OTC 17700

API RP2FB, 1st Edition - Design of Offshore Facilities against Fire & Blast Loading
P.E. OConnor, BP; P.E. Versowsky, ChevronTexaco; and J .R. Bucknell and M. Chakravorty, MSL
Copyright 2005, Offshore Technology Conference

This paper was prepared for presentation at the 2005 Offshore Technology Conference held in
Houston, TX, U.S.A., 25 May 2005.

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Abstract
As the oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico began to
extend into deeper water and larger and more congested
topsides facilities became necessary, the US offshore Industry
recognized the need for a Recommended Practice (RP) for
design of these new facilities against fire and blast loading.
This paper describes the background to the development of the
RP, which has been put together with extensive contributions
from industry experts with different areas of specialist
knowledge. The paper discusses the consistency of the RP
with recent work to update related standards, in particular the
UKOOA/HSE initiatives in the UK.
The paper addresses the issue of blast load determination
and discusses the nominal loads provided in the new RP and
their application to design. It also considers alternative
methods for the calculation of blast loads, in lieu of applicable
nominal load cases, including a promising new methodology
analogous to the derivation of earthquake loading. The paper
stresses the importance of good practice for fire and blast
design and discuss the guidelines for facilities layout and
structural connection detailing.
The paper highlights the interface to other API documents
that provide guidance on the implementation of safety and
environmental management practices and hazard
identification, event definition and risk assessment e.g. API
RP 75 (1) and the API RP14 (2,3) series. It briefly outlines
how the new RP incorporates hazard analysis output into the
structural response assessment to determine whether the
structure or its components meet the specified performance
criteria.

Background
Deepwater developments to harness larger and deeper
hydrocarbon deposits bring with them the need for larger and
more complex topsides facilities. A key learning from
explosion research over the past 10 years is that congestion as
well as confinement can lead to high overpressures in an
explosion. The increased size of facilities increases the
porabaility of releases and the increased congestion of
facilities increase the consequences in the event that the
release ignites, particularly if the ignition is delayed and an
explosion occurs. Much can be done to manage this risk.
Prevent the releases occurring is clearly preferable but the
cosnsequences in terms of possible life-safety, environmental
and economic consequences can be reduced by establishing
performance objectives and incorporating good practices.
Good practices have been developed in the industry and
incorporation of thiose practices early in the design can
significantly reduce the risks associated with fire and
explosions. Hence one on the key objectives of this proposed
RP was to capture those practices and share them with the rst
of industry.
In December 2000, API issued the 21
st
Edition of RP2A
(4). The document includes as Section 18, Fire, Blast and
Accidental Loading that provides, for the first time in API, a
recommended practice for design of fixed steel offshore
structures against fire and blast events.
In October 2001, API SC2 formed a Fire and Blast Task
Group under the Chairmanship of BPs Patrick OConnor. The
objective of the Task Group was to create an RP for the
Design of Offshore Structures for Fire and Blast. The focus of
the document was to be structural loading and response to fire
and blast events with RP2A Section 18 as the primary source
document.
API provided funding for a Consultant to draft the RP
under the direction of the Task Group. MSL Services
Corporation (MSL) was the selected Consultant. MSL was
also coordinating a parallel MMS initiative to host an
International Workshop on the subject of fire and blast of
offshore facilities. The Task Group planned to use the
Workshop as a forum for review of the draft RP and receive
industry feedback.
At the same time in the UK a joint operator (UKOOA)
and regulator (HSE) team had begun a parallel initiative to
update the UK Interim Guidance Notes for Fire and Blast.
This work was also coordinated by MSL through their UK
office thus ensuring effective communication with the API
initiative.
The scope of the RP encompassed the design of all new
offshore platforms. In recognition of the specific issues
associated with floating facilities a sub-Task Group was
established to address fire and blast issues specific to floating
structures.
The MMS International Workshop on Fire and Blast was
held in Houston in June 2002 (5). Over 150 delegates from
2 OTC 17700
around the world attended the three-day event. Deliberations
and output from the seven working group was compiled into a
Proceedings (5) that was used by the Task Group as input to
the API RP.
The proposals contained in this paper are still being
developed and have not yet been approved within API. As
such this should be viewed as work in progress
Alternative Codes and Standards
The UKOOA/HSE study (6) has concluded the first phase
of their initiative, which provides updated explosion design
guidance. The methodology and general guidance is largely
consistent with the API RP. One major difference is that
nominal blast loads are not provided in the UKOOA/HSE
code. The second phase, for fire loading and response is
presently underway.
The relevant ISO Standards, ISO 13702: Control and
mitigation of fires and explosions and ISO: 19901-3 Topside
structures, are currently on hold pending completion of the
UKOOA/HSE and API work.
Norwegian, Norsok Standards (Z-013 Risk and
preparedness analysis and N-003 actions and action effects)
adopts a more rigorous and probabilistic approach including
establishing leak scenarios, cloud size distribution, explosion
loads, from Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) simulations
and detailed risk assessment. The procedure requires a large
number of complex CFD and QRA analyses.
Canadian Petroleum Board Regulations, in particular CSA
standard S471 has a section dealing with accidental loads and
refers to the Norsok N-003 and Z-013 / ISO for loadings and
other NORSOK documents. This is currently being updated in
reference to the UKOOA/HSE proposed methodology.
Hence the proposed API approach whilst capturing a lot of
the knowledge gained in Europe attempts to simplify its
application within the API code.

