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Afghanistan Neg Supplement

Afghanistan Neg Supplement..................................................................................................................................1 Inherency FL [1/2]...................................................................................................................................................3 Inherency FL [2/2]...................................................................................................................................................4 Inherency FL Ext. 1.................................................................................................................................................5 SQ Solves Stability...............................................................................................................................................6 SQ Solves Drugs...................................................................................................................................................7 Long-term Approach Good......................................................................................................................................8 Troops Good............................................................................................................................................................9 Heg FL [1/2]..........................................................................................................................................................10 Heg FL [2/2]..........................................................................................................................................................11 Heg FL Ext. 1.........................................................................................................................................................12 Heg FL Ext. 3.........................................................................................................................................................13 Heg FL Ext. 4.........................................................................................................................................................14 Withdraw Terrorism..........................................................................................................................................15 Withdraw Narcotics..........................................................................................................................................16 Afghanistan Wants US There................................................................................................................................17 Drug FL [1/2].........................................................................................................................................................20 Drug FL [2/2].........................................................................................................................................................22 Drug FL Ext. 2.......................................................................................................................................................23 Drug FL Ext. 4....................................................................................................................................................24 1NC CP Drugs....................................................................................................................................................25 Drug CP Ext........................................................................................................................................................26 Drug CP Impact Module Medicine..................................................................................................................27 Drug CP Impact Module Medicine Ext...........................................................................................................28 Drug CP Impact Module Medicine Ext...........................................................................................................29 Drug CP Impact Module Farmers....................................................................................................................30 Drug CP Impact Module Taliban.....................................................................................................................31 Drug CP Impact Module Taliban Ext..............................................................................................................32 Drug CP Popular....................................................................................................................................................33 Drug War Good Stability....................................................................................................................................35 NATO FL [1/3]......................................................................................................................................................36 NATO FL [2/3]......................................................................................................................................................37 NATO FL [3/3]......................................................................................................................................................38 NATO FL Ext. 1....................................................................................................................................................39 NATO FL Ext. 2....................................................................................................................................................40 NATO FL Ext. 5....................................................................................................................................................41 Leadership Key to NATO......................................................................................................................................44 Politics Popular Public........................................................................................................................................45 1NC CP Surge.....................................................................................................................................................46 CP Surge Solvency.............................................................................................................................................48 CP Surge Solvency.............................................................................................................................................49 CP Surge Impact Module Pakistan..................................................................................................................52 CP Surge Impact Module Minerals..................................................................................................................53 CP Surge Impact Module China......................................................................................................................54 Warlords FL [1/2]..................................................................................................................................................55

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2 Warlords FL [2/2]..................................................................................................................................................56 Warlords FL Ext. 4................................................................................................................................................57 ***AFF ANSWERS***........................................................................................................................................58 A2 Drug CP US..................................................................................................................................................59 A2 Drug CP............................................................................................................................................................60 A2 Drug CP Afghan Opposes.............................................................................................................................62 A2 Drug CP Afghan Opposes.............................................................................................................................63 A2 Drug CP Afghan Opposes.............................................................................................................................64 A2 Drug CP International...................................................................................................................................65 A2 Drug CP - International....................................................................................................................................66 A2 Surge CP Defense.........................................................................................................................................67 A2 Surge CP Offense..........................................................................................................................................68

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1. Afghanistan progress is evident across the board Doug Bandow, Think Tank Contributor, May 7 2010, Cato Institute Herat, AfghanistanMalou Innocent and I have escaped Kabul for the much more pleasant city of Herat , in northwest Afghanistan near Iran and Turkmenistan. We havent left all of Afghanistans many problems behind, but the atmosphere here is far different than in Kabul. Set in a wide plain, Herat played an important historic role as part of the Silk Road, the famed Asian trading route. Although captured by the victorious Taliban, Herat showed little sympathy for its new overlords. After its liberation the city suffered from the domination of warlord Ismail Khan, but sprouts of liberalism increasingly can be seen in Herat. For instance, though women are expected to cover their hair, womens organizations have proliferated and gained public acceptance. Violence is minimal, though an RPG attack six months ago effectively shut down what
had been the citys only five-star hotel, transformed into offices for Westerners. Set on a hill dramatically overlooking the city, the building offered too tempting a target. Tight security is evident at the airport, hotels, government buildings, and NGO offices. But there are far fewer armed police on the streets, machine gun-topped Humvees at intersections, and fortress-like buildings. Most concrete goes to construction rather than barriers. Barbed wire is used sparingly, not by the mile, as in Kabul. The international presence is strong, but not as overwhelming as in the capital. We generated a lot of attention when we were on the street. Most reactions were positive. Children wanted their pictures taken with us; students wanted to practice their English; adults wanted to introduce themselves. We exercised caution and were closely guarded, but never felt the sense of persistent menace as in Kabul. Most humbling was meeting with human rights activists. Our cultures differ dramatically in some regards, but what most Afghans desire is not much different than what Americans want: peace and prosperity, freedom and opportunity. Evident on the street are the strong family and friendship ties that underlie Afghan society. A number of people have stepped out heroically in an attempt to build a better society. The consistent frustration of these activists is the Afghan government. Corruption is pervasive; the police cannot be trusted. While people disagree over Americas future role, virtually everyone desires a more effective, representative, and honest Afghan government. And many of them believe that requires less, rather than more, international aid. Malou and I have a few more days in Afghanistan, and another city to visit. So far it has been a fascinating and challenging visit. Many hard decisions must be made to reorient U.S. policy. Among the hardest of those decisions must be made regarding Afghanistan.

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Inherency FL [2/2]
2. Obama is committed to a one-year timetable hes breaking with military brass. Washington Times 6/20 [Sean Lengell, 6/20/10, " White House: Afghanistan withdrawal deadline firm
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/20/white-house-afghanistan-withdrawal-deadline-firm/] ",

The Obama administration has reaffirmed its promise to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan by July 2011, distancing itself from recent Pentagon comments that the move could take longer. "There's a firm date," said White House Chief of State Rahm Emanuel on ABC's "This Week" on Sunday. " The July [2011] date, as stated by the president, that's not moving, that's not changing. Everybody agreed on that date." Mr. Emanuel's remarks were in contrast to comments by Gen. David H. Petraeus, who told a congressional committee last week that any withdrawal would be "based on conditions" and that "July 2011 is not the date where we race for the exits." Mr. Emanuel said the White House and Pentagon positions are "not inconsistent" because both agree that "what will be determined [in July 2011], or going into that date, will be the scale and scope of the reduction. "But there will be no doubt that [a withdrawal is] going to happen" in July 2011, the aide said. Mr. Emanuel said the deadline has created a "sense of urgency" for the United
States, its coalition allies, and Afghanistan's government and security forces to push toward greater stability in the country. The president's aide added that the administration's "surge" of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan this year -- a deployment that is about two-thirds completed -- also has done much to improve security in the country. "This is creating a window of opportunity for Afghanistan," Mr. Emanuel said. "We are now at that point in Afghanistan that, for the

first time in . . . nine years they are actually meeting their police recruitment requirements, as well as their army recruitment requirements." Mr. Emanuel also said the war in Afghanistan has lead to the elimination of about half of al Qaeda's forces in the country in the past 18 months.

