C H A L C P C LAW: Onejos Aulo Mpong Aylo Havez Ilapil Elles

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW
1 Laurel v. Misa
30 Jan 1947
Facts:
This is a resolution on the Petition for habeas corpus filed by Laurel on the theory that a Filipino Citizen who adhered to the enemy
by giving them aid and comfort during the Japanese Occupation cannot be persecuted for Treason (Art 114, RPC) because:
1. The sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and the Filipinos correlative allegiance was suspended.
2. There was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Phil. Republic.
Issue: Should the SC consider his contentions?
Held: NO
Ruling:
In the Co Kim Chan doctrine: The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their
legitimate government is not severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the de jure is not transferred to the
occupier.
It is true that the military government has all the powers of a de facto govt and may either change existing laws or make ne ones,
except the repeal/suspension of the treason laws operation since this is essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the
inhabitants to the legitimate government.
2 - People v Perez
1949 Tuason, J.:
FACTS
1. accused recruited the woemn for sexual purposes, commandeering them to satisfy lust of Japanese officers
2. lower court convicted accused of treason
3. accused said that deeds committed by him do not constitute treason
ISSUE: Is the accused guilty of treason?
Held: No
RULING:
1. Commandeering of women to satisfy the lust of the Jap officers or men to enlive or entertain them was not reason even though
the women helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit
2. The law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political intercourse between the belligerent occupants of
the invaded country and its inhabitants
3. What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their nature degree and purpose
4. GR: to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies and
not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs
5. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken the
power of the United States
6. The acts here were not calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army.
7. so it should be RAPE not TREASON
8. Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express sanction in section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which
says: "where evidence is not sufficient to support the offense (treason) charged, the Court may, nevertheless, convict and sentence
the accused for any crime included in the acts alleged in the information and established by the evidence."
3 - People vs. Prieto
29 Jan 1948 J. Tuason
Facts:
Appellant was prosecuted for 7 counts of treason but pleaded guilty for the counts of 1, 2 ,3 and 7. The prosecutor claimed that he
could not produce evidence for 5 and 6 but has two witnesses for the fourth count.
Fourth Count:
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single detail.
The first witness testified that in March, 1945, the accused, accompanied by other Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught
an American aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled by carabao.
The second witness testified that he saw the accused follow an American whose hands were tied and that the accused was followed
by his fellow undercover Filipinos and Japanese soldiers.
On counts 1, 2 and 3, it is seen that the accused lead, guided, and accompanied a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino
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undercovers to areas in Cebu for the precise point of helping the enemy know who the guerrillas were. It is also stated that he aided
the Japanese in torturing and beating the accused guerilla soldiers.
On count 7, the accused, along with the enemy, tortured Antonio Soco and killed Gil Soco for guerilla activities.
The lower court believed that the accused is guilty of the crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries with the
aggravating circumstances of the above.
Issue:
Held:
Ruling:
The Two-Witness principle was not satisfied by the evidence produced on the fourth account. Where was the sled spoken of by the
first witness in the second witnesses testimony?
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are not
offenses separate from treason. The deeds mentioned are criminal offenses that become elements of treason.
The use of torture and other atrocities on the victims instead of the usual less painful methods will be considered as aggravating but
the plea of guilty offsets this.
Appellant is guilty of counts 1, 2, 3 , and 7 and not of 4.
4. People vs. Manayao
28 Jul 1947 J. Hilado
Facts:
1. On 27 Jan 1945, Filipino guerrillas raided the Japanes in Sitio Pulong Tindahan, Angat, Bulacan.
2. In reprisal, the Japanese soldiers and a number of Filipinos affiliated with the Makapili, armed with rifles and bayonets, gathered
the residents of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on 29 Jan 1945. Accused Pedro Manayao was part of the group.
3. They first set the houses on fire then proceeded to butcher all the adults assembled. Manayao alone killed six women, two of
whom were Patricia and Dodi who were murdered in front of their daughters, later star witnesses, Maria Paulino and Clarita
Perez. Manayao even tried to kill the children but was prevailed upon by the Japanese to spare them.
4. Manayao was then charged with the high crime of treason with multiple murder in the Peoples Court.
5. After trial, he was sentenced to death with the aggravating circumstances of (1) aid of armed men, and (2) presence of a band.
He was fined 20,000 pesos, and to pay an indemnity of 2,000 pesos each to the heirs of the victims. Manayao appealed.
Issue: Is the ruling of the Peoples Court convicting Manayao of treason with multiple murder correct?
Held: Yes. Penalty reduced to reclusion perpetua due to the dissent of Justice Perfecto to impose death.
Ruling:
1. The testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino is so clear, positive convincing that it would be sufficient for conviction without
any further corroboration.
2. Manayao admitted participation in the massacre in two statements: (1) before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment Commander of the
Angat 23rd MP Command on 28 Aug 1945, and (2) before Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan Feliciano Torres on 5 Sep 1945.
3. Manayaos contention that he was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan cannot be upheld. Makapili was not part of the said
army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors, pure and simple.
4. Manayaos claim that he had lost his Philippine citizenship cannot stand. Loss of citizenship is governed by C.A. No. 63:
Sec. 3: By subscribing an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country
There is no evidence that he has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution of Japan. The oath
before the Makapili is for the aim to help Japan in its fight against the Americans and their allies.
Sec. 4: By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country.
There is no showing of the acceptance of Manayao of a commission in the military, naval, or air service of Japan.
Sec 6: By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps in time of
war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.
Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that Manayao had ever been declared a deserter in the Philippine Army, Navy
or Air Corps nor even that he was a member of said force.
5. Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution (defense of State) covers both time of peace and time of war. During war, the citizen
cannot be considered free to cast off his loyalty and obligations toward the Fatherland.
6. If his claim of lost of citizenship is sustained, his very crime would be the shield that would protect him from punishment.
International law says that no person shall take up arms against his native country and can be held guilty of treason if he does
not observe this duty.
7. The aggravating circumstance of aid or armed men is inherent in a band. Only one aggravating circumstance can be considered.
8.
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His contention that he acted in obedience to a superior order as exemption from criminal liability is unacceptable. He voluntarily
joined the Makapili with the full knowledge of its avowed purpose of rendering military aid to Japan. He was on that occasion
even bent on more cruelty than the very ruthless Japanese themselves as regards the little children.
Dissent of Justice Perfecto in imposing the death penalty:

The statement of Policarpio Tigas, a municipal policeman who has claimed to have seen the crime, is doubtful.
Human fallability is more pronounced in children of tender age. Their age makes them highly susceptible to suggestions.
Concept:
Treason a breach of allegiance to a government, committed by a person who owes allegiance to it.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a Filipino citizen or an alien residing in the Philippines;
2. That there is a war in which the Philippines is involved;
3. That the offender either: (a) levies war against the Government, or (b) adheres to the enemies, giving them aid or comfort.
5 - People vs Adriano
June 30, 1947 J. Tuason
Facts:
1. During the occupation of the Japanese of the Philippines Apolinar Adriano a Filipino citizen joined the Makapili, a military
organization whichl aids the Japanese forces.
2. Apolinar Adriano was put into trial of the charges of treason by the Peoples Court. The prosecution did not present any proof by
a testimony of two witnesses any of his acts as a Makapili. The various testimonies refer to different acts of different dates and
only agreeing that he is a Makapili and was seen in Makapili uniform carrying arms.
3. According to the court being a Makapili is an overt act and does not require oaths of two-witnesses. That he has commited the
crime of treason by placing himself at the enemys call to fight by their side as it gave them aid and comfort.
Issue: Is the two witness requirement a strict rule despite an overt act in the crime of treason.
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
1. Taken from Anglo-American origins guidance is taken from American sources. Whartons Criminal Evidence provides that the
rule requires that two witnesses shall testify to the same overt act. Furthermore, in United States vs Robinson, that is is
necessary to produce two witnesses to the whole overt act, although it may be possible to piece bits of the overt act, each bit
have the support of two oaths.
2. The law to which we took our treason law is severely restrictive as to the evidence required that if there two or more people
who give oath to an overt act and only one is believed by the court the person accused is discharged.
3. Natural inferences however strong even from a trustworthy witness still require the corroboration on another direct testimony
of an eye-witness.
4. That the rule being taken from the American Constitution should operate with the same rigidity and inflexibility as intended by
its framers.
Dissent:
According to the dissent of Justice Hilado being a Makapili constitutes a single, continuous and indivisible overt act by the accused.
That at the different times he was seen as Makapili was one and the same and was no different or independent from his
membership from the other days.
That because of the singleness of the act, and having at least two-witness seeing him although on different days should comply with
the two-witness rule.
6 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- LOL-LO AND SARAW, Defendants-Appellants.
February 27, 1922- Malcolm
Facts:
1. June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession.
2. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise
subjects of Holland. (12 men all in all)
3. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang
and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies.
- There the boat was surrounded by six (6) vintas manned by twenty-four (24) Moros all armed.
- The Moros first asked for food,
- but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and
4.
5.
- brutally violated two (2) of the women by methods too horrible to described.
- All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were
made in it
- After eleven (11) days of hardship and privation, were succored.
- Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession.
- Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw.
- At Maruro, the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.
Defense
- based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any
court of the Philippine Islands, and that the
- facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands
Issue: Can they be charged with the crime of piracy?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
I.
Piracy,
1. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit
and intention of universal hostility.
2. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis (enemies of the human race).
3. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind.
4. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be
carried
5. The jurisdiction of piracy has no territorial limits.
6. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits,
though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."
II.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Municipal Law whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States or the characteristics and
institutions of the government, remains in force.
As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the
community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered
or repealed.
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine
Islands.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the
corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
III.
Penalty
1. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent
means of saving themselves.
2. the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction
3. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by
causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were
employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
7 - People vs. Rodriguez
March 20, 1985 Per Curiam
Facts:
1. August 29, 1981, 7:30 pm M.V Noria 767, owned and registered In the name of Hadji Noria Indasan, left Jolo
2. August 30, 1981, 2 pm Arrived at the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi
3. Evening of August 30 The vessel left for Labuan, on board were several traders and crew members
4. 2-3 hours after departure While sailing about 25 miles from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins:
From 3 testimonies: The 4 were armed with bladed weapons and high caliber firearms, they stole and carried away personal
properties and cash (totaling to P3, 687,300), they killed people (gunshot wounds).
5. August 31, 10am reached an island, the 4 secured pumpboats

6. January 8, 1982 After having been arrested and detained by Malaysian authorities, the NBI fetched and brought them to Manila
where they executed their respective statements:
Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty, death
Dario Raymundo not guilty, but withdrew it and substituted to guilty, death
Peter Ponce waived his right to counsel, pleaded not guilty, found guilty, death
7. They were charged and convicted of Piracy under PD 532 of the Anti-Piracy Law.
Issue: 1) Since this is on automatic review, did the court err in imposing death penalty and in giving weight to alleged sworn
Statements?
2) Did the lower court err in holding that Peter Ponce is guilty of the crime?
3) And is he guilty of bribing Atty. Capulong of the NBI?
Ruling:
1. No. Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the crime of piracy where rape, murder or homicide is committed
is mandatory death penalty. And Art. 63 of the PRC states that, when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Furthermore, the sworn statements established that there was
conspiracy among them.
2. No. Again, the sworn statements established the conspiracy among them. They also said he was armed. He also gave a statement
to the authorities stating his participation.
3. Yes. Lopez and Ponce delivered P3,700 and P1,700 respectively, aside from the P527,595 and 1 rolex watch, which the Malaysian
authorities turned over to the Acting In-Charge of the NBI.
Teehankee (Concurring)
Exception: The monosyllabic answers of Yes and No have been stricken down as unacceptable as a voluntary and intelligent waiver
of the constitutional right to silence and to counsel.
Morales Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with assistance of counsel
in order to assure that it is knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently given.
8 - People v. JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI,
1986 Abad Santos, J.:
FACTS
1. The victims in this case were: Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de Guzman
2. One day, these people went to Pilas Island and stayed there for a few days to sell some goods. They were accompanied by Siyoh
and Kiram. They stayed ay Kirams place.
3. Then one day they went to Baluk Baluk, using a boat, to maybe sell again. It was on their way back to Pilas that the crime
happened another boat was moving towards them. One of the victims regognized the guys from the other boat as the same
people that Kiram was talking to one time;
4. Shots were fired; accused made victims undress; Kiram even got one of the victims pants and wore it; Antonio de Guzman
(victim) jumped into the water in his efforts to escape, he was successful and he didnt die, but his back was shot; the rest of
the victims were killed
5. Later on, Antonio de Guzman, the only one who lived, saw Siyoh and Kiram and pointed out to the officials that they were the
suspects
6. The two were accordingly charged and convicted with qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder
7. Now the 2 suspects questioned the credibility of Antonio and alleged that their guilt wasnt proved beyond reasonable doubt
Issue: Who to believe Antonio de Guzman- the sole victim, or Siyoh and Kiram- the main suspects?
Held: Antonio de Guzman
Ruling:
1. Court isnt convinced by the claims if the suspects/accused
2. Following are the relevant claims of the accused which the Court didnt believe:
a. if they were the culprits, they couldve easily done those acts while the victims while still at Kirams place: Court said that if
they robbed and killed them at his place, it would be too obvious and of course they would want for the victims to sell the
goods first so they have money to get; also doing it in the sea would be safer for the accused
b. The 2 guys from the other boat were the killers not them: Court said this is baseless because theres conspiracy.
c. There is no evidence that one of the victims- Anastacio, was killed: court said that its not material whether or not he was
killed because the crime charged is a special complex crime and a certain law which is PD 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e.
rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by
death regardless of the number of victims.
Concept:
Qualified Piracy special complex crime where rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy
9 - Umil vs. Ramos
9 Jul 1990 Per Curiam
Facts:
These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus claiming that they were arrested without a warrant. The respondents claim that they have
been legally arrested under Section 5, rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The petitioners however believe otherwise.
1. Rolando Dural was arrested under the belief that he is a member of the NPA liquidation squad and was responsible for the killing
of 2 soldiers the day before. He was identified by witnesses as the said gunman and was thus picked up and charged for the crime of
Double Murder with Assault upon Agents of Persons in Authority.
Rolando Dural claims he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 soldiers nor was he arrested after the crime, thus he
claims it to be unwarranted and unjustified.
2. Wilfredo Buenaobra was arrested at a safe house and admitted to being an NPA courier and had letters to a Renato Constantino
and other members of the rebel group.
The police were led to Amelia Roque because of a telephone number found on Wilfredo. When she was arrested she was caught
with the possession of ammunition and grenades without a license.
3. Domingo and Ramon were arrested without warrant and were caught carrying firearms and ammunition for which they had no
license to possess or carry. They however claim that they had a right for a preliminary investigation and that they were denied such
right.
4. Vicky Ocaya was arrested when the police were in the process of searching a safe house, which they had a permit to search for.
They arrested her and added that she was carrying weapons and ammunition without a license.
5. Petitioners claim that the military planted them with firearms and ammunition.
6. Petitioner was asleep in his house when he was awakened by his sister who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his
jeepney. He was immediately arrested after he came out through the door. The police claim that he was being arrested without a
warrant because of the offense he committed for inciting sedition in a press conference earlier that day.
7. Ramil Regala was arrested by the police on December 23, 1988 with the belief that he killed a group of men in Mendiola on
December 14, 1988. When he was arrested he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions in the killing, and without
warrant the police picked him up for questioning.
8. Petitioners now point out that the doctrine of Ilagan vs. Enrile should be abandoned because it allows the possible arrest and
detention of innocent people despite the lack of evidence against them, and a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court
precisely in order to protect them.
Issue:
Held:
Ruling:
1. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy, or proposal to commit such crimes constitute continuing crimes. Thus, it did not
matter that he would have to be arrested immediately after, before, or during the shooting because his crime is ongoing.
2. Same reasons.
3. Sec 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court states that before filing such complaint or information, the person may ask for a preliminary
investigation but must sign a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125. The petitioners did not sign it thus they now cannot say that they
were unjustly denied it.
4. She also waived her right to preliminary investigation when she failed to sign the same waiver spoken previously.
5. There is no evidence to show such a claim. Also, the said arresting officers have no personal interest other than their duty because
no order of reward is on either of them.
6. The arrest of the petitioner is justified under Sec. 5 (b) of Rule 113 of the rules of court.
7. The evidence of petitioners (Nazareno) guilt is strong because an information charging him, Ramil and 2 others for the killing of
Bunye was filed in the RTC. Evidently, the arrest of Nazreno was affected by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b) Rule
113 of Court.
8. SC has no compelling reason to abandon the doctrine. What should be done is that the court, for all petitions for habeas corpus
must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioners detention from the moment he or she was taken into custody and the
moment the court passed upon the merits of the petition.
10. People vs. Burgos

4 Sep 1986 J. Gutierrez
Facts:
1. On 13 May 1982, Pedro Burgos was arrested by the police without a warrant for the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
2. After being charged and tried, the trial court held that the search and arrest without warrant was valid and held him guilty of
the said crime.
Prosecution:
1. On 7 Mar 1972, Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his companions Landrino Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to the
house of Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert, to ask rice and one (1) peso from him, as his contribution to their companions.
2. Ruben and his companions told Masamlok that he has to join their group otherwise he and his family will be killed. He was also
warned not to reveal anything with the government authorities. Because of the threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok
joined the group.
3. During a seminar in 19 Apr 1982 at the house of Ruben where he said that he is an NPA together with his companions. He
encouraged the group to overthrow the government, emphasizing that those who attended the seminar were already members
of the NPA, and if they reveal to the authorities, they will be killed.
4. On 12 May 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to Captain Bargio of the Provincial Headquarters of the Philippine
Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.
5. On 13 May 1982, a team of policemen went to the house of Ruben and recovered a .38 caliber pistol. At first he denied
possession of said firearm but later, upon question profounded by Sgt. Alejandro Buncalan with his wife, the latter pointed to a
place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground.
6. He then readily admitted that the pistol was issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain Alias Pedipol,
allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's Army. Thus, he was arrested.
7. With the aid of Atty. Anyog, Ruben prepared and signed his confession in the presence of Atty. Anyog and Fiscal Lovitos.
8. In order to prove illegal possession, Sgt. Epifanio Comabig in-charge of firearms and explosives of the Philippine Constabulary,
Digos, Davao del Sur, was presented and testified, that among the lists of firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in
the name of Ruben Burgos.
Defense:
1. On 13 May 1982, from his farm, the military personnel brought him to the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur, and arrived there
at about 3:00 o'clock. At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he was investigated by soldiers, whom he cannot identify because
they were wearing civilian attire.
2. The investigator wished him to admit but he denied ownership of the gun. Because of his refusal, he was mauled, hitting him on
the left and right side of his body which rendered him unconscious. Upon regaining consciousness, he was continuously
tortured.
3. On May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal, he was seriously warned that if he will still refuse to
accept ownership of the subject firearm, he will be salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the pain and agony, he
admitted ownership of subject firearm.
Issue: Is the decision of the trial court convicting him of the crime correct?
Held: No. Evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Burgos is acquitted.
Ruling:
1. The arrest was illegal because the police did not have any warrant of arrest or search warrant. Article 4, Sec. 3 of the
Constitution is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person,
papers and effects.
2. The reliance of the trial court in Rule 113, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court in justifying the warrantless arrest was erroneous. The
officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have a personal
knowledge of that fact. There is no such personal knowledge in this case.
3. At the time of his arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document.
4. He was arrested solely on Masamloks verbal report that led the police to suspect him of having committed a crime. Masamloks
testimony was totally uncorroborated. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. There was no
compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest Ruben.
5. Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in violation of the accused's
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows that they are inadmissible as evidence.
6. The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of Ruben as inadmissible in evidence having been done after being
exhaustively subjected to physical terror, violence, and torture.
7. Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude towards constitutional liberties and
protections will only fan the increase of subversive activities instead of containing and suppressing them.
11 - Milo vs Salanga
July 20, 1987 - Gancayco
Facts:
1. Juan Tuvera, barrio captain of Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan with the aid of other people maltreated and thereafter detained
Armando Valdez without legal grounds.
2. They were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge of arbitrary detention and filed a motion to quash on the contention
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because it does not constitute the elements of Arbitratry Detention which
was granted by the Judge as Tuvera could not be considered as a public officer.
3. Also according to the judge Valera had nothing to do with the detention because he was not connected with the police force
which detained Armando Valdez because he did not have the authority to arrest, nor jail him being a mere barrio captain and
that barrio captains are not yet considered public authority until the promulgation of PD.299.
4. Thus an appeal on certiorari by Provincial Fiscal Milo.
Issue: Is the barrio captain a public officer and could be liable for arbitrary detention
Held: Yes. The barrio captain is empowered to look after the general welfare of the barrio.
Ruling:
1. Even before PD 299, barrio lieutenants as they were earlier called, were already recognized as person in authority. In the cases
of US vs Braganza and US vs Gellada it was held that barrio captains can be charged of Arbitrary Detention.
2. The barrio captain is a peace officer in the barrio and considered a person in authority according to the Treatise on Barrio
Government Law and Administration. That it is his utmost duty to maintain public order in the barrio.
3. As barrio captain, he performs powers and actions similar to mayors although is a smaller jurisdiction. He even admitted that he
could have led the arrest of Valdez.
4. On his motion to quash the court reasoned that in resolving motion to quash they cannot consider facts contrary to those in the
information or which is not in it. As to his claims of double jeopardy on his being granted the motion to quash, it could not hold
water, as it is appealable and the case dismissal was secured through his consent and at his instance.
Concept:
Elements of Arbitrary Detention
1. That the offender is a public officer
2. That he detains a person
3. That the detention is without legal grounds
PD 299: That Barrio Captain and Heads of baranggay are person in authority.
RA 3590: The Revised Barrio Chapter, include the power and duties of barrio captain include the ff:
1. Look after the maintenance of peace in barrio and assist mayor and councilor in performance of their duties.
2. Look after general welfare of barrio
3. Enforce all laws and ordinances which are operative w/in the barrio
4. Organize and lead emergency group when necessary
12 - Stonehill v. Diokno
19 Jun 1967 Concepcion, C. J.
Facts:
1. Upon application of the officers of the government, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal Jr.
and Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes; Judge Amado Roan (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Roman Cansino (Municipal Court
of Manila), Judge Hermogenes Caluag (Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and Judge Damian Jimenez
(Municipal Court of Quezon City) issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P.
Brooks, HJohn J. Brooks, and Karl Beck, and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to
search the said persons and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession
of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)
as the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used as
the means of committing the offense, which is described in the applications adverted to above as violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.
2.
Alleging that the search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court, Stonehill, et. al.
filed with the Supreme Court the original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;
the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of
in accordance with law
3.
Defense
a. that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;
b. that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and
c. that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged
illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
4.
On 22 March 1962, the Supreme Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
5.
However, by resolution dated 29 June 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and
things seized from the offices of the corporations are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers,
documents and things found and seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al.
6.
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2)
major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.
Issue: Note: issue is more related to the second group of documents
(1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and
(2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence
against petitioners herein.
I.
Held: Both No
- that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29,
1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal;
- petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in
the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
Ruling:
I. First Group
1. We hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made
2. the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
herein petitioners,
3. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.
4. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission
of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
5. may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
- If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the
rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants
- it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded.
- could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes
had not been disturbed;
II.
Second Group
Issue 1:
1. None of the requirements mandated by the Constitution has been complied with in the contested warrants.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
10
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications.
It was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers.
This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the quoted provision to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
Warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of
our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective:
the elimination of general warrants.
Issue 2:
1. We are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. (Moncado v. People
that illegally seized documents, papers and things are admissible in evidence)
2. the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other
than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained
3. Most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing
that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures
4. Mapp vs. Ohio: All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution, is, by that same
authority, inadmissible.
5. If the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given
crime, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law.
6. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant.
Concept:
I. Constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision;
and
(2) That the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
13 - Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff
December 26, 1984 - Justice Escolin
Facts:
1. Judge Pano, CFI Rizal Exec. Judge issued two search warrants on Dec. 7, 1982
2. The Metropolitan Mail and We forum were searched and articles were seized.
3. Prayer - Writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles
4. Prayer that the Chief Legal Officer, Pres. Security Command, Judge Advocate General, AFP, QC Fiscal, their reps be enjoined
from using the seized as evidence against Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in, People v. Jose Burgos, Jr., et al.
5. Procedural flaw of the Burgos, Jr., et al.according to respondents Before impugning the validity of the warrants before this
Court, should have filed a motion to quash the warrants in the court that issued them.
6. Dismissal on Laches While search warrants were issued, the instant petition impugning the same was filed after a lapse of more
than 6 months according to respondents
7. The reason for the delay of the petition: They tried to exhaust other remedies. Upon a suggestion of persons close to President
Marcos, they sent a letter to the president, through counsel Coronel, asking the return at least of the printing equipment and
vehicles. And through Col. Diego, Presidential Security Command Officer, they were further encouraged to wait.
8. Several reasons of the petitioners to nullify the search warrants:
a. Fault of the judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses
as mandated by Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
b. Search warrant No. 20-82b They object the latter address on the ground that two search warrants pinpointed only one place
where petitioner was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles
11
c. Although the search warrants were directed against Burgos, Jr. alone, articles belonging to his competitioners Jose Burgos, Sr.,
Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
d. Real properties were seized under the disputed warrant.
e. The Joint affidavit of the members of Metrocom regarding the surveillance of the premises before the filing of the application
for search warrants, did not provide sufficient evidence of a probable cause upon which a warrant may be valid (Sec. 3, Art.4 of the
1973 Constitution)
Issue: 1) Are the contentions of the respondents valid?
2) Do the court consider the reasons of the petitioner to nullify the search warrants valid?
*with emphasis on Rule 126, ROC
Held: Declared Null and Void.
Ruling:
Respondents:
1. Procedural Flaw They should have indeed done that, but the Court cannot dismiss on such ground since the Court takes
cognizance of the petition in view of the seriousness of and urgency of the constitutional issue raised, not to mention the public
interest generated (televised, published in newspaper)
2. Dismissal on Laches No ground to punish them for error in judgment. The extrajudicial efforts evidently negate the presumption
that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property.
3. The properties have been sequestered under Sec. 8 of PD 885 It is doubtful if such sequestration could validly be effected in the
absence of any implementing rules and regulations by the Minister of National Defense.
Petitioner:
1. Sec. 4, Rule 126: Examination of the Applicant The municipal or city judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine
an oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their deposition in writing and attach them to
the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to them.
*But this is moot already because they themselves conceded during the hearing.
2. Search Warrant Address This is only a typographical error. It would be illogical for the judge to have issued two warrants
intended for one and the same place.
3. Sec. 2, Rule 126: Personal Property to be seized - A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following
personal property: a) property subject to the offense, b) property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense, c)
property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense
*This rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the warrant is directed.
4. Real properties seized In the case, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. So, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground, remain movable property susceptible
to seizure under a search warrant.
Davao Sawmill Case machinery movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by owner of the tenement, but not when
placed by a tenant
5. Joint affidavit Impressed with merit. When the search applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating in particular the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish.
Also, the oath required, in this case, the affidavit of the respondents, must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or witnesses.
Also, the SC finds that the search warrants are in nature of general warrants. (p. 814-815, be familiar na lang with such facts, he
might ask the color of the vehicles =p)
And that it is no less than Pres. Marcos himself who denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized
from the petitioner (according the the Daily Express, Dec. 10, 1982 issue), and which was confirmed by Foreign Minister Romulo.
Abad Santos Concurring:
1. It would be of legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of violation the decree without reference to any
determinate provision. (On the issue of warrants issued without probable cause)
2. Why were the documents subversive? They are general warrants, obnoxious to the Constitution.
3. Fact: Malaya replaced We Forum, and both did not publish any subversive.
14. People v. Mandoriao

1955 De Leon:
Facts:
1. At 6pm, INC held a religious rally at the City Camp, Baguio. 50 out of approx. 200 people attendees were INC members while the
rest were outsiders and curious listeners.
12
2. Minister Plutarco Salvio expounded on the topic effecting that Jesus Christ is not God but only a man. Thereafter the crowd
became unruly, shouted and made noise.
3. Some people urged Mandoriao Jr. (JR) to go up the stage to have a debate with the minister. Among those shouting was
Mandoriao Sr. (SR) anc co-defendant Rivera. Thus, JR went up the stage and challenged the minister to a debate. He was not
able to speak because the wire connecting the microphone was abruptly disconnected.
4. JR and Rivera were accused of a violation of Art 133 of the RPC. Rivera was acquitted but JR was found guilty.
5. JR insists that the religious rally was not a religious ceremony within the purview of Art 133 and that the acts were not
notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithfuls.
Issue:
1. Was the religious rally a religious ceremony within the purview of Art 133? Held: No.
2. Were JR's acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithfuls? Held: No.
3. Can JR be liable under Art 153 of the RPC? Held: No.
Ruling:
1. The rally was not held in a place devoted to religious services but in a public space. A religious meeting is "an assemblage of
people met for the purpose of performing acts of adoration to the Supreme Being, or to perform religious services in recognition
of God as an object of worship, love and obedience, it amtters not the faith with respect to the Deity entertained by the persons
so assembled."
Salvio Admitted that the event was not limited to INC members, it was open to all per radio announcement. The meeting
was held for the purpose of acquiring new members and the parayers and singing of hymns were merely incidental.
The reading of a Bible in a public schoolhouse does not convert that into a place of worship. The mere saying of prayers and
singing of hymns in an open space don't make such place as one devoted to religious worship and make such an occasion a
religious ceremony within the purview of Art 133.
2.
JR did not state any notoriously offensive words. The information merely stated that he distrubed the meeting by going ip the
stage and grabbing the mic from the minister
In People v. Baes: An act is notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the faithful when a person ridicules or makes
light of anything constituting a religious dogma; mocks or scoffs at anything devoted to religious ceremonies; plays with or
damages or destroys any object of veneration by the faithful.
There was no object of veneration in this meeting. The mere fact that JR ascended the stage, challenged the minister to a
debate, and grabbed the mic do not constitute acts calculated to ridicule or make light of a religious ritual. They might fall
under public disturbance (Art 153, RPC) but not offending religious feelings under Art 133.
3.
While the informaiton may point to a violation of Art 153, the facts do not prove guilt beyong reasonable doubt.
There was already a commotion before he went up the stage
Some peopel urged JR to debate with Salvio
It was Salvio who is to blame because his remarks sparked the violent reactions from the crowd
JR's voice was loud and he did not need a mic
He wasn't even able to speak on the mic as it was disconnected
15. People vs. Baes

May 25, 1939 J. Concepcion
Facts:
The Parish Priest of the Catholic Church in Laguna charged Enrique Villaroca, Alejandro Lacbay and Bernardo del Rosario with an
offense against religion. While holding the funeral of Antonio Macabigtas, in accordance with the rites of the "Church of Christ",
caused the funeral to pass through the chruchyard fronting the Catholic Church, which churchyard belongs to the said Church.
Through force and threats of physical violence by the accused, the priest was compelled to allow the funeral to pass through.
The case was dismissed, and the appealed order is based on the fiscals motion.
Issue: Are they guilty under Article 133, offending religious feelings?
Held: YES
Ruling:
This fiscal questioned the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, but omits an essential part: that the churchyard belongs to
the church, and is devoted to the religious services of said church, and it is through this churchyard that the accused, over the
objection of the parish priest and through force and intimidation, caused to pass the funeral under the rites of the Church of
Christ. If he did not omit this essential part, he would not have come to the conclusion that the acts complained of do not
constitute the crime defined and penalized by article 133.
13
The motion raises a question of law, not one of fact. Whether or of the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful
ones, for it is possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive
to the feelings of those professing another faith.
The facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in article 133, and should the fiscal file an
information alleging the said facts, the court may find the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of
trespass under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code, as may be proper.
Concurring:
If the churchyard of the Catholic Church is like some of those seen in Manila churches where anyone can pass and where goods are
even sold to the public, then it is not a place devoted to religious worship, and the fact that a funeral to pass through it, does not
constitute a violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, but, at most, the offense of threats if it is true that the parish priest
was threatened when he prohibited the passage of the funeral.
Dissenting:
Based on Art. 133, two essential elements must be present: (1) That the facts complained of were performed in a place devoted to
religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony; and (2) that the said act or acts must be notoriously offensive
to the feelings of the faithful.
The whole incident happened in the "atrio" or "patio" (open space) of the Catholic Church. There was no celebration of any religious
ceremony then. While occasional religious ceremonies may be performed in the "atrio", nevertheless this does not make it a place
devoted to religious worship under article 133 , any more than a public plaza, a street or any other place occasionally used for
religious purposes. But assuming that the churchyard in this case is "a place devoted to religious worship," is the act complained of
"notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful?"
16. People vs. Tengson
30 Aug 1969 J. Esguerra (CA)
Facts:
On the morning of 10 Apr 1962, Alfonso Tengson, a minister of a Christian sect called Christ is the Answer received a telegram
from Leopoldo Cepillo that Ines Cepillo has died and her interment would be held the following day. Thereafter, he and his assistant
Eduardo Olegario, proceeded to the deceaseds residence at Bauan, Batangas. Upon the request of the widower, Tengson performed
a religious service for the dead at the residence, the barrio chapel, and in front of the chapel of the Roman Catholic cemetery. Such
religious service includes the singing of hymns, the reading of passages from the Bible and an explanation of such, and a prayer for
the repose of the soul. After the interment, Tengson and Olegario then returned to Lucban, Quezon.
Upon the facts narrated, Tengson was found guilty of violation of Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code and was sentenced to serve
six months and one day of prision correctional. It was found that he performed acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the
faithful when he performed the religious service for the dead in the Roman Catholic chapel in Bauan.
Issue: Did Tengson and Olegario perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of a Roman Catholic faithful?
Held:
There are two essential elements to the offense penalized under Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1) that the acts
complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony; and (2)
that the act or acts must be notoriously offensive to those who are faithful in their religion. A religious ceremony is defined as
religious acts performed outside of a church, such as processions and special prayers for burying dead persons. The first element is
present in this case as the acts complained of happened inside the Roman Catholic cemetery where there is a chapel. As to the
second element, the Court does not believe that the acts come within the purview of the law.
For an act to be notoriously offensive to religious feelings, it must be directed against a religious practice, dogma, or ritual for the
purpose of ridicule. The acts of performing burial rites in accordance with the rules of practices of Christ is the Answer, a Christian
sect, is not notoriously offensive provided there was no intent to mock, scoff at or to desecrate any religious act or object venerated
by the Roman Catholic faithful. Since there was a permit to use the said Catholic cemetery, he had not incurred criminal liability
because he was requested to perform such acts by the members of the family of the deceased who belong to his sect. Hence, the
Court acquitted Tengson of the charges.
14
17. People v. Nanoy

September 3, 1973 Fernandez
Facts:
Epifanio Nanoy alias Nanie was charged with the crime offending religious feeling under Article 133 of RPC. While the congregation
of Assembly of God having its afternoon services on April 27 1969, the accused being drunk intended to stop the rite in unholy
manner which caused the members to run outside and church and stopped the worship.
He entered the church with uplifted hands; and approached Levita Lapura, the song leader, and attempted to grab her. She ran away
and the accused was held by Romeo Zafra, a member, and led him outside the church.
Issue: Is it correct to charge him of crime offending religious feeling under Article 133 of RPC?
Held: No.
Ruling:
The accused is only guilty of unjust vexation under Article 287 of RPC. He did not perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of
the faithful. Neither did he cause such serious disturbance as to interrupt or disturb the services of the congregation of the Assembly
of God.
All the appellant did was to enter the chapel with upheld hands and attempted to grab the song leader. He had no intention of
interrupting the services was shown by the fact that appellant allowed himself to be led outside by Romeo Zafra.
18. Enrile vs. Salazar
July 5, 1990 J. Narvasa
Facts:
1. February 27, 1990 Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested, led by NBI Dir. Alfredo Lim on the strength of
a warrant issued by. Hon. Salazar.
2. Sen. Enrile, Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio (spouses) and Gregorio Honasan were charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt.
3. Sen. Enrile was arrested and detained overnight at the NBI headquarters in Taft, without bail.
4. The following morning, he was brought to Camp Karingal in QC where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District.
5. The same day, through counsel, he filed a petition for habeas corpus.
6. This was followed by a supplemental petition alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in having been held to
answer for a crime which does not exist, charged with a crime of which no complaint was initially filed, denied his right to bail,
arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without a judge who issued it first.
7. According to the OSG, the Hernandez ruling should not apply because the information in Hernandez charged murders and other
crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion (2nd clause, Art. 48), whereas the information against
Enrile, et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance of rebellion.
Issue: Should rebellion not absorb more serious crimes, and that under Art. 48 of the RPC rebellion may be complexed with common
offenses?
Held: 11 Members of the Court voted against abandoning the Hernandez ruling. 2 felt that this should be re-examined.
Ruling:
1. The court can do no less that accord Hernandez with the same recognition as the President. Not too long ago, Pres. Aquino,
exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, repealed PD 942 of the former regime which sought to nullify or
neutralize Hernandez: when by reason, or on the occasion of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (including rebellion),
acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious
offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender.
2. According to a few members of the Court who believed that Hernandez should be limited in its application, Art. 48 cannot be
applied in this case because if murder were not complexed with rebellion, the following would be imposable: rebellion not
exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, murder reclusion temporal in its maximum to death. In the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, Art. 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring
the culprit. And when two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse that when he
commits said crimes.
3. There is an apparent need to restructure our law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty or to clearly define and delimit the
other offenses to be considered as absorbed, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal
activity undertaken in its name. (Present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust of power.)
4. Primary Ruling: Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as unintended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion
15
19. Enrile vs. Amin

