(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti. §


THE DIVISION OF THE ARTS ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE. 1. An overview of the arts in the Aristotelian tradition. Cf. Marcus Berquist, Good Music and Bad. Excerpt from a lecture given at St. Thomas Aquinas College, Ojai, California, Oct. 1991:
At the beginning of his Metaphysics, Aristotle divides art into three genera. 1 There are the arts which produce necessary and useful things, for example carpentry. These are called “servile” because they provide instruments of life and of the good life. Secondly, there are the arts which aim at recreation and delight, what we now call the “fine” arts. The poet and the musician seek to please, and yet this pleasure is not the end of life. Life is not for the sake of recreation and amusement. Thirdly, there are the arts whose end is knowledge, for example geometry. The proper end of geometry is to know about magnitude and figure. Such arts are called “liberal” because they befit a free man, having value in themselves, because in and of themselves they make us know something about something worth knowing. And knowing is, largely, the end of life. The difference between the first and the third of these genera is evident. In the first genus, knowledge is simply for the sake of the making. If we could have the product without the knowledge we would not bother about the knowledge. Whereas in the third case the end sought is the knowledge itself. But as regards the second genus, the fine arts, the contrast is not so clear. Middles, things in between, are always hard to define. But we can say this. The poet, the painter, and the musician, are like the carpenter in this respect at least: their knowledge is for the sake of some work. The art of the poet is for the sake of the poem that he composes or the play or the story, the art of the musician is for the sake of the composition that he makes, the art of the sculptor is for the sake of the statue, and so on. The end of these sciences is making, not knowing, and making is for the sake of the thing made. Nevertheless, when we consider the use of the products of these arts, the fine arts, we perceive a certain likeness to the liberal arts. For the use of the products is not “use” in the ordinary sense; it’s in being seen or being heard, that is to say, in some act of knowledge, and knowing something is not using it in the ordinary sense. Thus, when we listen to the poet or the musician, we are not using his product to bring about some further effect by means of it, but we are ourselves being affected. But this affecting is in the first instance a kind of knowing, involving maybe both sense and intellect. Thus we see why these arts are called “fine”, at least when compared with the servile arts. The use of the products, here, is a sort of knowing. Next, we ask what do these fine arts produce such that they should receive such a use? Aristotle, at the beginning of the Poetics, gives a kind of an answer. He says this: “Our subject being poetry, I propose to speak not only of the art in general, but also its species and their respective capacities”, and then he goes on a little bit further “Epic poetry and tragedy, as also comedy, dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation. But at the same time they differ from one another in three ways: either by a difference of kind in their means, or by differences in their objects, or in the manner of their imitation”. From the discussion that follows in Aristotle’s text, we see that Aristotle also regards painting and sculpture to be modes of imitation. Aristotle, then, regards this to be a most general and fundamental difference between the fine arts and the other arts. Accordingly, an artist of this sort is essentially a maker of imitation. And thus Aristotle goes on to differentiate among the fine arts on this basis. These arts differ from one another by a difference in the objects imitated, the means of imitation, and the manner of imitation.

Cf. I. 1 (981b 7—982a 35), given below. –ed.


Cf. Mortimer J. Adler, The Great Treasury of Western Thought. 16.1 The Realm of Art:
As used by almost all of the authors quoted, from the Greeks down to the end of the eighteenth century, the word “art” refers to skill in the making of anything—a shoe or a ship as well as a poem or a painting or, for that matter, a demonstration in mathematics or a political oration. The artist is a man who has a specific skill to some degree. Those who happen to make something without art do so entirely by chance. Since the word “art” is used to refer to the skill possessed by a maker; it is not used to refer to the thing he makes, the object he produces. That is a work of art. The terms thus used are not evaluative. They do not signify the achievement of excellence. Artists may have more or less skill; works of art may be more or less good. It is only in the last few centuries that the term “art” has become so restricted that it refers only to literary and musical compositions, paintings, and sculptures, and the like; it is even narrowed further in the familiar expression “literature, music, and the fine arts,” in which the last phrase refers exclusively to what hangs on walls, stands on pedestals, or is enclosed in cases. When the phrase “fine art” was coined (it makes its first appearance in the age of Immanuel Kant), it was used to distinguish one group of arts from all others, i.e., those arts the products of which are an end (Latin, finis) in themselves—to be enjoyed for what they are rather than used for some ulterior purpose. The basic points made in the discussion of art in general apply equally to the fine arts, the useful arts, and the liberal arts. Writers call our attention, for example, to the fact that a work of art may either have an enduring existence or be a transient process. A statue and a poem, like a house or a chair, endure in themselves after the artist has finished his work; not so the performance of an actor or a dancer on the stage, the speech of an orator, and the operation of a surgeon.

Cf. J.A. Oesterle, “Art,” The New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York, 1967). Vol. 1:
There is no simple yet comprehensive definition of art; the word has in fact many meanings. The Greek and Latin equivalents (techne, ars) can include broadly everything customarily grouped under the label of fine art, and servile and liberal arts as well. Even when narrowed to fine art, the word retains ambiguity in at least two important respects. First, whatever community of meaning the various fine arts share, distinctive differences among them prevent the name’s remaining exactly the same in meaning; poetry and painting, for example, are not art in a wholly identical sense. Current usage tends to limit the meaning of art to painting and sculpturing. Second, within the context of fine art, art may signify the product of art, the creative process itself, or the experience of appreciating a work of art, sometimes referred to as aesthetic experience. This article deals with art from a broad, philosophical point of view, considering its definition and division, the notion of fine art, and problems associated with the latter’s finality. Notion of Art. In the Western tradition, the original meaning of art is skill in making; the word was used by the ancient Greeks to refer, first of all, to the crafts that satisfy basic human needs. Throughout the dialogues of Plato and the writings of Aristotle, this meaning of art is the basic one employed to explain all other skills, whether physical or mental. Art was also early recognized as a sign of a certain excellence, testifying to man’s progress beyond what nature can provide. Aristotle accordingly points out that he who invented any art was naturally admired by men as being wise and superior to the rest. “But as more arts were invented, and some were directed to the needs of life, others to recreation, the inventors of the latter were naturally always regarded as wiser than the former, because their branches of knowledge did not aim at mere utility (Meta. 981b 16-19). Art as “the capacity to make


Art and Science. This division is basic. is the result of 4 . they remain quite distinct. The most obvious type of makeable object is one that exists in external physical matter. The likeness of the work of art exists first in the mind of the maker. Prudence therefore involves the moral order in a way that art does not. there is a distinct world of fine art and aesthetic experience. therefore. knowing is for the sake of producing. and the corresponding resolution of a theory of art to aesthetics is a relatively modern contribution. a chair or a bed. readily lends itself to being shaped into a table. This Greek conception of art dominated the Middle Ages and persists in modern times. existing independently of the human mind. medicine. Art and Nature. at the same time what is produced is a subject of demonstration. however much art and nature resemble each other. In the Physics. even though both arise from the human mind. Much of Plato’s Timaeus seeks to render the pattern of the universe intelligible by comparison with man’s own making. the understanding of nature in terms of art has been fruitfully pursued. Craftsmanship enabled man to attain a grasp of the operations of nature. For example. emphasizing an association of art and beauty and stressing the autonomy of fine art. initially at least. prudence is a moral as well as an intellectual quality in man. Art has been traditionally divided into liberal and servile. and thus there is both knowledge and production. consequently. 1140a 20) was accordingly extended to what we now call liberal and fine art. as the writings of Galen and Harvey show. In art. the form of a living natural object. but art is ordered to something apart from knowledge itself. The development of art in the Renaissance undoubtedly accelerated this tendency. referring as it does to a difference in the work to be made. Alexander Baumgarten. and however much the understanding of one leads to an understanding of the other. The common notion of art as skill also distinguishes art from science. “art imitates nature. This distinction does not prevent some disciplines from being both art and science. for example. figures are constructed in mathematics.according to sound reason” (Eth. Art also differs from prudence or practical wisdom. The history of the meaning of art is the history of man’s progress from making products immediately necessary for living to making things ordered to knowledge or enjoyment. True enough. in the middle of the 18th century. namely. Art and Prudence. the work produced.” should first be grasped before it is applied to fine art. Plato and Aristotle in ancient times. Nevertheless. for although both involve reason. made major contributions to what is now regarded as a philosophy of fine art. Art uses knowledge to produce a work. It is equally evident that such making. while still viewing nature as a work of divine art. is generally regarded as the first to try to construct a systematic aesthetics in the modern sense. But in the last 200 years the fine arts have been approached in a quite different spirit. In science. wood. Art and Aesthetics. The narrowing of the meaning of art to fine art. and various writers in the Middle Ages. It is in this context of making as resembling natural processes that Aristotle’s often misunderstood dictum. for such matter is susceptible to receiving an artificial form. for he soon noted strong resemblances between the way he produces something and the way in which nature works. we seek to understand that something is so or why it is so. Aristotle appeals to the making of a statue or a bed to help understand how natural change takes place. A chair comes from a man’s mind. a special creative imagination and sensibility are thus required to appreciate the distinctive values found in such works. In such a view. they are concerned with distinct kinds of activity: work and behavior. Nic. but the man himself comes from another man. Both art and science are knowledge. prudence uses knowledge to deliberate well and to arrive at decisions regarding what is to be done to ensure right behavior. and thus pertains to a science. from nature. Kinds of Art. In another area. preexists in some other natural object.

and not just spontaneously. this priority is in the order of naming. 5 .. e. art is further divided into useful and fine. Such an object does not involve making in the original sense. but immanent activity that both originates and terminates within the agent. Some fine arts are liberal. for example. poetry and music. since the subjects and purposes of these arts pertain to the mind of man whereby he is set free from lack of order. These characteristics of servile art indicate. The servile arts would here be classified as useful. not a priority of perfection. Further. see the additional excerpt from Marcus Berquist below. There is. order is brought into man’s thinking when he establishes what a proposition is or how we reason in a valid way. forming the agent rather than some external physical object. therefore. Some prefer to make this point by saying that the end sought in the work of fine art is the contemplation and enjoyment of beauty. any functional value it might have. the action involved in such making is transitive. in the manner of a mathematical figure. for example. thus the painting is embodied on canvas and paint. Liberal arts such as logic. we are familiar also with the traditional division of the liberal arts into the trivium (logic. the statue in stone. The object of a wholly liberal art. found primarily in the mind or the imagination of the artist. there is an indetermination in the mind of man requiring that he set in order his means of knowing. considering the work produced. The painting is viewed primarily for itself. for the poet and composer produce their works primarily by immanent action. as suggested earlier. nevertheless. is entirely distinct from the composing art which comes under poetica. and rhetoric could be termed useful in the sense they are not ends in themselves. The useful arts pro-duce things to be enjoyed not in and for themselves. or persuasion. grammar. that has a kind of significance inciting enjoyment of a form wholly lacking to a merely useful product. is secondary. is art in a less obvious sense.bodily effort on the part of the maker. with respect to the latter. We thus see the reason for calling such arts liberal. its location in a particular area. provided that beauty is taken in a properly aesthetic sense. whereas poetry as such in no way is a liberal art. that the name “art” refers primarily to servile art. another division must be considered. understood as a liberal art. We see also that although the name “art” first signifies manual craft.g. liberal art is primary. music and astronomy). that is. The productions of fine art are contemplated and enjoyed for their own sake (which does not preclude their also being ordered to another extrinsic end). Liberal art is less evidently art because the making involved is not a transitive action. is immaterial. moreover. and rhetoric) and the quadrivium (arithmetic. therefore. though originating in an agent. for example. such as a shovel. it is not particularly revealing in regard to fine art which. but for some other good. On the former. The reason for this division can be shown in a painting. in fact. yet proportionally. To appreciate the distinctive character of fine art. 2 Music. Liberal Art. cuts across that division. a distinctive and unique type of enjoyment that arises in the viewing or hearing of a work of fine art consequent upon the equally distinctive type of contemplation realized in appreciating the work. geometry. adequate expression. Such constructions enjoy existence in the mind and imagination. We are nonetheless familiar with the extension of the name liberal art. for example. an activity which. grammar. terminates outside the agent in some product that comes to exist in physical matter. and the church in stone or brick. but are sought as indispensable aids for bringing about knowledge.2 Other fine arts are servile in the sense that the objects made require external physical matter and labor for their existence. Though the distinction of servile and liberal is basic. would fall within the liberal division. the fact that poetry has never been classified as a liberal art suffices. and their works exist chiefly in the imagination. From the standpoint of purpose. Liberal art. is something we construct deliberately. A syllogism. Fine Art. and this feature characterizes such art as servile.

and so on. pleasing form. Though music is sometimes regarded as a non-imitative art. In the poetic arts the object of imitation is the action and passion of men as reflected variously in the poem. We humanize our environment in precisely this way. There is equal. we project our desire for beauty of form onto objects around us as much as possible. in fact. by means of tonal and properly musical progressions. Finality of Art. The tendency to identify them may originate in the fact that the most evident instances of artistic imitation occur in the visual arts where imitation is associated too readily with natural or photographic likeness. it is not to be identified with more or less literal copying. Finality refers to a good or purpose. the artist may be working for a morally good or bad cause. in art. Such imitation should therefore be understood as creative. It is creative as well. We have already noted that in a sense all art imitates nature. sometimes in appearance. Artistic imitation by no means rests upon a complete dependence of the image upon some original in nature from which it proceeds. It is realized also in proportionately different ways in other arts. originally expressed in the intonation of the human voice. even the most “abstract” forms of musical composition. In any event. the differences among the fine arts come from the manner and means of imitation. 6 . The history of painting and sculpturing reflects this movement within these extremes. arousal and resolution. more serious works. Analysis of Fine Art. the facts of musical history belie this observation. The use of music to accompany drama or motion pictures obviously manifests this. Music represents the flow of passion. therefore. It always involves some degree of abstraction. no matter how “abstract” or “nonobjective” the work of art. and indeed a more significant one.It is worth noting that man’s preoccupation with beauty. Music. Hence no artist merely reproduces some aspect of reality. this consideration falls under the scope of prudence. Thus the artist can intend the work for propaganda or some other foreign end. The word “imitation” is subject to easy misunderstanding (“representation” might serve better for a modern reader). What is peculiar to fine art is that imitation (and delight in imitation) is the immediate end sought in fine art. for the mind and imagination of the artist is also a source. It is imitative in the sense that a work of art represents something other than itself. dependence of the image upon man’s creative imagination and understanding. From an Aristotelian point of view. As human beings. the novel or the drama. One could say that the common object of all fine art is human action and passion. and this is one way art and morality may be related. Artistic imitation. sometimes in operation. escape our passion for artistic enjoyment. yet we find it both necessary and desirable that a shoe look good. on the other hand. very few products of human art. does not represent in a visual manner nor is it imitative in the sense that it copies natural sounds. A shoe is clearly a product of a useful art. it cannot wholly escape reference to human experience of reality. it thus has reference to some aspect of reality as we experience it. if not more. carries over into many useful products of art. design. In other words. Even 20th-century music bears witness to such primal representational principles as tension and release. of course. being some sort of sign or symbol. do so more subtly and with more elaborate technique. no matter how utilitarian they are. over and beyond the good of art itself. is a broad notion ranging from the one extreme of approaching a somewhat literal representation of reality to the opposite extreme of retaining only a tenuous but still significant representation of some quality detected in reality. and hence the division into useful and fine should not be understood too rigidly. The artist then acts as man rather than as artist. what sets off fine art from either liberal or servile is imitation. whereas imitation serves only as a means in liberal or servile art. this refers both to the purpose of the artist and to the work of art itself. the expected and the unexpected.

which is at once an action of sense and intellectual appetite. however in that it disposes us for the ulterior end of artistic contemplation and delight. Most of all. it is quite another to make the work of art specifically moral in its aim. or joyful. while not itself of a moral nature. Aristotle’s notion of catharsis manifests this point in relation to tragedy. whether noble. Any work of art is an idea expressed by an image in the artist’s mind and in an appropriate sense medium. otherwise. There is the intellectual delight attendant upon the grasp of order entering into the rhythmic. it is more intuitive than discursive. tone. but in such a way that something universal is realized in it. and yet the work has its self-contained inevitability. One end is the arousal and release of the emotions wherein lies the great appeal art has for man. as artist. an intrinsic relation between art and morality is evident in the following way. We are thus led to recognize a finality of art which. So far as this can be summarized generally. for example. Artistic contemplation is a distinct kind of knowing. At the same time. can thus express man in some way acting as a moral agent. The action of the play is more intelligible and more significant than human action ordinarily is. it must be both concrete and abstract. accompanied by a distinct type of delight.Morality of Art. he will be unconvincing as an artist and will fail to move us in the manner that is appropriate to art. image and concept. the artist. the intrinsic end of art cannot be overtly moral. the development of a musical composition images in tonal progression the movement of human passion at its finest. is a type of man exemplified individually by his action. and chiefly in its moral character. Therein lies the source of special delight that accompanies this contemplation. line. and voluntary acts are moral acts. 7 . art suffers when used merely to propagandize morality. Moreover. and beauty of much art. what should be excluded from good art is the artist’s representing what is morally good as evil and what is morally evil as good. Consequently. For example. such delight arises from seeing in a work of creative representation an object that is more expressly formed and more intelligible than the original referent. for art represents the flow of emotional tension and release more skillfully than our normal experience usually permits. Whenever the work of art creatively represents something of human action and passion. imagination and understanding. realized proportionately in the different arts. The power of art lies in its simultaneous appeal to the senses and the understanding. the moral order enters into the work of art as a formal constituent. The sound of music is better formed and more discerning than the sound of speech as normally expressive of passion. Whatever is universal in art is realized in this sense medium. then. It is one thing for a moral dimension to enter into the artistic representation. for human action and passion are voluntary. or of the order of elements in a work of sculpture or a drama. it is a knowledge of what need not be. intelligibility. however. It is knowledge especially appropriate to the human mode of knowing: an intimate union of sense and intellect. tragic. rather than of what must be. the tragic hero. it bears on the singular. As far as the relation of art and the moral order is concerned. The artistic image. Art and morality may also be related within the work itself. Hence it can be maintained that when a moral dimension enters into the construction of a work of art. melodic. There is the initial sense of delight accompanying the grasp of such qualities as color. it is an imaginative reconstruction of some aspect of reality and life we are familiar with. the moral order contributes to the delight. is twofold. the intelligibility and delight we find in a tragedy depend in great measure on grasping some moral grandeur in the action of the hero. The cathartic end in art is instrumental. This is primarily so in poetic art and proportionally so in other arts. has an obligation to represent as morally right what is morally right or what is morally wrong as morally wrong. and harmonic construction of a musical composition. and with whom the spectators can identify themselves. Such a work of art images human nature in its various manifestations. in fact. Art and Contemplation. and sound.

The remarks of our author. never exhausts the significance set in motion by the initial experience of the work of art.Artistic contemplation. is the liberal art of music. for example. Such artistic finality. in the opinion of Aristotle and Plato and many others. the former comprehending what have come to be called the servile or mechanical arts. It pertains to education. which is perhaps a sufficient reason for its being. the work of art is simply the worth of man himself as mirrored in his creative representations. a doctrine which you have not derived from that subject matter. we first see in the order of learning that music is characterized by a reasonable order. The first in the order of learning. The numerical ratios and proportions you study in harmony are common to music and other things as well. Ojai. As Aristotle’s discussion at the outset of the Metaphysics makes clear. For in the final analysis. cf. This is the easiest sort of order for us to see and appreciate. for new significance and vitality always emerge in enduring works of art. can apprehend an order of this kind. This would be a thorough or definitive consideration in terms of the proximate genus. But the work of mousike techne. The third consideration of music in the course of study is in ethics and political philosophy. constitutes the primary worth of art. N. 1991 (excerpt): There are three places in the course of study where music is considered. as a mode of imitation.B. which is concerned with the acquisition of virtue. music is considered in terms of education. which is imitation. We see in music a kind of unity and harmony between the passions and reason. is to produce an imitation naturally delightful to man by moving his passions in accordance with reason. are accordingly confused. a part of the quadrivium. Even the young. California. tantalizing the mind with promises of hidden meaning waiting to be uncovered. contemplation with its ensuing delight. the imitative or fine arts. On the question of music as a liberal art distinguished from the poetic art of music. We find this. Good Music and Bad. and in Book VIII of Aristotle’s Politics. Thomas Aquinas College. as well as the logical sciences. Therefore it pertains to ethics and politics to consider it. and the specific differences. music not only amuses and pleases. these species mutually exclude one another. Here. which examines music in the light of certain mathematical principles which it exhibits. We are all concerned that citizens be good men. 8 . without a great deal of experience. the art of music. The unterminating character of this contemplation is the main reason we enjoy over and over again the same work. As we explain at length elsewhere. constantly fluctuating between an image and an original. the following: Cf. the consonances they make. It has an effect on the soul for good or for ill. the first division of the arts is into those which have been found out for their usefulness and those which have not. and from a consideration of its peculiarities. Here. it is a kind of recreation and rest from life’s effortful activities. and the arts whose end is pleasure. imitation of what? and by what means? We can contrast this with the kind of treatment you’d have in a liberal art where you are applying a doctrine which is abstract and general to a particular subject matter. then. As we shall endeavor to establish below. the work of the liberal art of music is to apply formal number to sounds as matter in order to understand such things as intervals. in Book II of his Laws. in Book VI of Plato’s Republic. Oct. but from a more general and abstract consideration. This kind of order is a good thing to see at the beginning because it is proportioned to us. Lecture given at St. Marcus Berquist. and the scales composed of them. but it is also dispositive. This is because. which is of political and social as well as familial concern. The next place that music would come up in the course of study is in a way analogous to Aristotle’s consideration of tragedy in the Poetics.

