instrument), but it does so insofar as its object, the passions, is a kind of motion or movement.12 Consequently, the sound of music has an intrinsic likeness13 to the passions insofar as they are both movements. Such a sound is first and through itself a likeness of the passions, particularly, of the order in their movement, and per consequens a likeness of the moral character belonging to the man (or woman) undergoing such passions. (b) the object of imitation in the plastic arts. The plastic arts of painting and sculpture imitate the visible, ton horomenon, or ‘what is seen’ (Xenophon, Memorab.III.10.1); that is to say, they imitate the outward appearance or ‘look’ of artificial and natural things, especially man, insofar as certain accidents of the human form (shape, color, proportion) have an extrinsic likeness to moral character (i.e. in the plastic arts the human form is the principle object of imitation).

See also On the Dialogue Form, Endnote B. In addition to his pertinent remarks above, cf. also John Oesterle, “Toward an Evaluation of Music,” The Thomist, Vol. XIV, July, 1951, no. 3, pp. 323-334:

The object of imitation is music—and this is the most fundamental point about music—is the movement of the emotions as reflected in the movement of the human voice. This basic point, somewhat strangely, has often been misunderstood, ignored, or even denied by some musical theorists and composers. They have been lead into this error, as we have already noted, by a misapprehension of imitation in art or by supposing that imitation in music consists primarily in copying the twittering of birds, the braying of donkeys, or the puffing of steam engines. This sort of thing, however, is quite foreign to the proper object of imitation in music and is used rather for extrinsic effects. Proper imitation in music means simply the representation of the movement of the emotions as produced intelligibly and artistically by the composer in tones. Inductively and historically, it is precisely this which music constantly exhibits as its object of imitation. Furthermore, rhythm, melody, and harmony are unintelligible in music –and are unintelligible as means of imitation in music –except in relation to the movement of the emotions through the voice as the object of imitation in music.

Cf. Marcus Berquist, Good Music and Bad, op.cit.: Music differs from the other fine arts in its object and its means…. [T]he object of imitation in music is the passions of the soul: joy, sorrow, boldness, fear, hope, despair, anger…. Next, we observe that music is unique or nearly so among the fine arts in the sort of likeness it has to its object. For it has an intrinsic likeness to the object it imitates as opposed to imitating simply through a likeness of its accidents…. It does not imitate the passion through being a likeness of something that goes with the passion…. It is ordered movement imitating order alone.


the object in the manner of a sign ‘Things seen’ ‘Bodies’ ‘The qualities of bodies’ ‘Concave or convex’ ‘Dark or light’ ‘Hard or soft’ ‘Rough or smooth’ ‘Young or old’ ‘Beautiful forms’ ‘Color’ ‘Proportion’ ‘The parts of the body’ ‘The eyes’.The accidents constituting such an outward appearance are first and through themselves signs of types of moral character and per consequens a likeness of states of soul belonging to the man (or woman) having such an appearance. good and lovable’ ‘The ugly. etc. depraved and hateful’ ‘The passions of men engaged in any act’: ‘the workings of the soul’ ‘The menacing looks of combatants’ ‘The joyful countenance of conquerors’ the means of imitation ‘Colors’ ‘Figures’ (shapes) ‘Proportions’ (perspective) the subjects of imitation (a statuary’s subjects) ‘Runners’ ‘Wrestlers’ ‘Boxers’ 37 . the object as something signified ‘Character’ ‘Friendly or unfriendly looks’ ‘The beautiful. (c) The latter according to Xenophon’s Socrates.

the invention was explicitly credited by Alberti to the Florentine architect. the others being De re aedificatoria (“On Architecture”. On the figurative art in two dimensions. cf. Alberti was thus the first to write down a theoretical resume of the art innovation in Florence at the time.N. consisting in drawing the bodies' contour Compositio (commensuratio in the Italian version of the treatise). Here he knew contemporary art innovators such as Filippo Brunelleschi.B. De pictura also includes the first description of linear geometric perspective devised by Brunelleschi around 1416. 1462)[1] Alberti was a member of Florentine family exiled in the 14th century. 2006. in this surpassing medieval works such as The book of Art by Cennino Cennini(1390). in the following of the Papal court during the Council of Florence. The treatise contained an analysis of all the techniques and painting theories knew at the time. References 1. Alberti divided painting into three parts: • • • Circumscriptio (Italian: disegno). It was first published in Italian in 1436. Rocco Sinisgalli. Work De pictura aimed to describe systematically the figurative arts through “geometry”.B. ISBN 978-887890-731-7. Il Nuovo De Pictura. the free encyclopedia De pictura (English: “On Painting”) is a treatise on painting written in 1435 by Italian architect and art theorist Leon Battista Alberti. It is the first in a trilogy of treatise on the “Major arts” which had a widespread circulation during the Renaissance. the following indicating the role drawing plays as a composing parts of painting: De pictura From Wikipedia. with whom he shared an interest for humanism and the Classic art. Rome: Kappa Edizioni. § 38 . Donatello and Masaccio. who was able to return in Florence only from 1434. including tracing the lines joining the bodies Receptio luminum (color). 1454) and De statua (“On Sculpture”. taking into consideration colors and light. to whom was dedicated the 1436 edition.

also the following excerpt from a dissertation directed by Charles De Koninck: Sheila O’Flynn. Si vero sit aliqua potentia quae non se habeat ad multa. 9: [Aristotle] gives us no complete classification of the fine arts. sculpture. therefore. cites as the various modes. Berquist ap.. 39 . some feeling or action – by the means they employ. 167-190: I. But if the form be such that it can operate in diverse ways.14 Cf.v. besides the form itself. for he can operate in diverse fashions. St. 49. 4. only the decorative side of architecture is imitative. no further disposition. 64: Aristotle in treating imitation in Poetics. because it is lacking in the imitative quality deemed essential. ut dictum est. I. to distinguish poetry. Et propter hoc vires naturales non agunt operationes suas mediantibus aliquibus habitibus: quia secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad unum (Ia IIae. namely. We shall probe the reason for this preference later on. What Is Logic? Although both Aristotle and St. Cf. Mitchell Carroll. Thomas says in the Summa Theologica: . and it is doubtful how far his principles are to be taken as applicable to other than the poetic art. Thomas. in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Posteriora Analytica. as the soul. and is especially consecrated to the useful. sec.. is not determined in his actions by instinct as are the other animals.If the form is limited to one fixed operation. q. s.49. 10 (1954) p. “Aristotle’s Aesthetics of Painting and Sculpture”. Architecture seems ignored by Aristotle as non-imitative. Notes from the Berquist Seminars 11/15/94: 740) Architecture is not an imitative art.. and dancing – all of which are supposed to imitate some element of human nature. we know. c. Let us first of all try to understand what the definition means. “The First Meaning of ‘Rational Process’ according to the Expositio In Boethium De Trinitate”. also Encyclopaedia Britannica. 4. rhythm. harmony. The Greeks. Architecture is omitted or excluded. such as the shoemaker’s craft. Painting and sculpture are spoken of as imitative arts.Potentia quandoque se habet ad multa: et ideo opportet quod aliquo alio determinetur. Where does architecture fit into the foregoing schemas? Let us begin with the following: Cf. music. Such determinations we call habits. ad 1] [–. 10th ed. non indiget habitu determinante.12. a faculty is left undetermined by nature. Art. and painting. p. Michael A. Duane H. Augros. and lastly poetry and its species. is the kind of stable determination with which nature does not provide us but which we must acquire on our own. Reasons for supposing that architecture is a species of the useful or servile arts. a. as the ability to make certain things. q.] 14 Cf. but their special aims are not defined. Laval théologique et philosophique vol. ease and without error. When. the dance and pantomime. Aesthetics. He seems. with regard to its operation. ad 1). (1902). For this purpose it will be of advantage to consider the necessity and the nature first of art in general and then of the type of art that is logic. then music. [Ia IIae.. defines it simply as an art: the art which directs the act of reason itself and by which man in the very act of reason proceeds with order. melody. St. George Washington University Bulletin 4 (1905). however. and vocal sound. classed it among the useful arts. a special disposition is required to incline it to act rightly. Man. a. it needs to be disposed to its operations by means of habits. is needed for the operation. Thomas plainly held that logic is a science as well as an art.

other than the mind itself? Since the intellect. In our next step. Consequently. In the Summa Theologica. is the subject of the right dispositions of prudence. that the reason requires certain habits to assist in directing the other faculties in regard to both immanent and transitive actions. a. not the fabrication of some exterior thing. can operate in diverse fashions. q. it must not be forgotten that among the actions that stand in need of direction there are the operations of the mind itself.e. such as a shoe. Perfecting the speculative intellect are the determinations of understanding.g. not being determined to one fixed operation. as such. –but in a certain order. not equally –that is. its specific object. to build. whereas prudence is the right reason of things to be done. on the one hand. Art. which enables the reason to judge rightly concerning how one must act under given circumstances. [Ia IIae. However. But what faculty can direct the mind.. then. we shall concern ourselves only with the division of good dispositions. some of which are good and others wrong. text 16. This is the habit that we call logic. and of art. logic must direct. IX. which is to show that logic is a type of art. is the habit that directs the operations of the mind. and so forth. is to establish the order which exists among the various makeable objects with a view to discovering how logic fits into the scheme. we are faced with a difficulty. and wisdom. Logic. e. the only way of establishing that logic is an art would be to show that its object is a thing to be made. then. Indeed. which are also called virtues though not quite in the previous sense. but the immanent operations of the mind. then.Now. because of its passivity.. i. a boat. art implies the transitive action of making. which determines the reason with regard to the production of a work. Since art is the kind of disposition which enables one to make things as they should be made. to see. the term art is analogous. on the other hand. the practical intellect. as art does to outward makings: since each is the perfect reason about the things with which it is concerned. The different types of art participate in the definition to the extent to which their respective objects approximate or coincide with the primary type of thing to be made. that according to which the things signified participate more or less fully in the common definition. If. then. and the like. 4] We have seen. 57. Our task. and if. we can state the problem as follows: Can there be something whose making does not require transitive action? The clue to the solution is to be found in the fact that there are different types of things capable of being made. the possibility of examining and directing its own act presents no problem. being in itself wholly immaterial. is the thing to be made. St. which distinguishes it from the other habits.g. how can logic possibly be an art? Since it is the work of the thing to be made that constitutes the object of an art as art. from which it follows that there are different types of art. is capable of reflection. lends itself most readily to a certain making or formation. This can be more readily understood by a comparison with prudence.. Thomas distinguishes the two habits as follows: The reason for this difference is that art is the right reason of things to be made. which dispose one to submit to the judgements of right reason. which. it signifies many things. And seeing that the difficulty lies in the fact that making has been specified as a transitive action. consisting in the use of powers and habits. passive matter. or a statue. for the mind. to will. as stated in Metaph. to saw. the intellect that does and makes. we have the moral virtues. In the appetitive faculties. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like human actions. Now making and doing differ. however. For this particular task. e. physical. a special disposition is required. not in such a way that the complete notion is found equally in each signification. There can be no doubt but that the matter to which we apply the expression makeable object most appropriately is none other than exterior. and. is the habit which disposes the practical reason to direct the making of things properly and with ease. whereas doing is an action abiding in the agent. science. to the 40 . Finally. for the various powers of operation there are corresponding dispositions. in that making is an action passing into outward matter.

