73 Phil 607

Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing the 16 year old
Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a
separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit
against Barredo the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the
civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing
that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla
primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent
employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil
action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving
his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees
because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him
something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil
action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages
arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his
employee (Article 1903).
AGAPITO FUELLAS, petitioner, vs. ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL., respondents.G.R. No. L-14409 [October 31,
1961]
FACTS
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old and
classmates at St. Marys High School, Dansalan City. While Pepito was studying his lessons in the
classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok and surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of
Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same, an act which
angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico
and Pepito and told them to go home. Rico went ahead, with Pepito following. When Pepito had just gone
down of the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in an angry mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the
two to shake hands. Pepito extended his hand to Rico, but the latter instead held the former by the neck
and with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the ground. Pepito fell on his right side
with his right arm under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was in such position,
Pepito suddenly cried out My arm is broken. Rico then got up and went away. Pepito was helped by
others to go home. That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General Hospital for treatment and
the results of the x-ray revealed that there was a complete fracture of the radius and ulna of the right
forearm which necessitated plaster casting. As a result, a civil case for damages was filed against Agapito
Fuellas, father of the minor Rico.
ISSUE
WON Agapito Fuellas may be held liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son.
HELD:
YES. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. This civil liability of
the father or the mother, as the case may be, is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they

exercise over them and the only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove
that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Since children and
wards do not yet have the capacity to govern themselves, the law imposes upon the parents and
guardians the duty of exercising special vigilance over the acts of their children and wards in order that
damages to third persons due to the ignorance, lack of foresight or discernment of such children and wards
may be avoided. If the parents and guardians fail to comply with this duty, they should suffer the
consequences of their abandonment or negligence by repairing the damage caused.

77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977

Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against
Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil
action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill
argued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil
liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by
reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority
over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but
he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since at the time of
the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity.
81 SCRA 472
Torts and Damages Double Recovery of Civil Liability
In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata thereby causing the latters
death. The heirs of Virata sued Borilla through an action for homicide through reckless imprudence in the
CFI of Rizal. Viratas lawyer reserved their right to file a separate civil action the he later withdrew said
motion. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratas again reserved their right to file a
separate civil action. Borilla was eventually acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was a mere
accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the jeep and employer of Borilla)

for damages based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civil suit alleging that Borilla was already acquitted
and that the Viratas were merely trying to recover damages twice. The lower court agreed with Ochoa and
dismissed the civil suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action
under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same
negligent act. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for
civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
But said article forestalls a double recovery.

MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL., plaintiffsappellees,
vs.
ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals, which
certified the same to us since the facts are not in issue.
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini
Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three other
classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a
plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said
aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her.
At that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye.
Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July
10, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents, who
thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20 and
again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the
parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely
lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso
Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages;
P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.
The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child which causes
damage to another under the specific facts related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code,
particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which read:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by provisions of this Chapter.

ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the
act or the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or
omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable
under Article 2180, in the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother
under the circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in
Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or
omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and
logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on
the defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in
connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child, especially when it takes place in his absence
or outside his immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable;
and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it
implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or
not by the exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented
the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at
school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be,
under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was
concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however
careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her
upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if
the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction
enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good conscience.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Civil Law Torts and Damages Article 2180 Liability of Schools of Arts and Trades and Academic
Schools Liability of Teachers and Heads of School
In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in the school
auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon

was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of Alfredo sued the school for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the schools negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal, the dean of boys, as well
as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school appealed as it averred that when the incident
happened, the school year has already ended. Amadora argued that even though the semester has
already ended, his son was there in school to complete a school requirement in his Physics subject.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school. The CA ruled that under the last paragraph of Article
2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last paragraph of Article
2180 which provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law due to the changing
times where there is hardly a distinction between schools of arts and trade and academic schools. That
being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools, academic or not, may be held liable under the said
provision of Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not, should not be held directly
liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be directly liable for the
tortuous act of its students. This is because historically, in non-academic schools, the head of school
exercised a closer administration over their students than heads of academic schools. In short, they are
more hands on to their students.
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for the tortuous act of
the students and not the dean or the head of school.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends or when the
semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as
he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not
yet begun or has already ended at the time of the happening of the incident. As long as it can be shown
that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of
a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the
company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still
within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid subsidiary
liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.

In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there was no sufficient
evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers
because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily liable too.
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL,
INC., respondents
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death
resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
The antecedents, as succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a
Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the
normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was
also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin
Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of] a
Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the
said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmea rotunda he
made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General
Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other
causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the
Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.
On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was there that Abad
signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay
whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.
After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case
was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So,
the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So
Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and
Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened to
collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez. 1
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin
Abad (hereafter ABAD) and petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to pay jointly
and solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez, the amounts of P8,000.00 for burial expenses; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and P778,752.00 for loss of earning capacity; and (2) Cebu
Doctor's Hospital, the sum of P50,927.83 for unpaid medical and hospital bills at 3% monthly interest from
27 July 1989 until fully paid, plus the costs of litigation. 2
CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.
In its decision 3 of 21 May 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and
CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former. It
reduced the award of damages representing loss of earning capacity from P778,752.00 to P214,156.80;