Introduction
The Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore
Facilities against Fire and Blast Loading is based on sound
engineering principles and was developed with the help and
extensive contributions of the owners, operators, designers,
fabricators, suppliers, and certifiers of offshore facilities, with
many years of experience. In no case is any specific
recommendation included that could not be accomplished by
presently available techniques and equipment. Foremost
consideration is given to the safety of personnel, compliance
with existing regulations, and prevention of pollution.
The RP includes a simple qualitative risk assessment
process to assist in the determination of the need for
consideration of fire and blast in the design of the facility.
Guidance is also provided for establishing performance
criteria. The user is referred to alternative sources for more
rigorous risk assessment outside the scope of the RP.
The recommended practice includes detailed Commentary.
The commentary provides design guidelines for the evaluation
of structural response to fire and blast loads. Nominal blast
load cases are provided for certain classes of facilities.
Guidance is also provided for the calculation of fire loads.
Discussion of alternative methods for the calculation of blast
loads, in lieu of applicable nominal load cases, is included
with reference to sources of detailed guidance. The
commentary also includes examples of good practice for fire
and blast design including guidelines for facilities layout and
structural connection detailing.

Screening
The proposed RP recognizes the excellent industry safety
record for fire and especially blast events in the Gulf of
Mexico. The platforms are typically open design with low
complexity and low congestion of facilities. The proposed RP
establishes a class of un-manned fixed structures; typical of
many Gulf of Mexico fixed steel structures, as low risk
facilities for which explicit modeling of fire and blast loading
is not required beyond the adoption of good practice.
Guidelines are provided in the proposed RP Commentary for
good practice in layout of facilities and equipment to minimize
likelihood and consequences of fire and/or blast events.

Performance Criteria
The operator is responsible for the overall safety of the
platform and performance criteria should be established
consistent with the operators overall safety management
philosophy. In the structural evaluation of a defined fire and/or
blast event, the structure should be designed to the adopted
performance criteria.
The propsed RP provides guidance to assist the user in
selection of performance criteria, as follows:
1. For structural evaluation of loads associated with low
probability, fire and/or blast events (infrequent
occurrences) performance criteria should ensure
defined survival of the platform.
2. Any blast wall and/or firewall should remain in-place
without rupture or disconnection from their supports.
Deformations of the wall should be limited to avoid
escalation.
3. Safety critical elements (SCEs) that are designed to
mitigate the effects of a major accident, such as, those
necessary for (a) the safe shut down of the installation,
(b) personnel protection and escape, (c) fire protection,
suppression and control, (d) communications, and for
(e) hydrocarbon containment including transport and
storage; should remain intact.
4. For platforms with the potential to be manned during
the defined event, performance criteria should ensure
defined survival of the platform.
For structural evaluation of loads associated with medium
or especially high probability fire and/or blast events (more
frequently occurring but smaller in magnitude) the RP
recommends that performance criteria be modified to limit the
extent of damage to the facility. For example, the platform
may be designed to permit restarting of operations in a
reasonable timeframe and following appropriate integrity
checks.