September 13, 1990 J. Gutierrez, Jr.
Facts:
Senator Enrile was caught harboring an enemy of the state, Col. Hunasan, who is accused of the crime of rebellion. His home in
Dasmarinas was raided by authorities, where he was then arrested and charged Enrile for rebellion by conspiring with the Colonel
and for breaching PD 1829 which states that anyone who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the
apprehension of suspects [by] harboring or concealing [said criminal]
Defendant says that the charges made against hum under the PD should be absorbed by the crime of rebellion. The prosecutor
however states that since the PD is a special law and rebellion is punished under the RPC hence not baring the second case regarding
the PD.
Issue: Can the act of harboring a person accused of rebellion be filed separately even if the offender is also accused of rebellion?
Held: No
Ruling:
The Hernandez doctrine still stands. All crimes punishable under a special or general law, which are mere components or
ingredients, or committed in furtherance of rebellion become absorbed. It thus cannot be made a separate charge.
20. People vs Dasig
April 28, 1993 J. Nocon
Facts:
Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuez were convicted by the RTC of Mandaue City for Murder with Direct Assault. They attacked and killed
Pfc. Manatad who at that time was tasked in commanding traffic together with two other soldiers by their commanding officer. One
of the soldier positively identified Nuez. After careful surveillance they were finally caught in Cebu where Dasig was shot in the arm
and was confined in a military hospital. It was there where he made the extra-judicial confession with Atty Parawan as his witness.
Issue: Should he be convicted of simple rebellion or murder with direct assault.
Held: Yes. He committed a political crime of simple rebellion.
Ruling:
The appellant voluntarily confessed that he is a member of the sparrow unit, the liquidation squad, of the New Peoples Army and
also admits to the killing of Pfc. Manatad. Their killing was a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.
Consequently, he should be guilty if rebellion and not murder with direct assault upon a person in authority. Furthermore since he
was not the one identified as the one who headed the crime, he should only be held liable as participant in the commission of the
act (Art.135 (2)).
Concept:
Rebellion: committed by taking up arms against the government, among other means (Art.135, RPC)
Extra-judicial confession:confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence,
intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency.
Art 135 (2): Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion temporal.
21. People v. Lovedioro
1995 Kapunan, J.:
Facts:
1. Lovedioro killed SPO3 Lucilo- he walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the policeman's
right ear and fired.
2. The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him.
3. Armenta witnessed this incident and testified that he knew both the killer (being his nephew) and the victim.
4. The lower court found accused guilty of Murder.
5. Accused would contest that the crime should be rebellion. H contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in
furtherance of subversive ends," (said killing) should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and
135 of the Revised Penal Code.
6. OSG said that the crime committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively
proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive ends."
Issue: Is the crime murder or rebellion?
Held: MURDER
Ruling:
1. SC agrees with OSG that the crime committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had
16
conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive ends."
2. Art 134 says :
as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, rebellion is committed in the following manner:
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
3. The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government. By its very nature, rebellion is
essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined
bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law,
absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political character.
4. Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in
the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder.
5. Thus, it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of
the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist.
6. Clearly, political motive should be established before a person be charged of a political crime. Intent or motive is a decisive
factor.
7. During the extrajudicial confession by the accused, nowhere did he ever mention that he was a member of the New People's
Army. Nothing would suggest that the killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose. His
membership in the NPA surfaced almost merely as an afterthought.
8. Thus, the correct crime is MURDER.
Concept:
People v. Hernandez: "Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be
committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like
homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the Government the territory of the Philippine Islands
or any part thereof," then it becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of
rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter."
22. People vs. Cabrera
4 Mar 1922 J. Malcolm
Facts:
On 13 Dec 1920, a Manila policeman arrested a woman who was a member of the household of a Constabulary soldier stationed at
Santa Lucia Barracks in Manila. This arrest was considered by some of the soldiers as an outrage committed by the policemen and
instantly gave rise to friction between the Manila police and the soldiers. The next day, an encounter ensued where private
Macasinag of the Constabulary was mortally wounded. The encounter engendered a deep feeling of resentment which was soon
converted into a desire for revenge.
On 15 Dec 1920, rumors circulated that the policeman involved in the encounter was allowed to continue on duty. This precipitated
a movement for reprisal. In the evening of the same day, the soldiers, with rifles and ammunitions, escaped through the window of
the quarters of the Fourth Company. Under the command of their sergeants and corporals, they divided into groups and launched
an attack upon the Manila Police. Because of this attack, six policemen and two civilians died and several others wounded.
Upon their return to the barracks the next day, investigation was commenced and statements of the seventy-seven soldiers were
obtained. They were then charged with two sets of Information, one for sedition and another for murder and serious physical
injuries. Initially, sixty nine pleaded guilty but was allowed by the court to change their plea to not guilty after the testimony of the
prosecutions first witness. After trial, the court found them guilty and sentenced to serve a maximum of ten years imprisonment.
Issue: Was the conviction for sedition correct?
Held:
Sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. Act No. 292 (now Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code) makes all
persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of five objects, including
that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular Government or of a
Provincial or Municipal Government guilty of sedition.
The finding of the trial court convicting the accused of sedition as defined and punished by the law is correct. The provisions of Act
No. 292, section 5, subdivision 3 makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. Even if it was a fight between two
armed bodies of the Government, it was an unequal fight brought on by the actions of the accused. The judgment is affirmed.
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23. US vs. Tolentino

6 Mar 1906 J. Carson
Facts:
Aurelio Tolentino, on or about the 14th day of May, 1903, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, did unlawfully utter seditious
words and speeches and did write, publish, and circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States and the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which tend to obstruct the lawful officers of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices, and which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet
together for unlawful purposes, and which suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots, and which tend to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of the Government of the United
States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which said seditious words and speeches are false and inflammatory,
and tend to incite and move the people to hatred and dislike of the government established by law within the Philippine Islands,
and tend to incite, move, and persuade great numbers of the people of said Philippine Islands to insurrection, riots, tumults, and
breaches of the public peace; which said false, seditious, and inflammatory words and scurrilous libels are in Tagalog language in a
theatrical work written by said Aurelio Tolentino, and which was presented by him and others on the said 14th day of May, 1903,
at the "Teatro Libertad," in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, entitled 'Kahapon gayon at Bukas' (Yesterday, To-day, and Tomorrow).
Counsel for the appellant insists that the intent of the accused to commit the crime with which he is charged does not appear from
the evidence of record, and that the drama is, in itself, a purely literary and artistic production wherein the legendary history of
these Islands and their future, as imagined by the author, are presented merely for the instruction and entertainment of the public.
** Inciting Sedition
Issue: whether the drama or any part of it was of a "scurrilous" nature in the legal acceptation of the word
Held: it was scurrilous in nature. (abusive or defamatory: containing abusive language or defamatory allegations)
Ruling:
We are all agreed that the publication and presentation of the drama directly and necessarily tend to instigate others to cabal and
meet together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people against
the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of the Government.
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time, place, and manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a
spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and the Government of the United States. The court is satisfied that the
principal object and intent of its author was to incite the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed resistance to the
constituted authorities, and to induce them to conspire together for the secret organization of armed forces, to be used when the
opportunity presented itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government and setting up another in its stead.
In rebuttable to the defense, the court said that the public presentation of the drama took place in the month of May, 1903, less
than two years after the establishment of the Civil Government. The smouldering embers of a wide-spread and dangerous
insurrection were not yet entirely extinguished, and here and there throughout the Islands occasional outbreaks still required the
use of the armed forces of the Government for their suppression.
Concept:
But it is a "a well-settled rule in considering indictments that where an offense may be committed in any of several different modes,
and the offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified, it is sufficient to
prove the offense committed in any one of them, provide that it be such as to constitute the substantive offense." (Com. vs.
Kneeland, 20 Pick. Mass. 206, 215), and the defendants may, therefore, be convicted if any one of the substantive charges into
which the complaint may be separated has been made out.
Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are define in that section, viz:
(1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches;
(2) the writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands;
(3) the writing, publishing, or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office;
(4) or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes;
(5) or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots;
(6) or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and
order of the Government;
(7) knowingly concealing such evil practices.
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24. Espuelas vs. People

December 17, 1951 J. Bengzon
Facts:
1. Oscar Espuelas sent photos of himself hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree (in truth,
he was merely standing on a barrel), to newspapers and weeklies throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication
with a suicide note: (excerpt) My dear wife, if someone asks you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not
pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about this Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas I
committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas
2. The note was signed in a pseudonymous name: Alberto Reveniera.
Issue: Is he guilty under Art. 142 of the RPC, of inciting to sedition?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
1. "The idea of violence prevades the whole letter" says Justice Paredes of the Court of Appeals. It is a clear act to arouse its
readers a sense of dissatisfaction against its duly constituted authorities.
2. The essence of seditious libel is to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution.
3. If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the
reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof."
Dissenting:
1. The message which the accused caused to be published with his picture contained no libel or criticism against the instituted
system of government as distinct from the administration.
WHY?
a. Based on the Sedition Act, the term government would appear to be used here in the abstract sense of the existing
political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government.
b. There was nothing in the article which could be regarded as having a tendency to produce anything like what may be called
disaffection, or in other words, a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws.
2. The meaning of his statement that he would kill himself because he could not kill President Roxas is doubtful, and where the
intention is ambiguous, he should be given the benefit of the doubt.
3. According to Mr. Justice Holmes: There is no inciting to sedition unless the words are used in such circumstances as to create
clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
a. Even in the ordinary offenses of threat and defamation, words are not taken at face value, but their gravity is gauged by the
circumstances surrounding each particular case.
b. Lead and Lend in Art. 142: Lead- to draw or direct by influence, Tend to conduce to an end
4. In fact, the witnesses for the government themselves, some of whom were constabulary officers stationed at Tagbilaran, stated
that upon seeing the authors picture, they just laughed it off and thought of him as crazy.
5. There are more serious attacks against the government, and this one is very tame and mild by comparison.
25. Martinez vs. Morfe
March 24, 1972 J. Fernando
Facts:
Martinez and Bautista are both delegated to the Constitutional Convention. Martinez is accused of falsifying a private document
wherein he wrote that he was born on June 20, 1945, when in fact he was born on June 20, 1946. A judge issued his arrest and he
was arrested when he was on his way to attend the plenary session of the Constitutional Convention. Bautista was also arrested but
on charges for distributing free food, drinks, and cigarettes at two public meetings. Both invoke the defense of Art 6, Section 15 of
the Constitution construed with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code. They claim that they should be immune from arrests.
Issue: Are they immune from their respective arrests?
Held: No
Ruling:
Art 16, Section 15 of the Constitution does not cover any prosecution for treason, a felony, and the breach of the peace. It is also
said that Art 145 of the RPC did not survive the 1935 Constitution because it was not in the intent of the drafters that a member of
the National Assembly should be immune from arrest. Allowing so would create a privileged class without justification, thus
conflicting with the principle that the government places all men equal before the eyes of the law.
They are however immune from civil suit.
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26. People vs Quijada

July 24, 1996 Davide Jr.
Facts:
On the evening of December 30, during a benefit dance held in a basketball court of a baranggay in Bohol, Rosita Iroy witnessed and
positively identified Daniel Quijada of shooting his brother, Diosdado Iroy, from behind hitting him at the back of his head, which
caused his death. Daniel interposed the defense of the alibi that he was with companion in a wharf waiting for tricycle passengers
and attacking the credibility of the witness which did not convince the judge due to the possibility that he could have gone to the
wharf after the crime and the credibility of the witness having positively identified him. He was convicted of two separate crimes by
the RTC of (1) murder and (2) illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form. He appealed and was taken by the court en banc to
settle which among the conflicting doctrines of convicting him of two separate crimes or of a single crime of illegal possession of
firearm in its aggravated form.
Issue: Should Daniel be convicted of two separate offenses or just one?
Held: Yes. The doctrine in Tac-an and Tiozon etc. are held for it applies the laws according to their letter and spirit.
Ruling:
The use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the penalty of homicide or murder but killing a person using an
unlicensed firearm increased the penalty of illegal possession of firearm as expressly stated in PD 1886. The rule of double jeopardy
despite both crimes arise from a single act couldnt be invoked as the crime of murder is punished under Art. 248 of the RPC while
the other is through a special law. Furthermore as homicide or murder may qualify the offense to illegal possession of firearm it will
be absurd if homicide which is a higher offense will be absorbed by a statutory offense which is merely a malum prohibitum.
Concept:
PD 1886 (1): Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments
Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or
possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
27. Advincula v. CA
2000 Bellosillo, J.:
Facts:
1. RESPONDENT says:
a. That private respondent Isagani Ocampo was on his way home when petitioner Noel Advincula and two (2) of his drinking
companions started shouting invectives at him and challenging him to a fight
b. Petitioner, armed with a bolo, ran after Isagani who was able to reach home and elude his attackers.
c. Isaganis father, Amando, was told that petitioner had chased his son with a bolo. Amando then got his gun, which he
claimed was licensed, and confronted petitioner who continued drinking with his friends. But petitioner threatened to attack
Amando with his bolo, thus prompting the latter to aim his gun upwards and fire a warning shot.
d. Cooler heads intervened and Amando was pacified. He left to check on his son. Later, however, he saw petitioner's drinking
companions firing at petitioner's house.
2.
PETITIONERs version:
a. According to him, he and his friends were having a conversation outside his house when Isagani passed by and shouted at
them. This led to a heated argument between him and Isagani.
b. Then Isagani left but returned with his father Amando and brother Jerry. Isagani and Amando were each armed with a gun
and started firing at petitioner who ran home to avoid harm but private respondents Isagani and Amando continued
shooting, hitting petitioner's residence in the process.
3. Petitioner then filed for illegal possession of firearms against respondents.
4. Sec of Justice in it Resolution (granted petitioner and) ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite to file the corresponding
charges of Illegal Possession of Firearms against private respondents
5. It reasoned that even if Amando had the requisite license, there was no proof that he had the necessary permit to carry it
outside his residence; and Isagani's plain denial could not overcome his positive identification by petitioner that he carried a
firearm in assaulting him.
6. CA reversed this.
Issue: Can the respondents be charged of illegal possession?
Held: NO
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Ruling:
1. The rule is well settled that in cases of Illegal Possession of Firearms, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence of
the firearm, and (b) the fact that it is not licensed
2. However, it should be noted that in People v. Ramos, citing People v. Gy Gesiong, the Court ruled: " Even if he has the license,
he cannot carry the firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor."
3. Court discussed the irregularity of the proceedings
a. that the rulings relied upon by the Court of Appeals and private respondents deal with the quantum of evidence needed to
convict persons for Illegal Possession of Firearms. This petition arose from a case which was still in its preliminary stages.
b. And these decisions are reviewable by the Secretary of Justice who may direct the filing of the corresponding information or
to move for the dismissal of the case.
c. The requisite evidence for convicting a person of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms is not needed at this point.
d. It is enough that the Secretary of Justice found that the facts, as presented by both petitioner and private respondents,
would constitute a violation of PD 1866.
4. Hence, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of criminal Informations against
private respondents, and clearly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to grant private respondents' petition for certiorari.
28. People vs. Tiozon
19 Jun 1991 J. Davide Jr.
Facts:
On the evening of 24 Feb 1989, Leonardo Bolima and his wife were awakened by the loud knocks on their door by Eutropio Tiozon.
Leonardo opened the door and found Eutropio drunk. He was invited to come in, exchanged pleasantries, and Eutropio showed a .38
caliber revolver to Leonardo. Irritated with her husbands act of playing with the gun, the wife stepped aside but after a while found
out that the two had already left. After five minutes, she heard two successive gunshots and Eutropio then came to her door and
said that he accidentally shot her husband. The Kalookan police then arrived and arrested Eutropio.
On 27 Feb 1989, he was charged for violation of P.D. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms) and pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court
found him guilty of the crime of P.D. 1866 and murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Decision stated that the court
would have given death sentence if it were allowed. Subsequently, his motion for reconsideration was denied by the court.
Issue: Was the conviction for violation of P.D. 1866 correct?
Held:
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 imposes the penalty of death if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Homicide or murder qualifies the offense but it does not absorb such because it would be absurd if a more serious crime defined and
penalized by the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense. In fine then, the killing of a person with the use of an
unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) murder or homicide.
There is unlawful possession if one does not have the license to possess the firearm.
The evidence in this case failed to disclose that the prosecution presented any evidence to prove that the accused was not
authorized to possess the firearm alleged in the Information. The lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense
which the prosecution must allege and prove. Since there was no proof, he could not be convicted for illegal possession of firearm.
Since treachery was not established, he could only be liable for homicide which is punished by reclusion temporal.
29. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DE GRACIA
July 6, 1994 J. Regalado
Facts:
The incidents took place at the height of the coup detat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform
the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. On 1 December 1989, Maj. Efren
Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a
surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Quezon City, together with his team
composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance,
which actually started on the night of 30 November 1989 at around 10:00 p.m., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report
received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command
post. Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around 10 to 15 meters away from the Eurocar building near P.
Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on foot.
After a while a group of 5 men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At that
moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car
21
and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only 6 meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at
the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 a.m. of 5 December 1989, searching them composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt.
Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the
Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate 6 cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells
of different calibers, and molotov bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the
right portion of the building. St. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw Rolando De Gracia inside the office of
Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door.
De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a
result of the raid, the team arrested de Gracia, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar
building. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team.
De Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of
rebellion, and for attempted homicide (Criminal Cases Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively), which were tried jointly by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103.
Appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms for the reason that he did not have
either physical or constructive possession thereof considering that he had no intent to possess the same; he is neither the owner
nor a tenant of the building where the ammunition and explosives were found; he was merely employed by Col. Matillano as an
errand boy; he was guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano; and he did not have actual possession of the
explosives. He claims that intent to possess, which is necessary before one can be convicted under Presidential Decree No. 1866,
was not present in the case at bar.
Issue: Whether or not De Gracia can be convicted of Illegal Possession of Firearm under PD 1866?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is
merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the
thing to one's control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the
same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a
borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender
has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.
While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be
shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however,
without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal
intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important
in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the
decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same,
even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of
a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or
constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.
THE CASE :
There is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed several firearms,
explosives and ammunition without the requisite license or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically
testified that he was the first one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same, and he saw De
Gracia standing in the room and holding the several explosives.
Animus possidendi was established when the court concluded that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about the dynamites,
22
"molotov" bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his possession. As a former soldier,
it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the dangerous uses and power of these weapons.
He cannot feign ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large quantity of explosives and ammunition.
Furthermore, the place where the explosives were found is not a military camp or office, nor one where such items can ordinarily
but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily prudent man would be put on guard and be
suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in a place intended to carry out the business of selling cars and which has nothing to do
at all, directly or indirectly, with the trade of firearms and ammunition.
Appellant De Gracia actually intended to possess the articles confiscated from his person
Concept:
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case basis, taking into consideration the prior and
coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in the
range of action.
RA 8294
Sec. 1. "If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection,
sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition,
or attempted coup d'etat.
30. People vs. Garcia
January 15, 2002 Per Curiam
Facts:
1. While jogging alone about 5:30 am, Atty. Tioleco was stopped by a car that lurched towards him, of which 2 men quickly
alighted from the car. One pointed a gun at him, the other hit his back and pushed him into the cars back seat. Once inside, he
saw two others.
2. The men feigned to be military men pestered him with accusation of being a drug pusher and the threat of detention at Camp
Crame. Then they started blindfolding him, taping his face, handcuffing him and then divesting him of his personal belongings.
3. After 30-45 mins, the car stopped. He was told to alight, then he was led into a room. One of the kidnappers approached him
and told him that he would be released for a P2M-ransom. He bargained.
4. (Bwisit tong part nato) Later on, he was told that they had mistaken him for a Chinese national and promised his release
without ransom, but he was just being taken for a ride since they had already begun contacting his sister.
5. P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission arrived at the sisters house after the kidnapper has made
several calls. They monitored the kidnapping.
6. She raised only P71k, and the kidnappers agreed.
7. 1st Pay-off: With 2 female friends (and with the police secretly surveying the site), she waited. According to the kidnappers, in a
phone call, they had aborted the pay-off because of her 2 companions which they suspected as police officers.
8. 2nd Pay-off: She was told that a man would go near her and whisper Romy (Ronald Garcia) to whom she would then hand the
ransom money. This took place.
9. The PACC operatives tried to follow the blue car ridden by Romy. They were able to catch up and arrest him. Garcia informed
them where Atty. Tioleco was being detained.
10. They were able to rescue Atty. Tioleco. The police were able to get hold of the men even before they were about to grab a .38
cal revolver and a .357 cal.
11. When arraigned, Garcia, Rogel, Lariba and Valler pleaded not guilty to the charge of kidnapping for ransom in Crim. Case No. Q96-68049, although during the trial Garcia admitted complicity in the abduction of Atty. Tioleco and in the receipt of the ransom
money from the victim's sister Floriana. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050 for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition,
Rodante Rogel and Rotchel Lariba also pleaded not guilty
Issue: Is the trial court correct in convicting Rogel and Lariba of a separate offense of illegal possession of firearms, under RA 8294?
Held: No.
Ruling:
1. A simple reading of RA 8294, Sec. 1 shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no
separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal possession of
firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense.
2. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for
illegal possession of firearms.
3. Penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's simple language is most
favorable to herein appellant.
4.
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The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime was
committed by the person arrested."
31. People vs. Castillo

February 15, 2000 J. Puno
Facts:
Witnesses saw the accused pursues the deceased in the ongoing construction site of the Gaisano building in Iloilo city. The accused
shot the deceased three times which eventually lead to his death. The police caught him on board a vessel bound for Cebu. He was
armed with a handmade revolver and he claimed that he did not have a license to carry the weapon.
The accused is appealing claiming the lower court was in error when they convicted him of RA 8294. He claims the prosecution did
not show proof that he did not have a license to carry the weapon.
Issue: Is he guilty of using a gun without a license?
Held: No
Ruling:
Although the appellant himself admitted that he had no license for the gun, this does not relieve the prosecution of its duty to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants lack of license or permit to possess the gun. The prosecution should have
presented into evidence the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit which said that
the accused was not a licensee of the pistol. They could have also argued that the type of firearm used can be lawfully possessed
only by certain military personnel.
32. People vs Nepumuceno
July 29, 1999 Davide Jr.
Facts:
In May 1994, Gulliermo Nepumuceno Jr. committed the crime of parricide against his wife using an unlicensed firearm (.38 revolver).
After which immediately brought her wife to the hospital and voluntarily surrendered. He was convicted of two separate crime,
following the ruling in People v. Quijada, with (1) parricide and (2) qualified illegal possession in violation of sec. 1 (2) of PD 1866 as
amended by RA 8294. Despite of his remorseful actions mitigating and aggravating circumstances couldnt be applied as he is
charged of violating a special law; the court thereby recommends his case to the Chief Executive for executive clemency.
Issue: Should Gulliermo be acquitted of qualified illegal possession in pursuant to the amendment by RA 8294?
Held: Yes. Since he is not a habitual delinquent it should take retroactive effect.
Ruling:
The intent of the legislature in implementing PD 1866 is to preserve homicide and murder as distinct acts penalized under the RPC
and to increase the penalty of illegal possession of firearm. With the amendment by RA 8294 which states that when an unlicensed
firearm is used in the commission of homicide or murder it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance and could not be
separately punished; therefore he should only be punished of one crime of parricide with the aggravating circumstance of use of
illegal firearm. He is therefore acquitted of the second offense but should remain in jail to serve his sentence for the first offense.
Concept:
Elements of illegal possession of firearm:
1. Firearm
2. Gun was possessed by the accused
3. The accused had no license
4. Homicide or murder was committed by the accused with the use of the firearm
R.A. No. 8294, approve on 6 June 1997 amended Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 by, among others things, revising the second paragraph
of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 from the following:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
to:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
33. People v. Evangelista
1996 Mendoza, J.:
Facts:
1. Efren was destroying house of accused-appellant's mother. Accused-appellant and his brother-in-law tried to stop him by
throwing stones at him.
24
2. This dispute didn't get fixed then one night, At around 12:00 p.m., Priscilla (Efren's wife) was awakened by a loud explosion
which turned out to be a gunshot. She looked out of the window to find what it was about and saw a man running away. She
saw her husband covered with blood, his skull open and his brains spilling out. Efren Arceo died before reaching the hospital.
3. Accused was charged of murder and aggravated by illegal possession of firearms.
4. Priscilla Arceo pointed to accused-appellant Reynaldo Evangelista as the man she saw running away after the explosion. She
stated that even if she saw the assailant with only his back turned on her, she was certain that it was accused-appellant because
she had known him for a long time, accused-appellant having been their former neighbor.
5. Accused later on admitted the killing and even surrender to one Ladia the gun he used.
Issue:
1. Was accused guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt? Held: Yes
2. Can he be charged of illegal possession of firearms? Held: No
Ruling:
1. Yes, he's guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Priscilla's testimony was given great credence. Also, had a motive for killing Efren
Marcos Arceo. He had an altercation with the deceased the day before the deceased was shot. He threatened the deceased
with something dire if the latter did not do something to repair the damage which he had caused to the house of accusedappellant's mother.
2. He cannot be found guilty of illegal possession of firearm, much less of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form.
a. The information charged accused-appellant with simple illegal possession of firearm but the trial court found him guilty of
illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. No. 1866, 1, par. 2, after finding that accused-appellant had used
an unlicensed firearm in killing Efren Arceo. This cannot be done.
b. That an unlicensed firearm was used in the commission of murder or homicide is a qualifying circumstance. Consequently, it
must be specifically alleged in the information, otherwise the accused cannot be sentenced to death for illegal possession of
firearm in its aggravated form without violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
c. Indeed accused-appellant cannot be convicted even of simple illegal possession of firearm because of lack of evidence that
the firearm is unlicensed.
d. The trial court based its decision simply on the fact that the firearm used in this case is a homemade gun known in the dialect
as paltik, apparently being of the opinion that a paltik cannot be licensed.
34. People vs. Beltran
13 Sep 1985 J. Relova
Facts:
In the evening of 11 Jan 1972, Delfino Beltran shouted cussing words to Ernesto Alvarado who was then passing by the Puzon
Compound. Upon reaching his destination, Alvarado went to the house of Mayor Bienvenido Quirulgico to report the incident. The
Mayor then told the Chief of Police that something should be done about it. They then decided to go to the Puzon Compound to talk
to Delfino Beltran and his companions and ask them to surrender.
Upon reaching the compound, the Mayor, accompanied by his son Vicente and Patrolman Rolando Tolentino, were fired upon by
Beltran and his companions. When the firing had stopped, they all went to the hospital where Vicente died. As they were fleeing,
three men came out of the compound and fired at the vehicle while three men tried to give chase.
Delfino Beltran and five others were then charged and found guilty of murder and double attempted murder with direct assault.
They were all sentenced to death.
Issue: Was the conviction for double attempted murder with direct assault proper?
Held:
Direct assault is committed by any person who, without public uprising, attacks, employs force, or seriously intimidates or resists any
person in authority or any of his agents while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on the occasion of such performance.
A person in authority is any person who is directly vested with jurisdiction meaning the power or authority to govern and execute
the laws. An agent of a person in authority is one who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent
authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property. Direct assault is
qualified when the assault is committed with a weapon.
Testimonial evidence proved that the accused knew that they were firing upon the Mayor of Ballesteros, Cagayan. Considering that
Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Patrolman Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at that time was in his uniform, both
performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the community, the finding of the trial court that the accused were
guilty of attempted murder with direct assault is correct. For lack of necessary votes, the death penalty imposed was reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
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35. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO DOLLANTES

June 30, 1987 - PARAS, J
Facts:
Marcos Gabutero was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental; that due to the approaching fiesta of
barangay Maglihe, a dance was held in said barangay in the evening of April 21, 1983; that while the Barangay Captain was
delivering a speech to start the dance, the accused Pedro Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor, making a dance
movement known in the visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife and challenging everyone as to who was brave among the
people present; the Barangay Captain approached Pedro Dollantes and told him to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance.
However, the accused, instead of heeding to the advice of the Barangay Captain, stabbed the latter on the left arm; that accused
Hugo Grengia held the left hand of accused Pedro Dollantes and Dionilo Garol was able to get from the hand of Pedro Dollantes the
hunting knife. Immediately thereafter, accused Hamlet Dollantes, who rushed towards the Barangay Captain, stabbed the
Barangay Captain at the back and the other co-accused also took turns in stabbing the Barangay Captain; the Barangay Captain at
that time was not armed. E
Except for the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester who were merely holding stones, the other co-accused
participated in the stabbing incident. When the Barangay Captain fell to the ground and died, the accused in this case took turns in
kicking the dead body of the Barangay Captain and were dancing around said dead body; that the Barangay Captain suffered eleven
(11) wounds in the different parts of his body, two of which happened to be at the back of his dead body. According to the attending
physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who examined the body of the deceased, the victim died of "Severe hemorrhage and cardiac tamponade
due to stab wounds."
Issue: Did trial court erred in holding that the accused-appellant herein is guilty of the crime complex crime of "Assault upon a
Person in Authority Resulting in Murder"
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
Finally, the records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act of trying to pacify Pedro Dollantes who was making trouble in the
dance hall when he was stabbed to death.
He was therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this Court ruled that
"As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he
incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in
authority.
38. Alberto vs. De la Cruz
June 30, 1980 J. Concepcion
*jail guard leaves detainee unguarded, his escape made possible
Facts:
Eligio Orbita, a jail guard, was tasked to keep under custody and vigilance detention prisoner Pablo Denaque. He handpicked Pablo
to work in the Governors guest house in constructing a fence. However, he left Pablo unguarded, thereby, giving him the chance to
run away and escape. Orbita is prosecuted for the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner, under Article 224 of the RPC.
During cross examination, prosecution witness Lt. Jose Esmeralda (Asst. Jail Warden), was confronted with a note,
purportedly written by Gov. Armando Cledera. The lieutenant was asked to send five men to work in the governors house. Lt.
Esmeralda declared in court, however, that he could not remember and that he was not sure of its genuineness.
Believing that the escape of Pablo was made possible by the note and that the governor and Jose are equally guilty of the offense,
the defense counsel moved to amend the information so as to include the two. The Judge directed the Fiscals office, within 15 days
from date, to further investigate the case. Subsequently, the judge ruled to amend the information.
Issue: Are Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda criminally liable in any way?
Held: NO
Ruling:
Under Art. 156, the crime of delivering prisons from jail is committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person confined in any jail or
penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a person to escape. To remove means to take away a person from the place of his
confinement, with or without the active compensation of the person released. To help in the escape of a Person confined in any jail
or penal institution means to furnished that person with the material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate
his escape. The offenders under this article are usually outsiders who remove from jail any person confined or help him escape.
26
If the offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner
defined and penalty under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Being public officers, Gov. Cledera and Lt. Jose Esmeralda, they
cannot be prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, there is no sufficient evidence in the record to show a prima facie case against Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda. Likewise,
there is no sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution either under Art. 156 or Art. 223.
Furthermore, a fiscal by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file information where he is not convinced that he has
evidence to support the allegations. It would also be embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a case
when he is in no position to do so.
Concept:
The prisoner may be under detention only.
The offender is usually an outsider, but Art. 156 may also apply to an employee of the penal establishment, for as long as he does
not have custody of such person.
39. Tanega vs. Masakayan
February 28, 1967 J. Sanchez
Facts:
The court of first instance directed the execution of the sentence of petitioner to January 11, 1965, for the crime of slander. It was
however deferred to February 12, 1965 at the motion of the petitioner. This prompted the respondent judge on February 15, 1965
to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 25, 1965 an alieas warrant of arrest. Petitioner however was never arrested.
On December 10, 1966, petitioner moved to quash the warrants of arrest on the ground that they had already prescribed.
Respondent ruled that the penalty imposed upon the accused has to be served, rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and
instead directed the issuance of another alias warrant of arrest, thus the current petition.
Issue:
Is she guilty of evasion of service sentence?
Held:
No
Ruling:
Prescription only starts the moment he or she escapes from confinement. In this case, she was sentenced to imprisonment by
final judgment but was never place in confinement.
Concept:
Elements of Evasion of Service of Sentence:
1. offender is a convict by final judgment.
2. He is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty
3. he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence
Evasion or escape by unlawful entry, breaking doors, windows (please refer to p. 567 of case)... elevates the penalty to prision
correccional to its maximum period.
40. People vs. Abilong ()
November 26, 1948 Montemayor
*hablo un poquito espagol (I speak little Spanish)
Facts:
Florentino Abiong was convicted of the crime of attempted murder and was sentenced to destierro, wherein he is not allowed enter
any place within the 100km radius of the City of Manila. He broke the terms of his service and upon arraignment pleaded guilty and
sentenced. He now contests that destierro is not a penalty of imprisonment, thus the evasion of its sentence is not punishable
under Art. 157.
Issues: Is evasion of service in a crime of destierro punishable under art. 157?
Held: Yes. The Spanish translation is controlling which includes destierro.
Ruling:
According to the OSG the Spanish text which is controlling uses the phrase sufriendo privacion de libertad which means to suffer
the deprivation of liberty or freedom thus includes destierro. In the case of People vs. Samonte it was held that a person under
sentence of destierro is suffering from deprivation of liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the
prohibited area. Thus he was held guilty of evasion of service by virtue of final judgement when he entered the City of Manila.
27
Dissenting: (Perfecto, J.)