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Inherency FL Ext. 1
Civilian casualties down Afghanistan is stabilizing Michael O Hanlon, Journalist, June 29 2010, Delaware Online
Marja is a mess. The U.S. military erred in raising expectations about its big February operation in Marja, a midsize town in Helmand province where violence remains too high and Afghan governance too weak. But the trend in Helmand, where we have added a number of forces since 2009, is encouraging. Even Marja is slowly progressing. The military needs to do a better job documenting this progress. The province is in better shape than a year ago in terms of the return of commerce and agriculture and the reduction in violence against citizens. There arent enough trainers for Afghan security forces. Our allies have not quite met their promises, or our expectations, for additional trainers. But allies have deployed more than 5,000 additional combat troops this year, exceeding the pace expected. The number of U.S.

trainers has risen, and the number of Afghan officers graduating from training has more than doubled since last year. Growth trajectories for the Afghan army and police remain on schedule. Perhaps most important, nearly 85 percent of Afghan army units are partnered with coalition units meaning that they plan, patrol, train and fight together. This is one of Gen. McChrystals many positive legacies . In southern and eastern Afghanistan last month I saw many signs of the Afghan armys willingness to fight. The
number of key districts where security conditions are at least tolerable, if not yet good, is up modestly. Directives to restrict the use of firepower when civilians may be present increase risk to our troops. George F. Will has raised this concern; the infamous Rolling Stone article did as well, quoting troops in the field. But evidence suggests its not true. Roadside bombs, against which firepower is tactically irrelevant, overwhelmingly remain the most frequent cause of casualties to coalition troops. The percent of casualties from firefights is up, but modestly and in any event

McChrystal favored allowing troops in danger to call in supporting firepower. Meanwhile, the policies have reduced civilian casualties from coalition forces, an important step toward winning greater support from Afghans. Some worry that President Obamas ambiguity about the timetable hurts the war effort. I
opposed that deadline and the presidents lack of clarity about its meaning. But there is still a logic to the vagueness: It keeps pressure on Afghan officials to deliver, it reminds Americans that this war will not last forever and it sustains the presidents flexibility to adjust the war plan to conditions. Even relative optimists can understand why such flexibility is valuable. If the strategy is bearing fruit by next summer, the U.S. drawdown is likely to be gradual, and the president should keep saying so. There are indeed weaknesses in U.S. strategy, including problems with the Afghan police and an inadequate plan to fight corruption. Gen. David Petraeus and military and civilian leaders should focus on these and other matters. But

on balance, we have many assets and strengths in Afghanistan and better-than-even odds of leaving behind a reasonably stable place if we persevere.

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SQ Solves Stability
The only way to tell if we are needed in Afghanistan is to wait it out and stay in Reginald Sikes 2/22 [DEFINING AFGHANISTAN POLICY AND RISK-AMERICAS ACHILLES HEEL? BY COLONEL
REGINALD L. SIKES, JR. United States AD=ADA518423&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf] Army 22-02-2010 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?

Can America win the war in Afghanistan? Is it truly a war of necessity? Will the American people continue to support a protracted conflict, and now demands the necessity of additional forces? Only time will tell, but if history holds true, the domestic interests of the American people will eventually converge to demand an exit from the conflict, until the next time the US is attacked. If we abandon afghan now it will never recover again Bron Hartman 2009 [The U.S. Should Not Give Up on Afghanistan Posted by Editoriar 2008 on Mon, 11/09/2009 - 05:15 in Security Policy, South Asia By Byron HartmanStaff EditorNovember 8, 2009 http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/96] Yet, there is an even more important truth that few in the foreign policy establishment are vocally articulating: the United States has made promises. It sounds simplistic, juvenile even. But to the Afghan people, abandoned by the U.S. government following the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1988, nothing is more central. To the
Afghans, this is about faith. It is about rebuilding the trust that was broken in the cold calculations of a post-Cold War peace dividend. It is about making good on the promises America made to the Afghan people, those

who defeated a ruthless Communist enemy over twenty years ago and were left to pick up the shattered pieces of a nation without U.S. assistance . Over one million Afghan civilians died during the Soviet-Afghan war.
The 8-year old Afghan child that was left orphaned in Pakistani refugee camps in 1988 turned into the 29-year old Afghan Taliban commander that NATO forces are fighting now, violently resentful of the way the American government abandoned his country. If we fail in Afghanistan now, the Afghan children of today, abandoned to a neo-

Taliban movement with global Al Qaeda ties, will almost certainly grow into the next Khalid Sheikh Mohammads and Imad Mugniyehs of tomorrow, engineering the murder of American citizens at home and abroad. The impact of deserting the Afghans ranges far beyond the Hindu Kush and Helmand Province though; if the United States abandons Afghanistan again, it will never recover its standing in Central Asia. No country in the region will be willing to place their trust in America. Americas NATO allies, whom it asked, cajoled and threatened into standing firm in Afghanistan will feel justifiably forsaken and misled. Many of these allies fought costly domestic political battles and made economic sacrifices to contribute additional forces. Breaking this trust with the NATO alliance would be an unprecedented blunder that will undermine the very integrity of the United States most important alliance.

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SQ Solves Drugs
US Troops is key to stopping Poppy Cultivation Semple and Golden, October 7, 2007 (Kirk and Tim, staff writers for the New York Times US Presses Again to eradicate Afghan Opium Poppies The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/news/07ihtkabul.5.7788904.html Accessed June 8, 2010) KABUL With opium and heroin production exploding in Afghanistan, the United States has renewed its efforts to persuade the government of President Hamid Karzai to start using chemical herbicides to destroy opium poppy, Afghan and U.S. officials said. Since early this year, Karzai has repeatedly
declared his opposition to spraying the poppy fields, whether by crop-dusting airplanes or by eradication teams on the ground.But now, after the largest opium harvest in Afghanistan's history , Afghan officials say the government is

reconsidering that stance. Some officials said a trial program of ground spraying could begin before next spring's harvest.The issue of chemical eradication has divided the Afghan government, its Western allies and even
U.S. officials of different agencies. The matter is fraught with political danger for Karzai, whose hold on power is weak.Many proponents of the spraying, including officials at the White House and the State Department, view it as the single best hope for curbing Afghanistan's poppy crop, which has become a major source of revenue for the Taliban insurgency.But skeptics - including some senior U.S. military and intelligence officials, as well as European diplomats in Afghanistan - say the use of herbicides could provide a propaganda windfall for Karzai's opponents and push farming communities into the hands of the Taliban."There has always been a need to balance the obvious greater effectiveness of spray against the potential for losing hearts and minds," said Thomas Schweich, U.S. assistant secretary of state for international narcotics issues. "The question is whether that's manageable. I think that it is."Bush administration officials say they will respect whatever decision the Afghan government makes on the matter . Crop-eradication

efforts, they insist, are only one element of a new counternarcotics strategy that will include increased efforts against traffickers, more aid for legal agriculture and development, and greater military support for the drug fight. Behind the scenes, however, senior Bush administration officials have been pressing the Afghan
government to at least allow a trial spray program using glyphosate, a commonly used weed killer, said current and former U.S. officials. Although ground spraying would likely bring only a modest improvement over the manual destruction of poppy plants, U.S. officials who support the strategy hope it would reassure Afghans about the safety of the herbicide and thus make possible much more effective aerial eradication.The problem is enormous.