Risk Assessment
The new RP includes guidance for the assessment of the
risk level associated with a fire or blast event. The
recommended approach is a simple qualitative assessment and
the user is referred to alternative API documents (6) for more
rigorous risk assessment methodologies outside the scope of
the RP.
OTC 17700 3
The three-by-three risk matrix provided in the RP is shown
in Figure 1. The matrix defines low, medium and higher risk
categories for fire or blast events. The risk is defined by
consideration of the probability of the event occurring and the
consequences of the event if it were to occur.

H
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Medium Risk Higher Risk Higher Risk
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Low Risk Medium Risk Higher Risk
L
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Low Risk Low Risk Medium Risk
Low Medium High
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Consequence of Occurrence
Figure 1: Risk Matrix
Low risk events do not require specific consideration of
the event in the structural design of the facility. However, the
design of all offshore structures should adopt good practice in
layout of facilities and equipment to minimize likelihood and
consequence of possible events.
Higher risk events shall be evaluated in the structural
design or reduced by implementation of prevention and/or
mitigation measures or through change(s) in layout etc.
Alternatively, more rigorous assessment of probability and/or
consequence of the event may be undertaken.
Medium risk events should be evaluated in the structural
design unless they are determined to be as low as reasonably
practicable i.e. the effort and/or expenses of mitigation
become disproportionate to the benefit. If this is determined to
be the case it should be suitably documented as such.
The significant events requiring consideration and their
probability of occurrence levels (that is low, medium or high)
are normally defined from a fire or blast process hazard
analysis. Such analyses are outside the scope of the RP.
General guidance is provided to assist the user in assigning
the probability and consequence of the event, as follows:
Higher Probability: The event is likely to occur during the
life of the platform OR has occurred more than once on a
similar platform in the past.
Medium Probability: The event is not expected to occur
during the life of the platform, and the event does not meet the
criteria for Higher Probability or Low Probability.
Low Probability: The event is extremely unlikely to occur
during the life of the platform OR no such occurrence of the
event is reported on similar platforms. (Note for novel
concepts the lack of historical evidence needs to recognized)
The consequence level for a defined fire or blast event
should be assigned as low, medium or high as applicable for
either life-safety, environmental, or other consequences. The
life safety of personnel in the direct vicinity of the event is an
issue for operational safety procedures and management and
not of structural design and is outside the scope of the RP. In
the selection of life safety consequence for structural design,
therefore, the designer should be considering life safety
consequence of personnel away from the immediate vicinity
of the event.

