PRE-BAR REVIEW NOTES

IN POLITICAL LAW
(Prepared by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO)

ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
- Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:
A group of islands, including parts of the islands,
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are
closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and other
natural resources form an intensive geographical, economic,
political entity or to have historically regarded as an
archipelago.
- Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly by
one or more archipelagos and may include other islands.
- Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treat
Kalayaan Group of Islands (KIG) and Scarborough
shaol: whether to include or to exclude them from the
baselines; and/or consider as part of the regime of
islands.
- Kalayaan Islands- part of Region IV-B, Province of
Palawan but under the custody of DND. Found some 380
miles west of the southern end of Palawan.
- Scarborough shaol also known as scarborough reef,
panatag shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found in the South China
Sea, part of the province of Zambales. A shaol is a traingle
shaped chain of reefs and islands (but mostly rocks. 55
kilometers around with an area of 150 square kilometer. Its
123 miles west of Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200 EEZ
- Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire
archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands is located.
The Philippines essentially claims only the western section
of Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan.
- RA 9552- redrew the countrys baseline to comply with the
UNCLOS requirements for archipelagic state, in the process
excluding the disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the
Scarborough from the main archipelago and classifying them
instead as regimes of islands. They excluded from the
baselines. The national territory constitutes a roughly
triangular delineation which excludes large areas of waters

within 600 miles by 1,200 miles rectangular enclosing the

Philippine archipelago as defined in the Treaty of Paris.
- Determines the countrys extended continental shelf which is
believed to contain substantial amounts of oil, natural gas,
minerals and polymetals.
- Regime of islands consists of islands or naturally formed
areas of land surrounded by water that remain above water
during high tide.
- Constitutional issues:
Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters
EEZ; claims over Sabbah and Spratly islands
Delineation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of
Paris vs. RA 9552
- Right of innocent passage- archipelagic sea lane passage and
right of overflight
- 200-Economic Zone (includes Territorial Seas and
Contiguous Zone) READ: UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea.
- Contiguous Zone (12 nm from the end of territorials seas)
- Teritorial seas/maritime domain (12 nm from baseline)
- Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters
- Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to the full
and complete power of a nation within its territories is by
virtue of the consent of the nation itself. The embassy
premises of a foreign power are within the territorial domain
of the host State. The ground occupied as embassy premises
is not the territory of the foreign State to which the premises
belong.
-

Kalayaan Island Group

a) historic right
b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978
c) effective occupation
d) principle of contiguity because of proximity
e) part of the continental shelf
c) RA 3046 & RA 5446
c) RA 9552
- Freedom islands to which Spratly islands belong- basis: terra
nullius
2

ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
- Republicanism
- Separation of Powers
- Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances
- under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot
interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its authority to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation (Senate Blue
Ribbon vs Majaducon, GR # 136760, July 29, 2003;
Executive privilege -Neri vs. Senate Committee, GR. No.
180643, Mach 25, 2008)
-

Judicial Review: Requisites (Francisco, et al. vs. HR,

et al., November 10, 2003; ABAKADA Guro Party List, et
al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, September 1, 2005;
David et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006).
Local governments: With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of
legislative and executive powers in the office of the local
chief executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded,
so that either department now comprises different and nonintermingling official personalities with the end in view of
ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a
system of check and balance between the two. The avowed
intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of
its legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the
Governor of the executive functions.
(Atienza vs.
Villarosa, May 10, 2005).
Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005;
Epira case-Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17,
2007).
Permissible delegation:
1. tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI)
2. emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of
Art. VI
3. people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2
of Art. XVII; RA 6735)
4. local governments (Art X)
5. administrative bodies (power of subordinate
legislation)
3

Tests of valid delegation:

1. completeness test * Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17,
2007
2. sufficient standard *Santiago vs. COMELEC,
3/19/97; Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Exec. Sec.
- Incorporation Clause -By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically
part of our own laws.[Tanada vs. Angara, May 2, 1997]
- Incorporated: 1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimentel vs. Ermita,
462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005)
2. norms of general or customary laws
3. treaties which have become part of customary
Law (Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons; Kuroda
vs. Jalandoni
- Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no
obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that
requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or
allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law
sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from
the combination two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States;
and a psychological element known as the opinion juris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in
the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it.
- Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines, vs. Duque, et al., GR No. 1703034, October 9,
2007- Customary international law is deemed incorporated
into our domestic system. A mere constitutionsl declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
- Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 generally accepted
principles of International Law, the provisions of a treaty are
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State.

- The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever

municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution
or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard
for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited
constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996
ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts
are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it
in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact
that international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international
law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat
priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a
statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may
be
- invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
[Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion]
- Civilian Supremacy (IBP vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)The calling of the marines constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian enforcement. Notwithstanding the
conduct of joint visibility patrols by the members of PNP and
the Philippine marines, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the
overall leader and it is the local police forces who are in
charge at all times.
- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- The vitality of the tenet that
the President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is
most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy
over the military, and to the general stability of our representative
system of government. The Constitution reposes final authority,
control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who
is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as
5

commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties

imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in
nature. Civilian supremacy over the military also countermands the
notion that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as
civil courts, on matters such as conducting warrantless searches
and seizure. The ability of the President to prevent military
officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as
commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of
members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as
commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations
as in executive privilege. The President could, as a general rule,
require military officers to seek presidential approval before
appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a
contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President
as commander-in-chief.
- Gonzales, et al vs. Gen. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10,
2006- Courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to
enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively
command, control, and discipline the armed forces (see Ruffy v.
Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrops Military Law
and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form
part of the disciplinary system that ensures the Presidents
control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the
apex of this disciplinary system is the President who exercises
review powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of
the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted
- Maintenance of Peace & Order and the protection of the people
against violence are constitutionsl duties of the State and to bear
arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with
these constitutional duties (Chavez s. Romulo, G. R. No.
157036, June 9, 2004).
- Separation of the Church and State- Estrada vs. Escritor,
June 22, 2006- It is indubitable that benevolent neutralityaccommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the
spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution. Benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interest.
- Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of
the Executive Secretary, July 9, 2003. Only the prevention
of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of
religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
6

constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic

framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference
with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious
activity.
- Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. This right implies, among other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the countrys
resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR. ( Prov. of
Rizal vs. Exec. Sec., December 13, 2005)
- Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local
government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide by law. The
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 constitution
simply means decentralization. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state of an imperium
in imperio (unlike in a Federal System). The matter of
regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a
State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State
to retain it or delegate it to local governments.
- Limbonas vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786- Under the
constitution, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangay
enjoy local autonomy subject to the supervision of the
national government acting through the President (and
the Department of Local Government). Autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras, on the
other hand, are subject alone to the decree of the organic act
creating them and accepted principles on the effects and
limits of autonomy.
- Lina vs. Pano, August 30, 2001- Ours is still a unitary form
of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of
autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be
limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central
government.
- National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA
130- Presidents power of general supervision, as exercised
by the DILG, extends to Liga ng mga Barangay.
- Dadole vs. COA, December 3, 2002- The Presidents power
of general supervision can only interfere in the affairs and
activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the
latter acted contrary to law. The President or his alter egos
7

cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local

government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
constitution.
- Equal access of opportunities for public service
Pamatong vs. COMELEC, April 13, 2004- the provision
does not bestow a right to seek the presidency; it does not
contain a judicial enforceable constitutional right and merely
specifies a guideline for legislative action. It is not intended to
compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accomodate as many as possible into public office.
*NOTE: (Details refer to Article X)

ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
- Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipino
father at the time of birth makes one a Filipino. Having an
Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration
does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship
and does not militate against the claim of Filipino citizenship.
- Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a persons
citizenship may be done through a direct action for its nullity.
- Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions
in order that the election of Philippine citizenship is
effective:
1. the mother of the person making the
election must be citizen of the
Philippines; and
2. said election must be made upon
reaching the age of majority.
- Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had
under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: 1) desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed forces
of the allied forces in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at
any other time; 4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;
5) political and economic necessity.
- R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is
an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b)
of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
8

citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. To

claim the benefit of RA 8171, the children must be of minor age
at the time of the petititon for repatriation was filed by the
parent [Angat vs. RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs. CA, GR.
No. 125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that Tabasas parents
lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity].
- Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance
to the RP and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
- Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil
registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in
effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
- Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of ones
application for repatriation. Supra.
- Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
If he was originally a natural born citizen before he lost his
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as natural born
Filipino.
- NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225,
amending CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)- including citizens
repatriated and unmarried children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age of those
repatriated.

- DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA

630- The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood
as referring to dual allegiance (especially for naturalized citizens).
In filing a certificate of candidacy, the person with dual citizenship
effectively renounces his foreign citizenship. The oath of
allegiance contained in the certificate of candidacy constitutes
sufficient renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
9

- Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009The Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino, who
also possesses American citizenship having been born of an
American father and a Filipino mother, is exempt from the twin
requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before running for
public office. The Supreme Court En Banc held that that it has
applied the twin requirements to cases which involve naturalborn Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another
country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In
the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a
natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized
citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA No.
9225 do not apply to him.
- LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008
Valles and Mercado Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires his
citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To comply
with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is necessary that
the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal
terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
- Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008
Mercado case was decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual
allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet enacted.
- Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January
19, 2009- It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs
the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or
retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign
citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such
circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it
does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born
Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225
imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention
of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current
residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.
Clearly,
Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of

residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general

intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born
Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign
citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or
in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. Residency in
the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born
Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office.
Under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1)
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
- Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June 19,
2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and
retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law,
become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they
are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. However, it must
be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional
requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, as
follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
- x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath. The filing
of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a
renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The
rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable
because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.

11

- BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of

Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual citizens
may practice law in the Philippines by leave of the Supreme Court
and upon compliance with the requirements, which will restore
their good standing as members of the Philippine Bar.

- Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- The

Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international
law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not
applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article
5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality
Laws as follows: Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more
than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without
prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status
and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the
nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize
exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in
which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of
the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in
fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a German by birth but
a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and
acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the
outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his
business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which
had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated
all his properties on the ground that he was a German national.
Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen,
against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held
Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was
more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.
*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23,
1989
- AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11,
2007- It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep.
Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth
Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from naturalborn Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.
1

What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to

natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By
swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section
3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual
allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a
concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with, Section 5,
Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is
not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the
law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225,
the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance
to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress
was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this
is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
including the Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to
dual allegiance.

- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and
Fornier vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine
Bill of 1902, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day
of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a
native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether
or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself
been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after
the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on
the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from
the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
1

benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine

Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether
such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
- As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not
distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate child of a
Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The civil
status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not
determinative of the Philippine citizenship.
- Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA
292- When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or
administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered as res judicata in any subsequent
proceeding challenging the same.
- Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res
judicata principle) 1.) a persons citizenship be raised as a material
issue in a controversy where the person is a party; 2.) the Solicitor
General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by
the Supreme Court.
- Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) grants
Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens born
and residing in the Philippines. They have the choice to apply for
judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications.

- Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . The

alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status
by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend
the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent
Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his
father.

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R.

No. 179120, April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the law and
jurisprudence, it is the - State, through its representatives
designated by statute, that may question the illegally or
invalidly procured certificate of naturalization proceedings. It
is not a matter that maybe raised by private persons in an
election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant.

ARTICLE V
(SUFFRAGE)
- READ: RA 9225 and RA 9189 (Absentee Voting)
- AKBAYAN-Youth vs. COMELEC, March 26, 2001- where it is
both impractical and illegal to conduct a two-day special
registration for new voters, the COMELEC cannot be compelled to
do so.
- The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right is
subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories
of law.
- The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must undergo, among others
the process of registration under RA 8189 (Voters Registration Act
of 1996).
- Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of
residence is synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains
attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile. Domicile means an
individuals permanent home or a place to which, whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.
- Absentee voting under Section 2 of RA 9189 is an exception
to the six-month/one-year residency requirement.
- Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision in
the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
1

actually establish residence and physically stay in the

Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On
the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals
are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the
same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under
R.A. 9189 (election for president, v-pres., senators). It cannot be
overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise
as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the
residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under
ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

ARTICLE VI
(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13,
2008- in elections for President, V-President, Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule
still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
election returns or certificates of canvass are prohibited. As
with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to he
prohibition namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2)
questions affecting the composition of proceeding of the
board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity
and the due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in
Section 30 of RA 7166, as amended by RA No. 9369.
- Non delegation of legislative power
- Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Under
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in
its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its
essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient
standards. xxx In the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following: "interest of law and order;" "adequate and efficient
instruction;" "public interest;" "justice and equity;" "public
convenience and welfare;" "simplicity, economy and
efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of medical
education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices."
1

Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure

the total electrification of the country and the quality,
reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric
power and watershed rehabilitation and management meet
the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the
limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These
are sufficient standards.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere
constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of
Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not
bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the
Secretary of Justice as the rule making authority under RA
No. 8177.
- EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533Power of Subordinate Legislation with this power,
administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by filling the details which Congress may
not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is
effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by DOLE on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.
- ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, September 1, 2005- No undue delegation of
legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment
of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has
made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006,
contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual
matters outside of the control of the executive.
- Congress did not delegate the power to tax to the
President.- The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to
12% came from Congress and the task of the President is
simply to execute the legislative policy.
- SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create legislative districts. The power
to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is
vested exclusively in Congress.

- PARTY-LIST SYSTEM- BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No.

1777271, May 4, 2007- No national security or like concerns is
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject
of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. xxx The
last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: [T]he names of
the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list is
certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the
requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the
Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration,
meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same
provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election
day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to
read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec
from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the
Certified List the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec
obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the
provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May
2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec
virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence
of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. xxx Comelec has a constitutional
duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups.
- Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244,
October 6, 2000; Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC,
March 15, 2006 Section VI 5(2) of Article of the Constitution is
not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats
in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the
Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable
parameters: (1) the 20% allocation: the combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total
membership of the House of Representatives; (2) the 2% threshold:
only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total votes
cast for the party list system are qualified to a have a seat in the
House; (3) the three seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of
the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; and (4)
proportional representation: the additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total
number of votes.
- CIBAC vs. COMELEC, GR No. 172103, April 13, 2007 Applying the Veterans formula in petitioners case, we reach the
conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to an additional seat. PartyList Canvass Report No. 2018 contained in the petition shows that
1

the first party, Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes,
that is, a total of 1,203,305 votes. Petitioner CIBAC, on the other
hand, received a total of 495,190 votes. It was proclaimed that the
first party, Bayan Muna, was entitled to a maximum of three (3)
seats19 based on June 2, 2004 Resolution No. NBC 04-004 of the
COMELEC. A computation using the Veterans formula would
therefore lead us to the following result:
No. of votes of
concerned party
No. of votes of the first
party

No. of
additional
x seats allocated =
to
the first party

Additional Seats for

concerned party

Applying this formula, the result is as

follows:
495,190
1,203,305
0.41152493

0.82304986

- BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2%

threshold in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found
in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is declared
unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.
- In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall
be observed:
- (1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections. (2)The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each. (3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to
the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

- In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall

no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are
the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of
a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
- In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not
limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the twopercenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the
second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is
multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the
difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the twopercenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage
and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share
in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list
seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats
are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining
38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply
the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified
party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Rank

Party

(B)
Votes
Addition
Applyin
Guarantee
plus
Garnere
al
g the
d Seat
(C), in
d over
Seats
three
whole
Total
seat
integer
Votes
cap
s
Votes
for Party
Garnered List, in
%
(First
(Second
Round)
Round)
(A)

(B)

(C)

(E)

(D)

BUHAY

1,169,234

7.33%

2.79

N.A.

BAYAN
MUNA

979,039

6.14%

2.33

N.A.

CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

1.80

N.A.

GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

1.48

N.A.

APEC

619,657

3.88%

1.48

N.A.

A Teacher

490,379

3.07%

1.17

N.A.

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

1.11

N.A.

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

1.01

N.A.

1[31]

COOPNATCCO

409,883

2.57%

N.A.

10

BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

N.A.

11

BATAS

385,810

2.42%

N.A.

12

ARC

374,288

2.35%

N.A.

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

2.32%

N.A.

14

ABONO

339,990

2.13%

N.A.

15

AMIN

338,185

2.12%

N.A.

16

AGAP

328,724

2.06%

N.A.

17

AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

N.A.

18

YACAP

310,889

1.95%

N.A.

19

FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

N.A.

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%

N.A.

21

ABS

235,086

1.47%

N.A.

22

KAKUSA

228,999

1.44%

N.A.

23

KABATAAN

228,637

1.43%

N.A.

24

ABA-AKO

218,818

1.37%

N.A.

25

ALIF

217,822

1.37%

N.A.

26

SENIOR
CITIZENS

213,058

1.34%

N.A.

27

AT

197,872

1.24%

N.A.

28

VFP

196,266

1.23%

N.A.

29

ANAD

188,521

1.18%

N.A.

30

BANAT

177,028

1.11%

N.A.

31

ANG
KASANGGA

170,531

1.07%

N.A.

32

BANTAY

169,801

1.06%

N.A.

33

ABAKADA

166,747

1.05%

N.A.

34

1-UTAK

164,980

1.03%

N.A.

35

TUCP

162,647

1.02%

N.A.

36

COCOFED

155,920

0.98%

N.A.

Total

17

55

- Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3

above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning
party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled.
The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number
of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three
seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
- Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections:
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that
1

allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list

elections.
- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major
political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list elections
through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent
sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list
system to the sectoral groups. In defining a party that
participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a
sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in
socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of
major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.
- Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should
not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in
the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas
(KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political
parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector
or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can
establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list
election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do
the same for the urban poor.
- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the
filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to
Congress: The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives
cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives
from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number
2

of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy,

remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections.
Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the
procedure used in Table 3 above.
- However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling
in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
- LEGISLATIVE PERKS (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689)
The history of the provision granting Senators and
Congressmen immunity from arrest and detention shows
that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense.
- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of
innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full
enjoyment of civil and politicsl rights.
- Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible
in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. However, it does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof (Osmea
vs. Pendatun).
- Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard
Gordon did not relinquish his Senatorial post despite his
election to and acceptance of the post Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
PNRC is a private organization merely performing public
functions, and that the PNRC Chairman is not a
government official or employee. Not being a government
office, the PNRC Chairmanship may be held by any
individual, including a Senator or Member of the House of
Congress. NRC is autonomous, neutral and independent of
the Philippine Government. It is a voluntary organization that
does not have government assets and does not receive any
appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is
not a part of any of the government branches. PNRC
Chairmanship is not a government office or an office in a
GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in the 1987
Constitution. Senator Gordon can validly serve as the
Chairman of the PNRC without giving up his senatorial
position.
2

- QUORUM PP vs. Jalosjos- The members of Congress

cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of
a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than 6 years is not merely authorized
by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, it does not
mean all the members. The base in computing majority is
normally the total membership of the body, within the
coercive power of the House.
Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majority
simply means the greater number or more than half. Who
shall sit as officers is the sole prerogative of the Senate.
(Note: splitting of term between Senate President Drilon and
another Senator). When the Constitution provides that the
Senate President shall be elected by the majority it does
not delineate who comprises the majority or the minority.
The defeated senator (s) in the election for the Senate
presidency are not necessarily the minority.
- RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277
SCRA 268- Courts cannot inquire into the allegations that in
enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its
own rules in the absence of showing that there was violation
of a constitutional provision or private rights. Parliamentary
rules are mere procedures which may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body.
- DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmea vs Pendatun, The
House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behavior. The courts will not assume jurisdiction in
any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial
department with the legislature.
- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as
congressman did not thereby amount to a condonation of his
offense; neither does it entitle him, pending appeal of his
case, to be free from confinement and to be allowed to attend
sessions of congress, for the people elected him with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action and
movement.
- It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to
shield a member of congress from the consequences of his
wrongdoings. A member of Congress could only invoke the
2

immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses,

punishable at most by correctional penalties.
Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by
Congress to a colleague is distinct from suspension spoken in
Section 13 of RA 3019 which is not a penalty but a
preliminary preventive measure, prescinding from the fact
that the latter is not being imposed for misbehavior as a
member of Congress.
- ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- The
members of the Senate validly suspended the oath-taking of
the 3 senators elect. This does not fall within the powers of
the electoral tribunal. The latter has jurisdiction only over
electoral contests in which contestant seeks not only to
oust the intruder, but also have himself inducted into
office.
- LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles;
Paras vs. Nograles & Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1,
2009- once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as member of the House of Rep
- rePsentatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over the election
contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications,
ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. The
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation.
- Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates
in the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may
assail ones eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or
disqualification is to file before the HRET a petition for an
election protest, or a petition for quo warranto, within the
period provided by the HRET Rules.
- Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10,
2002- Since petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division
suspending the proclamation and disqualifying him, the
COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to
review the validity of the said Order of the 2 nd Division. The
said Order was yet unenforceable as it has not attained
finality, the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration
suspends the execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis
for the assumption in office of the respondent (Locsin) as the
duly elected representative of the 4th District of Leyte.