US military counternarcotics efforts have succeeded, Afghan Opium cultivation are dropping Gavrilis, February 10, 2010 (George, international Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations The Good and Bad News
about Afghan Opium Council on Foreign http://www.cfr.org/publication/21372/good_and_bad_news_about_afghan_opium.html Accessed June 14, 2010) Relations

Some rare good news is coming out of Afghanistan these days. Internationally led counternarcotics efforts have gained momentum, opium cultivation is decreasing, and more provinces have gone "poppy free," a term developed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) that indicates provinces where opium growing has ceased or reached negligible levels. But the bad news is that many of Afghanistan's poppy-free provinces remain critical enablers of Afghanistan's opium economy. Though poppy growing may be eliminated, criminal networks in a number of provinces now focus on refining, stockpiling, and transporting opium. A broad range of authoritative international sources indicates these networks are at times aided by Afghan government officials who are little bothered by the Western-led counternarcotics efforts that seek to eradicate opium crops and chase down Taliban smugglers.

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Long-term Approach Good

Long-term approach is key for afghan stability Alexander Their 2009 [The Future of Afghanistan Stability in Afghanistan Requires Fundamental U.S. Policy Shift anuary 2009
| Book by J. Alexander Thier, editor. http://www.usip.org/peaceops/afghanistan/book.html] US policy toward Afghanistan will require a fundamental change in order to achieve long-term stability in that country, according to The Future of Afghanistan, a new U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) collection of essays written by some of the world's top South Asia analysts. "A focused, coherent, and long-term approach to

Afghan and regional stability is necessary to get Afghanistan out of its vicious cycle of insecurity, insurgency, impunity, and corruption" says J. Alexander Thier, who edited the volume. Any effort to establish stability through troop increases alone will ignore larger issues and lead to short-term improvements at best. While recent violence in Afghanistan must be brought under control, the U.S. and the international community must get back to the basics by placing critical focus on rule of law, ec onomic empowerment and the regional
context.

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American wars in Afghanistan are used to show dominance Mahboob Khawaia 6/14 [he Bogus War on Terrorism: How America and Britain Were Dragged to Wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan? By Mahboob A. Khawaja Al-Jazeerah: CCUN, June 14, 2010 http://www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion %20Editorials/2010/June/14%20o/The%20Bogus%20War%20on%20Terrorism%20How%20America%20and%20Britain%20Were %20Dragged%20to%20Wars%20in%20Iraq%20and%20Afghanistan%20%20By%20Mahboob%20A.htm] The American led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are fought to maintain the US domination worldwide, to

occupy the untapped natural resources of the Middle East in particular the oil and gas, and to protect the value of American dollar as a stable international reserve currency. In September 2000, the proactive
policy paper written by the neoconservative intellectuals to envision the Project for the New American Century (PNAC): sets out the milestone seeking American domination over the rest of the world powers and to meet its energies needs plans to occupy by force all the oil resources in the Arab Middle East. The blueprint supports military occupation of the oil exporting Arab countries and regime change where it is necessary to fulfill the policy

aims of the New American Century of global domination. American leadership is needed world-wide, no global problem can be solved without the US Stephen Lendman 6/10 [Obama's National Security Strategy (NSS): A New Direction or Continuity By Stephen Lendman 10
June, 2010 http://www.countercurrents.org/lendman100610.htm] Obama's first plan describes a time when America "will have to learn to live within its limits - a world in which two wars cannot be sustained for much longer and (other) rising powers inevitably begin to erode some elements of (US) influence around the globe." Seeking help to advance global hegemony, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, stressed "patience

and partners (to achieve) results more slowly," claiming "In a world like this, American leadership isn't needed less. It is needed more. And the simple fact is that no problem can be solved without us," or
perhaps less of them would exist without US policies creating them - the fractious, threatening world The Times writers mention, reflecting more continuity than divergence from Bush. On May 27 in Foreign Policy, Peter Feaver wondered the same thing in his article headlined, "Obama's National Security Strategy: real change or just 'Bush Lite,' " saying: Despite trying to frame it as a new direction, in fact, he's continuing "a slightly watered down but basically plausible remake" of his predecessor's. Beyond the hyperbole and talking points, "the conclusion is pretty obvious."

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1. US Hegemony in Middle East is ending Chris Phillips 5/31 [US hegemony in Middle East is ending Talk of a Middle East cold war is inaccurate Russia and Turkey
are simply capitalising on the region's new power vacuum Chris Phillips http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending] Monday 31 May 2010

While the Bush era saw the US hegemonic in the region, squeezing the defiant few like Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, today's Middle East sees a power vacuum led by partial US retreat being filled by assertive regional and middle powers. Turkey and Brazil's recent nuclear deal with Iran typify this emerging new climate. Stephen Walt has highlighted that this shift in power is global, with Asia's share of GDP already outstripping that of the US or Europe. As ever, it seems the Middle East could prove a microcosm of these international changes. If the age of American uni-polarity is coming to an end, perhaps hastened by unnecessary wars and economic shortsightedness, it is much more likely that international relations in the Middle East will come to reflect the multi-polar world that will follow rather than revert to a bipolar cold war. In such circumstances, it won't just be Russia and Turkey expanding their reach in the region, but China,
India and Brazil will all bid for a role, too presumably having fewer demands than Washington about their clients pursuing democratic reforms and peace with Israel. Saudi Arabia's growing relationship with China might signify the shape of things to come. Not that this era is yet upon us. T he US remains the superpower and could still effect serious

change in the region, should it desire. However, the recent actions of Russia and Turkey in the Middle East do show a new assertiveness from regional powers to pursue their own path in defiance of US will, whether through arms deals, trade agreements or diplomatic coups. A new cold war is unlikely, but the age of unchallenged US hegemony in the Middle East could be ending. 2. US does not face Overstretch in Afghanistan, we have unlimited power Robert J. Lieber, Summer 2008, professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown University Falling Upwards:
Declinism, The Box Set World Affairs Journal http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/2008%20-%20Summer/full-Lieber.html

In the realm of hard power, while the army and Marines have been stretched by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the fact is that no other country possesses anything like the capacity of the United States to project power around the globe. American military technology and sheer might remain unmatched no other country can compete in the arenas of land, sea, or air warfare. China claims that it spends $45 billion
annually on defense, but the truth comes closer to three times that figure. Still, Americas $625 billion defense budget dwarfs even that. The latter amounts to just 4.2 percent of GDP. This contrasts with 6.6 percent at the height of the Reagan buildup and double-digit percentages during the early and middle years of the Cold War.

3. TURN: A. Withdrawing from afghan commitment would hurt U.S. credibility Paul Pillar and John Nagel 2/25 [Debating Afghanistan by Paul R. Pillar and John Nagl 02.25.2010

http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22916]
My sparring partner asserts that backing away from the commitment in Afghanistan would damage U.S. credibilitya logic eerily reminiscent of the chief rationale for the war in which I served as an army officer: the one in Vietnam. The idea was as unexamined and invalid then as it is now. Governments (or terrorist groups) simply do not calculate other governments credibility that way.1 Nagls reference in this regard to how Pakistan would revisit its recent decisions to fight against the Taliban is odd given that the most recent decisionannounced during a visit by the U.S. secretary of defense, no lessis that the Pakistani army would not launch any new offensives for as much as a year.