Risk Assessment Process
The risk assessment process provided in the RP comprises a
series of tasks to be performed to identify facilities at
significant risk from specific fire and/or blast events. The
process is illustrated in Figure 2. The steps in the process are
defined as, follows:
Task A1: If facility meets the definition of a low-risk
facility as defined by the screening process describes above
and characterized by low equipment counts, limited to
wellheads and manifold with few vessels and little associated
pipe work, which would lead to low congestion and inventory,
consideration of specific fire and blast loading in the design of
the structure is not required.
Task A2: Establish the performance criteria for the facility
to comply with the overall safety and environmental
management philosophy, as well as relevant regulations and
company standards.
Task A3: Implement measures to reduce fire and blast risk
in accordance with good design practice.
Task A4: Establish whether nominal load cases for blast
loading are available for the facility. If nominal load cases are
not available for the facility, proceed to Task B1.
Task A5: Evaluate the response of the critical structure and
other key components to the nominal load cases. Critical
structure and key components refer to elements of the facility
that must survive for a specified duration of time following the
occurrence of the event in order that the performance criteria
for that event are met.
Task A6: If the performance criteria set in Task A2 can be
met for the nominal load cases the structural design for the
event is complete for the facility.
If it has been established from Tasks A1 to A5 that the
facility does not meet the low-risk platform definition and that
either nominal load cases are not available or structural
evaluation indicates that the facility does not meet the
performance criteria for the nominal load cases applied, it is
necessary to consider fire and blast risk on an event-by-event
basis.
Task B1: Consideration of event-by-event fire and blast
risk requires a formal hazard identification study for the
definition of credible events (scenarios) and determination of
their associated risk. Some guidance for the determination of
the probability of events and their consequences is provided in
the RP. More detailed Guidance is available within the API
RP 14 series (2,3) and other sources (7,8).
Task B2: Determine whether the level of risk associated
with the event is low-risk, medium risk or higher-risk. If the
risk is low, the assessment is complete for the defined event.
Task B3: For events, where a higher-risk is identified,
consideration may be given to modifying the design concept
or adopting an alternative concept. This may be especially
applicable during the early stages of a project. In this case, the
assessment process is repeated from Task B1 for the modified
or alternative concept.
Task B4: This task provides the choice for the engineering
team to explore prevention and mitigation options to reduce
the risk associated with the event.
4 OTC 17700
Task B5: If the probability of the event or its consequence
or both were reduced such that the risk becomes low-risk, the
assessment is complete for that event.
Task B6: This task involves the calculation of the fire or
blast loads associated with the event and the evaluation of the
survival of the critical structure and other key components
required to meet the performance criteria set in Task A2.
Task B7: If the performance criteria set in Task A2 can be
met for the load cases for the specific event, the assessment is
complete for the event.
Task B8: In the case that the structural evaluation indicates
that the performance criteria cannot be met, the engineering
team must consider whether further risk reduction/mitigation
options exist. If so, these should be implemented and the
process reverts to Task B4. If no further risk reduction options
are available, the RP stresses the need to modify the design
concept or, adopt an alternative concept. In this case, the
assessment process is repeated from Task A1 for the modified
or alternative concept.

Blast as a Load Condition
The loading generated by a blast depends on many factors,
such as the type and volume of hydrocarbon released; ignition
source, type and location; the degree of congestion in a
module; the amount of confinement; and the ventilation
conditions. The RP discusses alternative means for developing
the design blast event(s).
Blast Simulation Modeling
A blast scenario developed from a process hazard analysis
establishes the make up and size of the vapor cloud, and the
ignition source for the area being investigated. The blast
overpressure from explosions in congested volumes can be
predicted using various models, as follows:
Empirical models based on the correlation of
experimental data and their accuracy and applicability
relating to the experimental database.
Phenomenological models based on modeling the
underlying physical processes interpolating more
accurately between data and extrapolating with more
certainty to situations not addressed by experimental
work.
Numerical models that solve the underlying equations
describing gas flow, turbulence and combustion
processes.
Numerical models following the principles of
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) have the potential for
providing a higher accuracy and of addressing any blast
scenario (11). Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of blast
overpressures in a closed compartment.
Nominal Blast Loads
There is a reasonable experience base across industry from
which nominal loads have been established for certain
classes of structures. The Commentary section of the RP
provides available data sets for nominal loads. In lieu of the
availability of applicable nominal overpressures, some level of
blast simulation modeling is recommended for computation of
blast loading on offshore structures
The RP introduces the nominal load concept for blast
events on selected known facility types. Nominal loads for
fires have been in use since the publication of the Interim
Guidance Notes (8) in 1993, and have been updated and
extended in more recent references (6). For fires, these take
the form of recommended radiation levels and flame
temperatures for pool and jet fires in confined and open
conditions.
For blast, the nominal loads provided in the RP are peak
spatially averaged blast overpressures determined for specific
platform types from a set of data. The methodology for the
derivation of nominal overpressures was first developed
based on limited data extracted from a review of about 30
recent safety cases (about 50% post 1997) prepared in the UK
and carried out in April 2002 (12). These were extended with
additional data sets provided by Task Group members. If
available and considered suitable for use for the particular
facility, these nominal loads may be used for the structural
design of the facility.
Nominal loads may be particularly useful at an early
project phase where detailed geometry of the layout, and
congestion is not known.
Response Spectrum Method
A further attempt to simplify the assessment method is
presently under development (10) and is discussed briefly in
the proposed RP. The response spectrum approach takes into
account the variations in response of structural elements
resulting from their natural periods and differing dynamic
properties for a given pressure-time history. The proposed
method also enables the reserves of strength released when
elements are allowed to deform plastically to be taken into
account.
The purpose of the method is to enable equivalent static
blanket loads to be derived for use in a conventional design
check for blast loads of a given severity and duration. The
method has been in use for decades in the earthquake response
context.
Figure 3 shows the application of blast response spectra in
determining a static design pressure. The severity of the blast
loading is determined from local conditions by the use of
nominal overpressures, previous experience, risk
classification, simulations or experiment. The structural
element is represented by its natural period and resistance at
effective yield. A further important parameter is the allowable
ductility of the element, which is a measure of the amount of
plasticity that the element can sustain before rupture and is
related to the peak displacement. Allowance for local plastic
deformation is an essential part of efficient blast resistant
design.
The element natural period determines the position on the
horizontal axis in Figure 3 and the design pressure or required
static resistance may be read off the relevant curve
representing the allowable ductility. Continuing research work
in this area may lead to better data sets and simpler analytical
procedures in the near future.