- At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the

validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC 2 nd Division was
seasonably challenged by the petitioner (Codilla) in his
motion for reconsideration. The issue was still within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve.
Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
- Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase
election, returns and qualifications should be interpreted in
its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of
the contestees title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can
say that election referred to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes;
returns to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation
of the winners, including questions concerning the
composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of
the election returns; and qualifications to matters that
could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the
proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or
the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
- Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has
exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies
involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election
Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not
allowed in elections for President, V-President, Senator
and Members of the House of Representatives.
What is allowed is the correction of manifest errors in
the certificate of canvass or election returns. To be
manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates
of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or
objections thereto must have been made before the board of
canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their
respective proceedings.
Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest
errors in the certificates of canvass, COMELEC has
jurisdiction. If it calls for the re-opening and appreciation
of ballots, the Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction.
- This Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and
resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion
implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic

exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility

(Angara vs. Electoral Commission; Pena vs. HRET).
- Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of
congressional election contests are entitled to security of
tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of
tenure under our Constitution.
- Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is
not lost upon the instance of the parties bu| continues until
the case is terminated.
- Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Courts
jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET
operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of
power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. It
is absent in this case.
- DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House of
Representatives is authorized to change its representation in
the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the
changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. The changes must be PERMANENT and do
not include temporary alliances or factional divisions not
involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one
political party to another.
- The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is
mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to
the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard. A
political party must have at least two senators to be able to
have a representative in the Commission on Appointments, so
that any number less than 2 will not entitle such party a
membership in the CA. (Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA
789).
- Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Even
assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient
number and have agreed to designate common nominees to
the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests
with the House of Representatives and not with this Court.
Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution,
2

party-list representatives must first show to the House that

they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to
seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to
comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional
representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can
the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under
its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before
petitioners may bring the instant case to the court.
Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this Court is
premature. The discretion of the House to choose its members
to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.
- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is
the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the
complaint of Pimentel involving, as it does, a contest relating
to the election of Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.
- APPROPRIATION- Gonzales vs. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733,
- The Presidents creation of the Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform through an executive Order involves
no exercise by Congress of its taxing power or spending
power.
- The appropriation for the PCCR was authorized by the
President, not by Congress. In a strict sense, appropriation
has been defined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that the
money may be paid out of the treasury, while
appropriation made by law refers to the act of the
legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a
certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues
from the State to its creditors.
- IMPORTANT: LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY- Bengzon vs.
Senate Blue Ribbon (203 SRCA 76)- An investigation that
seeks the determination whether a law has been violated is not
in aid of legislation but in aid of prosecution, and therefore,
violative of separation of powers. To allow the Committee to
investigate the matter would create the possibility of
conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same
justiceable controversy would be an encroachment on the
exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much
earlier (investigation was not in aid of legislation).
- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on
Banks, GR No. 167173, December 27, 2007- the mere filing
2

of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or

quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct
of legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be extremely easy
to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the
convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint.
- EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional
power of the President to withhold information requested by
other branches of the government. The Constitution does not
expressly grant this power to the President but courts have
long recognized implied Presidential powers if necessary
and proper in carrying out powers and functions
expressly granted to the Executive under the
Constitution. xxx In this jurisdiction, several decisions have
recognized executive privilege starting with the 1995 case of
Almonte v. Vasquez, and the most recent being the 2002
case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and the 2006
case of Senate v. Ermita.
As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief
Executive, the President is ultimately responsible for military
and national security matters affecting the nation. In the
discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it
necessary to withhold sensitive military and national
security secrets from the Legislature or the public.
As the official in control of the nations foreign service by
virtue of the Presidents control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices, the President is the chief implementer of
the foreign policy relations of the State. The Presidents role
as chief implementer of the States foreign policy is
reinforced by the Presidents constitutional power to negotiate
and enter into treaties and international agreements. In the
discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it
necessary to refuse disclosure of sensitive diplomatic secrets
to the Legislature or the public. Traditionally, states have
conducted diplomacy with considerable secrecy. There is
every expectation that a state will not imprudently reveal
secrets that its allies have shared with it.
There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of
the internal deliberations of the President with his Cabinet
and advisers. To encourage candid discussions and thorough
exchange of views, the Presidents communications with
his Cabinet and advisers need to be shielded from the glare
of publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and other presidential
advisers may be reluctant to discuss freely with the President
policy issues and executive matters knowing that their
2

discussions will be publicly disclosed, thus depriving the

President of candid advice.
Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The
interest of protecting military, national security and
diplomatic
secrets,
as
well
as
Presidential
communications, must be weighed against other
constitutionally recognized interests. There is the
declared state policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest, the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern, the
accountability of public officers, the power of legislative
inquiry, and the judicial power to secure testimonial and
documentary evidence in deciding cases.
The balancing of interests between executive privilege
on one hand and the other competing constitutionally
recognized interests on the other hand - is a function of
the courts. The courts will have to decide the issue based on
the factual circumstances of each case. This is how conflicts
on executive privilege between the Executive and the
Legislature, and between the Executive and the Judiciary,
have been decided by the courts.
Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008
-Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is
clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential since there should be ample
opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the
offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published.
It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives
submitted their offers with the understanding that historic
confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these
offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not
only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations. xxx Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are
recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis,
however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as
Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as
privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged
in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in
which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a
public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired
information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally
privileged status.

- Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, March 25,

2008- The communications elicited by the three (3) questions
[a)
Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b)
Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c)
Whether
the President said to go ahead and approve the project after
being told about the alleged bribe?] are covered by the
presidential communications privilege.
First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of
the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner
can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
- Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordance
with publish rules.
- In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeas
corpus of Camilo Sabio- GR No. 174340, October 17,
2006- The Congress power of inquiry, being broad,
encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.
It even extends to government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions are within the
power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG
belongs to this class. xxx So long as the constitutional rights
of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners,
will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it is
their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the
facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting
obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to
respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to
testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper
investigation
- Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- a
mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad
power of Congress in the absence of constitutional basis.

- Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately,

the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22
find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information.
- Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the
executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If
the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is executive privileged, it must so assert it
and state the reason therefore and why it must be
respected.
- When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only
way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this power
the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of
the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a coequal branch of government which is sanctioned by a longstanding custom.
- The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation,
must be construed as limited in its appearance of department
heads in the question hour contemplated in Section 22 of
Article VI, the objective of which is to obtain information
in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
- The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken
by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence
over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly,
oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by
Congress (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives; (b) to determine whether agencies are
properly administered; (c) to eliminate executive waste and
dishonesty; (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority; and (e) to assess executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest.
- The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its
oversight powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny; investigation and supervision.
3

- ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE Abakada Guro Party

List, et al. vs. Ermita, ed al., October 18, 2005 the signing
of a bill by the Speaker of the Housa and the Senate Presi`ent
and the certification od the Secretaraes of both houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment.
- A bidl originating in the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Selate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole, a distinct bill may be produced.
The power of the Senate to propose alendments, it cal propose
its own version even with respect to bills which are required
by the Constitution to originate in the House.
- BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- The
Supreme Court recognizes the long standing legislative
practice of giving said conference ample latitude for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House.
It can propose amendment in the nature of a substitute, so
long as the amendment is germane to the subject of the
bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final
but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to
become valid as an act of the legislative department.
- Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29,
2004 Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160
in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is
burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it
is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are
actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable
purposes. Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to
the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or
enjoyment, and exclusively is defined, in a manner to
exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. The words
dominant use or principal use cannot be substituted for
the words used exclusively without doing violence to the
Constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with
exclusively.
- Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July
14, 2008- Any government expenditure without the
corresponding
appropriation
from
Congress
is
unconstitutional. There can be no dispute that the proceeds of
foreign loans, whether concluded or not, cannot be obligated
in a procurement contract without a prior appropriation from
Congress. When the executive branch secures a loan to fund a
procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds enter the
National Treasury as part of the general funds of the
3

government. Congress must appropriate by law the loan

proceeds to fund the procurement of goods or services,
otherwise the loan proceeds cannot be spent by the executive
branch. When the loan falls due, Congress must make another
appropriation law authorizing the repayment of the loan out
of the general funds in the National Treasury. This
appropriation for the repayment of the loan is what is covered
by the automatic appropriation.

ARTICLE VII
(PRESIDENT)
- PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a
sitting president evolved through case law.
Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President
by virtue of the office. There is nothing in our laws that
would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the Presidents prerogative.
Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that
the immunity of the President extends to the end of the term
to which he was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is
clear that the immunity of the President from suit is
concurrent only with his tenure (representing the period
during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his
term (the time during which the officer may claim to hold
office as a matter of right).
Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive
immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President.
David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 It is not
proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is
the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or
actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution
or law.
- SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL- Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the
law grants the Supreme Court the power to resolve an election
contest between or among presidential candidates, no new or
separate court is created. The law merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.

- The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for

President and/or Vice-President has obtained the largest number of
votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with
the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by RA
1793. Congress merely acts as national board of canvassers,
charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make said
declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly certified
by provincial and city boards of canvassers. Upon the other
hand, the Presidential Electoral tribunal has the judicial power
to determine whether or not said duly certified election returns
have been irregularly made or tampered with or reflect the
true results of the elections in the areas covered by each and, if
not, to recount the ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass
upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same
shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which
Congress has no power to do.
-

In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has

effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest to the election
protestee Ramos as President. (Santiago v. Ramos, 253
SCRA 559).

- Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that

Legarda effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest when
she ran in the Senate, which term coincides with the term of
the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No.
003, Legarda v. De Castro, February 12, 2008)
- The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential
election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It
provides,
Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate
for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who
received the second or third highest number of votes may
contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as
the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after
the proclamation of the winner.

- Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers,
may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the
rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in
interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned
a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly
voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that

2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be the legitimate

beneficiary in a successful election contest.
- The Supreme Court ruled that it does not have any rule on
substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the
analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court,
decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the
electoral tribunals. Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on
substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows
substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from
the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear
before
the
Presidential Tribunal
as
the
legal
representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by
said Section 16. However, in the Supreme Courts application
of this rule to an election contest, it has every time ruled that a
public office is personal to the public officer and not a
property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, the
Supreme Court consistently rejected substitution by the
widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant
dies during the pendency of the protest.
- This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily
abates the pending action. In Vda. de De Mesa (1966) the
Supreme Court held that while the right to a public office is
personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election
protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant
or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the
court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings.
Hence, the Supreme Court has allowed substitution and
intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party
in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured
by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the
avails of the suit. Herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ,
herself denies any claim to the august office of President.
Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude
that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this
election protest (Ronald Allan Poe vs. GMA, PET case No.
002, March 29, 2005).
- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277- The actions
contemplated in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution are
post election remedies, namely, regular election contests and
quo warranto. The word contest means that the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court only be invoked after the election and
proclamation of the President or Vice-President there can be
no contest before a winner is proclaimed.
3

- VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTEstrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001- Also Read:
TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF PRESIDENT- The
question whether the claimed temporary inability of Estrada is
a political question beyond the Supreme Courts power of
review. The decision that President Arroyo is the dejure
President made by a co-equal branch of government
cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
POLITICAL QUALIFIED AGENCY (ALTER-EGO
DOCTRINE) Constantino vs. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064,
October 13, 2005- Nevertheless, there are powers vested in
the President by the Constitution which may not be delegated
to or exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President.
Justice Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear:
Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem
plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that
there are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be
validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the
President. There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must
be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or
ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers
by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law
(PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the
benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem]. These
distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain
presidential powers which arise out of exceptional
circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension
of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence
of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal
branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of
the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this
special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the
President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by
no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the
executive power in question is of similar gravitas and
exceptional import. We cannot conclude that the power of the
President to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within
the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to
contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest,
but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the
sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident,
but from the established functions of governance.
3

- APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENTSarmiento vs. Mison; Bautista vs. Salonga; Bermudez vs.
Torres; Calderon vs. Carale- Congress cannot expand the
constitution by increasing those officers who need prior
confirmation by the CA.
-

Election Ban (Midnight Appointments) GR No. 191002,

De Castro v. JBC; GR No. 191032, Soriano v. JBC; GR No.
191057, PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No. 10-2-5-SC, In Re
Applicability of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution to
Appointments to the Judiciary; GR No. 191149, Peralta v.
JBC; GR No. 191342, Tolentino, Jr. v. JBC; GR No. 191420,
Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC; March 17, 2010,
April 20, 2010)- the prohibition under Article VII, Section 15
of the Constitution against presidential appointments
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of the term of the outgoing President does not apply
to vacancies in the High Tribunal. Although Valenzuela came
to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial
appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela
dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made
to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D.
Regalado of this Court, a former member of the
Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being
intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which
confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should
prevail. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so.

Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2,

2002- An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once an appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation
by the CA does not alter its permanent character. It is
effective until disapproved by the CA or until the next
adjournment of Congress. It is extended only during a
recess of Congress. If disapproved by CA, appointee can
no longer be extended a new appointment. If by-passed,
the President is free to renew the ad-interim appointment.

- Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462

SCRA 622, July 6, 2005- The law allows the President to
make such acting appointment. The President may even

appoint in acting capacity a person not yet in the government

service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
- Acting appointment- It is temporary in nature. It is a stopgap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until
the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In
case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of
her choice could assume office. It may be extended any time
there is vacancy, given while Congress is in session.
- Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21 2006- Under
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President
appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the
heads of the Executive departments," ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group
refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of
lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by
law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. xxx The President appoints the first group of officers with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President
appoints the second and third groups of officers without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President
appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is
the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a
department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is
declared unconstitutional.
- CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES
AND THEIR ASSISTANT SECRETARIES are prohibited
from holding multiple positions and receiving compensation
therefrom- BITONIO VS. COA, 425 SCRA 437, March 12,
2004.
- CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS- Buklod
ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, July 10, 2001- The general
rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office
is lodged with the legislature. The exception, however, is
that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the Presidents power of control
may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular
office, or certain laws may grant him broad authority to carry
out reorganization measures. The chief executive, under our
3

laws, has the continuing authority to reorganize the

administrative structure of the Office of the President.
- Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the
Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093,
July 31, 2007 The President has the authority to carry out a
reorganization of the Department of Health under the
Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct
of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17
of the 1987 Constitution.
The Presidents power to
reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his
residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O.
No. 292 which grants the President broad organization
powers to implement reorganization measures. Be that as it
may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out
the reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive
department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient.
- Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential
Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the
power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize
salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees
[is]"unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides
that all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with ths Constitution sha|n remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked.
- Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003
The Presidents power (EO 292) to reorganize offices
outside of the Office of the President Proper is limited
merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office
of the President to Departments or Agencies and viceversa. The DECS is indisputably a Department of the
Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is not part of the Office
of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly
authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of
the DECS to the Office of the President. Under its charter,
the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC), is attached to the
Office of the President. Therefore, the President has the
authority to transfer the functions, programs and activities of
DECS related to sports development to the PSC, making EO
81 a valid presidential issuance.
4

- Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 113956, July 21, 2006- The

presidential power of control over the Executive branch of
government extends to all executive employees from the
Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional
power of the President is self-executing and does not require any
implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the Presidents
power of control over the Executive branch. xxx In mandating that
the President shall have control of all executive x x x offices,
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt
any executive office one performing executive functions outside
of the independent constitutional bodies from the Presidents
power of control. xxx The Presidents power of control applies to
the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is
true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The
power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or
decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of
discretion.
- COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP (Lacson vs.
Perez, May 10, 2001)- The declaration by the President of
state of rebellion during or in the aftermath of the May 1,
2001 seige of Malacanang is not violative of the separation of
powers doctrine. The President, as Commander in chief of
Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call upon such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.
- Sanlakas vs. Executive Committee, 421 SCRA 656,
February 3, 2004- The Presidents authority to declare a
state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief
executive and, at the same time draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief powers pursuant to her calling out
power.
- Gudani vs. Senga, Augsut 15, 2006- It is on the President
that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and
all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position.
Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of
command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the
individual members of the armed forces be accorded the
utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between
obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Supreme
Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to
choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes
that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the
4

commander-in-chief of the armed forces. if the President or

the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to
appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such
testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance.
- Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora The
President has full discretion to call the military when in his
judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. There is no
equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of
the Presidents action to call out the armed forces.
- David, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, May 3, 2006PP 1017 constitutes the call by the President for the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, PP 1017s
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied
power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce
obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless
violence as well as decrees promulgated by the president; and
(3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. In
the absence of legislation, the President cannot take over
privately-owned public utility and private business affected
with public interest.
- The President can validly declare the existence of a state of
national emergency even in the absence of congressional
enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers requires a
delegation from Congress.
- EMERGENCY POWER GRANT TO PRESIDENTRequisites: 1) there must be a war or other emergency; 2) the
delegation must be for a limited period only; 3) the delegation
must be subject to such restrictions as Congress may
prescribe and 4) the emergency powers must be exercised to
carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
-

David, et al. vs. Ermita- It may be pointed out that the

second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to
war but also to other national emergency. If the intention of
the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the
President the authority to declare a state of national
emergency pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out
power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have
provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress
should first authorize the President before he can declare a
state of national emergency. The logical conclusion then is
that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a
4

state of national emergency even in the absence of a

Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency
powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest, is different
matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
- PARDONING POWER- Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 370The pardoning power of the President is final and
unappealable.
- TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342
SCRA 449-It is inconsequential whether the United States
treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a
treaty. (Also read USAFFE Veterans Ass. v. Treasurer 105
Phil. 1030) In the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
Akbayan vs. Aquino - The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus
that the treaty-making power is exclusive to the President,
being the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, was
echoed in BAYAN v. Executive Secretary where the Court
held:
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office,
the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the
external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the
chief architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the
field of foreign relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast powers
and influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as
Jefferson describes, is executive altogether.
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President,
subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the
members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the
subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain
solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and
diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law
itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it. x x x (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary where the Court ruled:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of
state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations
and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the
chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's
mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is
vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
4

extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter

into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.
In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority
to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to
negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a
limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by
him. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It has long been recognized that the power to enter into

treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President,
subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this
light, the authority of the President to enter into trade
agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464
may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power
already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis
to hold the President or its representatives accountable to
Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to
enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of
Senate concurrence, since the President must still ensure that
all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant
provisions of the Constitution. It follows from the above
discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative
powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty
negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for
Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of
the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of
negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not
even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to
concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the
President, but only the Senate.
- Pimentel, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary, July 6, 2005-Under
our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The
role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to
submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for
its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a
state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf
is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such
decision is within the competence of the President alone,
which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of
4

mandamus. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over

actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of
his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ
of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government
to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
- POWER TO CLASSIFY PUBLIC LANDS and TO SELL
THE SAME- The power to classify lands as alienable
belongs to the President. Only lands, which have been
classified as alienable, may be sold. There must be a law
authorizing its sale or alienation by the President or by
another officer before conveyance can be executed on behalf
of the government (Section 48, Book I of the 1987
Administrative Code). Laurel vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797The President may not convey valuable real property of the
government on her sole will. Conveyance must be authorized
by a law enacted by Congress.
- POWER
OF
SUPERVISION
OVER
LOCAL
GOVERNMENTSto ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law. xxx Insofar as existing
legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of
Local Government) to proceed against local officials
administratively.

ARTICLE VIII
(JUDICIAL)
- JUDICIAL REVIEW- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona; Oposa vs. Factoran (petitioners-children);
Kilosbayan vs. Morato; IBP vs. Zamora (IBP not proper
party); Gonzales vs. Narvasa (private citizen not proper
party).
- Garcia v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 157584, April 2,
2009- The immediate implementation of full deregulation of
the local downstream oil industry is a policy determination by
Congress which this Court cannot overturn without offending
the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers.
That the law failed in its objectives because its adoption
spawned the evils petitioner Garcia alludes to does not
warrant its nullification. In the words of Mr. Justice Leonardo
A. Quisumbing in the 1999 Garcia case, [a] calculus of fear
and pessimism xxx does not justify the remedy petitioner
seeks: that we overturn a law enacted by Congress and
approved by the Chief Executive.
4

- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- Courts are empowered,

under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to
arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive
branches of government on the proper constitutional
parameters of power.
- PROPER PARTY- In this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
adopts the DIRECT INJURY test. In People vs. Vera, it
held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.
- However, being a mere procedural technicality, the
requirement of locus standi may be waived by the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its discretion. Even when
the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have
been allowed to sue under the principle of transcendental
importance. DAVID, ET AL VS. ARROYO; CHAVEZ VS.
PEA, 384 SCRA 152; BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN VS. ZAMORA, 342 SCRA 449; LIM VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 380 SCRA 739.
- Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators may
be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
1. the cases involved constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure
is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that
the issues are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and
5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
- AIWA vs. Romulo, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005- For
a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
- TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party

1. registered voter must show that the action concerns his

right of suffrage
2. taxpayer he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.
3. corporate entity- the party suing has substantial relation to
the third party; the third party cannot assert his
constitutional right; the right of the third party will be
diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the
third partys constitutional claim.
- As the case involves constitutional questions, the Supreme
Court is not concerned with whether the petitioners are real
parties in interest, but whether they have legal standing. LA
BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASS., INC., VS RAMOS, 421
SCRA 148.
- EVEN WHEN THE ISSUES ARE MOOT AND
ACADEMIC, the Court still entertains to adjudicate the
substantive matter if there is a grave violation of the
constitution; to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, bar and public and capable of repetition, yet evading
review PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429
SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.
- The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic,
if: first, there is grave violation of the constitution, second,
the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved, third, when constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, bar and the public, and fourth, the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review. DAVID, ET AL. VS.
ARROYO, ET AL.; SANLAKAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 421
SCRA 656; ACOP VS. GUINGONA, JR., 383 SCRA 577;
ALBA-A VS. COMELEC, 435 SCRA 98.
- POLITICAL QUESTIONS- are concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure. QUESTIONS REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE
ISSUANCES will not preclude the SUPREME COURT from
exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether
or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of issuing authority under
its EXPANDED JURISDICTION- BRILLANTES VS.
COMELEC, 432 SCRA 269, June 15 2004.

- KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3,

2007 - Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as
peoples organizations and taxpayers since the matter
involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional
importance, namely, the qualification nay, the citizenship
of a person to be appointed a member of this Court. xxxx
This case is a matter of primordial importance involving
compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body
tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting
claims under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is the
proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has
the initial competence to do so. xxx It is clear, therefore,
that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision
of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his
mother were naturalized along with his father.
- FISCAL AUTONOMY- Bengzon vs. Drilon- The Chief
Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment
appropriations where augmentation is needed.
- PP VS. DY, 395 SCRA 256- Under Article VIII, Section 4(1)
of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in
its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members.
- IBP vs. Zamora, deployment of marines is justiciable- the
problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.
- FARIAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 417 SCRA 503- Policy
matters are not the concern of the Supreme Courtgovernment policy is within the exclusive dominion of the
political branches of the government.
- CHANGE OF VENUE-Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581, A
motion to change the venue of (and authority to conduct)
preliminary investigation cannot be taken cognizance by the
courts for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary
investigation is a function of the Executive department and
not of the judiciary.
- PP vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)- In case of doubt, it
should be resolved in favor of change of venue.
- PP VS. TUBONGBANUA, GR No. 171271- August 31,
2006- In view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or
the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty on June

24, 2006, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion

perpetua, thus:
-

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby

prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One
Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the
Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed.
Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A.
No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other
laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death
penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a)
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code;
or
(b)
the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated
does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code.

- PROMULGATE RULES concerning the protection and

enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all court, the admission to the practice of
law, the IBP, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
NOTE: Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure;
uniform; not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
WRIT OF AMPARO The right to enforce and protect a
persons rights guaranteed and recognized by the bill of
rights. It is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The
writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.
Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final
judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the
following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or
judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family be protected in a government agency or by
an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping
and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization,
association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of the

Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.

The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private
institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it
shall issue. The accredited persons and private institutions
shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be
imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon
verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person
in possession or control of a designated land or other
property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
relevant object or operation thereon. The motion shall state in
detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported
by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal
knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party. If the motion is opposed on the ground of
national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing
in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The
movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to
establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be
threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the
person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the
date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and
may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after
the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable
reasons.
(c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon
verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person
in possession, custody or control of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic
form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the
petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection,
copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The
motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or
of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the
court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to
determine the merit of the opposition. The court, justice or
judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the
constitutional rights of all the parties.
(d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge,
upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the
5

Department of Justice for admission to the Witness

Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6981. The court, justice or judge may also
refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to
accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping
and securing their safety.
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA- It is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
- Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17,
2008- To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was
originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in
the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to
the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond
those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Where, as in this case, there is an
ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory
dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we
see no point in separately and directly intervening through a
writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie
showing that the right to life, liberty or security the
personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is
immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger
or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an
application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by
motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying
by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with
a separately filed criminal case.
- Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires
the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
- (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the
respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or

threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or

security of the aggrieved party;
- (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
secure the data or information;
- (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the
government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if
known;
- (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the
updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of
the database or information or files kept by the
respondent.
Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 475- The
COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to
promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and
procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court.
Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19,
2005- Congress has the plenary legislative power. The silence
of the Constitution on the subject can only be interpreted as
meaning there is no intention to diminish that plenary power.
RA 8974 which requires full payment before the State may
exercise proprietary rights, contrary to Rule 67 which requires
only a deposit was recognized by the Supreme Court.
PEOPLE VS. MATEO, July 7, 2004 While the
fundamental law requires mandatory review by the Supreme
Court of cases where the penalty is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, nowhere however, has it proscribed
an intermediate review. The Supreme Court deems it wise and
compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of
Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more
squarely within the rule making prerogative of the
Supreme Court than the law making power of Congress.
The rule allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review, is such a
procedural matter.
- MINUTE RESOLUTION- Komatsu vs. CA, 289 SCRA
604- does not violate Section 14. Resolutions are not
decisions within the constitutional requirement; they merely
5

hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and
the petition to review decision of the CA is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, hence, there is no need
to fully explain the Courts denial since, for one thing, the
facts and the law are already mentioned in the CA decision.
- German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA
329- The mandate under Section 14, Article VIII of the
constitution is applicable only in cases submitted for
decision, i.e, given due course and after the filing of the
briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where a
resolution is issued denying due course to a petition and
stating the legal basis thereof.
- Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No.
181107- The Supreme Court stressed that it has the discretion
to decide whether a minute resolution should be used in lieu
of a full-blown decision in any particular case. Further, the
Supreme Court explained that the grant of due course to a
petition for review is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion. When it fails to find any reversible error
committed by the CA, there is no need to fully explain the
Courts denial as it means that the Supreme Court agrees
with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA. There
is no point in reproducing or restating in the resolution of
denial the conclusions of the appellate court affirmed.The
constitutional requirement of sec. 14, Art. VIII of a clear
presentation of facts and laws applies to decisions, where
the petition is given due course, but not where the petition
is denied due course, with the resolution stating the legal
basis for the dismissal.
- Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14
does not preclude the validity of Memorandum Decision
which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions
of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It is
intended to avoid cumbersome reproduction of the decision
(or portions thereof) of the lower court.

ARTICLE IX
(CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS)

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

- GSIS VS. CSC, 202 SCRA 799- The grant to the Civil
Service Commission of adjudicatory power, or the authority
to hear and adjudge cases, necessarily includes the power to
enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions, or
orders. The authority to decide cases would be inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see that what has been
decided is carried out.
- CSC vs. Sojor, GR No. 168766, May 22, 2008- The
Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire
civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces every
branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
government, including every government-owned or controlled
corporation. It is further classified into career and non-career
service positions. Career service positions are those where:
(1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly technical
qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement to
higher career positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. A
state university president with a fixed term of office
appointed by the governing board of trustees of the
university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was
appointed by the chairman and members of the governing
board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a
non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of
the CSC.
- CSC v. Alfonso, GR No. 179452, June 11, 2009,- Even though
the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided
by government departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, a
complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has the
authority to hear and decide the case, although it may in its
discretion opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct the
investigation, as provided for in the Civil Service Law of 1975. The
Supreme Court also ruled that since the complaints were filed
directly with the CSC and the CSC had opted to assume
jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSCs exercise of jurisdiction
shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction.
- CSC vs. DBM, GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005- The no
report, no release policy may not be validly enforced
against offices vested with fiscal autonomy. Being automatic
connotes
something
mechanical,
spontaneous
and
perfunctory. It means that no condition to fund releases to it
may be imposed.

- Naseco vs. NLRC, 68 SCRA 122- Employees of GOCCs,

as a general rule, are governed by the Civil Service Law. But
a distinction of the manner the GOCC was created must be
made. If the GOCC was established through an original
charter (or special law), then it falls under the civil service,
e.g., GSIS and SSS. However, corporations which are
subsidiaries of these chartered agencies, e.g., Manila Hotel, is
excluded from the coverage of the civil service.
- Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282An agency of
government refers to any of the various units of the
government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality or government-owned or controlled
corporation or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the national
government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, institutes and
government-owned or controlled corporations,
- MWSS vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602- If one is employed
in a GOCC, whether regular or not, the civil service law
applies. It is not true either that with respect to money claims,
the Labor Code applies. Regardless of the nature of
employment or claim, an employee in a GOCC with original
charter is covered by the Civil Service Law.
- Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II, 373 SCRA 652 (2002) the
appointment to the positions in the Career Executive Service
may be considered permanent in which the appointee enjoys
security of tenure.
- Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235permanent
appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all
the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service
does not automatically confer security of tenure on its
occupant even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature
of appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or
lack of it.
- Fernandez vs. Dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751- Unconsented
transfer of the officer, resulting in demotion in rank or salary

is a violation of the security of tenure clause in the

Constitution.
- Rosales, Jr. vs. Mijares, 442 SCRA 532- A transfer that aims
by indirect method to terminate services or to force
resignation constitutes removal.
- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006 In the area of religious
exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the
state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that
its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will
also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing such
state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the
Infinite.
- Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284- The party
aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency
of the government involving termination of services may
appeal to the CSC within 15 days. Thereafter, he could go on
certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC.
- PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL- Montecillo vs. CSC, June
28, 2001- The CSC is expressly empowered by the
Administrative Code of 1987 to declare positions in the Civil
Service primarily confidential. (Read: Salazar vs. Mathay, 73
SCRA 285, on two instances when a position may be
considered primarily confidential: (1) President declares the
position to be primarily confidential upon recommendation of
of the CSC; (2) when by the nature of the functions, there
exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing
authority which ensures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state.
HILARIO VS. CSC, 243 SCRA 206, City Legal Officer is
primarily confidential.
PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA, June 25, 2001, The position
of Casino Operations Manager is not primarily confidential
- RESIGNATION- Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001, There
must intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed
by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

- To constitute a complete and operative resignation from

public office, there must be: (1) an intention to relinquish a
part of the term; (2) an act of relinquishment; and (3) an
acceptance by the proper authority. The last one is required by
reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes vs. CA, 284
SCRA 276, 1997).
- Santos vs. CA, 345 SCRA 553, (2000) rule on double
compensation not applicable to pension. A retiree receiving
pension or gratuity after retirement can continue to receive
such pension or gratuity if he accepts another government
position to which another compensation is attached.
- PILC vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007 PCCG
Chair Magdangal Elma is prohibited under the Constitution
from simultaneously serving as Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel. The position of PCCG Chair and CPLC are
incompatible offices since the CPLC reviews actions of the
PCGG Chair. It pointed out that the general rule to hold more
than one office is allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position/
- Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21,
1997- When an employee is illegally dismissed, and his
reinstatement is later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents
and purposes he is considered as not having left his office,
and notwithstanding the silence of the decision, he is entitled
to payment of back salaries.
- DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 The
Supreme Court follows as a precedent, the DOTC did not effect
Cruz's termination with bad faith and, consequently, no backwages
can be awarded in his favor.
- David vs. Gania GR No. 156030, August 14, 2003- A civil
service officer or employee, who has been found illegally
dismissed or suspended, is entitled to be reinstated and to
back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of
his illegal dismissal or suspension up to his reinstatement,
and if at the time the decision of exoneration is promulgated,
he is already of retirement age, he shall be entitled not only to
back wages but also to full retirement benefits.
- CSC vs. Dacoycoy, April 29, 1999 The CSC as an
aggrieved party, may appeal the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court. Appeal now lies from a
decision exonerating a civil service employee of
administrative charges.
5

- CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes
of an act by petitioner CSC to protect the integrity of the civil
service system, and does not fall under the provision on
disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the
provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases
instituted by it directly. This is an integral part of its duty,
authority and power to administer the civil service system
and protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of
the Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles those
who falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished
from ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide
member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute
violations of the law or the rules of the service.
- SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the
Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether
government employees may strike, they are prohibited from
striking by express provision of Memorandum Circular
No. 6, series of 1997 of the CSC and as implied in E.O.
180.
COMELEC
- REAPPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS- Matibag vs.
Benipayo, April 2, 2002- The phrase without reappointment
applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not
such person completes his term of office which could be seven,
five or three years. There must be a confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment
before the prohibition on reappointment can apply.
- ISSUANCE of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.- Relampagos vs.
Cumba, 243 SCRA 690.
- Bedol vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179830, December
3, 2009- The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct
investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the
explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx

- (6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases

of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
- The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon
it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code,
may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and
quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC
embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative
power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to
implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative
functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its
administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power,
the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus
Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to
issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the
1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.7
- The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines
Inc. v. Esteva, described quasi-judicial power in the following
manner, viz:
- Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the
other hand is the power of the administrative agency to
adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner
is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance
of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In
carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and
draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action
and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of
specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the

proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be

observed in the conduct of the proceedings.
- Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation to
probe into the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the
elections in said province; and consequently, to determine
whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious,
and whether an election offense had possibly been committed
could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or
administrative function.
- The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was
exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth
behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in
Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force
conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties
concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to
argue and support their respective positions.
- The effectiveness of the quasijudicial power vested by law
on a government institution hinges on its authority to compel
attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings
or proceedings.
- In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power
to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a factfinding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to
attend, would render nugatory the COMELECs investigative
power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional
mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible
elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was
however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to
appear during said hearings and to answer questions regarding
the various election documents which, he claimed, were
stolen while they were in his possession and custody.
Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such
contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.
- Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a
board of canvassers at that time it required petitioner to
appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the
powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial.
The board exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the
function and duty to determine whether the papers transmitted
to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper
officers.10 When the results of the elections in the province of
Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for various
candidates posited numerous questions on the certificates of
canvass brought before the COMELEC. The COMELEC
6

asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on

the issue of whether the election documents coming from
Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner
unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted
within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed resolutions.
- LDP vs. COMELEC, GR No. 151265, February 24, 2004 The COMELEC correctly stated that the ascertainment of
the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers is
a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this
authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which
vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the
discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with
ample wherewithal and considerable latitude in adopting
means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of
the great objectives for which it was created to promote free,
orderly and honest elections.
- LP vs. ATIENZA, ET AL., GR No. 174992- April 17, 2007
COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide questions of
leadership within a party and to ascertain its legitimate
officers and leaders. xxx The COMELEC is endowed with
ample wherewithal and considerable latitude in adopting
means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of
the great objectives for which it was created to promote free
and orderly honest elections.
- Balajonda vs. COMELEC, GR No. 166032, February 28,
2005- Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the
COMELECs authority to do so, considering that the
suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly
authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provides that absent any applicable
provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect.
- Codilla vs. De Venecia, et al., December 10, 2002- Section
3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the
COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for reconsideration,
decisions or resolutions decided by a division. Since the
petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration
6

of the Order of the Second Division suspending his

proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en
banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the
validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said
Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has
not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be
used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte.
- Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307- The
COMELEC en banc does not have the authority to hear and
decide cases at the first instance. Under the COMELEC
Rules, pre-proclamation cases are classified as Special Cases
and in compliance with the provision of the Constitution, the
two divisions of the COMELEC are vested with the authority
to hear and decide these special cases.
- Santiago vs. COMELEC, March 19, 1997 - COMELEC
cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement
the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of
Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws
and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by
the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is
authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the
sufficient standard tests.
- The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for
initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the
initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by
the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition
are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate
on the total number of registered voters in each legislative
district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through
its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters
identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.
- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, January 23, 2006- The conduct
of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been
6

the business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts.

Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best
left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional
body exclusively charged with the power of enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the
indisputable expertise in the field of election and related
laws. Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties.
- Alunan III vs. Mirasol, GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997
Contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
- Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832- The COMELEC
may validly order a manual count notwithstanding the
required automated counting of ballots in R. A. 8436, the law
authorizing the commission to use an automated election
system, if that is the only way to count votes. It ought to be
self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a
COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.
- Limkaichong vs. COMELEC- Resolution No. 8062 is a
valid exercise of the COMELECs constitutionally mandated
power to promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the
conduct of the elections. In adopting such policy-guidelines
for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, the
COMELEC had in mind the objective of upholding the
sovereign will of the people and in the interest of justice and
fair play.
Accordingly, those candidates whose
disqualification cases are still pending at the time of the
elections, should they obtain the highest number of votes
from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their
proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of
the hearing and resolution of the involved cases.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
- COAS AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs.
Tantuico- Corporations covered by the COAs auditing
powers are not limited to GOCCs. Where a private
corporation or entity handles public funds, it falls under COA
jurisdiction. Under Sec. 2(1), item, (d), non-governmental
entities receiving subsidies or equity directly or indirectly
from or through the government are required to submit to post
audit.
6

- DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private
auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the
COA of its power to examine and audit the same government
agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since
even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual
examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will
still bind government agencies and their officials. A
concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public
funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit.
Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the
clear intent of its framers, point to only one indubitable
conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to
examine and audit government agencies. The framers of
the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow
independent private audit of certain government agencies in
addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private
investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a
government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as
in the case at bar when the government borrows money from
abroad.
- BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits
accruing to a public officer may not, without his consent, be
withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government.
- MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA,
acting by himself, has no authority to render or promulgate a
decision for the commission. The power to decide on issues
relating to audit and accounting is lodged in the COA acting
as a collegial body which has the jurisdiction to decide any
case brought before it.
- PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil
868, COAs power over the settlement of accounts is
different from power over unliquidated claims, the latter
of which is within the ambit of judicial power.
- NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the
approval of excess or unnecessary expenditures.

ARTICLE X
(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)
- TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL
OFFICIALS- Socrates vs. COMELEC, November 12,
2002, What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms.
6

The Constituton, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A
recall election mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate re-election after the third term.
- Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in
the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full
term of three years for purposes of counting the
consecutiveness of an elective officials terms in office. Thus,
in a situation where a candidate loses in an election to gain a
third consecutive term but later wins in the recall election, the
recall term cannot be stitched with his previous two
consecutive terms. The period of time prior to the recall term,
when another elective official holds office, constitutes an
interruption in the continuity of service.
- Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in
the computation of the three-term limit. Conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short
of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few
months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ
of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such
involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
- Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three termlimit rule to apply, the local official concerned must serve
three consecutive terms as a result of election. The term
served must be one for which he was elected. Thus, if he
assumes a position by virtue of succession, the official cannot
be considered to have fully served the term.
- Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office
constitutes, for Francis Ong, service for the full term, and
should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of
the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and
statutory provisions, barring local elective officials from
being elected and serving for more than three consecutive
terms for the same position. His continuous exercise of the
functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation
of the three-term rule, notwithstanding the subsequent
nullification of his proclamation. There was actually no
6

interruption or break in the continuity of Francis Ongs

service respecting the 1998-2001 term.
- METROPOLITAN
MANILA
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORTY- Its function is limited to the delivery of basic
services. RA 7924 does not grant the MMDA police power,
let alone legislative power. The MMDA is a development
authority. It is not a political unit of government. There is
no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations
for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
metropolis. It is the local government units, acting through
their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative
power and police power. (MMDA vs. BelAir Village
Association, 328 SCRA 836).
- Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is
understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant
the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers licenses without need of any other legislative
enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police
power. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with
metro-wide impact that transcend local political boundaries or
would entail huge expenditures if provided by the individual
LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic
management, and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the
petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of
Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by
the MMDAs enabling law, which we can but interpret, and
petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in this respect
must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or
regulation arising from a legitimate source (MMDA vs.
Danilo Garin, April 15, 2005).
- MMDA vs. MenCorp Transport System, G.R. No. 170657,
August 15, 2007- In light of the administrative nature of its
powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the Project (Greater Manila Transport System) as
envisioned by E.O 179; hence, it could not have been validly
designated by the President to undertake the Project. It
follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination
of respondents terminals. Even the MMDAs claimed
authority under the police power must necessarily fail in
consonance with the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. BelAir Village Association, Inc. and this Courts subsequent
ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Garin that the MMDA is not vested with police power.

INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT- IRAs- are items

of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the
funds of the local government unit Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252
SCRA 695).
- LGUS SHARE IN THE IRA SHALL BE
AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED WITHOUT ANY
CONDITION
OF
APPROVAL
FROM
ANY
GOVERNMENTAL BODY-Section 6, Art. X of the
1987constitution provides that LGUs shall have a just share,
as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. When passed, it would be
readily see that such provision mandates that (1) the LGUs
shall have a just share in the national taxes; and (2) just
share shall be determined by law; (3) that just share shall
be automatically released to the LGUs. PROVINCE OF
BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27,
2004.
- The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the
IRA. (ACORD vs. Zamora, June 8, 2005)
-

AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides

that pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the
internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be
withheld is declared in contravention of Section 286 of the
LG Code and Section 6 of Art X of the constitution (Pimentel
vs. Aguirre, July 19, 2000).

- LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the

principles of local autonomy as embodied in the Local
Government Code. The State is mandated to ensure the
autonomy of local governments, and local governments are
empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges that accrue
exclusively to them, subject to congressional guidelines and
limitations. The principle of local autonomy is no mere
passing dalliance but a constitutionally enshrined precept that
deserves respect and appropriate enforcement by this Court.
The GSISs tax-exempt status, in sum, was withdrawn in
1992 by the Local Government Code but restored by the
Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, the
operative provision of which is Section 39. The subject real
property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were assessed
against GSIS while the Local Government Code provisions
prevailed and, thus, may be collected by the City of Davao.
(City of Davao vs. RTC, Br. 12, August 18, 2005).

- G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs.