B. [International credibility key to US hegemony]

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4. If we leave Afghanistan then there will be an increase of terrorism Nicholas Watt 6/30 [Liam Fox insists army cannot leave Afghanistan until job done Early exit could bring civil war, says defence secretary, although his comments appear at odds with Cameron's 2015 vow Nicholas Watt, chief political correspondent guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 30 June 2010 20.43 BST Article history http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jun/30/liam-foxafghanistan-foreign-policy]

Were we to leave prematurely, without degrading the insurgency and increasing the capability of the Afghan national security forces, we could see the return of the destructive forces of transnational terror," he said. "Not only would we risk the return of civil war in Afghanistan, creating a security vacuum, but we would also risk the destabilisation of Pakistan with potentially unthinkable regional, and possibly nuclear, consequences." Fox warned of an increased terror threat across the world if troops left too soon. "The second reason is that it would be a shot in the arm to jihadists everywhere, reenergising violent radical and extreme Islamism. It would send the signal that we did not have the moral resolve and political fortitude to see through what we ourselves have described as a national security imperative."

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US heg is declining William Hawkins 2009 ["U.S. Hegemony Ends" By: William R. Hawkins FrontPageMagazine.com | Monday, March 09, 2009
http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=34262] The day after the Afghanistan editorial (and two days after Secretary Clinton left China), The Peoples Daily ran another opinion piece entitled, The U.S. Hegemony ends, the era of global multipolarity enters. It started by

reveling in the economic crisis that has swept America and signals a swift reduction of U.S. strength as a unipolar power. Its conclusion was stark. Does the decline of U.S. geopolitical hegemony make multilateral global governance more likely? Perhaps it is still too early to rush any conclusion, but at least one thing is certain: the U.S. strength is declining at a speed so fantastic that it is far beyond anticipation. The U.S. is no longer 'King of the hill, ' as a new phase of multipolar world power structure will
come into being in 2009, and the international order will be correspondingly reshuffled.

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The US going home is a sign of weakness to other countries Thayer 07 [Bradley American Empire: A Debate
http://books.google.com/books?id=nBl39Mozk8C&pg=PT117&lpg=PT117&dq=%22U.S.+power+protects+the+United+States. %22&source=bl&ots=hy975IGe3e&sig=kiOCmBBQ4vraJwnhSwVY3vsvb1w&hl=en&ei=jAYwTIS6CoP7lwfwgtSBCQ&sa=X&oi =book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22U.S.%20power%20protects%20the%20United %20States.%22&f=false (pg 41-42)] Second, U.S. power protects the United States . That sentence is as genuine and as important a statement about international politics as one can make. International politics is not a game or a sport. There are no "time

outs," there is no halftime and no rest. It never stops. There is no hiding from threats and dangers in international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats it confronts, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats . Simply by declaring that the United States is going home, thus abandoning its commitments or making half pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect its wishes to retreat. In fact, to make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the
anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true in the anarchic realm of international politics. If the United States is not strong and does not actively protect and advance its interests, other countries will prey upon those interests, and even on the United States itself .

Means that the US will lose their hegemony

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Removing troops from Afghanistan will put the country back into terror and instability Mail foreign service 6/26 [Cameron: I want British troops out of Afghanistan by the next election By mail foreign service Last
updated at 1:16 AM on 26th June 2010 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1289610/Cameron-I-want-British-troopsAfghanistan-election.html] Discussing Mr Obama's preference for beginning a drawdown around July next year, Mr Cameron said : 'I prefer not to

see it in strict timetables. 'I want us to roll up our sleeves and get on with delivering what will bring the success we want, which is not a perfect Afghanistan, but some stability in Afghanistan and the ability for the Afghans themselves to run their country so they can come home.' Yesterday the Prime Minister braced
Britain for more troop deaths in Afghanistan as the loss of four British soldiers made this the deadliest month for Nato since the 2001 invasion. The Prime Minister warned ominously of a 'difficult summer' ahead and admitted that the country was paying a 'very high price' in casualties. But he insisted that pulling out of Afghanistan would plunge it back

into terror and instability.

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Withdraw Terrorism
Afghanistan will still be unstable with terrorism after 2011 Daniel Flitton 4/9 [July next year is our date with
destiny for Afghan pullout Daniel Flitton http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/july-next-year-is-our-date-with-destiny-for-afghan-pullout-20100408-ruyk.html April 9, 2010] The second caveat to note is that July 2011 will mark the beginning of a withdrawal, not an end . Not being a NATO member, Australia is unable to take command of Oruzgan from the Dutch in August - but a modest boost in troops is possible. Even so, the defence white paper last year made it clear the government expects to be engaged in Afghanistan for the next decade or more. ''It will remain a challenged state and a potential source of ongoing instability in the region,'' the paper says. ''This weakness will have broader implications because of Afghanistan's potential as a base for global Islamist terrorism and its role in the narcotics trade .'' Many foreign soldiers will stay - especially to keep up pressure on al-Qaeda. But the military will not be the mainstay for Australia's involvement . The wider 7nternational plan is to focus on more aid and technical advice for the Afghan government. A big military operation in Helmand province last month and a coming push in Kandahar are intended to clear the ground of Taliban and allow newly mentored Afghan troops to take control.

Withdrawal of troops would risk war Nicholas Watt 6/30 [Liam Fox insists army cannot leave Afghanistan until job done Early exit could bring civil war, says defence secretary, although his comments appear at odds with Cameron's 2015 vow Nicholas Watt, chief political correspondent guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 30 June 2010 20.43 BST Article history http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jun/30/liam-foxafghanistan-foreign-policy] An early withdrawal

of coalition troops from Afghanistan would risk a return of civil war and act as a "shot in the arm to jihadists" across the world, the defence secretary, Liam Fox, warned today. In marked contrast to David Cameron, who pledged over the weekend to withdraw all British troops by 2015, Fox said Britain would be betraying the sacrifices of its fallen soldiers if it left "before the job is finished".

If we withdraw from Afghanistan Al Qaeda will gain more control Bron Hartman 2009 [The U.S. Should Not Give Up on Afghanistan Posted by Editoriar 2008 on Mon, 11/09/2009 - 05:15 in Security Policy, South Asia By Byron HartmanStaff EditorNovember 8, 2009 http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/96]
Some argue that our interests can be best served by a limited counter-terrorism campaign targeting Al Qaeda leaders in the Pakistani border region. Al Qaeda is not the cause of instability in Afghanistan, but rather a symptom of

the disease. The disease is the central governments lack of institutional capacity to provide security and services. The withdrawal of U.S. military support may not lead to the immediate collapse of the Afghan central government, but it will result in the immediate loss of large areas to tribal, narcotic and militant interests. Al Qaeda will exploit these autonomous areas to establish new bases and training camps from which to attack America and her allies around the world. What is most dangerous, though, is that the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the inevitable collapse of Afghanistan will provide Al Qaeda with space to operate. Their capacity to strike could return to the same levels they enjoyed prior to the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan would be portrayed not as a Taliban victory, but as an Al Qaeda one. Militant factions in the Muslim world deserted Al Qaeda in the aftermath of their failed campaign in Iraq, but new militant foot soldiers would flock to the banner of an Al Qaeda victory , setting off a period of global instability not seen in modern history. Nothing will encourage and embolden Al Qaeda so much as victory in Afghanistan.

