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Political Law Case Digests
GOROSPE
PRELIMINARY
CONSIDERATIONS
A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21,
1995
In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex
Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
HELD:
Joaquin Borromeo was declared guilty
of constructive contempt of court for
repetitiously disrespecting the decisions and
resolutions issued by the courts, and even by
issuing a circular containing libelous and
offending
accusations
(like
whimsical,
capricious,
and
tyrannical)
against
the
Supreme Court justices and its employees. He
even delivered a letter accusing lawyers of
defamatory comments and insults. This is due
to his series of dismissed complaints and
appeals against 3 banks namely Traders Royal
Bank, United Coconut Planters Bank, and
Security Bank and Trust Co. from which he
obtained loans with unfulfilled mortgages. In
relation to this, he filed cases against the
lawyers of these banks and even against the
clerks of court who signed the minute
resolutions of these cases. The actions reached
the alarming number of 50 cases varying from
civil, criminal, to administrative cases.
In response, the court answered all his
false alleged accusations through a resolution
along with declaring him guilty of contempt of
court.
HELD: NO.
RA 1379 raises the prima facie
presumption that a property is unlawfully
acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its
amount or value is manifestly disproportionate
to the official salary and other lawful income of
the public officer who owns it. The following
facts must be established in order that
forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may
be effected: (1) ownership by the public officer
of money or property acquired during his
incumbency, whether it be in his name or
otherwise, and (2) the extent to which the
amount of that money or property exceeds, i.
e., is grossly disproportionate to, the
legitimate income of the public officer. Herein,
the spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos
were public officials during the time material to
the present case was never in dispute.
The spouses accumulated salary of
$304,372.43 should be held as the only known
lawful income of the Marcoses since they did
not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities
(SAL), as required by law, from which their net
worth could be determined. Besides, under the
1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as
President could not receive "any other
emolument from the Government or any of its
subdivisions and instrumentalities". Likewise,
under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E.
Marcos as President could "not receive during
his tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source."
Their only known lawful income of
$304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly
serve as basis for determining the existence of
a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss
funds. The Republic did not fail to establish a
prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss
deposits.
The Swiss deposits which were
transferred to and are deposited in escrow at
the Philippine National Bank in the estimated
aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of
31 January 2002, plus interest, were forfeited
in favor of the Republic.
THE STATE
G.R. No. L-26379 December 27,
1969
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ET. AL vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
FACTS:
Petitioner Reagan, a civilian employee
of an American corporation providing technical
assistance to the US Air Force in the
Philippines, questioned the payment of the
income tax assessed on him by respondent CIR
on an amount realized by him on a sale of his
automobile to a member of the US Marine
Corps, the transaction having taken place at
the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his
contention, that in legal contemplation the sale
was made outside Philippine territory and
therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to
tax. He seeks that an amount of P2,979.00 as
the income tax paid by him be refunded.
ISSUE: WON the Clark Field Air Base is a
foreign property therefore excluded from the
power of Philippine taxation.
HELD: NO.
By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it
should be noted, the Philippine Government
merely consents that the United States
exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The
consent was given purely as a matter of
comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases
as part of the Philippine territory or divested
itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. This provision is not and
can not on principle or authority be construed
as a limitation upon the rights of the Philippine
Government.
The State is not precluded from
allowing another power to participate in the
exercise of jurisdictional right over certain
VFA
is
void
HELD: NO.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 states:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991
of
the
Agreement
between
the
Philippines and the United States of
America concerning Military Bases,
foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the
and
HELD: NO.
We hold that the respondent Unions
are not entitled to the certification election
sought in the Court below. Such certification is
admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf
of the employees with respect to terms and
conditions of employment, including the right
to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in
fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against
the ACCFA. This is contrary to Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 875, which provides for
the prohibition against to strike in the
government.
With the reorganization of the ACCFA
and its conversion into the ACA under the Land
Reform Code and in view of our ruling as to the
governmental character of the functions of the
ACA, the decision of the respondent Court
dated March 25, 1963, and the resolution en
banc affirming it, in the unfair labor practice
case filed by the ACCFA, which decision is the
subject of the present review in G. R. No. L21484, has become moot and academic,
particularly insofar as the order to bargain
collectively with the respondent Unions is
concerned. The respondent Unions have no
right to the certification election sought by
them nor, consequently, to bargain collectively
with the petitioner, no further fringe benefits
may be demanded on the basis of any
collective bargaining agreement.