The Supreme Court showed their un-infallibality when they applied the ruling in People v. De Jesus and did not consider the question
of interpretation of the wording of Art. 157. The question boils down to the words "fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo
privacion de libertad por sentencia firme," which are translated into English "by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by
reason of final judgment." The word fugandose which literally means to escape couldnt be applied to a person penalized with
destierro because he is free to roam anywhere and in no way could be applied to escape.
But this is not to say that evasion of the penalty of destierro should be left unpunished but rather that the punishment should be
commensurate to the penalty. For following the provision the they put on equal footing the evader of a sentence of one day and of
the imprisonment of a life-termer, one who commits an insignificant offense and one who perpetrates the most heinous crime. But
then this could only be solved by an act of Congress.
41. Torres v. Gonzales
1987
Facts:
1. In 1979, petitioner Wilfredo Torres was convicted of 2 counts of estafa.
2. The max sentence would expire Nov 2000.
3. A conditional pardon was granted by the President on the condition that petitioner would not again violate any of the penal laws
of the Philippines should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law.
4. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
5. In 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole recommended to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to
the petitioner.
6. Records of the NBI showed a long list of charges had been brought against the petitioner during the last 20 years. (20 counts of
estafa and sedition)
8. Respondent Minister of Justice Neptali Gonzales wrote the President informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending
the cancellation of the pardon previously granted to petitioner.
7. The conditional pardon was cancelled and petitioner was arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of
his sentence.
8. Wilfredo no questions the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment claiming that he did not violate his conditional
pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition.
Issue:
Is a conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrrested and recommitted
for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon.
Held: Yes
Ruling:
1. A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final
judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such
subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him
2. It may be emphasized that what is involved here is not the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular
course of administration of the criminal law. Rather, its the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking
that he would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines for purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted
portion of his original sentence.
3. since Article 159 of the RPC defines a distinct, substantive felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the
provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty in
Article 159.
4. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may
be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (I) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it
may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code.
DISSENTING: J. Cruz
There is no question that the petitioner is facing a long list of criminal charges, but that certainly is not the issue. The point is that, as
many as such charges may be, none of them so far has resulted in a final conviction , without which he cannot be recommitted
under the condition of his pardon.
Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. A prima facie case only justifies the filing of the corresponding information, but proof
beyond reasonable doubt is still necessary for conviction. Manifestly, an allegation merely accuses the defendant of a crime; it is the
conviction that makes him a criminal. In other words, a person is considered to have committed a crime only if he is convicted
28
thereof, and this is done not by his accuser but by the judge.
42. People vs. Dioso ()
23 Oct 1984 J. Escolin
*gang members inside Bilibid who killed two others are quasi-recidivists
Facts:
The two accused, Teofilo Dioso and Jacinto Abarca, were both inmates at the National Bilibid Prison. Abarca was serving sentence
for the crime of homicide while Dioso, of robbery. Both were members of the Batang Mindanao gang who frequently clash with a
rival group known as the Happy Go Lucky gang. The latest clash caused the death of an inmate named Balerio, a Batang
Mindanao gangster. Suspecting that Reyno and Gomez, members of the Happy Go Lucky gang, authored the slaying, Dioso and
Abarca conspired to avenge his death.
On 12 Sep 1972, they succeeded in their plans of killing Reyno and Gomez. They executed the act when the two victims were in the
hospital ward and killed them thru the use of a knife. Upon execution, they were met by a prison guard on their way out and
voluntarily surrendered their weapon. They were immediately investigated by a prison investigator and readily executed their sworn
statements admitting responsibility for the crime.
Upon arraignment for the crime of murder, they both pleaded guilty. After trial, the court found the presence of treachery and
sentenced both to death.
Issue: Is the imposition of the death penalty correct?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
Since both accused are quasi-recidivists, having committed a crime while serving sentence for a prior offense, the maximum penalty
of the new felony must be imposed. This being a crime of murder, the death penalty was properly imposed regardless of the
presence of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty. But for the lack of the required votes, the
Supreme Court commuted the death sentence to reclusion perpetua.
Concept:
Quasi-recidivism a special aggravating circumstance where a person, after having been convicted by final judgment, shall commit a
new felony before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same. He shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
Elements:
1. That the offender was already convicted by final judgment of one offense.
2. That he committed a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same.
43. People vs. Kong Leon ()
January 17, 1950 Labrador
*Counterfeiting US gold coins
Facts:
Kong Leon was accused of counterfeiting and selling illegally fabricated United States gold dollar coins. Gold smith tools where
found inside the Fitting Room which was once occupied by a Chinese tailor. On an extra judicially statement, in the police station,
the Kong Leon admitted that he fabricated 8 pieces of finished dollar coins, unfinished 5 dollar and 2 unfinished 10-dallr pieces.
The chemist found that most gold dollar coins confiscated were genuine except for the above mentioned. He only found 16-17 karat
gold whereas a genuine US gold coin should have 18 karats.
The accused asserted here that the coins he counterfeited were already withdrawn from the circulation pursuant to US Gold
Reserve Act of 1934. Thus, he can not be charged of such crime.
Therefore, the accused was charged of Counterfeiting coins of a foreign country (163 (3))
Issue: Can he be charged of counterfeiting of foreign coins?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
Kong Leon claims that the gold coins have been withdrawn from circulation, that have ceased to be a currency of US within the
meaning of RPC 163. However the court held that the law punishing the fabrication is evidently derived from the Spanish Penal
Code. It will be noted that the Spanish text and the local authors maintains the view that the coins that are subject of the said
articles may be a former coins which have been withdrawn by the State or a foreign coins which have been authorized as currency
in the Kingdom.
29
It stands to reason that the counterfeiting of such foreign currency withdrawn from circulation is not alone the harm caused to the
public by the fact that it may go into circulation but the danger that a counterfeiter produces by his stay in te country, and the
possibility that he may later apply his trade to making of coins n actual circulation.
In this case, collectors were to be defrauded, as it was apparent by the imitation of the US gold coins that they were to be passed
to Moros who value them even as relics of rar objects.
44. Del Rosario vs. People ()
December 22, 1961 Concepcion
Facts:
Del Rosario and two others were accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, and were convicted for illegal possession of the
forged treasury notes. They are now appealing, saying that the notes were counterfeit paper money manufactured by them, the fact
remains that they were genuine treasury notes from the Philippine government with one of the digits of each having been altered
and changed. The defendants were able to secure Php. 1,700.00. They claim that since that they are genuine treasure notes of the
government, the possession cannot be illegal.
Issue: Is the possession of printed counterfeit paper money made from genuine treasury notes illegal?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
Art 169 provides that the possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines with any of the figures, letters, words or signs
contained had been erased or altered, with knowledge of such notes is punishable under Art. 168
45. People vs. Galano ()
December 2, 1957- De Leon (CA)
* falsification of a one-peso bill
Facts:
Galano was accused of falsification of a one-peso bill when he used that to pay Lilia Cruz for the 4 balut eggs. It was falsified to look
like the the genuine one-peso bill by inscripting the word VICTORY at the back using an ink.
Issue: Can Galano be charged of Falsification
Held: Yes, under Article 169 paragraph 2
Ruling:
The unauthorized addition of the word Victory was made for no other purpose than to give to it the appearance of true legal
tender of the current Victory series. Although the bill is no legal tender and It can be presented only to Central Bank and be
exchange of the same value, it still showed the intention to deceive and defraud the Government in its avowed fully to protect not
only the public but also the paper bulls legally issued or authorized for circulation.
The forgery committed comes under first paragraph (. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument, payable to bearer or
order mentioned therein, the appearance of a true genuine document.)
The court held that this provision does not only contemplate situations where a spurious, false or fake document or instrument is
given the appearance of a true and genuine document, but also situation involving originally true and genuine documents which
have been withdrawn or demonetized or have outlived their usefulness.
46. People v. Romualdez ()
1932 Vickers, J.:
Facts:
1. Estela was appointed as Secretary of Justice Romualdez (she was his niece)
2. There was September 1926 bar; Justice Romualdez was appointed chairman of the examination committee of the bar; so Justice
appointed a group of people to be correctors (those that will check) and members of the examination committee
3. (in the dissent, Estela was said to be appointed as one of the correctors)
4. Because of the nature of Estelas work, she had under her care the compositions and other papers and documents in connection
with the bar exams;
5. Its proven that she changed the grades of one Luis Malubnay (a bar candidate that year) in Remedial law (from 58% to 64%)
and Civil Law (from 63% to 73%)
6. In her defense, she said she had the authority to do it, given by Justice Romualdez. The latter also attested to the same thing.
Issue: Is Estela and Luis guilty of falsification of public documents?
Held: Yes
FINDINGS & Ruling:
1. On the law and offense: Their acts fall under paragraph 2, 3, and 6 Arts 300 and 301 of the Penal Code (see concept)
2.
3.
4.
30
On Estelas authority- we find it difficult to believe that Justice Romualdez ever gave the accused the authority which she claims
to have received; and in the second place, even if it be assumed that he gave her the alleged authority, she did not exercise it in
accordance with the terms thereof.
- Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief Justice to conduct the examination in accordance with the law and the Rules
of Court. He himself had no such authority as he is alleged to have given his secretary.
- plus, such alleged authority was not in writing or evidenced by any memorandum. It was not even a positive statement.
-Justice Romualdez testified that he believed that on a certain occasion he gave his secretary to understand that if a case
should be brought to her attention she might revise any grade to prevent an injustice, so long as she did not know the name
of the candidate to whom the paper belonged. When asked where she was when the pretended authority was given to her,
the accused could not remember.
Bad faith- If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the accused Estela Romualdez was given the authority which she
claims to have received, nevertheless she was not authorized to change the grades now in question, because when she made
the changes she already knew that the papers belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay. (well, proof to this was that she
couldnt refute that she did know whom the papers belonged to)
- She did not attempt to explain how she arrived at the increased grades (acted in bad faith), or how she came to revise the
grades in question, how she happened to pick these two papers out of eight thousand. She could not point to any other grades
that had been altered by her.
- Another indication of their guilt: The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis Mabunay withdrew P600 from the Philippine
Trust Co., and that on March 7, 1927 Estela Romualdez deposited P510 in the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Luis Mabunay did
not testify, and he did not present any evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew P600 from the bank immediately after
the first list was disapproved.
Estela Romualdez is guilty of a violation of article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712; and Luis Mabunay as a
conspirator and coprincipal of Estela Romualdez.
Malcolm, J. Concurring:
- The legal features of the case offer no particular difficulties. Articles 300 and 301 of the old Penal Code were violated. Examination
papers leading to admission to the bar constitute a part of judicial proceedings and are in the nature of public documents.
Street, J. Dissenting:
1. Acts imputed to Estela Romualdez do not constitute the crime of falsification of a public document, and with respect to
Luis Mabunay there is no proof connecting him in any way whatever with the acts of Romualdez.
2. The dominating question in the case against Miss Romualdez is whether Justice Romualdez gave her authority to revise the
grades in the two papers marked "898". If that authority was in fact given, no case of falsification is made out but only
abuse of authority; That this authority was given we do not entertain the slightest doubt,
3. But the fact that the authority may have been coupled with this condition (that the revision to be effected by her should be
accomplished before the names of the candidates should be known) could not alter the character of the authority.
4. However gross may have been her delinquency (its proven that Estela acted in bad faith) the offense could be nothing
more than an abuse of authority.
5. Justice Romualdez had as much authority to authorize Estela to revise grades as he had to authorize her to read and grade
papers in the first place
6. A person charged with the duty of grading or revising examination papers exercises a power involving judgment and
discretion. Such duty is evidently of a quasi-judicial nature; and a violation of such duty constitutes an abuse of authority
rather than the falsification of a public document.
7. As to Luis Malubnay: there is no item of proof connecting this accused with the irregularity imputed to Miss Romualdez.
47. Beradio vs. Court of Appeals ()
May 30, 1981 De Castro
*lawyering for public good better than doing nothing
Facts:
Salud P. Beradio, an election registrar of COMELEC Pangasinan was charged by one Raymundo Valdez of an administrative
complaint but upon knowledge that she has already resigned filed criminal charges for falsification of her daily time records. She
was convicted of 4 counts of falsification of public or official document by indicating in her daily time records that she was in the
office working but wherein it was established that she was in the courts as counsel during those particular dates.
Issue: Did she commit falsification of official document penalized under Art. 171, par.4 ?
Held: No, she did not do the act with any criminal intent.
Ruling:
Saluds position actually exempts her from keeping and submitting the daily time record being an officer who ranks higher than
chiefs and assistants as provided by Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of 1965. Also her appearances in court are in consonance
31
with the COMELECs promotion of their lawyers to act as legal counsel because during that period of martial law there wasnt much
office work for them to do. She was even doing more for benefit of the public than for her own well-being. Obviously there was no
malus animus or criminal intent on her part and does not cause damage to the government. She merely believed that she had to fill
up her daily time cards in order to get the salary she deserved, for the its purpose is a matter of administrative procedural
convenience in the computation of salary for a given period, characteristically, not an outright and strict measure of professional
discipline, efficiency, dedication, honestly and competence.
48. Luague vs. CA ()
February 22, 1982 Abad Santos
*Grieving widow spared from falsification conviction
Facts:
Iliuminado Luague, a teacher clerk in the district office of Laoang II, Northern Samar, died. Thereafter, the then Bureau of Public
Schools sent the deceased's salary warrants to the Superintendent of schools at Catarman Northern Samar, who in turn forwarded
them to the District Supervisor, Florencio Guillermo. A payroll-warrant register accompanied the checks. The paychecks delivered,
Florencio Guillermo signed the payroll-warrant registers certifying that on his official oath, each employee whose name appeared on
the rolls had received the salary warrant. One of the paychecks was personally received by Pilar Luague, the wife, while the other
was received by Edmundo Echano, a relative of Iliuminado and who claimed to be employed in the Office of the District Supervisor.
Florencio Guillermo upon discovering his mistake, asked Pilar to return the treasury warrants. She promised to do so, but actually
did not. Upon the receipt of the xerox copies from the IBM Section of the Bureau of Public Schools, Guillermo discovered that the
treasury warrants in question had been encashed by Pilar and Glen Luague with different local stores at Laoang. The reason behind
this encashment was, from the proceeds of the warrants they received, the Luague family settled their debts with the drugstores
and to settle the hospitalization expenses. Also, it was paid to Edward Kam from whom they bought construction materials for
the tomb of the deceased and to Ong Kiats store for the payment of materials used for the coffin.
For signing the name of her husband Iluminado Luague as payee on three treasury warrants for purposes of endorsement, she
was charged with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document, 3 counts. She was then convicted of falsification
only.
Issue: Is she criminally liable of falsification?
Held: NO.
Ruling:
There was no criminal intent. She acted in good faith.
The Court of Appeals failed to take into account the following facts: That she signed her husband's name to the checks because
they were delivered to her by no less than Florencio; that she used the proceeds of the checks to pay for the expenses of her
husband's last illness and his burial; and that she believed that she was entitled to the money as an advance payment for her
husband's vacation and sick leave credits the money value of which exceeded the value of the checks.
Also, the absence of damage is an element to be considered to determine whether or not there is criminal intent.
During the hearing, it was brought out that the government did not sustain any financial loss due to the encashment of the checks
because the petitioner's husband had accumulated vacation and sick leaves, the money value of which exceeded the value of the
three paychecks and the value of the checks was simply deducted from the money value of the leaves, which explains why she
was not convicted of estafa but of falsification only.
A compassionate attitude repeatedly urged by the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, would have been highly in order under the
circumstances.
49. Cabigas vs. People ()
3 Jul 1987 J. Paras
*report did not show missing treasury bills
Facts:
Dario Cabigas is the Securities Custodian of the Land Bank of the Philippines Makati Branch. On 9 March 1982, the Fund
Management Division delivered to him 19 pieces of treasury bills in the denomination of 500,000 pesos each for safekeeping. After
receiving the treasury bills, he reflected the same in the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR SDUC). In the
course of his inventory on 29 March 1982, he discovered the loss of six treasury bills with a total value of 3 million pesos. Benedicto
Reynes, his co-accused and the securities receiving clerk, crossed out the last two digits of the serial numbers from 82 to 76 with
the notation for adjustment in the 9 March 1982 Securities Delivery Report (SDR) and prepared a draft DR SDUC which stated the
existence of 1,539 pieces of treasury bills. However, Reynes did not follow the draft and instead indicated in the 29 March DR SDUC
that only 1,533 treasury bills were in their possession. On 20 May 1982, Rosie Chua was found to be authenticating with the Central
Bank one of the missing treasury bills. Upon investigation of the NBI, it was discovered that the Branch Manager Aurora Pigram
32
negotiated the missing treasury bills to secure a loan. After the investigation, Cabigas and Reynes were arrested for falsifying the 9
March SDR and the 30 March DR SDUC. Informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan for falsification of official documents which
acquitted both accused on the first charge of falsifying the 9 March SDR but convicted Cabigas for his falsification of the 30 Mar DR
SDUC.
Issue: Is Cabigas guilty of falsification of official documents?
Held: No. The DR SDUC was not an official document.
Ruling:
The crime of falsification by an employee in Article 171 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts has four elements. These are: 1) that the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in
a narration of facts; 2) that he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3) that the facts narrated by
the offender are absolutely false; and 4) that the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person.
In this case, it appeared that the elements were not present. The correction of the figure from 1,539 to 1,533 was not falsification
because it was made to speak the truth. The adjustment was not made to conceal the fact that six treasury bills were missing and
the evidence disclosed that he immediately reported such loss to the branch manager and showed good faith and lack of motive on
his part. Also, the Solicitor General agreed with Cabigas that the DR SDUC was not an official form of the Land Bank or was required
by law. It was a form he initiated for his own reference purposes and therefore he was not under legal obligation to disclose or
reveal the truth. In the absence of such obligation and the alleged wrongful intent, Cabigas was acquitted on ground of reasonable
doubt.
50. People v. SENDAYDIEGO ()
1978 Aquino, J.:
Facts:
1. This involves 3 cases of malversation thru falsification
2. Its alleged that Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Samson, an employee of a lumber and
hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used 6 forged provincial vouchers
in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
3. The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Par 1 is a certificate to be signed by the creditor. In
this case, it was not signed presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects.
4. Pars 2 and 3 were signed by Sendaydiego. Par2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred.
Par 3 stated that its approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and and that funds are available
5. Par4 states: I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the amount of sixteen thought seven
hundred twenty-seven and 52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or in check, provided there is sufficient fund cover the payment. This was
signed by the auditor, Quirmit.
6. Par5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the provincial engineer's certification
"was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ."
7. There was receipt signed by the creditor (CARRIED Construction Supply) and signed by Samson (employee there) saying that it
received the amount (P16k)
8. The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following instances:
(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad
(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by CARRIED and the receipt was allegedly forged
(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in were never delivered by the company to the provincial government
9. Five other forged vouchers were also falsified.
10. SAMSON: played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective
supporting papers, were hand-carried by Samson.
11. SENDAYDIEGO: The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedly authentic.
- Sendaydiego's defense is that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the provincial
office concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited and approved by the auditor.
12. In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with malversation through falsification in
three cases
13. Sendaydiego and Samson appealed (Quirimit was acquitted)
14. Sendaydiego died October 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Death extinguished his criminal liability
remained.
Issue:Are Sendaydiego and Samson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation through falsification?
Held: YES
33
FINDINGS & Ruling:

1. Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability
for which his estate would be liable for which his estate would be liable.
2. There was indication that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Asst Provincial Treas testified that Samson approached him (re
vouchers) saying that things were areglado na as they were already signed by Sendaydiego
3. The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer where the cashier was summoned to
make the cash payments As noted by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments should be made in the treasurer's office
when that was a ministerial chore of the cashier.
4. The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from CARRIED authorizing him to receive
the payments.
5. Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers would have been unmasked by the
supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if the payments had been made by means of checks. The company on
receiving the checks would have returned them to the treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make any
payments at all. The trial court said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion with Samson.
6. Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the treasurer (MALVERSATION is a crime which can be
committed by means of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is the same).
> This argument does not deserve serious consideration because the facts proven by the prosecution show that he had a
tieup with Samson and that he acted maliciously in signing the six questioned vouchers.
7. Samson asserted that the signature on the questioned vouchers were not his; this was proven by experts but Court said that he
still had a hand in the forging/signing the vouchers;
- The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. One is where his lastname is encircled. The other is not.
- Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious transactions, he used therein his
fake signature, or the signature which is different from his signature in genuine documents.
- Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers were Samson's signatures
- Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the prov engr office; He actually received the cash payments. Under those
circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the forger of the vouchers.
8. The RULE is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it
and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.
9. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is
presumed to be the forger.
10. Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial government and another form of
signatures of his valid transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the falsifications perpetrated in these cases.
11. As to conspiracy well, there was conspiracy. As shown by the findings in the lower court:
Sendaydiego signed the six vouchers ahead of his assistant shows that there was "malice or fraud" on the part of
Sendaydiego and that there was conivance between Samson and Sendaydiego when the proceeds of the vouchers were paid
to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner office, instead of in the cashier's. The trial court said that the fact that Sendaydiego allowed
payment in cash shows "his collission with Samson.
12. Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid under the six vouchers "was really
MISAPPROPRIATED".
- this was refuted by testimony coming from CARRIED saying they didnt receive this money and no materials were
delivered by the company
13. Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation after Sendaydiego admitted that Samson
acknowledged in the six vouchers that he received from Treasurer Sendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23.
Concepts used as CONCLUSION by the Court:
The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification and malversation were
committed.
These are not cases where the execution of a single act constitutes two grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification
was used as a means to commit malversation.
In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the falsification was resorted to
for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses
Each falsification and each malversation constituted independent offenses which must be punished separately.
In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the road and bridge could have
malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification was used as a device to prevent detection
of the malversation.
The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.
Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers constitutes six separate or distinct
34
offenses
WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six crimes of malversation.
51. Siquian vs. People ()
May 16, 1951 Padilla
*Mayor biatch, Girl just wanted to work, landed in false job
Facts:
Manuel L. Siquian took advantage of his position as Municipal Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela by preparing and signing a false
document, knowing it to be false. This was an official communication to the Civil Service Commissioner, which is required by law in
order to support the appointment of Jesusa B. Carreon to the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary. In truth,
there was no such a position existing and that there were no funds available for it.
Earlier, Jesusa and her friends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask if there was any vacany for employment, and she was
informed, she went to see the Mayor. She was accompanied by the mayor to the Office of the Municipal Secretary, Emilio
Valenzuela. Emilio, however, was not there. Even so, the mayor told her to report for work the following day and that she should be
included in the budget. She was then brought to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, of which the treasurer agreed that she could
report for work.
As early as October 1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to receive her salary, but she was told that there was no money yet.
In November 1975, she went to see the mayor, but he told her to see the treasurer. She went to the treasurer who told her that
there was no money. Because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask
regarding her unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty. Efren Ambrosia Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she
had complete appointment papers.
She then addressed her complaint to Governor Faustino N. Dy.
Then when she filed a case, the court found the mayor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of public document.
Issue:
1. Should the Supreme Court affirm the lower courts decision of having convicted him of falsification of public document? Held: No.
2. Is there absence of criminal intent on the part of the mayor? Held: Intent is not a requisite of this crime.
Ruling:
It is immaterial whether or not the Civil Service Commissioner, to whom the certification was addressed, received the document
issued by the mayor. Since the certification was prepared by him in accordance with the standard forms prescribed by the
government (specifically the Civil Service Commission) pursuant to law, the certification was invested with the character of a public
document, falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
The requisite of absolute falsity of the statement was met.
The Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget of the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and
therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted. For the Fiscal Year 1974-1975, there is no
such position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary.
The second element of the offense is likewise present.
Under the Guidelines in the Preparation of Appointment for Original Appointment, a certification of the availability of funds for the
position to be filled up is required to be signed by the head of office or any officer who has been delegated the authority to sign. As
an officer authorized by law to issue this certification, the mayor has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts which
includes information as to the availability of the funds for the position being filled up.
Wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of this crime.
In falsification of public documents, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document and the existence of any
prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.
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52. People vs. Villalon ()

December 21, 1990 - Regalado
Facts:
The accused is charged with estafa thru falsification of a public document. The complainant (Mariano Carrera) and his brother are
co-owners of a parcel of land. The Complainant executed an SPA before a notary public naming the accused (Federico de Guzman) as
his lawful attorney-in-fact. On Feb 13, 1964- With the use of the SPA, the accused mortgaged the parcel of land with the People's
Bank and Trust Company and obtained a loan of Php. 8,500.00. When the accused failed to pay back the loan, the bank was forced to
foreclose the land and sell it to Ramon.
The Complainant filed a case against the accused when he found out that the land no longer belonged to him and that he was being
ejected by the new owner. The accused pleads not guilty and says that even if he were, the crime had already prescribed because
the mortgage documents were duly registered with the Registry of Deeds on Feb 13, 1964. While the complainant filed his
information on March 29, 1974
Issue:
4. Has the Crime already Prescribed? Held: Yes
5. Is there sufficient basis to hold the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document? Held: Yes
Ruling:
Issue: 1
In the crime of Falsification of a public document the prescriptive period commences from the time the offended party had
constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered with the Register of Deeds. People vs. Reyes shows that
the registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world, thus the prescriptive period started when it was registered on Feb
13, 1984. The 10 year prescriptive period has lapsed since the complaint was filed on March 29, 1974.
Issue 2:
The accused would have been guilty of the crime of estafa thru falsification of a public document. First off, the falsification of the
public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa, this explains why he is being charged for
estafa THRU falsification of a public document.
The accused claimed in his defense that he was authorized to mortgage the whole property is untenable because the witness
complainant clearly showed that what was intended to be mortgaged was the portion pertaining only to Severo Carrera, excluding
that portion pertaining to the complainant. Thus, the alleged authorization given to the accused to get a loan from the bank on the
half portion refereed only to the share of Severo Carrera (brother of complainant).
53. Dava vs. People ()

September 30, 1991 Fernan
*reckless driver needs a quickie-license
Facts:
Michael Davas license was submitted and used as prosecution evidence for his criminal case of homicide and serious physical
injuries. As a detailman he require a license to get him to work so he asked his friend Felizardo Manalili to secure it for him which
he promptly did in Pampanga through fixers. Then one day, upon the report of the relative of his victim, he was apprehended by the
authorities and charged for falsification and use of falsified document under Art. 172 of the RPC. He was found guilty in the trial
court and the Intermediate Appellate Court thus the appeal for certiorari.
Issue: Could Michael be convicted of falsification of private individual and use of falsified documents?
Held: Yes. He was not able to provide a satisfactory explanation why he is in possession of a false document.
Ruling:
Michael clearly induced Felizardo to get him a license at all cost thus the clear irregularity in obtaining the license. The crime
squarely fits the elements for it commission: (1) The license being a public document within the purview of Articles 171 and 172 of
the RPC; (2) When it was filled up and approved by the registrar of Pampanga LTC it became a public document; (3) Then when he
was apprehended he was caught in possession of what he claimed to be his license; and the (4) last element of damage caused to
another person or at least intent has become immaterial because the principal thing being punished is the violation of the public
faith and destruction of the truth proclaimed therein. Furthermore as established in People vs Sendaydiego that the accused may
be exempted of the crime if he has a satisfactory explanation which he was unable to do, for he only tried to pass the blame on his
friend.
36
54. People vs. Cortez ()

December 9, 1975 Ericta
*Fake BIR Agent
Facts:
The Cortez introduced himself to Mrs. Reyes as a BIR Agent by showing an ID card in the name of S. Begunia together with other
BIR Papers. He was telling Mrs. Reyes that he will inspect the books of accounts and receipts of the shop, but will do away with the
procedure of she will pay him P400 as a fee.
Therefore, Mrs. Reyes went to BIR and verified the identity of this BIR Agent and found out that Cortez as Begunia was a fake BIR
Agent. Thus, they came out with an entrapment plan to catch Cortez.
The day when Mr. Cortez returned to the shop to get his P400, he ws arrested and convicted of the complex crime of robbery thru
usurpation of authority and with the use of falsified public document.
Issue: Is the conviction for the said compex crim proper?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
The court agreed with the conviction under 172 (Falsification of Public Document by Private Individial0 and Article 177 ( Usurpation
of authority) however, the court did not agree that the crime robbery with violence or intimidation was committed.
The element of intimidation or violence was lacking in this case because she already knew that Mr. Cortez is a fake BIR Agent and
she freely gave the marked money as part of the entrapment plan.
Therefore, the crome is complex crime of usurpation of authority thru falsification of a public document by a private individual. In
this case falsification was the means employed by the accused to perpetrate the crime of usurpation.
55. Gigantoni vs. People ()
16 Jun 1988 C.J. Yap
*PAL lawyers deceived by a suspended CIS agent
Facts:
On 14 May 1981, Melencio Gigantoni, then an employee of a private company named Black Mountain Mining Inc., went to the
Philippine Air Lines office and falsely represented himself as a PC-CIS agent. There, he showed his identification card showing that
he was an agent and upon such belief, the PAL legal officers issued to him his requested records. After he left, the PAL lawyers
became suspicious of his real identity and verified with the PC-CIS if he was really agent. They then found out that he was dismissed
from the service since 30 June 1980 for gross misconduct brought about by the extortion charges filed against him and his final
conviction by the Sandiganbayan. The next day, he was arrested by the NBI when he returned to the PAL office and admitted that
he was no longer with the CIS. He was charged with usurpation of authority and was later convicted by the Makati RTC. Upon
appeal at the Supreme Court, he claimed that he could not be guilty of the charge since at that time, he was still a CIS agent who
was merely suspended. He denied receiving the notice of dismissal effective 20 June 1980 but was only aware of the notice of his
suspension dated 23 June 1980.
Issue: Did Gigantoni knowingly and falsely represent himself as an agent of the CIS?
Held: No. The prosecution did not prove that he was aware of his dismissal during the said act of misrepresentation.
Ruling:
Usurpation of authority under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who knowingly and falsely represents
himself to be an officer, agent, or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine government or any foreign
government.
In this case, there was no evidence by the prosecution showing that the dismissal was actually conveyed to Gigantoni. Thus, the
failure of the prosecution to prove that he was duly notified of his dismissal from the service negates the charge that he knowingly
and falsely represented himself to be a CIS agent. The burden of proof of the offense charged lies with the prosecution. It is
essential to present proof that he actually knew at the time of the alleged commission of the offense that he was already dismissed
from the service. Therefore, Gigantoni was acquitted.
On the claim of the Solicitor General that it made no difference if he was suspended or dismissed because both implied the absence
of power to represent himself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office to which he was knowingly deprived of
[usurpation of official functions], the Court held that the Gigantoni was charged only for knowingly and falsely representing himself
to be a CIS agent [usurpation of authority]. It has not been shown that the information given by PAL was confidential and was given
to him only because he was entitled to it as part of the exercise of his official function. It was shown that it was readily made
available to him because they believed at that time that he was a CIS agent.
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56. Legamia vs. IAC ()

August 28, 1984 Abad Santos
Facts:
Corazon Legamia lived with Emilo N. Reyes for 19 years. Throughout the time they lived with each other, Corazon was known as
Corazon L. Reyes, because she and he introduced her as such to friends. When Emilio died, Corazon filed a letter claim in behalf of
Michael, their child, with the Agricultural Credit Admin for death benefits. She signed the letter as Corazon L. Reyes. Felicisima Reyes,
who was married to Emiilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution.
Issue: Is Corazon guilty of using a fictitious name?
Held: No
Ruling:
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name of the man she is living with
despite the fact that he may be married to another woman. Corazon publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his family
name. Thus, it is in the light of the cultural environment that the law must be construed and that the lawmakers could not have
meant to criminalize what Corazon had done.
56. Diaz vs. People ()
October 31, 1990- Paras
*The one who did not graduate yet placed in his application that he graduated college
Facts:
Reolandi Diaz sought for appointment as School Administrative Assistant I in Jose Abad Santos High School. In his application he
indicated that his highest educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B. (Liberal Arts) allegedly pursued or obtained at the
Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges, respectively, during the years 1950 to 1954 inclusive.
But it was found that he was never enrolled at the Cosmopolitan and Harvadian Colleges. Certification from the school revealed
that he never enrolled in the said school both in Tondo and San Fernando, Pampanga. The name of petitioner was not included in
all the enrollment lists of college students submitted to the then Bureau of Private Schools of the Department of Education by the
Harvardian Colleges at San Fernando, Pampanga and at Tondo, Manila, during the period during which petitioner claimed to have
been enrolled. The same thing is true with the list submitted by the Cosmopolitan Colleges to the said bureau.
He only presented transcript of record signed by Mrs. Virginia King vda. de Yap, for and in behalf of the then President of the
school, Ildefonso Yap. But Mrs. Virginia Yap, disowned the said signature. Besides, at the bottom portion of the transcript is a
printed notation reading this is only valid with the college seal and signature of Pres. Ildefonso D. Yap. Exhibit "I" lacks the
imprint of the college seal and the signature of President Ildefonso Yap himself.
With foregoing facts, the lower court convicted him of crime of falsification of official document penalized under Article 171,
paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code
Issue: Is the crime of falsification of official document correct?
Held: No. He committed perjury
Ruling:
Based on the facts, evidently the statement made by accused is devoid of truth. The records of these colleges do not at all reveal
that petitioner was even enrolled at any time from 1950 to 1954 in its College of Liberal Arts. His name does not appear and could
not be found in the enrollment lists submitted to the Bureau of Private Schools by these colleges. The transcript presented lacks the
authenticating marks-the imprint of the college seal and the signature of the President of the college. His defense failed to present
any corroborating piece of evidence which will show that he was indeed enrolled
The elements of the crime of perjury are
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bar.
People v. Rufo B. Cruz:
Acused Rufo B. Cruz failed up an application form (Civil Service Form No. 2) for the patrolman examination. He stated therein that
he had never been accused, indicted or tried for violation of any law, ordinance or regulation before any court, when in truth and in
fact, as the accused well knew, he had been prosecuted and tried before the Justice of the Peace of Cainta, Rizal, for different
38
crimes. The application was signed and sworn to by him before the municipal mayor of Cainta, Rizal.
Court held that a person, who stated under oath in his application to take police examination that he had never been convicted of
any crime, when as a matter of fact he has previous convictions, committed perjury.
57. Paterno OUANO v. CA and Francisco Echavez ()
1990 Narvasa
*Cheating the bidding
Facts:
This case involves a parcel of land registered in DBPs (previously RFC) name. Adjoining it are Ouano and Echavezs lands. The
property was offered for sale by public bidding by DBP.
Prior to the bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid, and that if it was accepted, they would
divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties. To ensure success of their enterprise, they also agreed to induce the
only other party known to be interested in the property. Of course this setup was successful and Echavez became the highest
bidder.
But DBP never approved of this sharing agreement. It only approved of the lot sold to Echavez (thru budding) which the latter had
difficulty paying- it took him 4 yrs to pay. Ouano contested DBPs refusal to recognize their agreement. When he learned about
Echavezs difficulty in paying the property, he offered to pay and be subrogated in Echavezs rights over the propery. DBP didnt
allow it. Ouano sued them.
Issue: Is the agreement between Ouano and Echavez (done prior the bidding) valid?
Held: No, its against
Ruling:
Their acts of entering into that agreement and inducing a third party constitute a crime under Art 185 of the RPC which is
Machinations in public auctions.
The agreement thus being criminal in character (and VOID), the parties not only have no action against each other but are both
liable to prosecution.
58. People vs. Kottinger ()

29 Oct 1923 Malcolm
*Igorots are not obscene
Facts:
J. J. Kottinger is the manager of Camera Supply Co. On 24 November 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided his business and found
and confiscated postcards which disclosed six different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines. He was then
charged for having kept for sale in the store obscene and indecent pictures, in violation of section 12 of Act No. 277 or the
Philippine Libel Law. During trial, the prosecution produced no evidence proving that the postcards were obscene and indecent. The
fiscal merely admitted that the pictures represented the natives in their native dress. On the other hand, the defense presented Dr.
Henry Otley Beyer, a renowned anthropologist, and testified that from his studies, the pictures represented poses that he observed
on various occasions and that the costumes worn were the actual costumes regularly worn by them. Judgment was rendered finding
Kottinger guilty of the offense and sentenced him to pay a fine of 50.
Issue: Are the postcards obscene?
Held: No. The postcards merely depict reality.
Ruling:
The Court initially defined obscene as used in the United States as something that signifies that form of immorality which has
relation to sexual impurity, and has the same meaning as given at common law in prosecutions for libel. The test ordinarily
followed by the courts is whether the tendency of the matter charges as obscene is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences.
The Court held that following the standard set up by the US Congress, it would be extremely doubtful that the pictures were
obscene or indecent. The pictures merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in
unusual postures or dress. Since they were not obscene or indecent within the meaning of the law, the judgment was reversed and
Kottinger acquitted.
Justice Romualdez dissented and said that if the pictures cannot be termed obscene, they must be regarded as indecent. No
woman claiming to be decent would dare to stand before the public in Manila, where said pictures where exhibited. He concluded
that the law prohibits exhibition not only of obscene pictures but of indecent as well.
39
59. People vs. Aparici ()

August 30, 1955 Paredes
*Sige muna, sige nakakalibod.
Facts:
Detectives Nibungco and Jose, accompanied by photographers of the Manila Chronicle, went to the Azcarraga Theatre in order to
observe what was being exhibited there. Lo and behold, Virginia Aparici was dirty dancing and she had nothing on except nylon
patches over her breasts and nylon panties. Around her waist was a furry white girdle with a middle piece punctuating attention on
the thing she was supposed to hide. Apparently, this was a mens show, with more than 100 customers howling: Sige muna, sige
nakakalibod. She was found guilty under Art. 201 on indecent and immoral plays, scenes, acts and shows
Issue: Did she commit a crime under indecency and immorality of acts?
Held: YES
Ruling:
The artistic, the aesthetic and the pulchritude in the nude body of a living woman may readily be transformed into an indecent and
obscene object by postures and movements of such body which produce perceptible and discernible reaction in the public or
audience witnessing the same. The motive may be innocent, but its performance may be shocking, offensive and disgusting to good
morals.
Her manager, Leong Ching was exonerated when he should have been equally liable for the offense.
60. People vs. Alova ()
June 28, 1957--Montemayor
*Mickey's show: sex in the ping pong room
Facts:
Accused of performing highly immoral and indecent acts
In a one story building, that could have passed as a shed, an exhibit of the human fighting fish was held. In this exhibit, The
accused put an army steel bed with bedding into the center. Basically, the exhibit involved two people having sex in front of an
audience that paid Php. 3 per customer. Fajardo, one of the accused, aroused even more interest by allowing the audience to
choose who the principal actors would be.
Issue: Are they guilty of performing highly immoral and indecent acts?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
One cannot say that any of these actions was prompted or expressed art. This is clearly that the obscenity shown was an offense to
public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the
youth of the land.
61. Manipon vs. Sandiganbayan ()
July 31, 1986Fernan
...so they will have something for the New Year...
Facts:
Accused of Direct Bribery
Manipon is a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and he was tasked to enforce an order by the Minister of
Labor directing him to garnish the bank account of Harry Dominguez. Dominguez, a building contractor, had been order by the labor
arbiter to pay Tabek and other judgment creditors. Manipon garnished the bank accounts and yet did not immediately report back
to the labor arbiter. Dominguez later sought Manipon's help expressing interest that he needed to make a withdrawal from his
account. Manipon then implied that if he were bribed he would help Dominguez. They agreed, yet unknown to Manipon,
Dominguez confided to the authorities (Col. Sanchez) and a plan was hatched to entrap Manipon by paying him with marked
money.
On the day of the execution, Manipon delivered his letter to the bank lifting the garnishment. With that done, Dominguez made a
withdrawal for Php. 1000 and gave it to Manipon. Manipon was later picked up by the authorities.
Manipon for his defense, claims that Dominguez caries a grudge against him and that was what prompted him to set him up. Also,
that the collection made by Dominguez was payment in partial satisfaction of the judgment under execution to which the judgment
creditors headed by Tabek had agreed to.
Issue: Is Manipon guilty of Direct Bribery?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
The overt acts of Manipon do not add up to his defense. First, for such an important agreement, there is no written document
proving Manipon's defense. Secondly, if there existed distrust between the two, why did they not have the agreement in writing?
Thirdly, the very fact that Manipon did not immediately report to the labor arbiter over his accomplishment of the task of
garnishment makes his behavior at the very beginning irregular.
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62. Dacumos vs. Sandiganbayan ()

April 16, 1991 Cruz
* BIR examiner caught for direct bribery
Facts:
Alfonso Dacumos a BIR examiner, offered to settle the tax liability of R. Rebilla Interiors by pulling out its assessments papers from
the BIR commissioner in exchange of a fee of P30,000. Gregorio Samia, the manager of the firm, pretended to get along with him
but reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which later on arranged an entrapment. During the
entrapment in Rizal Cafe, he was caught holding on the marked money P1000.00 thus, he was arrested by the police and charged
with the crime of direct bribery.
Petitioners defense:
He said that he could not promised to pull out the assessment because he has no access to those documents. Furthermore, he said
that he has been in service for 29 years and he would not have been so crude and so rash as to demand money from Samia. He
said he had met Samia only because of Samias insistence in securing his help.
Issue: Is the crime of direct bribery correct?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
Alfonso has not shown that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence. His defense of being framed because Samia
resented his refusal to be bribed is not convincing. It is belied by his proven acts. The implausibility of his promise does not mean
they were not made or that they did not appear to be credible, coming as they did from one with his long experience in the BIR
and appeared to know his way around.
The Court finds it especially remarkable that he met Samia at a private place instead of his office in BIR.
The Court is not inclined to believe that Samia would be so vindictive as to falsely incriminate Alfonso with the serious charge of
bribery simple because Alfonso refused to reduce the tax assessment. Samia was not even directly involved in the assessment.
63. Morfe v. Mutuc ()
1968 Fernando, J.:
*no need for one-liner, its THE Morfe-Mutuc case
Facts:
This is a petition to declare null and void Sec 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices), insofar as it required
periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the government
after he had once submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming office. This petition hinges on due process.
Issue: Is the law valid?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
As the Sec of Justice says: when a government official, like plaintiff, accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily
assumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office but during
the time he continues to discharge public trust. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life.
SC says the law readily shows that its precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is enacted under the police power of the state to promote morality in
public service.
64. Jaravata vs. Sandiganbayan ()
31 Jan 1984 Abad Santos
*assistant principal follows-up salary differentials
Facts:
Having informed six classroom teachers that their salary differentials have already been approved for release, Hilario Jaravata,
their assistant principal, and the teachers concerned agreed that Jaravata would go to Manila to follow-up its release with the
obligation that the teachers would reimburse his expenses. Upon its release, the expenses incurred by Jaravata amounted to 220
and divided the said amount by six or 36 each. The teachers gave excess amounts but their administrator, Conrado Baltazar,
disapproved it and ordered Jaravata to return the money to which he complied. He was then charged of violating section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 and was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan. He was sentenced to one to four years imprisonment and
perpetual disqualification from public office.
The said provision prohibits public officers from directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift for himself in connection with
any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.
Issue: Did Jaravata violate the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
41
Held: No. He was not required to intervene under the law.