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Withdraw Narcotics
Afghan Government unlikely to continue counter-narcotics programs if the US leaves because of political pressures Kebede, 2008 (Solomon, writer for The Capital Ethiopia, Afghanistan and the Drug Trade, The Capital Ethiopia,
http://www.capitalethiopia.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12719:afghanistan-and-the-drugtrade&catid=3:business-and-economy&Itemid=14, Accessed May 19, 2010)

After 2002 Afghan opium production rose to unheard of levels. By 2007, Afghanistan was producing enough heroin to supply the entire world. In 2009, Thomas Schweich, who served as US state department co-ordinator for counter-narcotics and justice reform for Afghanistan, accused President Hamid Karzai of impeding the war on drugs. Schweich also accused the Pentagon of obstructing attempts to get military forces to assist and protect opium crop eradication drives. Schweich wrote in the New York Times that narco-corruption went to the top of the Afghan government. He said Karzai was reluctant to move against big drug lords in his political power base in the south, where most of the countrys opium and heroin is produced. The most prominent of these suspected drug lords was Ahmed Wali Karzai, the brother of President Hamid Karzai. Ahmed Wali Karzai was said to have orchestrated the manufacture of hundreds of thousands of phoney ballots for his brothers re-election effort in August 2009. He was also believed to have been responsible for setting up dozens of so-called ghost polling stations existing only on paper that were used to manufacture tens of thousands of phoney ballots. US officials have criticised his mafia-like control of southern Afghanistan. The New York Times reported that the Obama administration had vowed to crack down on the drug lords who permeate the highest levels of the government, and they pressed President Karzai to move his brother out of southern Afghanistan, but he refused to do so. Karzai was playing us like a fiddle, Schweich wrote. The US would spend billions of dollars on infrastructure development; the US and its allies would fight the Taliban; Karzais friends could get richer off the drug trade. Karzai had Taliban enemies who profited from drugs but he had even more supporters who did. But who was playing who like a fiddle? Was it the puppet president or the puppet masters who installed him? As Douglas Valentine shows in his history of the War on Drugs, The Strength of the Pack, this never-ending war has been a phoney contest, an arm wrestle between two arms of the US state, the DEA and the CIA; with the DEA vainly attempting to prosecute the war, while the CIA protects its drug-dealing assets. During the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries, European powers (chiefly the UK) and Japan used the opium trade to weaken and subjugate China. During the 21st century, it seems that the opium weapon is being used against Iran, Russia and the former Soviet republics, which all face spiralling rate of addiction and covert US penetration as the Afghan War fuels central Asias heroin plague.

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Afghanistan Wants US There

TURN: Karzai wants more US assistance to help out Afghanistan Larisa Epatko 5/10 [May 10, 2010 Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Afghanistan Hangs Over Karzai Visit BY: LARISA
EPATKO http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/05/karzai-visit-to-dc.html] One of the tasks at hand is rebuilding relations after comments Karzai made last month asserting that the fraud-riddled elections were caused by United Nations and other foreign organizations seeking to prevent his re-election. His spokesmen later sought to dial back his criticism, but in subsequent interviews with the media, Karzai did not back off his claims. In a letter printed in the Washington Post on Sunday , Karzai referred to the ups and downs of the U.S.-Afghanistan

relationship: "As in any genuine partnership, this has not been an easy ride. We have had our share of disagreements over some issues and approaches. What has kept us together is an overriding strategic vision of an Afghanistan whose peace and stability can guarantee the safety of the Afghan and the American peoples." Karzai also called for more assistance equipping Afghan security forces and rebuilding services and institutions, which he said would help reduce the country's corruption -- a
demand the Obama administration has placed on him. "Removing parallel structures that undermine the authority of our government is key," Karzai wrote. "Addressing corruption and waste in the delivery mechanisms, including

contractual systems, is imperative. President Obama's decision to channel more funds through the Afghan government is a good step forward." The visit comes with the July 2011 withdrawal of U.S. troops just a
little more than a year away. President Obama, who set the deadline, needs to know that things are progressing toward ending the war that his predecessor started and that he promised to bring to a close, said Torek Farhadi, who served as a senior adviser to the Afghan government from 2002-2004. But President Karzai, who just entered his second term

last year, is operating under a different timeframe and is seeking U.S. investments in security and infrastructure in Afghanistan beyond the July 2011 troop withdrawal, Farhadi said.

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18 More Afghanis say more US Forces Would Help Rather than Hurt Julie Ray and Rajesh Srinivasan, Poll Conductors, September 30 2009, Gallup Poll a Gallup survey during troop buildup earlier this year found nearly half of Afghans (49%) saying additional troops would help stabilize the security situation in the southern provinces. Thirty-two percent of Afghans said they would not. But opinions varied widely across Afghanistan at the time; residents in the troubled
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- As President Barack Obama mulls whether to commit more troops to Afghanistan, South were mostly mixed or uncertain, while those in the West largely disagreed that more U.S. troops would help the situation. Top U.S. and NATO commander Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal Friday submitted his long-anticipated request for more troops to the Pentagon. But before the White House even considers his request, officials say the administration needs to complete its reassessment of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Obama himself has said he's skeptical whether deploying additional troops -- beyond the 21,000 he committed earlier this year -- will make a difference in Afghanistan. Further, half of Americans would oppose it. Afghans surveyed in June as additional U.S. troops started to arrive were more likely to be convinced than skeptical that the infusion of troops would help stabilize the security situation in the southern provinces. Nearly half (49%) said more troops would help, while a sizable 32% thought they wouldn't and 19% didn't know. But opinions varied widely across Afghanistan, suggesting residents' views about troop buildup in the South were largely filtered through their own local experiences. Afghans in the East and South, where additional U.S. troops deployed this year have been sent to combat the growing Taliban insurgency, were mixed as to whether more troops would help the security situation. In the once-relatively peaceful North and Central regions, residents solidly said more troops would help. And residents in the West were most skeptical, with a strong majority (69%) saying more troops wouldn't help. Afghans' views vary by ethnicity as well, which helps explain some of these regional differences but doesn't explain them alone. Pashtuns, who dominate Afghanistan's South and East, were mostly mixed, with 35% saying more troops would help the situation in the southern provinces, 38% saying they would not, and 28% saying they didn't know. Conversely, at least 6 in 10 Tajiks and Hazaras, who are predominant in the North and Central areas, respectively, said more troops would help the situation in the South. However, sentiments were similar among different ethnic groups in the North and West. In addition to more resources and a new strategy in Afghanistan, McChrystal wrote in his assessment report to the administration that the United States must "redefine the fight" and "gain support of the people." Gallup's June survey suggests the Obama administration has some work to do in this regard. Afghans' opinions of the leadership of the United States had not changed much from 2008; they remained split in their approval of U.S. leadership, with 50% approving and 42% disapproving. Overall, Afghans who said they approved of U.S. leadership were more likely to say sending additional U.S. troops would help the security situation in the southern provinces (65%) than those who disapproved (35%). This pattern appears to hold across most regions in Afghanistan, though approval numbers in several regions, such as the West and South, were too Nearly half of Afghans surveyed in June amid U.S. troop buildup said additional troops would help stabilize the security situation in the southern provinces, but much has changed in Afghanistan since. Afghans have watched the security situation worsen and violence escalate and spread beyond Taliban strongholds in the South and East, increasing the numbers of U.S., NATO, and Afghan casualties. It may be weeks before the president completes his reassessment of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and decides whether to deploy additional combat troops U.S. commanders have requested. Gallup's data suggest Afghans' views on additional troops are likely to vary across Afghanistan, depending on security and other factors in play.

