Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Conflicts Case Digest
Conflicts Case Digest
RULING:
Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that
"any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage."
DECISION: Affirmed.
In re Mays Estate
305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953).
FACTS:
Ms. May died in 1945. Mr. May objected to Alice, one of six children born from
the marriage of W and H for issuance to her of letters of administration of the estate
of her mother. H claimed to be the husband of W; however, H was Ws uncle. Alice
contends that H is not the surviving husband of W because although their marriage
was legal in Rhode Island, the marriage never had validity in New York where they
were residents until Ws death. W and H were married in Rhode Island at the home
of a Jewish rabbi. They returned to New York two weeks later and lived there from
1913 until Ws death in 1945. Rhode Island laws prohibited the marriage of an uncle
and niece except for couples of the Jewish faith within the degrees of affinity and
consanguinity permitted by their religion. Alice was granted letters of administration
and this appeal resulted. That result was overruled by the Appellate Division and
this appeal resulted.
ISSUE:
Is the legality of a marriage between persons sui juris to be determined by
the law of the place it is celebrated?
HELD:
Yes. The legality of a marriage between persons sui juris is to be determined
by the law of the place it is celebrated. Although our statute declares a marriage
between an uncle and niece to be void, our statute does not state that we cannot
recognize such a relationship that is valid in another state. We should not extend
the statutes scope to by judicial construction.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
Dissenting: Every state has the right to determine the marital status of its residents.
The general rule that a marriage that is valid where solemnized is valid everywhere
does not apply to marriages contrary to the prohibitions of natural law or the
express prohibitions of a statute.
FACTS:
Sy Kiat, a chines national died in Caloocan City, leaving behind his real
and personal properties in the Philippines worth P 300,000 more or less. Aida SyGonzales, et. al. filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration claiming
among other things that they are children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego, a
Filipina. The petition was opposed by Yao kee who alleged that she is the lawful wife
of the deceased whom he married in China and that one of her children, Sze Sook
Wah, should be the administrator of the deceased. The CFI decided in favor of Yao
Kees petition but was modified and set aside by the court of appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sy Kiats marriage to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese
Law and Custom conclusive.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that evidence may prove the fact if marriage
between Sy Kiat and Yao Kee is valid, but it is not sufficient to establish the validity
of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law and custom. A custom must be
proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence and that a local custom as a
source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence. In the case at bar, petitioners did not
present any competent evidence relative to the law of China on marriage. In the
absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is
the same as that of the Philippines.
The Supreme Court affirmed (all of them were acknowledged as natural
children, hence given equal rights) the decision of the Court of Appelas.
FACTS:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian,
was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen
following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961,
Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a
daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and
identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram
bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and
sought admission as Filipino citizens.
On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as
Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The boarf of
commissioners waws directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where
entry was ed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the
case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which
recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Acting
commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion
ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond.
Thus on the 29th of the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen
HELD:
William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the
assailed marriage as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of
his father, a Filipino as legitimate child. Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos
who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution.
FACTS:
Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands on
August 5, 1919 and left property worth nearly P100,000 which is now being claimed
by two parties - (1) Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by
marriag contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China in 1985, and (2) Mora
Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in
Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two daughters with the deceased namely Payang
and Rosalia. The conflicting claims to Cheong Boos estate were ventilated in the
lower court that ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to sufficiently establish the
Chinese marriage through a mere letter testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan Bit
married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the
Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a
natural child. With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters,
the trial court reached the conclusion that the marriage between Adong and Cheong
Boo had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it
could not be held to be a lawful marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia
would inherit as natural children. The lower court believes that Mohammedan
marriages are not valid under the Philippine Islands laws this as an Imam as a
solemnizing officer and under Quaranic laws.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is
valid. Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora
Adong is valid
HELD:
The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese marriage not proved and Chinaman
Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child while (2) it found the
Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the widow Mora
Adong and the legitimate children Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them
under the law. The Supreme Court held that marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a
civil contract but it is a new relation, an instruction in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. The presumption as to marriage is that every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
People vs Dumpo
FACTS:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dupo have been legally married according to the rites
and practice of the Mohammedan religion. Without this marriage being dissolved, it
is alleged that Dumpo contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which
the two lived together as husband and wife. Dumpo was prosecuted for and
convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty with a maximum of eight years, and one day
of prision mayor and minimum of two years, four months and twenty one days of
prision correccional, with costs. From this judgment the accused interposed an
appeal. The records of the case disclose that it has been established by the defense,
without the prosecution having presented any objection nor evidence to the
contrary, that the alleged second marriage of the accused is null and void according
to Mohammedan rites on the ground that her father had not given his consent
thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Hassan and Dupo is valid.