Ruling:
The Court held that no law invests Jaravata with the power to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials of the teachers.
He merely played the humble role of a supplicant whose mission was to expedite payment of the differentials. As assistant
principal, he was not required by law to intervene. Thus, he cannot be said to have violated the law thereby acquitting him of the
charge.
65. Trieste vs. Sandiganbayan ()
Nov.13, 1986 Alampay
*Mayor merely signed vouchers, hes innocent! (???)
Facts:
Generoso Trieste Sr. is the municipal mayor of Numancia, Aklan. He was convicted of twelve (12) separate violations of Section 3
paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for having financial or pecuniary
interest in a business intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest in
the purchases of construction materials by the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation, of which the accused is the president, incorporator, director and major stockholder.
After review of the case he petitioned that his suspension for public office be lifted to which nobody opposed and he was reinstated
as Mayor immediately. He then submitted a supplemental petition that he did not in any way intervene in making the awards and
payment of the purchases that he only signed the vouchers after being delivered and paid by the Municipal Treasurer.
Issue: Could the Mayor be held guilty of graft and corruption under sec .3(h) R.A. 3019?
Held: No. He is Acquitted because it is not established that he intervened.
Ruling:
The new Solicitor General moved for the acquittal because the prosecution failed to establish all the elements of the offense and
proved that he directly or indirectly received pecuniary benefits in the business transaction. The prosecutions evidence if nondivestment is also weak, failed to establish intervention and that there was an absence if bidding and award as initially alleged.
There could be no intervention because there was no bidding as the purchases were made by and authorized by the Municipal
Treasurer and he only signed upon delivery and after the payment has been made.
Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order
that liability may attach. (Opinion No. 306, Series 1961 and Opinion No. 94, Series 1972 of the Secretary of Justice). The official need
not dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. For the law
aims to prevent the don-tenant use of influence, authority and power.
The Mayor could not be faulted for the municipality transacting with Trigen because they have been doing business with the
municipality even before Trieste became mayor. There was also no undue advantage given to Trigen for the mayor did not use his
influence or authority to give the transaction to Trigen.
66. Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan ()
June 30, 1987 Cortes
*Corrupt right-of-way agent, helpless claimants
Facts:
Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer who was a right-of-way agent in the Office of the Highway District Engineer. Some
residents were affected by the widening of the proposed Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. 2nd IBRD Project, and so as a right-of-way
agent, he contacted and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or
improvements affected by such. He required the them to sign blank copies of the "Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair
Market Value of Real Properties" and "Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct improvements" pertinent to their
claims. The claimants complied without bothering to find out what the documents were all about. However, in said statements, the
value of the respective properties were made to appear very much higher than the actual value claimed by them. Likewise, the said
"Agreements to Demolish" reflected the value of the improvements as per assessor" which on the average was only P2,000.00 lower
than the value they declared.
A few months after processing the claims, Mejorada accompanied the claimants to receive payments and personally assisted them
in signing the vouchers and encashing the checks. They were then accompanied to his car where they were divested of the amounts
paid to them leaving only the sum of P1,000.00 to each, except Isaac Carlos to whom P5,000.00 was left, explaining to them that
there were many who would share in said amounts. All the claimants were helpless to complaint because they were afraid of the
accused and his armed companion.
Issue: Did Mejorada commit graft and corruption?
Held: YES
Ruling:
42
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The last sentence of paragraph (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government
corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may not come within the term.
The government suffered undue injury as a result of the petitioner's having inflated the true claims of complainants which became
the basis of the report submitted by the Highway District Engineer to the Regional Director of the Department of Highways and
which eventually became the basis of payment. His contention that he had no participation is belied by the fact that as a right-ofway-agent, his duty was precisely to negotiate with property owners who are affected by highway constructions for the purpose of
compensating them.
He took advantage of his position as a right-of-way-agent by making the claimants sign the aforementioned agreements to
demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was evident
bad faith on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of the true claims and when he divested the claimants of a large
share of the amounts due them.
SP1: IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ()
October 15, 2010 Per Curiam
*The Famous Plagiarism Issue involving the SC
Facts:
The Vinuya Case:
Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 elderly women, members of the Malaya Lolas Organization, filed a case against the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Justice, and the Office of the Solicitor General. They allege that they have
since 1998 been approaching the Executive Department, requesting assistance in filing claims against the Japanese military officers
who established the comfort women stations. They claimed that during WWII, the Japanese army systematically raped them and
destroyed their village, and so they compelled the Executive Department to espouse their claims for official apology and other
forms of reparations against Japan before the ICJ and other international tribunals. But that Department declined, saying that
petitioners individual claims had already been fully satisfied under the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
On April 28, 2010, the Court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners action. Justice Mariano C. del Castillo wrote the decision for
the Court. The Court essentially gave two reasons for its decision: it cannot grant the petition because, first, the Executive
Department has the exclusive prerogative under the Constitution and the law to determine whether to espouse petitioners claim
against Japan; and, second, the Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse their claims.
The Plagiarism Controversy:
On July 18, 2010, more than a month after petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration, Atty. Harry Roque announced in his
online blog that his clients would file a supplemental petition for plagiarism committed by the court. The media gave publicity to his
announcement, and the next day, they filed such petition, accusing Justice Del Castillo of plagiarism. According to the petition, Del
Castillo copied without acknowledgement certain passages from 3 foreign articles and twisting the true intents of the plagiarized
sources (twisted to support the courts erroneous ruling that the Filipina comfort women during WWII have no further legal
remedies).
On the other hand, Justice Del Castillo argued that when he wrote the decision, he had the intent to attribute all sources used in it.
The ponencia involved lots of deliberations and major revisions. Also, he argued that the sources were re-studied.
The said authors expressed their concern about the conclusions made by the court in accordance with their works. Dr. Mark Ellis and
Mr. Christian Tams wrote the court, while Evan Criddle wrote on his blog.
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, referred to by the Court En Banc, assumed the investigation of the controversy. Justice
Del Castillos researcher was given the opportunity to demonstrate by Power Point presentation how the attribution of the lifted
passages were unintentionally deleted. She tearfully expressed remorse at her "grievous mistake" and grief for having "caused an
enormous amount of suffering for Justice Del Castillo and his family." She explained that accidentally, she electronically cut
relevant materials from books and journals in the Westlaw website. However, Atty. Harry Roque insisted that lack of intent was not
a defense in plagiarism. He invoked the Courts ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and
Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine, arguing that standards on plagiarism in the academe should apply with more force to the
judiciary.
Issue: Was plagiarism committed and did Justice Del Castillo twisted such works to make it appear that it supported the Courts
43
Position in Vinuya?
Held: No.
Ruling:
Petitioners theory ignores the fact that plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where intent to deceive is inherent.
The researchers explanation regarding the accidental removal of proper attributions to the three authors is credible. Given the
operational properties of the Microsoft program in use by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions to sources of
research materials is not remote. For most senior lawyers and judges who are not computer literate, this is likely to happen. MS
Word does not have a function that raises an alarm when original materials are cut up or pruned. The portions that remain simply
blend in with the rest of the manuscript.
The Court understands that Justice Del Castillo did not initially disclose his researchers error. He wrote the decision for the Court
and was expected to take full responsibility for any lapse arising from its preparation.
The omission of attribution did not bring about an impression that Justice Del Castillo himself created the passages that he lifted
from their published articles. The judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages courts to cite
historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions.
Assigning cases for study and research to a court attorney is standard practice in the high courts of all nations. This is dictated by
necessity. With about 80 to 100 cases assigned to a Justice in our Court each month, it would be truly senseless for him to do all the
studies and research. Justice Del Castillo retained control over the writing of the decision in the Vinuya case. The Justices researcher
was after all competent in the field of assignment given her. She finished law from a leading law school, graduated third in her class,
served as Editor-in Chief of her schools Law Journal, and placed fourth in the bar examinations when she took it. She earned a
masters degree in International Law and Human Rights from a prestigious university in the United States under the Global-Hauser
program, which counsel for petitioners concedes to be one of the top post graduate programs on International Law in the world.
Justice Del Castillo did not exercise bad judgment in assigning the research work in the Vinuya case to her.
SP2: Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan ()
September 12, 2007
*The Famous Plunder Case of our Ex-President Moviestar
Facts:
An Information for plunder was filed against former President Estrada, together with Jinggoy, Edward Serapio, et al. for the crime
of Plunder defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659. The Information was subsequently
amended:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, illgotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
MEANS.
(i) by a series of acts of receiving bi-monthly collections from jueteng, in the aggregate amount of P545,291,000.00. Out of this
amount, P200,000,000.00 was deposited in the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation; and
(ii) by a series consisting of two acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation and
collecting or receiving commission from the sales of Belle Shares in the amount of P189,700,000.00 which was deposited in the
Jose Velarde account.
Issue: Are they guilty of Plunder?
Held: Erap, GUILTY. Jinggoy and Atty. Serapio NOT GUILTY.
Ruling:
The elements of the crime of plunder, pursuant to RA 7080 and as laid down by the Supreme Court in the earlier case of Joseph
Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, 19 November 2001), are as follows:
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
44
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal
acts described in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 as amended; and
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
The terms Combination and Series were likewise defined in the above-cited case. Combination refers to at least two acts falling
under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec.1, par. (d), subpar. (1),
and fraudulent conveyance of assets belongings to the National Government under Sec.1, par. (d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to
constitute, there must be two or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d),
say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1).
Section 1 (d) reads:
Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of
Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or in directly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversation, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/ or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of asset belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivision,
agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including promises of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
With respect to Jinggoy Estrada, there was no evidence that the money he turned over to Gov. Singson or the latter representatives
or was part of the jueteng protection money collected. The prosecution did not also rebut the bank certification presented by the
defense that Jinggoy Estrada did not have an account with the United Overseas Bank.
With respect to Serapio, neither Gov. Chavit Singsons testimony nor the ledger entries proved that Serapio was involved in any way
in the collection or disbursement of jueteng protection money.
The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion
Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in
accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, accused Former President Estrada is sentenced to suffer
Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification.
Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the Court hereby declares
the forfeiture in favor of the government of the following: (1) The total amount of P545,291,000.00, with interest and income
earned, inclusive of the amount of P200,000,000.00, deposited in the name and account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation; (2)
The amount of P189,000,000.00, inclusive of interests and income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde account; and (3) The real
property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as Boracay Mansion located at #100 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
68. Labatagos v. Sandiganbayan ()
1990 Padilla:
*Preggy Malversationalist
Facts:
Labatagos was the cashier and collecting officer of the Mindanao State University. A COA agent conducted an examination on her
cash and accounts. It was found out that petitioner did not have any cash in her posssession, so she was asked to produce all her
records, books of collection, copies of official receipts and remittance advices and her monthly reports of collections. The result of
the investigation was that Labatagos had unremitted amounts of P34,336 and P71,365 (she didnt remit them to DBP). So she was
sued for Malversation of Public Funds.
In her defense, she said that she couldnt be held accountable because, 1st, because she was on maternity leave during the dates
45
were those unremitted amounts were transacted/dealt with; 2 , and that several disbursements not credited in her favor by the
auditors; 3rd, as regards the P34,336, its her superiors who appropriated the amounts and they were properly receipted but that the
receipts were lost.
Issue: Is Labatagos guilty of Malversation of public funds?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
On her 1st defense, Mrs Guazon, the one who was assigned to collect fees in Labatagos stead because the
latter filed for maternity leave, testified that she turned over all her collections to Labatagos. On her 2 nd defense, the auditor was
correct in refusing to credit Labatagos with the amounts she mentioned. One amount, purporting to be refunds of tuition fees to
students granted tuition privileges was not supported by any official authorization for such refunds by the University authorities.
Another amount was not supported by valid voucher. On her 3rd defense, all the other sums allegedly taken from her by her
superior was supported by mere pieces of paper, so not valid disbursements. And, assuming that the amounts were really obtained
by the superior, the responsibility to account for them still rests in Labatagos being the accountable officer.
nd
Malversation consists not only ill misappropriation or converting public funds or property to one's personal use but also by
knowingly allowing others to make use of or misappropriate them.
70. Ilogon vs. Sandiganbayan ()
9 Feb 1993 Campos Jr.
*acting postmaster giving cash advances
Facts:
Calinoco Ilogon was the acting Postmaster of the Bureau of Posts in Cagayan de Oro City and also performed the task of a cashier
from July 1978 to January 1986. On 19 Sep 1983, the Commission on Audit conducted an examination of the cash and accounts
under his possession and showed that he incurred a shortage of 118,003.10. He was charged with Malversation of Public Funds
and was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan. He raised the defense that the shortage was brought about by vales (cash advances) in
payments of salaries that he granted to his co-employees. He also argued that he never misappropriated the amount for his own
personal use and has since fully settled the same.
Issue: Is Ilogon guilty of the crime malversation of public funds?
Held: Yes. He was not in the possession of the money when the demand was made.
Ruling:
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received public funds and
that he did not have them in his possession when demand was made. There is even no need of direct evidence of personal
misappropriation as long as there is a shortage in his account and he cannot explain the same. The fact that his immediate superiors
acquiesced to his prating of giving out cash advances for convenience did not legalize the distribution. His ability to fully settle the
shortage is of no moment. At best, it is only a mitigating circumstance.
Also, the granting of vales which constituted the bulk of the shortage was a violation of the postal rules and regulations.
Postmasters are only allowed to use their collections to pay money orders, telegraphic transfers and withdrawals from the proper
depository bank whenever their cash advances for the purpose are exhausted.
82: Estepa vs. Sandiganbayan ()
February 15, 1990 Feliciano
*tanga-tanga iniwan yung bundles ng pera (Estapa-estupid)
Facts:
Leonardo Estepa is one of the senior paymaster who received their partition of the money for their cash advances. The partition of
the 7.64M was held during a brownout in a well-lighted room closed to other people. Mr. Marcelo supervising officer duly handed
down to each paymaster their share and to Leonardo Estapa the amount of 850K. And then he said, Ayos na ba kayo dyan?,
afterwhich people began leaving. Estapa then left the higher denomination bundles of money on the sofa inside the office and went
to get the other bills of lower denomination which he left on the table because people where already coming-in and he couldnt
carry the entire amount. After which when he counted the money in his cage he found out that it was short of one bundle of php 50
worth 50K.
Issues:
Is he guilty of malversation of public funds?
Held:
Yes. It was clear that he was negligent in his duty.
Ruling:
Certainly, it was foolhardy to leave bundles of money of high denominations of Pl00 or P50 with no one to guard for them even only
for a fleeting moment. In short, accused's inexcusable negligence consisted of the following: (1) failure to check-and re-check the
denominations by him before the paymasters disperse (He shouldve counted the money first before leaving), (2) not sounding off
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that he was not absolutely certain of the amount received when Mr. Marcelo asked the paymasters, "Ayos na ba kayo diyan?" (3)
failure to ask Atty. Kempis or any other person to watch over the money of bigger denominations at his cage before he returned to
the table of Mr. Pangilinan for the smaller denominations. Had he not been remiss on these, there would have been no opportunity
for an unknown hand to surreptitiously get hold of the money.
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds
and that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefore was made and he could not satisfactorily explain his
failure so to account. An accountable public officer may be convicted for malversation even if there is no direct evidence of
personal misappropriation, where he has not been able to explain satisfactorily the absence of the public funds involved.
Under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, there is prima facie evidence of malversation where the accountable public officer
fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable upon demand by duly authorized officer. As this Court
has pointed out, this presumption juris tantum is founded upon human experience.
Concept:
Presumption juris tantum legal but rebutabble presumption
71. Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan ()
February 26, 1997 Panganiban
*Private Indiv didnt become public officer by simply being BIR depository on distraint property
Facts:
Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services contracted by Paper industries Corp of
Phil (PICOP). Occasionally, he engaged services of sub-contractors like Ancla whose trucks were left at formers premises.
In May 1983, Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main Office of the BIR addressed to the Reg Director
Batausa commanding him to distraint the goods, chattels or effects of other personal property of Ancla, subcontractor of Azarcon
and delinquent taxpayer.
The warrant of garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to surrender, transmit, or remit to BIR the property in his
possession. Warrant was received by Azarcon in June 1985. Then, Azarcon signed the Receipt for goods, articles and things seized
under authority of the National Internal Revenue which stated that he promised to faithfully keep, preserve, to protect goods
articles and things seized xxx and will produce and deliver all said goods, articles etc upon the order of any court in
the Philippine or upon demand of Commissioner of Internal Revenue or any agent of BIR.
Azarcon wrote letter in 1985, November which stated that Jaime Ancla ceased his operations and surreptitiously withdrew his
equipment from custody. Therefore, he wanted to cancel the previous receipt he had signed. Incidentally Azarcon reported taking
of truck to security manager of PICOP and requested him to prevent truck being taken out of the PICOP concession. By the time the
order was given, it was too late.
Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, petitioner Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation
of public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
The petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan on May 14, 1991, alleging that:
(1) the Azarcon never appeared in the preliminary investigation; and
(2) the Azarcon was not a public officer, hence a doubt exists as to why he was being charged with malversation under Article 217
of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
1. Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a private individual who is charged with malversation of public funds as a
principal after the said individual had been designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a custodian of distrained
property? Held: No jurisdiction
2. Did such accused become a public officer and therefore subject to the graft courts jurisdiction as a consequence of such
designation by the BIR? Held: Did not become a public officer
Ruling:
I. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual, i.e. when the complaint charges the private individual either as a coprincipal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction. The
Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an
offense under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. Thus, unless petitioner be proven a public officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no
jurisdiction over the crime charged.
47
II. Azarcon: A Public Officer or A Private Individual?

In signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public
functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. He did not qualify also because of direct provision of
law, or by competent authority.
The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in effecting constructive distraint over the truck allegedly owned by Jaime Ancla, and in
requiring the petitioner Alfredo Azarcon who was in possession thereof to sign a pro forma receipt for it, effectively designated
petitioner a depositary and, hence, citing U.S. vs. Rastrollo. The court disagreed because the facts therein are not identical, similar
or analogous to those obtaining here.
Although sec 206 of the NIRC authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring any person to preserve distrained
property, the BIRs power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to
appoint him as a public officer. No provision in the NIRC constituting such person to become a public officer by reason of
constructive distraint of personal property.
The language of the foregoing provision is clear. A private individual who has in his charge any of the public funds or property
enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should
likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied
that a private individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer.
It is evident that the petitioner did not cease to be a private individual when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump
truck. Therefore, when the information charged him and Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds or
property, the prosecution was in fact charging two private individuals without any public officer being similarly charged as a coconspirator. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore all the proceedings taken
below as well as the Decision rendered by Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction
Concept:
Who public officers? (to) be a public officer, one must be -(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or
(2) Performing in said Government or any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or
class; and
(3) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform public duties must be -a. by direct provision of the law, or
b. by popular election, or
c. by appointment by competent authority.
72. Rodillas vs. Sandiganbayan ()
May, 1988-Gutierrez
*escaped through the bathroom
Facts:
The accused is a police officer and is said to have committed the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner Thru Negligence.
(elements at bottom) He had brought the prisoner for her trial. She was charged with something in relation to the Dangerous Drug
Act law, which during the trial, the judge chose to defer the decision. When court was adjourned, the husband of the prisoner asked
the accused (the guard) if they could have lunch because they were already very hungry. The Accused agreed. After which, the
husband asked the guard another favor which was if the prisoner could go to the bathroom to relieve herself. The guard agreed and
allowed the prisoner and a lady companion to enter the bathroom. The lady friend left the bathroom and claimed that she was
getting napkins for the accused because she had her period. It was only 10 minutes after the friend left the bathroom did he get
suspicious and checked. She was gone. He spent the rest of the going to the home of the husband in Rizal, Nueva Ecija and other
place where she might have escaped to. It was only at 8PM did he report the loss of the prisoner to his superior.
Defense: The accused argues that he never received any formal training for this sort of thing.
Issue: Is he guilty of Art 224?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
It is known that well planned escapes are always possible. The request for lunch was a consequent delay for the prisoner to learn of
a plan or to carry out an earlier plan which she could escape. The plan was in fact carried out with the help of the lady who
accompanied the prisoner inside the comfort room. The use of a toilet is one of the most familiar and common place methods of
escape.
48
The accused even admits that he did not even bother to check if the bathroom was secure. Also, it was clear negligence when he
allowed 10 minutes to lapse after the friend said she was getting napkins for the prisoner before checking in on her. Considering that
it was only 11:30 AM, it would not have been inhuman to forego lunch (the jail was near) and to allow her to use the restroom. Also,
there was no genuine effort on the part of the accused to find her. There would have been a higher chance of recovering the
prisoner had he reported it earlier but he only reported it late at night.
The defense does not float because there are no hard and fast rules of conduct under all conceivable situations for police officers
acting as guards should know. They are however expected to use prudence, diligence, and common sense.
Concept:
Art 224:
1. Offender is a public officer
2. he is charged with conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment
3. that such prisoner escapes through his negligence
Negligence- definite laxity as all but amounts to a deliberate non-performance of duty on the part of the guard.
73. People v. JUMAWAN ()
1982 Abad Santos
*wife asks brother to kill her
husband
Facts:
Rodolfo Magnaye and Presentacion Jumawan were married but had already been living separately. The wife and her family,
particularly the mom, had made several attempts to secure the signature of Rodolfo Magnaye on a document agreeing to a
separation from his wife so that both he and his wife will be free to marry again but Rodolfo Magnaye persisted in refusing to sign
said document. One day, Rodolfo went to the market because apparently he and wife had an agreement to meet that day. Then on
that day, one witness said that he saw accused Francisco Jumawan, Manuel Jumawan and Cesario Jumawan na pinagtutulungan si
Rodolfo. Cesario was the one who stabbed Rodolfo. The latter died. Evidence established that it was Presentacion who ordered the
killing.
Issue: Can Presentacion Jumawan be held guilty of parricide?
Held: No, simply because it was not alleged in the information
Ruling:
Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but since her relationship to the deceased is not alleged in the information,
she, like the others, can be convicted of murder only qualified by abuse of superior strength. Although not alleged in the
information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should be assigned against the appellants. True, relationship is inherent
in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of murder. And as to the others, the relationships of father-in-law and brother-in-law
aggravate the crime.
*There was conspiracy among them so though she didnt actually participate in the killing, she was nevertheless charged of murder.
74. People vs. Tomotorgo ()
April 30, 1985 Alampay
*wife who threw baby beaten to death by enraged husband
Facts:
Jaime Tomotorgo and Magdalena de los Santos are husband and wife. Magdalena has been insisting that they sell their conjugal
home and live with his husbands-in-laws. But Jaime doesnt want because he has been tending to his farm which is far the house of
his in-laws. Coming home one day he found his wife leaving with their child with her bags of clothing, he pleaded for her to return
home but she was not willing. When he tried to get the baby from his wife, she threw it to a grassy portion which enraged the
husband. He picked up a piece of wood and beat up her wife until she complained of difficulty of breathing after which he brought
her to their house and came back for their child. The wife died and he surrendered to the authorities thereafter.
Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty but eventually changed his plea to guilty. He was nonetheless found guilty of parricide with
three mitigating circumstances of: 1. Voluntary surrender, 2. Plea of guilty and 3. Passion and Obfuscation. He was penalized with
reclusion perpetua.
Issues: Was Tomotorgo properly convicted of parricide and given the correct applicable penalty?
Held: Yes. He is guilty of parricide and given proper penalty.
Ruling:
He contends that according to Art. 49 of the RPC the crime of penalty which he is charged provides for a higher penalty to which he
intended to commit which is only serious physical injuries, the latters penalty should be imposed in its maximum. Also given that
there are three mitigating circumstances he deserves to be given a penalty lower by one degree. And that pursuant to par.4 of Art.
263 he deserves to be given only the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods.
49
These contentions are manifestly untenable and incorrect, for Art.4 of the RPC expressly states that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended and that
the accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious acts. The contention that he deserves to be given the graduated
penalty in Art. 263 is untenable as his wife died very soon after the assault. Following the ruling in People v. Demiar, where the
accussed choked his mother causing her death in a fit of rage for not preparing him food is properly charged with parricide despite
his lack of intent to kill his mother. Considering the circumstance the court recommends executive clemency or his sentence be
commuted so that he can now be eligible for parole.
75. People vs Malabago ()
2 Dec 1996 J. Puno
*husbands admission of marriage enough even without marriage certificate
Facts:
On 5 Jan 1994, after an argument with her wife Letecia, Pedro Malabago struck her with a bolo in her face down to the neck which
immediately led to her death. He was then charged with parricide and was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. On
appeal, he claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the legitimate marital relation between him and Letecia. However during
trial, he admitted that he was legally married to Letecia Malabago by civil ceremony officiated by Mayor Barinaga.
Issue: Did the prosecution prove that Pedro and Letecia were legally married?
Held: Yes. Pedros admission in open court of a valid marriage with Letecia was against his penal interest.
Ruling:
In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage
certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such
proof is not objected to. The testimony of Pedro that he was married to Letecia is an admission against his penal interest. It is a
confirmation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
The testimony of Letecias mother, Guillerma Romano who witnessed the crime, was clear, spontaneous, and straightforward. The
affidavit of desistance she later signed was for the sake of her three grandchildren who pleaded that she withdraw the complaint.
The court modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua considering the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
Concept:
Parricide is committed when:
1. A person is killed;
2. The deceased is killed by the accused;
3. The deceased is the father, mother, child, a legitimate descendant or ascendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.
76. People vs. Ignacio ()
March 26, 1997 Vitug
*Wife use palo-palo to kill his husband and now saying that they are not married.
Facts:
On the night of 09 February 1992, Rosaria and Juan had a heated argument. Milagros, entreated them to stop but the couple were in
no mood to heed her. The following night (10 February 1992), at dinner, Juan and Rosaria had another quarrel. Milagros grudgingly
went upstairs and tried instead to put her child to sleep. She could hear, after a brief moment, that the fight had become somewhat
violent (nagrarambulan). Milagros peeped. She saw by the gas lamp (batutoy), that both were pulling a piece of lawanit and each
tried to take possession of it. Juan ultimately released the lawanit and turned to go for his bolo when Rosaria picked up a palopalo and hit Juan on the nape.
Rosaria left the straggling (kikisay-kisay) Juan and surrendered to the police at the municipal building. Juan died the following day.
Testifying in her defense, Rosaria did not deny having inflicted the fatal wounds on her husband. According to her, between seven
and eight o'clock in the evening of 10 February 1992, while she was resting on the wooden bed near the kitchen, after having
returned home from her laundry work, her husband arrived. He was drunk. Armed with a bolo, he went around the wooden bed
and then faced her. Exasperated, she finally stood up, pulled his hair, got hold of a palo-palo and hit him once on the head. The
assault sent Juan hovering down the floor seriously wounded. Rosaria went to the municipal hall and surrendered to police officer
San Diego.
Rosaria has interposed this appeal praying that she be acquitted on the basis of self-defense or, in the alternative, that she be held
guilty only of homicide rather than of parricide.
50
Appellant contends that, if at all, she should be convicted only of homicide, not parricide, because "there was no clear evidence of
marriage" between her and the victim
Issue: Is she guilty of the crime parricide?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without it, there can be no selfdefense. In this case, appellant's claim of self-defense was belied by her own daughter, Milagros, who declared that even before
the victim could get his bolo, appellant already picked up her palo-palo and hit him.
Here, appellant not only declared in court that the victim was her fourth husband but she also swore that they were married
before a judge in Montalban, Rizal. The victim's son testified that his father and appellant were husband and wife, in much the
same way that appellant's daughter, Milagros, held the victim to be her mother's husband.
Appellant's own admission that she was married to the victim was a confirmation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio and the
presumption that a man and a woman so deporting themselves as husband and wife had verily entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.
77. People vs. Genosa ()
September 29, 2010 Panganiban
*Sir Jominis case and Legardas client
Facts:
The accused is the wife of the deceased and is being accused of parricide for the murder of her husband. It was discovered that the
body of her husband was found with his eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protruding out of its mouth. She claims
that she had shot her husband, yet the trial judge ruled that the cause of death was due to the act of her smashing him with a pipe.
The accused admits that she killed her husband but she did so out of self-defense under the concept of the battered wife syndrome.
She requests that her case be remanded back to the RTC for the reception of evidence from qualified psychologists or psychiatrists.
Issue: Should the case be remanded?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
The accused wishes to impress upon the court the existence of the defense of the battered wife syndrome. A post-traumatic stress
disorder that the U.S. and Europe have accepted as valid forms of self defense. The characteristics of the syndrome are:
(1) The woman believes that the violence was her fault.
(2) She has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere
(3) She fears for her life and / her childrens lives and
(4) She has an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and omniscient.
She claims that she lived in a constant state of danger of harm or death and that the beatings would escalate over time. She claims
that she was trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would succumb to her helplessness and fail to
perceive possible solutions to the problem other than to injure or kill her batterer.
It is not for the Supreme Court to determine if the accused acted freely, intelligently and voluntarily when she killed her spouse. The
court however cannot properly evaluate her battered woman syndrome defense, absent expert testimony, thus the case should be
remanded.
78. People vs. Abarca ()
September 14, 1987
*He was studying for the bar, she was studying alsothe art of making love
Facts:
Francisco and Jenny Abarca were married. While Francisco was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar Exam, his wife was left in
Tacloban and had an illicit affair with Khingsley Paul Koh. In 1984, after having failed to ride the bus twice to fetch his daughter, he
proceeded to his fathers house; lo and behold, he caught the two having sex. Francisco, however, had to run away because when
they realized that he was there, Koh immediately got hold of his revolver. Francisco then went to look for his own firearm. 30 mins
having already lapsed, he returned to the house, but they were gone. He then proceeded to Kohs hideout, where he was there,
playing mahjong. With his M-16, Francisco shot Koh 3 times and died instantly. It so happened that adjacent to where Koh was
situated, was a room occupied by Arnold and Lina Amparado. They were accidentally hit by such shots; fortunately, both lived after
medical attention. He was charged and convicted of murder with double frustrated murder. He was sentenced to death.
Issue: Is Article 247, Death or Physical Injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances, applicable in this case?
51
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
It is very clear that Francisco caught his wife and her paramour in the act of sex. According to Article 247, he should only be given the
penalty of Destierro. For the injuries he caused on the Amparados, he should not be penalized with double frustrated murder
because he was in the act of committing a lawful act, under Art. 247. However, he is held liable for less serious physical injuries
through simple imprudence or negligence.
79. People v. BUENSUCESO ()
1984 Melencio-Herrera
*patrolman kills a man who doesnt wanna surrender his
knife
Facts:
Patrolman Aguilar was trying to take the fan knife of Tayag, but the latter wouldnt give it, according to him he wasnt doing
anything. At the suggestion Aguilar, Tayag readily agreed to go to the office of the chief of police. Tayag still wouldnt give it, so he
hurriedly left the office. He was followed by Aguilar, Mallari and de la Cruz who walked fast, with Aguilar and Mallari holding guns.
After having gone out of the building, Aguilar fired his gun upward.Hearing the shot, Tayag turned about, then retreated backwards.
Aguilar aimed his gun at Tayag and fired, hitting him above the right knee. Tayag continued to run towards his house. Then there
were several successive gun shots. After the commotion, Tayag was seen lying dead.
Issue: What crime are the accused guilty of?
Held: Murder, qualified by treachery
Ruling:
There is ample evidence establishing that all the accused had fired their guns at the victim hitting him on different parts of his body.
True, it has not been established as to which wound was inflicted by each accused. However, as this Court has held, where the
victim died as a result of wounds received from several persons acting independently of each other, but it has not been shown
which wound was inflicted by each assailant, all of the assailants are liable for the death of the victim.
The crime is Murder, qualified by treachery. The victim was already retreating backwards until he reached the fence of the building
when AGUILAR fired his revolver at the former hitting him above the right knee. Notwithstanding that he was already hit and
wounded, and possibly immobilized, he was still subjected to successive shots. Certainly, the means employed by the accusedappellants tended directly and specially to insure the execution of the crime without risk to themselves arising from any defense
which the victim might have made. The killing of the victim was aggravated by abuse of superior strength as shown by the number
of assailants, which circumstance, however, is absorbed by treachery.
Aguilars claim that it was self-defense is not meritorious as clearly shown by the circumstances under which he fired shots.
80. People vs. Pugay ()
November 17, 1988 Medialdea
*they made a retardate human torch Flame on!
Facts:
Bayani Miranda, a retardate, met the group of drunken friends including the accused Fernando Pugay and Benjamin Samson at the
town plaza. They made fun of him by tickling him with a stick on his ass making him dance. Pugay suddenly took hold of a can of
gasoline and poured it on Miranda, Eduardo Gabion who witnessed the incident while on the ferris wheel asked him to stop. Then
Samson set him on fire which stunned them all. Miranda died after being brought to the hospital.
The accused are convicted of murder with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, conspiracy, abuse of superior strength and
evident premeditation.
Issues: Are Pugay and Samson guilty of Murder or Homicide?
Held: Homicide. They had no intent to kill but was only part of their merry-making.
Ruling:
There is no proof showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accusedappellants immediately before the commission of the crime. The respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from
different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by
him
Pugay failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be
committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the
accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the RPC.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On
the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the
circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
52
the offended party might make. As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the
accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide. To his credit is the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to
commit so grave a wrong.
81. People vs. Basay and Ramirez ()
3 Mar 1993 Davide Jr.
*improperly made extra-judicial confession inadmissible as evidence
Facts:
Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez were charged with Multiple Murder and Frustrated Murder with Arson for having allegedly killed
the spouses Zosimo and Beatrice Toting, their 6-year old daughter Bombie who died three days after due to her injuries, and having
burned their house to conceal the crime and as a consequence killing the other daughter Manolita and injuring Manolo Toting.
Evidence presented during the trial include: a) the dying declaration of Bombie that both accused killed her parents and burned
their house; b) that when investigating officers went to the house of Ramirez, he tried to run away; and c) a Joint Waiver containing
their extrajudicial confession which was however disregarded by the court for being signed without presence of a counsel. After
trial, the trial court acquitted Basay but convicted Ramirez and sentenced him to life imprisonment. It took notice of Ramirezs
extrajudicial confession and his conduct of running away which is indicative of guilt. The trial court judge then ordered that the
records of the case be transmitted to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
Issue: Is Ramirez guilty of the crime charged?
Held: No. His guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt and was therefore acquitted.
Ruling:
The extra-judicial confession made by Ramirez and obtained during his custodial interrogation was taken in blatant disregard of
his right to counsel, to remain silent, and to be informed of such rights, thus inadmissible as evidence. First, the interrogation was
conducted and written in English, a language he cannot speak or understand. Second, he was not told that he could retain a counsel.
Third, he did not sign any waiver of his right to remain silent and to counsel. Fourth, he was not assisted by any counsel during the
investigation. A barrister, Elpedio Catacutan, merely signed as a witness and not as a counsel (because he was not a lawyer). Fifth,
the extra-judicial confession was not correctly explained and translated by the Judge.
The trial court also erred in admitting Bombies alleged statement. She was not a competent witness because her condition made it
impossible for her to have communicated effectively. The doctor presented during trial testified that when he last saw Bombie, she
could not talk thereby expressing doubts to the veracity of her statement. When the trial court disregarded Bombies testimony for
Basay, it should have done so also for Ramirez. Also at the time of his arrest, he tried to run away out of fear when he saw the
armed law officers. This should not be considered as the flight which is indicative of guilt. At best, it could only be considered as
circumstantial evidence.
The crimes that should have been charged against the accused were 3 separate murders and arson. The death of Manolita and the
injuries sustained by Manolo were consequences of the burning of the house. Also, the trial court erred in imposing life
imprisonment as penalty when it should have been reclusion perpetua. The transmittal of the case for automatic review was also
erroneous since it only applies to those punished with death.
82. People vs. Salufrania ()
March 30, 1988 Padilla
*Husband killed his wife and testified by his 13 year old son
Facts:
Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was charged before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch I, with the complex crime
of parricide with intentional abortion
Filomeno Salufrania and Marciana Abuyo were legally married and they had several children. Two of of their sons, Pedro and Alex
witnessed how their father killed their mother.
Pedro is 13 years old and accused alleged that he cannot be considered as witness since he is of tender age thus incapable of
receiving correct impressions of facts and that he was only 11 when the crime happened. Presumed to incompetent under ROC Art
130 sec 19(b). However, with careful supervision of the court a quo, they determined that he is capable and intelligent. He
convincingly declared that he was not under the threat of his uncle to testify.
He testified that at around 6 pm their parents quarreled and he saw his father boxed the stomach of his pregnant mother then
strangle her to death afterwards. He saw blood oozing from her nose and eyes and died on the spot where she fell. Then he saw his
father went out of the house to get a hammock and the father arrived early in the morning and place the body of their mother in
the hammock and brought to his sister Conching in Tigbinan and from there was transferred to Talisay for burial.
53
He refused to live with his father because the latter threatened him and his siblings that he will kill them should they reveal the true
cause of their mothers death.
Narciso Abuyo testified that the accused and his sister were legally wedded husband and wife evidenced by a marriage contract.
That he first came to know about his sisters death thru his nephews. After being told of the incident, he went to the police.
Accused had for his defense witnesses Villan, Bragais, Balce and himself. Villan testified that he happened to pass by the house and
saw accused boiling ikmo and garlic as medicine for wife who was about to deliver. He helped the accused in applying the treatment
on the victims body. When the condition worsened, he told accused to get Bragais who is a healer. But when the latter arrived,
victim is already dead.
Bragais testified that he was fetched by Felipe, another son, and that victim was already dead when he arrived.
Balce was called by one of the latters son and when she arrived, victim is still in coma lying on the lap of the husband.
Filomeno said that he was wedded to victim and that wife complained of stomach pain and so he took care of her, prepared the
treatment and the condition worsened, woke up sons to call for help and fetch Villanueva but the sons arrived without Villanueva
but arrived a little later.
Issue: WON the crime judged by the RTC of complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion is proper.
Sub issue of WON Pedro as a witness is credible.
Held: Accused guilty of Complex Crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion.
Ruling:
Lastly, appellant alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an
abortion. In this contention, appellant is correct. He should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional
Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. 17
The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because he boxed his pregnant wife on
the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her.
We find that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken
together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In
fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
Sub issue:
- Although there were minor discrepancies and inconsistencies in Pedros testimony, the Court appreciated his answer only
as miscomprehension or confusion of the questions asked by the examiner.
83. People vs. Orita ()
April 3, 1990 Medialdea
*19 year old college student who jumps out of a window
Facts:
The victim is a 19 year old college student who came home late from a party. The moment she knocked on the door of her boarding
house, the accused poked a knife at her neck. It was a man who was a frequent visitor of another boarder. It is later identified that
he is a Constabulary Soldier. Forced to follow his orders out of fear of death, she opened the door and was lead towards her room,
where the man asked her to take off her cloths. Afterwards, he ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. While
doing so, he made her hold his penis and insert it into her vagina. The second position he requested was when the accused lay down
on his back and commanded her to mount him. Both positions did not amount to complete penetration. Taking advantage of the
fact that his hands were face down on the floor, she fled from the room, and eventually jumped out of the window and found
herself with the company of several police officers.
The trial court rules that the accused committed the crime of frustrated rape.
Issue: Is there such a thing as frustrated rape?
54
Held: No
Ruling:
The supreme court rules that the case of People vs. Erinia, which appreciated frustrated rape, was an isolated case and was never
repeated.
By applying the elements of the frustrated felony mainly:
(1) That the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony.
Correct: The fact that there was penetration shows that all the acts were accomplished.
(2) That the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrators will.
Wrong: The second element of the frustrated offense is lacking because any act of penetration already consummates the crime of
rape. Thus, it does not matter if the penis did not fully penetrate the woman.
Concept:
Attempted Rape occurs when there is no penetration of the female organ.
84. People vs. Campuhan ()
March 30, 2000 Bellosillo
*Mere bombardment of the castle of orgasmic potency only
Facts:
Primo Campuhan was allegedy caught by Corazon Pamintuan kneeling in front of her daughter Crysthel (4 years old), with both their
pants down, he, forcing his penis into the childs vagina, while she was crying Ayoko, Ayoko. Primo, who was the helper of
Corazons brother, was charged of rape. According to the medico legal officer, the hymen of the child was intact. Nonetheless, Primo
was convicted of statutory rape, death penalty imposed, based on the testimony of the Crysthel. She denied that penetration
occurred. This case is on automatic review.
Issue: Did he commit the crime of rape?
Held: No. The court found that instead, he committed Attempted Rape.
Ruling:
"Mere bombardment of the castle of orgasmic potency or mere strafing of the citadel of passion is only Attempted Rape. But
mere bombardment of the drawbridge is invasion enough even if the troops did not succeed in entering the castle."
In consummated rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Slight penetration is equivalent to rape. The mere touching of external
genitalia is considered rape when it is an essential part of penetration, and not just touching in the ordinary sense (People vs. Orita).
Labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated (People vs. Escober). It is also consummated even when penetration is
doubted, which is manifested in the discoloration of the inner lips of the vagina, the redness of the labia minora, or theres a
presence of hymenal tags.
It is only attempted rape when there is no penetration, or when it did not reach the labia. What occurred was a mere grazing of the
surface.
85. People v. Mangalino ()
June 28, 2000 Rehnquist
*neighbor rapist (!!!) gives innocent kid 2 pesos to satisfy his devil-manned lust
Facts:
So accused raped 6-y/o victim (Marichelle). Then her mom found out and reported the incident. Medico legal reports: No evidence
or sign of any extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination. Hymen, intact and its orifice,
narrow. Sign of recent genital trauma, present. In short, the doctor said that rape could have been perpetrated. To reiterate, he
certified the existence of indications of recent genital trauma.
Curiously, the young victim candidly testified that she felt no pain when the accused was allegedly trying to insert his penis into her
vagina. She did not cry in pain nor shout for help when she was being abused.
Issue: Is accused guilty of statutory rape?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
The victim being of a tender age, the penetration could go only as deep as the labia. In any case, the Court has consistently held that
for rape to be committed, full penetration is not required. It is enough that there is proof of entrance of the male organ within
the labia or pudendum of the female organ. Indeed, even the slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape.
The attempt to discredit the prosecution's version as shown by the fact that Marichelle did not cry out or struggle against her
attacker deserves scant consideration. The absence of hymenal laceration adequately explains why Marichelle did not feel any pain
during the attempted sexual intercourse.
86. People vs. Villapana ()
55
*sweetheart unwilling to marry charged with rape by smiling widower
May 5, 1988 Cortes