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19 Afghanis Embrace USAID and Security Efforts Cpl. Daniel A. Blatter, Soldier and Journalist, June 2010, International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan Afghan and ISAF forces are supporting the reconstruction and development of Now Zad District, once known for being the largest producer of fruit in Helmand Province, but that in recent years has suffered destruction and been considered dangerous by its inhabitants. Said Thomas Gillick, the deputy manager for U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Helmand operations. "Our goal is to rehabilitate over 400 shops in the bazaar within approximately 70 days, and we are currently on day 12 The development of the Now Zad bazaar is a USAID-funded project which is already seeing results; the number of shops has grown whom approximately 25 in March to more than 140 today. As
the population in Now Zad continues to grow at a rapid pace, it is important for the local bazaar to be able to house the coming businesses as well as food and supplies for the people. "Roughly 50 to 60 families are moving back into the Now Zad valley per week," said Capt. Jeremy S. Wilkinson , U.S. Marine Alpha company commander. "The local economy will be able to support them after the rehabilitation of the bazaar. It will llow the people who move back in here to have jobs." There are more than 60 residents currently working on the bazaar project, and upon arrival of the tools needed, that number is predicted to grow to around 750. "Overall, the Now Zad village community and elders have been supportive of this project 110 percent," said Gillick. "The idea behind rehabilitating the bazaar is to promote commerce and to quickly get cash into the hands of [young] males so they will be gainfully employed and less prone to planting improvised explosive devices, fighting, or becoming disenfranchised from the government," said Gillick. Since Afghan National Security Force and ISAF troops have been living and patrolling close to the bazaar, security has improved. "One of the benefits that we have had with this project is the safety and security that we feel when going into the bazaar," said Gillick. "There is no hostility whatsoever.

The people embrace us and they are friendly."

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Drug FL [1/2]
1. Afghan Poppy cultivation is low due to US counter-narcotics efforts UN, September 2, 2009 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghan opium production in significant decline UNDOC.COM,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2009/September/afghan-opium-production-in-significant--decline.html Accessed May 21, 2010)

2 September 2009 - Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is down 22 per cent, opium production is down 10 per cent, while prices are at a 10-year low. The number of opium poppy-free provinces has increased from 18 to 20 out of a total number of 34, and more drugs are being seized as a result of more robust counter-narcotics operations by Afghan and NATO forces. These are the findings contained in the summary findings of the Afghan Opium Survey 2009, released in Kabul today by UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa. This annual survey covers the planting cycle from May 2008 to June 2009. "At a time of pessimism about the situation in Afghanistan, these results are a welcome piece of good news and demonstrate that progress is possible", said Mr. Costa. possible", said Mr. Costa. Cultivation and production decrease Opium poppy cultivation has fallen to 123,000 hectares, down from a peak of 193,000 hectares in 2007. This year, the most significant decrease was recorded in Helmand Province, where cultivation declined by a third to 69,833 hectares from 103,590 hectares in 2008. The dramatic turnaround in one of Afghanistan's most unstable provinces can be attributed to an effective mix of sticks and carrots: strong leadership by the governor; a more aggressive counter-narcotics offensive; terms of trade that are more favourable to legal crops; and the successful introduction of "food zones" to promote licit farming. 2. Cant end opium production, even with gentler measures too many vested interests across society want to preserve the status quo Barnett Rubin, director of studies and a senior fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, September 27, 2007, http://icga.blogspot.com/2007/09/counter-narcotics-in-afghanistan-iv.html Training people in the technical skills required for counter-narcotics (interdiction, prosecution, law enforcement, and development) is necessary, but it is not a substitute for a state whose power holders and decision makers exercise a degree of autonomy from the socially powerful, who in Afghanistan include drug traffickers. As a result, frustrated foreign advisors increasingly press for more control over operations and autonomy from
the governmental apparatus, which leaves power-holders the choice of being seen as foreign puppets or of engaging in some form of resistance, whether covert (corruption) or overt (insurgency). Jon Lee Anderson of the New Yorker observed this first-hand while reporting on a U.S.-supported eradication effort in Uruzgan province. When the Afghan force refused to eradicate a field belonging to a local power holder, the DEA agent accompanying them (Douglas Wankel, a determined and dedicated professional) tried to make counter-narcotics more equitable by forcing the reluctant Afghans to eradicate the field. But even if the field is eradicated, such an operation does not strengthen the authority of the state or prevent future poppy cultivation in any sustainable way. Hence the problem confronted by the policies labeled as interdiction, law enforcement, or anti-corruption are pieces of the same daunting task: consolidating at least a minimal state structure in the face of enormous resources in the hands of unofficial (and sometimes, but not always, criminal) power holders. For the foreseeable future, the government and its international supporters will be able to accomplish little in Afghanistan without the support of the de facto power holders. These are local leaders who combine functions as politicians, tribal or ethnic leaders, businessmen, landowners, commanders of armed groups of varying degrees of legality, parliamentarians, and government officials. Many were marginalized under the Taliban regime but returned as the allies of the U.S.-led Coalition and the new government. The mixture of functions varies among members of this group, as does their political orientation. Most have mastered several rhetorical repertoires for different audiences, and they manifest considerable pragmatism in their actions. These leaders have a healthy respect for the effective use of force, money, and rhetoric. Conversely, nothing more incites their contempt than wasteful and ineffective use of force, money, and rhetoric, which, rightly or wrongly, is what most of them see in the actions of the international community in Afghanistan, especially in counter-narcotics. Many of them derive much of their resources directly or indirectly from the opiate

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21 industry, sometimes without ever actually seeing, handling, or even mentioning the substance in question. An Afghan
official once pointed out to me that all Afghan politicians had brothers who were businessmen. Afghan leaders also have half-brothers, stepbrothers, cousins, uncles, and nephews, and so do their (possibly several) wives. During the Taliban period one Afghan leader asked for political asylum for himself and his family. When asked how large his family was, he said, About fifty households. An average Afghan household has about six members, and those of the wealthy and powerful have more. These extensive, dense, and opaque family networks enable some of the powerful to denounce or oppose the drug economy while simultaneously (and invisibly) benefiting from it.