Province of Isabela, represented by Hon. Benjamin G. Dy,
Provincial Governor, June 16, 2006)- the NAPOCOR is not
exempt from paying franchise tax. Though its charter
exempted it from the tax, the enactment of the Local
Government Code (LGC) has withdraw such exemption, the
Court said, citing its previous ruling in National Power
Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan.
- MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax
is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our
jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies,
no longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but
pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X
of the Constitution. An agency of the Government refers
to any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or governmentowned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a
distinct unit therein; while an instrumentality refers to
any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and
government-owned and controlled corporations. It had
already become, even if it be conceded to be an agency or
instrumentality of the Government, a taxable person for
such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph
of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real
property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to
MCIAA.
- PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that
the port and its facilities and appurtenances are accessible to
the general public does not exempt it from the payment of
real property taxes. It must be stressed that the said port
facilities and appurtenances are the petitioners corporate
patrimonial properties, not for public use, and that the
operation of the port and its facilities and the administration
of its buildings are in the nature of ordinary business.
- MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAAs Airport Lands
and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by
local governments. MIAA is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National
Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second,
the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of
the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.
6

TheAirport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of

public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and
Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by
the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA
are devoted to public use and thus are properties of public
dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport
Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of
man. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable.
- When local governments invoke the power to tax on national
government instrumentalities, such power is construed
strictly against local governments. The rule is that a tax is
never presumed and there must be clear language in the law
imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or
activity is taxable is resolved against taxation. This rule
applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax
national government instrumentalities.
- Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed
against the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However,
when Congress grants an exemption to a national
government instrumentality from local taxation, such
exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national
government instrumentality.
- PRESIDENTS
SUPERVISION- National Liga vs.
Paredes, September 27, 2004- Like the local government
units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by
the Chief Executive or his alter ego.
- The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of
a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has
acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents
supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the
President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in
local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit
acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution.
Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her
alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a
patent nullity because it violates the principle of local
autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and
legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.
(Dadole vs. COA, December 3, 2002).
- Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of
LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their
6

discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant,

depending on the availability of local funds, the genuine and
meaningful local autonomy is ensured.
- Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence
of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities
have no power to grant franchises.

ARTICLE XI
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)
- IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3,
2001Section 3(7) of Article XI provides for the limit and the
consequence of an impeachment judgment. Convic
- uted, tried and punished for criminal offenses committed.
- READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives,
November 10, 2003definition of TO INITIATE
IMPEACHMENT- proceeding is initiated or begins,
when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice.
- A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee or override its
contrary resolution, De Castro vs. Committee on Justice,
Batasan Pambansa, September 3, 1995.
- Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him
beyond the reach of impeachment proceedings; he can still be
impeached.
- The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the
opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the
Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. (Office
of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and former Deputy
Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica, March 4, 2005).
- Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001- there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction before
inspection of bank accounts by Ombudsman may be allowed.
- OMBS
POWER
TO
PROSECUTE,
Uy
vs.
Sandiganbayan, March 20, 2001- The power to prosecute
granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified.
The law does not make a distinction between cases
7

cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by

regular courts.
- Ombudsman vs. Valera, September 30, 2005- The Court
has consistently held that the Office of the Special Prosecutor
is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and
may only act under the supervision and control and upon
authority of the Ombudsman. xxx However, with respect to
the grant of the power to preventively suspend, Section 24 of
R.A. No 6770 makes no mention of the Special Prosecutor.
The obvious import of this exclusion is to withhold from
the Special Prosecutor the power to preventively suspend.
- Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ,
April 13, 2004- The power of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officers or employees
is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly
authorized agencies of the government such as the
provincial, city and state prosecutors. DOJ Panel is not
precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against
public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the
cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
- Ledesma vs. CA, July 29, 2005 - Ombudsman has the
authority to determine the administrative liability of a
public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel
the head of the office or agency concerned to implement
the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the
procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and not its
jurisdiction.
- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, et al.,GR No. 160675 ,
June 16, 2006- the Court similarly upholds the Office of the
Ombudsmans power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a
public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise
of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of
such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic
Act No. 6770. xxx The legislative history of Republic Act No.
6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the Office of the
Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative
disciplinary authority, including the power to impose the
penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the
Ombudsman to be an activist watchman, not merely a
passive one.
7

- Masing, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.

165584, January 22, 2008 Supreme Court reiterated this
ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we
emphasized that the Ombudsmans order to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or
employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is
actually mandatory. Implementation of the order imposing
the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper
officer.
- Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative
investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and
consistent with due process. It is erroneous, therefore, for
respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an
exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public
school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in
administrative investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670
was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987
Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987
while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is
basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its
meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority
on the Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public
officials and employees, with the exception of officials who
may be removed only by impeachment or over members of
Congress and the Judiciary.
- QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN- It is not material that a
GOCC is originally created by charter or not. What is
decisive is that it has been acquired by the government to
perform functions related to government programs and
policies.
- JURISDICTION
OVER
GOCCMacalino
vs.
Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 452- Section 13, Article XI of
the Constitution and Section 15 of RA 6770 granted the
Ombudsman the power to direct any officer or employee of
government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters to perform any act or duty required by law
or to stop any abuse or impropriety in the performance of
duties.
- PRESCRIPTION- Presidential Ad-hoc Fact-finding
Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto , 317 SCRA 272Section 15 of Article XI applies only to civil actions for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal cases.
7

ARTICLE XII
(NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY)
1
-

ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No.

161881, July 31, 2008- It must be emphasized that FLGLA No.
542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner
for the use or exploitation of natural resources and public lands over
which the State has sovereign ownership under the Regalian
Doctrine. Like timber or mining licenses, a forest land grazing
lease agreement is a mere permit which, by executive action, can be
revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or modified, whenever
public welfare or public interest so requires. The determination of
what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the State as
owner of the country's natural resources. Thus, a privilege or
license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys protection under
the due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In
cases in which the license or privilege is in conflict with the people's
welfare, the license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the
latter, as well as to the police power of the State. Such a privilege
or license is not even a property or property right, nor does it
create a vested right; as such, no irrevocable rights are created
in its issuance. xxx

- The Supreme Court recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to

recover their ancestral land from outsiders and usurpers. Seen
by many as a victory attained by the private respondents only after a
long and costly effort, the Court, as a guardian and instrument of
social justice, abhors a further delay in the resolution of this
controversy and brings it to its fitting conclusion by denying the
petition.
- CRUZ VS. SEC. OF DENR, 347 SCRA 128- RA 8371
categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by
native title as never to have been public land. Domains and
lands under native title are, therefore, indisputably
presumed to have never been public lands and are private.
The right of ownership granted to indigenous peoples over
their ancestral domains does not cover the natural resources.
The right granted to IP to negotiate the terms and conditions
over the natural resources covers only their exploration to
ensure ecological and environmental protection.
- Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 US 449 recognized
the existence of a native title to land by Filipinos by virtue of

possession under a claim of ownership since time

immemorial as an exception to the theory of jus regalia.
- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public
domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore
and submerged areas are also form part of the public domain
and are also inalienable, unless converted into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain.
- The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of
the public domain may only be leased and not sold to
private parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the
only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
which the government could not sell to private parties
except if the legislature passes a law authorizing such sale.
Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for
public use or public service. xxx The ownership of lands
reclaimed from foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian
Doctrine, which declares that all lands and waters of the
public domain belong to the State
- But notwithstanding the conversion of reclaimed lands to
alienable lands of the public domain, they may not be sold to
private corporations which can only lease the same. The
State may only sell alienable public land to Filipino citizens.
- Chavez vs. PEA & Amari, May 6, 2003- Decision does not
bar private corporations from participating in reclamation
projects and being paid for their services in reclaiming lands.
What the Decision prohibits, following the explicit
constitutional mandate, is for private corporations to acquire
reclaimed lands of the public domain. There is no
prohibition on the directors, officers and stockholders of
private corporations, if they are Filipino citizens, from
acquiring at public auction reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain. They can acquire not more than 12
hectares per individual, and the land thus acquired becomes
private land.
- Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain.
Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial
property, can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino
citizens or qualified private corporations. Thus, the so-called
Friar Lands acquired by the government under Act No. 1120
are patrimonial property which even private corporations can
acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain if sold or transferred to a public or
municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become
7

patrimonial property in the hands of the public or municipal

corporation. Once converted to patrimonial property, the
land may be sold by the public or municipal corporation
to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified
private corporations.
- Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philipipnes,
GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009)- public domain lands
become patrimonial property or private property of the
government only upon a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable lands, together with an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of
national wealth. Only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public domain begin to run.
- in connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes that
those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ownership,
since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title, to such lands based on the length and quality
of their possession. The Court clarified that the Public Land
Act merely requires possession since June 12, 1945 and does
not require that the lands should have been alienable and
disposable during the entire period of possession. The
possessor is thus entitled to secure judicial confirmation of
title as soon as the land it covers is declared alienable and
disposable. This is, however, subject to the December 31,
2020 deadline imposed by the Public Land Act, as amended
by R.A. 9176.
- DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, Sacay vs. DENR, GR No.
17775, October 8, 2008- Boracay Island is owned by the
State except for the lot areas with existing titles. The
continued possession and considerable investment of private
claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in
Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply a title to the
land they are presently occupying. The present land law traces
its roots to the Regalian Doctrine.
- Except for lands already covered by existing titles, the
Supreme Court said that Boracay was unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proc. 1064 (which classified Boracay
as 400 hecs of reserved forest land and 628.96 hecs. of
agricultural land). Such unclassified lands are considered
7

public forest under PD No. 705. Forest lands do not

necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses
covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.
- Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, February 24,
2009- While the acquisition and the purchase of real
properties in the country by a foreigner is void ab initio for
being contrary to the Constitution, the subsequent acquisition
of the said properties from the foreigner by a Filipino citizen
has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of
the transferee is valid.
- Chavez vs. NHA, et al., August 15, 2007- To lands
reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a private person
or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of
public domain which can be transferred only to Filipino
citizens but not to a private corporation. This is because PEA
under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold and dispose of
alienable lands of public domain and it is only when it is
transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial
property. On the other hand, the NHA is a government
agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its
charterThe Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The
NHA is an end-user agency authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment
titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are
transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are
automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the
State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private
corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The
reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to
patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be
useless to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally
transfer or alienate lands of public domain. More
importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes and goals
since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified
beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise funds for the
SMDRP. From the foregoing considerations, we find that the
79-hectare reclaimed land has been declared alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and in the hands of
NHA, it has been reclassified as patrimonial property.
- Republic vs. Tri-plus Corp., September 26, 2006- Section 6
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the
classification and reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the
prerogative of the Executive Department. Under the
Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all
7

lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the

source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All
lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public domain.
- JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA, January 31, 2005- the
prohibition in the Constitution applies only to ownership of
land. It does not extend to immovable or real property as
defined under Article 415 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, we
would have a strange situation where the ownership of
immovable property such as trees, plants and growing fruit
attached to the land would be limited to Filipinos and Filipino
corporations only.
- Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos, January 23, 2006- Under the
Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Lands
of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. A
homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant case, is
one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes.
- La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Ass., Inc. vs. Ramos, December 1,
2004 Foreign corporations are confined to technical and
financial assistance. The State itself may explore, develop or
utilize the countrys natural resources by entering into the
necessary agreements with individuals or entities in the
pursuit of visible operations. Service contracts with foreign
corporations as contractors who invest in and operate and
manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and
supervision of the State. Control by the state must be on the
macro level, through the establishment of policies,
guidelines, regulations, industry standards and similar
measures that would enable the government to control the
conduct of the affairs in various enterprises and restrain
activities deemed not desirable or beneficial.
- GR No. 157882, Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose
Association, Incorporated, et al. v. DENR Sec. Gozun, et
al., March 30, 2006- the Constitution expressly allows
service contracts in the large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and mineral oils via
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
7

either technical or financial assistance as provided by law.