Painting. the dresser. laws. the spinner. as in the Gorgias.” As late as the end of the 18th century. arms. which raised them from a brutish existence. Smith. in the thought of all previous eras the useful arts came first. however defined or enumerated. it formed an integral part of social life.” “beaux arts” or “Schöne Kunst” (arts of the beautiful). writing in a line that goes from Homer through Thucydides and Plato to Francis Bacon. Chapter 1. correct the assumption. and song. Adler.” In the first great conversation on art – that presented in the Platonic dialogues – we find useful techniques and everyday skills typifying art. In our thought the first connotation of “art” is fine art. the wool-comber or carder. We are acquainted with such phrases as “the industrial arts” and “arts and crafts” in which the reference is to the production of useful things. 1952). the dyer. the scribbler. also Mortimer J. all life’s luxuries. This naturally led to the identification of art with one kind of art – the so-called “fine arts.” we realize that art is distinguished from and sometimes even opposed to nature.” This restricted usage has become so customary that we ordinarily refer to a museum of art or to an art exhibit in a manner which seems to assume that the word “art” is exclusively the name for something which can be hung on a wall or placed on a pedestal. If the liberal arts are praised as highest. of course. by reference to which all other skills are analyzed. Adam Smith follows the traditional usage which begins with Plato when. Rewards and pleasures. The ancient and traditional meanings are all present in our daily vocabulary. because the logician or rhetorician works in the medium of the soul rather than in matter. Art had not yet fled to transcendental heights. are supposed to constitute skills of mind. he constantly turns to the productions of the cobbler and the weaver and to the procedures of the husbandman and the physician. The Promethean gift of fire to men. the fuller. roads. he says: “The shepherd. and all the rest. and sculpture – these were taught 9 . yet its historical connections with utility and knowledge are probably more intimate and pervasive. music. I{I}.Cf. with many others. and Rousseau. Vol. “at the close of the Middle Ages. they are called arts “only in a manner of speaking” and by comparison with the fundamental arts which handle physical material. Our discussions of liberal education should require us to consider the liberal arts which. must all join their different arts in order to complete even this homely production. As Huizinga points out. farms. In contemporary thought. and the fine arts. art is most readily associated with beauty. A moment’s thought will. Seeing it also as the root of “artifice” and “artificial. the weaver. “Art” (Introduction): Art THE WORD “art” has a range of meanings which may be obscured by the current disposition to use the word in an extremely restricted sense. The contraction of meaning has gone so far that the word “art” sometimes signifies one group of the fine arts – painting and sculpture – as in the common phrase “literature. We are not unfamiliar with the conception of healing and teaching as arts. carried with it various techniques for mastering matter – the basic useful arts. attributes the progress of civilization and the difference between civilized and primitive society to the development of the arts and sciences: Ships. walls. Even when Socrates analyzes the art of the rhetorician. in referring to the production of a woolen coat. the connections between art and fashion were closer than at present. The prevalent popular association reflects a tendency in the 19th century to annex the theory of art to aesthetics. Lucretius. The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World (Chicago. We recognize that “art” is the root of “artisan” as well as “artist.” We thus discern the presence of skill in even the lowest forms of productive labor. the sorter of the wool.

On the other hand. in medicine and teaching. “there is something by way of work.” Sometimes we use it to name the effects produced by human workmanship.g. They are the dedication of human leisure and its best fruit. The fine arts and the speculative sciences complete human life. but by his thought or knowledge. in the other as the effect. art seems to be primarily in the mind and work of the cobbler or sculptor and only derivatively in the objects produced. “were the two arts which produced this great revolution” – the advance from primitive to civilized life. but liberal arts. So. “Metallurgy and agriculture. The more generic meaning of art seems to be that of art as cause rather than as effect. 10 . are. a very little at a time. to the exclusion of art or skill.Slowly. are called sciences simply. We elliptically refer to works of art as art. Science. belongs to the mind and involves experience and learning. on the other hand. is knowledge that something is the case. and man as regards his soul is free.. By practice and by trial. or a fitting speech. but only fragments of such a classification are ever explicitly presented. the making of a syllogism. or that a thing has a certain nature. The fine arts and the speculative sciences come last. The leisure without which they neither could come into being nor prosper is found for man and fostered by the work of the useful arts. We do not find art in them. not first. in defining art as a “capacity to make. imagination and thought. a transformation produced not merely by the hand of man. which arts are. Aristotle tells us that is “why the mathematical arts were founded in Egypt. but we depart from this narrow notion whenever we recognize that skill consists in knowing how to make something. Hence even in the case of the shoe or the statue. in being knowledge of how to make something or to obtain a desired effect. by a kind of comparison. Aristotle. involving a true course of reasoning.” writes Aquinas. for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure. What is effected is a certain ennoblement of matter. too. inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul.” says Rousseau. Art is both in the artist and in the work of art – in the one as cause. At the beginning of this progress Lucretius places man’s discovery of the arts of metalworking. as in navigation or military strategy. or the work of counting or measuring. Though art. it is distinct from both in aiming at production. There are many spheres of art in which no tangible product results. like science and moral action. of course. “Even in speculative matters. in the progress of civilization. in a fashion. e. domesticating animals. servile. call a landfall or a victory a work of art. but we tend rather to speak of the art of the navigator or the general. as the mind Went forward searching.” THERE IS ANOTHER ambiguity in the reference of the word “art. in order to distinguish them from those arts which are ordained to works done by the body. Knowledge is sometimes identified with science. and not arts.” <…> THE DISCUSSIONS OF ART in the great books afford materials from which a systematic classification of the arts might be constructed. We might. but rather in the skill of the healer or teacher who has helped to produce that result.” identifies it with making as distinct from doing and knowing. They are not necessary – except perhaps for the good life. Hence whatever habits are ordained to suchlike works of the speculative reason. those sciences which are not ordained to any suchlike work. Sometimes we use it to signify the cause of the things produced by human work – that skill of mind which directs the hand in its manipulation of matter. and cultivating the soil. we look upon the health or knowledge which results from healing or teaching as natural. called arts indeed.

of course. with a view to communicating themselves to one another as completely as possible. such as LOGIC. “are used as means by some . and tone. others to be contemplated or enjoyed. or other aspect of a natural object is considered to be the source of pleasure. particular liberal arts receive so rich and varied a discussion in the tradition of the great books that the consideration of them must be distributed among a number of chapters. Aristotle’s principle also suggests questions about the useful arts. Fruits and grains would grow without the intervention of the farmer. music. gesture.” Aristotle’s treatise deals mainly with this art – poetry. The imitation merely indicates the use. the theory of art as imitation poses many questions which Aristotle left unanswered. in prose or in verse. Are such arts as shoemaking and house-building imitations of nature in the same sense as poetry and music? Does the way in which the farmer. Health and knowledge are natural effects. some arts work toward a result which can hardly be regarded as an artificial product. and their ordered relation to one another. and it is the use which counts. the protective function of calloused skin). . in Augustine’s work On Christian Doctrine we have a discussion of these arts as they are ordered to the study of theology. sculpture. A different principle of division is indicated in the opening chapters of Aristotle’s On Poetics. without harmony. if ever. The principle that all art imitates nature suggests the possibility of distinguishing and relating the various arts according to their characteristic differences as imitations – by reference to the object imitated and to the medium and manner in which it is imitated by the poet. for example. “Color and form. but for 11 . Apart from the issue of its truth. it does not develop for the other fine arts the analysis it suggests. they are there by implication rather than by statement. named. If there are answers in the great books.” Since such expression “consists in word. or a house? The Aristotelian dictum about art imitating nature has.For example. The principles of classification of the fine arts are laid down by Kant from “the analogy which art bears to the mode of expression of which men avail themselves in speech. stand in sharp contrast to those skills whereby man produces the useful things which. and MATHEMATICS. LANGUAGE (for the discussion of grammar). rhetoric. an art which imitates by language alone. yet the farmer helps them to grow more abundantly and regularly. There is no treatment of grammar. been as frequently challenged as approved.. Rhythm alone. and the art of the play of sensations. the physician. architecture. sculptor or painter. or a poem. Some of man’s productions are intended to be used. further. Within the sphere of useful art. the products of the useful arts must be said to imitate a natural function (the shoe. and logic (or dialectic) to parallel Plato’s consideration of arithmetic. THE MOST FAMILIAR distinction between arts – that between the useful and the fine – is also the one most frequently made in modern discussion. without harmony. However. is the means in the dancer’s imitations . more fully discussed in the chapters on MEDICINE and EDUCATION. But in the products of the fine arts. and musician. There is. formative art.” Aristotle writes. These arts. and music. . but their distinction from other arts. nor is there any analysis of the relation of the first three arts to the other four – traditionally organized as the trivium and the quadrivium. even though the arts of medicine and teaching may aid in their production. . quality.” he finds three corresponding fine arts: “the art of speech. To describe them in terms of imitation. The least familiar distinction among the arts is implied in any thorough discussion. do not receive full explication. Quite apart from the problem of how they are ordered to one another.” In these terms he analyzes rhetoric and poetry. the imitation of the form. the seven liberal arts are enumerated by various authors. and astronomy in The Republic. yet its divisions are seldom. RHETORIC. That orientation of the liberal arts is also the theme of Bonaventure’s Reduction of the Arts to Theology. The criterion of the distinction needs little explanation. geometry. . painting and landscape gardening.. and the teacher imitate nature distinguish these three arts from the way in which a statue is an imitation. and the voice is used by others . who imitate and portray many things by their aid.

The great books frequently discuss the arts of animal husbandry and navigation. in Plato’s Ion. This last division had its origin in the recognition that some arts. music may simulate the tonal qualities and rhythms of the human voice registering the course of the emotions. and teaching. . But Freud is attempting to account for the origin of art. The arts which cooperate with nature usually work with living matter. the things which the artist makes by operating on passive materials supplied by nature imitate natural forms or functions. in the other. the arts of cooking and hunting. disposes men to look with favor upon productive efficiency. medicine. Nevertheless. The adequacy of any classification. It is worth noting. and Aristotle is trying to describe an effect proper to its enjoyment. On the question of state control over the production and 12 . THERE ARE TWO OTHER major issues which have been debated mainly with respect to the fine arts. We encounter this notion first. foregoing explanation. the arts serve primarily as a medium of spiritual communication. it is the artist’s activity itself which imitates or cooperates with nature’s manner of working.” If to the foregoing we add the division of the arts into liberal and servile. the motivation of artistic creation lies deeper. or arts concerned with processes of thinking and knowing. however. is separated from poetry and sculpture. For the most part. as in agriculture. their “instinct of workmanship . along with grammar. The work of agriculture is associated with industry in the production of wealth. The distinction seems warranted and clear. the fine arts (chiefly poetry and music) have been the focus of the debate. the arts of war and government. whereas some arts. In the one case. . but not last. But by other principles of classifycation. Yet it is cut across by Smith’s division of labor into productive and nonproductive. It signifies only the speculative arts. Veblen. must stand the test of questions about particular arts. already mentioned. at least in the sense that they worked productively in symbolic mediums. were free from matter. it is said. helping to create the ties of human brotherhood. which is the deepest spring of art. according to Smith. as before. rather than imitation or communication. the poet or artist “forces us to become aware of our inner selves in which the same impulses are still extant even though they are suppressed. When the word “liberal” is used to state this last distinction. concerns the imitative character of art. as fine from useful art. rhetoric. They transform dead matter into commodities or tools. that a parallel problem of political regulation occurs in the sphere of the industrial arts. the work of unfathomable genius.man’s work. expression. the industrial arts are of the second sort. According to Freud. like poetry or logic. or at least its motivation. Logic. poetry and sculpture are separated from logic and carpentry. But there is also a conception of art which. could not effect their products except by shaping matter.” Freud’s theory of sublimation of emotion or desire through art seems to connect with Aristotle’s theory of emotional catharsis or purgation. the major traditional distinctions are covered. Here. THE OTHER MAJOR controversy concerns the regulation of the arts by the state for human welfare and the public good. but whatever other use they may have. The opponents of imitation do not deny that there may be some perceptible resemblance between a work of art and a natural object. than a desire to imitate nature. A drama may remind us of human actions we have experienced. Each raises a question about the nature of art in general and challenges any analysis of the arts to classify them and explain their peculiarities. it is emotion or subconscious expression. its meaning narrows. as liberal from fine art. attempt to explain art. The theories of communication. or to find some pleasure in such resemblances. According to Tolstoy. points out. of a divine madness. would be totally lacking. and the mathematical arts. like sculpture and carpentry. do not directly augment the wealth of nations. One. leaves it a mystery – the spontaneous product of inspiration. or imitation. As another economist. physicians and teachers. and the intelligibility of its principles.

As we have seen. S.distribution of wealth. Yet because both Plato and Aristotle judge that influence to be far from negligible. Mill with Milton. in the first text excerpted above. Smith and Marx represent extreme opposites.B. not law and the reason of mankind. A. In this regard. Aristotle stands on Plato’s side in many particulars. AD 1) It is clear from this statement that De Koninck understood the term “fine arts” to be the same as the beaux arts. either in epic or lyric verse. But how did he conceive the relationship between the two? Which was the genus and which the species? 13 . And so arts of imitating delightfully are abusively equated with those which are called “fine arts. Plato argues in The Republic that all poetry but “hymns to the gods and praises of famous men” must be banned from the State. IX. they do not see any reason in individual liberty for the state to refrain from interfering with the rights of the artist for the greater good of the community.” (NOTULA IN IA PARTIS Q. or the arts of the beautiful. and that these are not coextensive with the imitative arts. “for if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter. identifies them with “what are now called the ‘fine’ arts”. which by common consent have ever been deemed the best. 1. compare the following remark from his teacher. § N. but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State. The problem of censorship or political regulation of the fine arts presupposes some prior questions. speaking of the arts which “aim at recreation and delight”. as Milton and Plato are poles apart on the question of the state’s right to censor the artist’s work. going on to cite Aristotle as his authority for concluding that they all agree in producing an imitation. Marcus Berquist. and J. but in a delightful imitation.” Such a view presupposes a certain theory of the fine arts and of their influence on the citizens and the whole character of the community. Charles De Koninck: To the first [I answer] that the property of the art of imitating delightfully is not preserved in a beautiful work of art as such. In this debate.

we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. he will often fail to cure.2. (We think the manual workers are like certain lifeless things which act indeed. For to have a judgement that when Callias was ill of this disease this did him good. For men of experience know that the thing is so. except in an incidental way. the bee. and related matters. and men of mere experience cannot. Now from memory experience is produced in men. I. but to judge that it has done good to all persons of a certain constitution. and men of experience succeed even better than those who have theory without experience. for it is the individual that is to be cured. for not only with a view to action. and this because the former know the cause.’ as Polus says.. makes us know and brings to light many differences between things. and have but little of connected experience. most of all the senses. when they were ill of this disease )e. Cf. to phlegmatic or bilious people when burning with fevers) . The animals other than man live by appearances and memories. but act without knowing what they do. a man has the theory without the experience. while the others know the ‘why’ and the cause. (The reason is that experience is knowledge of individuals. Now art arises when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgement about a class of objects is produced. who happens to be a man. and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience (which implies that wisdom depends in all cases rather on knowledge). because they know the causes of the things that are done. and those which besides memory have this sense of hearing can be taught. and from sensation memory is produced in some of them. but Callias or Socrates or some other called by some such individual name. Malcolm Heath): [980a20] All men by nature desire to know.983a) (tr.for ‘experience made art. Aristotle’s consideration of the arts: their place in the rise of first philosophy.this is a matter of art.) Thus we view them as being wiser not in virtue of being able to act. that the former can teach. but do not know why. and actions and productions are all concerned with the individual.g. and therefore we think art more truly knowledge than experience is. Metaph. and recognises the universal but does not know the individual included in this. is a matter of experience. Hence we think also that the masterworkers in each craft are more honourable and know in a truer sense and are [981b] wiser than the manual workers. But while the lifeless things perform each of their functions by a natural tendency. as fire burns. ‘but inexperience luck’. and any other race of animals that may be like it). An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses. and above all others the sense of sight. The physician does not cure man. marked off in one class. The reason is that this. but the latter do not. those which are incapable of hearing sounds are intelligent though they cannot be taught (e. and similarly in the case of Socrates and in many individual cases. [980b] Therefore the former are more intelligent and apt at learning than those which cannot remember. the labourers perform them through habit. And in general it is a sign of the man who knows and of the man who does not know. 1-2 (980a 20. but even when we are not going to do anything. For even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves. Aristotle. the definetion of art. but the human race lives also by art and reasonings.g. By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation. art of universals. For artists can teach. [981a] Experience seems pretty much like science and art. With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to art.) But yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to experience. but of having the theory for themselves and knowing the causes. for the several memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience. though not in others. If. 14 . then. but really science and art come to men through experience .

the sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or at the necessities of life were discovered. We suppose first. which we have about wisdom and the wise. in a higher degree.e. for the people who instruct us are those who tell the causes of each thing. 15 . and from these.g. because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility. for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure. And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences. At first he who invented any art whatever that went beyond the common perceptions of man was naturally admired by men. but because he was thought wise and superior to the rest. for they are farthest from the senses. Now of these characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge. this might perhaps make the answer more evident. but the less wise must obey him. and the superior science is more of the nature of wisdom than the ancillary. why fire is hot. If one were to take the notions we have about the wise man. that all men suppose what is called wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things. But they do not tell us the ‘why’ of anything . But as more arts were invented. [982a] and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of wisdom than the productive. also. But the science which investigates causes is also instructive. the artist wiser than the men of experience. arithmetic than geometry. and such is the knowledge of that which is most knowable). although he has not knowledge of each of them in detail. This is why the mathematical arts were founded in Egypt. that he who is more exact and more capable of teaching the causes is wiser. yet surely these give the most authoritative knowledge of particulars. so that. and the first principles and the causes are most knowable.g. and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. we must inquire of what kind are the causes and the principles. for he knows in a sense all the instances that fall under the universal. Such and so many are the notions. for by reason of these. the inventors of the latter were naturally always regarded as wiser than the inventors of the former. then. as far as possible. We have said in the Ethics what the difference is between art and science and the other kindred faculties. the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any sense-perception whatever. are on the whole the hardest for men to know. and not these by means of the things subordinate to them. we do not regard any of the senses as wisdom. Hence when all such inventions were already established. and first in the places where men first began to have leisure. e. and therefore easy and no mark of wisdom). the most universal. the knowledge of which is wisdom. then.Again. and not easy for man to know. that which is desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of wisdom than that which is desirable on account of its results. And these things. others to recreation. and more authoritative than any ancillary science. the masterworker than the mechanic. for the wise man must not be ordered but must order. but the point of our present discussion is this. and that of the sciences. they only say that it is hot. Clearly then wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes. And understanding and knowledge pursued for their own sake are found most in the knowledge of that which is most knowable (for he who chooses to know for the sake of knowing [982b] will choose most readily that which is most truly knowledge. again. as has been said before.2] Since we are seeking this knowledge. that he who can learn things that are difficult. that the wise man knows all things. all other things come to be known. in every branch of knowledge. for those which involve fewer principles are more exact than those which involve additional principles. [1. not only because there was something useful in the inventions. secondly. is wise (sense-perception is common to all. and some were directed to the necessities of life. And the most exact of the sciences are those which deal most with first principles. and this end is the good of that thing. and he must not obey another.