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Drug FL [2/2]
3. TURN: Drug War is key to stability it severs the link between terrorism and narcotics Rachel Ehrenfeld, writer for Forbes Magazine, 2/26/09 Stop the Afghan Drug Trade, Stop Terrorism Forbes Magazine
http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/26/drug-trade-afghanistan-opinions-contributors_terrorism_mycoherbicides.html Accessed July 1, 2010 "The fight against drugs is actually the fight for Afghanistan ," said Afghan President Hamid Karzai when he took office in 2002. Judging by the current situation, Afghanistan is losing. To win, the link between narcotics and terrorism must be severed . That is the necessary condition for a successful strategy to undermine the growing influence of al-Qaida, the Taliban and radical Muslim groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is all about money--more precisely, drug money. The huge revenues from the heroin trade fill the coffers of the terrorists and thwart any attempt to stabilize the region .Though not traded on any stock exchange, heroin is one of the most valuable commodities in the world today. While a ton of crude oil costs less than $290, a ton of heroin costs $67 million in Europe and between $360 million and $900 million in New York, according to estimates based on recent Drug Enforcement Administration figures.Since its liberation from Taliban rule, Afghanistan's opium production has gone from 640 tons in 2001 to 8,200 tons in 2007. Afghanistan now supplies over 93% of the global opiate market."This is a source of income for the warlords and regional factions to pay their soldiers," warned former Afghan Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalili in a May 2005 interview with Reuters. "The terrorists are funding their operations through illicit drug trade, so they are all interlinked." In 2004, the G-8 designated Britain to lead counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Its three-year eradication policy was designed specifically not to alienate the local population. It dictated the crop eradication be done "by hand." Moreover, the

British entrusted the provincial governors with the eradication process, even though Afghan provincial governors, many of whom are powerful warlords, have been engaged in the drug trade for decades. Not surprisingly, the eradication effort failed miserably. Comment On This Story The exponential growth in narcoterrorism in Afghanistan led to a well-entrenched narco-economy, strengthening the power of tribal warlords, the Taliban and al-Qaida . The growing
violence led NATO leaders, who met in Budapest in October 2008, to agree to allow their military forces to strike the drug traffickers. However, NATO troops were not ordered to attack; in fact, NATO's European allies are "averse" to drug eradication programs for fear of alienating the local population and because of the risks associated with such operations.

4. No brink their Senlis council evidence is from 06 weve sent more troops in since then the US has been failing to nationbuild in Afghanistan for a while but their Pakistani scenario hasnt been triggered

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Drug FL Ext. 2
Cant solve opium until 2025 best-case scenario Mark Schneider, senior vice president of the International Crisis Group, Federal News Service, October 4, 2007
REP. ACKERMAN: Do we have enough assets and resources dedicated to this proposition so that if we went and concentrated in the areas, such as the province in which there's a 53 percent increase, which accounts for a great deal of that expanded new number, that we just don't allow the balloon to be squeezed there and the poppy production pop up somewhere else in greater percentages? MR. SCHNEIDER: I mean, I think we do need to provide more resources. I think one of the most important things is to demonstrate that it's a long-term commitment. It took 15-17 years to really change Thailand in terms of a producer of opium poppies. And I think that in terms of overall sustainable counternarcotics, it's going to take that long. Right now I think that you have a challenge, as well, of demonstrating to significant portions of the country that this is a long-term international commitment , not only for the next two or three years. And so I would argue that to the degree that you can find ways to make that kind of long-term authorization at significant levels, that would have a great deal of benefit.

Poppy Reduction Impossible Paul Eckert, staff writer for Reuters, 8/3/07 U.S Sees Uphill fight against Afghan Opium Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0332324120070803 Accessed July 1, 2010
The $420 million spent by U.S. government agencies on poppy eradication in the war-torn country in 2006 was "dwarfed by the roughly $38 billion 'street value' if the entire Afghan poppy crop were converted to heroin," it said .The report by

State Department Inspector General Howard Krongard said initial U.S. eradication goals for 2007 in Afghanistan, the source of about 90 percent of the world's opium, were "not realistic." The Taliban, which
ruled Afghanistan under strict principals of Islamic law, drastically reduced poppy growing throughout the country in the years before it was ousted by the U.S.-led 2001 invasion for harboring al Qaeda militants.But in recent years poppy growth has increased dramatically, especially in southern provinces where the Taliban has encouraged the profitable crop.A U.S. government assessment team that visited seven locations in Afghanistan "found no realistic possibility of outspending economic incentives in the narcotics industry ," the report said.It added that "security in the poppy producing provinces was viewed as a growing concern and necessitated further reliance on inadequate air support for execution of counternarcotics programs." Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher told reporters on Thursday, ahead a visit to Washington next week by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, that "The poppy issue this year is: There is going to be a lot of production in Afghanistan."But Boucher, the top U.S. diplomat for South and Central Asia, said that growth of the raw material for heroin was increasingly concentrated in the "areas of the insurgency" and that production was decreasing in areas where Karzai's U.S.-backed government has established control. "So you'll probably go this year from six poppy-free provinces to at least double that number," said Boucher. Opium production

in Afghanistan rose by as much as 50 percent last year, according to a United Nations estimate. This year's crop, recently harvested, could easily equal that, the United Nations says. The Afghan and Western
governments accuse Taliban insurgents of offering protection to opium farmers in return for taxing their crop and then using the funds to fend off Afghan and foreign troops.

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Drug FL Ext. 4
Afghan Government unlikely to continue counter-narcotics programs if the US leaves because of political pressures Kebede, 2008 (Solomon, writer for The Capital Ethiopia, Afghanistan and the Drug Trade, The Capital Ethiopia,
http://www.capitalethiopia.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12719:afghanistan-and-the-drugtrade&catid=3:business-and-economy&Itemid=14, Accessed May 19, 2010)

After 2002 Afghan opium production rose to unheard of levels. By 2007, Afghanistan was producing enough heroin to supply the entire world. In 2009, Thomas Schweich, who served as US state department co-ordinator for counter-narcotics and justice reform for Afghanistan, accused President Hamid Karzai of impeding the war on drugs. Schweich also accused the Pentagon of obstructing attempts to get military forces to assist and protect opium crop eradication drives. Schweich wrote in the New York Times that narco-corruption went to the top of the Afghan government. He said Karzai was reluctant to move against big drug lords in his political power base in the south, where most of the countrys opium and heroin is produced. The most prominent of these suspected drug lords was Ahmed Wali Karzai, the brother of President Hamid Karzai. Ahmed Wali Karzai was said to have orchestrated the manufacture of hundreds of thousands of phoney ballots for his brothers re-election effort in August 2009. He was also believed to have been responsible for setting up dozens of so-called ghost polling stations existing only on paper that were used to manufacture tens of thousands of phoney ballots. US officials have criticised his mafia-like control of southern Afghanistan. The New York Times reported that the Obama administration had vowed to crack down on the drug lords who permeate the highest levels of the government, and they pressed President Karzai to move his brother out of southern Afghanistan, but he refused to do so. Karzai was playing us like a fiddle, Schweich wrote. The US would spend billions of dollars on infrastructure development; the US and its allies would fight the Taliban; Karzais friends could get richer off the drug trade. Karzai had Taliban enemies who profited from drugs but he had even more supporters who did. But who was playing who like a fiddle? Was it the puppet president or the puppet masters who installed him? As Douglas Valentine shows in his history of the War on Drugs, The Strength of the Pack, this never-ending war has been a phoney contest, an arm wrestle between two arms of the US state, the DEA and the CIA; with the DEA vainly attempting to prosecute the war, while the CIA protects its drug-dealing assets. During the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries, European powers (chiefly the UK) and Japan used the opium trade to weaken and subjugate China. During the 21st century, it seems that the opium weapon is being used against Iran, Russia and the former Soviet republics, which all face spiralling rate of addiction and covert US penetration as the Afghan War fuels central Asias heroin plague.