Facts:
Eduardo Antonio Villapana was charged and was convicted of rape of complainant Maria Macaranas. The incident happened on
April 16, 1976 when she was awakened by the accused trying to enter the window, but failure to do so entered through the door
and pointed a knife at her breast and was dragged to the kitchen so as not to awaken her 7yr old child and made to lie on the
wooden bed where he then inserted his finger and penis into her private part.
After being raped, she rested for a while before confiding it to her Aunt who lived next door that they lost control of themselves
and took her a week to complain to the baranggay captain.
Antonio alleges that they were sweethearts, and that he was invited to her house where she kissed him and then proceeded to the
kitchen where they made love twice.
Issues: Could Antonio be rightfully convicted of rape?
Held: No, the actions of the complainant of the accused before, during and after the incident show otherwise.
Ruling:
This case for the prosecution rests solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Macaranas. "While we have frequently held that the
uncorroborated testimony of the offended party in cases of this kind may be sufficient under certain circumstances to warrant
conviction, yet from the very nature of the charge and the ease with which it may be made and the difficulty which surrounds the
accused in disproving it where the point is as to whether the cohabitation was with or without the use of force or threats, it is
imperative that such testimony should be scrutinized with the greatest caution."
The prosecution has failed to meet the exacting test of moral certainty and proof of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The normal reaction of any person being entered upon by an intruder under would have been to call for help or make an outcry to
awaken her neighbors and/or call their attention, or do something to repel the intruder, and protect her home, herself and her
daughter from any harm. Also her actions are unnatural and unbelievable that a woman whose honor had just been outraged
would do nothing to immediately bring the culprit to justice as it took him a week to report the incident to the authorities and has
not offered a satisfactory reason for the delay.
It was also established by witnesses that there exist a special relationship between the two and the case was instituted because of
the accused refusal to marry her until he finds a regular job.
Concepts:
Three (3) settled principles to guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence in rape cases:
(1) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove it but more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove it;
(2) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. [People v. Quintal, G.R. No. L-49656, November 25,
1983 125 SCRA 734.]
87. People vs. Balbuena ()
27 Apr 1984 Guerrero
*lesbian raped during a drinking session with Ginebra
Facts:
On 28 August 1975 and after holding a drinking party, accused Abelardo Balbuena and Juanito Torres raped Elvira Polintan, a
lesbian. Elvira consumed half a glass of gin and asked permission from the group to lie down in a bench in the billiard hall where they
were drinking. It was at this instance that the accused undressed her and forced her into sex on top of the billiard table, one after
the other. One month and 23 days after, she related her experience to her mother and thereafter filed charges against them. The
medico-legal report concluded that there was no evident sign of extragenital physical injury on her body and that she could have had
sexual intercourse with a man on or about the alleged date of commission. Both the accused rest their defense on alibi. After trial,
the court convicted them of rape and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Were the accused guilty of rape?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
The accused contend that the lower court should have declared Elvira as an incredible witness due to the delay of more than a
month before the rape was reported to the police. The court ruled that the delay in filing the complaint was reasonable. It
considered the inate modesty of Filipina womanhood and the inherent reluctance of the Filipino family to be exposed to the rigors
of a long drawn out trial scandalizing the family. She was also fearful over the threats of the accused that they would kill her and her
parents should she report the matter and expressed her worry that her ongoing classes at school would be disrupted. Her desire to
avoid further shame was more sufficient to restrain her from immediately reporting the incident.
56
The general rule is that the testimony of the victim, whose chastity has not been questioned, is generally accorded credence
because she would not have fabricated facts that could bring shame and dishonor on her. When a woman testifies that she has
been raped, she says all that need to be said to signify that the crime has been committed. During her testimony, she was steadfast
in the fact that she was raped. The fact that she was a lesbian showed that she would not willingly submit herself to a sexual
intercourse with a male person. Also, the evidence was clear that the accused employed force in raping her when they held her at
her wrists and feet while she fought and struggled.
Abad Santos dissenting:
Elviras conduct casts a dark cloud on her claim that she was raped. First, there was no determined resistance nor did she shout for
help considering that there were other persons in the premises. Second, there were no signs of extragenital injury. Third, there was
unreasonable delay in the filing of the complaint. She was also not a typical Filipino woman because she was already a guzzler of gin!
88. People vs. Castro ()

May 6, 1991 Padilla
* 6 years old girl being raped inside the toilet in standing position
Facts:
Delfin Castro y Lozada, being charged of statutory rape defined under Art. 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
Six (6) year old Diana Rose Castro , while playing with a neighbor sometime on 4 October 1986, she was pulled by the accused
inside a bathroom, prevented from going out, and made to stand on the toilet bowl. Accused is a first cousin of Diana Rose's
mother. Kuya Delfin, as Diana Rose referred to the accused, then put up her clothes, took off her panty, made her lean on the wall
and, despite her efforts to pull away he inserted his private part into her causing pain. Then she was told by the accused to go home.
At home, she refused to have her private part washed by her Auntie Alice because it was hurting and painful.
Delfin's alibi is that Diana went to his house while he was taking a bath. She was crying and went inside the bathroom. When asked
by the accused why, she replied that while going down the stairs, a dog whose two (2) hind legs were limping, chased her and so she
tripped. In the morning of 4 October 1986, he woke up went to school, pass a term paper, treated his godsister lunch and went
home. Delfin further narrated that on or about 8 October 1986, he was invited to the Pasay Police Headquarters for questioning.
While there, he was asked to undress, was blindfolded and beaten by around 7 to 10 policemen for about half an hour and made to
admit that he raped Diana. Since he could no longer stand the torture, he told them that he used his small finger to touch her
private part.
He contends now there is no rape because
a. the hymen of the victim was not lacerated.
b. the victim was allegedly standing while the crime was being committed.
c. the victim is still a virgin.
Issue: Is it proper to charged Castro the crime of statutory rape?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
The victim being of tender age, the penetration of the male organ could go only as deep as the labia. In any case, for rape to be
committed, full penetration is not required. It is enough that there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia or
pudendum of the female organ. Even the slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape.
Perfect penetration, rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina are not essential for the offense of consummated rape.
Entry, to the least extent, of the labia or lips of the female organ is sufficient. Diana's remaining a virgin does not negate rape.
Sexual intercourse in a standing position, while perhaps uncomfortable, is not improbable.
89. People vs. Atento ()
April 26, 1991 Cruz
*retarded girl who says that her rape was masarap
Facts:
The victim is 16 years old and is classified as being a mental retardate. She claims that she was raped a total of 5 times by the
accused, who is their 39-year old neighbor who owns a store. One day she went to buy bread when the accused asked her to come
inside his home and brought her downstairs where he succeeded in deflowering her. The victim claims that she was raped four
other times and was threatened by the accused never to speak of the rapes or he would kill her. The victim could not hide the truth
57
forever because she became pregnant and gave birth to his child.
The accused denies the charges of rape and believes that the stipulations were mere harassment and concocted by a relative of the
girl who wanted to eject him from his home.
Issue: Was the victim raped?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
The court finds that the accused did indeed rape her and he can help accountable for both paragraph 2 and 3 of Article 355. Had she
not been retarded, the case would have probably been dropped because of the victims description of the act being pleasurable. It is
because of the fact that she is retarded and because of her low I.Q., which leads the court to believe that it is impossible to believe
that she could have fabricated her charges against the accused because she lacks the guilt of articulation and inventiveness. Rape
primarily exists in the succeeding paragraphs because it is the absence of free will which determines the existence of rape.
Article 355 (2)

All of the elements necessary to consummate the crime of rape exist. (1) the victim is a woman. (2) the victim was deprived of
reason, she being a mental retardate.
Article 355 (3)
The court finds that the level of retardate of the victim is that of the intellectual capacity between the ages of 9 and 12 years old,
thus it can be said that she qualifies under paragraph 3 because she possessed the same mentality of a girl less than 12 years old at
the time of rape.
Judgment: She should be charged with only 1 count of rape because the other 4 have not been sufficiently proven.
Concept: Where the offended party was feeble-minded, sickly and almost an idiot, sexual intercourse with her is rape. Her failure to
offer resistance to the act did not mean consent for she was incapable of giving any rational consent.
90. People vs. Dela Cuesta ()
April 16, 2002 Puno
*Uncle not found to have raped niece, 2 counts of Acts of Lasciviousness
Facts:
Joey dela Cuesta was charged with qualified rape and acts of lasciviousness against his niece, Frances Grace Alcido (11 years old). On
January 3, 1998, his uncle carried her to the room, kissed her vagina, he spread her legs and inserted his organ into hers. She could
not do anything because the uncle was holding her hands. She felt pain. She was threatened to be killed if she would tell anybody.
On January 13, 1998, while she was sleeping with her brothers and sisters, she felt somebody kissing her vagina, and she later
realized that it was her uncle. Her aunt, Imelda, caught Joey in the act, and she solded him. According to the medico legal officer, she
did not find any extra-genital or genital injuries on Frances vagina. Her hymen was intact and the hymenal orifice was small.
Nonetheless, he was found guilty of both charges, sentenced to death for qualified rape. Under the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness,
there was the aggravating circumstance of relationship as Joey is the victims uncle, the victim being only 11 years old. This case is on
automatic review.
Issue: Did he commit rape?
Held: No, but 2 counts of Acts of Lasciviousness.
Ruling:
To convict the accused of the offense, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with
a woman, (3) by force and without consent, and in order to warrant the imposition of death penalty, the additional elements that
(4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted), ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The prosecution in this case failed to prove the first element of sexual congress. It presented the testimony of private complainant:
While she was sleeping, she felt somebody was kissing her private part. It turned out to be accused-appellant, her uncle. Her Uncle
Joey carried her to the room, kissed her vagina, spread her legs, and then inserted his organ into her organ. Prosecution witness Joel
Atibola testified that he and his friends were watching a movie, and from where he stood, he could see the area where private
complainant and accused-appellant slept. He saw accused-appellant position himself near the foot of private complainant, and he
noticed that accused-appellant placed his hands under the blanket of private complainant and touched her private part. Atibola did
not mention anything about the rape. In addition, the medico-legal report shows that the hymen of private complainant is still
intact. While it is true that a torn hymen is not an essential element of the crime of rape, such finding would be material to this case
58
since the testimony of another prosecution witness clouds the veracity of complainants assertion that she was raped.
Nonetheless, although it was not established that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of private complainant, the evidence
showed that he touched private complainants private parts while the latter was deep in sleep. Such act constitutes acts of
lasciviousness penalized under Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness are: (1)
that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force or intimidation or (b) when
the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex. All the elements of
the offense are present in this case.
91. People v. Sabredo ()
June 28, 2000 Rehnquist
*uncle kidnaps and rapes niece
=((
Facts:
Sabredo is the uncle of complainant (Judeliza). He is the younger brother of her father. Sabredo has been living the with the family
of Jud when the incident happened. One day, Judeliza went to the well near their house, to take a bath. There, Jimmy grabbed and
forcibly dragged her at knife's point, to the highway where he made her board a truck for Bogo, Cebu. Impelled by fear, she
complied, since Jimmy continuously poked a knife under cover of his jacket at her. From Bogo, he took her by passenger motorboat
to Placer, Masbate. They stayed at the house of Conchita Tipnit. Conchita was Jimmy's sister and Judeliza's aunt, though aunt and
niece did not know each other. Judeliza tried to escape but was caught by Jimmy, who severely mauled her until she lost
consciousness.
Then one night, Jimmy, armed with a blade, sexually assaulted Judeliza. Later, Jimmy struck Judeliza with a piece of wood, rendering
her unconscious. Much later, he brought her to the house of his sister, Nilda Polloso, also at Cagba. Judeliza recovered sufficiently
from her injuries. Nilda brought her to the police where Judeliza reported her ordeal.
Jimmy admitted having sexual relations with Judeliza, but insisted that it was consensual. He claimed that they were lovers and had
been engaging in sexual intimacies for three months before running away. He explained that they had gone to Masbate after
Judeliza had revealed to him that she was not really her father's daughter.
Issue: Is the accused guilty of forcible abduction with rape?
Held: No, just because the information failed to allege that she was abducted with lewd designs, so RAPE lang
Ruling:
First, theres no proof that the intercourse between him and Judeliza was consensual.
The elements of forcible abduction are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of age, civil status, or reputation; (2)
that the abduction is against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. Here, the victim was forcibly taken at
knifepoint and through threats and intimidation brought to various towns in Masbate, where he passed her off as his "wife". That
appellant was moved by lewd designs was shown in regard to rape by his having carnal knowledge of private complainant, against
her will.
While it may appear at that forcible abduction was also committed, we are not totally disposed to convict appellant for the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape. The information fails to allege "lewd designs." When a complex crime is charged, such as
forcible abduction with rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of all the elements of forcible
abduction, as well as all the elements of the crime of rape.
The imposable penalty for rape, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. But where the rape is committed with the use
of deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion perpetua to death. The use of the
bladed weapon already qualified the rape. However, R.A. No. 7659 cannot be made to apply in the instant case for two reasons:
First, at the time the rape was committed, private complainant was already more than 18 of age. Second, the information did not
allege that offender and offended party were relatives within the third degree of consanguinity. We have held that the seven
circumstances in R.A. No. 7659 which warrant the automatic imposition of the death penalty partake of the nature of qualifying
circumstances and as such should be alleged in the information to be appreciated as such. So penalty here is only reclusion
perpetua.
92. People vs. Arillas ()
June 19, 2000 Puno
*Rapist-father escaped death due to failure to allege age in information
Facts:
Amor Arillas was the daughter of accused Romeo Arillas. She was sixteen years of age. She was raped on two occasions by her
father while his sibling and mother were outside of the house with the use of force, violence and intimidation. For fear that she will
be ravished again she reported the incident to the baranggay captain.
59
The trial court convicted Romeo with two counts of rape and to suffer the penalty of death as provided by section 11 of R.A. 7659,
calling for the imposition of the death penalty when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is her parent or ascendant.
Issues: Was Romeo correctly penalized with death for qualified rape?
Held: No, he could only be convicted of simple rape.
Ruling:
The trial court was incorrect to charge him with qualified rape because the age of Amor was not alleged in the information. As ruled
in People vs. Garcia, we held that these circumstances should be considered as special qualifying circumstances as they change the
nature of simple rape by punishing the offender with the penalty of death. For a crime to be elevated in its qualified form, the
circumstance that qualifies it should be alleged in the information. If the qualifying aggravating circumstance is not alleged but
proved, it shall only be considered as an aggravating circumstance since the latter may be proven even if not alleged.
The information only alleges that the victim is the daughter of the accused and does not allege that she is under 18yrs old thus only
simple rape may be charged.
93. People vs. Mahinay ()
1 Feb 1999 Per Curiam
*child who was raped and killed in an unfinished house and dumped in the septic tank
Facts:
After drinking the whole day on 25 June 1995, Larry Mahinay, a houseboy employed by Maria Isip to take care of her house which
was still under construction, raped and killed a neighbor, 12-year old Ma. Victoria Chan. He was convicted of rape with homicide
and sentenced to death after the following circumstantial evidence were presented: 1) he was seen drunk when he tried to buy
lugaw from a store in front of the Isip compound at around 9pm; 2) a policeman saw the victim standing in front of the unfinished
house between 8 and 9pm; 3) Maria Isip testified that Larry did not return home after asking permission to go out with friends; 4) a
jeepney driver testified that he boarded a jeep at 2am the next day; 5) personal belongings of the victim was found in the
unfinished house where Larry slept; 6) Larrys extra-judicial confession; 7) Larrys testimony in the court that he slept in the room
and implicated two others as alibi; 8) he could have apprised his innocence when he was arrested to a high ranking police officer or
a lady reported who interviewed him; and 9) the circumstance of flight strongly indicated his guilt. He killed the child by throwing
her over the terrace then dumping her in the septic tank.
Issue: Was the crime of rape proved by the circumstantial evidence?
Held: Yes. The circumstantial evidence clearly established rape with homicide.
Ruling:
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent
and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
If a woman is 12 years of age or over at the time of rape, not only the first element of sexual intercourse must be proven but also the
other element that the perpetrators evil acts with the victim was done through force, violence, intimidation or threat needs to be
established. Both elements were present since Larry admitted that he raped the child while she was unconscious after her head hit
a table. Since she was unconscious, it could be safely concluded that she had not given free and voluntary consent to her
defilement.
His claim that his constitutional right to counsel was violated was belied by the testimony of the PAO lawyer who was present when
he gave his extra-judicial confession. The sentence imposed upon him was correct since the special complex crime of rape with
homicide is punishable by death under Article 47 of the RPC.
Concept:
Conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites occur:
1. There is more than one circumstance;
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. The combination of all the circumstance is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
94. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGAPITO QUIANOLA y ESCUADRO and EDUARDO ESCUADRO y FLORO ()
May 5, 1999- Vitug
*Girl went to a dance party went home, but got rape by those pretended to be NPA
Facts:
Catalina Carciller her cousin 15-year-old Rufo Ginto and another male companion named Richard Diaz, went to attend a dance.
About an hour later they left the party and were soon on their way home. The three unsuspecting youngsters stopped momentarily
to rest at a waiting shed beside the Tangil Elementary School. Accused Agapito Quianola a.k.a. "Petoy" and accused Eduardo
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Escuadro a.k.a. "Botiquil" who were both armed with guns suddenly turned up Quianola beaming his flashlight at the trio while
Escuadro stood by focused his attention on Catalina. Quionala announced that he and Escuardo were members of New People's
Army ("NPA"). Quionala instructed Escuadro to take care of the male companions of Catalina while he (Quianola) held the latter
at gunpoint.
Escuadro brought Diaz and Ginto outside the waiting shed area. He ordered the duo to lie face down on the ground and then
urinated at them. While Escuadro was fixing the zipper of his pants, Diaz and Ginto were bale to escape and ran away.
Meanwhile Quianola with his gun pointed at Catalina, forcibly brought her towards the nearby school. Catalina begged that she
herself be allowed to leave. Pretending to agree, they walked the path towards the road behind the school. Then, unsuspectingly,
Quianola forced Catalina to sit on the ground. Catalina started to cry p. Quianola told Escuadro to remove her denim ants.
Catalina struggled to free herself from Escuadro's hold but to no avail. Escuadro held her legs Quianola "started to pump, to push
and pull". She felt his organ "on the lips of (her) genitalia." 6 When Quianola had satisfied his lust, Escuadro took his turn by
placing himself on top of Catalina. Catalina could feel the sex organ of Escuadro "on the lips of (her) vulva" while he made a push
and pull movement. Quianola, who stood by, kept on smoking a cigarette.
Escuadro and Quianola scampered immediately after Catalina's ordeal. Failing to find her pair of pants and panty. Catalina was left
wearing her T-shirt and brassieres. Catalina just then sat down, not knowing what to do, until she finally started to run home fearing
that she might be followed. Guillermo Zozobrado learned from his wife, Catalina's sister, that Catalina had been raped. He promptly
repaired to the municipal hall of Dumanjug to report the crime.
The trial court ruled that the accused were liable for the crime of frustrated rape "with an eye to extending to the two accused the
benefit of the principle that in case of doubt criminal justice naturally leans in favor of the milder form of penalty."
Issue: Is it proper for the trial court to charge them Frustrated Rape?
Held: No, there is no such thing as frustrated rape.
Ruling:
Appellants theorize that the sexual intercourse, if indeed true, could have only been committed against Catalina in a sitting
position, contrary to her declaration of having been made to lie on the ground because her T-shirt, marked Exhibit E, is "not tainted
with mud at all especially the back if she were made to lie down. Catalina creditably explained that when it was offered in evidence,
she had already dusted and rid it of grass particles. At all events, whether appellants spent their lust on Catalina in a sitting
position or lying down would not be important because the prosecution has clearly established that appellants had forced carnal
knowledge of the victim.
Catalina's candid and straightforward narration of the two sexuals assaults perpetrated on her on the night of the incident
unmistakably deserves credence. It is unbelievable that a young barrio lass would concoct a tale of defloration publicly admit
having been ravished and her honor tainted allow the examination of her private parts, and undergo all the trouble and
inconvenience not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial had she not in fact been raped and truly moved to protect
and preserve her honor as well as to obtain justice, for the wicked acts committed against her. [In short, the TRAIT OF FILIPINA
WOMEN by Justice Callejo]
In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, "carnal knowledge" unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does
not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. The crime
of rape is deemed consummated even when the man's penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female organ or, as once so said
in a case, by the "mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act. Findings showed she
did not sustain any extragenital injuries and her hymenal orifice was so small that an erect average-size penis would not have
completely penetrated it would cause laceration is not an important factor.
The Court is not unaware that Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, has retained the provision
penalizing with reclusion perpetua to death an accused who commits homicide by reason or on the occasion of an attempted or
frustrated rape. Until Congress sees it fit to define the term frustrated rape and thereby penalize it, the Court will see its
continued usage in the statute book as being merely a persistent lapse in language. [ In short, not until Congress has defined
frustrated rape there will be no concept of such]
Generic aggravating circumstances the fact that the crime is committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity. The fact alone, then, that a malefactor has sported a firearm does not, by itself, militate to aggravate crime. As regards
appellant Quianola, the aggravating circumstance of his being a member of the Philippine National Police would have exposed
him to the penalty of death.
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Neither may nighttime be considered an aggravating circumstance in the absence of proof of its having been deliberately sought
out by appellants to by appellants to facilitate the commission of the offense. The fact that one of the appellants has pretended to
be a member of the New People's Army does not necessarily imply the use of craft, fraud or disguise, in the commission of the
crime.
"stripp(ing) the victim of her denim parts and panties and then sending her home in this humiliating and distressing condition not
ignominy.
Concept:
In reviewing rape cases, this Court must again say that it has been continually guided by the principles
(a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove;
(b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime which usually involves only two persons, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and
(c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence of the defense.
95. People v. Tomio ()
1991 Davide, Jr.
*kidnappers & Japanese victim move from hotel to hotel during the commission of the crime
Facts:
The appellants, together with their co-conspirators, had an elaborate and carefully designed plan to kidnap Mr. Nagao in order to
obtain ransom from him. The plan was effectively carried out at lunchtime on May 3 1968 at the coffee shop in Holiday Inn Hotel
when appellant Tomio approached Mr. Nagao to find out if the latter had Japanese yen to be converted to Philippine pesos because
a friend was to leave for Japan and needed the yen; Tomio succeeded in having P1,100 exchanged for 10k yen belonging to Nagao.
Then, another Japanese companion of Tomio, one Mitamura, invited complainant to join them at their table. Later on during the
trial Tomio stupidly admitted how the plot would be pursued with the assistance of law enforcement authorities. So these bad guys,
Tomio and co., offered to make Nagao pasyal. And during dinner on that same day, Nagao's companion placed a pack of cigarettes
on his (Nagao's) shirt pocket and him to just wait because he has to talk to a taxi driver. After taking few steps from the restaurant,
Nagao was approached by five (5) plainclothesmen who Identified themselves as policemen. They bodily searched him and found
the pack of cigarettes earlier given him which the policemen claimed contained marijuana. Thereafter, the policemen brought him
to the police station. There, Tomio & company acted as interpreters. Tomio and Mitamura then suggested that Nagao give money to
the policemen who, they claim, demanded U.S. $100,000.00 for his release. Nagao agreed. Thereafter, Toshio and Nakajima
informed him that they had advanced the payment of the bribe money to the policemen who agreed to release him. So they made
Nagaos father agree to send money.
So from May 3, 1968 to May 12, appellants stuck like with Nagao for the money. Theyd transfer to different hotels but they
wouldnt leave Nagao alone. As in literally, thus depriving him of his liberty.
Issue: Do the facts establish that Nagao was kidnapped?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
There is no doubt in that during the period from 3 May 1986 until the accused-appellants were arrested on 12 May 1986,
complainant was moved from one hotel to another by the appellants, effectively depriving him of his liberty. As correctly observed
by the Solicitor General, while it may be conceded that complainant had the freedom of locomotion, he "did not have the freedom
to leave the hotel premises at will and go wherever he pleased."
Their claim that money involved was not ransom money, but rather payment of hotel bills or for reimbursement of the sum they
advanced to pay the policemen and for hotel accommodations and additional expenses spent is untenable. Nothing was actually
given to the police as advanced payment. However, they succeeded in making it appear to Nagao that they have advanced the
amount.
Says the Court: Now then, if indeed the appellants only wanted reimbursement for the money "paid" to the police, and that they
were merely motivated by a desire to help a fellow Japanese in distress, why did they have to bring him from one expensive hotel to
the other, thereby incurring more expenses? Why did they not bring him to their homes, as the trial court asked, if only to show
their genuine concern for him?
The deprivation of the former's liberty until the amount shall have been fully "paid" to them, is kidnapping or illegal detention for
ransom.
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In People vs. Akiran (which is applicable in this case) the Court said: even if the kidnapping were to compel the victim to fulfill his
promise of defraying the hospital expenses of a brother of one of the accused, there is still kidnapping for ransom, since if that were
indeed the purpose, the accused need not kidnap the victim.
96. People vs. Mercado ()
August 30, 1988 Relova
*he kidnaps his live-in partners sister because his live-in partner vanished
Facts:
Fernando was the live-in partner of Susan, the younger sister of Yvonne Baylon. Susan left the family residence for an unknown
place. He suspected that it was Yvonne who instigated her to leave.
At about 8:30 o'clock in the morning on the following day while Yvonne was walking on the road, he came from behind her. Without
any warning, he grabbed her by the neck and pointed a knife on her throat. He dragged her to the house of his friend. Upon reaching
the porch, she asked him why he was acting that way and he replied that he was angry with her and demanded that she produce
Susan. At this juncture, he dragged her this time to the road side. Yvonnes brothers and some neighbors arrived asking him to
release Yvonne. Instead, he raised Yvonnes blouse and inserted his hand underneath it and pointed the knife on her breast. He then
dragged her to a store. He told the Chief of Police that he wanted to see Susan and demanded that he be given transportation and
money. This lasted up to about 12:00 noon with the policemen surrounding him and Yvonne about 15 meters away. After being
given some food to partake, the barrio captain arrived and he was able to take hold of the accused and subdue hint him. Yvonne,
because of the traumatic experience she was subjected to, lost consciousness and was brought to the hospital. Her fingers suffered
injuries, abrasion on her neck and a small wound on her stomach.
He was charged and convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, punishable by Reclusion Perpetua.
Issue: Is the charge and conviction proper?
Held: YES
Ruling:
FIRST: The elements of the crime are satisfied
The elements of the crime of illegal detention, as defined in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the offender is a
private individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) that the act
of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is
present:
that the kidnapping or detention last for more than 5 days; or
that it is committed simulating public authority; or
that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
SECOND: The witnesses are credible
The court finds no justification to overturn the judgment of the trial court in giving credence to the declarations of 5 witnesses, 3 of
whom are policemen who did not know appellant before the incident. The records of the case are convincing enough that Mercado
forcibly brought Yvonne from place to place. For almost 5 hours, he held Yvonne in a store before he was subdued. Pictures of the
incident show appellant's hand around the neck of complainant, with a knife poked at it.
THIRD: He should not be convicted of grave coercion only
The extant evidence on record shows that "the accused held complainant because he wanted her to produce her sister, Susan, who
was the common-law wife of the accused."
FOURTH: The mitigating circumstance of obfuscation cannot be invoked
Fernandos relationship with Susan was illegitimate. The obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments.
However, Fernando should be credited with the period of his preventive suspension, in accordance with Article 29.
97. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LETICIA SANIDAD DE DEL SOCORRO ()
February 15, 1990- Padilla
*Kid kidnapped and later was sold to a doctor.
Facts:
1. Between 10:00 o'clock and 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 February 1984, while Evelyn Sanchez was in her residence,
cooking food for lunch, her four-year old daughter named Claire Sanchez went out of the house to play with other children.
2. After she had finished cooking, Evelyn called her child to get inside and eat her lunch.
3. Receiving no response, she went out of the house and looked for her child in the neighborhood. But the child was nowhere to
be found.
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4. She inquired from the other children and she was informed that Claire was taken by a woman whom the children thought was
the aunt of Claire.
5. She was also informed that her child had resisted in going with the woman and cried for her mother, but the woman carried
the child and got on board a jeepney and left the place.
6. Several days after the disappearance, the distraught mother was informed by a relative that a certain doctor in Angono, Rizal,
had bought a child who fitted the description of her daughter, Claire.
7. She went to Angono, Rizal and with some town policemen, went to see the lady physician, one Dr. Villamayor, who told the
policemen that she had given the child to her aunt.
8. The child was then taken from the aunt of the doctor and brought to the municipal building of Angono where she was re-united
with her mother.
9. She told the policemen that a child was given to her for adoption for P700 the previous Saturday, and that she gave the child to
her aunt Lourdes. She also told the policemen that the woman who brought the child to her was coming back that day to collect
the balance of P300.00. She asked them to wait for her.
10. Leticia, the accused, indeed returned for the balance and was apprehended by the policemen
Her defense was,
11. she saw the child, Claire, standing on the sidewalk in front of the Jose Rizal College in Mandaluyong. The child was crying and
when she asked why, the child told her that two (2) children had quarelled with her.
12. The child also told her that her lola had refused to take her along.
13. She asked the child where she was living, but the child did not point to any particular place or direction.
14. Out of pity for the child, she brought the child along with her.
Issue: Is she properly convicted of the crime of kidnapping?
Held: Yes, despite of contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution.
Ruling:
1. if she really pitied the child whom she described as crying on the sidewalk, why, it can be asked, did she not bring her to the
nearest police station
2. To cut down the illicit traffic of children, we urge the prosecution of persons to whom children are sold or given away for a
valuable consideration.
3. Oftentimes, it is only the abductor or kidnapper who is prosecuted.
4. Case at bar, it is our opinion, and we so hold, that the evidence adduced during the trial is sufficient to justify the conclusions
of the trial court. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Obiter
5. Yet, the person to whom the kidnapped child is given and who may have wittingly or unwittingly given the motivation for the
abduction, goes scot-free, even as the intention of this person is to keep and raise the child as his own. By keeping the child,
under these circumstances, is he not guilty of serious illegal detention?
Maybe here the court Is trying to assert whether the doctor should also be convicted of kidnapping or not.
98. People vs. Lim ()
18 Oct 1990 Gutierrez Jr.
*good Samaritan made a child a maid and convicted of kidnapping
Facts:
Carmen Lim was accused of kidnapping Aida and Avelyn Villanueva. The prosecution claimed that on 1 July 1986, after being
ordered by their father Charito Villanueva to buy rice, Aida and Avelyn arrived in Masbate. They initially went to the pier to meet
their mother but she didnt arrive. They then proceeded to Helen Theatre to watch a movie. At around 2p.m., they were called by
Carmen and asked them to go inside her house. They were fed and asked to take a bath and from that day to 15 Jul 1986, Aida was
detained in the house to do household chores. Avelyn was then brought to Cebu that same day by Carmens sister. On 15 Jul 1986,
Charito found Aida in Carmens house. He asked to bring her home but Carmen refused. The next day, he went back with Sgt.
Antonio Ariate armed with an armalite and the soldier told Carmen that hes taking Aida with him. Carmen did not resist but
uttered slanderous remarks.
On the other hand, Carmen claimed that it was the sisters who went to her store and told her that their father drove them away.
Taking pity on them, she fed and offered to shelter the sisters. Since Carmens sister was there, she proposed that her sister bring
Avelyn home and Aida agreed on condition that theyll meet every week. Aida then stayed with her for two weeks and helped in
doing the household chores and manning the store. On 15 Jul 1986, Charito came and told Carmen that hes taking the sisters home.
Carmen talked to Aida and asked her to go home with him but she refused claiming that shes afraid that her father would beat her.
The next day, Charito returned with Sgt. Ariate and Aida agreed to go home with her father after Carmen convinced her.
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Carmen was then accused of kidnapping the two minors. After trial, she was found guilty and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Did Carmen kidnap the two sisters?
Held: No. The evidence presented was insufficient to support a conviction.
Ruling:
There was no kidnapping in this case. The uncorroborated testimony of Aida was not clear and convincing enough to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. The two sisters voluntarily entered Carmens house and there was no actual confinement
or restriction of their person. There was no indication that Aida was locked up or restrained of her liberty since it was proved that
she had the freedom to go in and out of the house. Aida claimed that she attempted to escape thrice but she did not clearly explain
how thus creating grave doubts in her testimony. When Aida saw her father for the first time on 15 Jul 1986, she did not shout for
help or run to him but just observed him and Carmen talk for half an hour. This was not a natural reaction of someone who had
been allegedly detained against her will; she would have run to her father and clung to him. The unbelievable and conflicting
evidence of the prosecution strengthened Carmens version that she took pity of the two runaways and decided to give them food
and shelter.
There was also no motive for Carmen to kidnap the two sisters. She was a woman of sufficient means and could easily hire an
additional maid without going to the extent of committing a serious crime. Later in the trial, Charito had conflicting statements
admitting that his daughters ran away and even executed an affidavit of desistance which said that his daughters were not
detained after all. This had the effect of exculpating her from the charge of kidnapping. Thus, Carmen was acquitted.
99. People vs. Padica ()
April 7, 1993 Regalado
*Patay na nga may ransom pa, murder lang talaga!
Facts:
Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos and his companions were convicted for kidnapping for ransom with murder of Francis Banaga. The facts
of the case are as follows: Bothers Leon and Leonardo Marajas asked Romeo Padica, who turned state witness, to drive for them to
pick up their younger brother Eddie boy. They picked up Eddie Boy together with his classmate the victim Francis Banaga in their
village in Sukat. They then drove to Calamba where they forcibly dragged Francis despite his resistance out of the car and into the
middle of sugarcane. Then Leon shot and killed and him. On their way back they told Romeo Padica not to tell anyone or else he will
be killed.
In the Afternoon they contacted the father of Francis, Tomas and asked them to pay for their childs ransom and not to worry as he
was in good condition. The initial ransom was 500K but was eventually reduced to 23K to be given by a girl with red flower under a
tree in Luneta in front of the National Library. Leon was then caught in the entrapment upon receiving the money.
The accused used the defense of alibi alleging that they were a victim of frame-up as they were picked up by the Metrocom, beaten
and forced to admit to the crime. They also contend that Romeo Padicas testimony as incredible and full of inconsistencies.
Issues: Should they be charged of murder only?
Held: Yes. The intent was to kill.
Ruling:
The crime committed was murder, attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery and/or abuse of superior strength, and not
the complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder. Where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to
kill, the crime is only murder, and this is true even if, before the killing but for purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one place
to another. Thus, where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be
inferred that the latter's purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims
constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a component felony to
produce a complex crime of kidnapping with murder.
As held in the case of Masilang, et al., although the accused had planned to kidnap the victim for ransom but they first killed him
and it was only later that they demanded and obtained the money, such demand for ransom did not convert the crime into
kidnapping since no detention or deprivation of liberty was involved, hence the crime committed was only murder.
Furthermore the demand for ransom appears to have arisen and was consequently made as an afterthought, as it was relayed to
the victim's family very much later that afternoon after a sufficient interval for consultation and deliberation among the felons who
had killed the victim around five hours earlier.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the circumstance that the kidnapping is perpetrated for the purpose of ransom raises the
imposable penalty to death. It is essential, however, that the element of deprivation or restraint of liberty of the victim be
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present. The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the act of preventing the liberty of movement of
the victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless the victim is actually restrained or deprived of his liberty for some appreciable
period of time or that such restraint was the basic intent of the accused. Absent such determinant intent and duration of restraint,
the mere curtailment of freedom of movement would at most constitute coercion.
The crime also include the aggravating circumstance of treachery since, the victim was lured by his killers into going with them to
Laguna without the slightest inkling of their nefarious design and killed him instantly without giving the opportunity either to
effectively resist or to escape. Abuse of superior strength was likewise present, for the accused deliberately resorted to their
collective strength for the purpose of overpowering whatever feeble defense the poor Francis Banaga could offer. They thus insured
the commission of the crime with practically no risk at all to themselves.
100. People vs. Ramos ()
October 12, 1998--- Per Curiam
*the kidnap that started with the American Clergyman
Facts:
1. An American pastor was driving his daughter to school one day. He saw the accused and the victim. The victim seemed to be
struggling with the accused. He deduced that the victim was in danger through the way she was desperately trying to hail down a
car. The pastor beeped his horn to signal that she should come to him. Unfortunately, both the accused and the victim boarded their
car. He was then forced to drive and drop them of somewhere on Katipunan Avenue. As she was being taken away, she told the
pastor I will probably not get out of this with my life The pastor also found a receipt with her name and a telephone number.
He called it and informed a friend at Meralco that the victim was being held hostage.
2. The victim called Atty del Rosario for whom she worked as a secretary for and told him that she needed Php. 200,000.00 in cash
immediately, other wise she may not be able to go home anymore. She insisted that an armed security officer should not be the
one to hand over the money in the designated spot (Glori supermarket at Sikatuna Village). Del Rosario told his driver to give the
money to whoever was going to collect.
By this time, the accused had acquired a taxi driver, whom he instructed to collect the money. The money was collected. The
accused then instructed the taxi driver to leave because he wanted to privately talk to the victim. The taxi driver noticed that the
accused was armed, when they both took a leak and noticed that the accused was strangling the victim in his car when he was told
to give them some privacy.
3. After the driver got back in the car, the accused launched into a desperate plea for help claiming that the accused would kill her.
The driver, eventually pulled over when he saw an armed traffic aide. The traffic aide and the driver approached the car but when
they heard from the victim that he was armed, the 2 retreated. The accused took it upon himself to drive the car. The victim, in a
desperate attempt to escape, opened the rear door and attempted to jump out but her blouse was caught in the process, as a
consequence she was dragged by the vehicle.
4. Two shots were fired by the accused into the back of the head of the victim. The taxi aid returned fire.
5. The accused wishes to impress upon the court that:
a. Kidnapping was never established.
b. Defense that the force or pressure employed against the victim was merely a matter of persuasion and not restraint on liberty.
c. no proof of demand or received money from anybody since it was the victim who asked fro the money
d. the traffic office was the one who shot her.
Issue: Should he be charged for the special complex crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
1. Kidnapping was sufficiently established by the overt acts which showed that she was being forcibly detained by the accused and
that she attempted to escape three times. (1) When she struggled to free herself from his clutches and hailed a bus and a white car
but without success, thus leading to her jumping into the car of the American Clergyman and his daughter. (2) When the taxi driver
noticed that the rear door of his taxi being repeatedly opened and closed by the victim and (3) at Mac Arthur Highway when the
victim jumped out of the taxicab but her blouse was caught by the accused. (4) Her freedom of movement was effectively restricted
by her abductor, who armed with a gun, instilled fear in her. (Refutes points a, and b.
2. The convenient method resorted by kidnappers is using the victim to call for the demanded ransom, thus shrouding their identity
in mystery.
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3. The traffic officer could not have been the one who killed her because the two shots were first fired by the accused and the
autopsy report showed that they entered behind the head of the victim.
4. Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of detention, regardless of whether the killing was sought or an afterthought,
the kidnapping and murder can no longer be complexed under Article 48 nor treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a
special complex crime under the last paragraph of Article 267 as amended by RA 7659.
101. People v. LUARTES ()
1999 Bellosillo
*kidnapping of a kid at Isetann; pretends the kid is his niece
Facts:
Evelyn Macairan went to shop at the Isetann Department Store. With her was her three 3yr old daughter Junichi Macairan.
While strolling on the second floor of the store she noticed that Junichi was no longer by her side, so she immediately informed a
sales attendant about her missing daughter. After 15mins, an MMA traffic enforcer by the name of Francisco Lacanilao, together
with two (2) policemen, entered the department store with Junichi. Lacanilao asked Evelyn if she was the mother of the child.
When Evelyn said yes, Lacanilao immediately released Junichi to her. He informed Evelyn that a person had just been arrested for
the kidnapping of her daughter and so he requested Evelyn to go with him to the police station to give her statement. On the way
to the police station on board their Ford Fiera Evelyn asked him why he abducted her daughter Junichi. His reply was that he was
merely interested in the jewelry worn by the child.
Traffic enforcer Francisco Lacanilao testified that he noticed something unusual with a passenger jeep. He approached the driver
and asked him if there was anything wrong and the driver whispered, "Kidnap ito." Then Lacanilao noticed a man seated at the
back with a child crying. Lacanilao asked the man, "Pare, anong nangyayari?" and he replied that the child was only afraid of
people. When the man alighted from the jeep, Lacanilao placed his arm around his shoulder and said to him, "Halika, pare." But
the man scampered away carrying the child with him (karga-karga niyang patalikod). Lacanilao gave chase and with the assistance
of a motorcycle cop he was able to apprehend Luartes.
Luartes now appeals claiming that the evidence against him was too insufficient for his conviction. He insists that he did not
kidnap Junichi but was merely helping her find her lost mother.
Issue: Is Luartes guilty of Kidnapping a minor under Art 267 par 4?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
Luartes banks on the question of intent to neutralize the seemingly overwhelming evidence against him. He depicts himself
simply as a good Samaritan who was just helping the kid. Sc doesnt agree. Its simply belied by evidence. His supposed lack of intent
to take custody of the child away from her mother was completely discredited by the testimony of SPO2 Gabay who accosted him
during the incident. When Gabay stopped Luartes and asked him why he was running, and he informed Gabay that there was
nothing wrong as the child was his niece. SC said: If indeed accused-appellant was trying to help the lost child, why then did he
misrepresent himself as her uncle. And, if his intention was only to help the child look for her mother, why did he have to board a
passenger jeepney taking the child with him?
Conviction: Guilty of Kidnapping a minor under Art 267 par 4
102. People vs. Pavillare ()

April 5, 2000 Per Curiam
*KIDNAPPER OF INDIAN NATIONAL SENTENCED TO DEATH
Facts:
At about noon of February 12, 1996 while Sukhjiner Singh (Indian National) was on his way back to his motorcycle parked at the
corner of Scout Reyes and Roces Avenue, three men blocked his way. The one directly in front of him, accused him of having raped
the woman inside the red Kia taxi cab parked nearby. Singh denied the accusation, the three men nevertheless forced him inside
the taxi cab and brought him somewhere near St Joseph's College in Quezon City. One of the abductors took the key to his
motorcycle and drove it alongside the cab. He was beaten and they demanded P100,000.00 for his release but Singh told him he
only had P5,000.00 with him. The was accused-appellant and two of the male abductors alighted while the driver and their lady
companion stayed with the complainant in the car. When the complainant turned to see where the accused-appellant and his,
companions went he saw his uncle and his cousin in a motorcycle and together with the kidnappers they entered a mini-grocery.
Later the kidnappers brought the complainant to the mini-grocery where he met his relatives. The ransom money was handed to
the appellant by the complainant's cousin, after which the accused-appellant counted the money and then, together with his
cohorts, immediately left the scene.
Eduardo Pavillare was charged and convicted of kidnapping for the purpose of random. He was sentenced to suffer Death.
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Issue: Was he guilty of kidnapping for the purpose of ransom?