Fire As Load Condition
The treatment of fire as a load condition as provided in the RP
requires the definition of the following:
The fire event or scenario.
Heat flow characteristics from the fire to the unprotected
and protected steel members.
OTC 17700 5
Properties of steel at elevated temperatures where
applicable.
Where applicable, properties of fire protection systems
(active and passive).
The fire scenario may be identified from a process hazard
analysis. The fire scenario establishes the fire type, location,
geometry, and intensity. The fire type will distinguish between
a hydrocarbon pool fire and a hydrocarbon jet fire. The fires
location and geometry defines the relative position of the heat
source to the structural steel work, while the intensity (heat
flux) defines the amount of heat emanating from the heat
source.
The Commentary in the RP provides guidance on the
calculation of temperature/time histories of the member and/or
the steady state temperature. For load bearing members, the
temperature determines the appropriate values for the material
properties to be used in the structural analysis.
For panels and firewalls, which are usually, not load
bearing; the important parameters are the temperature of the
cold face and the time to reach certain limiting temperatures,
which determine the walls rating.

Structural Assessment Against Blast
For higher consequence facilities, the RP recommends that the
operators may consider two levels of explosion loading by
analogy with earthquake assessment, i.e., the ductility level
blast and the strength level blast.
The design level blast load (derived for the blast event
using one of the options described above) is referred to as the
Ductility Level Blast (DLB); defined as a low-probability
high-consequence event, which is to be evaluated to confirm
whether performance criteria are met. The ductility level blast
is the design level overpressure used to represent the extreme
design event.
A reduced blast load, sometimes referred to as a Strength
Level Blast (SLB) by analogy with earthquake design, is
defined as a higher probability, lower consequence event.
Performance criteria associated with the SLB may include
elastic response of the primary structure, with the safety
critical elements remaining functional, and with an expected
platform restart within a reasonable period.
In lieu of a more detailed hazard process study or other
means to define the magnitude of the SLB, the RP
recommends the load may be taken as 1/3 the DLB
overpressure. The SLB load case may be desirable for the
following reasons:
The SLB may detect weaknesses in the structure at an
early stage of the design improving the likelihood of
meeting performance criteria for the DLB.
The prediction of equipment and piping response in the
elastic regime is better understood than the conditions that
give rise to rupture. The SLB enables these checks to be
made at a lower load level often resulting in good
performance at the higher load level.
It is quicker to perform SLB load case. If performed
correctly, the assessment will provide good assurance of
adequacy of structure under DLB loads.
The SLB load case provides a degree of additional asset
protection.
Ductility Level Assessment
The performance of the primary framing of an installation
during the ductility level load can be assessed with either
linear elastic structural response analysis or a more accurate
non-linear assessment.
In the case of the linear elastic analysis, code checks may
be accepted with higher than normal utilization factors to
allow for member plasticity, strain rate and strain hardening
effects. The RP provides guidance on acceptable code check
utilization ratios e.g. 2.5 for a tension member and 2.0 for
members under bending and/or compression so long as the
member does not buckle, under the blast loading.
The preferred assessment is to use a non-linear ductility
level analysis that will account for large displacements, load
re-distribution, material property changes, non-linear effects
and the dynamics of the structure. This method of analysis is
recommended in the RP where it is required to account for the
reserve strengths of the structure. The Commentary in the RP
provides guidance on deformation checks, buckling checks,
and rupture checks.
The Commentary in the RP describes details of the
analysis procedures and provides guidance on properties of
material behavior under blast loads including strain rate
effects, strain hardening and ductility. Figure 10 illustrates the
progressive collapse of a deck structure in a blast scenario.