The Court said that these agreements with foreign
corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical
assistance. The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use
of service contracts with foreign corporations as
contractors who would invest in and operate and manage
extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and
supervision of the State.
- GR Nos. 152613 & 152628, Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; GR No.
152619-20, Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative
v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; and GR
No. 152870-71, The Mines Adjudication Board and its
Members, et al. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corp., et al., June 23, 2006- Mining operations in the
Diwalwal Mineral Reservation Area lies within the full
control of the executive branch of the state. xxx Mining
operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are now,
therefore, within the full control of the State through the
executive branch. Pursuant to sec. 5 of RA 7942, the State can
either directly undertake the exploration, development, and
utilization of the area or it can enter into agreement with
qualified entities.
- Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., 426
SCRA 517 Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 constitution
does not apply retroactively to a license, concession or
lease granted by the government under the 1973
constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987
constitution.
- Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 434 SCRA 322- It is the rule
of law that possession, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.
- PUBLIC UTILITIES- Republic vs. EXTELCOM, 373
SCRA 316 The operation of public utility shall not be
exclusive.
- FRANCHISE - PLDT vs. Bacolod City, July 15, 2005 - In
sum, it does not appear that, in approving 23 of R.A. No.
7925, Congress intended it to operate as a blanket tax
exemption to all telecommunications entities. Applying the
rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and
the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal
corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal
taxing powers, we hold that 23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be
considered as having amended petitioner's franchise so as
7

to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local

franchise taxes.
- Divinagracia v. CBS, GR No. 162272, April &, 2009-The
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is not
authorized to cancel the certificates of public convenience
(CPCs) and other licenses it had issued to the holders of duly
issued legislative franchises on the ground that the latter had
violated the terms of their franchise. As legislative franchises
are extended through statutes, they should receive recognition
as the ultimate expression of State policy.
- City Government of San Pablo vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353Under the Constitution, no franchise shall be granted under
the condition that it shall be subject to amendment or repeal
when the public interest so requires. Franchises are also
subject to alteration by the power to tax, which cannot be
contracted away.
- Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. NTC, 410 SCRA 82 The
constitution is emphatic that the operation of public utility
shall not be exclusive.
- Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. LTFRB, October
7, 2003 - The constitution does not totally prohibit
monopolies. It mandates the State to regulate them when
public interest so requires.

ARTICLE XIII
(SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS)
- SOCIAL JUSTICE- while the pursuit of social justice can
have revolutionary effect, it cannot justify breaking the law.
(Astudillo v. Board of Directors, PHHC, 73 SCRA 15).
- HUMAN RIGHTS- read EPZA VS, HR, 208 SCRA; Simon
vs. Com. on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 1170- limited to
violations of civil and political rights only either by
government official or private individual.
- Human Security Act- granting adjudicatory and
prosecutorial powers to the CHR re violations of human
rights.- refer to Section 5- perform such other functions and
duties as may be provided by law.

- CHREA vs. CHR, November 25, 2004- The CHR, although

admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not
included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy
by constitutional or legislative fiat.
- People vs. Leachon, 1998- The constitutional requirement
that the eviction and demolition be in accordance with law
and conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean
validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on
the existence of resettlement area designated or earmarked by
the government.

ARTICLE XIV
(ESTACS)
- Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita,
GR No. 180046, April 2, 2009- A review center is not an
institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722
[i]t does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it
under the jurisdiction of the CHED. Moreover, [a] review
course is only intended to refresh and enhance the
knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees, and it
does not require enrollment, attendance, a grade or
submission of a thesis in order to complete the review center
course requirements or take the licensure examination.
- ACADEMIC FREEDOM- from standpoint of the
educational institution and the members of the academe. The
Supreme Court sustained the primacy of academic freedom
over Civil service rules on AWOL, stressing when UP opted
to retain private petitioner and even promoted him
despite
his absence, the University was exercising its freedom to
choose who may teach or who may continue to teach its
faculty (UP, et al. vs. CSC, April 3, 2001).
- Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, December 13, 2004- As
enunciated by this Court in the case of University of San
Carlos v. Court of Appeals, the discretion of schools of
learning to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of
honors for purposes of graduation forms part of academic
freedom. And such discretion may not be disturbed much less
controlled by the courts, unless there is grave abuse of
discretion in its exercise. Therefore, absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion, the courts may not disturb the
Universitys decision not to confer honors to petitioner.

- Lacuesta vs. Ateneo, December 9, 2005- Consistent with

academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution
of higher learning has the prerogative to provide standards for
its teachers and determine whether these standards have been
met. At the end of the probation period, the decision to rehire an employee on probation, belongs to the university as
the employer alone.
- UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- the University has the academic
freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and
who may be admitted to study. Clearly, this freedom
encompasses the autonomy to choose who should teach and,
concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of
professors and other academic personnel.
This Court
declared in Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong: As
corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning
are inherently endowed with the right to establish their
policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external
controls or pressure.
- De LaSalle University vs. CA, December 19, 2007- Section
5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all
institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the
school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives,
and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public interest
calls for some restraint. According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for
itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how
it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.
- It cannot be gainsaid that the school has an interest in
teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling
discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the
right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the
freedom what to teach. Indeed, while it is categorically
stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have
a right to freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up
to graduation, such right is subject to the established
academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very
well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free
choice of students for admission to its school.

ARTICLE XVI
(GENERAL PROVISIONS)
- IMMUNITY OF THE STATE FROM SUIT (Read general
principles; Phil Agila Satellite, Inc. vs. Lichauco, May 3,
2006)- The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the
performance of official functions against an officer of the
government by a private citizen which would result in a
charge against or financial liability to the government must be
regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it has not
been formally impleaded. However, government immunity
from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the
government no longer has an interest to protect in the
outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal
because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of
his/her duties.
- GTZ v. CA, GR No. 152318, April 16, 2009- German
Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), which implements
a joint health insurance project of the German and Philippine
governments, is not entitled to immunity from suit in the
Philippines as GTZ, being the equivalent of a governmentowned-and-controlled corporation, has the power and
capacity to sue and be sued under the Corporation Code. GTZ
is akin to a governmental owned or controlled corporation
without original charter which, by virtue of the Corporation
Code, has expressly consented to be sued,
- PCCG vs. Sandiganbayan, March 6, 2006- When the
government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034.
Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in
the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively
invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State,
through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in
a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level
of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever
counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it.
Petitioner Republics act of filing its complaint in Civil Case
No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit.
Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic
cannot set up its immunity against private respondent
Benedictos prayers in the same case.
- NATIONAL POLICE FORCE- Under the DILG (Carpio
vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290). Alunan vs.
Asuncion, January 28, 2000, the new PNP absorbed the

members of the former NAPOLCOM, PC and INP, all three

of which accordingly abolished.
- Note: Professionalism of the AFP- cannot engage, directly or
indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote.
They cannot be appointed to a civilian position in the
government, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.
- IBP vs. Zamora- Since none of the marines were incorporated
or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to a civilian position to speak of.
- OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- 60% Filipino
ownership.
- MASS MEDIA- 100% Filipino ownership
- ADVERSTISING INDUSTRY 70%
- EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION- 60 %
EXCEPT:
Schools established by religious groups and mission boards.

ARTICLE XVII
(AMENDMENTS)
- The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, GR Nos.
183591, 183572, 183893, and 183951, October 14, 2008The Court noted that inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD
establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and
the Central Government is itself a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March
1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover,
it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to
the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in
place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself
is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an
act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves
through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment
process is through an undue influence or interference with
that process.
- IMBONG VS. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28- Congress when
acting as a Constituent Assembly has full and plenary powers
8

to propose amendments or to call a convention. The grant to

Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority
includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication,
all powers necessary to the effective exercise of principal
power granted, such as the power to fix qualifications,
apportionment, etc..
- SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106- RA 6735 is
insufficient in providing for mechanism to govern initiatives
for constitutional amendments. While the Constitution
recognizes the right of citizens to propose amendments, the
people cannot exercise such until Congress provides for its
implementation.
- LAMBINO VS., ET AL. VS. COMELEC, October 25,
2006 -Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that
the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment
should be ready and shown to the people before they
sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that before
they sign there is already a draft shown to them. The
framers also envisioned that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature. The essence of
amendments directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its
face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition,
the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
- DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION- GONZALES
VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774- The power to amend the
Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the
general grant of legislative power to Congress. It is part of the
inherent powers of the people as the repository of sovereignty
in a republican state. Congress may propose amendments to
the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants
such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act,
not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a
Constituent Assembly.
- When Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly, makes
proposals for amendments, it does not have the final say on
whether or not its acts are within constitutional limits- an
issue which is clearly subject to judicial review.

- There is nothing to indicate that a special election is all times

necessary in the ratification of amendments. A plebiscite may
be validly held together with general elections.
- TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702- There can
be no piece meal ratification.
- Presidential proclamation is not required for effectivity of
amendment/revisions.
UNLESS,
the
proposed
amendments/revisions so provide.

ARTICLE XVIII
(TRANSITORY PROVISIONS)
- LIM VS. EXEC SEC., April11, 2002- Section 25 of the
Transitory Provisions show a marked antipathy towards
foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign
influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry
into the Philippines only be way of direct exception.
- Under the Constitution, the US forces are prohibited from
engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory. The
Supreme Court, however, cannot accept the bare allegations
that the Arroyo administration is engaged in double speak in
trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive
effort by foreign troops on native soil.
- Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342
SCRA 449-the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as
attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the
United States government. The fact that the VFA was not
submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does
not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or
treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal
United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally
known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for
advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature,
whereas those that carry out or further implement these
policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under
the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty
days from ratification. The second reason has to do with the
relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty
of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly

ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the
United States Senate.
- AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN), et al.,
Petitioners - versus - THOMAS G. AQUINO, et al., No.
170516, July 16, 2008- While Article VII, Section 21 provides for
Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty
under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to
its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that
has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the
treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.
- Nicolas vs. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888; Salonga vs. Smith,
et al. G.R. No. 176051; and Makabayan vs. Arroyo, et al., G.R.
No. 176222- February 11, 2009 - The Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as
constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December
19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the
VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby
ordered to forthwith negotiate with the United States
representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention
facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10
of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained until
further orders by this Court.