Hence the rational quality concerned with doing is different from the rational quality concerned with making. that there is a thing which cannot be measured even by the smallest unit. and not for any utilitarian end. then. is one of the causes. and it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him. or God above all others. who exists for his own sake and not for another’s. ‘bards tell a lie’). for it alone exists for its own sake. For the most divine science is also most honourable. but as the man is free. But the divine power cannot be jealous (nay. for it seems wonderful to all who have not yet seen the reason. e. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and of the stars. nor is one of them a part of the other. nor making a form of doing. and this science alone must be. the better state. as we said. But we must end in the contrary and. But making is different from doing (a distinction we may accept from extraneous discourses). in two ways. for the good. by wondering that things are as they are. or about the solstices or the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with the side. for there is nothing which would surprise a geometer so much as if the diagonal turned out to be commensurable.): [1140a] The class of things that admit of variation includes both things made and actions done. and about the genesis of the universe. Aristotle. so that according to Simonides ‘God alone can have this privilege’. And this is confirmed by the facts. for the myth is composed of wonders).Judged by all the tests we have mentioned. That it is not a science of production is clear even from the history of the earliest philosophers. according to the proverb. for it was when almost all the necessities of life and the things that make for comfort and recreation had been secured. for (i) God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle. then. i. For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophise. Nicomachean Ethics. 5 (1140a 1-24) (Oxford tr. but none is better. evidently they were pursuing science in order to know. it would probably occur in this case above all. For the science which it would be most meet for God to have is a divine science. this must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes. For all men begin. there is something in what the poets say. and (ii) such a science either God alone can have.g. VI. so we pursue this as the only free science. then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters. Hence also the possession of it might be justly regarded as beyond human power. most divine. 16 . and jealousy is natural to [983a] the divine power. we say. as is the case in these instances too when men learn the cause. for doing is not a form of making. are more necessary than this. according to the proverb. nor should any other science be thought more honourable than one of this sort. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (for this reason even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom. All the sciences. If. as they do about self-moving marionettes. indeed. the name in question falls to the same science. what is the nature of the science we are searching for. and all who excelled in this knowledge would be unfortunate. Evidently then we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage. the end. On the definition of art. they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties. Yet the acquisition of it must in a sense end in something which is the opposite of our original inquiries. that such knowledge began to be sought. and what is the mark which our search and our whole investigation must reach. then. and so is any science that deals with divine objects. and this science alone has both these qualities.e. For in many ways human nature is in bondage. We have stated. cf. therefore since they philosophised order to escape from ignorance.

Nic.not as at present. In this particular as in some others the Lacedaemonians are to be praised. and Art of Chance. for they take the greatest pains about their children. it follows that Art. when every one looks after his own children separately. VIII. concerned with making. and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole. therefore. the training in things which are of common interest should be the same for all. 1310a 12-36. for instance. And in a sense Art deals with the same objects as chance. or according to nature. Eth. [20] And since the whole city has one end. 1180a 24.Now architectural skill. and not private. cf. Again. for the exercise of any faculty or art a previous training and habituation are required. whether we look to virtue or the best life. concerned with making. as Agathon says: Chance is beloved of Art. for the neglect of education does harm to the constitution The citizen should be molded to suit the form of government under which he lives. Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned with intellectual or with 17 . concerned with making. Lack of Art. as has been said. for they all belong to the state. that reasons falsely. are questions which remain to be considered. is a rational quality. Its opposite.2 2 That education should be regulated by law and should be an affair of state is not to be denied. and gives them separate instruction of the sort [25] which he thinks best. nor is there any art which is not a rational quality concerned with making. and how young persons should be educated. x. and make education the business of the state. is a rational quality. nor any such quality which is not an art. Both deal with that which admits of variation. and always the better the character. [20] Art. It follows that an art is the same thing as a rational quality. and to pursue an art means to study how to bring into existence a thing which may either exist or not. is not concerned with doing. 2 Cp. v. All Art deals with bringing some thing into existence. and that it should be public. that reasons truly. it is manifest that education should be one and the same for all. this public education. The character of democracy creates democracy. But as doing and making are distinct. Aristotle. but what should be the character of 1 Cp. is an art. since these have their efficient cause in themselves. and the character of oligarchy creates oligarchy. that reasons truly.1 For each government has a peculiar character which originally formed and which continues to [15] preserve it. For mankind are by no means agreed about the things to be taught. there is [35] disagreement about the subjects. and it is also a rational quality concerned with making. the better the government. B. being concerned with making. On the difference between liberal and illiberal occupations. for Art does not deal with things that exist or come into existence of necessity. clearly therefore for the practice of virtue. Politics. Jowett): 1 No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention above all to the education of youth. Neither must we suppose that any one of the citizens belongs to himself. As things are. and are each of them a part of the state. 1-3 (1337a 8—1338b 7) (tr. and the efficient cause of which lies in the maker and not in the thing made.

for occupations are divided into liberal and illiberal. 18 . and from the pleasure we obtain rest. reading and writing and drawing are regarded as useful for the purposes of life in a variety of ways. but only in a certain degree. the pleasure of the best man is the best. [15] There are also some liberal arts quite proper for a freeman to acquire. Both are required. 4 are partly of a liberal and party of an illiberal character. starting with different ideas about the nature of virtue. but not all [5] useful things. Concerning music a doubt may be raised– in our own day most men cultivate it for the sake of pleasure.4 requires that we should be able. but originally it was included [30] in education. and gymnastic exercises are thought to infuse courage. (2) gymnastic exercises. the first principle of all action is leisure. [35] for then amusement would be the end of life. as I have already remarked. 3 4 a Cp. but to use leisure well. but by those who have leisure. and varies according to the habit of individuals. but leisure is better than occupation and is its end. 3 But leisure of itself gives [1338a] pleasure and happiness and enjoyment of life. the same evil effects will follow. VIII. for the emotion which they create in the soul is a relaxation. and likewise all paid employments. however. as has been often said. about the means there is no agreement. and springs from the noblest sources. or with a view to excellence the action will not appear [20] illiberal. or should virtue. but happiness is an end. as well the related ends of education and katharsis. The existing practice is perplexing. The received subjects of instruction. The object also which a man sets before him makes a great difference. With respect to the latter.). they are– (1) reading and writing. iii. and amusement is needed more amid serious occupations than at other times (for he who is hard at work has need of relaxation. or science. and amusement gives relaxation. naturally disagree about the practice of it. Again. not by the busy man. to [25] which is sometimes added (4) drawing. [40] no one knows on what principle we should proceed– should the useful in life. (3) music. all three opinions have been entertained. because nature herself. which treats of this end. whereas occupation is always accompanied with exertion and effort). for different persons. This pleasure. But if this is inconceivable. art. what ought we to do when at leisure? Clearly we ought not to be amusing ourselves. and they should be our medicines. which makes the body or soul or mind of the free-man less fit for the practice or exercise of virtue. 1277b 3. which are experienced. the very same action will be thought menial and servile. is regarded differently by different persons. be the [1337b] aim of our training. There can be no doubt that children should be taught those useful things which are really necessary. 7 (1341 a 32 ff. but if done for the sake of others. or should the higher knowledge. since all men [5] deem it to be accompanied with pleasure and not with pain. for they absorb and degrade the mind. for. Of these. and to young children should be imparted only such kinds of knowledge as will be useful to them without vulgarizing them. not only to work well. in order to attain perfection in them. wherefore we call those arts vulgar which tend to deform the body. we should introduce amusements [40] only at suitable times. 3 Cf. is vulgar. cf. 3 The customary branches of education are in number four. my brief discussion at the end of this paper. And any [10] occupation. and if he attend to them too closely. as I must repeat once again. 39-b3. if he does or learns anything for his own sake3 or for the sake of his friends.moral virtue. Pol. and therefore the question must be asked. 5 (1340a 1-12) and VIII. For he who is occupied has in view some end which he has not attained.

as Homer says. which gives health and strength. but because it is liberal or noble. who creates in them the roper habit of body. nor like drawing. 9 Thus much we are now in a position to say. Xvii. 525 ff. or after. nor again like gymnastic. Further. whereas those kinds of know-ledge which are useful in business are to be deemed necessary. not on the ground either of its necessity or utility. An unfulfilled promise.It is clear then that there are branches of learning and education which we must study [10] merely with a view to leisure spent in intellectual activity. then. but in Aristotle’s text it probably came instead of. and therefore boys should be handed over to the trainer. [15] which are useful in money-making. who teaches them their exercises. this being one of the ways in which it is thought that a freeman should pass his leisure. 10 Cp. Od. Ix. With a like view they may be taught drawing.”8 [30] It is evident. Xvii. that there is a sort of education in which parents should train their sons. in reading and writing– not only for their usefulness. “But he who alone should be called6 to the pleasant feast. the use of music for intellectual enjoyment in leisure. it is clear that children should be instructed in some useful things– for example.” [25] and afterwards he speaks of others whom he describes as inviting “The bard who would delight them all. nor indeed useful in the same manner as reading and writing. hear the voice of the minstrel. And therefore our fathers admitted music into education. and to the wrestling-master. for it is not necessary. useful for a more correct judgment of the works of artists. [35] that the ancients witness to us. There remains. not as being useful or necessary. sitting in order. but also because many other sorts of knowledge [40] are acquired through them.”7 The line does not occur in our text of Homer. 6 And in another place Odysseus says there is no better way of passing life than when men's hearts are merry and “The banqueters in the hall. what they are. 7. in the management of a household. Plato. then. and if so. for their opinion may be gathered from the fact that music is one of the received and traditional branches of education. but perhaps rather because it makes them judges of the beauty of the human form. vii. 383 7 Od. and how they are to be imparted. Rep. Whether this is of one kind only. and the body be trained before the mind. To be always seeking after the useful does not become free and exalted souls. or in order that they may not be imposed upon in the [1338b] buying or selling of articles. 8 9 Od. and these are to be valued for their own sake. 10 Now it is clear that in education practice must be used before theory. which is in fact evidently the reason of its introduction. § 19 . 385. [20] for neither of these is to be gained from music. and exist for the sake of other things. must hereafter be determined. in the acquisition of knowledge and in political life. not to prevent their making mistakes in their own purchases. or of more than one.

LB1LC-1N.M. II.6 But he shows the first thing he said by an argument of this sort.… he compares active art4 to speculative. in quibuscumque scientiis vel artibus invenitur id propter quod homines scientes prae aliis hominibus in admiratione vel honore habentur. ibi.A. 1. as it may be read passively. Cf. quasi in hoc ab aliis distinguatur. but distinguishing with respect to the investigation of the differences of one thing from another.5 And with respect to this he does two things. ostendit autem quod primo dictum est. a practical or “doing” art. differentem. and not because of their usefulness. are more admirable and more worthy of the name of wisdom because of their more eminent comprehension. Hugh of St.. Second. 62): “… [T]he practical may be called active. and a discrimination of causes beyond the comprehension of other men. sapientem quidem.31 deinde cum dicit primum quidem comparat artem activam speculativae. 6 I. unde alia litera habet. But we admire him rather as wise and distinguishing from other things. Or otherwise. from the fact that morals consist in good action”. quod ars speculativa magis est sapientia quam activa. In I Meta.e. a judgment. et magis dignae nomine sapientiae.32 4 Then when he says.1 (tr. that is. et circa hoc duo facit. p. primo ostendit. he shows that a speculative art is more wisdom than an active one. Thomas Aquinas. For this reason. et non propter utilitatem. those sciences are more honorable and more worthy of the name of ‘wisdom’.): LB1LC-1N. sicut sapientem et ab aliis distinguentem. B. Now any discoverer of an art is held in admiration on account of this. there. with respect to the subtlety of his inquiry into the causes of the thing he has discovered. et non propter utilitatem illorum quae invenit: sed magis admiramur. propter hoc quod habet sensum et iudicium et discretionem causae ultra aliorum hominum sensum. First. In any sciences or arts where one finds that on account of which men characterized by knowing are held in admiration or honor before other men. Thomas Aquinas on certain matters pertaining to the arts. moral.) In the Morals. ab aliis distinguentem. St. quantum ad investigationem differentiarum unius rei ad aliam. illae scientiae sunt magis honorabiles. Cf. another text has “differently”. secundo respondet cuidam obiectioni. quilibet autem inventor artis habetur in admiratione. Victor. ut passive legatur. indeed. 20 . tali ratione. vel aliter. 5 That is. then. likewise ethical. ergo scientiae aliquae sunt magis admirabiles et magis dignae nomine sapientiae propter eminentiorem sensum. distinguishing from other things. the Nicomachean Ethics. in fact.3. n. he was distinguished in this from others. he responds to a certain objection. a considering or “looking” art. as if to say. quantum ad subtilem inquisitionem causarum rei inventae: distingueentem vero. St. (where he says. Certain sciences. lect. 31 (tr. Wise. First. in moralibus. and not on account of the usefulness of what he discovered. that he has a comprehension. Jerome Taylor. That is. Didascalicon.

which can serve for leading into the sciences. And that the speculative sciences were not discovered for their usefulness is clear through this sign: since in everything of this sort already brought forth. of which sort are the speculative sciences. et quod non sint ad utilitatem inventae. sicut mechanicae. a sacerdotibus. as are the arts ordained for man’s delight.e. as if to say. sed propter seipsas. for the sake of this sort [of end. in locis enim illis primo repertae sunt. LB1LC-1N. many arts had been discovered for their usefulness. And so the mathematical arts. 21 . quorum scientiae non sunt ad utilitatem inventae. to whom it was permitted to be free from labor. acquired or discovered. “and first in those places where they were free from labor. et de publico expensas habebant. of which certain ones are for the necessities of life. sed propter ipsum scire. iam partis. et primum his locis ubi vacabant. resting from effort they were free from other occupations. And that they were not discovered for their usefulness is clear from the place where they were discovered. therefore. speculativae non sunt propter huiusmodi the speculative ones have been discovered not repertae. qui sunt concessi studio vacare. were first discovered by the priests in the vicinity of Egypt. for their own sakes]. sicut scientiae logicales: illi artifices dicendi sunt sapientiores. but on account of the very knowing. vel ad voluptatem. unde et circa aegyptum primo inventae sunt artes mathematicae. id est ab aliis occupationibus quiescentes studio vacabant quasi necessariis abundantes. or for the necessities of life. ubi primo homines studuerunt circa talia. patet ex loco quo inventae sunt. but some for an introduction [or a leading] into the other sciences. quarum quaedam sunt ad vitae necessitatem.33 et quod speculativae scientiae non sint inventae ad utilitatem. quae possunt esse ad introductionem in scientiis. sicut artes quae sunt ordinatae ad hominum delectationem: When. For those [sciences] were first discovered in the place where men first were eager in the pursuit of such things. abounding in necessary things. sicut etiam legitur in genesi. necessity or pleasure]. id est acquisitis vel repertis omnibus huiusmodi.” i. quae sunt maxime speculativae. just as we also read in Genesis. vel ad necessitatem vitae. those artisans were called wiser whose sciences were not discovered for their usefulness. Another text has. cuiusmodi sunt scientiae speculativae. alia litera habet. like the mechanic. like the logical sciences. but for the sake of themselves [that is. that is.cum igitur plures artes sint repertae quantum ad utilitatem. patet per hoc signum: quia. or for pleasure. which are the most speculative. quaedam vero ad introductionem in aliis scientiis. and who were kept at the public expense.

prudentia vero et ars est circa animae partem practicam. differunt autem. and understanding have to do with the speculative part of the soul. It is made known. indifferently of both wisdom and science. ibid.): LB1LC-3N. ne aliquis putet haec omnia esse nomina synonyma idem penitus significantia hanc opinionem removet. understanding. idest ad sextum ethicorum. to which it belongs to reason about contingent things that can be done by us. saying that this that is said. but science is of conclusions gathered from inferior causes.-6 deinde cum dicit testatur autem probat idem per signum. sapientia vero considerat causas primas. unde ibidem dicitur caput scientiarum.. sed propter ipsam Then when he says. quae in materiam exteriorem transeunt. And they differ. however . et differunt: nam prudentia dirigit in actionibus quae non transeunt ad exteriorem materiam. but for the sake of the know- 22 . But they differ because understanding is the habit of the first principles of demonstration. for prudence directs in actions which do not pass over to external matter. But because the name of ‘art’ was used. quod hoc quod dictum est. scientia vero est conclusionis ex causis inferioribus.M. ars vero dirigit in factionibus. science. to the sixth book of the Ethics. i. 6 (tr. But art directs in productions which pass over into exterior matter. lect. dicens. that wisdom or philosophy is not sought for the sake of some usefulness. Cf. he proves the same thing through a sign. et remittit ad librum moralium. For this reason. sapientia et scientia et intellectus sunt circa partem animae speculativam. where that in which wisdom. sicut aedificare et secare: unde dicitur quod ars est recta ratio factibilium. quae est ratiocinativa de contingentibus operabilibus a nobis. But prudence and art have to do with the practical part of the soul. in quo differant scientia et ars et sapientia et prudentia et intellectus.A.LB1LC-1N. quam ibi scientificum animae appellat. but are perfections of the agent. n. but wisdom considers the first causes. sed sunt perfectiones agentis: unde dicitur ibi quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. ubi dictum est. scilicet quod sapientia vel philosophia non sit propter aliquam utilitatem quaesita. B. for which reason art is called right reason about makeable things. 3. lest someone think all these names to be synonyms signifying entirely the same thing. which he there names the scientific soul. quia intellectus est habitus principiorum primorum demonstrationis. he removes this opinion and refers to the book of Morals. namely. prudence and art differ has been stated.e. for this reason prudence is there called right reason about doable things. science. as it were. And (to put the matter briefly). wisdom.34 sed quia usus nomine artis fuerat et sapientiae et scientiae quasi indifferenter. as to build and to cut. in the same place it is called the head of the sciences. et ut breviter dicatur.

lect.): LB6LC-3N. etc. because it is sought by all the other habits. by the event. quae in quadam vitae quiete consistit. tertio determinat de altero. For no one will seek what he has. etc.. testatur accidens. sicut scientiae logicales. And with respect to this he does three things. For when in them nearly the whole [of the arts and sciences] were in existence. Thomas Aquinas. as are the logical sciences. there. ex quo patet. scilicet de prudentia. quia omnibus aliis habitis ipsa quaesita est. 3. quod non quaeritur propter aliquam necessitatem aliam a se. quae sunt ad necessitatem vitae. then of such things prudence [ sophrosyne]. First. sed propter seipsam. idest eventus. idest ad voluptatem.. (where he says. is made known by what has happened. Cf. sed ut introductoriae ad alias artes. about art..-9 deinde cum dicit contingentis autem etc. 23 ..e. and those which are also necessary for instructtion. For this reason. and those which are for leisure. that is. ledge itself. which are not sought for their own sakes. at which those inquirers of philosophy have arrived. n. however. In VI Ethic. et circa hoc tria facit. determinat de habitibus qui perficiunt intellectum circa contingentia.scientiam. unde. St. wisdom. primo ostendit duos esse habitus circa contingentia. quia autem aedificativa etc.) Since house-building. patet quod non propter aliquid aliud ipsa quaesita est.. however. quae non propter se quaeruntur. 9-19 (tr. those which are for the necessity of life. it is clear that it is not sought for the sake of something other than itself. that is. about prudence. for pleasure. secundo determinat de uno eorum. et quae sunt etiam ad eruditionem necessaria. i. et quae sunt ad pigritiam. he shows that there are two habits concerned with contingent things. That which can have itself otherwise. idest sapientia. ibi. sed propter seipsam: nullus enim quaerit hoc quod habetur. however. he determines about the habits by which the intellect is perfected with respect to contingent things. scilicet de arte. Then when he says. namely. Second. tunc primo incoepit quaeri talis prudentia. Third.M. It is clear from this that it is not sought for the sake of any necessity other than itself. namely. there. (where he says.A. but as introductory to the other arts. qui circa inquisitores philosophiae provenit. ibi: de prudentia autem sic utique etc. nam cum eis cuncta fere existerent. first began to be sought. he determines about one of them. which consists in a certain repose of life. but for the sake of itself.) Concerning prudence. etc. but for its own sake. B. he determines about the other one.

which indeed is known through this. is useful according as it is directive of a human operation which is concerned with contingent things. and to will. contingent things are passed over by the understanding which is perfected by knowledge of the truth. is other than a making [or productive] habit which is with reason. ideo quantum ad solam cognitionem pertinet. driving out falsehood. because something of it can be done. urere et secare. He says therefore first. scilicet prudentia. quod quidem cognoscitur per hoc quod alterum est factio et alterum est actio. quia aliquid eius est agibile et aliquid est factibile. factio autem dicitur operatio transiens in exteriorem materiam ad aliquid formandum ex ea. which is art. however. sicut videre. for there the difference between doing and making has been shown. to burn. to understand. intelligere et velle.11 est autem considerandum quod quia contingentium cognitio non potest habere certitudinem veritatis repellentem falsitatem. and something can be made. bespeaks an operation passing over into exterior matter for the sake of forming something from it. One must consider. as to build a house. what happens to have itself otherwise is divided into two. in the ninth book of the Metaphysics. prudence. neque factio est actio. quia ergo habitus distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Knowledge of contingent things. just as neither are doing and making contained under each other. however. et quod unus eorum non contineatur sub alio. consequens est quod habitus qui est activus cum ratione. namely.dicit ergo primo. est autem utilis contingentium cognitio secundum quod est directiva humanae operati-onis quae circa contingentia est. and that one is not contained under the other. however. idest per ea quae determinata sunt extra istam scientiam. that one is making [or production] and the other is doing [or action]. sit alius ab habitu factivo qui est cum ratione qui est ars.e. it follows that a habit which is doing [or active] with reason. because habits are distinguished according to their objects. ibi enim ostensa est differentia inter actionem et factionem. ut ex dictis patet. sicut aedificare. distinguuntur enim oppositis differentiis. quia neque actio est factio. and to cut. quod contingens aliter se habere dividitur in duo. making. therefore. scilicet in ix metaphysicae. as to see. i.10 et his possumus assentire per rationes exteriores. Therefore. For doing bespeaks an operation remaining in the doer [or agent] himself. since neither is doing making. LB6LC-3N. And we can assent to this through exoteric accounts. For they are distinguished by opposite differences. contingentia praetermittuntur ab intellectu qui perficitur per cognitionem veritatis. that because knowledge of contingent things cannot have the certitude of truth. nor making doing. LB6LC-3N. namely. 24 . inasmuch as belongs to knowledge only. nam actio dicitur operatio manens in ipso agente. through those things which have been determined outside this science. sicut neque actio et factio continentur sub invicem. as is clear from what has been said.