Held: YES
Ruling:
The trial court did not err in giving due weight and credence to the identification in open court of the accused-appellant by the
private complainant and his cousin as one of the kidnappers. Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and
to remember their faces. The complainant had close contact with the kidnappers when he was abducted and beaten up, and later
when the kidnappers haggled on the amount of the ransom money. His cousin met Pavillare face to face and actually dealt with
him when he paid the ransom money.
Pavillare prays for an acquittal based on reasonable doubt. While under police custody he was required to stand in a police line-up
where he was supposedly identified by Singh as one of his abductors. Five separate charges arising from five separate incidents of
kidnapping, all of whom were Indian nationals, were filed against him. He argues that Singe could not identify his captors by himself
which is shown by the inconsistencies in his testimony and by the improper suggestion made by the investigating police officer
pointing to the accused-appellant as one of the malefactors. This, however, was untenable.
103. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CESAR LACANIETA alias "Boy Alog", JERRY BALLENAS alias "Marlon Marquez" and
Carlito Gamad, accused, JERRY BALLENAS ()
April 12, 2000 Gonzaga-Rey
*The witnesses stood 3 brazas away from the scene of those accused just having happy-happy
Facts:
1. On March 20, 1987 about 7 o'clock in the evening, the Wilma Tayo and her mother Mrs. Consorcia Tayo were in their house.
They were about to eat supper when someone called to them asking to light a cigarette.
2. Wilma Tayo asked who was calling and the answer was "I am Junior, let me light my cigarette".
3. Wilma Tayo opened the door slightly and there stood accused Jerry Ballenas alias Marlon Marquez.
4. Accused did not light his cigarette but instead blew the gas lamp and put out the light.
5. He held Wilma Tayo by the wrist. Accused Jerry Ballenas pointed a short firearm to Wilma Tayo and Consorcia Tayo.
6. Accused Jerry Ballenas forced Wilma Tayo to go out with him and struck the hand of Consorcia Tayo and pointed the handgun
at her. Accused held Wilma Tayo tightly and took her away.
7. The following morning, Consorcia Tayo reported the abduction of Wilma Tayo to her son-in-law who is a member of the
Integrated National Police.
8. She learned from Aurelio Gamad that her daughter Wilma Tayo was already dead.
9. She was raped and killed as testified by Florencio
he was passing through the street of Barangay Catmon, Sibalom, antique when he saw "Boy Alog" (LACANIETA) lying on
top of WILMA.
The hands of WILMA were then held down by BALLENAS and SALVADOR.
Surprised by the presence of Florencio, LACANIETA stood up and told the former that they were just having a "happyhappy".
Hid three brazas away and Florencio testified that he thereafter saw four men take turns in ravishing and stabbing
WILMA.
Issue: Is the crime of forcible abduction with rape proper?
Held: Yes, established beyond reasonable doubt thru testimonies
Ruling:
1. Consorcia, the mother of WILMA, positively identified BALLENAS as the person who went to her house and abducted her
daughter at gunpoint that fateful night.
2. Consorcia has no reason to wrongfully implicate BALLENAS. As the mother of the deceased victim, Consorcia would want
nothing short of justice for her dead daughter.
3. The fact that BALLENAS exposed himself to Consorcia all the more indicates his brazenness in abducting WILMA. The return of
BALLENAS to Catmon after the death of WILMA cannot be also taken as a badge of his innocence.
4. We have no reason to doubt the credibility of Florencio in light of the doctrine that where there is no evidence to show any
dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a
serious offense, the testimony deserves full faith and credit
COURT RULED
5. No aggravating of nighttime because there is still a kerosene lamp upstairs.
The prosecution also failed to prove that nighttime was specially sought by the accused or taken advantage of by him or
that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime, circumstances which must be present before the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime can be appreciated.
6.
7.
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No cruelty because WILMA sustained ten (10) stab wounds, but these multiple wounds alone do not prove that the accused
deliberately inflicted the injuries to prolong unnecessarily her physical suffering.
There is aggravating of DWELLING Consorcia testified that her house has a ladder that leads to the main door; that BALLENAS
was at the main door when he called WILMA
Penalty
8. BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape on March 20, 1987, before the passage of Republic Act 7659 or
the Heinous Crimes Law that took effect on December 31, 1993.
9. At the time that BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape, the penalty then applicable was reclusion
perpetua to death. The use by BALLENAS of a firearm in committing the crime, a fact duly alleged in the information and proven
in court, should have warranted the imposition of the death penalty.
10. However, since the crime took place prior to the implementation of RA 7659, the trial court correctfully ruled that the penalty
that can be imposed on BALLENAS is reclusion perpetua.
11. Hence, despite the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the penalty herein of reclusion perpetua would not
be affected.
Concept:
The two elements of forcible abduction are
(1) the taking of a woman against her will and
(2) with lewd designs
The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there is carnal knowledge with the abducted woman
under the following circumstances:
(1) by using force or intimidation;
(2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
(3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
104. People vs. Ty ()
30 Oct 1996 Kapunan
*another good Samaritan Doctor charged with kidnapping and failure to return a minor
Facts:
Johanna Sombong, the complainant, brought her daughter Arabella, then only seven months old to a clinic owned by the accused,
Vicente and Dr. Carmen Ty. She was confined for three days for bronchitis but Johanna was not able to take her home. A week later,
Johanna came back but didnt have the money to pay for the bill and confided to Dr. Ty that no one would take care of the child
because she was working. They later agreed to leave Arabella to the care of the clinic nursery for 50 a day. When hospital bills
started to mount, they then agreed to instead hire a yaya and Arabella was transferred to the residence of the hospital staff. From
then on, nothing was heard of Johanna. Eventually, Dr. Ty notified the barangay captain of the childs abandonment and the
hospital staff took care of Arabella.
Two years after, Dr. Mallonga, a dentist at the clinic, suggested that Arabella be entrusted to a guardian. She was then given to
Lilibeth Neri, Dr. Mallongas aunt. Five years later, Johanna came back to claim Arabella. She filed for a petition for habeas corpus
against Dr. Ty but was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, she filed a criminal case for kidnapping and failure to return a
minor (Art. 270). Upon trial, Vicente and Carmen Ty were found guilty and were sentenced to reclusion perpetua. She likewise filed
an administrative case against Dr. Ty for dishonorable conduct but was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
She then filed a petition for habeas corpus against the guardians of her alleged daughter Marietta Neri Alviar and Lilibeth Neri.
The petition was granted and ordered the guardians to deliver Cristina Grace Neri to Johanna. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed on the ground that Arabella and Cristina are not the same person. This finding was affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Sombong vs. Court of Appeals. It was shown that Johanna returned in 1989 to the clinic and found Arabella still there. However,
Cristina was adopted in April 1988 leading to the conclusion that Arabella is not Cristina. Also, the trial judge found no signs of
endearment and affection from Johanna to Cristina. It was a case of mistaken identity.
Issue: Did Dr. Ty kidnap and failed to return Arabella to Johanna?
Held: No. There was no deliberate refusal or failure to restore Arabella to Johanna.
Ruling:
The Court held that because of the ruling in Sombong, there was no reason to hold Dr. Ty liable for failing to return one Cristina
Grace Neri, a child not conclusively shown to be Arabella. Article 270 requires that two elements concur: (a) that the offender has
been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) that the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or
guardians. The essential element is that the offender was entrusted with the custody and what is actually punishable is the
deliberate failure or refusal to restore the minor to his parents or guardians. Deliberate should imply something more than mere
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negligence; it must be premeditated or intentionally and maliciously wrong.

The Court found that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on Dr. Tys part to restore Arabella to Johanna. They tried their best
to help Johanna find her child because the child was no longer under the clinics care. Upon Johannas return, Dr. Ty asked Dr.
Mallonga for the address of Arabellas guardian. Upon obtaining such address, Dr. Ty went to the house and talked to the guardian
but the latter refused to return the child. After which, she sought the assistance of PAO and the NBI to get the child back. Thus, the
efforts taken by her to help Johanna find the child clearly negate her guilt. Dr. Tys conduct was nothing more than an earnest
desire to help the child for her welfare and well-being.
105. People vs. Gutierrez ()
May 28, 1991 Feliciano
*unlettered woman sells child of in-law to avenge abandonment by husband
Facts:
Lilia Gutierrez obtained permission from her sister-in-law to take her youngest son, Hazel, 2 1/2 years old for the day because
appellant's husband wanted to spend time with him with a promise to return the child by 4pm. But when she got home he found
that her husband was no longer home along with his belongings. Bewildered she brought the child to her former employers and
executed an agreement surrendering custody of the child for P250 as evidenced by a receipt.
The parents of the child have been looking for them for two days until they chanced upon her in a telephone booth along the
street where she lived. She was accosted and brought to the police. It is there where she admitted that she did it because of her
confused state and as vengeance to his husband who left him and helped the spouses recover the child in Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal.
Issues: Could Lilia be convicted of kidnapping and failure to return a minor child?
Held: Yes. She failed to deliberately return the minor to his parents.
Ruling:
The offense of kidnapping and failure to return a minor defined and penalized under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code consists
of two elements: 1.) the offender has been entrusted with the custody of a minor person, and 2.) the offender deliberately fails to
restore said minor to his parents or guardians. Lilia admitted the existence of the first element for she had not disputed the
testimony on circumstances under which she obtained custody for the day of the child.
The court believes that the second element of the offense charged has been established by the prosecution's evidence. In the first
place, appellant's own conduct in leading the police to the Felipe residence in Intramuros, in an initial unsuccessful effort to recover
the child, indicated her awareness of the probable whereabouts of the child. In the second place, the precise motive that appellant
might have had for bringing the child to the Felipe spouses and leaving him with them, apparently for an indefinite period, is not an
indispensable element of the offense charged. All that was necessary for the prosecution to prove was that she had deliberately
failed to return the minor to his parents
The Court finds that since she had no intention to commit so grave a crime. After she was found, she voluntarily surrendered
and accompanied the police and the minor's parents to Intramuros, Manila and later to Cogeo. And although she was alleged to
have received P250.00 from the Felipes when she left the minor with them, still appellant's previous admissions and cooperation
with the police show that she did not have a criminal mind or intent to commit so grave an offense. She was recommended to an
early pardon because these mitigating crimcumstances could not be considered in her favor under art.63 of the RPC.
106. People vs. Reyes ()
August 30, 1996Puno
Facts:
1. Appellant re-applied as the housemaid of the Mohamad family. One day, when the parents of their 3 children were out of the
house, Appellant decided to take the 3 children out to watch a movie. The three of them agreed. While they were walking away, she
remembered that she had left the door unlocked and asked the two other kids (Aslima and Badudin) to lock the door. When the two
kids returned the appellant was nowhere to be found and noted that she must have taken their youngest sister (4 years old), Asnia.
2. A massive man-hunt lasted for two months until they found appellants cousin (Rey Reyes) and also a former employee of the
same household. He dropped a hint as to where she would be.
3. They found both of them in Manila. The daughter being raised by an old woman in a squatter area. The accused simply replied to
the question as to why she took her, wala lang.
Defense:
4. The accused claims that her mother had just died and she had to rush home. She thus left her friend in charge of returning Asnia
to her parents.
Issue: Should she be charged for the crime of kidnapping?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
1. It is hard to believe that the news about her mothers death would so unsettle the appellant that she had to rush to La Union
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without first-returning Asnia to her parents in Angeles City. Asnia was a mere 4 and a half year old child entrusted to her care and
Angeles city is bt a few kilometers away from Mabalacat. It would have taken appellant a few minutes to return the child.
2. It was also shown that the appellant harbored ill-feelings against the Mohamad family because they did not pay her salary for 5
months when she worked for them in 1989.
107. People v. Zoilo BORROMEO ()
2000 Per Curiam
*former employee kidnaps former employers kid
Facts:
On Jan 3, 1996 at around 4pm, Rowena Hernandez, owner of a bakeshop in Pasay, left with a friend to buy shoes for her son
Kenneth. The little boy who at that time was one 1yr and 7mos old was then sleeping at the bakeshop under the watchful eye of
his yaya. Outside the store was seated the accused, a bakery helper of Rowena who had earlier been discharged by her due to
negative attitude problems. When the child woke up Annabelle took him home. 15mins later Zoilo arrived at the Hernandez
residence and told the nursemaid that "Ate Weng" (Rowena's nickname) had sent him to fetch Kenneth and bring him to her for
shoe measurement. Annabelle gave Kenneth to Zoilo but shortly thereafter she realized that she should not have done so.
Suspecting that something wrong was happening, she immediately reported the incident to Kenneth's father, Nelson, who was
minding his watch repair store nearby. They looked for Kenneth but their initial search and inquiry yielded negative results. Nelson
and Annabelle proceeded to the Pasay City Police Station to report the matter.
The next day, Rowena received a telephone call from Zoilo Borromeo who demanded ransom from her for the release of her son
Kenneth. Zoilo told her, "Pasensiya ka na, Ate Weng, kailangan ng boss ko ang P300,000 but this 300k was later reduced to 250k.
The next day, Zoilo called again. He specifically instructed Nelson to immediately bring the money with him to the parking lot in
front of "Max's Restaurant" near the Baclaran Church. Meanwhile, Nelson reported his telephone conversations with Zoilo to the
police who hatched an entrapment scheme by preparing six (6) bundles of bogus bills. The Pasay police also dispatched a team of
law enforcers to the designated meeting site for the apprehension in flagrante of the accused and the rescue of the kidnapped
child. So the 2 kidnappers arrived and Nelson gave them the marked money, and this was seen by the police. As the two
kidnappers then walked away from the restaurant, 2 policemen accosted them and swiftly nabbed Zoilo. At the Pasay City police
station, Zoilo disclosed that the little boy Kenneth was in Cavite. So the police, the Hernandez spouses and Zoilo left for Cavite, and
found the kidnap victim inside a hut owned by Ernesto and Arsenia Viray. Ernesto said that Zoilo had told them that Kenneth was
his son and that he was leaving the boy with them as he was going back to Manila to get some clothes for the child.
Zoilo now appeals. He basically just questions evidence, he says its weak to convict him. His defenses are:
a) the parents of Kenneth allowed him to take the child for a walk to the Baclaran Church
b) he failed to return Kenneth promptly to his parents because he had to leave hurriedly for work in Cainta, Rizal
Issue: Is Borromeo guilty of kidnapping a minor for ransom?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
SCs rebuttal on Zoilos defenses:
a) That the parents of Kenneth allowed him to take the child for a walk to the Baclaran Church: flies in the face of the contrary
testimony of Annabelle that Zoilo had told her that he was taking Kenneth to his mother upon the latter's instructions.
Moreover, it was highly improbable that Rowena would give permission to Zoilo. Had she done so she would not have been
so terrified and alarmed as to immediately report to the police. It was also quite inconceivable that Rowena, and Nelson for
that matter, would entrust their one (1)-year and seven (7)-month old baby boy to Zoilo, whom they earlier dismissed as
their baker "due to negative attitude problems," since the child was in the care of the nursemaid Annabelle with whom the
child was more comfortable, having been his nanny already for sometime.
b) That he failed to return Kenneth promptly to his parents because he had to leave hurriedly for work in Cainta, Rizal: This is a
feeble attempt to tone down his culpability. For if he had no evil design on Kenneth and his parents, he could very well have
brought Kenneth back to his Pasay home from Baclaran Church en route to his work, if indeed he was employed, in Cainta,
Rizal, a town located northeast of Pasay, instead of bringing the baby down south to Tagaytay, a place very far away from
Cainta.
Most detrimental to the case of the accused is his barefaced denial that he extorted ransom from the Hernandez spouses despite
his being caught redhanded in the entrapment.
If the person detained is a child, the question that needs to be addressed is whether there is evidence to show that in taking the
child, there was deprivation of the child's liberty and that it was the intention of the accused to deprive the mother of the child's
custody >>
It has been established with great certainty that Kenneth was deprived of his liberty.
Discernible from this fact is the intent of the accused to keep the child under detention for as long as no ransom was paid to
him for his release.
There was no voluntary restoration by the accused of the child to his parents. Kenneth was recovered only after the police
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intervened and the accused was apprehended.

When taken to the police station for the requisite investigation, Zoilo confessed that he brought the baby boy to a remote
barangay in in Cavite, and that he demanded money from the parents for the release of their child so that he could start a
bakery business.
There is no question that the elements of kidnapping for ransom were sufficiently established: (a) the accused is a private
individual; (b) the accused kidnapped or detained the victim and deprived him of his liberty; and, (c) the deprivation of the victim's
liberty was illegal.
The imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the victim is a minor. In this case, the minority of Kenneth Hernandez was
never disputed. Assuming minority was not proved, still under the same provision of law, the imposition of the death penalty is
obligatory if the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. This was
certainly so in this case. To recapitulate, minority and the demand for the payment of ransom, both specifically described in the
Information, were clearly established by the State.
Conviction: Guilty of kidnapping a minor for ransom
108. Lamera vs. CA ()
February 15, 1990- Padilla
*DRIVER OF OWNER-TYPE JEEP GUILTY OF ABANDONMENT OF VICTIMS IN THE TRICYCLE
Facts:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven
by petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries
to Ernesto Reyes, Paulino Gonzal and Patricio Quitalig. As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against petitioner:
(a) an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, and (b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment
of one's victim. He was found guilty of abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of
the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period of six (6) months of arresto mayor and to pay the
costs. On appeal, the court affirmed with modification the decision appealed from. The modification consisted merely in the
reduction of the penalty of imprisonment from six (6) to two (2) months. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that: We cannot
sustain the contention of the petitioner that par. 2 of Art. 275 does not apply to him since the evidence allegedly shows that it was
Ernesto Reyes, who negligently caused the accident. Petitioner misses the import of the provision. The provision punishes
the failure to help or render assistance to another whom the offender accidentally wounded or injured. Accidental means that
which happens by chance or fortuitously. There is no need to prove that petitioner was negligent and that it was his negligence
that caused the injury.
Issue: Is Lamera guilty of abandonment of ones victim?
Held: YES.
Ruling:
The petitioner was actually invoking his right against double jeopardy, though it was not expressly stated. However, legal jeopardy
attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered,
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses. The first, for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls
under the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the RPC. The second, for
Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against
Personal Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the same Code. Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa,
while Crimes against Security are committed by means of dolo. Moreover, in Article 365, failure to lend help to one's victim is
neither an offense by itself nor an element of the offense therein penalized. Its presence merely increases the penalty by one
degree. Such being the case, it must be specifically alleged in the information. The information against petitioner in this case does
not so allege. On the other hand, failure to help or render assistance to another whom one has accidentally wounded or injured is
an offense under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the same code.
Undoubtedly then, no constitutional, statutory or procedural obstacle barred the filing of the two information against petitioner.
109. People vs. Timbol ()
April 8, 1949 Endencia (CA)
*Accused said he was a member of CID
Facts:
1. Nicolas Timbol is charged with the crimes of acts of lasciviousness and crime of grave threat
2. Nicolas together with Rufino Flores, husband of Francisca Garcia, went to their house
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3.
4.
Nicolas then told Rufino that he is a member of CID and need to investigate his wife alone.
Nicolas and Francisca while alone, he asked if it is true that her husband Rufino was a member of the HUKS to which she replied
that he was not.
5. Nicolas insisted and came near her with the intention of kissing.
6. She tried to shout but Nicolas threat her that her husband will be killed by Nicolas companion
7. Nicolas then lift her skirt, touched her privates, kiss and embraced her.
8. Later on, she shouted and the accused told her that he was going down to kill her husband
9. When he was about to go down, she begged for forgiveness and then Nicolas told her to meet him at Cine Illusion the following
day alone.
10. She told him that she does not know the place. At this point, Nicolas went down, held Rufino and was acting as if he was taking
along with him her husband.
11. Then she promised so that the accused would leave them.
12. The main contention of the defense is that Nicolas should be acquitted because of the alleged pardon of Francisca.
Issue:
1. Is the crime of acts of lasciviousness proper? Held: Yes.
2. Is the crime of grave threat proper? Held: No. It is already absorbed by the crime of acts of lasciviousness
Ruling:
1. The alleged pardon was given not by the offended party but by her husband and that the same was granted by the latter after
the filling of the complaint therefore, the pardon has no effect.
2. Pardon which was not given by the offended party herself but by her husband and that the same was granted by the latter after
the filing of the complaint cannot extinguish the criminal responsibility of the accused.
3. The crime of grave threat will not prosper because the threats were made to the wife thus cannot be considered as a separate
offense and independent crime.
110. Reyes vs. People ()

28 Mar 1969 Makalintal
*dismissed employee who shouted Putang Ina guilty of grave threats
Facts:
One month after his dismissal from Navy Exchange, Rosauro Reyes led a group of protesters in a demonstration staged in front of
the main gate of the US Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as Agustin, mamatay ka
directed against Agustin Hallare for having allegedly caused Rosauros termination. The Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point,
Col. Monzon then talked to Rosauro and suggested to them to demonstrate in front of Agustins residence instead. Being present
inside his office in the naval station and apprehensive about his safety, Agustin sough Col. Monzons protection. He was then drove
home by Col. Monzon inside his vehicle and on the way out was seen by the protesters. The protesters then boarded their jeeps
and followed the car to Agustins residence. Upon arrival thereat, Rosauro got off his jeep, went in front of the gate, and shouted
Agustin, putang ina mo. Mawawala ka. Lumabas ka, papatayin kita. Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and left.
He was then charged with grave threats and grave oral defamation. He pleaded not guilty but on the last day of the hearing, the
prosecution moved to drop orally in the charge. He was found guilty in both charges. Upon appeal, Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision.
Issue: Was Rosauro guilty of grave threats and grave oral defamation?
Held: No. He was guilty only of grave threats since the oral defamation was part of the threats.
Ruling:
The Court found that all the elements of grave threats were present: (1) that the offender threatened another person with the
infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a
condition. The deletion of the word orally did not affect the nature and essence of the crime but was made to make the
information conformable to the evidence to be presented during the trial without prejudice to the rights of the accused. Clearly, the
acts of Rosauro leading the demonstration, trailing Agustin in a motorcade to his residence, and threatening him in front of his
house were made with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of Agustin the belief that the threat would be carried into
effect. The threats were made deliberately thus, Rosauros conviction for grave threats was proper.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words Agustin, putang ina mo, should be viewed as part of the
threats voiced by Rosauro against Agustin. It was made to make it more emphatic. Thus, his conviction for oral defamation was
reversed.
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111. Timoner v. People ()