and the interest on the hospital and medical bills, from 3% per month to 12% per annum from 5
September 1988 until fully paid.
Upon CASTILEX's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by (1) reducing the
award of moral damages from P50,000 to P30,000 in view of the deceased's contributory negligence; (b)
deleting the award of attorney's fees for lack of evidence; and (c) reducing the interest on hospital and
medical bills to 6% per annum from 5 September 1988 until fully paid. 4
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) applying to the
case the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, instead of the fourth paragraph thereof; (2) that
as a managerial employee, ABAD was deemed to have been always acting within the scope of his assigned
task even outside office hours because he was using a vehicle issued to him by petitioner; and (3) ruling
that petitioner had the burden to prove that the employee was not acting within the scope of his assigned
task.
Jose Benjamin ABAD merely adopted the statement of facts of petitioner which holds fast on the theory of
negligence on the part of the deceased.
On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their son's death was caused by the
negligence of petitioner's employee who was driving a vehicle issued by petitioner and who was on his way
home from overtime work for petitioner; and that petitioner is thus liable for the resulting injury and
subsequent death of their son on the basis of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the fourth
paragraph of Article 2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape liability therefor. They moreover argue
that the Court of Appeals erred in reducing the amount of compensatory damages when the award made
by the trial court was borne both by evidence adduced during the trial regarding deceased's wages and by
jurisprudence on life expectancy. Moreover, they point out that the petition is procedurally not acceptable
on the following grounds: (1) lack of an explanation for serving the petition upon the Court of Appeals by
registered mail, as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) lack of a
statement of the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period and of the filing of the motion
for extension of time to file a petition for review.
For its part, respondent Cebu Doctor's Hospital maintains that petitioner CASTILEX is indeed vicariously
liable for the injuries and subsequent death of Romeo Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on his way home
from taking snacks after doing overtime work for petitioner. Although the incident occurred when ABAD
was not working anymore "the inescapable fact remains that said employee would not have been situated
at such time and place had he not been required by petitioner to do overtime work." Moreover, since
petitioner adopted the evidence adduced by ABAD, it cannot, as the latter's employer, inveigle itself from
the ambit of liability, and is thus estopped by the records of the case, which it failed to refute.
We shall first address the issue raised by the private respondents regarding some alleged procedural
lapses in the petition.
Private respondent's contention of petitioner's violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 and Section 4 of Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure holds no water.
Sec. 11 of Rule 13 provides:
Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of services and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and
filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers
emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written
explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be
cause to consider the paper as not filed.

The explanation why service of a copy of the petition upon the Court of Appeals was done by registered
mail is found on Page 28 of the petition. Thus, there has been compliance with the aforequoted provision.
As regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under Section 4 of Rule 45, the same is
unfounded. The material dates required to be stated in the petition are the following: (1) the date of
receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of the petition; (2) the date of filing of a motion
for new trial or reconsideration, if any; and (3) the date of receipt of the notice of the denial of the motion.
Contrary to private respondent's claim, the petition need not indicate the dates of the expiration of the
original reglementary period and the filing of a motion for extension of time to file the petition. At any rate,
aside from the material dates required under Section 4 of Rule 45, petitioner CASTILEX also stated in the
first page of the petition the date it filed the motion for extension of time to file the petition.
Now on the merits of the case.
The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but
claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD.
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances
where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth
paragraph should apply.
Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it
is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence
of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task. 5
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions
apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and
the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The
fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on
the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting
within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage
and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or
industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though
committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly,
employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or
designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.
This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or
industry such as truck operators 6 and banks. 7 The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in
applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer
is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to
establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the
employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort
complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. 8
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort
occurrence. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which
the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
entitled to great respect, and even finality at times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as
when the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures. 9 Such exception obtain in the
present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was
driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager.
Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts within the range of his employment,
we shall first take up the other reason invoked by the Court of Appeals in holding petitioner CASTILEX
vicariously liable for ABAD's negligence, i.e., that the petitioner did not present evidence that ABAD was
not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the
ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same. It was enough
for petitioner CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was not
under obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove). The Court has consistently applied the ancient rule that if the
plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner
facts which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. 10
Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting
within the scope of his assigned tasks.
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a
company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant
where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the
petitioner.
No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of
whether at a given moment, an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a
motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's action or inaction; but
rather, the result varies with each state of facts. 11
In Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellant Court, 12 this Court had the occasion to hold that
acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks includes "any act done by an employee in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction
of the injury or damages."
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a companyissued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident
is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless
it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.
The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted
by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle:
I. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to
or from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where
he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. Evidence that
by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off

and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is acting
within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. 13
II. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to
or from Work
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the
employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to
the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed,
the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor
vehicle. 14
The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee
drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work
earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his actual duties. Where the employee's duties require him
to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various
outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have
frequently applied what has been called the "special errand" or "roving commission" rule, under which it
can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home.
However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or
from work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the
accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal
errand of his own.
III. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular
working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the
period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle
will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental
benefit to the employer. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been
accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has
been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's
negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip. 15
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of
respondent superior, not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or
negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or merely
gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is
indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned
task. 16
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioner's office, which was
located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmea, Cebu
City, which is about seven kilometers away from petitioner's place of business. 17 A witness for the private
respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmea is a "lively place" even at dawn because
Goldie's Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover,
prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the place. 18
At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when ABAD was
leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. That same witness for the private
respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his car, who

then shouted: "Daddy, Daddy!"

years old at the time.

19

This woman could not have been ABAD's daughter, for ABAD was only 29

To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose
not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28
August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had ended; his overtime work
had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for
prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither had
it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was
a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him,
petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of
vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle. 20
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of any liability
for the damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin Abad.