STATE IMMUNITY
ACT NO. 3083
AN ACT DEFINING THE
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS MAY BE SUED
Section 1. Complaint against Government.
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
Government of the Philippine Islands hereby
consents and submits to be sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from
contract, expressed or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties.
Sec. 2. A person desiring to avail himself of
the privilege herein conferred must show that
he has presented his claim to the Insular
Auditor 1 and that the latter did not decide the
same within two months from the date of its
presentation.
Sec. 3. Venue. Original actions brought
pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act
shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance
of the City of Manila or of the province were
the claimant resides, at the option of the
latter, upon which court exclusive original
jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and
determine such actions.
Sec. 4. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be
governed by the same rules of procedure, both
original and appellate, as if the litigants were
ISSUE:
FACTS:
of
law
FACTS:
Petitioners sought the payment of just
compensation for a registered lot alleging that
in 1927 the National Government through its
authorized representatives took physical and
material possession of it and used it for the
widening of a national road, without paying
just compensation and without any agreement,
either written or verbal. There was an
allegation of repeated demands for the
payment of its price or return of its possession,
but defendants Public Highway Commissioner
and the Auditor General refused to restore its
possession.
ISSUE: WON the defendants are immune from
suit.
HELD: NO.
Where the judgment in such a case
would result not only in the recovery of
possession of the property in favor of said
citizen but also in a charge against or financial
liability to the Government, then the suit
should be regarded as one against the
government itself, and, consequently, it cannot
prosper or be validly entertained by the courts
except with the consent of said Government.
Inasmuch as the State authorizes only
legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts
of government officials or officers are not
acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have
been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
FACTS:
Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. is
a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of manufacturing and supplying
pharmaceutical
products
to
government
hospitals in the Philippines. Then Secretary of
Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27 outlining
the guidelines and procedures on the
accreditation of government suppliers for
pharmaceutical products. A.O. No. 27 was later
amended
by
providing
for
additional
guidelines for accreditation of
drug
suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified
bidders can transact business with petitioner.
Respondent submitted to petitioner
DOH a request for the inclusion of additional
items in its list of accredited drug products,
including
the
antibiotic
"Penicillin
G
Benzathine." DOH issued an Invitation for Bids
for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of
Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of
response from petitioner DOH regarding
respondents request for inclusion of additional
items in its list of accredited products,
respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G
Benzathine contract. Only two companies
participated, the respondent being the lower
bidder. In view, however, of the nonaccreditation of respondents Penicillin G
Benzathine product, the contract was awarded
to the other company. Hence, respondent filed
a complaint injunction, mandamus and
damages against DOH.
ISSUE: WON DOH can invoke immunity from
suit.
DPWH
can
invoke
state
HELD: NO.
Under these circumstances, respondent
may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative
of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under
the States cloak of invincibility against
suit, considering that this principle yields to
certain settled exceptions. True enough, the
rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not
say that the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. The doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen.
To be sure, this Court as the staunch
guardian of the citizens rights and welfare
cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its
face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the
perpetration
thereof. Justice
and
equity
sternly demand that the States cloak of
invincibility against suit be shred in this
particular instance, and that petitioners
contractors be duly compensated on the
HELD: NO.
For three years now, petitioner has
enjoyed possession and use of the subject
property notwithstanding its inexcusable failure
to comply with its legal obligation to pay just
compensation. Just compensation means not
only the correct determination of the amount
to be paid to the owner of the land but also the
payment of the land within a reasonable time
from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just" for
the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of
his land while being made to wait for a long
period.
The State's power of eminent domain
should be exercised within the bounds of fair
play and justice. In the case at bar,
considering that valuable property has been
taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and
the municipality is in full possession and
utilizing the property for public purpose, for
three (3) years, the Court finds that the
municipality has had more than reasonable
time to pay full compensation.
FACTS:
FACTS:
petitioner
Holy
See
is
HELD: YES.
The logical question is whether the
foreign state is engaged in the activity in the
regular course of business. If the foreign state
is not engaged regularly in a business or trade,
the particular act or transaction must then be
tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a
sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then
it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is
not undertaken for gain or profit.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a
donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The
donation was made not for commercial
purpose, but for the use of petitioner to
construct thereon the official place of residence
of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign
sovereign to acquire property, real or personal,
in a receiving state, necessary for the creation
and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is
recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations.
August
The Charter
Clearly,
Historically,
Under
Considering