1983 Escolin
*Mayor barricades sidewalk stalls
Facts:
Then Mayor (Timoner) of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by two uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral,
and six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway. The Mayor then instructed the laborers to fence off the stalls
(barricade!) which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among the structures barricaded were the barbershop
of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. These establishments had
been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and
sanitation requirements. So after that, the Mayor filed a complaint against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial
abatement of their stalls. The complaint alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per se. Dayaon
was never able to reopen his barbershop business. Subsequently, Timoner and the two policemen, were charged with the offense
of grave coercion. Two policemen were exonerated, but Timoner was convicted of the crime charged as principal by inducement.
Timoner now appeals and contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was done in abatement of a public
nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority.
Issue: Was the instruction of the mayor to barricade the stalls under lawful authority?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did constitute a public nuisance as defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil
Code (see Concept, baka magtanong si sir). The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main
thoroughfare and had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer. In fact, in the decision of the Court in the
Civil Case filed by Timoner against them, it said there that there is no semblance of any legality or right that exists in favor of the
defendants to build a stall and conduct their business in a sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does not only constitute a
menace to the health of the general public passing through the street and also of the unsanitary condition that is bred therein as
well as the unsightly and ugly structures in the said place.
But even without this judicial pronouncement, petitioner could not have been faulted for having fenced off said barbershop.
The Civil Code authorizes the abatement of a public nuisance without judicial proceedings. Here, petitioner, as mayor of the town,
merely implemented the aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the
performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal liability.
The 3 elements of grave coercion are: [1] that any person be prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law,
or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; [2] that the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence,
either by material force or such display of it as would produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party, and [3] that
the person who restrained the will and liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint was not
made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right. The 3rd element being absent, petitioner cannot be held guilty of
grave coercion.
Concept:
ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or
endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders
or impairs the use of property.
ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number
of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal A private nuisance is one that
is not included in the foregoing definition.
112. Lee vs. CA ()
September 6, 1991 Medialdea
*Pregnant girl felt coerced by shouting manager
Facts:
Complainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin, 23 years old and five months pregnant, was fetched from her house by Atanacio
Lumba, a bank employee, upon the instruction of the petitioner Branch Manager Francis Lee(petioner) of Pacific Banking
Corporation. Petitioner confronted the complainant about a forged Midland National Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794, which the
latter allegedly deposited in the account of Honorio Carpio. During the said confrontation, the petitioner Francis Lee was shouting
at her with piercing looks and threatened to file charges against her unless and until she returned all the money equivalent of the
subject cashier check. Accordingly, the complainant was caused to sign a prepared withdrawal slip, and later, an affidavit prepared
by the bank's lawyer, where she was made to admit that she had swindled the bank and had return the money equivalent of the
spurious check. Mr. Lee was found guilty by the MTC and Affirmed in toto by the CA for grave coercion.
Issues: Was Mr. Lees shouting and piercing looks whit threats of filing charges constitute grave coercion?
Held: Yes. He is guilty of parricide and given proper penalty.
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Ruling:
The present case does not involve violence but intimidation, the provisions of Article 1335 of the New Civil Code on intimidation
are relevant. While the appellate court emphasized the pregnancy and feminine gender of the complainant, it overlooked other
significant personal circumstances which are material in determining the presence of coercion in this case. The records show that
complainant is a highly educated person who is familiar with banking procedures. Also she actively participated in the deposit and
withdrawal of the proceeds of the controversial check.
Petitioner's demand that the private respondent return the proceeds of the check accompanied by a threat to file criminal
charges was not improper. There is nothing unlawful on the threat to sue. Marias bare assertion simply confirms the voluntariness
of her actions. All her disputed acts were geared towards proving her good faith. Complainant was willing to return the sum of
P48,000.00 she took since it was only up to this amount where her involvement lies. However, as soon as she realized that she
would have the enormous task of reimbursing the bank the balance of the proceeds of the forged check allegedly taken by Carpio,
she refused to cooperate any further. Notwithstanding the alleged threats of petitioner, she did not budge.
A distinction between a case where a person gives his consent reluctantly and against his good sense and judgment and where
he gives no consent at all, as where he acts against his will under a pressure he cannot resist. One acts as voluntarily and
independently in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously.
Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when he acts in
conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law. But when his sense, judgment, and his will rebel and he
refuses absolutely to act as requested, but is nevertheless overcome by force or intimidation to such an extent that he becomes a
mere automaton and acts mechanically only, a new element enters, namely, a disappearance of the personality of the actor.
The circumstances of this case reveal that the complainant, despite her protestations, indeed voluntarily, albeit reluctantly,
consented to do all the aforesaid acts. Her testimony shows that her lengthy stay at the bank was not due to the petitioner's threat.
It was rather due to her desire to prove her innocence.
The court find it as a logical consequence that she merely asked for the receipt of the P18,000.00 she deposited rather than the
cancellation of her earlier withdrawal. On this point, complainant claimed that after her refusal to sign the document, she no longer
insisted on the return of the money because she felt that it was the only way she could leave the bank premises. This pretense,
however, was belied by her subsequent actuations. We find that she and her sister left the bank unescorted to eat their snack; that
they were required by the petitioner to come back; and that they decided not to eat but instead went home. With such behavior,
The Court is at a loss to understand how coercion could attach in this case.
Concept:
Art. 1335. ...
There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and
grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.
To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind.
A threat to enforce once's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent.
113. People vs. Alfeche ()
July 23, 1992Davide
Facts:
1. A complaint for grave threats and usurpation of real property was filed against Ruperto Dimalata and Norberto Fuentes. The
complainants are owners of a parcel of land. On November 1990, the accused entered and occupied a portion of the lot and
threatened to kill the tenant-encargado if the latter would resist their taking of the portion of the land, and thereafter plowed,
cultivated and planted palay on said portion.
2. The prosecution moves that the intimidation consist of the threat to kill the encargado, penalized under Article 282 of the RPC,;
considering that the accused attained their purpose, the penalty imposable hereunder is that which is one degree lower than that
prescribed by law for the crime they had threatened to commit- --homicide.
3. The judge defends his ruling by saying that:
a. Only the crime of usurpation of real property Is charged in the information; the violence against the people alleged is an
element of the crime already charged, thus cannot constitute a complex crime.
b. the clause in addition to the penalty incurred for tal he acts of violence executed by him does not refer to Art 282. Both Articles
312 and 282 are distinct offenses where only one juridical interest is violated.
Issue: Was the judges ruling in the RTC correct?
Held: No
Ruling:
1. In the crime of grave coercion, violence through force or such display of force that would produce intimidation nand control the
will of the offended party is an essential ingredient. Articles 282 of the RPC, shows that intimidation is also present. However, this
intimidation is different from (par 5) of Article 294 or Article 286which is actual, immediate and personalis condictional and not
necessarily personal because it may be caused by an intermediary.
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2. Article 312 may also be considered as defining and penalizing the single, special and indivisible crime of occupation of real
property or usurpation of real rights in property by means of violence against or intimidation if persons. It is likewise not a complex
crime as defined under Article 48.
3. What article 312 means is that when the occupation of real property is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, the accused may be prosecuted under an information for the violation thereof, and not for a separate crime involving
violence or intimidation. But, whenever appropriate, he may be sentenced to suffer the penalty for the accts of violence and to pay a
fine based on the value of the gain obtained.
4. The information does not even suggest that the accused threatened complainants or their families with the infliction upon their
persons, honor or property of any wrong amounting to a rime so as to bring the former within the purview of Article 282.
5. Thus if complainants were in fact the parties threatened and paragraph 1 of Article 282 is applicable, the RTC would have
exclusive original jurisdiction over the offense charged because the penalty for the crime would be prison mayor, which is the
penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense threatened and to be committedhomicide, which is reclusion
temporal.
6. The case should be dismissed, unless the petitioner amends the information.
114. People vs. Reyes ()
August 23, 1934 Hull
*Not Art. 133, but Art. 287
Facts:
In barrio Macalong, La Paz, Tarlac, there is a chapel where it is customary to hold a pabasa. While the pabasa was going on the
evening of April 10, 1933, between 11 and 12 o'clock, the Procopio Reyes, Policarpio Nacana, Florentino Clemente, Hermogenes
Mallari, Marcelino Mallari, Castor Alipio, and Rufino Matias arrived at the place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and started to
construct a barbed wire fence in front of the chapel. They are partisans of the Clemente family, who many years ago, by informal
donation gave the land on which the old chapel was erected. When it was destroyed, the present chapel was erected. Alfonso
Castillo, who was chairman of the committee in charge of the pabasa, tried to persuade them to refrain from carrying out their plan.
A verbal altercation ensued. The pabasa was discontinued and it was not resumed until after an investigation conducted, which
investigation led to the filing of the complaint. Subseqently, they were convicted under Art. 133, Offending Religious Feelings.
Issue: Are they guilty of a violation of Art. 133?
Held: No. They are acquitted of violation of Art. 133, but guilty of Art. 287, unjust vexation.
Ruling:
It is urged upon us that the act of building a fence was innocent and was simply to protect private property rights. The construction
of a fence, even though irritating and vexatious under the circumstances to those present, is not such an act as can be designated as
"notoriously offensive to the faithful", as normally such an act would be a matter of complete indifference to those not present, no
matter how religious a turn of mind they might be.The fact that this argument is a pretense only is clearly shown by the
circumstances under which the fence was constructed, namely, late at night and in such a way as to vex and annoy the parties who
had gathered to celebrate the pabasa and is further shown by the fact that many of the appellants saw fit to introduce as their
defense a false alibi. They are therefore acquitted of a violation of article 133, but found guilty of a violation of article 287 are
sentenced each to a fine of P75 with subsidiary confinement in case of insolvency.
115. People vs. Anonuevo
116. Napolis vs. CA ()
28 Feb 1972 Concepcion
*penalty in robbery with violence in an inhabited house should be graver
Facts:
On the early morning of 1 Oct 1956, the accused Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis, and Apolinario Satimbre broke into the store of
Ignacio and Casimira Penaflor to enter the house of the victims which was on the same building. Acting on instinct with his .38
caliber revolver, Ignacio approached the door of the store but it suddenly gave way and was forcibly opened by the 4 men, one of
them holding a machinegun. He received a blow on the head, became unconscious, and was hogtied. They were able to take cash
amounting to 2,000, two rings worth 350, Ignacios revolver, and also ransacked the wardrobe. They then hogtied Casimira
together with her two sons and left. After their call for help, their neighbor Councilor Almorio came and the robbery was reported to
the Chief of Police and to the Philippine Constabulary.
A complaint for robbery in a band was then filed. After trial, the accused were found guilty of robbery in a band and were sentenced
to prision mayor as minimum to reclusion temporal as maximum. They then appealed to the Court of Appeals which subsequently
dismissed Malanas appeal and affirmed the conviction of Satimbre and Napolis. Satimbre no longer appealed.
Issue: Were the accused properly sentenced under robbery in Article 294 (prision mayor max to reclusion temporal med)?
Held: No. Since there was entry in an inhabited place, it should be reclusion temporal under Art. 299.
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Ruling:
Robbery which is characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is graver than ordinary robbery committed by force
upon things. However, in previous rulings, the Court applied Article 294 which has a lower penalty when the robbery is
characterized by intimidation committed in an inhabited house, instead of Article 299. In this case, the Court abandoned the
previous rulings. It agrees that robbery with violence against the person is graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon
things but it cannot accept the conclusion that the penalty would be lower. Thus, it believed that Article 294 applies only where
robbery with violence against or intimidation of person takes place without entering an inhabited house. Therefore, when the
elements of both provisions are present, the crime committed is a complex crime calling for the imposition of the penalty for the
more serious offense in its maximum period. Thus, the accused should have been punished with reclusion temporal in its maximum
period.
[Basically, when there was a robbery in an inhabited place and violence upon a person was committed, the penalty in Article 299
should apply.]
117. People vs. Biruar ()
July 25, 1984 Concepcion
*Paraplegic vs. 8 armed men
Facts:
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, while Gorgonio Mosende and his wife, Fausta, were preparing to go to sleep in their house
in Sitio Suapit, Barrio Limot, Mati, Davao, several persons arrived and called: "Good evening, tiyo. Thinking it was their relative they
let them in but they were surprised to see two armed men demanding for their gun and took their money. After they went to the
house of George Kalitas, a paraplegic, where all of the inmates were sleeping and started firing. Jessie Renopal, the 11-year old
granddaughter of George Kalitas, was also grazed by a bullet in the head when she stood up upon hearing the volley. She felt pain,
but she did not lose consciousness, thus enabling her to see five robbers enter the house while two others remained by the door.
Narciso Bauyot who was sleeping in the dining room, ran to the kitchen upon hearing the gunfire and hid in anaparador. But, when
the toilet of the main house of George Kalitas was set on fire, he left his hiding place and went out of the house, passing through a
small window in the kitchen. He landed safely on the ground only to fall into the hands of the accused was threatened by them but
was set free.
They started breaking in the house through the main door with an axe and was shot at by George with his "Stevens" 12-gauge
shotgun who hit one of them, he was eventually hit. And his grandson gave up to their shotgun. Then they were rushed by the four
armed men who forcibly opened a trunk placed under the bed which contained the amount of P40,000.00. After getting the money,
the robbers left. The inmates of the house also went out because of the fire and brought the wounded to the hospital. But, George
Kalitas died before they could reach the hospital.
The crime was immediately reported to the authorities and a search was initiated for a light green Buick Electra 225 Sedan, 1964
model seen at the scene of the crime. They were eventually arrested: They found the accused Angel Dy inside the car who, when
asked who the owner of the car was, pointed to Onting Biruar at the Kingston Hotel. The policemen went to the hotel and found
Onting Biruar together with Romualdo Raboy and Edgardo Seeres whom they brought to the police headquarters for investigation.
Upon questioning, Angel Dy informed the police investigators that the car was driven by Abraham Lim on the night of July 2, 1966,
and led a police posse to Barrios Obrero and Piapi, both in Davao City, in an effort to catch the said Abraham Lim. But, they failed to
find him. Instead, they found the accused Ceferino Caturan in Barrio Piapi, who was nursing a bullet wound on his left upper leg.
From Piapi, Angel Dy brought the police team to a house in Toril, Davao City, where they finally found Abraham Lim in the company
of Eugene Ruslin. The policemen found a .45 cal. pistol, with seven rounds of ammunition under the pillow used by Abraham Lim
and were charged with Robbery in Band, Arson, and Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries before the Court of First Instance
of Davao.
Issues: Could they be convicted of the crime of robbery? And should it be one offense or separate offenses?
Held: Yes It has been established clearly by witnesses. Also, it should be separate crimes of robbery because they performed
different acts with distinct purposes which resulted in juridically independent crimes.
Ruling:
The Court have examined the record of the cases with great care and found no convincing reason to disturb the findings of the
trial court that the accused were the perpetrators of the offenses charged. The claim of Abraham Lim that he went to the house of
George Kalitas to collect what the latter allegedly owned him is improbable and not worthy of belief. The contention that no
robbery was made is devoid of merit. It had been positively established that the late George Kalitas had kept money in a trunk
placed under his bed which the accused took on the night in question. Martillana Kalitas categorically stated in court that her father,
George Kalitas, had money, amounting to P65,000.00, which he kept in a trunk placed under his bed, because he had no trust in
banks. Jessie Renopal testified that the accused broke open the said trunk with an axe on the night of July 2, 1966 and took the
money placed inside. Her testimony is corroborated by Silvia Mingming Kalitas, the wife of George Kalitas. Silvia Mingming Kalitas
declared, however, that the money kept by her husband amounted to only P40,560.00 at the last counting.
The argument of counsel that the amount stolen, or a portion thereof, should have been presented in evidence in order to make
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the transportation credible, is untenable. Where the property stolen was not recovered, it would be impossible to present it in
evidence. Besides, there is no law or jurisprudence which requires the presentation of the thing stolen in order to prove that it had
been taken away. The accused could have disposed of the money before their arrest. The failure of the prosecution to present in
evidence the money stolen does not give rise to a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
On being a continuing offense
The contention by the accused that only one offense was committed since the robbery in the houses of Gorgonio Mosende and
George Kalitas is one continuing offense, committed at the same time and on one occasion, and arising out of one criminal
resolution, and the burning of the house of George Kalitas was the means to commit the crime of robbery. Counsel cites the case
of People vs. De Leon.
In this case, however, the accused, after committing the crime of robbery in band in the house of Gorgonio Mosende, went to
the neighboring house of George Kalitas where they committed the crimes of Arson and Robbery with Homicide and Physical
Injuries. Obviously, the rule enunciated in the cited case cannot be made applicable since the herein accused performed different
acts with distinct purposes which resulted in juridically independent crimes. The Court also rejected the applicability of the cited
case of People vs. De Leon in the case of People vs. Enguerro, and found the accused therein guilty of three (3) separate crimes of
Robbery in Band, where the said accused, after committing a robbery in band in a store, went to another house where they
committed a second robbery, and after committing it proceeded to another house where they committed a third robbery, and in
the same barrio during the period from 7:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. of the same day.
Final Disposition
The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the defendants Abraham Lim alias Titing Lim, Ceferino Caturanalias Fred,
Romualdo Raboy alias Romy, and Saturnino Galliano guilty of the crimes of Robbery in Band, Arson, and Robbery with Homicide and
Physical Injuries.
The trial court found that the commission of the offenses charged was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime,
dwelling, use of motor vehicle, use of unlicensed firearm, and with the aid of armed men to ensure or afford impunity. The use of
unlicensed firearm, however, cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in Crim. Case Nos. 9988 (Arson) and 9989
(Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries) since the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm is solely
applicable to robbery in band under Art. 295 of the Revised Penal Code.
118. People vs. Salas ()
March 7, 2000Quisumbing
Facts:
(1) A 60 year old woman and the accused were gambling during the wake of a Mr. Flores. The accused noticed that her purse
contained Php. 2,000. He noticed this when the lady gave her son some money while she was playing. After the wake, two of their
companions left her and the accused when they had reached their home. It was the last time they saw the woman alive. One of
them heard a shout at 3 am. The next day, the victim lay dead in the canal and the 2,000 pesos was not recovered from the body.
(2) The accused no longer reported for work the next day. He was eventually caught. His defense is that it should be the people who
heard the scream that should be accused of the crime because it is contrary to human experience that they would not have
rendered assistance. Secondly, that there was no evidence to show that the deceased carried the sum of 2,000 pesos with her. He
claims that it is essential that that money existed in order to prove an essential element of the crime. He quit his job (as a painter)
because the pay wasnt very good and that he never went into hiding. He also contends that the court should consider his voluntary
surrender.
Issue: Is he guilty of robbery with homicide?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
(1) In case there are no eye witnesses nor direct evidence either to the robbery or to the homicide and none of the things stolen
were ever recovered. One must resort to circumstantial evidence. It is to be noted that he claimed to have left the job because the
pay was not good but the fact that he abandoned his job as a paint when he had an unfinished project which makes his excuse
doubtful. Also, bloodstains were found on the front door of appellants house, on his clothing, and on his yellow slippers after the
victim killed.
(2) He was also only caught when he was hospitalized under the laias Rommel Salas, instead of his true name Elmer Salas. These
circumstances denote flight, which when unexplained, has always been considered by the courts as indicative of guilt.
Elements of Robbery with Homicide:
(3) It is found that there was taking of personal property (1st element) and that it belonged to another (2nd element), and that the
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taking is characterized with animus lucrandi (3rd element) and (4) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide was committed.
119. People v. Mangulabnan ()
1956 Felix
*man hid himself inside the ceiling accidentally shot
Facts:
At about 11pm, in Nov 5 1953, the spouses Vicente Pacson and Cipriana Tadeo, the 4 minor children and Ciprianas mother,
Monica del Mundo, were awaken by gunfire in their house in Nueva Ecija. Whereupon, Vicente Pacson crossed the room and
shouted to one Tata Pisio that persons were going up their house and then hid himself inside the ceiling.
In the meantime, a robber entered by breaking wall of the kitchen at the back of the house, then later got into the living room.
The intruder who was armed with a hunting knife was recognized by Cipriana Tadeo to be Agustin Mangulabnan, who was
previously known to her. Then 2 other persons whose identity has not been ascertained entered. Mangulabnan then approached
Cipriana Tadeo and snatched from her neck one necklace valued P50 and also took from her person P50 in the paper bills and P20 in
silver coins. One of the small children of Vicente Pacson who was terrified called to his mother and that unidentified
person/robber, irked by the boys impudence, made a move to strike him, but Monica del Mundo warded off the blow with her
right arm. At this juncture, the second unidentified individual put his companion aside the climbing on the table, fired his gun at
the ceiling. Afterwards, Mangulabnan and his two unidentified companion left the place.
After they were gone, Cipriana Tadeo called to her husband Vicente Pacson, and receiving no answer she climbed the ceiling and
she found him lying face downward already dead.
Then Cipriana repored to the police. When Mangulabnan was investigated, he readily and voluntarily subscribed before the
Justice of the Peace in Nueva Ecija, an affidavit admitting his participation in the robbery and killing of Vicente Pacson. Agustin
Mangulabnan was found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide
Issue: Is Mangulabnan guilty of robber with homicide?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
There is no denial that the crime of robbery with homicides was committed. By Mangulabnans own admission and the testimony
of Cipriana Tadeo, we cannot have any doubt as to Appellants participation in the execution thereof. Mangulabnan and the rest of
the malefactors came together to the house of the offended parties to commit the robbery perpetuated therein and together went
away from the scene of the crime after its perpetration. This shows conspiracy among the offenders which rendered each of them
liable for the acts of the others.
It may be argued that the killing of Vicente Pacson undertaken by one of the 2 unidentified persons who climbed up a table and
fired at the ceiling, was an unpremeditated act that surged on the spur of the amount and possibly without any idea that Vicente
Pacson was hiding therein but the rule is that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is
enough that a homicide would result by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. It is immaterial that the death would
supervene by mere accident.
The commission of the offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of superior strength
and with the aid of armed men. However, as the required number of votes for the imposition of the capital penalty has not been
secured in this case, the penalty to be imposed upon Agustin Mangulabnan is the next lower in degree or reclusion perpetua.
120. People vs. Calixtro ()
July 15, 1983 Abad Santos
Facts:
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of February 16, 1970, a jeep with seven men on board stopped in front of the Rural Bank of
San Luis, Batangas. Six men alighted while one was left behind the steering wheel of the parked jeep. Of the six who alighted, three
proceeded to the bank and the rest took positions in front of the bank. The men who stood in front of the bank were Alberto
Katigbak, Petronilo Mercado and Apolinario Martinez. Of the three men who proceeded to the bank, the first to enter was Pio
Cuevas, then Chief of Police of San Antonio, Quezon, in uniform and was armed with a carbine. He was followed by Juanito Calixtro
and Juan Mercado who were both in civilian attire and were armed with short firearms. As Cuevas entered, he told the security
guard of the bank, Julian Agojo, that the Lieutenant was going to apply for a loan. Agojo then instructed them to proceed to the
manager. Calixtro proceeded directly to the cashier's table. Cuevas, however, instead of following Calixtro, immediately grabbed the
service carbine of Agojo and poked the same at the latter shouting in a loud voice, 'dapa kayo, holdup ito, mamamatay kayo. As
Agojo grappled with Cuevas for the possession of the carbine, some shots were heard from outside and inside the bank. After the
firing, Calixtro took P150 from the cashier's table, while Cuevas (wounded) and Agojo were still grappling for the possession of the
carbine. Cuevas shouted to his companions for help and another burst of shots were fired. Alberto Katigbak, Apolinario Martinez
and Petronilo Mercado who were deployed outside the bank were seen firing towards the direction of the bank while Jaunito
Calixtro and Juan Mercado were shooting at Agojo as he grappled with Cuevas. Cuevas was apparently hit, but he was still able to rin
out towards the jeep. As Agojo tried to Chase Cuevas, the latters companions fired at Agojo. Cuevas and his companions then
79
boarded their jeep which sped northward. Thereafter, Dionisio Aquino, Antonio de Sagun, Mario Kaibigan, Julian Agojo and Alfredo
Rojas boarded a volkswagen car and gave chase. The jeep which Cuevas and his companions rode was finally sighted at Lemery,
Batangas. Cuevas and Juan Mercado were brought to the Lemery Emergency Hospital for treatment. Calixtro, Petronilo Mercado
and Katigbak were brought to the municipal jail and were investigated.
Cuevas had an ante-mortem statement while in the hospital. He affixed his thumb mark thereto, and it was not made under
circumstances of an impending death. He stated that those who shot him were his companions and that he was told by them that
they were going to rob a bank.
Ocular investigation: Retrieved five (5) empty carbine shells (found 5m away from the bank door), one (1) empty .45 caliber shell
one (1) empty .38 caliber shell one (1) empty .22 caliber shell and one (1) deformed slug; Pershing cap near the guard's table; All the
empty bullet shells were found outside the bank building, no shell was found inside the premises of the bank.
No paraffin test was conducted because the lieutenant had to attend to the investigation of the incident first and no one among the
appellants admitted having fired a gun. (But the walls and ceiling of the bank, a glass window and desk top inside the bank, were
punctured with bullet holes).
Medico-legal findings: presence of gun shot wounds and Cuevas died of severe hemorrhage due to gunshot wound on the chest;
Julian Agojo lacerations and abrasions 79 days healing time
All of the appellants claim ignorance of any plan to rob the Rural Bank of San Luis, deny participation in the robbery and assert that
each of them was a mere accidental by-stander.
The accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as Principals in the crime of Robbery in Band with Homicide, aggravated by
the circumstances of use of a motor vehicle, craft, disguise, and use of unlicensed firearms. In the absence of any other modifying
circumstances, the court sentences each of the said defendants to Death, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of deceased
victim Pio Cuevas and Alberto Obrador.
Issue: Did the appellants commit robbery in band with homicide considering that Cuevas was one of them and not a robbery victim,
an innocent bystander or a stranger?
Ruling: Yes because Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code says so.
Held:
As held in People vs. Mangulabnan,
Article 294, No. 1., of the Revised Penal Code, which defines the special, single and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide ..., but
this English version of the Code is a poor translation of the prevailing Spanish text of said paragraph, which reads as follows:
l. Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con ocasion del robo resultare homicidio.
In order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on
the occasion of the robbery.
121. People vs. Pecato ()
June 18, 1987 Sarmiento
* 70 and 85 years old were killed for only P350.00
Facts:
1. In the evening of November 1, 1971, while Felix Larong, about 70 years old, his wife Luciana Larong, about 85 years of age, and
his 31-year old unmarried daughter, Uldarica Larong, were preparing to sleep, several men called from outside their small
house requested that they be allowed to enter the Larongs' house.
2. Felix Larong opened the door of their house and four men, each carrying a gun entered.
3. The intruders then ordered the Larongs to he face down on the floor and demanded money from Felix Larong.
4. When the old man replied that he had no money, Arturo Pecato, shot him.
5. He died as a result of the shotgun wounds he sustained.
6. Then they asked Uldarica Larong for money.
7. She refused thus they hit her with gun butt on different parts of her body.
8. Uldarica Larong then gave the men P300.00, but when they still demanded for more, so she gave an additional P50.00.
9. After a while, the intruders left.
10. Fearful that the robbers-killers would come back, Uldarica Larong and Luciana Larong went out of their house and hid
themselves among the bushes nearby.
11. On the following morning, the robbery killing was reported to the Police Department of Gigaquit
12. The two women positively Identified and pointed to Arturo Pecato, Felix Pecato, Victoriano Leyros, and Ereneo Peruda as the
criminals who robbed them and killed Felix Larong.
Issue: Are all the accused guilty of the complex crime robbery with homicide even though only Arturo who killed Felix Larong?
Held: Yes.
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Ruling:
1. The crime committed by the accused is Robbery with Homicide.
2. We have repeatedly held that:
- (A)s long as homicide resulted during or because of, the robbery, even if the killing is by mere accident robbery with
homicide is committed,- it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes,
modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration
- Further, whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who
took part as principals in the commission of the crime are also guilty as principals in the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly appeared that they
endeavored to prevent the homicide.
3. In this instance, the evidence on record is bereft of any showing that any of the accused tried to prevent the killing of Felix
Larong.
4. What is shown instead is that they merely stood watching and did nothing when one of their companions shot the victim.
Other rulings
5. The court is fully satisfied that the prosecution has established a clear and positive identification of the accused
6. The bad blood defense is not proven satisfactorily
122. People vs. Tapales ()
10 Sep 1979 Per Curiam
*rape considered as aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide
Facts:
On 1 a.m. of 27 Oct 1971, Diana Ang and her boyfriend Eugenio Calaykay boarded a taxi in front of the Jai Alai building in Manila.
Upon reaching the Jones Bridge, the cab driver stopped and two people, Jessie Tapales and Perdo Coranez, entered the taxi and
declared a hold up. They divested Eugenio of his Rado watch and Diana with her Parker ballpen and Mexican money worth 2. The
cab driver continued driving until they reached a fire station at Intramuros when Eugenio shouted hold up and was then stabbed
and shot by the accused. He was forced out of the cab in Del Pan bridge and subsequently died. The driver was then ordered to
proceed to Quezon City and looked for a vacant lot. There, they took turns in raping Diana. After the rape, they dropped Diana
behind the Carbungco restaurant where she pleaded for help. Upon reaching the precinct, she saw the shoes of Eugenio and
thereafter identified his body in the morgue.
After the police apprehended the accused, they were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide and rape. They both
pleaded guilty to Robbery with Homicide but denied the occurrence of the rape which they claimed was with consent of Diana. After
trial, the court found them guilty of robbery with homicide aggravated by rape, use of motor vehicle, and nighttime and was
sentenced to the penalty of death.
Issue: Should rape be considered an aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide?
Held: Yes. It increases the moral evil of the crime.
Ruling:
The special complex crime of robbery with homicide does not include rape. However, there is no question that the occurrence of
rape increases the moral evil of the crime. Consistent to the Courts ruling, rape can be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
It is considered as ignominy (par. 17) and causing other wrong not necessary for its commission (par. 21) under Article 14. In this
case, there was no question that it was by reason or on the occasion of the robbery that homicide and rape were committed.
123. People vs. Quinones ()
March 28, 1990 Cruz
*Kill as many as you want it will still be robbery with homicide
Facts:
The bodies of three men were found in a wooded area in barangay Tuaco, Basud, Camarines Norte. The corpses were in a state of
decomposition and bore various contusions, stab and bullet wounds, and other injuries indicating foul play. The victims were later
positively identified as Alexander Sy, Augusto Gabo and Frisco Marcellana. In due time, an information for robbery with multiple
homicide was filed against Adolfo Quiones, Alfredo Aban, Zaldy Civico, Ronilo Canaba, Amado Conda, Jr., Santiago Solarte,
Armando Buitre and one John Doe.
It was established that the three victims were riding in a dark blue Mitsubishi car at about seven o'clock in the evening when they
were intercepted along the Maharlika Highway by the accused, who had placed sacks on the road to block the way. The three were
taken to the nearby woods where they were killed. According to his brother, Napoleon, Alexander Sy was at that time carrying
P300,000.00, representing the weekly collections of his business, a necklace with pendant worth P20,000.00, a P10,000.00 diamond
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ring, and a licensed .22 caliber handgun.

On their arraignment on November 13, 1986, Quiones, Canaba, Aban, Civico and Conda pleaded not guilty. On November 20,
1986, Conda, Canaba, and Quiones withdrew their plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty. On April 1, 1986, Conda was
allowed to withdraw his former plea of guilty and substitute the same With not guilty. Solarte escaped and is presently at large
while Buitre was killed in an encounter with the Manila police.
Issues: Could they be charged with robbery with multiple homicide?
Held: No. The complex crime of robbery with homicide is not to be multiplied with the number of persons killed.
Ruling:
The Court is satisfied that the evidence against the accused is sufficient to justify their conviction. The declarations of the
prosecution witnesses and more so of defendants Quiones and Canaba, both of whom had pleaded guilty are telling enough
to toll their guilt. The seized weapons and the other exhibits offer strong corroboration that has not been refuted. The state of the
cadavers of the swollen scrotums and the protruding tongues tell a tale of their own of the defendants' perverted
ruthlessness.
It is clear from the evidence on record that there was a conspiracy among the perpetrators of the crime to rob and slay. Proof of
conspiracy in the case at bar was supplied, paradoxically enough, mainly by defendants Quiones and Canaba themselves. From the
time they blocked the road to waylay their prey to the killing and robbing in the woods, to the distribution of the loot and their
escape in the stolen car, all the accused were acting in concert and in accordance with their common plan.
The charge should have been for robbery with homicide only regardless of the fact that three persons were killed in the
commission of the robbery. In this special complex crime, the number of persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the
penalty prescribed in Article 294 of the said Code. As held in People v. Cabuena:The complex crime of robbery with homicide is not
to be multiplied with the number of persons killed. As was said by this Court in People vs. Madrid (88 Phil. 1), "the general concept
of this crime does not limit the taking of human life to one single victim making the slaying of human being in excess of that number
punishable as separate individual offense or offenses. All the homicides or murders are merged in the composite, integrated whole
that is robbery with homicide so long as the killings were perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.
124. People vs. Faigano ()
BellosilloFebruary 22, 1996
Facts:
(1) One night, the victim was sleeping with her 2 children in her bed. She woke to see the accused wearing a black t-shirt but with
no pants or underwear on. Instinctively, she tried to scream but he raised the mosquito net and poked a balisong at her neck and
warned her not to make any sound or he would kill her and the children. He then started kissing her and tore off her nigh tie. He
then had carnal knowledge of her and discharged his semen on the blanket. He then put on his shorts and ordered the victim to
bring out her money. The accused took 2 rings, a watch, and 2k pesos.
(2) The next day, the victim saw the accused working at the nearby construction site. She reported that she was merely kissed.
However, she changed this later on and said in the criminal complaint that she was raped.
(3) His defense is that he was a sleep when it happened. Also, that there were two kids next to her thus it was impossible to have
sex with her and not wake them. Also, the act that she did not disclose that she was raped to her neighbors shows that this is
contrary to res gestae. Also, it is contrary to human experience to discharge oneself on the blanket instead of the vagina at the
height of satisfaction and if he was the criminal, why would he return to a place so near the victim?
Issue: Is he guilty of the complex crime of robbery with rape?
Held: No, separate crimes of rape and robbery.
Ruling:
(1) People vs. Ignacio rules that among poor couples with big families living in cramped quarters it is possible to have sex and not
disturb the others. Also, the fact that the people sleeping next to her were children can be applied to the concept that children sleep
more soundly than grown-ups and are not easily disturbed by the exertions of adults in the night. The fact that they did not wake is
normal to their age.
(2) The fact that she did not immediately report that she was raped is simply because she was shy and coy. What matters is that she
finally reported it in the sworn statement at the police HQ.
(3) Neither complete penetration nor ejaculation is essential to consummate rape.
(4) It is equally true that culprits have become bolder by returning to their prey under the pretext of feigning innocence to ensure
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that their victim has been successfully elimineated or they could believe that since there were no witnesses the victims would have
been cowed into silence.
POINT OF CASE:
(5) The special complex crime of robbery with rape can only be committed if the intent to take personal property of another must
precede the rape. (Specific intent was to rob and rape is merely incidental to the crime)
(6) If the original plan was to rape but the accused after committing the rape also committed robbery when the opportunity
presented itself, the offenses should be viewed as separate and distinct crimes.
Conclusion: Thus, since the accused first raped the girl. And after that robbed her, the crimes should be treated independent of one
another.
125. PEOPLE v. Feliciano PATOLA and Eunillo Sangayon ()

1986 Aquino
*beer drinkers raped and deflowered salesgirls
Facts:
This is a review of the death penalty imposed upon Feliciano Patola and Eunillo Sangayon. hey were convicted of robbery with rape
with the use of deadly weapons. Sangayon executed an extrajudicial confession. The prosecution's evidence shows that at around
8pm, on September 7, 1973 in the store of Roman Conado, salesgirls, were piling up the goods as it was closing time. Patola,
Sangayon, and two unidentified persons were still in the store drinking beer. Unexpectedly, Sangayon closed the door of the
store, Patola, with a gun in his hand, approached Mila and told her not to shout if she did not want to die. Patola and Sangayon
herded Mila, Elena, the Cohado couple and their son William to an adjoining room and told them to lie down on the floor face
down. They were hogtied with nylon ropes. Their mouths were stuffed with pieces of cloth torn from the curtains. Patola,
Sangayon and their two companions ransacked the store and took away cash, appliances, a wrist watch and other thing (The fact of
the robbery is shown in the five photographs of the rooms in Cohado's house taken the next day).
Then, Sangayon untied the feet of Elena and brought her to a room and abused her. After Sangayon was through, his companion
entered the room and in turn abused Elena. The second robber brought Elena to the sala, hogtied her again and covered her with a
blanket. Mila was untied by Patola and brought to another room where he ravished her.
The next day the physician examined Mila and Elena. According to the former, the 2 had been deflowered/devirginized (Milas
case: There were contusions in her labia majora and labia minora. Her fourchette was bleeding. Her hymen was ruptured. There
were fresh lacerations at the three o'clock and seven o'clock positions. Sperm cells were found in her vagina. Elenas: the labia
minora of Elena had a contusion. Her fourchette was lacerated. Her hymen was ruptured at the three o'clock and nine o'clock
positions. There were sperm cells in the vagina.)
Patola and Sangayon were arrested 6 days after the commission of the robbery. They were Identified by Mila, Elena and Zosima
Conado. The revolvers used in the robbery with rape were seized from them. Patola, Sangayon, Jesus Montecino and Alfredo
Dalogdog were charged with robbery with rape. Upon motion of the fiscal, the case against Dalogdog was dismissed. Montecino
was acquitted by the trial court. Patola and Sangayons defense was that they were at different places (separately) during the crime.
Issue: Are Patola and Sangayon guilty of robbery with rape?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
Oral evidence against Patola is sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Mila remembered that Patola was wearing a
pink shirt with long sleeves. Zosima Conado recognized Patola and Sangayon by their faces (The store was lighted by a flourescent
lamp). Testimonies of the offended parties are adequate to prove the special complex crime charged.
The accused were charged with a crime against property, not a crime against chastity. There was no complaint of the offended
parties in this case. Robbery with rape is punishable with reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua.
There used to be a controversy as to whether robbery with qualified rape should be penalized under article 294[2] or under article
335 which imposes a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. That controversy was set at rest in People vs. Cabural: Robbery with
qualified rape should be punished under article 294[2]. Penalty is reclusion perpetua. (Art 335 imposes death penalty)
It should be stressed that in the case the accused were not charged with qualified rape alone, a crime against chastity, but with
robbery with rape, a crime against property. Penalty imposed on the accused is reclusion perpetua.
126. People vs. Dinola ()
March 22, 1990 Cortes
Facts:
On October 21, 1977, at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Marilyn Caldosa was at home sleeping [alone] in the house of her aunt,
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who was then in Tacloban. She was awakened by a voice saying: "Do not make a noise or I will kill you. If you will not accede to a
carnal knowledge I will count from one to three and I will kill you."; that she noticed a small bolo pointed towards her breast and she
was frightened. The person then placed himself on top of her and placed his penis inside her vagina by push and pull. The first push
was not successful and the person tried many times to put his penis inside her vagina until he was able to do so and she felt pain.
While she was on top of her, she did not resist as he was big and she cannot overcome him. After having carnal knowledge with her,
he lighted a candle and when he saw her "Citizen" watch valued at P300.00 he grabbed it from her; that after the candle was
lighted, she saw that the person was "Eme" whose full name is Emeterio Dinola, who resides in front of her house and he had
previously worked for them. He left after grabbing her watch while she stayed in bed as she was afraid and at about 4:00 o'clock in
the morning she went to the bathroom and washed her vagina as she felt dirty. At about 5:00 or 6:00 o'clock in the morning, she
went to the house of the son of her aunt and they went to the Provincial Hospital to have her painful vagina treated. she was not
treated that morning as the doctor on duty was not there, but they were given a prescription for the medicine. She went back to the
hospital in the afternoon and was physically examined.
The medicolegal certificate of the complainant stated the following findings:
No external sign of physical injuries; Admits 2 examining fingers with slight pain; There is an incomplete laceration of the hymen at 6
o'clock position; There is a contusion 0.5 cm. at the 1 o'clock position of the hymen; Cervix: Negative Sperm Exam: Negative for
spermatozoa; Uterus: Not Enlarged; Discharges: None
According to the officer, it is possible that there was sexual contact and that the victim was possibly raped.
The accused assails the credibility of Marilyn Caldosa: (1) there were no external signs of injuries on her body; (2) the complainant
did not make any resistance as in fact her hands were just on her sides during the time the forced intercourse allegedly occurred;
and (3) she did not say anything to stop her assailant from consummating the act.
Issue: Should Dinola be convicted of robbery with rape?
Held: NO
Ruling:
The Court has already ruled that rape may be committed even if no force was used, intimidation being sufficient. Intimidation
includes the moral kind such as fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife. The Court has likewise held that the admission of
the victim that her hands were on her sides while the accused was on top of her does not mean that she consented to the act. The
complainant in this case, is a seventeen (17) year old lass while the accused is a thirty four (34) year old laborer. In complainant's
words: "he is bigger and I am small." This was coupled by his use of a bolo to threaten the complainant. The law does not impose a
burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What needs only to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation
by the accused in having sexual intercourse with the victim.
However, it does not appear from the record of the case that when the accused entered the house of the complainant, he already
had the intention to rob the complainant. In fact, the complainant testified that after she was raped by the accused, the latter lit a
candle, saw the watch on her wrist, threatened to kill her if she did not give it to him and forcibly took it from her. Hence, the taking
of the watch by the accused was more of an afterthought, even accidental.
The Court hereby modifies the judgment: guilty of two independent crimes of rape and robbery, indeterminate penalty of not less
than two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, to not more than eight (8) years of prision mayor. As for
the crime of rape, since it was committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the accused must suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
127. People vs. Moreno ()
March 22, 1993 Campos Jr.
*2 maids raped during the robbery
Facts:
1. In the early morning of May 31, 1985, the Spouses Mohnani Raj and Sundri Mohnani, both Indian nationals were sleeping in
their house with their three (3) children.
2. The couple had two maids, namely, Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo, who were sleeping in another room near the sala of
the house.
3. The three (3) Accused (Juan Moreno, Paulino Deloria, and Reynaldo Maniquez) agreed to rob the house of Mohnani Raj and

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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Sundri Mohnani.
The Accused Juan Moreno entered the house first by cutting the iron grills of the window of the house.
In the meanwhile, the Accused Paulino Deloria patrolled the street nearby for any persons or tanod in the vicinity.
The Accused Reynaldo Maniquez, on the other hand, acted as the look-out.
After breaking through the trio entered the house together, using a flashlight.
The spouses were awakened when the three Accused Juan Moreno, Reynaldo Maniquez and Paulino Deloria entered their
bedroom.
The Accused Paulino Deloria, who was armed with a gun covered with a towel, switched on the lights inside the bedroom of the
couple and stood by the door.
The Accused Reynaldo Maniquez, sat on the stomach of Mohnani Raj, at the same time, warning the latter not to shout, while
poking the pair of scissors on him.
The Accused Juan Moreno posted himself beside where Sundri Mohnani Raj was lying down, while poking his knife at her.
They started to rob the couple getting all their belongings, cash, watch etc.
Then they asked where are the maids
Then, Accused Paulino Deloria and Reynaldo Maniquez told the maids to go with them stead.
Reynaldo Maniquez brought Mary Ann Galedo to the bathroom of the house while Paulino Deloria brought Narcisa Sumayo to
the sala.
Sundri Mohnani was afraid to go out of the bedroom. However, she peeped through the door of the bedroom which was then
open. Although she could see the bathroom, the door to the bathroom was closed. She could not, moreover, see the sala from
where she was.
After about five (5) minutes, Paulino Deloria and Reynaldo Maniquez and the two (2) maids returned to the room of the couple.
Sundri Mohnani saw that the zipper of the pants of Reynaldo Maniquez was still open.
Narcisa Sumayo was crying while Mary Ann Galedo was lying in bed, quiet.
After the Accused left the residence of the couple, Sundri Mohnani locked their door while Mohnani Raj shouted "Nakaw,
nakaw".
The couple called up the police who later responded and arrived in their house. There were also about twenty or so people who
offered succor to the couple. The police officers were told of the circumstances of the robbery-rape perpetrated by the
Accused.
Problem
22. there is no direct evidence to prove the crime of rape considering that Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo, after they
executed their respective statements before the police investigators, left for their respective provinces and that their
whereabouts were unknown
23. Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo were not presented by the Prosecution as its witnesses, however, when the Prosecution
offered the aforementioned written statements of the two (2) maids, the counsel of the accused did not object to the
admission of said evidence:
24. The maids were not presented for cross-examination. Only the testimony of Sundri Mohnani was the basis for the conviction of
the crime
Issue: Is the special complex crime of robbery with rape proper?
Held: Yes. Except for Juan Moreno who took no part in the rape shall be guilty of robbery only
Ruling:
1. There is sufficient, ample and convincing circumstantial evidence in the record proving the guilt of the Accused beyond
peradventure of doubt for the crime of rape.
2. The testimony of Sundri Mohnani is vital.
- Thus, she positively and spontaneously testified that he saw the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez bring Mary Ann Galedo from
her room to the bathroom.
- The two of them, the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez and Mary Ann Galedo staying inside the bathroom for about five (5)
minutes.
- After the lapse of said time, Mary Ann Galedo and the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez went out of the bathroom.
- Mary Ann Galedo proceeded to the bathroom of the couple.
- Sundri Mohnani saw the zipper to the pants of the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez still open.
- It was only after two (2) minutes that the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez bothered to close the zipper of his pants.
- both Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo told their employers, the Mohnani spouses, that they were raped.
3. Therefore, evidence of rape may be based on circumstantial inference
4. One who did not take part in rape, but only robbery is guilty only of robbery.
5. Dwelling, nighttime and use of vehicle aggravating in rape.
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128. People vs. Salvilla ()