exterior things can be made and consequently that only these can be objects of art. there is the formation of a work inasmuch as there is a composition or ordering of objects. why. not of prudence. Servile art alone realizes 15 Not only is poetry not a liberal art. In I Ethicor. is practical truth. which are those wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the end. which are not given. the difference that separates it from servile art must not be minimized. for. it requires the direction of art. most forceful and most easily understood distinction is to be had from the opposition between immanent and transitive actions. consisting in its conformity with the right appetite. it is itself a material work and must be executed by means of corporeal activity. from the habits of the speculative intellect. a sonata or a syllogism are works of art? The question brings us face to face with our problem. for the appetite is the principle of the work and the end proposed by the artist or craftsman is its measure. which are intended for the bonum animae. although liberal art is art in a proper and not merely in a metaphorical sense. but even a poem. [cf. the art that directs this type of making is art only according to a secondary acceptation. such as poetry and architecture. however. the object is quite immaterial –for the exterior work of a poem only signifies the interior one. requires from the craftsman. because of its exterior and physical conditions. and not simply doing. not only a statue or a house. a. and [ii] the fine arts. q. ad 3] If the production of a work is sufficient to distinguish art from prudence. We must answer that in each of these examples. it is the former distinction that is the most radical because the work is the object and specifies the art. since it could be other than it is or not made at all. for often. Servile art. most proper and most complete notion of making involves a transitive action.15 Nevertheless. the work is contingent. 2. in this case. for it relates to that part of man which is least free. Insofar as it considers the makeable as makeable. differing from prudence by its object –which is. Consequently. so long as it is considered as producing a work. as in the case of architecture. Likewise. it involves a representation intended to please the mind. But such is obviously not the case. 47. 1] But since. whose works pertain to the part of man that is most free –his mind. be it material or spiritual. we may ask. In fact. prudence regards the perfection of human action and hence of man himself as an agent. [IIa IIae. We recognize. It is important to note that the division of art into liberal and servile is based upon the differences that are to be found in the work. neither can any liberal or servile art be arranged under the fine. and which comprise both liberal and servile arts. such as shoemaking. inasmuch as the first. a transitive operation. as the wood from which one makes a table. and which include only servile arts. 41 . Every application of right reason in the work of production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the application of right reason in matters of counsel. for the accomplishment of this transformation. lect. – the formation does not involve exterior action. calls for determinate means of procedure. his body –not that the work of servile art is intended uniquely for the good of the body. again from the point of view of its object. namely. Furthermore. The art having such matter as its object is called servile. that another classification can be had from the point of view of the end: [i] the arts of what is merely useful. This is liberal art. even though an action is immanent.reception of an artificial form. inasmuch as the agent is concerned with the perfection of a work. not actions to be performed. and its truth. and. For whereas art is concerned with the perfection of a work. its field is limited to the strictly practical. the most proper. Do we not say that.. there is indeed making. but things to be made– is also entirely distinct. and hence there is no making in the first and most proper sense. the formation of a work. is the transitive action usually given as the principle of their distinction? The answer lies in the fact that. whose purpose is the bonum corporis. The association of making with transitive action and of doing with immanent action seems to imply that only material. in each instance.

For there is a radical distinction –once more from the point of view of the work. there can be no doubt. it forms a certain work. the extension of the term art to include liberal art entails the rejection of a fundamental element of the primary notion. the truth is not practical but speculative. by setting the concepts in their proper order. a. a habit that is indivisibly science and art: science because it seeks the knowledge of the proper order of concepts through its cause. And since it is a science in the strict sense but an art only by participation.g. resulting in the production of a certain work. q.. the consideration of the end as measure and of the appetite as principle. it differs from the other types of art in that it has for its subject the speculative. 57. and we have a third type of art. which is the concepts of the mind. besides. liberal art. namely. Like the servile arts. In logic. they have certain characteristics repugnant to speculative knowledge. the speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms. This is sufficient for the denomination art. and it is in accordance with this relationship that they must be arranged if they are to be ordered correctly. and again in the following passage: Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e. there is a marked distinction from the habits of the speculative intellect. are interrelated in a definite fashion. whereas the other type is art only by participation. Considering this distinction of ultimate genera. but not prudence. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like works of the speculative reason. namely. something which receives some kind of determination). Consequently. an action. a possibility of error. but liberal arts. 3. according to their very nature. by division. indivisibly both because it is precisely by considering the concepts that the mind establishes the logical order. inasmuch as it is a science that also accomplishes the work of an art. and there is. which can be given by determinate rules of procedure. puts the right order among the concepts by contemplating the relationship implied in their nature. Since. it is entirely different. our concepts. Furthermore. definition and demonstration. 47. art because. The marks that have until now distinguished art from the habits of the speculative intellect have disappeared. then. In the case of such liberal arts as poetry and music. that is. a. such as a proposition or a syllogism. does not permit of any order or form arising from the free choice of the logician. [IIa IIae. wherein the process follows certain and fixed rules. As we shall see in the next section of this study. then. the principle of the work is no longer the appetite. propositions and the like. is a speculative. and therefore a need for direction. The initial difficulty concerning the apparent irreducibility of logic and art has been cleared away by the foregoing considerations on liberal art. the nature of the concepts. q. But to infer that it is in every respect the same type of art as music and poetry would be too hasty a judgement. the measure is no longer the end proposed by the artist. as in poetry. Hence the words speculative reason of the previous quotation. it is not surprising that there is no common term to include both types of art as species of a same genus. one that proceeds not sub lumine artis but sub lumine scientiae. Logic. [see Ia IIae. the former being a quality and the latter.perfectly the definition of the common term.e. in such a way that truth will be attained. With logic. ad 3] 42 .. the concepts of the intellect. Indeed. however. called arts indeed. then. although there is no longer question of transitive operation and of making in the strict sense. not the practical. or the work of counting or measuring. ad 3] That logic is a liberal art. reason. by a kind of comparison. an indetermination of the act itself. are. the matter. there still remains something which is in the nature of matter (i. consequently in respect of such things it is possible to have the essentials of art. The logician. and results in a diversity that is rooted in the distinction of the transitive and immanent operations which differ as ultimate genera. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech. the contingency of their object as well as its practical truth. into which may be introduced an artificial form or order. 2. The work of this art is not contingent but necessary.

that. since both are concerned with forming a spiritual work. the habit in question merely participates in the notion of art and is called a speculative. (emphasis added) Cf. He remarks that in the Metaphysics. not determined by nature in respect to his operations.In view of this conclusion. Aristotle says that man lives by “art and reasonings”. it is opposed to experience in the Metaphysics.. by which man in the very act of reason proceeds with order and ease and without error. Thomas touches on this in his prooemium to the Posterior Analytics. The word “ars” can also be translated as “universal knowledge”. To show that logic accomplishes the role of an art by introducing the correct order among our intellectual acts in view of the obtaining of truth. that logic is an art for the sole reason that it involves a certain making. a special habit is required for their direction.. It lacks all the other elements of the definition. Notes by Michael A. we must distinguish it from the other acceptations of the term art which participate more fully in the definition. it is an art. also makes clear from the beginning that we are dealing with something that is purely intentional and not with the natural act as such. since even the human intellect is undetermined with regard to its own operations. that this art which directs the act of reason itself. If we took logic to be art in the primary sense. If we were to say that logic belongs to the same type of art as poetry. this art we call logic. in particular. Augros on LES PRINCIPES DE VERITE DE LA LOGIQUE (Cours donnés en Janvier-Février 1972): Monseigneur Maurice Dionne Professeur Titulaire à la Faculté de Philosophie de l’Université Laval Québec Notes rédigées par Louis Brunet et Yvan Pelletier LA SOCIETE D’ETUDES ARISTOTELICIENNES 1978 P101 The necessity of logic. We may presume that logic. Rationes can also be translated by “discourse”. we should be guilty of disregarding the fact that logic is a science having as object the necessary and not the contingent. Summing up. Thus. but because its object does not involve transitive action and is a work of the speculative intellect. finally. liberal art. when so defined. we might say that man. St. of art which assures him ease and order in those of his actions by which he produces works. then. P128 43 . that because this habit has for its object a thing to be made. We have seen. is better distinguished from philosophy of nature which also has to do with the operations of the mind. to a comparison of singulars preserved in the memory.. it may now be asked why logic is usually defined as an art rather than as a science. as stone. has need of habits and. we should imply that the operations of the mind were comparable to some sort of exterior physical matter.