et primo de ipsa arte secundum se. neque invenitur talis habitus factivus. determinat materiam artis. namely. however. And therefore he divides contingent things. second. which is not an art.. there.. however. however. as was said above. (where he says.. Then when he says: Art is. unde et solae scientiae practicae sunt circa contingentia. etc. he determines the matter of art. And first about art in itself according to itself. qui non sit ars. about art through a comparison with its opposite. he shows what art is. there. About the first he does two things. in particular. Speculative sciences.. secundo quae sit artis materia. what the matter of art is. scilicet cum ratione. etc. scilicet in particulari. therefore. etc.13 deinde cum dicit: est autem ars etc. scientiae autem speculativae non sunt circa contingentia nisi secundum rationes universales. First. videmus enim quod aedificativa est ars quaedam. ars quidem igitur etc. he determines about art.. Wherefore only the practical sciences are concerned with contingent things inasmuch as they are contingent. 25 . et nulla ars invenitur cui hoc non conveniat. neither is there found such a making habit. with reason. are not concerned with contingent things except according to universal notions. (where he says. that. etc. ut supra dictum est. however. namely.) Every art. He manifests the first through induction. is. inquantum contingentia sunt. Second. unde manifestum est quod idem est ars et habitus factivus cum vera ratione.. ibi.et ideo contingentia divisit tractans de intellectualibus virtutibus solum secundum quod subiiciuntur humanae operationi. that it is a certain habit for making something with reason. et iterum quod est habitus quidam ad faciendum aliquid cum ratione. it be a making habit with reason. Then when he says: Since house-building. treating about the intellectual virtues only according as they are joined to human operations. Wherefore it is obvious that art is the same thing as a making habit with true reason. est autem ars omnis etc. circa primum duo facit. LB6LC-3N. LB6LC-3N. For we see that house-building is a certain art. ibi. determinat de arte. secundo de arte per comparationem ad oppositum eius. And no art is found to which this does not belong. quod scilicet sit habitus factivus cum ratione. and again. primo ostendit quid sit ars. primum manifestat per inductionem. namely.) Art indeed.12 deinde cum dicit: quia autem aedificativa etc.

he puts down the matter of art... id est circa constitutionem et complementum operis. LB6LC-3N. et ideo dicit quod omnis ars est circa generationem. (where he says. About the matter of art. prima quidem est considerare qualiter aliquid sit faciendum.) And in a certain way. The second. quod primo ponit tamquam finem artis: et est etiam circa artificiare. The second is that the principle of generation in artificial works is in the maker alone as extrinsic to them. i.e. tertia autem est constituere ipsum opus. that when they are made they begin to be de novo [i. secundum est quod principium generationis artificialium operum est in solo faciente quasi extrinsecum ab eis. sed non in facto quasi intrinsecum. But the third is to constitute the work itself. he shows with what it agrees in matter. scilicet ipsam actionem artificis quae per artem dirigitur. est autem triplex operatio artis.) For neither about these things. And about this he does three things: first. from not having existed before]. with the constitution and completion of a work. which is clear from this. neque enim de his etc. a threefold operation of art. secunda autem est operari circa materiam exteriorem. second. and it is also about the consideration of how something may be made by art. quod quando fiunt incipiunt esse de novo.e. there are two things to consider. tertio ostendit cum quo conveniat in materia. And therefore he says that every art is concerned with generation. id est circa operationem artis qua disponit materiam. is to work on exterior matter.e. circa materiam autem artis duo est considerare. ibi. quod patet ex hoc. however. which he puts first as the end of art: and it is also about contriving by art. But on the part of the work itself there are two things to consider. about the operation [or working] of art which disposes its matter. 26 . but not in the thing made as intrinsic. (where he says. there. however. and the work which is made by art. third. There is. the action itself of the artisan which is directed by art.14 ex parte vero ipsius operis duo est considerare. he shows from what it differs according to its matter. The first indeed is to consider how something must be made. et opus quod est per artem factum. in not being. ibi. secundo ostendit a quibus differat secundum suam materiam. i. etc. there. namely.. et secundum modum quemdam etc. quorum primum est quod ea quae fiunt per of which the first is that those things which are artem humanam sunt contingentia esse et non made by human art are contingent in being and esse. et est etiam circa speculari qualiter aliquid fiat per artem.et circa hoc tria facit: primo ponit artis materiam. etc.

there. saying that art loves luck. ut dictum est. insofar. And he says that because doing and making are different from each other. ostendit cum quo conveniat ars in materia. sed ars cum ratione.. primo quidem ad scientias divinas et mathematicas. about which there is no art. showing the difference between art and three things. ostendit differentiam ad scientiam naturalem. but art with reason. (where he says.) Because. inquantum scilicet in materia conveniunt. LB6LC-3N. quod non competit operibus artis. quod quia actio et factio sunt altera invicem. Then when he says. there. And he says that luck and art are concerned with the same thing in some way. ut dicitur in ii physicorum. etc. etc. it is necessary that art be directive of making and not of doing. et fortuna artem. quae sunt secundum naturam. about which there is no art. etc. ostendens differentiam artis ad tria. fortuna sine ratione.LB6LC-3N. et hanc convenientiam agathon designavit dicens. et dicit quod fortuna et ars sunt circa eadem secundum aliquem modum.. utraque enim est circa ea quae fiunt per intellectum. as is said in the second book of the Physics. Third....19 Then when he says: And in a certain way. as was said. cuius est directiva prudentia. For neither about these things. de quibus non est ars.17 tertio ibi: quia autem etc. [the difference between art and] divine science and mathematics. LB6LC-3N. in seipsis principium motus. however. quae est de his quae sunt secundum naturam. which are about those things which are. of which prudence is directive. as they agree in matter. LB6LC-3N. habent enim ea. manifestat quod dictum est. (where he says.) neither about these things. And this agreement Agathon pointed out. namely. luck without reason.16 secundo ibi: neque de his etc. For those things which are according to nature have in themselves a principle of motion. he shows its difference from natural science. 27 .15 deinde cum dicit neque enim de his etc. LB6LC-3N. he shows with what art agrees in matter. he shows the difference between art and prudence. or are made.. ostendit differentiam artis ad prudentiam. quae sunt de his quae ex necessitate sunt vel fiunt. necesse est quod ars sit factionis directiva et non actionis. of necessity. quod ars dilexit fortunam. Second. de quibus non est ars. First indeed. et dicit. which does not befit works of art. for each is about those things which are made through understanding. and luck art . he manifests what was said..18 deinde cum dicit: et secundum modum quendam etc. etc.

prout ejus operationes et passiones modificantur. according as one’s operations and passions are modified. ad 6. 1. sed rationis practicae rectitudo et veritas consistit. quod sicut ars.. and so prudence. ita et ars mechanica poni debet. just as prudence is placed among the cardinal virtues. quae in eis dirigit.. art. ad 4 (tr. Cf. quod consideratio veri est quaedam operatio intellectus. as has been said.. ad quam virtus intellectualis ordinatur: sed habitus qui operativi dicuntur. is called in the sixth book of the Ethics ‘right reason in things to be done’. in conformitate ad appetitum rectum. Thomas Aquinas. so is art. On the mechanic arts.A. B. as was said before.M. 23. i. St. ut patet in operibus mechanicis: et dicitur actio. which directs in them. just as prudence is a perfection of practical reason. q. et dicit. the rightness of practical reason consists in conformity to right appetite. ita athennia. ars vero mechanica recta ratio factibilium. ‘right reason about makeable things’. Further.deinde cum dicit: ars quidem igitur etc.): DS33 QU2 AR1C AG6 praeterea. secundum quod transit in exteriorem materiam transmutandam. recta ratio agibilium. 2. ut praedictum est. obj. et ideo prudentia. as is clear in mechanic works: and it is called action according as it exists in the one operating. is a certain making habit with true reason. And he says that just as art.e.M. art. according as it passes over into the exterior matter to be transmuted. But as is said in the sixth book of the Ethics. determinat de arte per comparationem ad eius oppositum. ut dictum est. ordinantur ulterius ad exteriorem operationem quae dicitur factio. ut dicitur in 6 ethic. dicitur in 6 ethic. Thomas Aquinas. id est inertia. 1. 6.): DS23 QU1 AR4A RA4 ad quartum dicendum. sicut prudentia est perfectio rationis practicae. In III Sent. B. etc. he determines about art through a comparison to its opposite. quod contingit in operibus virtutum moralium. is a making habit with false reason about something happening to have itself otherwise. which is produced by the moral virtues. unskillfulness.. Therefore. ita et ars. but mechanic art. ergo sicut prudentia inter virtutes morales ponitur cardinalis virtus. e contrario est habitus factivus cum ratione falsa circa contingens aliter se habere. 28 . est quidam habitus factivus cum vera ratione. dist.. Then when he says: Art indeed. 33. St. In III Sent. which happens in works of moral virtue. so atechnia. dist. on the contrary. so mechanic art ought to be put there.A. q. therefore. (tr. 4a. To the fourth it must be said that in the consideration of the true there is a certain operation of the intellect to which the intellectual power is ordered: but the habits which are called ‘operative’ are ordered last to an exterior operation which is called ‘making’. secundum quod sistit in operante. cf. quod fit per virtutes morales.

propter quod inter morales computatur.): DS33 QU2 AR2A CO respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem. cujusmodi est rectitudo quae est in artificiatis. secundum quod ea quae in appetitu sunt. and giving precepts. And because the prudent man is said to good at counseling simply. unde etiam circa hoc oportet prudentiam esse.A. 6. et praecipiendo. uno modo in se. art. and this is [said] materially. and so about this there should be prudence. therefore when moral virtues communicate in matter and concur in the same operation. q. inasmuch as. ideo cum moralibus virtutibus in materia communicat. oportet quod consilietur de his quae sunt ordinata ad bonum hominis simpliciter. called ‘right’ in two ways. Now counsel regards contingent things which can be done by us. et hoc est materialiter. In one way in itself. and because prudence conforms practical reason to appetite thus directly. ad 6. In III Sent. according as those things which are in the appetite are ordered: and this rightness makes moral virtue.M. cujus ultima perfectio est debita operatio potentiarum animae. 1. consiliando. of which sort is the rightness which is in things made by art. B. St. alio modo dicitur appetitus rectus a rectitudine quae est extra ipsum. dist. judicando. judging. it is necessary that there be counsel about those things which are ordained to man’s good simply. hoc autem consistit in animae perfectione. Cf.e. by reason of the fact that it pertains to prudence to have oneself rightly about counsel by counseling.DS33 QU2 AR1C RA6 ad sextum dicendum. 2. Thomas Aquinas. and thus mechanic art conforms reason to right appetite. inquantum scilicet tendit in aliquid rectum extra se faciendum. 29 . c (tr. et in eamdem operationem concurrit. et sic conformat rationem appetitui recto ars mechanica. et quia prudens dicitur bene consiliativus simpliciter. ordinata sunt: et hanc rectitudinem facit virtus moralis: et quia prudentia conformat rationem practicam appetitui sic directo. on this account it [i. But this consists in the perfection of the soul. 33. quod appetitus dicitur To the sixth it must be said that appetite is rectus dupliciter. the ultimate perfection of which is a due operation of the powers of the soul. it tends into something right in things to be made outside itself.. quod prudentia circa illa est de quibus est consilium. obj. But in another way the appetite is called “right” by a rightness which is outside itself. eo quod ad prudentem pertinet bene se habere circa consilia. I reply that it must be said that prudence concerns those things about which there is counsel. prudence] is reckoned among the moral. namely. ideo non computatur inter morales virtutes. and so it is not reckoned among the moral virtues. consilium autem est de contingentibus operabilibus a nobis.

B. 30 . in ipso operante consistens. sunt propria materia prudentiae. Now there are certain principles useful for the rule of the people. quod est operatio mechanicae artis.A.M. et ideo bene consiliari de his. but for some end. non in materiam exteriorem transmutandam transiens: quia hoc esset facere.): DS35 QU1 AR1. c. est prudentia. dicuntur factiones magis quam actiones. and so counseling well in these matter is not counseling well simply. et circa eas est ars mechanica praedicta. lect.): CP3LC1 utiles autem sunt aliqui principibus ad regimen populi. or for expediting a doubtful business. secundum quod sunt consiliabilia.CO unde secundum philosophum agere proprie dicitur operatio quae est a voluntate imperata. et propter hoc secundum hoc non dicitur aliquis prudens simpliciter. In Isaiam cap. For those things which pass over into exterior matter in order to perfect it are called ‘makings’ rather than actions. circa agibilia dicuntur. DS33 QU2 AR2A RA2 ad secundum dicendum. ergo agibilia. sed prudens in hoc. and concerning these there is the aforesaid mechanic art. 1. quod operationes artis mechanicae ordinantur ad perfectionem exterioris materiae.A. inasmuch as one uses what he makes: but this happens to art. non est bene consiliari simpliciter. St. and not to the perfection of the one doing them. but prudent in this. art. B. and for this reason in this respect one is not called prudent simply. St. In III Sent. q. because this would be ‘to make’ [or ‘making’]. 3. inquantum scilicet utitur eis quae facit: sed hoc accidit arti. vel ad expediendum dubia negotia. Cf.M. existing in the one operating himself. except per accidens. which is the operation of mechanic art.. And so things that can be done according as they are subject to counsel are the proper matter of prudence To the second it must be said that the activities of the mechanic art are ordered to the perfection of exterior matter. sed ad finem aliquem. For the moral virtues which perfect in the active life are said about things which can be done. 35.et ideo de his in quibus bonum operantis consistit. et non ad perfectionem operantis. For this reason according to the Philosopher to act properly means an operation which is commanded by the will. And so prudence concerns those things in which the good of the doer consists. Cf. 1. and these are called ‘doable’. et haec agibilia dicuntur. ea enim quae transeunt in exteriorem materiam ad perficiendum eam. morales enim virtutes quae in vita activa perficiunt. not passing over into exterior matter to be transmuted. Thomas Aquinas. dist. nisi per accidens. (tr. 1 (tr. Thomas Aquinas.

and principally of the mechanic arts. quod est ars. who gives precepts to the workmen to introduce the form. 8:7). and my lips shall hate impiety” (Prov. substantiarum scilicet separatarum. among other things that men have conceived about the wise man. qui praecipit artificibus inducere formam. est metaphysica. et similiter sapiens faber. from archos. is metaphysics. as in in medicine: and the doctor is called wise who is most certain about those things which belong to medicine. sapientem de architectis. secundum philosophum. quod est princeps. and according us. Pegis (Notre Dame. And in this way it is taken here. et haec. universalis sapientia est quae est ultimum in omnibus artibus et scientiis. with an Introduction and Notes by Anton C. Thomas Aquinas. sapientia autem. and to prepare the matter. et sic de aliis. ab archos. The most universal wisdom is that which is the last degree in all the arts and sciences. ut medicinae: et dicitur sapiens medicus qui est certissimus in his quae sunt medicinae. Translated. et techne. 31 . ‘Architect’ means the principal artificer. Defining it in particular he says that it is the virtue by which a man is placed in the last degree of each art. of counsels: or for making buildings. substances. of separated. and techne.” Now. secundum philosophum. architector dicitur principalis artifex. according to the Philosopher. dicitur dupliciter. St. And so we see among the arts that one functions as the governor and the ruler of another because it controls its end. For. which is art. namely. quod est virtus per quam homo ponitur in ultimo cujuscumque artis. et hoc modo sumitur hic. which according to the Philosopher is to be followed in giving names to things. [1] The usage of the multitude. is said in two ways. Summa Contra Gentiles Book I: God. scilicet universalis et particularis. secundum considerationem finis cujus scientiam habet in usu vel ratione. according to the consideration of whose end he has science in use or in reason. or spiritual. since the end of each thing is its good. et ista est per quam homo ponitur in cognitione nobilissimarum rerum. has commonly held that they are to be called wise who order things rightly and govern them well. theology. and so on in the other cases. vel spiritualium. et praeparare materiam.et quantum ad hoc dicit. 1: Chapter 1 THE OFFICE OF THE WISE MAN “My mouth shall meditate truth. Cf. and with respect to this he says. the rule of government and order for all things directed to an end must be taken from the end. cap. universally and in particular. 1975). consiliarium: vel ad facienda aedificia. et praecipue mechanicarum. the wisdom of the architect. and this is that by which man is placed in the knowledge of the noblest things. et secundum nos theologia. the Philosopher includes the notion that “it belongs to the wise man to order. Now wisdom. particularem definiens dicit. Hence. and likewise the wise craftsman. which is prince. according to the Philosopher. a thing is then best disposed when it is fittingly ordered to its end. And this.

its end and arranges what is to be done by the subordinate artisans to realize the end . But. and in the military art with respect to the equestrian art and the equipment of war. The arts that rule other arts are called architectonic. 148: 3-2 1 Cor 3:8b-15 8b And each shall receive his wages according to his labor. it belongs to the wise man to consider the highest causes. because he considers the principal cause of the building. I have laid a foundation. O. Trans. not where Christ was named. A similar situation obtains in the art of ship navigation in relation to shipbuilding. hay. he will receive a reward. as being the ruling arts. for the Day will disclose it. lest I should build upon another man’s foundation” (Rom 15:20). yet not I but the grace of God with me” (1 Cor 15:10). since these artisans are concerned. 3:10). he describes his own labor under the likeness of a building. Who made me fit and worthy for this ministry: “I have labored more abundantly than all they. Now it is obvious that the entire structure of a building depends on the foundation. you are God’s field. Consequently. with which medicine is concerned. however. which is also the origin of the universe. – In regard to the first he does two things: first. I have laid the foundation” (1 Cor. it pertains to a wise architect to lay a solid foundation. saying: according to the commission of God given to me.e. Commentary By Saint Thomas Aquinas On the First Epistle to the Corinthians. 2.). but only as through fire. Fabian Larcher. 3. silver. because both signify expressly the first preaching of the faith: “I have preached this gospel. precious stones. 148. they do not reach to the universal end of all things. That is why. hence he said above. like a skilled master builder I laid a foundation. he is called wise in building. which is brought to completion by the activities of the manual laborers. especially of a building. 14 If the work which any man has built on the foundation survives. the art of medicine rules and orders the art of the chemist because health. which is Jesus Christ. because it will be revealed with fire. and the fire will test what sort of work each one has done. consequently. 12 Now if any one builds on the foundation with gold. according to the Philosopher. i. and another man is building upon it.” for planting is related to plants as the foundations to buildings. who are called master artisans.Thus. 10 According to the grace of God given to me. They are therefore said to be wise with respect to this or that thing. as a wise architect. though he himself will be saved. Let each man take care how he builds upon it. 11 For no other foundation can any one lay than that which is laid.. with the ends of certain particular things. Here it should be noted that an architect. is called the chief artisan. is reserved for him whose consideration is directed to the end of the universe. “I have planted. 9 For we are God’s fellow workers. (emphasis added) § 32 . appropriate to themselves the name of wise men. (paragraphs 987-1046 trans. That is why the artisans devoted to these arts. inasmuch as it is his duty to comprehend the entire arrangement of the whole work . 15 If any man’s work is burned up. by Daniel Keating) (n. in each case. wood. But Paul himself laid the foundation of the spiritual edifice for the Corinthians. is the end of all the medications prepared by the art of the chemist. The name of the absolutely wise man. he will suffer loss. which is what he says: according to the grace of God given to me.P. in which sense it is said that “as a wise architect. abandoning the simile based on agriculture. God’s building.d. But he attributes this not to his own power but to God’s grace. n. straw— 13 each man’s work will become manifest. This is why he compares himself to a wise architect. Cf.