Structural Assessment Against Fire
Three successively more complex methods of analysis
requiring different analysis tools with increasing complexity
are recommended in the RP for structural response assessment
against fire by using one, or a combination of, the following
methods.
Zone (or screening) method
Strength level method
Ductility level method
For the zone method, the temperature of the structural steel
member due to a fire scenario is checked against the
maximum allowable temperature that a steel member can
sustain without reducing its yield strength below 60% of the
yield strength (F
y
) at ambient temperature. If this is confirmed
for the design event then further checks are not required.
A strength level analysis consists of a conventional linear
elastic structural analysis. Depending on the maximum
temperature attained by individual structural members for the
duration of the fire, the reduced stiffness and yield stress of
the member are used in the structural analysis.
A ductility level analysis, which is a progressive collapse
analysis, allows redistribution of structural load from failed
members and can indicate collapse of the structure after no
further load distribution is possible. Facilities, which do not
pass the strength level analysis, may be evaluated using
ductility level analysis if prevention and mitigation measures
are not available or desirable. This level of analysis will also
allow sequences of failure and time histories of events to be
established. This may be important for emergency evacuation
and escape assessments. Figure 9 illustrates progressive
collapse of a support structure in a fire scenario.
6 OTC 17700
The Commentary in the RP describes details of the
analysis methodologies and guidance on thermal properties of
steel subject to fire loads.

Mitigation
Implementing preventative measures has historically been, and
will continue to be, the most effective approach in minimizing
the possibility of occurrence of a fire or blast event and the
resulting consequences of the event.
The RP draws attention to the design of the structure and
in the layout and arrangement of the facilities and equipment
to minimize the effects of these events. The commentary in the
RP details the various mitigation measures including the use
of passive fire protection systems, and use of properly
designed blast walls. Figures 5, 6 and 7 illustrate details of
commonly used blast wall profiles, penetrations and
connections. The RP stresses the need for using good
engineering practice particularly in detailing connections to
ensure adequate design ductility. These are shown in Figure 8.

Floating Structures, Storage and Offloading Systems
An increasing number of large floating installations with high
inventories, storage and/or throughput are operated and being
planned around the world including the Gulf of Mexico.
There are several special features associated with floating
installations, which cannot be dealt with by simple
extrapolation of current practices in use on fixed installations.
These features relate to the differing geometry, methods of
construction, compartmentation, operations, fire and blast
scenarios, response characteristics of marine construction to
fire and blast, and special features associated with the motion,
station keeping and stability of the installation.
The RP emphasizes the need to check on the stability of
the installation due to the effect of any fire or blast event,
which has the potential to bring on the instability of the
floating system. Other considerations include structural
integrity of the hull, maintenance of evacuation capabilities,
and prevention of secondary events and escalation.
Floating Offshore Installation require the use of Marine
Systems and a Marine Operations Manual as well as personnel
for safe operation. The marine operations depend on a number
of sub-systems that are important in evaluation of safety
against fire and explosion events. The RP provides details of
all such sub-systems.
The specific issues that should be addressed during risk
analysis of a floating offshore installation including FPSOs
have also been categorized in the RP. The features of a
floating offshore installation that may contribute to the change
of risk associated with fire and blast events have been
identified in the RP.
The specific design issues for a floating offshore
installation against fire and blast loading including hull design,
hull compartmentation, etc., are highlighted in the RP.