The first question is “What does Aristotle intend to prove? What is the ultimate conclusion?” Aristotle here wants to manifest that natural form is the final cause of matter. P134 Matter : Form :: Form : Usage At In II Physic. one must be able to decide. P141 Artificial form – Final cause Artificial form – Form Form – Final cause Form – Final cause Natural form – Form Natural form – Final cause 44 . death). Thomas insists that something can be the term of a movement without being the purpose of it (e.The artificial is much more manifest than the natural. for example.g. Lect. P130 Man is the end of the works of every art. do we have here an example in 4 terms? One must be able to see all the terms present.4 n173: in looking at a determinate matter. P137 Usage – Final cause Usage – Architectonic Architectonic – Final cause Architectonic – Final cause Artificial form – Architectonic Artificial form – Final cause But St. which directly weakens “What is the term is the final cause”.

of course. it is a modus artis. saying that the science of nature proceeds rationabiliter. Q. there are actually 3 modes to distinguish: [1] The natural mode [2] The common modus artis [3] The proper mode which is multiplied together with all the disciplines. In this way it is common to all the sciences. Today many people have a very detailed knowledge of material causes. There he says that as in art and action. so in biology. But opinion cannot be caused in us by one dialectical syllogism. many are required (see De Virtutibus in Communi. which we surely must not neglect. The common mode inscribed in the very nature of the reasonable soul is before every art. P61 Science is caused in us by one demonstration. one must acquire it. The Greek commentators make the mode one of the elements of a prooemium. These are the modes Aristotle is speaking about in the first book of the Parts of Animals. we must point out that we find many proper modes. But logic differs from the modus animae.Cf. In a similar way. So. mathematics disciplinabiliter. 45 . Logic is not inscribed in us by nature. Notes by Michael Augros on LA NECESSITE DE LA LOGIQUE EN REGARD DE CHACUNE DES VIRTUS INTELLECTUELLES (Cours donnés de septembre à novembre 1977): Notes rédigées par Louis Brunet TOUS DROITS RESERVES LA SOCIETE D’ETUDES ARISTOTELICIENNES 1980 It belongs to logic to define this. un. the chief demonstrations are from the end. Boethius discusses these proper modes. It is. A9 Ad11). but they either neglect or reject final causes. it holds the place of a principle. and metaphysics intelligibiliter. because of their weakness. P60 To complete our division of modes. founded on the modus animae. a single human act is not enough to cause a virtue. P62 The mode is a magnum virtute.

operatio transiens . Notes by Michael Augros on LA NECESSITE DE LA LOGIQUE EN REGARD DE CHACUNE DES VIRTUS INTELLECTUELLES (Cours donnés de janvier à avril 1978): Notes rédigées par Louis Brunet TOUS DROITS RESERVES LA SOCIETE D’ETUDES ARISTOTELICIENNES 1983 TOME II P4 Purpose: Aristotle distinguishes 5 genera of intellectual virtues.contingent .factio . it is more difficult. in science. and wisdom. What is art? The elements of the first sense of art. P8 46 . These are the speculative virtues of reason. P7 The different senses of the word “Art”.factibile . Now we will consider the necessity of logic for art. We have considered the necessity of logic for natural understanding. argue. Consider the first imposition of “art”: art concerned with transitive actions. We must divide. the ratio propria of art. are: .intelligence practique P7 We must distinguish making from doing. define. it will not be necessary insofar as it “ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta” (Super Boetii de Trinitate Q5 A1 Ad2). science. a practical virtue of reason (we will not consider foresight. or prudence). factio vs. actio.Cf.g. Is logic necessary for that? E. P4 Difficulty: it was relatively easy to see the need of logic for science. etc. if logic is needed for it. for building a cathedral? P5 Since art does not consist in speculation. But in the case of art.

we will have a sense of “art” per posterius. or. Factio is an operation which passes into an exterior matter in view of making something.3. The mere fact that this conception is exteriorized does not make his contingent object a factibile. when written out. and the contingent is wholly irreducible to the speculative virtues of reason. But not as in ethics: ethics is a practical science. As soon as we remove an element or two from the proper definition of art. In the first sense of the word. This is important. of facere. but the poet himself essentially forms: he makes a tragedy or comedy as a musician makes a symphony. not only is it practical. practical reason. Which part of the strict definition of “art” should we drop in calling poetry an “art”? We must let go of “factibile” as the object of an “operatio transiens”. in the definition. P9 The will is the efficient cause of the material work. P9 Art per posterius. because many moderns speak of poetry in terms of contemplation. The word “art” is an analogous word. an opus immediate rationis (In Boetii de Trinitate Q5 A1 Ad3). such as building or cutting (In VI Ethicorum. since factibile. and when he is finished doing that. but the truth is speculative. implies transitive operation. right reason about works. according to this definition. designates the object of a transitive action. for example. Of course. it cannot have its proper effect of engendering fear and pity. The factibile is therefore contingent and proceeds from practical reason. which is wholly false. of course. P9 The factibile is a species of the contingent. Art. One can in some way contemplate poetry. In the case of art. This is an operation which goes beyond the physical 47 . an operation which transforms physical matter. But it is the poet who forms the characters. art is recta ratio factibilium. P10 The task of the poet is to order words. There is such a thing as a work of the mind. which implies the will.Actio is an operation (or doing) which remains in the agent himself. but its truth is practical. his work is done. the play resembles the result of a transitive action. the factibile (from words to all the works of art). Not every contingent thing proceeding from practical reason is necessarily a bodily work. is defined in the line of POIEIN. P10 Poetry. Lect. What we require of the poet is the conception. And if a tragedy is not acted out before an audience in outward movements. in other words. n 1152).

He does touch upon the universal in some way. and instead of practical. we do retain the element “contingent”. He has PAIDEIA. “Etiam in ipsis speculabilibus est aliquid per modum cujusdam operis. We look to the common notion of “work” and leave everything else aside. poetics is more or less useful. and poetics falls under logic (in the broad sense of “logic”). P10 When we call poetry an “art”. But reason. but cannot judge the truth or falsity of this or that conclusion. a syllogism. P15 The distinction between the [1] PEPAIDEUMENOS.and requires the intentional. but for judging poetry. it is necessary. P13 Distinguishing and ordering the senses of the word art allows us to clarify the genus of poetry. nothing could justify our use of the word “art” for logic. does form something. it is speculative.g. poetics is indispensable. P11 The truth in poetic art proceeds from practical reason (and so this element is also retained). in knowing. if reason in knowing things did not form anything. [1] can judge the mode of proceeding. Poetry is in the line of making. but only as it is incarnated in his work. The work of fiction is true if it conforms to the exemplar of the artist. e. the habit of the method. pure and simple. P14 What is the usefulness of poetics? For writing poetry. logic includes certain elements opposed to “art” in the strict sense: instead of contingent. and the [2] ARCHITEKTONIKOS. the operatio transiens which is defined in the line of movement. The poet is free to take this or that as his subject. vs. beyond this ratio operis. P12 These distinctions help us to distinguish very carefully between poetics and poetry. However. 48 . We can see that it is an art and in what sense it is an art.” (I-II Q57 A3 Ad3) If this were not so. Therefore the truth is practical. P11 Is anything left of the strict definition of “art” if we must drop “contingent” in calling logic an art? Yes: we retain ratio operis. The discipline would be a science.

who possesses the art of medicine. since he does not stick to the singular. P17 The PEPAIDEUMENOS goes beyond experientia. The second kind of judgment about poetry is made by the PEPAIDEUMENOI. He has an experience of certain works of fiction and can also make certain universal statements about them. This is yet another sense of ars. [1] Judgment of the poet. but only executes commands (nurse). which is wholly proper to the poet as such. The judgment of the expertus. although he cannot present them scientifically. [b] PEPAIDEUMENOS. the PEPAIDEUMENOS does not resolve as the ARCHITEKTONIKOS does.In the Politics (BK III). who has good taste by nature and has acquired some experience. [2] Judgment of the EXPERTUS. or expertus. there will be a judgment relevant precisely to the practical virtue of reason. but he can resolve them into their first principles. 49 . It is not possible to possess this intellectual virtue without this type of judgment. then. P16 Some people have the gift of saying very well what they conceive. even if they do not form very strict definitions. The first judgment. P16 In sum. If an artist cannot execute. [a] The one who does not have the art of medicine. scientific) knowledge. does not yet surpass the order of the PEPAIDEUMENOS. but he does not possess art in the sense of universal (i. Since poetry is a practical virtue. but if he cannot judge well. PP18-19 There are 4 types of judgments about poetry. The naturalis gives the propter quid to the medicus. that does not necessarily impede him from having the intellectual virtue of art. Aristotle distinguishes 3 senses of “doctor”. is about the practical truth. it is not enough to have an experience with the works of fiction. opposed to experientia by Aristotle in the beginning of the Metaphysics.e. P16 The PEPAIDEUMENOS in poetry cannot be content with being an expertus. all is lost. who not only knows practically the means which are causes of health. [c] ARCHITEKTONIKOS.

P20 St. this is very good. prooemium). emotions. P20 A good use of a work of fiction implies a fair proportion to the hearer. P22 The distinction between PEPAIDEUMENOS and ARCHITEKTONIKOS covers the whole field of teaching. Without movere. Is this essential to the work of art or just to its good use? Saying what St. n 250). if a poetic representation does not bear on human acts but on nature. We enter now into the moral order. in quibus multa involvebat in uno (In De Divinibus Nominibus. of the logician. If the poet represents vice as abominable. This bears not only on its usage. He will not only judge about this work and this kind of work. but about the very nature of poetry. His speech has few words. 1 Un. This is something essential to the representation of the poet. there are 4 kinds of judgment about fiction: that of the poet as such. The third kind is the judgment of the philosopher. The speech of the poet is not situated on the level of reason as such. the logician. Of course. This judge resolves. Thomas says in more common terms. The politicus commands the use of and exercize in certain works. P23 The ARCHITEKTONIKOS speaks in a very perfect and universal way.III. the poet “movere ad aliquid”. 50 .. Thomas says it belongs to good fiction “inducere ad virtutem per decentem representationem” (In Post. the work will be false inasmuch as it is a work. but says many things. that of the expert. motions of the soul.[3] Judgment of the ARCHITEKTONIKOS. C. The representation absolutely must arouse certain feelings. but is a defect in the work inasmuch as it is a representation. but if he represents it as delightful. one will be far from the moral order. P19 We must apply to poetry what Aristotle says about music in the Politics. in poetry there is a question about inducere ad virtutem. and of the politician. An. [4] Judgment of the POLITICUS. The speech of the PEPAIDEUMENOS is divided. there is no persuasion. P20 In sum.