26 Apr 1990 Melencio-Herrera
*robbery is consummated upon taking possession of the thing
Facts:
On 12 Apr 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused, Bienvenido Salvilla, Reynaldo Cansares, Ronaldo Canasares, and
Simplicio Canasares, at the New Iloilio Lumber Yard at about noon time. Armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade, they
announced a hold-up. The owner, Severino Choco then hurriedly placed 20,000 in a paper bag, gave them to the accused, and
pleaded them to leave as they already had the money. However, the accused held hostage Severino, his two daughters, and his
secretary inside the office and demanded a ransom of 100,000. The police and military later arrived including the OIC Mayor of
Iloilo City and negotiated with the accused. They then gave the demanded ransom (reduced to 50,000) but Severino and his
daughters were not released. Thereafter, the police launched an assault and as a result injuring the two daughters. They were then
charged with robbery with serious physical injuries and serious illegal detention. After trial, they were found guilty and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Was the robbery consummated?
Held: Yes. From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, the unlawful taking is complete.
Ruling:
In robbery, the taking of personal property belonging to another, the element of asportation, is required. The unlawful taking of the
personal property of another is an essential part of the crime. In this case, the taking was sufficiently proved. The accused already
had in their possession the initial 20,000 from Severino and the Mayor gave the ransom money to the holduppers. From the
moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful
taking is complete. Thus, the robbery was consummated.
The complex crime has been committed such that the penalty for the more serious offense of Serious Illegal Detention is to be
imposed instead of the penalty prescribed for Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries. The crime of serious illegal detention was a
necessary means employed by the accused to facilitate and carry out more effectively their evil design to stage a robbery.
129. People vs. Apuduhan ()
August 30, 1968 Castro
*Perverse killer, topsy-turvy on admission of guilt
Facts:
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, in the Municipality of Mabini, Province of Bohol, Philippines, the Apolonio Apduhan, Jr. and
five (5) other persons whose true names are not yet known all of them armed with different unlicensed firearms, daggers, and other
deadly weapons feloniously enter, by means of violence, the dwelling house of the spouses Honorato Miano and Antonia Miano,
which was also the dwelling house of their children, the spouses Geronimo Miano and Herminigilda de Miano; and, once inside the
said dwelling house, the above-named accused with their five (5) other companions, did attack, hack and shoot Geronimo Miano
and another person by the name of Norberto Aton, who happened to be also in the said dwelling house, thereby inflicting upon the
said two (2) persons physical injuries which caused their death; and thereafter the same accused and their five (5) other
companions, did take and carry way from said dwelling house cash money amounting to Three Hundred Twenty-two Pesos
(P322.00).
The act committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 294, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code with the special aggravating
circumstance that the crime was committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms (Art. 296, Rev. Penal Code), and other
aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and superior strength.
The accused has been desisted from pleading guilty and let his previous plea stand on record after further warnings that he faced
the grave danger of being sentenced to death in view of the circumstances of his case. But eventually pleaded guilty despite the
chance that he will be convicted of death penalty despite his insistence that he be given life imprisonment.
Issues: What crime has been committed and to which Art. 294, 295 or 296 does it fall?
Held: Art. 296. Robbery in a band.
Ruling:
The case at bar falls under art. 294(1) which defines robbery with homicide and fixes the penalty from reclusion perpetua to
death.
Article 296, defines "band", creates the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, and provides the criminal
liability incurred by the members of the band. The ascertainment of the definite function and range of applicability of this article in
relation to articles 294 and 295 is essential in the disposition of the case at bar.
If the foregoing classes of robbery which are described in art. 294(1) and (2) are perpetrated by a band, they would not be
punishable under art. 295, but then cuadrilla would be a generic aggravating under Art. 14 of the Code. Hence, with the present
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wording of art. 295 there is no crime as "robbery with homicide in band." If robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the
indictable offense would still be denominated as "robbery with homicide" under art. 294(1), but the element of band, as stated
above, would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
After a perceptive analysis of the provisions of art. 296, we reach the considered opinion that the said article is exclusively linked
and singularly applicable to the immediately antecedent provision of art. 295 on robbery in band, as the latter article, in turn, is
explicitly limited in scope to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. Consequently, although the use of unlicensed firearm is a special
aggravating circumstance under art. 296, as amended by Rep. Act 12, 3 it cannot be appreciated as such in relation to robbery with
homicide, described and penalized under paragraph 1 of art. 294.
Conceding, however, that his plea was "spontaneous" and "insistent," such manifestation of sincere repentance cannot serve to
obliterate the attendant aggravating circumstances which patently reveal the accused's criminal perversity. For failure to secure the
required number of votes, the penalty of death cannot be legally imposed. The penalty next lower in degree - reclusion perpetua should consequently be imposed on the accused.
Concepts:
ART. 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof. When more than three armed malefactors take part
in the commission of a robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. When any of the arms used in the
commission of the offense be an unlicensed firearm the penalty to be imposed upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of
the corresponding penalty provided by law, without prejudice to the criminal liability for illegal possession of such unlicensed
firearm.
130. People vs. Jaranilla ()
February 22, 1974Aquino
*the theft of 2 cocks
Facts:
(1) Gorriceta (our main witness for this case) claims that he was driving along the road when he saw Ricardo, Elias, and Franco. He
picked them up and they asked him to take them to Mandurria because Elias had to get something from his uncles place. Although
Gorriceta wanted to go home and return the truck to his sister he agreed. When they got to their point of destination. The 3 of them
disembarked. They hurriedly came back to the truck with 2 fighting cocks and told Gorriceta to drive because they were being
chased.
(2) While Gorriceta continued driving he saw patrolman Jabatan who had begun to fire warning shots as to instruct them to pull
over. They pulled over. The officer asked them to step out of the car. All of a sudden, Elias brandished his revolver and shot the
police officer. Gorrcieta, frightened, hit the gas and drove on to home. He was warned by Elias not to tell anyone. (The police officer
died that night)
(3) A complaint report was filed by a person claiming that his cock pens were broken. He claimed that 6 fighting cocks were
missing. The accused stood before trial and were charged with robbery with homicide with the aggravating circumstances of use of
a motor vehicle, nocturnity, band, contempt of or with insult to the public authorities and recidivism.
(4) The trial court ruled that the taking of 6 fighting cocks was robbery and that the patrolman was killed by reason nor on the
occasion of the robbery within the purview of Article 294 of the RPC.
(5) The defense on the other hand say that the taking of the roosters was mere theft and that if it was robbery, the crime could not
be robbery with homicide because the robbery was already consummated when Jabatan was killed. They also claim that it was
Gorriceta who killed the officer and not Elias. They claim that Gorriceta was drunk at the time.
Issue: Are they guilty of Robbery with homicide?
Held: No
Ruling:
(1) The defense must fail. If Gorriceta were drunk, he could not have thought of killing the officer in his state and would not have
been able to shoot accurately. It is thus believed that only a sober person like Elias could have done it.
(2) Elias and his 2 companions were interested in concealing the fighting cocks (the motive) thus it was they who had the motive for
shooting Jabatan. However, there is no evidence that in taking the 6 roosters from their coop or cages in the yard of the owner
constitutes violence against or intimidation of person was employed. Neither does it fall under Article 299 of the RPC which
penalizes robbery in an inhabited place.
(3) The translation of Uninhabited place for the said article is incorrect. What lugar no habitado means is inhabited house.
The term building refers to a place to that which is HABITABLE. Thus, a pig sty is not a building within the meaning of Article 302,
neither is the chicken coop which is the issue in the case.
(4) Elias two companions should only be guilty of theft (as proven above that it was not robbery).
(5) Elias on the other hand should be guilty of:
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a. theft
b. and the complex crime of direct assault with homicide.
(6) Simply because there was no indication that the other 2 had conspired to kill the police officer. It is to be noted that treachery
cannot be appreciated because it was not deliberately undertaken by the offender.
131. People v. Danilo DE LA CRUZ, Romeo Salvador, Dantes Beloso ()
1990 Melencio-Herrera
*buying car modus operandi
Facts:
The three accused had known one another some time before December 1984. BELOSO had been hired through DE LA CRUZ (who
claimed to be a 1st Lieutenant of the Philippine Army as well as a customs broker)to man the office at Centrum Condominium in
Makati. On Dec 4, 1984, they met at a restaurant to discuss a "car deal" to be consummated the next day. Dantes BELOSO,
masquerading for Mike Garcia, had caused an advertisement to be published in the 28 and 29 November issues of the Bulletin
Today. On the same dates, BELOSO had rented an office space at the Centrum Condominium under the name of said Garcia for the
two days mentioned, and again on 5 December 1984. BELOSO held himself out as in the business of buying cars. The victim,
ANTHONY, responded to the ad, went to said office and offered to sell his Ford Telstar, Model '83. Posing again as Mike Garcia,
BELOSO called ANTHONY's house at around 9am on 5 December 1984 and informed the latter's mother that he was the buyer of the
car. When ANTHONY went to the Centrum office, bringing with him an envelope containing the certificate of registration, official
receipt, and other papers pertaining to the car. BELOSO told ANTHONY to wait for DE LA CRUZ. Upon the latter's arrival, he had a
talk with ANTHONY. ANTHONY and DE LA CRUZ then proceeded to the latter's house in Makati. Meanwhile, SALVADOR was
instructed by DE LA CRUZ also to wait at the latter's house. When DE LA CRUZ and ANTHONY arrived, the former told SALVADOR to
take a snack somewhere while he (DE LA CRUZ) and ANTHONY talked. It was after SALVADOR returned to the house that the killing
of ANTHONY transpired between 12-2pm place) Later, at about 3pm, DE LA CRUZ then allegedly called for BELOSO at the Centrum
office. When BELOSO arrived, DE LA CRUZ handed him the keys to the car. DE LA CRUZ also handed to SALVADOR a brown envelope
containing papers of the Telstar with the instruction to bring the car to a certain Hernandez, who was buying the car. Following that
bidding, the two left and looked for Hernandez. But unable to locate him, SALVADOR went on his own in a taxi. BELOSO was left
with the car at the Brunch Restaurant near UERM. After having located Hernandez, SALVADOR, Hernandez, and a driver went back
to where BELOSO was, took the car and proceeded to the Metropolitan Pawnshop leaving BELOSO behind. At this place, the three
alighted. SALVADOR introduced himself as ANTHONY Banzon, the owner of the car and the name appearing in the car's Certificate of
Registration, to Pat. Rosauro de la Rosa, brother of the pawnshop owner who was the real buyer of the car. SALVADOR even showed
the Registration Certificate and a Residence Certificate, purportedly ANTHONY'S, as proof thereof. SALVADOR then asked for
P130,000 as selling price. Pat. de la Rosa agreed but asked that payment be made the following day as banks were already closed.
SALVADOR, however, insisted on payment that evening as he was badly in need of money. This made Pat. de la Rosa suspicious that
the car had been stolen, and reported to the Quezon City police. Pat. de la Rosa then instructed SALVADOR to return to the
pawnshop the next day. As SALVADOR did not know how to drive he left the Telstar at the pawnshop, went to the Brunch
Restaurant near UERM, picked up BELOSO so the latter could drive the car back to DE LA CRUZ. When they returned that night and
boarded the car, elements of the Quezon City police approached them and asked them questions. BELOSO got down from the car
and started shouting that he was ANTHONY, the owner of the car. This all the more aroused Pat. de la Rosa's suspicion for earlier it
was SALVADOR who claimed to be ANTHONY.
Meanwhile, at around 9pm of the same day, Cynthia Juarez a boarder of the house of DE LA CRUZ, reported to Bactad of the
Makati Police that when she arrived at the boarding house she found it unlocked but with the lights on and a dead man in the
kitchen. Then the next day, Dela Cruz went to the same Makati police station to report that his house has been ransacked. Bactad
then coordinated with the Quezon City Police anti-carnapping unit, which had given notice that they had apprehended two persons,
Romeo SALVADOR and Dantes BELOSO. Bactad was subsequently able to straighten out the identity of the victim to be ANTHONY
Banzon.
When Beloso and Salvador were interrogated, they elicited their modus operandi as follows: 1) blank residence certificates were
secured and kept by the three accused; 2) their "business" of buying of cars was advertised in the newspapers; 3) the ads yielding
fruitful results, prospective sellers would be asked about their respective certificates of registration and other documents; 4) when
the portion for the signature of the owner is found to be blank, the accused would pretend to test the car, demand the certificate of
registration, and fill in the signature space with their own signature; 5) present the same certificate of registration bearing their own
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signature, along with the residence certificate supplied by DE LA CRUZ which is made to coincide with the name and signature
appearing in the certificate of registration, to the prospective buyers; and 6) pretend to test the car although, in fact, just waiting for
the opportunity to leave the owner of the car behind so that the accused could dispose of the same in the meantime.
But BELOSO and SALVADOR's posed that they were unaware of any carnapping; that they were in a regular business transaction to
sell a car with promise of a commission; that they were not in the house of DE LA CRUZ in the early afternoon of 5 December 1984
when ANTHONY was killed; that they were unaware of the killing, of ANTHONY which, according to SALVADOR was DE LA CRUZ' own
doing. Both BELOSO and SALVADOR are in unison in claiming that their statements (in the investigation/interrogation), are
inadmissible in evidence as the same were extracted by force and without the presence of counsel.
Issue: Were the 3 in conspiracy in committing the crime of carnapping with homicide?
Held: Yes, they are co-principals
Ruling:
The crime committed is Carnapping with Homicide, with carnapping defined as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things" (Sec. 2, RA No. 6539). In this case, the owner of the carnapped vehicle was killed in the commission of the carnapping
obviously to gain possession of the car, its registration certificate and other pertinent papers, get the owner out of the way, and
thus facilitate its sale to a third party, in keeping with the modus operandi of the perpetrators.
BELOSO's and SALVADOR's protestations of innocence do not inspire belief. Both of them posed as ANTHONY at one time or
another during the "negotiations." What further bolsters the conclusion that Salvador had a hand in the commission of the crime
was the fact that when he and BELOSO were arrested by the Quezon City anti-carnapping unit, it was now BELOSO claiming to be
ANTHONY Banzon. BELOSO's claim that he was ANTHONY Banzon and SALVADOR's silence in the face of such claim, despite the fact
that he had earlier misrepresented himself as ANTHONY, all the more reveal that the two of them were one in keeping secret the
true ownership of the car.
They were united in its execution as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances established by the evidence. Conspiracy
need not be established by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite
acts, condition and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished.
What of the killing of ANTHONY? There is no question that he was killed "in the commission of the carnapping." DE LA CRUZ tried
to camouflage the killing by ostensibly reporting to the police that his place had been ransacked and that a person had been killed.
As Pat. Bactad testified, however, when he and a police team went to the house, belongings therein were found wrapped and ready
to be transferred.
But Beloso and Salvador again claimed they had nothing to do with the killing. Those denial, however, cannot prevail over the
physical evidence that BELOSO and SALVADOR were found positive for nitrates, which means that they were within the vicinity
when the gun was fired. The fact that DE LA CRUZ was negative for powder burns, although he was tagged by SALVADOR as the
triggerman, can only mean that he knew how to sufficiently protect himself, a knowledge that must have been derived form his stint
as an officer of the Philippine Army. The identical claims of BELOSO and SALVADOR that they were heavy smokers, of about 3 packs
of Marlboro cigarretes a day, which accounts for the pressent of nitrate in both their right and left hands, is contradicted by the
testimony of the forensic chemist that nitrates produced by cigarrete smoking have different characteristics form those caused by
powder burns. BELOSO's and SALVADOR's complicity in the kiling is, therefore, established not by any of the extradujicial confesions
but by the physical evidence on record.
Doctrine: That the respective participations of BELOSO and SALVADOR in the kiling is not claercut is of no moment: In order to
determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide, it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery and it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident provided that the homicide be
produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to
the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration."
All of them are liable as co-principals.
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132. Izon vs. People ()

August 31, 1981 De Castro
Facts:
Amado Izon and Jimmy Milla were charged, together with Pedro Divino with Robbery with Violence Against Person. On or about
September 8, 1977, Olongapo City, Philippines, they conspired and by means of violence and intimidation applied upon the person
of Reynaldo Togorio.They were armed with bladed weapon which they pointed to Reynaldo Togorio and used in stabbing him and
Amado Izon who helped in mauling him thereby inflicting upon Togorio physical injuries, which shall require medical attendance for
a period of less than nine (9) days. They stole and carried away one motorized tricycle with a total value of P11,000. However, the
motorized tricycle Zukurmi 120 was recovered. They were sentenced to the penalty provided in Republic Act No. 6539 known as
Anti-Car-napping Act of 1972.
Motor vehicle is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using the public highways, but excepting road rollers,
trolley cars, street sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used
on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails or tracks, and tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively
for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a
motor vehicle, shall be classified as separate motor vehicle with no power rating.
Petitioners maintain that the tricycle in question is not a "motor vehicle" as the anti-carnapping law defines the term because it is
not licensed to operate on the "public highways."
The Solicitor General contends otherwise: To limit the words "public highways" to a national road connecting the various towns, as
petitioners' suggest would create a distinction which the statute itself does not make. Under petitioners' proposition, a distinction
should be made between motor vehicles operating within a town like the motorized tricycle involved herein, and those using roads
connecting towns. This, however, goes against the well known maxim that where the law does not distinguish, no distinction should
be made.
Issues: Is a motorized tricycle is a motor vehicle within the definition in the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972?
Held: Yes. The intent was to kill.
Ruling:
There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway to make the vehicle a "motor vehicle" within the definition
given the anti-carnapping law. If a vehicle uses the streets with or without the required license, same comes within the protection of
the law, for the severity of the offense is not to be measured by what kind of streets or highway the same is used; but by the very
nature of the vehicle itself and the use to which it is devoted. Otherwise, cars using the streets but still unlicensed or unregistered as
when they have just beet bought from the company, or only on test runs, may be stolen without the penal sanction of the anticarnapping statute, but only as simple robbery punishable under the provision of the Revised Penal Code. This obviously, could not
have been the intention of the anti-carnapping law.
133. People vs. Puno ()
February 17, 1993 Regalado
* Owner of bakery was robbed by her driver along the north superhighway
Facts:
1. On January 13, 1988 in Quezon City, the said accused Isabelo Puno and Enrique Amurao, being then private individuals
kidnapped Maria del Socorro Sarmiento for the purpose of extorting ransom
2. Mrs. Socorro's got into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel.
3. After the car turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the
car beside the driver
4. Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the
rear. He poke a gun at her.
5. Isabelo announced that they wanted money so she gave them P7,000.00
6. Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more so Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro
complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to
swallow a pill but she refused
7. Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila.
8. Later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga.
9. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some
vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood because, according to Ma.
Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
10. On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM
11. Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank,
Makati.
Issue: Whether accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom, as charged in the information; or a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and found
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by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished, as claimed by the defense.
Held: It is only a simple robbery.
Ruling:
1. Accordingly, it was held that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery.
2. there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive other than the extortion of money from her under the
compulsion of threats or intimidation.
3. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for his ulcer and that the
company does not want to give advances.
Why not kidnapping?
4. We can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty,
5. appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal liberty is clearly
demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno
6. The amounts given to appellants is not as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of their
obtention thereof from the complainant personally.
7. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of which she was
summarily divested by appellants.
Why not Highway robbery?
8. Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage.
9. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the
alternative and synonymously with brigandage
10. The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the
formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306.
11. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art 306.
12. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of
committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was
committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands.
13. it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the accused as their specific victim
could be considered as highway robbery.
- "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another,"
- capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered
- "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and would accordingly
- constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people, "
14. Isolated act done by the accused will be to exaggerate if would be punished in said decree.
134. People vs. Pulusan ()
21 May 1998 Kapunan
*no highway robbery if there is no proof that they were organized to do such act
Facts:
At 9 p.m. on 20 Jan 1986, four men held a robbery of a passenger jeepney with 6 passengers along the Bulacan-Pampanga highway,
divesting all passengers of their valuables. Four of the jeepney's passengers were killed by the robbers and the only female
passenger was raped repeatedly. After the hold-up was declared and consummated in Malolos, Bulacan, the accused Eduardo
Pulusan took over the drivers seat and drove to Pampanga. He parked the jeepney in a "talahiban" and one after the other raped
Marilyn Martinez who was then a virgin. After the rape, the other passengers were one after the other killed except for the driver, a
55-year old man, and Marilyn. They were eventually told to go home by the robbers.
Through joint police efforts, two of the robbers were arrested, Eduardo Pulusan and Rolando Rodriguez. The two others, Rolando
Tayag and one alias Efren remained at large. They were then charged with the crime of highway robbery attended with multiple
homicide and multiple rape. Pulusan and Rodriguez pleaded not guilty and raised the defenses of alibi. Rodriguez claimed that he
was kabo ng jueteng with the last draw at 9:30 in the evening. He presented three witnesses. On the other hand, Pulusan claimed
that he was repairing his house on that day in preparation of a fiesta. After trial, they were found guilty of Robbery with Homicide
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Were they guilty of the crime of highway robbery?
Held: No. There is no proof that they were organized for the purpose of committing robbery.
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Ruling:
The crime Highway robbery or brigandage as defined in Sec (2) of Presidential Decree No. 532 is the seizure of any person for
ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or
intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway. A
conviction for highway robbery requires proof that the accused were organized for the purpose of committing robbery
indiscriminately. There is no such proof in this case. Neither is there proof that the four men previously attempted to commit similar
robberies indiscriminately.
The trial court thus correctly found Pulusan and Rodriguez guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by rape.
Regardless of the number of homicides committed on the occasion of a robbery, the crime is still robbery with homicide. In this
special complex crime, the number of persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code. All those who took part in the robbery are liable as principals therein although they did not actually take part in
the homicide. The same crime is committed even if rape and physical injuries are also committed on the occasion of said crime. Rape
had not been proven to be the original intention of the accused, the crime having been committed simply because there was a
female passenger in the jeep. Hence, rape can only be considered as an aggravating circumstance and not a principal offense.
Robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Considering the attendance of rape as a generic aggravating
circumstance, the maximum penalty of death should be imposed but because of the Constitutional prohibition, it was reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
135. Taer vs CA ()
June 19, 2000 Puno
*Stray Carabao was actually stolen
Facts:
The accused Emilio Namocatcat and Mario Cago arrived dawn at the house of the accused Jorge Taer with two (2) male carabaos
owned by and which Namocatcat wanted Taer to tend. The said carabaos were left at Taer's place. Tirso Dalde and Eladio Palaca
discovered that their two carabaos were missing but they were informed and soon found their carabaos tied to a bamboo thicket
near the house accused Taer who was then not in his house.
According to them Taer defended that the carabaos reached his place tied together without any person in company but in Taers
defense, what he told Dalde and Palaca was that the carabaos were brought to his place by the accused Namocatcat who asked him
to tell anybody looking for them that they just strayed thereat.
The owners filed a case and all the accused including Taer because of conspiracy, were convicted for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 53 with the aggravating circumstance of nighttime. Taer now appeal.
Issues: WON accused Taer be convicted as principal by direct participation for violation of PD No. 53 or the crime of cattle-rustling
Held: He should be convicted of as an accessory with the penalty of arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that Taer participated neither as principal nor as an accomplice but as an accessory since he did not participate in
the taking of the carabaos but took part subsequent to the commission of the act of taking by profiting himself by its effects. He
acted as an accessory when he employed the two carabaos in his farm.
The testimony of Namocatcat is not sufficient to convict Taer as principal and the ruling of the Court of Appeals that Taer acts as
principal is wrong because mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the transaction with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
136. Ordonio vs. CA ()
SarmientoJuly 31, 1991
*lost calf runs to his mother
Facts:
(1) The owner of an 11 month old cow went searching for it. He asked the accused if he had seen it. The accused replied that he
hadnt. A cow mooed in the background and the owner claimed that that cow was his. The accused claimed that it was his brothers
cow, which he was tasked to watch. Unsatisfied with his response, the owner went to the constabulary and brought the mother of
the young calf along with him. Upon seeing its mother, the calf which the accused claimed to be his came running towards its
mother. While the accused persisted that it was theirs his wife conceded and told him to give up the calf to the real owner and that
they would pay for the damages.
(2) The defense of the accused is that the cow was not actually his brothers but it was a cow that had wandered into his own land. It
began destroying his plants. To prevent any further damages he caught it and tied it to his house. He did not report the incident
because it was too burdensome.
Issue: Is he guilty of the crime of cattle rustling?
Held: Yes
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Ruling:
(1) PD 533 provides that cattle rustling includes the taking away by any means, methods, or schemes. Thus the intent to gain may
be inferred from the deliberate failure to deliver the lost property to the proper person, the finder knowing that the property does
not belong to him. The fact that the calf came running towards his mother is also given as profound evidence against the accused.
(2) He later caved in court and admitted that the calf was not his brothers. Having fully known it belong to complainant, he shud
thus be convicted of cattle rustling. Also, his alibi that he was no where near his home when the owner searched for the calf is not a
reasonable defense because he did not even present his wife to testify on his behalf.
People v. Gulinao ()
1989 Paras
*bodyguard kills his boss and steals the latters car
Facts:
On March 3, 1987, at about 9pm, Dr. Chua, appellant Gulinao (driver-bodyguard of Dr. Chua), Virgilio Caguioa (secretary of Dr.
Chua), Vice Mayor Teofilo Reyes of Malabon, Dante Reyes (nephew of Vice Mayor Reyes), Boy Salazar and other politicians were
having a caucus in the house of a certain Torre in Acacia, Malabon. After the caucus at about 11:00 P.M., the group of Dr. Chua
boarded Dr. Chua's car and that of Vice Mayor Reyes and proceeded to the Bar-Bar Disco House along McArthur Highway,
Valenzuela. Upon arriving at the disco house, Gulinao, who had in his possession an Ingram machine pistol, swapped the same with
a .45 caliber pistol in possession of Dante Reyes. Inside the disco house, Dr. Chua, Gulinao and companions occupied 2 tables which
were joined together. Later, Gulinao went to the comfort room and cocked the .45 caliber pistol. He then returned to his seat
beside Dr. Chua. While Dr. Chua was watching the floor show, Gulinao stood up and shot him on the head at close range. When
Gulinao was about to leave the disco house, he turned back to Dr. Chua and took the latter's gold ring embedded with 12 diamonds.
Thereupon, Gulinao rushed outside the disco house to the car of Dr. Chua. Poking the gun at Caguioa who was inside the car,
Gulinao ordered the former to leave the car. While Caguioa was getting out of the car, Gulinao fired at him but missed. Gulinao
drove the car towards Monumento. However, he was constrained to leave the car and take a taxi when the car he was driving
figured in an accident in Malabon.
Gulinao was charged of 3 separate infos: illegal possession of firearm with murder, robbery, and carnapping.
Gulinao pleaded "not guilty" to the "Robbery" and "Carnapping" charges. But, he refused to enter any plea to the charge of "Illegal
Possession of Firearm with Murder." But, he refused to enter any plea to the charge of "Illegal Possession of Firearm with Murder",
hence, the trial court entered for him a plea of "not guilty" pursuant to Sec. 1 (c), Rule 116, 1985 Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure. However, Gulinao moved to quash the Information charging him with "Illegal Possession of Firearm" on the ground
that there was another Criminal Case for "Illegal Possession of Firearm" pending before the RTC of Manila. This was denied. So these
3 informations were jointly tried but Guliano wouldnt cooperate with the proceedings; wouldnt entertain his counsel. So lower
court ruled against him. Thus this appeal.
His assignment of errors:
1. He claimed that "the indictment for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm) against the him
in this criminal case after he was already slapped of the same violation before the RTC of Manila involving the same
firearm and ammunition is a classic case of putting him in jeopardy
2. He should have been convicted of the crime of theft not robbery
There was no proof of intent to gain in the taking of Dr. Chua's car
Issue: Is Gulinao guilty or robbery or theft?
Held: ROBBERY
Ruling:
SCs answers to his assignment of errors:
1) Wrong. There is no possibility of double jeopardy, as the possession thereof had taken place in two separate and distinct
places and jurisdiction and the two informations state different dates of commission.
2) Wrong. As the taking of the ring of Dr. Chua was merely an afterthought. The force employed in the killing of Dr. Chua has
no bearing on the taking of his ring.
3) Wrong. Intent to gain, being an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the car. This presumption was
unrebutted.
Santos vs. People
January 29, 1990 Cruz
Facts:
Encarnacion Pealosa, entrusted 1976 Ford Escort, to Lauro Santos for repair of the carburetor. The work was to cost P300.00. A
week later, Santos persuaded her to have her car repainted by him for P6,500.00, within a period of two months. After two months,
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Pealosa went to the petitioner's repair shop to retrieve her car, but Santos refused to deliver the vehicle unless she paid him
P634.60 for the repairs. As she did not have the money then, she left the shop to get the needed payment. Upon her return, she
could not find Santos although she waited five hours for him. She went back to the shop several times thereafter but to no avail.
Pealosa was to learn later that Santos had abandoned his shop in Malabon. Unable to recover her car, she filed a complaint for
carnapping against Santos with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group in Camp Crame. The case was dismissed when Santos
convinced the military authorities that Pealosa had sold the vehicle to him. This notwithstanding, an information for estafa on
Pealosa's complaint was filed against Santos, and he was found guilty as charged. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed but
Santos was held guilty of qualified theft and not estafa. Santos main reliance, though, is on the Deed of Sale with Right of
Repurchase which he submitted at the trial to prove that Pealosa had sold the car to him and now had no claim to it. A cursory look
at this alleged document will show that it is spurious. There are alterations and deletions that are not even initialed to authenticate
the changes. Two entire paragraphs are cancelled. The name and address of the supposed original vendee are crossed out and those
of the petitioner are written in place of the deletions. Moreover, the so-called deed is not notarized. He also contend that there was
no proof at all of such payment, that Pealosa did not even sign a job order or get a receipt when she delivered her car to him for
repairs.
Issue: Should he be convicted of estafa?
Held: NO
Ruling:
Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime committed was theft. It is settled that what controls is not
the designation of the offense but the description thereof as alleged in the information. And as described therein, the offense
imputed to Santos contains all the essential elements of theft, to wit: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that said
property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.
"The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the property
and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was
entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de factopossession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same
constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa."
It was erroneous for the respondent court to hold the petitioner guilty of qualified theft because the fact that the object of the crime
was a car was not alleged in the information as a qualifying circumstance. Santos would have had reason to argue that he had not
been properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, as qualified theft carries a higher penalty.
But although not pleaded and so not considered qualifying, the same circumstance may be considered aggravating, having been
proved at the trial. Hence the imposable penalty for the theft, there being no other modifying circumstances, should be in the
maximum degree.
The petitioner is declared guilty of theft and sentenced to from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years
of reclusion temporal. He is also ordered to restore the car in question to the private respondent, or if this is no longer possible, to
pay her the value thereof in the amount of P38,000.00.
139.People vs. Bago ()
April 6, 2000 Puno
* metal rolled sheets being rob by the company employee
Facts:
1. REYNALDO BAGO was an employee of Azkcon Metal Industries.
2. He started working as a factory worker and later became a machine operator and a truck helper.
3. When the crime was committed he is a team leader at the cutting department under the supervision of Material Comptroller
WILLIAM HILO who kept track of all the materials coming in and going out of the companys plant in Kalookan City.[2]
4. Azkcon has a business arrangement with Power Construction Supply Company
5. Power Construction supplies cold rolled sheets to Azkcon
6. On April 21, 1992, Bago went to Power Construction and loaded two cold rolled sheets in a truck owned by Azkcon.
7. Before entering the premises of Azkcon, appellant presented to security guard RUBEN DE LA CRUZ MANANGAN two
receipts,both dated April 21, 1992, covering the cold rolled sheets from Power Construction.
8. Manangan inspected the contents of the truck. As everything was accounted for, Manangan stamped on the two receipts
covering the materials.
9. BAGO then presented a third receipt dated March 23, 1992, for stamping.
94
10. Manangan likewise stamped the third receipt. As the third receipt bore a different date, Manangan asked appellant if the
materials covered by said receipt were in the truck. Appellant replied that the materials had long been delivered.
11. Manangan did not investigate further but later reported the incident to the Chief of Security Department, AFLOR ONG.
12. Upon receipt of the report, Hilo discreetly conducted a more in-depth investigation. He found out that the materials covered by
the third receipt, worth P192,000.00, were not delivered to Azkcon.
13. The truck used to get the materials on the 3rd receipt did not belong to Azkcon but already paid by Azarcon.
14. A police team, led by SPO3 ALFREDO ALFARO, investigated appellant at Azkcon.
15. He disclosed that his cohorts on May 23, 1992 were ARMANDO CAPARAS and RODOLFO ONGSECO, former employees of
Azkcon. He revealed that they usually loaded the stolen materials in a truck rented by Caparas and Ongseco. He received
P10,000 to P35,000 for his participation in the different thefts.
Issue: Is it correct to charged Bago the crime of qualified theft based on the circumstantial evidence?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
1. Clearly, all the elements of theft were established, to wit:
a. (1) there was a taking of personal property;
b. (2) the property belongs to another;
c. (3) the taking was without the consent of the owner;
d. (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; and
e. (5) the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon things.
f. As the theft was committed with grave abuse of confidence, appellant is guilty of qualified theft.
2.
3.
Accused Bago is a trusted employee of Azkcon and detailed with Power Construction Supply Company in charge of the Cutting
Department; and that as such he was authorized by Mr. William Hilo, Controller Manager of Azkcon, to pull out from the Power
Construction Supply the cut materials and to deliver the same to Azkcon;
there were three (3) receipts which came in, but only two materials were delivered inside the company compound. The
materials covered by the two (2) receipts were delivered but the materials covered by the third receipt were not.
Correctness of Penalty for qualified theft

4. The RPC meant to say that when the penalty for qualified theft is 2 degrees higher than that specified under Article 309, the
judgment provide that convict should not be given the benefit of the provisions of Article 27 until 40 years have lapsed, other
wise there could be no distinction between reclusion perpetua when imposed as a penalty next higher in degree and when it is
imposed as a penalty fixed by law.
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. Any person sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be pardoned after undergoing the
penalty for thirty years, unless such person by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause shall be considered by the Chief
Executive as unworthy of pardon.
Other side issue: the reliability of the receipt
5. The accused assails that the 3rd receipt is the best evidence and be given more credence than Manangans testimony (guard)
6. Court held that Bago can not rely on the best evidence rules. Rule can not be invoked unless the content of the writing is the
subject of judiciary inquiry.
7. In this case, no secondary evidence is offered to prove the content of the document.
140. Valenzuela vs. People ()
21 Jun 2007 Tinga
*theft can never be frustrated
Facts:
On 19 May 1994, Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within SM North
EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw
Valenzuela, who was wearing an identification card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU), hauling a push cart with cases
of Tide. Valenzuela and Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide inside a taxi and boarded the vehicle. They were stopped by Lago as
the taxi was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked Valenzuela for a receipt, they reacted by fleeing on foot, but were
eventually apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered.
They were then charged with theft. After trial, the court convicted them of consummated theft. Before the Court of Appeals,
Valenzuela argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed
in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. However the Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed the
conviction. Valenzuela now appealed to the Supreme Court to modify his conviction to Frustrated Theft.
95
Issue: Is there a crime of frustrated theft?

Held: None. Theft is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same.
Ruling:
The elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, are:(1) that there be taking of personal property; (2)
that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things. There is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft the taking of personal property of
another.
Unlawful taking is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. Theft is consummated after the accused had
material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated. It is
immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable
to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution.
With these considerations, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.
141. Hizon, et. al vs. CA ()

August 30, 1968 Castro
*Muro-ami fishers not poisoning fishes
Facts:
The Task Force Bantay Dagat together with the PNP Maritime Command searched a big fishing boat identified as F/B
Robinson because of the report that they are fishing by "muro ami" within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa.
The police saw foreigners with photocopies only of their passports and discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and
assorted fish but the license of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order. Random samples of fish from the fish cage
of F/B Robinson for laboratory examination were seized and NBI Forensic Chemist conducted two tests on the fish samples and
found that they contained sodium cyanide which is illegal. They were then, convicted with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33
and 38 of P.D. 704by the lower court and court of appeals.
Petitioners now invoked the defense that they are legitimate fishermen and that they catch fish by the hook and line method and
that they had used this method for one month and a half in the waters of Cuyo Island. They contend that the NBI finding of sodium
cyanide in the fish specimens should not have been admitted and considered by the trial court because the fish samples were seized
from the F/B Robinson without a search warrant.
Issues: WON the petitioners should be convicted for the crime with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704
Held: The Court acquitted them
Ruling:
GENERAL RULE: The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes or gathers or causes to be caught, taken
or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, electricity, obnoxious or poisonous
substances. The law creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed when: (a) explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substances or equipment or device for electric fishing are found in a fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman; or (b) when fish
caught or killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. Under
these instances, the boat owner, operator or fishermen are presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.
In the present case, Salud Rosales, another forensic chemist of the NBI in Manila conducted three (3) tests on the specimens and
found the fish negative for the presence of sodium cyanide. Also, the prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the
fish samples and this omission raises a reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were caught with the use of sodium
cyanide.
Hence, the absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports petitioners' claim that they did not use the poison in
fishing. According to them, they caught the fishes by the ordinary and legal way, i.e., by hook and line on board their sampans. This
claim is buttressed by the prosecution evidence itself. The apprehending officers saw petitioners fishing by hook and line when they
came upon them in the waters of Barangay San Rafael.
Furthermore, the apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous
or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself. The
authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the
fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners
were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.
142. Empelis vs. IAC
RelovaSeptember 28, 1984
*literally stealing coconuts from a plantation
Facts:
(1) The owner of a coconut plantation knew his coconuts were being taken by thieves. So, one day, he decided to wait up and watch
96
out for the thieves. After seeing them, he ran to his neighbors house and asked them to come with him. When they returned to the
plantation, the thieves dropped the coconuts they were carrying and fled (50 coconuts).
(2) The Trial court finds them guilty of Qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code for stealing coconuts within a
plantation. The defense of the accused was that the article does not apply to coconuts taken from a tree OUTSIDE the plantation.
Thus the appeal.
Issue: Should they be guilty of qualified theft?
Held: No, only frustrated qualified theft.
Ruling:
(1) The petitioners were seen carrying away 50 coconuts WHILE still in the premises of the plantation. They would therefore come
within the definition of qualified theft because the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation.
(2) The history of that specific provision was laid down in People vs. Isnain, wherein the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of
the heavier penalty is to encourage and protect the development of the coconut industry as one of the sources of our national
economy. Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the range of vision is unobstructed, coconut groves cannot be efficiently watched
because of the nature of the growth of coconut trees and without a special measure to protect this kind of property, it will be as it
has been the past the favorite resort of thieves.
(3) They should be guilty of frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the acts of execution which
should have produced the felony as a consequence because they WERE NOT able to REMOVE the coconuts away from the
plantation. [interesting]
People vs. Caales
October 12, 1998 - Puno
Facts:
1. Accused Fernando Caales and Romeo Sarmiento were employees of First Based Industries Corporation. They conspired to
steal one Heino Truck (P 300K) and P 1.5 million worth of frozen prawn which resulted to damage worth P 1.8 million
2. November 9, 1987- Danilo Ramos, truck helper of the company as assigned to deliver with Romeo Sarmiento as the driver
of the van.
After unloading the cargo of chicken, they were to unload the van with frozen prawns to Manila and Lubao,
Pampanga
3. When they were somewhere between the Pier 10 and 12 North Harbor, Sarmiento (driver of van) slackened speed in order
to allow two (2) persons to board the van
Two of Sarmientos friends: "Nanding" and "Lolong" boarded the van and said they will only ride with them until
Manila City Hall but they did not
Sarmiento told him to cooperate with them in whatever they planned to do because they would make money
Ramos kept silent as he was scared and started to perspire profusely accused asked him to cooperate and in
return, he will have his share in the P 100, 000
Fearing for his safety, Ramos agreed
4. Truck stopped in front of an apartment Appellant Ramos and Sarmiento knocked and went inside the
apartmentUpon entering, Ramos and Sarmiento sat in the sala
5. Appellant got the Forwarders Cargo Receipt (FCR) from Ramos then he and Lolong left the apartment, leaving Ramos and
Sarmiento behind
6. Appellant and Lolong drove away in the van. Leaving Ramos and Sarmiento behind. The latter told the former not to
worry
7. 5:00 am- Sarmiento fell asleep. Finding his chance to escape, Ramos went out of the apartment and immediately
proceeded to the nearest police station and reported to the police that:
a) The truck to which he was assigned as helper had been hijacked
b) One of of the culprits, Romeo Sarmiento, was sleeping inside an apartment near the detachment
8. Two policemen, Patrolman Reynaldo Ventinilla and Eddie Loreto, were assigned to investigate Sarmiento was brought to
the police detachment
9. Ramos told the policemen that the two companions of Sarmiento would return to the apartment after disposing of the
frozen prawns but nobody showed up
10. The hijacked truck was eventually found abandoned at the corner of Santolan and Marcos Highway in Marikina
11. Accused-appellant Fernando Caales, together with Romeo Sarmiento, Jr., Joven Lim and Peter Doe alias "Lolong" were
charged with qualified theft Accused all pleaded not guilty.
12. Decision of TC:
Convicted Caales , Romeo Sarmiento and Lolong were found guilty for qualified theft under Art. 310 in relation to
Art. 308309 of the RPC
Jove Lim was acquitted
97
Penalty of accused: Suffer 13 years, 1 month and 11 days to 18 years, 9 months and 24 days, both of reclusion
temporal, and to indemnify and pay P 2. 3 million to indemnify the complainant
13. Decision of CA: Modified penalty
Changed to reclusion perpetua for 40 years with accessory penalties of death under Art. 40 of RPC
14. Alibi of the accused appellant:
Being a stay-in family driver of Atty. Agapito Oquindo, he went to bed at about 8 p.m. and woke up at 5 a.m.,
the next day.
People's Journal published his name as a suspect but he ignored it until he was arrested and forced to sign a
statement confessing to the crime.
He also denied knowing his co-accused Romeo Sarmiento.
Issue:
1) WON the accused is guilty of the qualified theft even if the van was abandoned
2) WON the testimony provided by Ramos properly admitted by the lower court
3) WON the lower court erred in applying the penalties for the crime committed*
Held: Decision appealed from is AFFRIMED.
Ruling:
1) Yes, the accused are guilty of qualified theft because they were employers of the company which owned the properties
stolen and they took advantage of the trust and abused the confidence reposed on them
What is being punished in the crime of theft? (People vs. Carpio)
The taking of property and with intent to deprive the true owner of the possession thereof.
In this case, the accused deprived the true owner of the possession of the entire automobile, the offense of
larceny comprised the whole car.
Note: The fact that the accused stripped the car of its tires and abandoned the machine in a
distant part of the city this does not extinguish their criminal liability.
2) No, the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of the accused
The inconsistency of Ramos on the number of hours it took them to unload their cargoes cannot exculpate the
appellant. The inconsistency refers to a minor detail which does not affect the total credibility of Ramos.
No witness who can perfectly remember the details of a crime.
Inconsistent facts in this case are negligible
Ramos was inconsistent in his testimony in court relating to such minute details as to whether a stout woman
opened the apartment door upon their arrival, or whether he bade goodbye when he sneaked out of the
apartment
Court is not persuaded by the argument that Ramos lacked personal knowledge of the contents of the van.
3) No, the penalties provided by the lower court was proper.
In ordinary situations, the penalty for the crime committed by the accused under Art. 309 is reclusion temporal on the
basis of the value of the van and the cargo amounting to Php 1.8 million.
Under Art. 310 of the RPC- qualified theft is punishable by the penalty next higher by two (2) degrees than that
meted under Article 309.
Since reclusion temporal is the penalty found in Art. 309, the penalty two degrees higher than reclusion
temporal is death (based on Art 25, RPC)
BUT Art. 74 of RPC prevents the application of death as penalty
Art. 74 of RPC provides that when a given penalty has to be raised by one or two degrees and the
resulting penalty is death according to the scale, but is not specifically provided by law as a
penalty, the latter cannot be imposed.
Given this prohibition, what penalty did the court applied?
They applied penalty higher than reclusion perpetua this penalty is reclusion perpetua for
forty years with the accessory penalties of death under Art. 40.
Reason for this:
If this penalty is not applied "There could be no difference at all between reclusion
perpetua, when imposed as the penalty next higher in degree and when it is imposed as
the penalty fixed by law."
Thus, Canales should be meted the penalty reclusion perpetua for forty years with the accessory penalties of death
under Art. 40 and he is not entitled to pardon before a. lapse of forty-year period

C H A L C P C LAW: Onejos Aulo Mpong Aylo Havez Ilapil Elles

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CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

Dissent of Justice Perfecto in imposing the death penalty:

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

5. August 31, 10am reached an island, the 4 secured pumpboats

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

10. People vs. Burgos

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

14. People v. Mandoriao

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

15. People vs. Baes

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

17. People v. Nanoy

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

19. Enrile vs. Amin

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

23. US vs. Tolentino

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

24. Espuelas vs. People

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

26. People vs Quijada

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

31. People vs. Castillo

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

35. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO DOLLANTES

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

Dissenting: (Perfecto, J.)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

FINDINGS & Ruling:

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

52. People vs. Villalon ()

53. Dava vs. People ()

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

54. People vs. Cortez ()

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

56. Legamia vs. IAC ()

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

58. People vs. Kottinger ()

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

59. People vs. Aparici ()

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

62. Dacumos vs. Sandiganbayan ()

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

Held: No. He was not required to intervene under the law.