HELD:
We formulate no general statement regarding the requisites necessary for the
validity of a marriage between Moros according to Mohammedan rites. This is a fact
of which no judicial notice may be taken and must be subject to proof in every
particular case. In the case at bar we have the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari,
an Iman or Mohammedan priest authorized to solemnize marriages between
Mohammedans, to the effect that the consent of the bride's father or. in the
absence thereof, that of the chief of the tribe to which she belongs in an
indipensable requisite for the validity of such contracts. If the absence of this
requisite did not make the marriage contract between Mohammedans void, it was
easy for the prosecution to show it by refuting Iman Tahari's testimony inasmuch as
for lack of one there were two other Imans among the State witnesses in this case.
It failed to do so, however, and from such failure we infer that the Iman's testimony
for the defense is in accordance with truth. It is contended that, granting the
absolute necessity of the requisite in question, tacit compliance therewith may be
presumed because it does not appear that Dumpo's father has signified his
opposition to this alleged marriage after he had been informed of its celebration.
But this presumption should not be established over the categorical affirmation of
Moro Jalmani, Dumpo's father, that he did not give his consent to his daughter's
alleged second marriage for the reason that he was not informed thereof and that,
at all events, he would not have given it, knowing that Dumpo's first marriage was
not dissolved.
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage. It appearing that the marriage alleged to first
been contracted by the accused with Sabdapal, her former marriage with Hassan
being undissolved, cannot be considered as such, there is no justification to hold her
guilty of the crime charged in the information.
Wherefore, reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is acquitted of the
charges and if she should be in detention her immediate release is ordered, with the
costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.
1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas, a Filipino Citizen, to whom
she was married in Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929, 2) that they had several
children all of whom are not in the Philippines; 3) that their marriage was celebrated
by one Chua Tio, a village leader. On June 28, 1961 the Board of Special Inquiry No.
3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas, thus
declaring legal her admission into the country. This decision was affirmed by the
Board of Commissioners on July 12, 1961 of which petitioner was duly informed in a
letter sent on the same date by the Secretary of the Board. However, on June 28,
1962, the same Board of Commissioners, but composed entirely of a new set of
members, rendered a new decision contrary to that of the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country, after discrepancies
were found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged husband during
several investigations conducted by the immigration authorities concerning the
alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929, thus concluding that the
petitioners claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas was without basis in
evidence as it was "bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship."
ISSUE:
Whether or not WONG WOO YIUs marriage to PERFECTO BLAS is valid in the
Philippines, and her admission into the country is legal.
HELD:
The above revocation of decision cannot be disputed, it finding support in the
record and investigation. Indeed, not only is there no documentary evidence to
support the alleged marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the record is
punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to doubt their
veracity concerning the said marriage in China on 1929. Even if we assume,
therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is
valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our country. (In order that
a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either
by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a
priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine
Library and Museum Public Act 3412, Section 2) Since our law only recognizes a
marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein, and a village
leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner's marriage cannot be recognized
in this jurisdiction.
Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaos animosity toward him strikes the court to be
merely based on conjecture and exaggeration. In so doing Vicentas parents cannot
be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy
motives. As provide by Sec. 529 of the Civil Code. Wherefore Tenchavez, in falsely
charging Vicentas aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having
exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably
caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.
REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO
G.R. No. 154380
October 5, 2005
FACTS:
In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myro Villanueva in Lam-an,
Ozamis City. In 1986, Orbecido discovered that his wife had had been naturalized as
an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Orbecido learned from his son that his wife
had obtained a divorce decree and married an American. Orbecido filed with the
Trial Court a petition for Authority to Remarry invoking Article 26 Paragraph 2 of
the Family Code, the Court granted the petition. The Republic, herein petitioner,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought for reconsideration but it was
denied by the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations of the respondent was proven as a fact
according to the rules of evidence.