P36 Music moves the soul even more than poetry. We must be careful to distinguish principle and instrument. P40 Dionne moves to the third and principal PEPAIDEUMENOS: Goethe. poetics is born of poetry. and not the reverse. a sacred writer uses poetry. P37 Cicero said “Rhetoric is born of eloquence”. P23 One thing that makes teaching so hard is that one’s speech must be fitted to the measure of understanding in the hearer. Likewise. P23 Dionne will consider poetry with the help of some PEPAIDEUMENOI. and therefore he remains a theologian. verbal expression or expression in words) of the philosopher is much more difficult than that of the poet. He is a model 51 . but of an imagination guided by reason. detailed. P33 The word (i. P28 The theologian uses principles in natural science as instruments and not as his proper principles (which are taken from scripture). The first is Philip Sidney.particularized. P38 The second PEPAIDEUMENOS Dionne will consider is Ronsard. The poetry brings with it a certain universality.e. P32 Poetry gives both a moral precept and a moral example. P39 Poetry is principally an affair of the imagination. the work is always something primary. The method is born of eloquence. one cannot say simpliciter that David was a poet. Likewise. a poet of the 16th century.

and likewise with poetry. namely a strong and lively imagination. P44 We find in nature a sort of indetermination which an art can complete or perfect. then he can do it only DIA TECHNE–in virtue of a rule acquired by study. P50 “Imitation” can be used to mean either the act of imitating or the work. P51 52 .2 n598: “Art imitates nature and perfects what nature cannot do). but for the formation of speculative judgments about the works. for example.g. Nature plays an enormous role in the case of poetry. Thomas In I Corinthios XI Lect. Dionne is struck by the justice he does to poetry in remarking about it (e. nature gives the proximate dispositions for it to some people. We will usually use the word in the second sense. But if someone cannot form a unity of action. P49 Poetry is an art. for example. as when we say a story (MUTHOS) is an imitation. we cannot say someone is a natural geometer. and likewise is the object of the senses. Geometry is well-proportioned to us. P49 Aristotle is an ARCHITEKTONIKOS. where nature is the principal cause. PP47-48 An ability to write poetry well is not totally natural. seems to be a poet DIA PHUSIN. We might be proximately well disposed by nature to make the works of geometry more easily. By way of opposition. where practical reason is truly the principle. but is due to a natural disposition of the body. Because of this. St. we have only remote dispositions given by nature. poets do not need external help (such as rules. P46 Nature gives man only the remote dispositions for science: that is why the acquisition of logic is necessary. it would be geometry. in his Conversations with Eckermann). a practical virtue. but not like medicine or teaching. It is in this sense that an art in imitating nature can complement nature (cf. in a piece of fiction DIA PHUSIN. and so we need logic (and poetics). etc. P47 The senses play a powerful role in our habits of action because the object of such habits is the singular. and so if there were a science which we could know naturally. It is more like the art of carpentry. and especially with great poets–Homer.) as much. But in the case of poetry.PEPAIDEUMENOS.

and Super I Sent. does not mean simply a copy. is nearest to substance. P56 “Imitation”. we have a work which proceeds from the act of molding. n 917). of all the accidents. P53 “Fabula”. P57 Even if in fact certain characters in a tragedy are historical. as applied to a work of fiction. as a son is the image of his father. This word was first connected with sculpture. In the case of a natural image. but Shakespeare’s Henry IV had a certain universality. P52 We must define poetry in the line of making (POIEIN) and not of contemplation. and shape or figure is a determination of quantity. we have a sign of the species. as in poetry. since it does not represent by figure and shape. In what does a 53 . P52 “Fingo” first meant “to make something out of clay”. we speak of the act of signifying. But we cannot be content with the word “make”: it is too common. But we find works also which are formed by the mind and remain in the mind. mustic. For in the case of “figulus”. but a representation which is the fruit of the imagination and which has a certain universality. Art is “recta ratio factibilium”. in which the factibile is the work of a transitive action. which proceeds within the mind. and in the end. we go from the transitive to the immanent. P55 The figure or shape of a plant or animal manifests its species better than any other quality in it (see In VIII Physicorum. Henry IV really existed. In poetry and music. Lectio V. P54 “Figura” designates a quality in a quantity.There is a connection between the words imitation and image (see I Q35 A1 C. and it looks like the word “figura”. Why? Because quantity. In the case of an artificial image. there is a likeness of species. D28 Q2 A1). the poet adds something. which is also a transitive act. P54 “Imago”. “imitation” has undergone an extension. and therefore something physical. but in the case of “sensus figuratus”. This word can have an opposition to reality. “Figulus” is also in bodily matter. logic. But from “figulus” to “figuratus”.

as in learning to speak. P65 The diversity of the sciences is taken from the diversity of their principles. P58 The natural causes of imitation: children learn their first lessons by imitating.properly poetic universal consist? It is not the nature pure and simple (which is considered rather by the philosopher). P64 Poetics strangely resembles moral science (as rhetoric resembles politics).4 Lect. In I Ad Timotheum C.2 n152) A fable “composita est ex miris”. P67 In moral principles. since poetics is a part of logic. P58 (St. P60 St. That is why children always take pleasure in games which have some kind of representation of something. but the nature concretized. Thomas. the more mobility and contingency we encounter. This is surprising. Thus Henry IV is not a singular for Shakespeare: the real and historical Henry IV is as a material example and Shakespeare’s Henry IV is as a formed Henry IV. the further removed we are from common things. or in most cases. That is why the hero borrowed from the legend is in our opinion more of the nature of something to stir or arouse us than the one which is tied to history. P64 The resemblance is in certain principles or rules found in these two disciplines (poetics and moral science). and there seems to be so great a difference between logic and moral science as to preclude any significant resemblance. Thomas notes that it is natural to man to take pleasure in representations. war [or playing house] (Super Matthaeum XI 2 n932) PP60-61 Man has two parts to his nature: sensitive and rational (I-II Q71 A2 Ad3). P67 Moral science often must restrict itself to what is true ut in pluribus. “That one must act according to reason” is a rule imposed 54 . e.g.

Lect. thought.e. Aristotle lists and explains the 6 composing parts of a tragedy: “La fable.absolutely on the whole world. ens verum. in comparison to the speculative sciences. which consists in the composition of being ut est in anima. I-II Q94 A4 C). P78 The first chapters of the Poetics are devoted chiefly to forming a definition of tragedy. but is the product of a slow evolution. ens falsum. les caractères. characters. Aristotle says that when we contemplate a thing in its beginning. as opposed to the being which is extra animam (In VI Metaph. i. P92 “Tota logica videtur esse de ente et non ente sic”. Tragedy was born from songs. le spectacle. la pensée. Among these parts. P84 St. diction. After defining the tragedy. but “that one must return what one has borrowed” is true in many cases but not all (cf. The tragedy. P79 Aristotle says the plot is the ARCHE and PSUCHE. P73 The knowledge of moral science is. that is ideal.” “Plot. of a tragedy. Thomas said: nihil immutat animam sicut cantus. 55 . That is not its purpose. P87 Aristotle speaks of verisimilitude or probability at the beginning of his discussion of the unity of a plot. is not a form which was discovered in one fell swoop. P69 Man is a mobile being. the soul. too. but the definition of man is immobile. because moral science cannot go to the foundation of things. P82 In the Politics. It remains on the surface of things and cannot attain to the quid. The characters come second. a superficial knowledge. P71 Matter is the cause of the contingency of proper principles. spectacle. Aristotle clearly gives the priority to plot and action. melody”. le chant. l’élocution.4).

the species of poetic art which use words as a medium have something fundamental in common with the liberal. or of an equilateral triangle in geometry. nothing prevents a given species from agreeing in part of its definition with that of another species. Thomas Aquinas. So.17 and for that reason constitute a single genus of art. 3. or plastic arts. but the mathematical. obj. with each involving a work immediate to reason itself . the bronze of the statuary—share an important differentia with the servile or mechanical arts. the remarks of Marcus Berquist in the first passage excerpted above. I would like to suggest that a genuine difficulty in classifying the arts lies in the fact that certain of the imitative arts. ad 3 and associated texts. the aforementioned arts are all imitative. the marble of the sculptor. 5. as we have seen. the liberal arts all agree in being introductory to the other sciences. rather than a part of the art itself. in the present case. but her remarks proceed from the assumption that architecture is in part an imitative art. without thereby undermining their essential agreement. Likewise. a position we have met with above in the excerpt from Mitchell Carroll. such as the construction of a sentence in grammar. In our view. which is the species-making difference. as the logical sciences come under the division of those found out for their usefulness. Sheila O’Flynn raises a similar problem in the case of architecture. 17 Cf.B. Super Boethium De Trinitate. those found out for the sake of the very knowing.P94 The necessity of logic for poetry: one might say that poetics directs reason in the verisimilitude of the representation. 16 Still. 1. art. q. the so-called artes figurandi. whereas for St. insofar as they pass over into exterior matter—the oils and canvas of the painter. 18 Cf. § N.18 § 16 As we have seen. With the foregoing witnesses in hand. 56 . as we have seen in the case of the artes liberales. what Carroll calls the “decorative” part of the art is simply an imitative art put at the service of architecture.