whereas the mathematical sciences. Thomas Aquinas (Metaphysics. were not. as the text cited in the previous footnote makes clear. Its Parts and the Order among Them) (emphasis added) 8 Note that. inasmuch as the logical arts compromising the threefold way. form the quadrivium. Of course. On the principle of Aristotle’s division. Accordingly.7 It is therefore evident that the so-called liberal arts (for which see my separate treatment) cut across the foregoing division.” ( A Proposal for the Fulfillment of Catholic Liberal Education (Thomas Aquinas College Blue Book). so will be the arts. for man’s delight: the arts of imitation (now called by some the fine arts) as an introduction to the sciences: the logical sciences (= the arts of the trivium)8 arts not found out for their usefulness but for the sake of knowing the mathematical sciences: arithmetic and geometry (which. 5. = the imitative arts) the figurative or plastic arts the poetic arts necessary for instruction (the logical sciences) (scientias logicales) 7 In regard to this division. or quadrivium. with additions from the Poetics. for leisure or recreation. the logical sciences. or trivium.4. along with music and astronomy. are clearly no essential part of a free man’s education. the first two of these arts may be grouped together as ‘productive’. Since the arts aim at some good. go with the mathematical to form the liberal arts. Thomas’ treatment of logic and the liberal arts). Now those arts which were not discovered for the sake of their usefulness but on account of the very knowing or the knowledge itself aim at the honorable good. Liberal Education. together with the trivium comprising the liberal arts) for their necessity to life (the servile or mechanical arts) house-building carpentry [other arts. 1-2. sec. VII. I. he should be able to recognize and appreciate the various kinds of artifacts. which is defined as that which is chosen for its own sake. 33 . whether servile or fine . coming under the fourfold way. But the arts which were discovered for the sake of their usefulness aim at either the useful or the pleasing good. What is the principle of Aristotle’s division of the arts in the Metaphysics? It is not difficult to determine. it follows that as the good is divided. whereas the third. ancient and modern] for pleasure (that is. consider also the following: “ The productive arts. were discovered for their usefulness. the first division of the useful arts is into ‘productive’ and ‘not productive’. necessitating a recourse to a distinct principle to account for their being grouped together. The division according to Aristotle and St. But the good is threefold: the honorable. the pleasing. and the useful. as well as St. arts have been found out either for their usefulness or not: arts found out for their usefulness for the necessities of life: the mechanic or servile arts for pleasure—that is. but his knowledge will be that of a judge rather than a producer.

pertaining to the first act of the intellect (cf. the Predicamenta) pertaining to the second act of the intellect (cf. the De Interpretatione) pertaining to the third act of the intellect (cf. the division given below) the trivium or arts concerned with words (trivium seu artes sermocinales) grammar (grammatica) logic (logica) rhetoric (rhetorica) arts necessary for instruction (ad eruditionem necessaria) the logical sciences pertaining to the third act of the intellect apodictic or demonstrative science (apodictica seu demonstrativa scientia)9 dialectic or topic (dialectica seu topica) rhetoric (rhetorica) poetic (poetica) sophistic (sophistica) 6. The division of imitative art. imitative art (ars imitandi) figurative or plastic art (ars figurandi)10 poetic art (ars poetica) 7. The division of figurative or plastic art. in two dimensions: graphike (Gk) drawing, or graphic art ars pingendi (pictoria) (painting) in three dimensions: ars fingendi sculptura (sculpture) statuaria (statuary) [various other arts, such as wood-carving and modeling in clay] 8. The division of the poetic art. the species of the poetic art (cf. Poetics ch. 1; Bywater tr.)
epic poetry tragedy comedy dithyrambic poetry most flute-playing and lyre-playing

This member also involving a distinction between the form of reasoning and its matter; the former being treated by Aristotle’s Prior Analytics; the latter, by his Posteriora. 10 Cf. Peter of Auvergne, In VIII Politic. L. 1. 1, n. 1270 (tr. B.A.M.): “…and the ars figurandi which is common to painting and sculpture…. ( et artem figurandi quae communis est pictoriae et sculpturae ….)”. Note that this is Peter’s gloss on Pol. VIII, 3 (1337a 24-27), where Aristotle is speaking of graphike. So far as I have been able to determine, the latter is not synonymous with figurative art, understood as including sculpture (and, by extension, statuary), but rather extends solely to drawing and painting.


the species of the poetic art are determined by differences in the means (that in which) the object (that of which) the manner of imitating (the means by which) the means of imitating rhythm harmony speech (these being used either separately or mixed) 9. The division of the poetic art according to the means of imitating. the poetic art imitates by means of rhythm and harmony (instrumental music) rhythm alone (dance) bare speech alone, without harmony without metre (mimes, dialogues) with metre the poetic art imitates in rhythm and speech without harmony either with metre, or without metre without metre mimes Socratic discourses (dialogues, as of Plato) [modern forms, romance, novel, short story, etc.] with metre epopoeia (epic poetry) rhapsody [other such forms, ancient and modern] poetic art that imitates in rhythm, speech and harmony tragedy comedy dithyrambic poetry nome [other forms, ancient and modern] 10. The division of the poetic art according to differences in the object imitated. the object imitated the serious the laughable 11. The division of the poetic art according to differences in the manner of imitating. 35

the manner of imitating11 narrative (poet speaks in own person as narrator) dramatic (poet represents the agents as acting out their roles) mixed (the poet at times narrates the action and at times assumes the person of the agents of the action and so is narrative and dramatic by turns) N.B. Since they are less well known than the objects imitated by the poetic art, cf. also the following: (a) the object of imitation in music: Music imitates the audible, to akouston, or ‘what is heard’ (Aristotle, Prob. XIX.27, 2636); that is to say, it imitates the sound produced by the voice (whether human or belonging to an inanimate instrument), but it does so insofar as its object, the passions, is a kind of motion or movement.12 Consequently, the sound of music has an intrinsic likeness13 to the passions insofar as they are both movements. Such a sound is first and through itself a likeness of the passions, particularly, of the order in their movement, and per consequens a likeness of the moral character belonging to the man (or woman) undergoing such passions. (b) the object of imitation in the plastic arts. The plastic arts of painting and sculpture imitate the visible, ton horomenon, or ‘what is seen’ (Xenophon, Memorab.III.10.1); that is to say, they imitate the outward appearance or ‘look’ of artificial and natural things, especially man, insofar as certain accidents of the human form (shape, color, proportion) have an extrinsic likeness to moral character (i.e. in the plastic arts the human form is the principle object of imitation).

See also On the Dialogue Form, Endnote B. In addition to his pertinent remarks above, cf. also John Oesterle, “Toward an Evaluation of Music,” The Thomist, Vol. XIV, July, 1951, no. 3, pp. 323-334:

The object of imitation is music—and this is the most fundamental point about music—is the movement of the emotions as reflected in the movement of the human voice. This basic point, somewhat strangely, has often been misunderstood, ignored, or even denied by some musical theorists and composers. They have been lead into this error, as we have already noted, by a misapprehension of imitation in art or by supposing that imitation in music consists primarily in copying the twittering of birds, the braying of donkeys, or the puffing of steam engines. This sort of thing, however, is quite foreign to the proper object of imitation in music and is used rather for extrinsic effects. Proper imitation in music means simply the representation of the movement of the emotions as produced intelligibly and artistically by the composer in tones. Inductively and historically, it is precisely this which music constantly exhibits as its object of imitation. Furthermore, rhythm, melody, and harmony are unintelligible in music –and are unintelligible as means of imitation in music –except in relation to the movement of the emotions through the voice as the object of imitation in music.

Cf. Marcus Berquist, Good Music and Bad, op.cit.: Music differs from the other fine arts in its object and its means…. [T]he object of imitation in music is the passions of the soul: joy, sorrow, boldness, fear, hope, despair, anger…. Next, we observe that music is unique or nearly so among the fine arts in the sort of likeness it has to its object. For it has an intrinsic likeness to the object it imitates as opposed to imitating simply through a likeness of its accidents…. It does not imitate the passion through being a likeness of something that goes with the passion…. It is ordered movement imitating order alone.


the object in the manner of a sign ‘Things seen’ ‘Bodies’ ‘The qualities of bodies’ ‘Concave or convex’ ‘Dark or light’ ‘Hard or soft’ ‘Rough or smooth’ ‘Young or old’ ‘Beautiful forms’ ‘Color’ ‘Proportion’ ‘The parts of the body’ ‘The eyes’. (c) The latter according to Xenophon’s Socrates.The accidents constituting such an outward appearance are first and through themselves signs of types of moral character and per consequens a likeness of states of soul belonging to the man (or woman) having such an appearance. etc. good and lovable’ ‘The ugly. depraved and hateful’ ‘The passions of men engaged in any act’: ‘the workings of the soul’ ‘The menacing looks of combatants’ ‘The joyful countenance of conquerors’ the means of imitation ‘Colors’ ‘Figures’ (shapes) ‘Proportions’ (perspective) the subjects of imitation (a statuary’s subjects) ‘Runners’ ‘Wrestlers’ ‘Boxers’ 37 . the object as something signified ‘Character’ ‘Friendly or unfriendly looks’ ‘The beautiful.

the free encyclopedia De pictura (English: “On Painting”) is a treatise on painting written in 1435 by Italian architect and art theorist Leon Battista Alberti. Alberti was thus the first to write down a theoretical resume of the art innovation in Florence at the time. the following indicating the role drawing plays as a composing parts of painting: De pictura From Wikipedia. including tracing the lines joining the bodies Receptio luminum (color). in this surpassing medieval works such as The book of Art by Cennino Cennini(1390). It is the first in a trilogy of treatise on the “Major arts” which had a widespread circulation during the Renaissance. consisting in drawing the bodies' contour Compositio (commensuratio in the Italian version of the treatise). It was first published in Italian in 1436. References 1.B. the others being De re aedificatoria (“On Architecture”. ISBN 978-887890-731-7.B. Alberti divided painting into three parts: • • • Circumscriptio (Italian: disegno). Rocco Sinisgalli. 2006. 1454) and De statua (“On Sculpture”.N. taking into consideration colors and light. Work De pictura aimed to describe systematically the figurative arts through “geometry”. 1462)[1] Alberti was a member of Florentine family exiled in the 14th century. On the figurative art in two dimensions. cf. Here he knew contemporary art innovators such as Filippo Brunelleschi. to whom was dedicated the 1436 edition. Rome: Kappa Edizioni. with whom he shared an interest for humanism and the Classic art. in the following of the Papal court during the Council of Florence. who was able to return in Florence only from 1434. De pictura also includes the first description of linear geometric perspective devised by Brunelleschi around 1416. Donatello and Masaccio. The treatise contained an analysis of all the techniques and painting theories knew at the time. the invention was explicitly credited by Alberti to the Florentine architect. Il Nuovo De Pictura. § 38 .

Let us first of all try to understand what the definition means. rhythm. Michael A. George Washington University Bulletin 4 (1905). with regard to its operation. When. and dancing – all of which are supposed to imitate some element of human nature. the dance and pantomime. 4. ad 1] [–. q. Thomas says in the Summa Theologica: . sec. Augros. we know.. ad 1). for he can operate in diverse fashions. Aesthetics. also Encyclopaedia Britannica. namely. For this purpose it will be of advantage to consider the necessity and the nature first of art in general and then of the type of art that is logic. “The First Meaning of ‘Rational Process’ according to the Expositio In Boethium De Trinitate”.v. Thomas. (1902). cites as the various modes. Reasons for supposing that architecture is a species of the useful or servile arts. Et propter hoc vires naturales non agunt operationes suas mediantibus aliquibus habitibus: quia secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad unum (Ia IIae. sculpture. 10 (1954) p. ut dictum est. music. What Is Logic? Although both Aristotle and St. 39 .. Cf. Such determinations we call habits. a.49. some feeling or action – by the means they employ. Painting and sculpture are spoken of as imitative arts. We shall probe the reason for this preference later on. as the ability to make certain things. such as the shoemaker’s craft. it needs to be disposed to its operations by means of habits. defines it simply as an art: the art which directs the act of reason itself and by which man in the very act of reason proceeds with order. classed it among the useful arts. also the following excerpt from a dissertation directed by Charles De Koninck: Sheila O’Flynn. 9: [Aristotle] gives us no complete classification of the fine arts.12. Man. 49. 4. Mitchell Carroll. however. a faculty is left undetermined by nature.14 Cf. is not determined in his actions by instinct as are the other animals. 10th ed. melody. therefore. to distinguish poetry. Where does architecture fit into the foregoing schemas? Let us begin with the following: Cf. and lastly poetry and its species. Berquist ap..] 14 Cf. and painting. But if the form be such that it can operate in diverse ways. and it is doubtful how far his principles are to be taken as applicable to other than the poetic art. is needed for the operation. St. ease and without error. non indiget habitu determinante. Notes from the Berquist Seminars 11/15/94: 740) Architecture is not an imitative art. is the kind of stable determination with which nature does not provide us but which we must acquire on our own. Duane H.. and is especially consecrated to the useful. as the soul. Architecture is omitted or excluded. Si vero sit aliqua potentia quae non se habeat ad multa. Art. He seems. c. p. but their special aims are not defined. because it is lacking in the imitative quality deemed essential. and vocal sound. no further disposition. Laval théologique et philosophique vol. q. s. [Ia IIae. 167-190: I. I. 64: Aristotle in treating imitation in Poetics. besides the form itself. St. The Greeks. only the decorative side of architecture is imitative. Thomas plainly held that logic is a science as well as an art. in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Posteriora Analytica.Potentia quandoque se habet ad multa: et ideo opportet quod aliquo alio determinetur. harmony.If the form is limited to one fixed operation. a. “Aristotle’s Aesthetics of Painting and Sculpture”. then music. Architecture seems ignored by Aristotle as non-imitative. a special disposition is required to incline it to act rightly.

not being determined to one fixed operation. other than the mind itself? Since the intellect. Consequently. as such. the only way of establishing that logic is an art would be to show that its object is a thing to be made. which is to show that logic is a type of art. we are faced with a difficulty. the possibility of examining and directing its own act presents no problem.g. for the mind. In our next step. some of which are good and others wrong. that the reason requires certain habits to assist in directing the other faculties in regard to both immanent and transitive actions. a. on the one hand. its specific object. Finally. logic must direct. which dispose one to submit to the judgements of right reason. But what faculty can direct the mind. However. as art does to outward makings: since each is the perfect reason about the things with which it is concerned. being in itself wholly immaterial. then. This is the habit that we call logic. and. but the immanent operations of the mind. The different types of art participate in the definition to the extent to which their respective objects approximate or coincide with the primary type of thing to be made. which determines the reason with regard to the production of a work. lends itself most readily to a certain making or formation. we have the moral virtues. art implies the transitive action of making. [Ia IIae. which enables the reason to judge rightly concerning how one must act under given circumstances.g. Thomas distinguishes the two habits as follows: The reason for this difference is that art is the right reason of things to be made. it signifies many things. the practical intellect. text 16. the intellect that does and makes. then. This can be more readily understood by a comparison with prudence. For this particular task. and of art. for the various powers of operation there are corresponding dispositions. not the fabrication of some exterior thing. is capable of reflection. Now making and doing differ. is the subject of the right dispositions of prudence. If. e. Since art is the kind of disposition which enables one to make things as they should be made. –but in a certain order. however. which. because of its passivity. to see. then. which distinguishes it from the other habits. In the appetitive faculties. 4] We have seen. Indeed. from which it follows that there are different types of art. and wisdom. to the 40 . is the habit that directs the operations of the mind. i.. Art. whereas prudence is the right reason of things to be done. whereas doing is an action abiding in the agent. we shall concern ourselves only with the division of good dispositions. then. Our task. on the other hand. that according to which the things signified participate more or less fully in the common definition. St. Perfecting the speculative intellect are the determinations of understanding. we can state the problem as follows: Can there be something whose making does not require transitive action? The clue to the solution is to be found in the fact that there are different types of things capable of being made. science. and so forth. consisting in the use of powers and habits.. not equally –that is. And seeing that the difficulty lies in the fact that making has been specified as a transitive action. not in such a way that the complete notion is found equally in each signification. such as a shoe. is the thing to be made. is to establish the order which exists among the various makeable objects with a view to discovering how logic fits into the scheme. e. can operate in diverse fashions.. as stated in Metaph. IX. or a statue. q. and if. it must not be forgotten that among the actions that stand in need of direction there are the operations of the mind itself. to saw. Logic.e. the term art is analogous. 57. in that making is an action passing into outward matter. is the habit which disposes the practical reason to direct the making of things properly and with ease.Now. a boat. and the like. how can logic possibly be an art? Since it is the work of the thing to be made that constitutes the object of an art as art. to will. physical. which are also called virtues though not quite in the previous sense. to build. There can be no doubt but that the matter to which we apply the expression makeable object most appropriately is none other than exterior. a special disposition is required. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like human actions. In the Summa Theologica. passive matter.

in each instance. Servile art. In I Ethicor. from the habits of the speculative intellect. The association of making with transitive action and of doing with immanent action seems to imply that only material. but things to be made– is also entirely distinct. his body –not that the work of servile art is intended uniquely for the good of the body. so long as it is considered as producing a work. 1] But since. which are those wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the end.15 Nevertheless. most forceful and most easily understood distinction is to be had from the opposition between immanent and transitive actions. Insofar as it considers the makeable as makeable. for it relates to that part of man which is least free. We recognize. why. is practical truth. the most proper. it is itself a material work and must be executed by means of corporeal activity. and which include only servile arts. such as poetry and architecture. Every application of right reason in the work of production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the application of right reason in matters of counsel. in this case. and not simply doing. since it could be other than it is or not made at all. most proper and most complete notion of making involves a transitive action. 2.. 41 . exterior things can be made and consequently that only these can be objects of art. and. it requires the direction of art. inasmuch as the agent is concerned with the perfection of a work. – the formation does not involve exterior action. be it material or spiritual. Furthermore. neither can any liberal or servile art be arranged under the fine. not actions to be performed. 47. even though an action is immanent. such as shoemaking. its field is limited to the strictly practical. as in the case of architecture. calls for determinate means of procedure. a. for the accomplishment of this transformation. the difference that separates it from servile art must not be minimized. which are intended for the bonum animae. [cf. it is the former distinction that is the most radical because the work is the object and specifies the art. prudence regards the perfection of human action and hence of man himself as an agent. however. the object is quite immaterial –for the exterior work of a poem only signifies the interior one. requires from the craftsman. and which comprise both liberal and servile arts. ad 3] If the production of a work is sufficient to distinguish art from prudence. although liberal art is art in a proper and not merely in a metaphorical sense. the formation of a work. differing from prudence by its object –which is. For whereas art is concerned with the perfection of a work. the art that directs this type of making is art only according to a secondary acceptation. because of its exterior and physical conditions. This is liberal art. not only a statue or a house. we may ask. it involves a representation intended to please the mind. consisting in its conformity with the right appetite. Servile art alone realizes 15 Not only is poetry not a liberal art. that another classification can be had from the point of view of the end: [i] the arts of what is merely useful. there is the formation of a work inasmuch as there is a composition or ordering of objects. [IIa IIae. whose purpose is the bonum corporis. as the wood from which one makes a table. Consequently. Do we not say that. whose works pertain to the part of man that is most free –his mind. for. which are not given. and [ii] the fine arts.reception of an artificial form. It is important to note that the division of art into liberal and servile is based upon the differences that are to be found in the work. there is indeed making. We must answer that in each of these examples. and hence there is no making in the first and most proper sense. not of prudence. a sonata or a syllogism are works of art? The question brings us face to face with our problem. the work is contingent. Likewise. for often. In fact. The art having such matter as its object is called servile. for the appetite is the principle of the work and the end proposed by the artist or craftsman is its measure. namely. and its truth. q. is the transitive action usually given as the principle of their distinction? The answer lies in the fact that. again from the point of view of its object. lect. but even a poem. inasmuch as the first. a transitive operation. But such is obviously not the case.

by division. such as a proposition or a syllogism. and again in the following passage: Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e. propositions and the like. 57. as in poetry. ad 3] 42 . then. [see Ia IIae. something which receives some kind of determination).. The work of this art is not contingent but necessary. and results in a diversity that is rooted in the distinction of the transitive and immanent operations which differ as ultimate genera. art because. definition and demonstration. namely. a possibility of error. reason. are. which can be given by determinate rules of procedure. namely. Indeed. and we have a third type of art. This is sufficient for the denomination art. liberal art. Logic. The initial difficulty concerning the apparent irreducibility of logic and art has been cleared away by the foregoing considerations on liberal art. 47. or the work of counting or measuring. the contingency of their object as well as its practical truth. Consequently. are interrelated in a definite fashion. 2. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech. according to their very nature. 3. which is the concepts of the mind. puts the right order among the concepts by contemplating the relationship implied in their nature. and there is. our concepts. In logic. however.perfectly the definition of the common term. The marks that have until now distinguished art from the habits of the speculative intellect have disappeared. Hence the words speculative reason of the previous quotation. Furthermore. Since. inasmuch as it is a science that also accomplishes the work of an art. the nature of the concepts. the matter. a. an indetermination of the act itself. With logic. resulting in the production of a certain work. there is a marked distinction from the habits of the speculative intellect. the concepts of the intellect. For there is a radical distinction –once more from the point of view of the work. the speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms. the principle of the work is no longer the appetite. there can be no doubt. The logician. is a speculative. As we shall see in the next section of this study. besides. that is. an action. a habit that is indivisibly science and art: science because it seeks the knowledge of the proper order of concepts through its cause. Like the servile arts. not the practical. by setting the concepts in their proper order. one that proceeds not sub lumine artis but sub lumine scientiae. consequently in respect of such things it is possible to have the essentials of art. Considering this distinction of ultimate genera.. the truth is not practical but speculative. then. there still remains something which is in the nature of matter (i. the extension of the term art to include liberal art entails the rejection of a fundamental element of the primary notion.e. the consideration of the end as measure and of the appetite as principle. the measure is no longer the end proposed by the artist. although there is no longer question of transitive operation and of making in the strict sense. into which may be introduced an artificial form or order. it forms a certain work. it differs from the other types of art in that it has for its subject the speculative. a. but liberal arts. in such a way that truth will be attained. it is entirely different. But to infer that it is in every respect the same type of art as music and poetry would be too hasty a judgement. [IIa IIae. then. q. And since it is a science in the strict sense but an art only by participation. indivisibly both because it is precisely by considering the concepts that the mind establishes the logical order. whereas the other type is art only by participation. by a kind of comparison. In the case of such liberal arts as poetry and music.g. q. it is not surprising that there is no common term to include both types of art as species of a same genus. and it is in accordance with this relationship that they must be arranged if they are to be ordered correctly. called arts indeed. they have certain characteristics repugnant to speculative knowledge. but not prudence. ad 3] That logic is a liberal art. does not permit of any order or form arising from the free choice of the logician. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like works of the speculative reason. wherein the process follows certain and fixed rules. and therefore a need for direction. the former being a quality and the latter.