Conclusion
In response to the needs of US industry API established a Task
Group, and funded a specialist consultant, to develop a
Recommended Practice for the Design of New Offshore
Structures for Fire and Blast Loading. The RP provides a
consistent approach for the design of future offshore
structures. The document has been balloted and approved by
API Subcommittee 2: Offshore Structures. It will be re-
balloted with updates to address comments received during the
first ballot in the second quarter of 2005. Some of the
noteworthy features of the new RP may be summarized, as
follows:
Screening: The RP establishes a class of un-manned fixed
structures as low risk facilities for which specific
consideration of fire and blast loading is not required beyond
the adoption of good practice.
Risk Assessment: The RP provides a simplified qualitative
risk assessment process for determining risk of fire and blast
events. The RP also suggests alternative API and other
documents for hazard studies and more detailed risk
assessment outside the scope of the document.
Applicability: The RP is applicable to the new design of
future offshore production systems including fixed and
floating structures. Specific recommendations are provided for
floating systems as appropriate.
Nominal Loads: The RP provides nominal blast loads for
certain known facility types and configurations to reduce the
requirement for complex blast simulation analyses.
The Response Spectrum Approach: The RP introduces a
promising new methodology for blast load derivation.
Strength and Ductility Checks: The RP introduces the
concept, analogous to earthquake engineering, of strength
level and ductility level analyses. Strength level analyses are
linear elastic checks that can be used at the early project stage
and with basic design analysis tools.
Standardization: The RP is consistent with the general
approach to fire and blast design for offshore structures
contained in the parallel UKOOA/HSE study (6) and intended
for the future updates to the ISO Standards.

Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank their respective companies for the
opportunity to publish this paper. Thanks are also extended to
Steve Walker with MSL for his technical input to the drafting
of the RP and to all members of the API Task Group on Fire
and Blast for the contribution of their knowledge and
experience.

References
1. American Petroleum Institute, Recommended Practice for
Development of a Safety and Environmental Management
Program for Outer Continental Shelf Operations and Facilities,
API RP75, 3rd Edition - May 2004.
2. American Petroleum Institute, Recommended Practice for
Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore Production
Facilities, API RP 14J , 2nd Edition - April 2001.
3. American Petroleum Institute, Recommended Practice for Fire
Prevention and Control on Open-type Offshore Production
Platforms, API RP 14G, 3rd Edition - December 1993.
4. American Petroleum Institute, Recommended Practice for
Planning, Designing and Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms
Working Stress Design, API RP 2A, 21
st
. Edition, December
2001.
5. Bucknell J ., Chakravorty M. and Smith C., Editors, Proceedings
of International Workshop on Fire and Blast Considerations in
the Design of Offshore Facilities, J une 12-14, 2002, Houston,
Texas.
OTC 17700 7
6. UKOOA/HSE, Preparation of Updated Guidance for Fire and
Explosion Hazards Part 1 Guidance on Design and
Operational Considerations for the Avoidance and Mitigation of
Explosions, Commentary, December 2002.
7. NORSK Standard, N-004, Design of Steel Structures, Annexure
A Design against Accidental Loads, 2000.
8. Selby C. A. and Burgan B.A., Blast and Fire Engineering for
Topside Structures Phase 2, Final Summary Report, SCI
Publication Number 253, Ascot, UK, 1998.
9. Steel Construction Institute, Interim Guidance Notes for the
Design and Protection of Topside Structures against Explosion
and Fire, SCI-P-112/005, Ascot, UK, 1993.
10. Private Communication from Brian Corr (bp), Vincent Tam (bp)
and Steve Walker (MSL).
11. Steel Construction Institute, Interim Guidance Notes for the
Design and Protection of Topside Structures against Explosion
and Fire, SCI-P-112/005, Ascot, UK, 1993.
12. W.S. Atkins, Inc., Preparation of Updated Guidance for Fire &
Explosion Hazards, 2002.