as has been said. is a state concerned with making. involving a true course of reasoning. involving a false course of reasoning. both are concerned with the variable.13. either things able to be done within us ( agibilia interiora).. for art is concerned neither with things that are. i. involving a true course of reasoning”. not of acting. but only to necessary.Th. Msgr. Hence too they are not included one in the other. ad 3. being a virtue of the practical intellect. therefore no speculative habit of contingent things is a speculative virtue. The definition of art as a virtue of the practical intellect. which are not done by the human will: but only in contingent things which are able to be done by us. and so bearing on something contingent as its end. 5 (1140a 1-24) (tr. prudence. In VI Ethic. q. art must be a matter of making. For the truth of the speculative intellect is taken through the conformity of the intellect to the thing. And because the intellect cannot be infallibly conformed to contingent things. What is art? The elements of the first sense of art. supra: P7 The different senses of the word “Art”. but about agibilia. Art. Terence Irwin): [1140a] In the variable are included both things made and things done. one should read ‘house-building’. involving a true course of reasoning. are: 19 For architecture here. for neither is acting making nor is making acting. and there is neither any art that is not such a state nor any such state that is not an art. Cf. art. as is said in the sixth book of the Ethics. Making and acting being different. about factibilia.e. All art is concerned with coming into being. 5. making and acting are different (for their nature we treat even the discussions outside our school as reliable). VI. Nicomachean Ethics. or come into being. with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being. so that the reasoned state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. According to Aristotle. then. Ia-IIae. lect. nor with things that do so in accordance with nature (since these have their origin in themselves). But the truth of the practical intellect is taken through conformity to right appetite. 57 . and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made. 2) Cf. or things able to be made outside us (factibilia exteriora). then. and lack of art on the contrary is a state concerned with making. cf. “art is identical with a state of capacity to make. art. as Agathon says. And in a sense chance [tukhê] and art are concerned with the same objects. the ratio propria of art. also Notes by Michael Augros on LA NECESSITE DE LA LOGIQUE EN REGARD DE CHACUNE DES VIRTUS INTELLECTUELLES. This conformity has no place in necessary things. 57. which is the measure of its truth: “[For] the practical intellect is taken otherwise than the speculative. Aristotle. Maurice Dionne. Now since architecture19 is an art [tekhnê] and is essentially a reasoned state of capacity to make. ‘art loves chance and chance loves art’. art is identical with a state of capacity to make. by necessity.” (S. And therefore the virtue of the practical intellect is posited solely about contingent things. but only that which is about necessary things.

cf. An. 3.) (3) Again. 11) On the ratio of art and its work. c. The word “art” is an analogous word. the factibile (from words to all the works of art). lect. But not as in ethics: ethics is a practical science. 2. (Summa Theol. lect. art is “a rightness of reason with respect to things that can be made. also the following definitions from St. n. 44. 1965: 1. By way of summary.operatio transiens . n. actio. such as to cut and other works of this sort in which art gives direction”.. Art. such as building or cutting (In VI Ethicorum. (In I Post.factibile . implies transitive operation. or. according to this definition. that is. P8 Actio is an operation (or doing) which remains in the agent himself. in the definition. cf.D. but its truth is practical. ad 3) (4) Again. practical reason. (In VI Ethic. The factibile is therefore contingent and proceeds from practical reason. 47. 1) (5) But properly speaking. n. since factibile.contingent . 12) (2) Again. P9 The will is the efficient cause of the material work.intelligence practique P7 We must distinguish making from doing. art is “a certain ordination of reason whereby human acts arrive at their due end through determinate means”. lect. which implies the will. not only is it practical.. q. In the first sense of the word.. q. p.. in other words. Volume XXXIX. art is “right reason about any works that are to be made”. art is recta ratio factibilium. but the truth is speculative. 1.. right reason about works. “Philosophy and the Arts”. [n. “every application of right reason to something that can be made” pertains to art. designates the object of a transitive action. Factio is an operation which passes into an exterior matter in view of making something. art. Kovach. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. looking to the definition of logic. Thomas: (1) Art is “a making habit with true reason. 3. Lect. Francis J. an operation which transforms physical matter.3. n 1152). P9 The factibile is a species of the contingent. 39] 58 .factio . 5. with respect to things that can be done in exterior matter. ( In I Post. An. In the case of art. and the contingent is wholly irreducible to the speculative virtues of reason.. ( Summa Theol. Ph. art. factio vs. 57.

The reason for this division is that the cause of generation is either a per se cause or an accidental one. n. n. because art is a principle of action in something other than the thing 59 . n. n. L. 1719) and accidental form (In I De gen. and induced into second matter (In XII. n. Met. 6. 1398) so that the matter is to the form of their products as potency is to act (ibid.” namely. Eth. 1721). Met. Eth. and can both be lost (In VI. but art does not exist in the thing produced by art but in something else. In VIII. and then it is nature. i. 3. 1442f). L. L. For if it is a per se cause. Met. 4. n. but not with artistic production (In I. 3. L. –It is for these differences between nature and art that the philosophy of nature deals ex professo only with natural. and then it is art. L. n. Met. 5. 2445). and which fail only accidentally in producing the intended effect (In XII. L. Met.. 286) or improved (In II Phys. he points that things acquire their form from agents like themselves. 3. 1381) efficient causes (In XII. (2) both produce some form (De ver. n. 1381) He accordingly says. 35 3728) in the substantial (In VII. Met. L. IV. L. 5. L. and is educed from the mind of the artist.e. thereby rendering its product definable by its matter and form alone (In VII. 7. 2402). c. L.. 818) in second matter (In VIII. n. 1442f). L. Met. 1815). g. 268). and some by chance. n. L. L. in matter with a normal aptitude to receive the substantial form (In VII. 8).. 65. 3. n. 1. . it is either the principle of motion intrinsic to a thing. 1388).e.e... 1. – (2) as to what they produce: Nature can produce both substantial (In VIII.. 426. n. Met. ad 1) through the spatial arrangement of its integral parts (In I De gen. first (598). n. for nature is a principle of motion in that in which it exists. Met. 1... n. L. 3. i. 1452) and an extrinsic principle (In IX. that of things which come to be. III. Met. artificial form (In VII. n. He says that every substance comes to be “from an agent having the same name. 3). 6.. 8. so that the form of the natural thing is educed from its prime matter (ST I 45. L. whereas art produces only accidental forms (In V. Met. 40). by contact (In XII. n. in which their products pre-exist (De pot. 12. n.. 2444). n. or it is extrinsic to a thing. but the artificial form is superimposed upon the prejacent substance (ibid. n. n. differs from nature (1) as an efficient cause: Nature is a univocal cause (ST I 45. Met.efficient causes. (In VII. 7.Art is similar to nature insofar as (1) both are per se (In VII. some by art. L. 6. art is mostly an equivocal cause (In VII. 145) and innate principle that cannot be lost (In II. some come to be by nature. 8. 3. Thomas] 1. by chance. i. n. n 1704).. 14. 2444). L. 2. g. Met. ad 2) and an intrinsic (In II Phys. 3. 4. 1851)... 1716) in a determinate manner (In VII. 2444) Third. 1417) matter of their products (In VIII. Met. S. in matter without any natural aptitude to receive the accidental. an agent similar in form.e. 3. De gen. n. c. L. For all substances which are generated come to be either by nature or by art or by luck or “spontaneously. L. L. L. 4. 1174) and improved (In IX Met. Met. 6. art needs nature not only for the material cause of its work but also for the qualities of natural things by which the art work can be preserved (S. L.. 8. by itself without purpose. [The foregoing references supplemented by the texts of St. Art differs from nature. 3. and finally (3) in the mode they produce: Nature produces its product without any need for the aid of human art.’ i. n. L. Met. L. L. n. L. however. L. 1837) that is acquired (ibid. and it produces substantial form in prime matter. Art is similar to nature insofar as (1) both are per se. they are not directly an object of design. Met. 6.e. 2446). 3. that is. n. L.. L. 8. n. n. ad 4). Met. 40). n. 5. n. and in all this. Met. or ‘spontaneously.. –Art. 8.. and by the natural union of the producing principles. 3. 1719). 3.” i. except by accident (De pot. (In XII. 3). so that its product can be defined only by the species of its second matter and by the mode of the arrangement or composition of that matter (In II Met.

because it seems that the word idea signifies a form separate from that whose form it is. and not accidentally. 2445) For “the remaining causes. for effects often fall short of this. 4. Now.. ad 4) To the fourth it ought to be said that the likeness between this force and art consists in this. Now. For this reason. if a thing imitating something else comes into existence through an agent which has not itself determined the end. because according to seems to imply direction to an end. . 1. for man begets man. For example. as when we say that the informing of an effect proceeds from the form of the agent. For example.. Second.moved. Similarly.. This is the exemplary form in imitation of which a thing is made..” Now the form of a thing has three meanings. Hence.. It can imitate it because of the agent’s intention. the form of a thing can mean that by which a thing is informed. for luck is intellect producing an effect over and above the one at which it aims. every work of nature is said to be a work of intelligence. what imitates a form by chance is not said to be formed according to that form.. as when we say that the soul is the form of man. but happens by chance or by accident. however. .both produce some form. . a. an operation of a nature which is for a definite end presupposes an intellect that has pre-established the end of the nature and ordered it to that end. c. L. we do not usually call it its idea. however. but this end is determined by the archer. painters frequently paint something resembling someone when they have not intended to do so. We see also that a thing acts because of an end in two ways.. 3. the flight of an arrow is toward a definite end. For example. The agent himself may determine his end –and this is true of all intellectual agents– or the end of the agent may be determined by another principal agent. Now things produced by art obviously come to be from something similar to themselves in form. although form..” luck and chance. that a thing can imitate a form in two ways. Now. are defects and privations as it were of nature and of art. the form imitated will not have the character of an exemplar or idea merely because of what has happened. we do 60 .. the form from which something gets its form is not said to be its idea or form. First. (In XII. for it is by means of the form of the house in his mind that the builder causes the house which exists in matter. 12. Consequently.) As St. which is part of the composite. Met.and which fail only accidentally in producing the intended effect. 3. especially in the case of equivocal causes. (De ver. and chance is nature producing an effect over and above the one at which it aims. n.in which their products pre-exist. since the exemplary form or idea is that according to which a thing is formed. Consequently. It happens at times. that as the thing made by the craftsman pre-exists in his art as in an active force. an action does not necessarily result in effects that attain the complete character of the form of the agent. and the shape of a statue is the form of the bronze. (De pot. Third.. 3.. whereas nature is a principle of action and motion in a thing in which it is present. Augustine says: “We can literally translate ideai as species or forms. it can mean that from which a thing gets its form. as an artist makes his painting imitate someone whose portrait he is making. it is in this meaning that idea is originally used. so before it is generated a living being pre-exists in the formative energy. Hence. the exemplary form or idea should imitate something intentionally. the form of a thing can mean that according to which a thing is informed. that such an imitation is not intentional. 3. Note. 5. is truly said to be the form of a thing. the idea of a thing is the form which a thing imitates. The same thing is also apparent in the case of natural things..