Augros on LES PRINCIPES DE VERITE DE LA LOGIQUE (Cours donnés en Janvier-Février 1972): Monseigneur Maurice Dionne Professeur Titulaire à la Faculté de Philosophie de l’Université Laval Québec Notes rédigées par Louis Brunet et Yvan Pelletier LA SOCIETE D’ETUDES ARISTOTELICIENNES 1978 P101 The necessity of logic. it is an art. we might say that man. that. Aristotle says that man lives by “art and reasonings”... we should imply that the operations of the mind were comparable to some sort of exterior physical matter. finally. we must distinguish it from the other acceptations of the term art which participate more fully in the definition. this art we call logic. of art which assures him ease and order in those of his actions by which he produces works. The word “ars” can also be translated as “universal knowledge”. we should be guilty of disregarding the fact that logic is a science having as object the necessary and not the contingent.In view of this conclusion. Summing up. it is opposed to experience in the Metaphysics.. Thomas touches on this in his prooemium to the Posterior Analytics. then. If we took logic to be art in the primary sense. P128 43 . since even the human intellect is undetermined with regard to its own operations. when so defined. in particular. Rationes can also be translated by “discourse”. by which man in the very act of reason proceeds with order and ease and without error. To show that logic accomplishes the role of an art by introducing the correct order among our intellectual acts in view of the obtaining of truth. If we were to say that logic belongs to the same type of art as poetry. Thus. St. that logic is an art for the sole reason that it involves a certain making. He remarks that in the Metaphysics. not determined by nature in respect to his operations. We have seen. as stone. to a comparison of singulars preserved in the memory. a special habit is required for their direction. also makes clear from the beginning that we are dealing with something that is purely intentional and not with the natural act as such. We may presume that logic. it may now be asked why logic is usually defined as an art rather than as a science. but because its object does not involve transitive action and is a work of the speculative intellect. has need of habits and. (emphasis added) Cf. It lacks all the other elements of the definition. that this art which directs the act of reason itself. since both are concerned with forming a spiritual work. is better distinguished from philosophy of nature which also has to do with the operations of the mind. the habit in question merely participates in the notion of art and is called a speculative. that because this habit has for its object a thing to be made. Notes by Michael A. liberal art.

which directly weakens “What is the term is the final cause”. death). P141 Artificial form – Final cause Artificial form – Form Form – Final cause Form – Final cause Natural form – Form Natural form – Final cause 44 . Thomas insists that something can be the term of a movement without being the purpose of it (e. P134 Matter : Form :: Form : Usage At In II Physic. for example. P137 Usage – Final cause Usage – Architectonic Architectonic – Final cause Architectonic – Final cause Artificial form – Architectonic Artificial form – Final cause But St.4 n173: in looking at a determinate matter.The artificial is much more manifest than the natural.g. P130 Man is the end of the works of every art. do we have here an example in 4 terms? One must be able to see all the terms present. one must be able to decide. The first question is “What does Aristotle intend to prove? What is the ultimate conclusion?” Aristotle here wants to manifest that natural form is the final cause of matter. Lect.

which we surely must not neglect. a single human act is not enough to cause a virtue. one must acquire it. In this way it is common to all the sciences. It is. P60 To complete our division of modes. A9 Ad11). mathematics disciplinabiliter. but they either neglect or reject final causes. There he says that as in art and action. Logic is not inscribed in us by nature.Cf. we must point out that we find many proper modes. Q. it holds the place of a principle. Today many people have a very detailed knowledge of material causes. so in biology. P61 Science is caused in us by one demonstration. and metaphysics intelligibiliter. many are required (see De Virtutibus in Communi. But opinion cannot be caused in us by one dialectical syllogism. Notes by Michael Augros on LA NECESSITE DE LA LOGIQUE EN REGARD DE CHACUNE DES VIRTUS INTELLECTUELLES (Cours donnés de septembre à novembre 1977): Notes rédigées par Louis Brunet TOUS DROITS RESERVES LA SOCIETE D’ETUDES ARISTOTELICIENNES 1980 It belongs to logic to define this. it is a modus artis. The common mode inscribed in the very nature of the reasonable soul is before every art. there are actually 3 modes to distinguish: [1] The natural mode [2] The common modus artis [3] The proper mode which is multiplied together with all the disciplines. because of their weakness. These are the modes Aristotle is speaking about in the first book of the Parts of Animals. In a similar way. saying that the science of nature proceeds rationabiliter. of course. Boethius discusses these proper modes. But logic differs from the modus animae. So. un. the chief demonstrations are from the end. founded on the modus animae. 45 . The Greek commentators make the mode one of the elements of a prooemium. P62 The mode is a magnum virtute.

Now we will consider the necessity of logic for art.Cf. a practical virtue of reason (we will not consider foresight. argue. are: .factibile . Is logic necessary for that? E. and wisdom. P4 Difficulty: it was relatively easy to see the need of logic for science. We must divide. P8 46 . P7 The different senses of the word “Art”. science. define. But in the case of art. Consider the first imposition of “art”: art concerned with transitive actions. it is more difficult.operatio transiens . We have considered the necessity of logic for natural understanding. factio vs.intelligence practique P7 We must distinguish making from doing. it will not be necessary insofar as it “ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta” (Super Boetii de Trinitate Q5 A1 Ad2).g.factio . actio. Notes by Michael Augros on LA NECESSITE DE LA LOGIQUE EN REGARD DE CHACUNE DES VIRTUS INTELLECTUELLES (Cours donnés de janvier à avril 1978): Notes rédigées par Louis Brunet TOUS DROITS RESERVES LA SOCIETE D’ETUDES ARISTOTELICIENNES 1983 TOME II P4 Purpose: Aristotle distinguishes 5 genera of intellectual virtues. What is art? The elements of the first sense of art. etc. for building a cathedral? P5 Since art does not consist in speculation. if logic is needed for it. in science. or prudence).contingent . These are the speculative virtues of reason. the ratio propria of art.

P9 The factibile is a species of the contingent. P9 Art per posterius. The word “art” is an analogous word. One can in some way contemplate poetry. but its truth is practical. right reason about works. for example. in other words. In the case of art. Not every contingent thing proceeding from practical reason is necessarily a bodily work. Factio is an operation which passes into an exterior matter in view of making something. practical reason. The mere fact that this conception is exteriorized does not make his contingent object a factibile. since factibile. the play resembles the result of a transitive action. an operation which transforms physical matter. But it is the poet who forms the characters. an opus immediate rationis (In Boetii de Trinitate Q5 A1 Ad3). There is such a thing as a work of the mind. This is an operation which goes beyond the physical 47 . As soon as we remove an element or two from the proper definition of art. P10 The task of the poet is to order words. not only is it practical. Art. such as building or cutting (In VI Ethicorum. but the poet himself essentially forms: he makes a tragedy or comedy as a musician makes a symphony. when written out. This is important. in the definition. What we require of the poet is the conception. and when he is finished doing that.3. because many moderns speak of poetry in terms of contemplation. but the truth is speculative. In the first sense of the word. according to this definition. and the contingent is wholly irreducible to the speculative virtues of reason. his work is done. which implies the will.Actio is an operation (or doing) which remains in the agent himself. which is wholly false. the factibile (from words to all the works of art). And if a tragedy is not acted out before an audience in outward movements. Which part of the strict definition of “art” should we drop in calling poetry an “art”? We must let go of “factibile” as the object of an “operatio transiens”. Of course. implies transitive operation. But not as in ethics: ethics is a practical science. we will have a sense of “art” per posterius. P10 Poetry. art is recta ratio factibilium. or. P9 The will is the efficient cause of the material work. of course. The factibile is therefore contingent and proceeds from practical reason. it cannot have its proper effect of engendering fear and pity. n 1152). Lect. designates the object of a transitive action. of facere. is defined in the line of POIEIN.

but cannot judge the truth or falsity of this or that conclusion. and the [2] ARCHITEKTONIKOS. we do retain the element “contingent”. P11 The truth in poetic art proceeds from practical reason (and so this element is also retained). it is necessary. 48 . The discipline would be a science. e.” (I-II Q57 A3 Ad3) If this were not so. the habit of the method. but for judging poetry. He has PAIDEIA.g. He does touch upon the universal in some way. poetics is indispensable. Poetry is in the line of making. a syllogism. Therefore the truth is practical. nothing could justify our use of the word “art” for logic. P12 These distinctions help us to distinguish very carefully between poetics and poetry. P14 What is the usefulness of poetics? For writing poetry. beyond this ratio operis. and poetics falls under logic (in the broad sense of “logic”). poetics is more or less useful. vs. We look to the common notion of “work” and leave everything else aside. if reason in knowing things did not form anything. and instead of practical. pure and simple. We can see that it is an art and in what sense it is an art. However. it is speculative. P10 When we call poetry an “art”. The work of fiction is true if it conforms to the exemplar of the artist.and requires the intentional. [1] can judge the mode of proceeding. the operatio transiens which is defined in the line of movement. does form something. in knowing. “Etiam in ipsis speculabilibus est aliquid per modum cujusdam operis. But reason. P15 The distinction between the [1] PEPAIDEUMENOS. but only as it is incarnated in his work. P11 Is anything left of the strict definition of “art” if we must drop “contingent” in calling logic an art? Yes: we retain ratio operis. P13 Distinguishing and ordering the senses of the word art allows us to clarify the genus of poetry. The poet is free to take this or that as his subject. logic includes certain elements opposed to “art” in the strict sense: instead of contingent.

PP18-19 There are 4 types of judgments about poetry. The first judgment. Since poetry is a practical virtue. If an artist cannot execute. or expertus. P17 The PEPAIDEUMENOS goes beyond experientia. It is not possible to possess this intellectual virtue without this type of judgment. then. Aristotle distinguishes 3 senses of “doctor”.In the Politics (BK III). The second kind of judgment about poetry is made by the PEPAIDEUMENOI. [c] ARCHITEKTONIKOS. does not yet surpass the order of the PEPAIDEUMENOS. since he does not stick to the singular. who possesses the art of medicine. [a] The one who does not have the art of medicine. it is not enough to have an experience with the works of fiction. 49 . [1] Judgment of the poet. P16 In sum. all is lost. who not only knows practically the means which are causes of health. [2] Judgment of the EXPERTUS. that does not necessarily impede him from having the intellectual virtue of art. who has good taste by nature and has acquired some experience. but if he cannot judge well. even if they do not form very strict definitions. P16 Some people have the gift of saying very well what they conceive. The naturalis gives the propter quid to the medicus. there will be a judgment relevant precisely to the practical virtue of reason. although he cannot present them scientifically. but he does not possess art in the sense of universal (i. [b] PEPAIDEUMENOS.e. but he can resolve them into their first principles. opposed to experientia by Aristotle in the beginning of the Metaphysics. This is yet another sense of ars. the PEPAIDEUMENOS does not resolve as the ARCHITEKTONIKOS does. is about the practical truth. P16 The PEPAIDEUMENOS in poetry cannot be content with being an expertus. scientific) knowledge. The judgment of the expertus. but only executes commands (nurse). He has an experience of certain works of fiction and can also make certain universal statements about them. which is wholly proper to the poet as such.

motions of the soul. This is something essential to the representation of the poet. The speech of the PEPAIDEUMENOS is divided. P23 The ARCHITEKTONIKOS speaks in a very perfect and universal way. This judge resolves. He will not only judge about this work and this kind of work. The representation absolutely must arouse certain feelings. An. but about the very nature of poetry. one will be far from the moral order. in poetry there is a question about inducere ad virtutem. prooemium). but says many things. The third kind is the judgment of the philosopher. P20 A good use of a work of fiction implies a fair proportion to the hearer.. 50 .III. Is this essential to the work of art or just to its good use? Saying what St. in quibus multa involvebat in uno (In De Divinibus Nominibus. P20 In sum. We enter now into the moral order. Without movere. but is a defect in the work inasmuch as it is a representation. and of the politician. the poet “movere ad aliquid”. The politicus commands the use of and exercize in certain works. the work will be false inasmuch as it is a work. there is no persuasion. but if he represents it as delightful. [4] Judgment of the POLITICUS. P19 We must apply to poetry what Aristotle says about music in the Politics. 1 Un. Thomas says in more common terms. that of the expert. If the poet represents vice as abominable. n 250). Thomas says it belongs to good fiction “inducere ad virtutem per decentem representationem” (In Post. The speech of the poet is not situated on the level of reason as such. P20 St. P22 The distinction between PEPAIDEUMENOS and ARCHITEKTONIKOS covers the whole field of teaching. of the logician. Of course.[3] Judgment of the ARCHITEKTONIKOS. C. This bears not only on its usage. the logician. emotions. His speech has few words. if a poetic representation does not bear on human acts but on nature. there are 4 kinds of judgment about fiction: that of the poet as such. this is very good.

a sacred writer uses poetry. one cannot say simpliciter that David was a poet. poetics is born of poetry. P32 Poetry gives both a moral precept and a moral example. but of an imagination guided by reason. P37 Cicero said “Rhetoric is born of eloquence”. P36 Music moves the soul even more than poetry. P38 The second PEPAIDEUMENOS Dionne will consider is Ronsard. The first is Philip Sidney. P28 The theologian uses principles in natural science as instruments and not as his proper principles (which are taken from scripture). Likewise. P40 Dionne moves to the third and principal PEPAIDEUMENOS: Goethe. P39 Poetry is principally an affair of the imagination. The poetry brings with it a certain universality. We must be careful to distinguish principle and instrument. a poet of the 16th century. The method is born of eloquence. Likewise. P23 Dionne will consider poetry with the help of some PEPAIDEUMENOI. and not the reverse. verbal expression or expression in words) of the philosopher is much more difficult than that of the poet. He is a model 51 . P23 One thing that makes teaching so hard is that one’s speech must be fitted to the measure of understanding in the hearer. and therefore he remains a theologian. the work is always something primary.particularized.e. detailed. P33 The word (i.

P51 52 . P49 Poetry is an art.g. and so we need logic (and poetics). PP47-48 An ability to write poetry well is not totally natural. P46 Nature gives man only the remote dispositions for science: that is why the acquisition of logic is necessary. By way of opposition. we cannot say someone is a natural geometer. But if someone cannot form a unity of action. We will usually use the word in the second sense. poets do not need external help (such as rules. Dionne is struck by the justice he does to poetry in remarking about it (e.PEPAIDEUMENOS.2 n598: “Art imitates nature and perfects what nature cannot do). namely a strong and lively imagination. but for the formation of speculative judgments about the works. then he can do it only DIA TECHNE–in virtue of a rule acquired by study. P47 The senses play a powerful role in our habits of action because the object of such habits is the singular. as when we say a story (MUTHOS) is an imitation. P44 We find in nature a sort of indetermination which an art can complete or perfect. and likewise is the object of the senses. we have only remote dispositions given by nature. where practical reason is truly the principle. for example. and so if there were a science which we could know naturally. but is due to a natural disposition of the body. a practical virtue. in his Conversations with Eckermann). for example. nature gives the proximate dispositions for it to some people. etc. Because of this. in a piece of fiction DIA PHUSIN. St. Thomas In I Corinthios XI Lect. and likewise with poetry. Geometry is well-proportioned to us. P50 “Imitation” can be used to mean either the act of imitating or the work. It is in this sense that an art in imitating nature can complement nature (cf. where nature is the principal cause. P49 Aristotle is an ARCHITEKTONIKOS. It is more like the art of carpentry. seems to be a poet DIA PHUSIN. it would be geometry. and especially with great poets–Homer. Nature plays an enormous role in the case of poetry. but not like medicine or teaching. We might be proximately well disposed by nature to make the works of geometry more easily. But in the case of poetry.) as much.

the poet adds something. we have a work which proceeds from the act of molding. P54 “Imago”. there is a likeness of species. D28 Q2 A1). “Figulus” is also in bodily matter. Lectio V. we go from the transitive to the immanent. mustic.There is a connection between the words imitation and image (see I Q35 A1 C. as a son is the image of his father. of all the accidents. which is also a transitive act. P55 The figure or shape of a plant or animal manifests its species better than any other quality in it (see In VIII Physicorum. we have a sign of the species. “imitation” has undergone an extension. In the case of a natural image. Henry IV really existed. and therefore something physical. does not mean simply a copy. since it does not represent by figure and shape. P57 Even if in fact certain characters in a tragedy are historical. This word was first connected with sculpture. For in the case of “figulus”. But we find works also which are formed by the mind and remain in the mind. and Super I Sent. In poetry and music. is nearest to substance. in which the factibile is the work of a transitive action. logic. which proceeds within the mind. This word can have an opposition to reality. but Shakespeare’s Henry IV had a certain universality. n 917). But from “figulus” to “figuratus”. P56 “Imitation”. we speak of the act of signifying. and in the end. P52 We must define poetry in the line of making (POIEIN) and not of contemplation. In what does a 53 . P52 “Fingo” first meant “to make something out of clay”. Why? Because quantity. In the case of an artificial image. and shape or figure is a determination of quantity. but in the case of “sensus figuratus”. as in poetry. Art is “recta ratio factibilium”. But we cannot be content with the word “make”: it is too common. as applied to a work of fiction. and it looks like the word “figura”. P53 “Fabula”. but a representation which is the fruit of the imagination and which has a certain universality. P54 “Figura” designates a quality in a quantity.

P60 St. “That one must act according to reason” is a rule imposed 54 .2 n152) A fable “composita est ex miris”. and there seems to be so great a difference between logic and moral science as to preclude any significant resemblance. e.properly poetic universal consist? It is not the nature pure and simple (which is considered rather by the philosopher). Thus Henry IV is not a singular for Shakespeare: the real and historical Henry IV is as a material example and Shakespeare’s Henry IV is as a formed Henry IV. In I Ad Timotheum C. That is why children always take pleasure in games which have some kind of representation of something. That is why the hero borrowed from the legend is in our opinion more of the nature of something to stir or arouse us than the one which is tied to history. the further removed we are from common things. since poetics is a part of logic. P67 In moral principles. as in learning to speak. Thomas notes that it is natural to man to take pleasure in representations. P64 The resemblance is in certain principles or rules found in these two disciplines (poetics and moral science). P67 Moral science often must restrict itself to what is true ut in pluribus. This is surprising.g. P65 The diversity of the sciences is taken from the diversity of their principles. or in most cases. but the nature concretized. P58 The natural causes of imitation: children learn their first lessons by imitating. the more mobility and contingency we encounter. P58 (St. P64 Poetics strangely resembles moral science (as rhetoric resembles politics).4 Lect. Thomas. war [or playing house] (Super Matthaeum XI 2 n932) PP60-61 Man has two parts to his nature: sensitive and rational (I-II Q71 A2 Ad3).

