TAKE-HOME EXAM A Long and Winding Road: The Process of EU Enlargement

Coordinator: Dr. Oriane Calligaro

Student number: I6022285 Pigeon hole number: 1035 Course: A Long and Winding Road: The Process of EU Enlargement Date: 31-05-13

Question 1 The 2004 enlargement round was preceded by a wide-spread concern that it would result in a paralyzed and ineffective Union (Wicawski, 2010, p.1). What were the reasons to proceed this enlargement project? Rationalist institutionalism (cost-benefit analysis) and social constructivism (common norms and values) anticipated and framed positive and negative consequences for all stakeholders to either support or oppose the 2004 enlargement (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p.77). The consequences for the existing MS, or the so-called EU-15, could be traced back in the experiences of previous enlargement rounds. These were all driven by national interests and state power, in which the benefits supersede the costs of accepting accession (Moravcsik, 2003, p.2). First of all, the ten MS have increased the internal market by the increase in number of consumers with a significant amount of 100 million people. Moreover, the current 15 MS long term economic gain will be 10 billion euro which is more than the costs spend on the enlargement (Ibid, p.12). Furthermore, internal market tariffs between the existing and new MS have been removed (Lammer, 2004, p.133). Additionally, the EU has proved to be a true geopolitical actor by recognizing ten new members as meaningful democratic states, putting a definite end to the communist past and the Cold War division (Wicawski, 2010, p.3; Vclav, 2004, p.61). This ultimately makes the easing conflicts and countering illegal immigration more effective and facilitates stability (Moravcsik, 2003, p.12). On the other hand, enlargement has only minor economic effect on the EU-15 because the GDP of the new MS does not even constitute 5 percent of the total EU GDP and the income gains in the EU-15 GDP are estimated to be about 0.2 percent after a couple of years of enlargement (Ibid; Lammers, 2004, p.136). Nonetheless, negative welfare effects were felt by the old MS because they had obligations to pay transfer costs (Ibid.). This was strengthened by the increased competition for EU funds (Vclav, 2004, p.62). Moreover, the enlargement fatigue became more prominent in the EU-15, linking the accession of new MS with instability and complexity (Timus, 2006, p.344). These negative implications are also reflected in the public opinion; enlargement was associated with the exposure of illegal immigration, crime and rising unemployment (Moravcsik, 2003, p.14). Citizens in the EU-15 were afraid of East Europeans taking over job opportunities, the so-called fear for the Polish plumber and Polish nurse (Wicawski, 2010, p.8). According to economists, enlargement would be most beneficial for those MS which were closest to the new MS (Timus, 2006, p.341). While the German politicians were convinced of the advantages of

enlargement due to cross-border trade and capital flows, only 10% of the German public trusted that EU enlargement would lead to improvements (Ibid.). The ten new MS were glad to finally reunite with the lost continent. The prospect of membership has helped facilitating the transition from a communist to a democratic state (Moravcsik, 2003, p.7). The domestic implementation the acquis communautaire resulted in competitive functioning markets, improved financial markets and an effective state administrations (Ibid.). They were in a relatively weak negotiation as applicant countries because they simply had to approve and give in much to become members. In 2004, the year of accession, farmers from new MS would only receive one fourth of the direct payments the EU15 farmers got, this amount would progressively increase until it is equal to the level of the existing MS in 2013 (European Commission, 2004, p.7). More exceptions were made regarding the free movement of workers from new MS to the EU-15; Germany set the transition period at seven years (until 2011), which is the maximum allowed (Wicawski, 2010, p.8). This confirms the fear of the German citizens to increased competition in the labour market. Moravcsik implied that enlargement would be advantageous for old and new MS, however the latter would eventually enjoy more benefits (2003, p.6). The income gains of the new MS are 1000 percent higher than those of the old MS (Lammers, 2004, p.136). This can be explained by the attraction of foreign direct investment, expected technology transfers and increased integration in the internal market (Moravcsik, 2003, p.8). Their weak negotiation position will be reversed as a consequence of enlargement; politically the new MS become crucial because they can use their veto right to block decisions and initiatives often proposed by old influential MS which require unanimity to be passed (Ibid, p.17). Moreover, the new MS have become the strongest advocates for a further Eastern enlargement, since they, on their turn, become rhetorically entrapped because of the shared communist history (Timus, 2006, p.339; Schimmelfennig, 2001, p.77). The effect of the enlargement on the Commission was unproblematic, portfolios were distributed among all 25 commissioners, Ciobanu-Dordea (2005) wrote that this was a balanced division among old and new MS (p.36), while Timus (2010) stated that differentiation of portfolios took place, old MS standing on top of the ladder having access to the key dossiers and new MS somewhere at the bottom (slide 12). Furthermore, the new commissioners added more enthusiasm and energy to the institution, making it more dynamic (Ciobanu-Dordea, 2005, p.36).

Accordingly, the load of administration becomes heavier and therefore the Commission has decided to introduce less legislation and to focus on the key proposals (Best, 2009, p.114). The European Parliament continued business as usual; the new MEPs voted according to their political affiliations, kept national affiliations aside and contributed to the political decisionmaking process (Hertz & Leuffen, 2010, p.3; Best, 2009, p.115). The Council of Ministers encountered the most challenges integrating the ten new MS in the institution, relatively speaking. It seemed that they would have a tougher time reaching consensus with EU-25 instead of EU-15 because of the increased number of interests and probably languages (Wicawski, 2010, p.4). Hagemann, however, implies that after enlargement there was no increase in conflicting interests in the council and that voting has not become more troublesome (Hertz & Leuffen, 2010, p.3). As a response to enlargement, many decisions based on unanimity were replaced by qualified majority voting to prevent delay; decisions concerning crucial policy fields remained under the unanimity rule, and this was recognised by every MS (Wicawski, 2010, p.4). Each MS possesses veto power, notwithstanding, it is widely accepted that it should be saved as a last resort (Ibid., p.4, 5). As Hertz & Leuffen (2010) stressed: Eastern enlargement has not led to a watershed in EU decision-making. We do not observe an increase of gridlock, voting has not become more conflict-laden(p.4). Concerns about the collapse of the EU and its functioning turned out to be based on mere assumptions and were overstated (Moravcsik, 2003, p.18).