.so that the matter is to the form of their products as potency is to act.. one does not call a house a house before it has the form of its architecture. (S. L. is its nature. The form of a natural thing. n. seems to constitute the character of an idea: It must be a form which something imitates because of the intention of an agent who antecedently determines the end himself.. 9. but we use these terms only when an agent acting for an end has determined the end himself –whether the form imitated be within him or outside of him. 8. and then it is said to happen by chance. (ibid. n.. nor a horse a horse before it has the form of its nature. . and by this something from which generation takes place we mean the matter and not the privation. And just as an effect produced by art may also occur apart from the intention of art or of mind. For we say that the form of art in the artist is the plan or idea of the artistic product.. is similar to art. 35 3728) Again. . This. (In VIII.in a determinate manner. The first of these is that everything which comes to be.” i.. as one does with an artificial thing. g. L.. 7. Therefore it follows that a form neither comes to be nor is generated in itself...in the substantial . The third point is that in every process of generation there must be something which comes to be. 1716) Further. because just as art through certain definite intermediates attains the form at which it aims. namely. comes to be from something. from its material and individuating principles... that no one makes or produces a form. then.e. Hence.. but it is this particular thing which comes to be or is generated in itself.matter of their products. 6. .. which is the principle of generation. One calls it a natural thing because it has a form. n. 1388) 61 .. it is by its nature that something is called a natural thing.. (In VII. (In VII. for the power contained in the seed. L. And the reason is that everything which comes to be comes to be from matter. c. Aristotle proceeds to demonstrate by reason of what was shown above.. Met. on which each of the aforementioned points depends.. Met. the statement that forms can neither be corrupted nor generated in themselves (710-12. and we also say that a form outside the artist is a plan if he imitates it when he makes a thing. But it was stated above that a form is not an element or anything composed of the elements.. comes to be by something. as is said below (619: C 1451). therefore. and this is either a sphere or a circle or something else. 1398) And the same thing occurs in the case of things produced by art as in those produced by nature. so too in the case of these things. n.e. For it was said above that something comes to be from matter in a different way than it does from a privation.. . it comes to be or is generated “from these principles. first (611).not say that the form of the man who generates is the idea or exemplar of the man who is generated. Met. i. 7. so also does the formative power in the seed. nor is a form generated or produced in itself. 1417) He accordingly says. 6. and this is the agent or generator. that the points explained above are true. some things are generated both from seed and without seed. C 1708-15). natural ones. and the second is that everything which comes to be. b. IV. since this particular thing is composed of matter and form. 3.

. . which we are treating. for it is in potentiality to the forms by which things have being. however. (In II Phys. 145) Then from the preceding [considerations] he concludes the definition of nature in the following way: Natural things differ from non-natural things insofar as the former have a nature. a ship would have been made by nature in the same way as it is made by art. differs from nature (1) as an efficient cause: Nature is a univocal cause. the first principles of reason. and not accidentally. L. as is clear from what was said above. Therefore it follows that there must be matter in every kind of generation.. 1. but according to species. therefore nature is nothing other than the principle of motion and of rest in that in which it exists primarily. . Now. . and this would be true only if it were possible for it both to be and not to be. 4. n.. For if the art of ship building were intrinsic to wood.or improved. n. (ST I 45. L. but [natural things] do not differ from non-natural things except insofar as the former have a principle of movement within them... n.and an intrinsic. have been given by nature.. L. just as by previously known principles a man makes himself actually understand by personal effort of discovery.. the thing generated must at one time be and at another not be. 14. since nothing can move itself from potency to act. 10. in virtue of itself.Here he proves that one of these three conditions —the principle from which a thing comes to be— is found in every kind of generation.... . ad 2) To the second it ought to be said that active qualities in nature act in virtue of their substantial forms: and thus the natural agent not only produces something similar to it according to quality. consists in reason’s control of the appetite. L... Therefore. (In II. 1452) 20 The applicability of this text to the doctrine in question is not apparent to me. 286) If it should be asked how this is possible. although per accidens.and innate principle that cannot be lost.... 268) For nature seems to differ from art only because nature is an intrinsic principle and art is an extrinsic principle. no less in moral than in speculative matters. not only in natural generations but also in artificial ones (for the nature of the other two conditions is evident). and to the privations by which they have non-being. for everything that is generated by nature or by art is capable both of being and of not being. such as in the doctor who cures himself..Art. 12. And this is most obvious in the art which is in that which is moved. so also by acting according to the principles of practical reason a man makes himself actually virtuous. Met. 62 . Eth.art is mostly an equivocal cause. 8. (In VII. 8. 14. For nature is very similar to this art... 11. Now the potential element which each thing has both for being and for not being is matter.. He says that all the things which come to be by nature or by art have a matter from which they come to be. ...20 13. (In II Phys. For since generation is a change from non-being to being. we must answer that the perfection of moral virtue. n.

because in artifacts the matter alone is held to be substance. and corruption through separating. and this is why Plato did not hold that the forms of artifacts exist apart from matter but only substantial forms.e.. 16.. L. For example. that simple and perfect generation occurs through assembling. Met. 18. because these things come to be only by assembling the parts. n.that is acquired. unless the habit is a natural one.. he precludes an objection.. one becomes a harpist by playing the harp.. i. as the sensory potencies in animals. because it is not necessary for the form of the house in the mind of the master builder to come from a house. L. L. which is not assembled or disintegrated.. 3.. which have no natural existence.. 1851) Now one could not learn an art of this kind unless he himself performed the actions associated with it. saying that perhaps the forms of artifacts are not substances or anything in their own right. for one learns the harp by playing it. whereas the forms of artifacts are accidents. L... and so cannot have separate existence. 1815) He accordingly says. 6. n. 7. as in the case of natural things. Eth. and are disintegrated only by separating the parts.. as the art of flute-playing and other operative arts of this kind. . (In I De gen. 20. that. .. whose form consists of position and order... (In IX Met.and improved. all of the abovementioned potencies which we have as a result of practice and the use of reason must first be exercised and their acts repeated before they are acquired. first (761). is alteration. as in the case of artificial things.. belong to the class of substance..and an extrinsic principle... although this sometimes happens. however. Met. 19. L. 4.. art and science). and that any change which takes place in a permanent continuum. Nor similarly can other artificial forms. . n. (ibid. (In VIII. n. 17. as when someone makes a plan of one house from that of another. (In IX.(2) as to what they produce: Nature can produce both substantial. 4.. 1837) And the same holds true in the case of other things whether their principle of perfection is outside of them. L. 15. n.. . . or within them. and some are acquired by practice. . (In VI.and can both be lost. 40) He says therefore first [39] that one should not say. and some are acquired by teaching and learning... 63 . as some have said.. For they thought that this occurred in natural things as it does in a house and in all such things. 5.. Natural forms.And in this respect natural generation bears no likeness to artificial generation. since some potencies are innate in the things of which they are the potencies. 1174) A sign of this is that a habit in the reason alone can be forgotten (for example. like understanding. 1719) Third.. as medicine and other similar arts. n.and accidental form. and one becomes a physician by studying medical matters. This is also true of the other arts.

e.. Met.. L. (In V.. L.. 8. n. . he indicates what seems to be evident on this point... n 1704) The second is that form is something beside the material parts. . 3.” i. . as was pointed out above (704:C 1696-8). “all those” which are incapable of existing apart from their matters. n. and this can be brought to actuality by a natural agent. . L.21. must be one that is composite. L. (In VIII. L. 8.. 1719) Second.... they are incapable of definition.. 27.. i. 5. b. artificial form. . 818) They held this view because they considered the matter and form of natural bodies in the same way as they did the matter and form of things made by art.e.. one of which is as form and the other as matter... because neither the form of a house nor that of a vessel can exist apart from its proper matter. .. if one wished to know a bed. n. (In VII. . Met. He says that it is evident that the forms of some corruptible things are not separate. in which forms are merely accidents and matter alone is substance.. Met. in matter with a normal aptitude to receive the substantial form. n. in matter without any natural aptitude to receive the accidental. 1721) Hence in order to solve this problem we must say that the substance which is defined... (In VII. namely.whereas art produces only accidental forms.i. whether it be intellectual or sensible. as house or vessel. 3.and it produces substantial form in prime matter.and finally (3) in the mode they produce: Nature produces its product without any 64 .... n. 25. because in the matter of natural things there is a natural aptitude for form.. (In VII. He says that if someone wished “to speculate about their nature. n.. but this does not occur in the matter of things made by art. 1442f) [given above] 26. of bodies made by human art. For it was stated above (706:C 1700) that the definitive statement joins one part to another. (In II Met. and in this way he would know the nature of a bed.. (In VIII. But since the primary parts of which a definition is composed are simple. 1442f) Yet there is a difference between the matter of natural things and that of things made by art... 22. Met.so that its product can be defined only by the species of its second matter and by the mode of the arrangement or composition of that matter. about the definition which indicates the essence of other bodies than natural ones. which involves things made by art.e. 3. for example.. it would be necessary to consider of what parts it is made and how they are put together.. Met. 23. a.. L. Met.thereby rendering its product definable by its matter and form alone. 24. because genus is derived from matter and difference from form. 8. namely.in second matter. 426) Here he gives the third argument. L.