Aristotle lists and explains the 6 composing parts of a tragedy: “La fable. P87 Aristotle speaks of verisimilitude or probability at the beginning of his discussion of the unity of a plot. P92 “Tota logica videtur esse de ente et non ente sic”.” “Plot. After defining the tragedy. melody”. 55 . P73 The knowledge of moral science is. characters. thought. but is the product of a slow evolution. P69 Man is a mobile being. which consists in the composition of being ut est in anima. Aristotle clearly gives the priority to plot and action. Thomas said: nihil immutat animam sicut cantus. P71 Matter is the cause of the contingency of proper principles. That is not its purpose. is not a form which was discovered in one fell swoop. P82 In the Politics. P79 Aristotle says the plot is the ARCHE and PSUCHE. that is ideal. le chant. because moral science cannot go to the foundation of things. in comparison to the speculative sciences.4). Tragedy was born from songs. spectacle. too. Lect. le spectacle. ens falsum. of a tragedy. but the definition of man is immobile. I-II Q94 A4 C). The tragedy. diction. the soul. P78 The first chapters of the Poetics are devoted chiefly to forming a definition of tragedy. a superficial knowledge. Aristotle says that when we contemplate a thing in its beginning. P84 St. but “that one must return what one has borrowed” is true in many cases but not all (cf. The characters come second. les caractères. as opposed to the being which is extra animam (In VI Metaph. It remains on the surface of things and cannot attain to the quid. Among these parts.absolutely on the whole world.e. i. ens verum. la pensée. l’élocution.

as we have seen.B. Sheila O’Flynn raises a similar problem in the case of architecture. what Carroll calls the “decorative” part of the art is simply an imitative art put at the service of architecture. such as the construction of a sentence in grammar.17 and for that reason constitute a single genus of art. the marble of the sculptor. without thereby undermining their essential agreement. obj. 18 Cf.18 § 16 As we have seen. 3. as we have seen in the case of the artes liberales. Thomas Aquinas. the bronze of the statuary—share an important differentia with the servile or mechanical arts. Likewise. nothing prevents a given species from agreeing in part of its definition with that of another species. with each involving a work immediate to reason itself . but her remarks proceed from the assumption that architecture is in part an imitative art. the aforementioned arts are all imitative. I would like to suggest that a genuine difficulty in classifying the arts lies in the fact that certain of the imitative arts. the remarks of Marcus Berquist in the first passage excerpted above. insofar as they pass over into exterior matter—the oils and canvas of the painter. whereas for St. ad 3 and associated texts. art. 17 Cf. in the present case. the liberal arts all agree in being introductory to the other sciences. 5. the so-called artes figurandi. § N. With the foregoing witnesses in hand. 16 Still. In our view. or of an equilateral triangle in geometry. which is the species-making difference. or plastic arts. Super Boethium De Trinitate. but the mathematical. q. 56 . So. those found out for the sake of the very knowing. as the logical sciences come under the division of those found out for their usefulness. the species of poetic art which use words as a medium have something fundamental in common with the liberal. a position we have met with above in the excerpt from Mitchell Carroll.P94 The necessity of logic for poetry: one might say that poetics directs reason in the verisimilitude of the representation. rather than a part of the art itself. 1.

“art is identical with a state of capacity to make. i. This conformity has no place in necessary things. making and acting are different (for their nature we treat even the discussions outside our school as reliable).. art. one should read ‘house-building’. Cf. And in a sense chance [tukhê] and art are concerned with the same objects. 57 . for art is concerned neither with things that are. According to Aristotle. Aristotle. which is the measure of its truth: “[For] the practical intellect is taken otherwise than the speculative. as Agathon says. or come into being. And therefore the virtue of the practical intellect is posited solely about contingent things. so that the reasoned state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. and there is neither any art that is not such a state nor any such state that is not an art. as has been said. cf. q. art must be a matter of making. which are not done by the human will: but only in contingent things which are able to be done by us. involving a true course of reasoning. not of acting. then. then. art is identical with a state of capacity to make. Hence too they are not included one in the other. or things able to be made outside us (factibilia exteriora). but about agibilia. lect. Msgr. 5. 2) Cf. is a state concerned with making. involving a false course of reasoning.13. nor with things that do so in accordance with nature (since these have their origin in themselves).” (S. and lack of art on the contrary is a state concerned with making. Maurice Dionne. but only that which is about necessary things. All art is concerned with coming into being. about factibilia. 5 (1140a 1-24) (tr. Making and acting being different. The definition of art as a virtue of the practical intellect. Art. And because the intellect cannot be infallibly conformed to contingent things. art. involving a true course of reasoning.e. ‘art loves chance and chance loves art’. and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made. both are concerned with the variable. for neither is acting making nor is making acting. by necessity. as is said in the sixth book of the Ethics. involving a true course of reasoning”. the ratio propria of art. prudence. ad 3. What is art? The elements of the first sense of art. Now since architecture19 is an art [tekhnê] and is essentially a reasoned state of capacity to make. with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being.Th. supra: P7 The different senses of the word “Art”. either things able to be done within us ( agibilia interiora). and so bearing on something contingent as its end. For the truth of the speculative intellect is taken through the conformity of the intellect to the thing. In VI Ethic. Nicomachean Ethics. are: 19 For architecture here. but only to necessary. therefore no speculative habit of contingent things is a speculative virtue. Terence Irwin): [1140a] In the variable are included both things made and things done. VI. But the truth of the practical intellect is taken through conformity to right appetite. also Notes by Michael Augros on LA NECESSITE DE LA LOGIQUE EN REGARD DE CHACUNE DES VIRTUS INTELLECTUELLES. being a virtue of the practical intellect. Ia-IIae. 57.

contingent . art. lect. c. in other words. Ph. Francis J. 2. P9 The factibile is a species of the contingent. In the first sense of the word. with respect to things that can be done in exterior matter. but the truth is speculative. looking to the definition of logic.. but its truth is practical. also the following definitions from St.factibile . and the contingent is wholly irreducible to the speculative virtues of reason..intelligence practique P7 We must distinguish making from doing. art is “right reason about any works that are to be made”. p. An. 1. By way of summary. P8 Actio is an operation (or doing) which remains in the agent himself. 44. ( In I Post. practical reason. An.. cf. 57. implies transitive operation. according to this definition. The word “art” is an analogous word. in the definition. since factibile. (Summa Theol. or. But not as in ethics: ethics is a practical science. cf. Kovach.factio . ( Summa Theol.. Lect. factio vs. such as building or cutting (In VI Ethicorum.. art is “a certain ordination of reason whereby human acts arrive at their due end through determinate means”. “Philosophy and the Arts”. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Thomas: (1) Art is “a making habit with true reason. ad 3) (4) Again. the factibile (from words to all the works of art).) (3) Again. (In I Post. lect. art is “a rightness of reason with respect to things that can be made. P9 The will is the efficient cause of the material work. art is recta ratio factibilium.3.. right reason about works. 12) (2) Again. n 1152). Factio is an operation which passes into an exterior matter in view of making something. which implies the will. not only is it practical. n.D. 47. n. lect. art. that is. 5. 3. (In VI Ethic. an operation which transforms physical matter. 3. q. Volume XXXIX. n. 1965: 1. [n.operatio transiens . q. 11) On the ratio of art and its work. 1) (5) But properly speaking. designates the object of a transitive action. In the case of art. The factibile is therefore contingent and proceeds from practical reason. 39] 58 . Art. actio. such as to cut and other works of this sort in which art gives direction”. “every application of right reason to something that can be made” pertains to art.

e... 1388). and some by chance. and can both be lost (In VI. 40). 6. 3. 3. 6. that is. L. n. n. 2446). n. 8.efficient causes. L. Met. it is either the principle of motion intrinsic to a thing. For all substances which are generated come to be either by nature or by art or by luck or “spontaneously. and induced into second matter (In XII. 1417) matter of their products (In VIII. or it is extrinsic to a thing. L. 3. n. 1719) and accidental form (In I De gen. n.’ i. n. n. Art is similar to nature insofar as (1) both are per se. L. 426. 6. whereas art produces only accidental forms (In V. Met. 8. ad 4). –It is for these differences between nature and art that the philosophy of nature deals ex professo only with natural.. Met. Met.. thereby rendering its product definable by its matter and form alone (In VII.. 1.. 1442f). Met. 2. 3. For if it is a per se cause... they are not directly an object of design. an agent similar in form. artificial form (In VII. 3. 3. i. 8). by itself without purpose. – (2) as to what they produce: Nature can produce both substantial (In VIII. n. 65. n. Art differs from nature. Met. 7.” namely. 6. n. n. n. n. L. by contact (In XII. 286) or improved (In II Phys. Thomas] 1. 1721). and in all this. [The foregoing references supplemented by the texts of St. S. L. Met. –Art. n. The reason for this division is that the cause of generation is either a per se cause or an accidental one. L. 3. L. n. 1381) efficient causes (In XII. (2) both produce some form (De ver. n. L. . III. 5.. and it produces substantial form in prime matter. De gen. In VIII. n. and then it is art. g. 145) and innate principle that cannot be lost (In II. 1851). n. ad 1) through the spatial arrangement of its integral parts (In I De gen. n. 14.. L.e. L. n. because art is a principle of action in something other than the thing 59 . L. 3. except by accident (De pot. 1815). Met. 1719). 1716) in a determinate manner (In VII. 35 3728) in the substantial (In VII. L. but the artificial form is superimposed upon the prejacent substance (ibid. that of things which come to be. L. 2444) Third. some by art. 1837) that is acquired (ibid. first (598). but not with artistic production (In I. 2444). in which their products pre-exist (De pot. differs from nature (1) as an efficient cause: Nature is a univocal cause (ST I 45. 8. L. (In XII. c. n. 7.. 1442f).. Met. 3. 2444). 1452) and an extrinsic principle (In IX. L. 818) in second matter (In VIII. He says that every substance comes to be “from an agent having the same name. Met. n. 268).Art is similar to nature insofar as (1) both are per se (In VII. 3. Met. Met. 4. ad 2) and an intrinsic (In II Phys. L. and which fail only accidentally in producing the intended effect (In XII. 1174) and improved (In IX Met. Met. in matter with a normal aptitude to receive the substantial form (In VII. so that its product can be defined only by the species of its second matter and by the mode of the arrangement or composition of that matter (In II Met. or ‘spontaneously. n. n. L. Met.e.e.” i. in matter without any natural aptitude to receive the accidental. however. 2402).. 1398) so that the matter is to the form of their products as potency is to act (ibid. L. (In VII. L. 40). art is mostly an equivocal cause (In VII. he points that things acquire their form from agents like themselves. 3. Met. and by the natural union of the producing principles. 12.. IV. for nature is a principle of motion in that in which it exists. n. 2445). i. 8. Eth. art needs nature not only for the material cause of its work but also for the qualities of natural things by which the art work can be preserved (S. 1. 4. Eth.. c. L. Met. 6. Met.. 3). L. some come to be by nature. 1. L. 5. 3. 3). Met. n.e. n. n. and then it is nature. 1381) He accordingly says. and finally (3) in the mode they produce: Nature produces its product without any need for the aid of human art. 4. L. n. 8. 5. and is educed from the mind of the artist. L. L. n 1704). i. so that the form of the natural thing is educed from its prime matter (ST I 45. L. by chance.. Met. L. but art does not exist in the thing produced by art but in something else. g. L.

We see also that a thing acts because of an end in two ways.) As St. it can mean that from which a thing gets its form.. The agent himself may determine his end –and this is true of all intellectual agents– or the end of the agent may be determined by another principal agent. n. It can imitate it because of the agent’s intention... the form imitated will not have the character of an exemplar or idea merely because of what has happened. the form of a thing can mean that by which a thing is informed. the idea of a thing is the form which a thing imitates. whereas nature is a principle of action and motion in a thing in which it is present. Consequently. however. 3. Note. c. that as the thing made by the craftsman pre-exists in his art as in an active force. (De ver. as an artist makes his painting imitate someone whose portrait he is making. but this end is determined by the archer. 2445) For “the remaining causes. Now things produced by art obviously come to be from something similar to themselves in form. for effects often fall short of this.. . (De pot. the exemplary form or idea should imitate something intentionally. The same thing is also apparent in the case of natural things. as when we say that the informing of an effect proceeds from the form of the agent. . 1.. For example. 3.. Now. an action does not necessarily result in effects that attain the complete character of the form of the agent. Second.. Hence.. 3. a. Hence. as when we say that the soul is the form of man. L. we do not usually call it its idea.both produce some form. that such an imitation is not intentional. Consequently.in which their products pre-exist. Met. an operation of a nature which is for a definite end presupposes an intellect that has pre-established the end of the nature and ordered it to that end. 12. 4. because it seems that the word idea signifies a form separate from that whose form it is.” luck and chance. (In XII. if a thing imitating something else comes into existence through an agent which has not itself determined the end.. for luck is intellect producing an effect over and above the one at which it aims. It happens at times. since the exemplary form or idea is that according to which a thing is formed. First. 3. we do 60 .. and the shape of a statue is the form of the bronze. the flight of an arrow is toward a definite end. For example. it is in this meaning that idea is originally used. so before it is generated a living being pre-exists in the formative energy. and not accidentally. however. This is the exemplary form in imitation of which a thing is made. For this reason. which is part of the composite. Similarly. . Third. 5. Augustine says: “We can literally translate ideai as species or forms. but happens by chance or by accident.. the form from which something gets its form is not said to be its idea or form. although form. especially in the case of equivocal causes. for man begets man..and which fail only accidentally in producing the intended effect. for it is by means of the form of the house in his mind that the builder causes the house which exists in matter. are defects and privations as it were of nature and of art. what imitates a form by chance is not said to be formed according to that form. Now. ad 4) To the fourth it ought to be said that the likeness between this force and art consists in this. is truly said to be the form of a thing. For example. the form of a thing can mean that according to which a thing is informed. that a thing can imitate a form in two ways. because according to seems to imply direction to an end.moved. every work of nature is said to be a work of intelligence.” Now the form of a thing has three meanings. painters frequently paint something resembling someone when they have not intended to do so. Now. and chance is nature producing an effect over and above the one at which it aims.

is similar to art. is its nature. Therefore it follows that a form neither comes to be nor is generated in itself..in a determinate manner.. and this is the agent or generator.not say that the form of the man who generates is the idea or exemplar of the man who is generated. namely. (In VIII.matter of their products. that the points explained above are true... 1398) And the same thing occurs in the case of things produced by art as in those produced by nature.. nor is a form generated or produced in itself. The third point is that in every process of generation there must be something which comes to be. 9.. i. one does not call a house a house before it has the form of its architecture. as one does with an artificial thing. Hence. (In VII. as is said below (619: C 1451).. and we also say that a form outside the artist is a plan if he imitates it when he makes a thing.so that the matter is to the form of their products as potency is to act. so too in the case of these things. 8. . 7. Met..e.. The first of these is that everything which comes to be. This. . comes to be by something. comes to be from something. then.” i. it is by its nature that something is called a natural thing.. nor a horse a horse before it has the form of its nature. For it was said above that something comes to be from matter in a different way than it does from a privation. . For we say that the form of art in the artist is the plan or idea of the artistic product.. but it is this particular thing which comes to be or is generated in itself. . And just as an effect produced by art may also occur apart from the intention of art or of mind. L. Aristotle proceeds to demonstrate by reason of what was shown above. (S. (In VII.e. c.. and this is either a sphere or a circle or something else. seems to constitute the character of an idea: It must be a form which something imitates because of the intention of an agent who antecedently determines the end himself. L.. and by this something from which generation takes place we mean the matter and not the privation. which is the principle of generation. since this particular thing is composed of matter and form. and the second is that everything which comes to be. because just as art through certain definite intermediates attains the form at which it aims. some things are generated both from seed and without seed. 6. but we use these terms only when an agent acting for an end has determined the end himself –whether the form imitated be within him or outside of him. n. b. 1388) 61 . IV.. for the power contained in the seed. natural ones. from its material and individuating principles. that no one makes or produces a form. L. 35 3728) Again. Met. The form of a natural thing. first (611). Met. But it was stated above that a form is not an element or anything composed of the elements. 7... C 1708-15). (ibid. g. the statement that forms can neither be corrupted nor generated in themselves (710-12. 3. 1417) He accordingly says.. n. n. n.. 1716) Further. so also does the formative power in the seed. One calls it a natural thing because it has a form. it comes to be or is generated “from these principles. And the reason is that everything which comes to be comes to be from matter. 6. therefore. and then it is said to happen by chance.in the substantial .. on which each of the aforementioned points depends.

n. L. Therefore it follows that there must be matter in every kind of generation. n.. . 62 . but [natural things] do not differ from non-natural things except insofar as the former have a principle of movement within them. 145) Then from the preceding [considerations] he concludes the definition of nature in the following way: Natural things differ from non-natural things insofar as the former have a nature. 11. L. . 8. such as in the doctor who cures himself. L. L.. 12.. n. 4.and an intrinsic. and this would be true only if it were possible for it both to be and not to be... .. And this is most obvious in the art which is in that which is moved. have been given by nature. however. differs from nature (1) as an efficient cause: Nature is a univocal cause. (In VII.. Therefore. we must answer that the perfection of moral virtue. 1. 268) For nature seems to differ from art only because nature is an intrinsic principle and art is an extrinsic principle. the thing generated must at one time be and at another not be.. 8. ad 2) To the second it ought to be said that active qualities in nature act in virtue of their substantial forms: and thus the natural agent not only produces something similar to it according to quality. For since generation is a change from non-being to being. 1452) 20 The applicability of this text to the doctrine in question is not apparent to me.. a ship would have been made by nature in the same way as it is made by art.. so also by acting according to the principles of practical reason a man makes himself actually virtuous. 14. (ST I 45. therefore nature is nothing other than the principle of motion and of rest in that in which it exists primarily.. for everything that is generated by nature or by art is capable both of being and of not being. 10. (In II. and to the privations by which they have non-being.Here he proves that one of these three conditions —the principle from which a thing comes to be— is found in every kind of generation.. the first principles of reason.... since nothing can move itself from potency to act.or improved. consists in reason’s control of the appetite. For nature is very similar to this art. Now the potential element which each thing has both for being and for not being is matter.. (In II Phys.. although per accidens. but according to species. which we are treating. as is clear from what was said above.art is mostly an equivocal cause. Eth.and innate principle that cannot be lost. no less in moral than in speculative matters. Met. just as by previously known principles a man makes himself actually understand by personal effort of discovery.. . not only in natural generations but also in artificial ones (for the nature of the other two conditions is evident).. in virtue of itself.Art. 286) If it should be asked how this is possible. He says that all the things which come to be by nature or by art have a matter from which they come to be. n. Now.. and not accidentally. For if the art of ship building were intrinsic to wood.20 13. (In II Phys. 14. for it is in potentiality to the forms by which things have being. ..

. 3. because these things come to be only by assembling the parts. 6. 19. since some potencies are innate in the things of which they are the potencies. .. art and science).. and some are acquired by practice. whereas the forms of artifacts are accidents. 63 . one becomes a harpist by playing the harp. and some are acquired by teaching and learning. as when someone makes a plan of one house from that of another. which have no natural existence. Met. i. Eth. which is not assembled or disintegrated. 1851) Now one could not learn an art of this kind unless he himself performed the actions associated with it. (In VIII. L.. n.. saying that perhaps the forms of artifacts are not substances or anything in their own right. 4. L. n. For they thought that this occurred in natural things as it does in a house and in all such things. 1174) A sign of this is that a habit in the reason alone can be forgotten (for example. 16.. L. and so cannot have separate existence.that is acquired.. 5.. Nor similarly can other artificial forms..and an extrinsic principle. first (761). Met. L. . as the sensory potencies in animals. and one becomes a physician by studying medical matters. . 4. 17. (In IX. and this is why Plato did not hold that the forms of artifacts exist apart from matter but only substantial forms. L. 15. he precludes an objection.. as in the case of natural things.. and are disintegrated only by separating the parts. for one learns the harp by playing it. n.. as some have said. like understanding. whose form consists of position and order.. (In VI..(2) as to what they produce: Nature can produce both substantial.... that simple and perfect generation occurs through assembling..and accidental form.. (ibid. 20. although this sometimes happens.. all of the abovementioned potencies which we have as a result of practice and the use of reason must first be exercised and their acts repeated before they are acquired. (In IX Met.. that.e. and corruption through separating. n. . as medicine and other similar arts. 1837) And the same holds true in the case of other things whether their principle of perfection is outside of them.and can both be lost. 1815) He accordingly says... 7.and improved. however.. 40) He says therefore first [39] that one should not say. n. 1719) Third.And in this respect natural generation bears no likeness to artificial generation. 18. because in artifacts the matter alone is held to be substance. as in the case of artificial things. For example. or within them. (In I De gen. . belong to the class of substance.. . n. as the art of flute-playing and other operative arts of this kind. because it is not necessary for the form of the house in the mind of the master builder to come from a house. L. and that any change which takes place in a permanent continuum. This is also true of the other arts. Natural forms. is alteration. unless the habit is a natural one..

and in this way he would know the nature of a bed. . a. . 1442f) [given above] 26. about the definition which indicates the essence of other bodies than natural ones. 3.thereby rendering its product definable by its matter and form alone.in second matter. they are incapable of definition. .. in which forms are merely accidents and matter alone is substance. L.. n. but this does not occur in the matter of things made by art. 22.e... (In V. .. of bodies made by human art. and this can be brought to actuality by a natural agent. which involves things made by art. n. in matter without any natural aptitude to receive the accidental. artificial form. 426) Here he gives the third argument. 8. as house or vessel... “all those” which are incapable of existing apart from their matters. L.. n. L. it would be necessary to consider of what parts it is made and how they are put together.. 1719) Second. Met.21.. 24..e. 8.. ... for example.and finally (3) in the mode they produce: Nature produces its product without any 64 . He says that if someone wished “to speculate about their nature. Met.so that its product can be defined only by the species of its second matter and by the mode of the arrangement or composition of that matter. 3. Met.i. For it was stated above (706:C 1700) that the definitive statement joins one part to another. must be one that is composite... 8. 3. (In VII... n. namely. 1442f) Yet there is a difference between the matter of natural things and that of things made by art..whereas art produces only accidental forms. (In VII.. as was pointed out above (704:C 1696-8). (In VIII. 23. (In VII. n. 25. because in the matter of natural things there is a natural aptitude for form.. 5. if one wished to know a bed. one of which is as form and the other as matter. 818) They held this view because they considered the matter and form of natural bodies in the same way as they did the matter and form of things made by art. because genus is derived from matter and difference from form. (In VIII. 1721) Hence in order to solve this problem we must say that the substance which is defined. But since the primary parts of which a definition is composed are simple. because neither the form of a house nor that of a vessel can exist apart from its proper matter. namely. Met.. he indicates what seems to be evident on this point.. L. L. .. He says that it is evident that the forms of some corruptible things are not separate.e..and it produces substantial form in prime matter. Met. in matter with a normal aptitude to receive the substantial form.. Met..” i.. 27. L. n. b. L. (In II Met.. whether it be intellectual or sensible.. i. n 1704) The second is that form is something beside the material parts. .