References Best, E. et al. (2009). Effects of enlargement on the EUs institutions & decision-making The EU Institutions after Enlargement: Not quite Business as Usual. In G. Avery, A. Faber and A. Schmidt (Eds.), Enlarging the European Union: Effects on the new member states and the EU (pp.112). Trans European Policy Studies Association: Brussels. Ciobanu-Dordea, A. (2005). Reflection on the impact of enlargement for the EU institutions. In, Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol.5, no.3. European Commission. (2004). Enlargement and Agriculture. Lammers, K. (2004). How Will the Enlargement Affect the Old Members of the European Union? In, Intereconomics, pp. 132-141. Moravcsik, A. and Vachudova, M. (2003). National interests, state power and EU enlargement. In, East European Politics and Societies, 17(1). Schimmelfennig, F. (2001).The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. In, International Organization,55:1, pp. 47-80. Timus, N. (2006). The role of public opinion in European Union policy making: The case of European Union enlargement. In, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 7:3, pp. 336-347. Timus, N. (2010). Lecture 1- EU integration: Balancing between Deepening and Widening. Maastricht University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Vclav, K. (2004). Implications on this years EU enlargement: A preliminary analysis. Wicawski, J. (2010). The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: Fears, Challenges, and Reality. In, Globality Studies Journal: Global History, Society, Civilization, volume 15, pp.118. Hertz, R. & Leuffen, D. (2010). Comparing European Union Decision-Making before and after Eastern Enlargement.

(1) 1000 words Discuss the evolution of EU conditionality in the past decades and its specific implications for Turkeys application.

Evolution of EU conditionality in the past decades

Yet one of the crucial challenges to the future of the continent was the response to the transformation of East-Central Europe and the aspirations of countries in the region to join the European Union. It was clear that the European Union could not afford to open its door to countries that were unprepared or unable to prove the efficiency of their democratic systems. The answer was the Copenhagen criteria, defined at the meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993. These rules set general requirements for establishing effective democratic institutions, respect for human and minority rights, and appropriate mechanisms for guaranteeing a market economy.[1] Upon meeting the criteria, the first group of candidates was able to open the accession negotiations in 1998. Ten new members that joined the European Union on 1 May 2004 completed these negotiations in 2002. (Wicawski, 2010, p.3).
It also imposes a double standard in a handful of areas, chiefly the protection of ethnic minority rights, where candidates are asked to meet standards that the EU-15 have never set for themselves. (Moravcsik, 2003, p.8). Not only have the applicants been compelled to accept EU standards, but they are also now being forced to accept unfavorable terms for their accession to sacrifice some portion of the benefits of membership over the short and medium term. They will receive lower (albeit still substantial) subsidies from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and from the Structural and Cohesion Funds than did the previous poorer applicants. (Moravcsik, 2003, p.10).

The recent enlargement crisis should not cause the EU to close its institutions to countries willing to join it. The European Union must fulfil its commitments of including the states with which the accession negotiations have been started, and those that were granted future prospects of membership. Likewise, the Union has to remain open to other countries willing to join it, and that satisfy the Copenhagen criteria. (p.346,347, Timu, 2006).

Specific implications of EU conditionality for Turkeys application

References Timu, N. (2006). The role of public opinion in European Union policy making: The case of European Union enlargement, in Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 7:3, pp. 336-347. Schimmelfennig, Frank, Engert, Stephan and Knobbel, Heiko (2003) Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(3):495. Westering, Jolanda van (2000) Conditionailty and EU Membership: The Cases of Turkey and Cyprus, European Foreign Affairs Review, 5(1): 95. Arvanitopoulos, Constantine (ed.) (2009) Turkeys Accession to the European Union: An Unusual candidacy, New York: Springer. Brca, Grinne de (2004) Beyond the Charter: how Enlargement has Enlarged the Human rights policy of the European Union, Fordham International Law Journal, 27:679. Dogan, Nejat (2006) Human rights and Turkeys bid for EU membership: Will fundamental rights of the union, bring fundamental changes to the Turkish Consitution and Turkish Politics? Turkisch Studies, 7(2): 243. Ekeus, Rolf (2003) From the Copenhagen Criteria to the Copenhagen Summit: Minority Issues in an Enlarging Europe, Helsinki Monitor, 14:38. Hardy, Liam (2008) Turkey and the EU: Slowly but SurelyMiddle East Times. Lake, Michael (ed.) (2005) The EU and Turkey: A Glittering Prize or a Millstone?, London: Federal Trust. Moravcsik, A. and Vachudova, M. (2003). National interests, state power and EU enlargement. In, East European Politics and Societies, 17(1). Pelmans, Jacques (2001) The crucial terms of EU enlargement distinguishing the Core Acquis from less urgent requirement, European Journal of Law Reform, 3:411. Schimmelfennig, Frank (2008) Entrapped Again: The way to EU membership negotiations with Turkey, UCD Dublin European Institute Working Paper. Wicawski, J. (2010). The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: Fears, Challenges, and Reality. In, Globality Studies Journal: Global History, Society, Civilization, volume 15, pp.1-

18.