” Others. or at least not so efficiently. said that the forms were given or caused by a separate agent by way of creation.. .” they asserted that they pre-exist “simply. in producing an effect which either nature cannot produce. 3) . is not a creature. and from not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. however. 2446) They did this because they saw in the case of artifacts. For because forms pre-exist in matter. [not by] by contact. as is evident in animals generated through putrefaction. Objection 4: Further. in nature like begets like. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form. and therefore it must be produced by creation. 6. that is. which is heretical. and accordingly. 6. the effect is not more powerful than its cause. . but is that by which a thing is. (De pot. for artificial forms are accidents.need for the aid of human art. and thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation. and the same reason applies to other things. what is not created.. This arose from ignorance concerning matter. II) that art both imitates nature. and sometimes assists nature: thus the physician helps nature to heal by employing those things which have a natural healing power in the process of alteration and digestion. The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which. since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone. For in every operation of nature and art some form is produced. (ST I 45.so that the form of the natural thing is educed from its prime matter.. Objection 2: Further. Therefore the form of these is not from nature. I answer that. since matter has no part in it. If therefore in nature’s productions there were not creation. it would follow that nature’s productions are not creatures. n. And therefore. 29. and makes things that nature cannot make. but by creation. v. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. Augustine (Super Gen.. But it is not produced from anything. Objection 3: Further... But this opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. “in potentiality. which is a work of nature. 28.. (In XII. But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them. do not come into existence by the action of nature. which is an active or a passive form.15) distinguishes the work of propagation..It belongs to art to employ the action of natural principles. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature..14. Therefore it is produced from nothing. Met..and by the natural union of the producing principles. it does 65 .. On the contrary. from the work of creation... except by accident. as shown above (A[4]). L. for they asserted that forms are latent. some said. that to each operation of nature is joined creation. only the matter or underlying subject seems to be substance. 3. 8) Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art? Objection 1: It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art. which come to be by contact and not by natural union. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting. but previously exist in matter.

40) [given above] 32. (ibid. –It is for these differences between nature and art that the philosophy of nature deals ex professo only with natural. is properly made by the natural agent is the “composite. a universal agent suffices. 34.” which is made from matter.and is educed from the mind of the artist. . g.. n. c.and in all this.” because the study of the generation and corruption of artificial things does not pertain to natural science... n. Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter. 3) He says... .” but only “indirectly. (In I De gen. “of things that come to be and pass away by nature. Reply to Objection 3: For the generation of imperfect animals.. ad 1) [given above]21 31. . but is presupposed to the work of nature. L... 3. art objects are preserved in being by the power of natural things. 1. but not with artistic production. L.. 2402) Moreover.” Reply to Objection 2: The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces its like according to quality...” What. Reply to Objection 4: The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles. but according to species. and induced into second matter. (S. by the solidity of its stones.. in the shape of a univocal generator... . but to be “concreated... for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice. art needs nature not only for the material cause of its work but also for the qualities of natural things by which the art work can be preserved. not as though they were made “directly. 21 It does not appear to me that the article adduced directly bears on the assertion made. and this is to be found in the celestial power to which they are assimilated. but a proper agent is required.. (In I. for instance. (In XII. a house. 30. but according to a kind of analogy. 5.but the artificial form is superimposed upon the prejacent substance.not belong to forms to be made or to be created. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are created by a separate agent. .. 65. De gen. L.through the spatial arrangement of its integral parts. n... III. 66 . and thus the products of nature are called creatures. indeed.. 2444) [given above] 33. Reply to Objection 1: Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made. Met.. not in species. However. although both statements accurately express the views of the Angelic Doctor.

– ‘cum habitus cognoscantur per actus et actus per obiecta 25 (ST II-II 4. [n. 3. et opus quod est per artem factum 22 (In VI. and the work which is made by art. ipsius artis sunt repraesentativae 24 (S. Eth. ST I 14. John’s College Press. 1). ap. If I’m making something. 1979). For example. 1381 and In XII. n. [n. L. ‘Ea enima quae arte fiunt. l. in the Meno he addresses the question of definition. also In VII. Let me make this point to you. 2. – ‘cum actio sit media inter faciens et factum 23 (ST I 36. For instance. and he saw that we need a method for getting there. I eat my food and swallow it. Could we begin by stating the situation that makes art necessary? Art becomes necessary when there is an end to be reached and we haven’t been equipped by nature to reach that end. I don’t need to learn any procedure to digest my food—I have it by nature. In philosophy.2. 3. 14. there would be no schools and no teaching. 24. 1154). c. too.. 3). cf. you have an art.6] In terms of exemplary causality. In terms of efficient causality. divine foreknowledge is to things as art is to artificial things (De ver. II. I have to discover those steps and the right order for carrying them out. no matter what you did or in what order you did it. That I say. But to get to my goal I still have to follow a certain number of steps in the right order. Met. just as nature does. 1039). 2444. c. 1). It’s a knowledge of how to reach some given end through means that are not determined by nature. Art is that kind of enterprise. the divine art is to the creature as the human art is to the artwork (S. n. c. 3. 11] Cf. He says to Meno over and over again—and Meno refuses to believe him—that you can’t tell whether something is teachable unless you first know what it is. 1). I think we need an art of inquiry. Everything would just happen by nature. That’s why we have logic. On the need for art. II. Socrates made the momentous discovery that nature has not equipped us with a method for arriving at the truth. and God the Artist is to the created world as the human artist is to his work (ST I-II 93. g. 8. 12] Cf. Three Dialogues on Liberal Education (St. Berquist. But I carry on other activities for which I don’t have the right kind of sequence built into me.” 25 “since habits are known by their acts and acts by their objects” 67 . you must start here and proceed the right way. Second Day: Mr. If you could get to your goal in just any way.” 23 “since action is a mean between the maker and the thing made” 24 “For those things which come about by art are representative of the art itself. et al). Met. There is art to the extent that the means are determined. William Darkey (ed. L. g.. § 22 “With respect to the matter of art there are two things to consider: the very action of the artificer which is directed by art. sed. n. 2. 1006. It is clear that it does make a difference what order you proceed in and how much time you spend on such and such a thing. if it happened at all. 4. I-II 93. [n. 6. ‘Circa materiam artis due est considere: scilicet ipsam actionem artificis quae per artem dirigitur. 2. is a very simple point of method: if you want to get to that goal there.. 859). then nature takes care of the rest.. To the extent that this is the case and that the necessary order is discoverable. 26. Marcus Berquist. and then I have to apply my understanding.

26 it does not seem possible to place it among them. 27 Cf. being ‘industrial’ arts. the end of the former being the thing made or the use of it. and the work already produced.A. Thomas Aquinas.14. 4. Thomas calls aedifactiva. Likewise. Lectio 4. Since the end of the fine arts is pleasure. are themselves servile. Accordingly. n. whereas the latter produce a work in necessary matter while remaining in the agent. whether in vocal sound. But the reason that art imitates nature is that the principle of artificial operation is knowledge. St. the written word. which. again (2) the exemplar of the exterior word. 26 For the foundation of this difference. And just as in a work of art the intention of the end precedes. rather. the pertinent remarks of Dionne supra. its exemplar. as is clear from the fact that it can equally imitate artificial things. which also art imitates in operating. several assertions made by Sheila O’Flynn in this regard also appear to be mistaken. and lastly the work is produced in being —so the word of the heart in the one speaking is prior to the word which involves the image of the voice. 1. 27 For the same reason. the making idea in the mind of the artist. NOTULA IN IAE PARTIS Q. and since all such arts are defined as imitations.28 and so are speculative. But that concept or image has a more radical original the concept or image of which is a likeness in form with the origination. the art in question is not imitative in the way the aforementioned arts are). B. art. 6. de Veritate. The place of architecture among the arts. with respect to which the exterior word is uttered in order for it to be signified: and this is the word of the heart without being uttered by the voice. the servile and liberal arts are mutually exclusive. a cloud. Charles De Koninck. ‘construction’. when by determinate means it proceeds to certain ends. Cf. just as in things made by art we consider three things. and so are virtues of the practical intellect. AD 1 (The Charles De Koninck Project): To the third I answer that in any art there is some imitation. [In II Physic. by which we may understand ‘house-building’ or. which is common to all arts. disp. Qu.” And therefore it must be considered that in these arts there is a twofold exemplar or original: first. neither of which is true of architecture (for although every art imitates nature.): And so. not yet written out. or an electronic storage and retrieval system such as the Cloud. (emphasis added) 28 It being only their signs which exist in exterior matter. being the “thinking out” of the form to be introduced into exterior matter. and this is called the interior word which involves an image of the voice. namely. something known. whence the exemplar sometimes is called an original and the exemplared an image. and in the last place is the word of the voice. and then follows the thinking out of the form of the work. of the latter.M. the end of the work of art. it would appear to be a composing part of the art St. But the difference of the arts about which we now speak is found in the “delightfully. c. And therefore natural things are imitable by art. whence in artificial things we work toward a likeness of natural things.] And so the art of imitating delightfully as such and inasmuch as it is of this sort is not said to imitate. no servile art can be a fine art. which is called the word of the voice. and all things which can be imitated thus. more generally. (tr. as also [there is] an exemplar and an exemplared. namely. (1) that which is conceived by the intellect. anger. IX. and already expresses the “what” of the thing to be made. so also in speaking a threefold word is found: namely. one ought to mark that the exemplar already is an exemplared or image. as a lion. nor can a liberal art be fine. I. but in the art of imitating delightfully. A. and (3) the exterior word expressed. or in the conceived poem. as is clear in the picture conceived by the painter before execution. q. because by an intellective principle the whole of nature is ordained to its end. cf. a king. so thus the work of nature seems to be the work of intelligence. since the former produce a contingent work in exterior matter. but all our knowledge is through the senses and taken from sensible and natural things. 68 .