If therefore in nature’s productions there were not creation. For in every operation of nature and art some form is produced. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form.. Objection 3: Further. what is not created... however. . or at least not so efficiently.need for the aid of human art. that is. 3. I answer that. And therefore. since matter has no part in it. But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them. But it is not produced from anything... is not a creature.. Met. (De pot.” they asserted that they pre-exist “simply. Therefore it is produced from nothing. 29. [not by] by contact. as is evident in animals generated through putrefaction.” Others. only the matter or underlying subject seems to be substance. in nature like begets like. (ST I 45. and sometimes assists nature: thus the physician helps nature to heal by employing those things which have a natural healing power in the process of alteration and digestion. and from not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act.. 8) Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art? Objection 1: It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art.. the effect is not more powerful than its cause. This arose from ignorance concerning matter. . it would follow that nature’s productions are not creatures. The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which. but by creation. “in potentiality. that to each operation of nature is joined creation. On the contrary. (In XII. Objection 4: Further. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. Objection 2: Further. except by accident.. since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone. v. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting. and makes things that nature cannot make. but previously exist in matter. said that the forms were given or caused by a separate agent by way of creation. but is that by which a thing is. II) that art both imitates nature. Augustine (Super Gen.It belongs to art to employ the action of natural principles. which is a work of nature. and the same reason applies to other things. which come to be by contact and not by natural union. in producing an effect which either nature cannot produce.. for artificial forms are accidents. as shown above (A[4]).. 28.and by the natural union of the producing principles. 2446) They did this because they saw in the case of artifacts. which is heretical. and therefore it must be produced by creation. from the work of creation. For because forms pre-exist in matter. it does 65 .so that the form of the natural thing is educed from its prime matter.14. which is an active or a passive form. 3) .15) distinguishes the work of propagation. some said. L.. 6. and thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation. for they asserted that forms are latent. But this opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. 6. do not come into existence by the action of nature. n. Therefore the form of these is not from nature. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature. and accordingly..

” What. III.and in all this. and induced into second matter. Reply to Objection 1: Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made. by the solidity of its stones. 2444) [given above] 33.. (In I. ad 1) [given above]21 31.. (In XII... but not with artistic production. for instance. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are created by a separate agent. a universal agent suffices. (ibid....” Reply to Objection 2: The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces its like according to quality. but to be “concreated. not in species. g. c.... n. 1..” which is made from matter. L. indeed. is properly made by the natural agent is the “composite. in the shape of a univocal generator. for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice. art objects are preserved in being by the power of natural things. but a proper agent is required. De gen.. not as though they were made “directly. ..” but only “indirectly. (In I De gen. but is presupposed to the work of nature.. a house. Reply to Objection 4: The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles..through the spatial arrangement of its integral parts. Met..” because the study of the generation and corruption of artificial things does not pertain to natural science. L.. Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter. Reply to Objection 3: For the generation of imperfect animals.and is educed from the mind of the artist. . (S.. and thus the products of nature are called creatures.. but according to a kind of analogy. n. . . 34. “of things that come to be and pass away by nature. 2402) Moreover.. L. .. 40) [given above] 32. 21 It does not appear to me that the article adduced directly bears on the assertion made.not belong to forms to be made or to be created. and this is to be found in the celestial power to which they are assimilated. n. –It is for these differences between nature and art that the philosophy of nature deals ex professo only with natural.. although both statements accurately express the views of the Angelic Doctor. 65. 66 . However. 3. but according to species.but the artificial form is superimposed upon the prejacent substance. 3) He says. 5. 30. art needs nature not only for the material cause of its work but also for the qualities of natural things by which the art work can be preserved.

2. 3. L. 1). Socrates made the momentous discovery that nature has not equipped us with a method for arriving at the truth. [n. 2. Art is that kind of enterprise. the divine art is to the creature as the human art is to the artwork (S. He says to Meno over and over again—and Meno refuses to believe him—that you can’t tell whether something is teachable unless you first know what it is. 6. divine foreknowledge is to things as art is to artificial things (De ver. [n. in the Meno he addresses the question of definition.. n. Met. ST I 14. ipsius artis sunt repraesentativae 24 (S. 8. 1). g. n. Could we begin by stating the situation that makes art necessary? Art becomes necessary when there is an end to be reached and we haven’t been equipped by nature to reach that end. et al). In philosophy. To the extent that this is the case and that the necessary order is discoverable. 24. 2. For example. But I carry on other activities for which I don’t have the right kind of sequence built into me. I have to discover those steps and the right order for carrying them out. If I’m making something. For instance.. 1979). also In VII. I think we need an art of inquiry. and then I have to apply my understanding. I eat my food and swallow it. ap. g. 3). cf. and he saw that we need a method for getting there. It’s a knowledge of how to reach some given end through means that are not determined by nature. William Darkey (ed. 2444. 12] Cf. n. no matter what you did or in what order you did it. and the work which is made by art. if it happened at all. Eth. ‘Ea enima quae arte fiunt. just as nature does. It is clear that it does make a difference what order you proceed in and how much time you spend on such and such a thing. John’s College Press. then nature takes care of the rest. II. L. In terms of efficient causality. If you could get to your goal in just any way. 14. c. Second Day: Mr. 2. II. ‘Circa materiam artis due est considere: scilicet ipsam actionem artificis quae per artem dirigitur. 3. you have an art. There is art to the extent that the means are determined.” 25 “since habits are known by their acts and acts by their objects” 67 . 1). sed. I-II 93. and God the Artist is to the created world as the human artist is to his work (ST I-II 93. But to get to my goal I still have to follow a certain number of steps in the right order. c. [n. 4.” 23 “since action is a mean between the maker and the thing made” 24 “For those things which come about by art are representative of the art itself.. 26. l. 1381 and In XII. I don’t need to learn any procedure to digest my food—I have it by nature. too. That I say. 1006. – ‘cum habitus cognoscantur per actus et actus per obiecta 25 (ST II-II 4. – ‘cum actio sit media inter faciens et factum 23 (ST I 36. Marcus Berquist. 1154). 3. et opus quod est per artem factum 22 (In VI. 11] Cf. On the need for art. Berquist. Everything would just happen by nature. is a very simple point of method: if you want to get to that goal there. c. 859). Let me make this point to you. That’s why we have logic. Three Dialogues on Liberal Education (St. § 22 “With respect to the matter of art there are two things to consider: the very action of the artificer which is directed by art.6] In terms of exemplary causality. 1039).. there would be no schools and no teaching. you must start here and proceed the right way. Met.

disp. and so are virtues of the practical intellect. 27 Cf. de Veritate. the pertinent remarks of Dionne supra. it would appear to be a composing part of the art St. a cloud. and then follows the thinking out of the form of the work.” And therefore it must be considered that in these arts there is a twofold exemplar or original: first. as also [there is] an exemplar and an exemplared. The place of architecture among the arts. ‘construction’.14. since the former produce a contingent work in exterior matter. being the “thinking out” of the form to be introduced into exterior matter. the making idea in the mind of the artist. I. and all things which can be imitated thus. 68 . which is common to all arts. so also in speaking a threefold word is found: namely. Thomas calls aedifactiva. B. and (3) the exterior word expressed. Charles De Koninck. so thus the work of nature seems to be the work of intelligence. but all our knowledge is through the senses and taken from sensible and natural things. when by determinate means it proceeds to certain ends. because by an intellective principle the whole of nature is ordained to its end. 27 For the same reason. as is clear from the fact that it can equally imitate artificial things. Accordingly.A. and in the last place is the word of the voice. or an electronic storage and retrieval system such as the Cloud. anger. and the work already produced. 1. the written word. the servile and liberal arts are mutually exclusive. nor can a liberal art be fine. a king. being ‘industrial’ arts. [In II Physic. rather. neither of which is true of architecture (for although every art imitates nature. cf. 6.28 and so are speculative. and lastly the work is produced in being —so the word of the heart in the one speaking is prior to the word which involves the image of the voice. with respect to which the exterior word is uttered in order for it to be signified: and this is the word of the heart without being uttered by the voice. one ought to mark that the exemplar already is an exemplared or image. by which we may understand ‘house-building’ or. whence the exemplar sometimes is called an original and the exemplared an image. Lectio 4. are themselves servile. n. A. which is called the word of the voice. namely. And therefore natural things are imitable by art. which also art imitates in operating. not yet written out. as a lion. as is clear in the picture conceived by the painter before execution. more generally. 26 it does not seem possible to place it among them. whence in artificial things we work toward a likeness of natural things. whereas the latter produce a work in necessary matter while remaining in the agent. 26 For the foundation of this difference. or in the conceived poem. Cf. But the difference of the arts about which we now speak is found in the “delightfully. but in the art of imitating delightfully. art. no servile art can be a fine art. IX. the end of the former being the thing made or the use of it. something known. and this is called the interior word which involves an image of the voice. which. NOTULA IN IAE PARTIS Q. its exemplar. and since all such arts are defined as imitations. AD 1 (The Charles De Koninck Project): To the third I answer that in any art there is some imitation. just as in things made by art we consider three things. Qu. again (2) the exemplar of the exterior word. and already expresses the “what” of the thing to be made. Since the end of the fine arts is pleasure. (emphasis added) 28 It being only their signs which exist in exterior matter. of the latter. the art in question is not imitative in the way the aforementioned arts are). (1) that which is conceived by the intellect. 4. several assertions made by Sheila O’Flynn in this regard also appear to be mistaken. q. Likewise. (tr. namely. But the reason that art imitates nature is that the principle of artificial operation is knowledge. the end of the work of art.M. whether in vocal sound.): And so. c. And just as in a work of art the intention of the end precedes.] And so the art of imitating delightfully as such and inasmuch as it is of this sort is not said to imitate. But that concept or image has a more radical original the concept or image of which is a likeness in form with the origination. St. Thomas Aquinas.

lect. 1447a 10: ei) me/llei kalw=j e)/cein h) poi/hsij. the following from Elder Olson. 30 7. cf. as it were. then such and such parts must be assembled in such and such a way. 1961). the nature of the product. 1952. which is a whole. 34 Supra. 28 What is made by the artist is neither the form nor the matter. 1032a 32.” In English Institute Essays.63 9b 24 ff. but the iron sphere. therefore. i. but the statue. 1. Since the reasoning is based upon a definition of a certain whole as its principle and since that definition must be arrived at in some fashion.29 In art a form in the mind of the artist is imposed upon his medium. 31 1032b 15 ff. 190: Moreover. any productive science must consist of two main parts: inductive reasoning toward its principle. and deductive reasoning from its principle. n.). vii. 1406: 69 . this is making. the sculptor makes neither the marble which is his material nor the human form which he gives it. for art is concerned neither with things that are or come into being by necessity nor with things that do so in accordance with nature. but first there must be the requisite parts. eth. 31 For example. but the process from the terminus of the reasoning to the final production of the form is making. this is reasoning. i. (emphasis added) For St. which is the human form imposed upon marble. if a shoe is to be produced—a certain kind of composite—then parts must be stitched or nailed together. 33 The reasoning is hypothetical because it is based upon hypotheses: If such and such a work. ii. 337b 14 ff. p. cf. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas. and if the work is to have excellence as a whole. Thomas’ understanding. Rowan (Chicago. according to Aristotle all art is concerned with coming into being. Book VII. De generatione et corruptione.N. translated by John P. nn. “The Poetic Method of Aristotle: Its Powers and Limitations. 8. and indeed based upon. 11. and so forth to the first thing that can be done. 1040a 10-16 (Oxford tr. 6. the artistic whole which is to be produced and proceeding through the various parts of the various kinds to be assembled. 28 29 Nic. but the synolon. 1033a 23-1033b. and the structure of such science may be described as hypothetical regressive reasoning. taking for its starting-point. 1976). a concretum of form and matter. to the parts which must have existence previous to that of the whole. and the ironworker makes neither the iron nor the spherical form. 6. 4.30 and the productive process may be divided into two parts. For the basis of my suggestion that architecture ought to be understood as the “thinking out” of the form of what is to be built. The reasoning is regressive because it works backward from the whole. the concretum. and these will have to be cut and prepared. the other must determine the parts according to that formulation. For instance. De partibus animalium. The second proceeds from the first thing which can be produced to the form itself.B. [190-191] The scope of any productive science. Reprinted in On Value Judgments in the Arts (Chicago. or principle. since these latter have their origin in themselves. All this is reasoning. to produce the artistic composite. then the parts must be of such and such a kind and quality. that is.34 One part must make possible the formulation of the whole. is the rational part of production centering in. 32 33 Poetics. which is to exist. which are.. is to be produced. with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being and whose origin is in the maker. vi. Met. not in the thing made. The first proceeds from the form to be produced to the first thing which can be produced. of contrary direction.

i. 30 Transcription furnished to me by Richard Diamond. for example. Charles De Koninck. is called producing. and in regard to this he does two things. . He now shows how health is produced by this principle. cf. health is brought about in a subject as a result of someone thinking in this manner: since health is such and such. choose Medicine to show.. he shows how the health which exists in the mind is the principle (or starting point) for the restoring of health. until he reaches some final thing which he himself is immediately capable of doing. and finally the motion beginning from the thing which he can do immediately is said to be the activity directed to the production of health. He accordingly says (606) that. also the following: 15.B. and thus by always going from what is subsequent to what is prior he thinks of the thing which is productive of heat. eventually. since the health present in the mind is the principle of the health produced by art. He says that in artificial generations and motions there is one activity which is called thinking and another which is called producing. and this is then a motion affecting matter. The Art of Medicine As a Kind of Prudence (Charles De Koninck Papers) (Q30-7—10):30 Why does Aristotle. .. as was said above. 148. .” 29 It being “[the architect’s] duty to comprehend the entire arrangement of the whole work” to be built. idem. First. He shows how the word principle is taken in different ways in regard to the activities of art. either regularity or the balance of heat. moisture and dryness. the dispensing of some particular medicine. . regularity or the balance of humors. which also support my claim. 1408: Now of generations (607). also his pertinent remarks on the meaning of ‘architect’ and on architectonic arts above. what is meant by science and wisdom? See Aristotle’s text: Book I. and then of the thing which is productive of this. Therefore the activity which begins from this last thing in which the activity of thinking terminates. Thomas explains in his Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians. as St. cold. which begins from the principle which is the form of the thing to be made by his art. men of mere experience cannot. i.e. chapter 1: “The animals other than man . at the very outset of his Metaphysics. and this activity extends. n. it is necessary that this exist.1406. Health comes about (606). 70 . and if regularity or balance must exist. is itself called thinking. . right down to what is last in the order of intention and first in the order of execution. .e. . . . For the artist’s planning. Cf. and as an ars cooperativa naturae. Cf. how the term principle is taken in different ways in regard to the activity of art (‘Now of generations’). N. by which the humors are balanced. 29 Hence we observe that the “thinking out of the form” furnishes the starting-point of the process consisting in the “thinking” or “reasoning” which arrives at the first thing to be done in the order of execution. there must be heat. if health is to exist. On medicine in relation to prudence. and second (607:C 1408). n. As the foregoing explanation is made in terms of the medical art. (emphasis added) Cf.

we acknowledge his inquisitive mind). Of a fluteplayer who would have to deliberate in the course of a concert we would hardly say that he is a true artist. which we make as we do for a purpose of our own choosing. whereas in this field there is always some looseness in and about general reasons. We encourage those who are not content with mere experience. like nature. the machine. our own. of prudence. For. whose father was the most famous medical doctor of that time and physician to Alexander the Great. (Aristotle himself is a case in point. He thought that wine to excess produces a congestion of the liver. and the art of the physician: What is a well-running machine? What is health? Man is a product of nature. to restore health. — Prudence must deliberate: the circumstances [are] far more complex: and good judgment will be conditioned by [the] right disposition of the agent. and one may have the one without the other: the former regulates making. and vice versa. that will happen because it has always or frequently been so in the past. as the wise man points out. or practical wisdom. personal or otherwise. uses determinate means to the end and does not deliberate. it is better to have experience without knowing the “why” than to know the “why” without experience. per se. the latter. and the preservation of health in those who possess it. However. seeks reasons for what is known from experience. but this man and that. One may be a good craftsman without being a good man. but we would have more esteem for the person who could also tell us just why this is usually so. the quality of the action with respect to the end of man: happiness. the health of the patient. Medicine. and its purpose being the health of individuals. Whatever the value of this reason. For experience is derived from and is about particular cases. The same Greek philosopher. it is another to know why. in themselves. One may know from experience. Now Medicine is an art. conduct. 71 . And here is a further difference to be noted: — Art. It is not enough to reason: “Plato is constipated. It is only on this condition that medicine can be truly a practical art. then. We know machines better than we know nature. after all. when one does this. as the man of experience knows. has also said that medicine is at the same time a kind of prudence. the reasons themselves are sought for sake of returning to the order of experience where enlightened practice should bear more fruit. and another after—one should attend these affairs well-oiled! That seems to have been a good enough advice for his time. The aim of medicine is. and oil would unloose a flow of bile. Why should this be so? When we consider art and prudence. The good of the art is the good of the work.It is one thing to know that if one does this. its end. that is likely to ensue. they differ so widely that one can hardly see how one could share in the other. Art and prudence are profoundly different qualities. but he also enquired into the reason. But [there is a] great difference between the art of a mechanic. begins with experience. and so he needs a physic”. He advises anyone who expects to be generously wined and dined to take a spoonful of olive oil before. somewhat like the art of navigation which likewise shares in the nature of practical wisdom. the purgation which was beneficial to Socrates could be calamitous when administered to Plato. We shall never know nature as well as we know the products of our own contrivance. and one does not set out to heal man in general. drink to excess produces a condition called “hang-over”.

even medicine—not of health. Christian physicians: mercy: not only bodily but also spiritual. Infinity because of ignorance of nature. Cf. Letter to Mortimer Adler (Quebec June 15. Charles De Koninck Papers) (Excerpt): …Whether an art is cooperativa naturæ as medicine and bridge-building. Thomas: “ars medicinatis intendit ad sanandum in infinitum. Natural [L]aw. All art is productive. cannot but imitate his own nature. A more philosophical consideration: End of medicine infinite. And no art can be anything but imitation of nature. Every doctor has some philosophy. a. but not even [a] mere animal. (The geometrising God of Plato and Jeans is a monstrosity. Practical and productive are distinct only when the production remains within the speculative intellect as is possible only in logic and mathematics. Physician has special reason for “wonder”.. the indefinite variety of the individuals. 1938) (Unpublished manuscript. but of the circumstances favouring the operation of nature. Here the care we wish to bestow on [the] patient may depend upon our general conception of man. Limits imposed upon experimentation. S. monster in Christian world. Even God. both strictly human sciences. 72 . requires deliberation in each individual instance. Charles De Koninck. Nature acts from within. The Incarnation is a work of practical art—“et homo factus est”. 107. are not infinite—nor is such an infinity intended. Here [lies the] difference between physician and horse-doctor. which is still a mimèsis of nature. —Good example of “imprudence”: theories concerning infant care. whether real or apparent. or aesthetic. and therefore distinct from the speculative. the amount of contingency. Medicine cannot reach [a] definitive stage which would allow the physician to proceed with the determination of a plumber. most of man’s psychological faculties are organic—not just “separate” faculties. Good Samaritan. the unique complexity of each individual instance. q. sed secundum mensuram”. Av. cum inducit sanitatem quantumcumque potest. The end of medicine is without limit—and the physician must be satisfied to treat the patient as best he can. The means. and I admire Eddington for rebuking this idea). Hence [the] danger of heeding one and neglecting [the] other. The most perfect art of the creatures—the laus proffered and addressed to God by the intellect enjoying the beatific vision (Ia. Actually. art from without. Still [an]other reason for “quædam prudentia”: man not only [is] not [a] machine. Necessary because of deficiencies of nature—tries to do what nature would do if she could. whose art takes the purest form. coupled with the necessity of intervention. does not alter its status as practical. principle of science. Doctor whose end wealth.This inevitable ignorance. yet. added on to organs: [the] disturbance of [an] organ affects the whole. calls for deliberation—and this alone would make of medicine a kind of prudence. among other because nature at infinity. sed medicinam non dat quantumcumque potest. 3)—is a production and essentially practical. however. medicine. End does not justify means.

This is the point we should be able to agree upon before discussing the others….So that the main issue remains as I have stated it in the notes: no created science can be both speculative and practical. See also: On the Liberal Arts. A Compendium of Texts. Even the “futuribilia” are inseparable from the decrees which imply will. All rights reserved. Mazzetti. Divine art is always practical. 73 . § (c) 2013 Bart A.

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