HELD:
In the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his
wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree
and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor. ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the
Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution
dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
GR No. 80116
FACTS:
Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino Citizen and Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German National were married on Sept. 7, 1979 in Germany. After about three and a
half years of their marriage, Erich initiated a divorce proceeding against the
Petitioner. On Jan. 5, 1986 the local court of Germany promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. On June 27, 1986,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery, alleging that while still married
to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with certain William Chia and Jesus
Chua.Eventually two Criminal cases were file against the Petitioner: Pp vs Imelda
Pilapil and William Chia under respondent judge (Judge Somera) Pp vs Imelda Pilapil
and James Chua under Judge Cruz Petitioner thereafter, filed a motion for both
criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend proceedings thereon. Judge
Cruz suspended the proceedings. On the other hand, respondent Judge merely reset
the date of arraignment. Again, petitioner before the scheduled date moved for the
cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings. A motion to
quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction however,
denied by the respondent judge.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAD THE LEGAL CAPACITY TO FILE
THE SAID COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER
HELD:
The High Court ordered the Dismissal of the case filed by the private
respondent against the petitioner for lack of jurisdiction and to Set ASIDE
respondent judges order to deny petitioners motion to quash the case. It was clear
then that prior to the filing of the case by the private respondents, his marriage with
the petitioner had already been dissolved through a decree of divorce. Thus,
declaring that the private respondent had no longer legal capacity for filing the
complaints (no legal standing to commence the adultery). The High Court
emphasized that the status and legal capacity of the complainant to initiate the
action be definitely established (they must exist as of the time the private
respondent commenced the action).
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married
in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23,
1954. Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the
respondent herewith. They were blessed with six children. On April 16, 1972, when
Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to who will be the intestate heirs.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce acquired by
the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondent stressed that the
citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the Philippnes
provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner herself
answered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she
also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying
the she was no longer a Filipino citizen. The Trial court disregarded the respondents
statement. The net hereditary estate was ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and
Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan children moved for
reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring
the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one- half of the estate
to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita. Private
respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared void
since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was decided
without a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio. (2) Whether
or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo.
HELD:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.
Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here
since she was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in
their countrys national law. Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of
Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving
spouse of Arturo
Whealton v. Whealton
67 Cal.2d 656
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a petty officer on active duty with the United States Navy, married
defendant at Bel Air, Maryland, on June 15, 1964. Thereafter his military duties took
him from place to place on the east coast until he was assigned to the U.S.S. Repose
at the San Francisco Naval Shipyard. He arrived in California on July 14,
1965.plaintiff and defendant lived together for only six or seven weeks on the east
coast. On September 3, 1965, plaintiff filed this action for annulment of the
marriage. Summons was issued and an order for publication of summons was filed
on the same day.publication of the summons was accomplished as prescribed by
law. Defendant received a copy of the summons by mail at her home in Maryland on
September 7, 1965. On September 11, 1965, she wrote the court that she was
having difficulty obtaining legal counsel, but that she wished "it known that it is my
earnest desire and intent to contest this complaint." On [67 Cal.2d 659] October 11,
1965, the court entered her default, heard testimony in support of the complaint,
and entered a judgment annulling the marriage. On October 19, 1965, defendant
made a motion to set aside the default and the judgment by default and to permit
the filing of an answer and a cross-complaint. The motion was denied on November
9, 1965. Defendant contends that the default judgment must be reversed on the
grounds that it was prematurely entered and that the court did not have jurisdiction
of the subject matter.
ISSUE:
Whether court may grant annulment decree even if it acquires only personal
jurisdiction and not the place of celebration nor the place of marital domicile.
HELD:
Jurisdiction to grant annulments has followed an analogous, but somewhat
divergent course. An annulment differs conceptually from a divorce in that a divorce
terminates a legal status, whereas an annulment establishes that a marital status
never existed. The absence of a valid marriage precluded reliance on the divorce
cases in formulating a theory of ex parte jurisdiction in annulment, for no res or
status could be found within the state. The courts, however, did not let jurisdictional
concepts of in personam and in rem dictate results in annulment actions. They
recognized a state's interest in providing a forum for some annulment actions even
though the court lacked personal jurisdiction over one of the parties. The crucial
question, then, is whether there are sufficient factors to justify the court's exercising
ex parte annulment jurisdiction. Although we write on a slate free of legislative
directives regarding annulment, we are bound by constitutional limitations.
CITIZENSHIP
OF
THE
ADOPTER
IS
HELD:
NO. The adoption was denied solely because the same would not result
in the loss of the minor's Filipino citizenship and the acquisition by him of the
citizenship of his adopter. Unfortunately, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court did not expound the reasons for its opinion; but it is clear that, if
pursued to its logical consequences, the judgment appealed from would
operate to impose a further prerequisite on adoptions by aliens beyond those
required by law. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief, the
present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from being adopters
those aliens that are either(a) non-residents or (b) who are residents but the
Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their
government. Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not
to enter the territory of the Philippine Islands as her adopted son. Therefore the
judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.