32 33 Poetics. if a shoe is to be produced—a certain kind of composite—then parts must be stitched or nailed together. De generatione et corruptione. 31 For example. the following from Elder Olson. the artistic whole which is to be produced and proceeding through the various parts of the various kinds to be assembled. nn. but the iron sphere. cf. i. ii.). this is reasoning. n. taking for its starting-point. eth. 8. for art is concerned neither with things that are or come into being by necessity nor with things that do so in accordance with nature. vii. cf. The first proceeds from the form to be produced to the first thing which can be produced.29 In art a form in the mind of the artist is imposed upon his medium. that is. which is a whole. All this is reasoning. which is to exist. and indeed based upon. the concretum. and if the work is to have excellence as a whole. 1032a 32. 1040a 10-16 (Oxford tr. 1033a 23-1033b. then the parts must be of such and such a kind and quality. 28 29 Nic. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas. with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being and whose origin is in the maker. and the structure of such science may be described as hypothetical regressive reasoning. of contrary direction.. For the basis of my suggestion that architecture ought to be understood as the “thinking out” of the form of what is to be built. the other must determine the parts according to that formulation. p. and deductive reasoning from its principle. or principle. not in the thing made. since these latter have their origin in themselves. to the parts which must have existence previous to that of the whole. 337b 14 ff. 28 What is made by the artist is neither the form nor the matter. Rowan (Chicago. 1447a 10: ei) me/llei kalw=j e)/cein h) poi/hsij. De partibus animalium. which are. 1. 33 The reasoning is hypothetical because it is based upon hypotheses: If such and such a work. [190-191] The scope of any productive science. any productive science must consist of two main parts: inductive reasoning toward its principle. is to be produced. this is making. 34 Supra. vi. to produce the artistic composite.N. a concretum of form and matter. 1976). 190: Moreover. Book VII. (emphasis added) For St. lect. is the rational part of production centering in. 4. but the statue. as it were. 11. 1952. 1406: 69 . Reprinted in On Value Judgments in the Arts (Chicago. The reasoning is regressive because it works backward from the whole. the sculptor makes neither the marble which is his material nor the human form which he gives it. which is the human form imposed upon marble. “The Poetic Method of Aristotle: Its Powers and Limitations. 6. therefore.63 9b 24 ff. The second proceeds from the first thing which can be produced to the form itself.B. but the process from the terminus of the reasoning to the final production of the form is making. Since the reasoning is based upon a definition of a certain whole as its principle and since that definition must be arrived at in some fashion. the nature of the product. Met.34 One part must make possible the formulation of the whole. i. but the synolon. according to Aristotle all art is concerned with coming into being. For instance. 30 7.30 and the productive process may be divided into two parts. and the ironworker makes neither the iron nor the spherical form. and these will have to be cut and prepared. translated by John P. and so forth to the first thing that can be done. 1961). 31 1032b 15 ff.” In English Institute Essays. then such and such parts must be assembled in such and such a way. 6. but first there must be the requisite parts. Thomas’ understanding.

how the term principle is taken in different ways in regard to the activity of art (‘Now of generations’). 70 . 30 Transcription furnished to me by Richard Diamond. for example. is itself called thinking. . Cf.. if health is to exist. i. and this activity extends. which also support my claim. idem. men of mere experience cannot. and this is then a motion affecting matter. 1408: Now of generations (607). i.. he shows how the health which exists in the mind is the principle (or starting point) for the restoring of health. N. and second (607:C 1408). Therefore the activity which begins from this last thing in which the activity of thinking terminates. He accordingly says (606) that. by which the humors are balanced. n. (emphasis added) Cf. also the following: 15. and in regard to this he does two things. . cf.e. what is meant by science and wisdom? See Aristotle’s text: Book I. . On medicine in relation to prudence. n. is called producing. and as an ars cooperativa naturae.” 29 It being “[the architect’s] duty to comprehend the entire arrangement of the whole work” to be built. As the foregoing explanation is made in terms of the medical art. either regularity or the balance of heat. chapter 1: “The animals other than man . He shows how the word principle is taken in different ways in regard to the activities of art. it is necessary that this exist. and thus by always going from what is subsequent to what is prior he thinks of the thing which is productive of heat. since the health present in the mind is the principle of the health produced by art. moisture and dryness. 148. 29 Hence we observe that the “thinking out of the form” furnishes the starting-point of the process consisting in the “thinking” or “reasoning” which arrives at the first thing to be done in the order of execution. He says that in artificial generations and motions there is one activity which is called thinking and another which is called producing. as St. The Art of Medicine As a Kind of Prudence (Charles De Koninck Papers) (Q30-7—10):30 Why does Aristotle. health is brought about in a subject as a result of someone thinking in this manner: since health is such and such. until he reaches some final thing which he himself is immediately capable of doing. regularity or the balance of humors.e. . and if regularity or balance must exist. For the artist’s planning. Cf. and then of the thing which is productive of this. . cold. and finally the motion beginning from the thing which he can do immediately is said to be the activity directed to the production of health. . He now shows how health is produced by this principle. at the very outset of his Metaphysics. also his pertinent remarks on the meaning of ‘architect’ and on architectonic arts above.1406. right down to what is last in the order of intention and first in the order of execution. . choose Medicine to show. First. eventually. Health comes about (606). the dispensing of some particular medicine. as was said above. . there must be heat.B. which begins from the principle which is the form of the thing to be made by his art. . Thomas explains in his Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians. Charles De Koninck.

71 . of prudence. which we make as we do for a purpose of our own choosing. whereas in this field there is always some looseness in and about general reasons. However. Art and prudence are profoundly different qualities. the health of the patient. its end. they differ so widely that one can hardly see how one could share in the other. the reasons themselves are sought for sake of returning to the order of experience where enlightened practice should bear more fruit. but this man and that. Whatever the value of this reason. somewhat like the art of navigation which likewise shares in the nature of practical wisdom. For experience is derived from and is about particular cases. Why should this be so? When we consider art and prudence. the purgation which was beneficial to Socrates could be calamitous when administered to Plato. We encourage those who are not content with mere experience. begins with experience. It is not enough to reason: “Plato is constipated. He advises anyone who expects to be generously wined and dined to take a spoonful of olive oil before. and its purpose being the health of individuals. Now Medicine is an art. and so he needs a physic”. that will happen because it has always or frequently been so in the past. the latter. that is likely to ensue. The good of the art is the good of the work. when one does this. or practical wisdom.It is one thing to know that if one does this. it is better to have experience without knowing the “why” than to know the “why” without experience. then. He thought that wine to excess produces a congestion of the liver. and the art of the physician: What is a well-running machine? What is health? Man is a product of nature. but he also enquired into the reason. and the preservation of health in those who possess it. For. to restore health. conduct. it is another to know why. The same Greek philosopher. personal or otherwise. our own. And here is a further difference to be noted: — Art. has also said that medicine is at the same time a kind of prudence. after all. But [there is a] great difference between the art of a mechanic. We know machines better than we know nature. One may know from experience. in themselves. and one may have the one without the other: the former regulates making. as the wise man points out. and one does not set out to heal man in general. The aim of medicine is. and vice versa. (Aristotle himself is a case in point. Of a fluteplayer who would have to deliberate in the course of a concert we would hardly say that he is a true artist. uses determinate means to the end and does not deliberate. One may be a good craftsman without being a good man. and oil would unloose a flow of bile. the quality of the action with respect to the end of man: happiness. we acknowledge his inquisitive mind). It is only on this condition that medicine can be truly a practical art. the machine. — Prudence must deliberate: the circumstances [are] far more complex: and good judgment will be conditioned by [the] right disposition of the agent. drink to excess produces a condition called “hang-over”. seeks reasons for what is known from experience. We shall never know nature as well as we know the products of our own contrivance. whose father was the most famous medical doctor of that time and physician to Alexander the Great. as the man of experience knows. but we would have more esteem for the person who could also tell us just why this is usually so. Medicine. like nature. and another after—one should attend these affairs well-oiled! That seems to have been a good enough advice for his time. per se.

Practical and productive are distinct only when the production remains within the speculative intellect as is possible only in logic and mathematics. among other because nature at infinity. Doctor whose end wealth. Charles De Koninck. Physician has special reason for “wonder”. Natural [L]aw. Thomas: “ars medicinatis intendit ad sanandum in infinitum. The most perfect art of the creatures—the laus proffered and addressed to God by the intellect enjoying the beatific vision (Ia. A more philosophical consideration: End of medicine infinite. The means. but of the circumstances favouring the operation of nature. art from without. S. the amount of contingency. Nature acts from within. yet. whose art takes the purest form. the indefinite variety of the individuals. added on to organs: [the] disturbance of [an] organ affects the whole. which is still a mimèsis of nature. q. 107. are not infinite—nor is such an infinity intended. Actually. or aesthetic. requires deliberation in each individual instance. coupled with the necessity of intervention. Still [an]other reason for “quædam prudentia”: man not only [is] not [a] machine. monster in Christian world. Good Samaritan. Hence [the] danger of heeding one and neglecting [the] other. both strictly human sciences. most of man’s psychological faculties are organic—not just “separate” faculties. and therefore distinct from the speculative. Christian physicians: mercy: not only bodily but also spiritual.. Cf. Av. Infinity because of ignorance of nature.This inevitable ignorance. a. Here the care we wish to bestow on [the] patient may depend upon our general conception of man. Every doctor has some philosophy. calls for deliberation—and this alone would make of medicine a kind of prudence. whether real or apparent. principle of science. 1938) (Unpublished manuscript. the unique complexity of each individual instance. The Incarnation is a work of practical art—“et homo factus est”. sed secundum mensuram”. Charles De Koninck Papers) (Excerpt): …Whether an art is cooperativa naturæ as medicine and bridge-building. All art is productive. and I admire Eddington for rebuking this idea). (The geometrising God of Plato and Jeans is a monstrosity. Necessary because of deficiencies of nature—tries to do what nature would do if she could. Medicine cannot reach [a] definitive stage which would allow the physician to proceed with the determination of a plumber. Here [lies the] difference between physician and horse-doctor. however. cannot but imitate his own nature. Even God. End does not justify means. sed medicinam non dat quantumcumque potest. Letter to Mortimer Adler (Quebec June 15. 72 . cum inducit sanitatem quantumcumque potest. The end of medicine is without limit—and the physician must be satisfied to treat the patient as best he can. —Good example of “imprudence”: theories concerning infant care. but not even [a] mere animal. 3)—is a production and essentially practical. even medicine—not of health. And no art can be anything but imitation of nature. medicine. Limits imposed upon experimentation. does not alter its status as practical.

All rights reserved. This is the point we should be able to agree upon before discussing the others…. Mazzetti. A Compendium of Texts. Divine art is always practical. Even the “futuribilia” are inseparable from the decrees which imply will. See also: On the Liberal Arts. § (c) 2013 Bart A. 73 .So that the main issue remains as I have stated it in the notes: no created science can be both speculative and practical.

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