8 OTC 17700








Assess impact on safety
critical elements
Implement measures to
reduce fire and blast risk
Assessment Complete
for the Event
Assessment Complete
for the Facility
Establish performance
criteria
Modify, or select new,
concept
Assessment complete
Ensure Good Practice
Yes
Does the
facility meet
screening
criteria?
Are
nominal loadcases
applicable?
Are performance
criteria met?
No
Yes
No
Yes
Consider fire and blast risk
Event-by-Event
Risk Matrix
Risk Matrix
Low
Higher
Reconsider or modify
concept or reassess risk
with more rigorous
approach
Yes
Implement measures to
reduce fire and blast risk
No
Low
Assess Load and Response
for the Event
Higher
Are performance
criteria met?
Yes
Are further risk
reduction options
available
No
No
Modify, or select new,
concept or reassess risk
Yes
No
Task A.1
Task A.2
Task A.3
Task A.4
Task A.5
Task A.6
Task B.1
Task B.2
Task B.3
Task B.4
Task B.5
Task B.6
Task B.7
Task B.8
Not e 1 : Interface to API 75 or rel evant regul ati ons or company
standards.
Performance criteria are established in line with the overall safety
philosophy with due consideration of safe design practice and inherent
safety - these can be re-evaluated at any stage provided the
appropriate disciplines are involved in the decision process and the
intent of the original criteria are maintained.
Note 2: Interface to API 14 Seri es or al ternative company practice
Input required from other disciplines for hazard identification and
selection of credible fire and blast events.
Note 1
Note 2
Figure 2: Risk Assessment Process
OTC 17700 9
Local conditions
Risk level
Ignition point
Mass release
Confinement
Congestion
Impulse
Energy
Duration td
Generic response
spectrum
Scale severity
Impulse energy
Local conditions
Required
static resistance
Design pressure
Peak deflection
Dynamic Reactio
Ideali se structure
Mass M
Stiffness Ke
Resistance Rm
Yield deflection Xe
Allowable ductility mu
Natural period
T=2 pi sqrt (M/Ke)
Figure 3: Generic Response Spectra for a Hydrocarbon Blast (10)




Figure 4: Blast Pressure Distribution in a Closed Compartment





10 OTC 17700




Blast Pressure
Blast Pressure Blast Pressure
Unstiffened Stiffened (bent)
Stiffened (welded)

Figure 5: Blast Wall Profiles





Box section Penetration plate
D
o
o
r
Elevation

Figure 6: Blast Wall Penetrations




OTC 17700 11








Blast Wall Top Support Details
Blast Wall Bottom Support Details
Bent plate
welded to bot. of girder
Blast wall cap plate
site welded to bent plate
PFP
if reqd.
Girder
Bent plate
welded to bot. of girder
Blast wall cap plate
site welded to bent plate
(a) (b)
Channel
site welded to deck
plate
Blast wall bot.
plate
welded to channel
Channel
Deck plate
PFP
if reqd.
Blast wall bot. plate
welded to deck
plate
Deck plate
(a)
(b)

Figure 7: Blast Wall Connections

















12 OTC 17700








Not preferred


Preferred



Vent area
restricted
Equipment
Vent area
maximized
B
l
a
s
t

w
a
l
l
Elevation
Equipment
B
l
a
s
t

w
a
l
l
Plan
Venting
through
narrow side is
restricted and
promotes
turbulance
Vessels Vessels
Venting
through wide
side allow
smooth flow
Plan
Vessels
Vessels
alongside
module
improves
venting and
promotes
smooth flow
Vent area
maximized
V
e
s
s
e
l
s
Vessels
across
module
restricts
venting and
promotes
turbulance
V
e
s
s
e
l
s
Plan
Vent area
restricted
by vessels
V
e
s
s
e
l
s


Figure 8: Layout Options







OTC 17700 13




Location of thermally loaded region.

Time =240 sec.

Time =0 sec.

Time =320 sec.

Time =60 sec.

Time =360 sec.

Time =120 sec.

Time =420 sec.
C


Time =180 sec.

Time =480 sec.

Figure 9: Progressi ve Collapse of a Support Structure in a Fire Scenario






14 OTC 17700









T=1.000 ms

T=1.0592 ms

T=1.0382 ms

T=1.0722 ms

T=1.0502 ms

T=1.0812 ms

T=1.0562 ms

T=1.1612 ms


Figure 10: Progressi ve Collapse of a Deck Structure in a Blast Scenario