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1NC CP Drugs
Text: The United States Federal Government should legalize opium growth in Afghanistan for the purpose of medical drugs. 1. Legalization of medical Opium would solve Afghani drug and security problem Dr. Frederic Grare, Southeast Asia Scholar, February 2008, Centre for International Governance Innovation Drug production and trafficking is therefore a major governance issue, at global and local levels, with serious actual and potential security and diplomatic implications. Arising from the absence of governance at the local level, drug production and smuggling have become one of the main impediments to governance in Afghanistan. The problem, moreover, is disrupting the entire region as it feeds militancy, creating additional tensions between Afghanistan and its neighbors. It is in this context that the Senlis Council, an international drug policy think tank, launched an initiative for the creation of a licensing system in Afghanistan which would allow the cultivation of opium for the production of essential medicines such as morphine and codeine. The idea is to break the vicious circle of the drug economy in Afghanistan by moving the opium trade into a legal system controlled by and benefiting the state. Additionally, this would make opium production a legitimate source of income that would contribute to stability and promote economic development. The paper argues, therefore, that, imperfect as they may be, current policies may well be optimum for
Afghanistan given the country's present situation and the structural problems (inelasticity of the demand vs. extreme elasticity of the sources) inherent in the global war against drugs, where, increasingly, experts consider that only a

demand reduction will lead to a decrease of supplies.

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Drug CP Ext.
Support for Karzais government is key to successful implementation of the Senlis Plan Dr. Frederic Grare, Southeast Asia Scholar, February 2008, Centre for International Governance Innovation
Ali Jalali again provides probably the most accurate description of the current situation in Afghanistan when he asserts that

"Growing poppies is at present a low-risk enterprise in a high- risk environment. The key will be to turning it into a high-risk enterprise in a low-risk environment" (Ibid). Legalizing opium production in such a context would only send the wrong message. State building is therefore central to the issue. It is a prerequisite to an efficient reduction of opium and heroin production. State building will not eliminate drug trafficking but no counter- narcotic efforts will be successful without prior strengthening of the Afghan state's capacities. Police, and more generally, law enforcement agencies, will have to be reinforced before the drug processing and trafficking can be stopped. This effort will have to be accompanied
by alternative livelihoods development in order to provide the farmers with a reasonable income, which the Senlis proposals would provide, at best, only for a limited number of farmers. Only when these conditions have been

met could the legalization of opium production for pharmaceutical purposes be envisaged.

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Drug CP Impact Module Medicine

Afghani Poppy Legalization would Help Ease Massive Morphine Demand Romesh Bhattacharji, Former Narcotics Commissioner of India, May 20 10, International Council on Security and Development The actual need for painkilling medicines worldwide is not fully matched by figures measuring market demand. In particular, as most of the worlds population still has little access to painkilling medicines, the actual need for morphine remains largely unmet. Official figures from the INCB show that just a handful of wealthy countries consume the significant majority of the global supply of poppy-based medicines.
For instance, the United States, Canada, Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, together representing less than 20% of the worlds population, accounted for more than 95% of the total morphine consumption in 2005. This indicates a significant underconsumption of morphine affecting the remaining 80% of the worlds population, whose combined morphine consumption represented less than 5% of the global total. Stressing the need for a balance between the obligations posed by UN conventions for fighting against the illegal narcotics, and the need to ensure and, in most cases, increase the availability of poppy-based medicines, the World Health Organisation (WHO) heavily promotes

the prescription of poppy-based medicines for the treatment of pain, and includes morphine is on its list of essential medicines. Based on the known effectiveness of morphine and codeine, the WHO has created a three
step pain ladder known as the WHO Analgesic Method for Cancer Pain Relief, designed to provide a scientific basis to encourage health professionals worldwide to use poppy-based medicines to treat pain. To help address the impediments that hamper the availability and use of poppy-based medicines particularly in less economically developed and emerging countries, at the request of the United Nations Economic and Social Council COSOC and the World Health Assembly, the WHO developed the Framework to the Access to Controlled Medications Programme in consultation with the INCB. Despite the World Health Organisations limited success in promoting poppy-based medicines for palliative care for cancer and HIV/AIDS in emerging countries, the sheer enormity of the global pain crisis demands ongoing sustained action by the WHO, governments and international regulatory boards. Moreover, given the increasing need for cancer and HIV/AIDS related palliative care, demand for poppy-based medicines is set to rise dramatically in the next few years. Pain relief experts predict the global need for pain medication will increase. By 2020, there will be a significant ageing population in Europe, North America, East Asia and Latin America. HIV/ AIDS projections in 53 African countries suggest that mortality due to HIV will increase by a factor of five, while global cancer rates will increase by 50% from 10 million in 2002 to 15 million in 2010. Furthermore, 50% of new cancer cases are now occurring in developing countries. These figures show that significant levels of pain medicine needs are going un-met around the world. Furthermore, it should be noted that the above figures only represent the un-met needs of HIV/AIDS and cancer patients for morphine, while other patients suffering from post-operative and chronic pain are not taken into account. Thus it is likely that the pain-medicine deficits in these regions would be even more alarming once all the poppybased medicines needs of patients are factored in. Equally, pain medicine needs are set to rise in the future, as palliative care becomes more necessary. The global need for poppy-based medicines far outweighs their current

availability. Even in the worlds six richest countries, which include the United States and the Western Europe, only 24% of patients pain needs are being met. In 2006, Afghanistan produced 6,100 metric tons of
opium. Yet even this huge quantity would be insufficient to meet the worlds current actual morphine needs, which in 2005 were estimated to be equal to 6,152 metric tons of opium. The licensing of Afghan poppy crops would go a long way towards improving the quality of life for those suffering severe pain, especially in transitional and emerging countries where the availability of poppy-based medicines is at its lowest. The potential market for the affordable medical morphine that Afghan Poppy for Medicine projects could fill is considerable.

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Purchasing of Poppy Crop Viable Alternative to Eradication Donald G. McNeil Jr., Journalist, October 14 2007, The New York Times AS opium harvests in Afghanistan have steadily increased, some think tanks and politicians mostly in Britain have raised a trenchant question: rather than trying to eradicate Afghanistans poppies, why not instead buy them and make morphine? Given that the World Health Organization estimates that over 6.2 million of the worlds poor are dying of cancer, AIDS, burns and wounds without adequate pain relief, the argument goes, wouldnt it make sense? Most prominent among these proposals is an analysis by the Senlis Council, a drug-policy research group with offices in London, Brussels and Kabul. The council argues that the United States and Britain waste more than $800 million a year, as well as soldiers lives, trying futilely to eradicate poppies. Instead, it calculated two years ago, Afghanistans whole crop could be purchased for about $600 million the farm gate price, not the street value of the heroin into which it is refined, which is over $50 billion. (The farm gate estimate has gone up as the crop has increased, and may be $1 billion now.) Whatever the price, enforcement will not work, said Romesh Bhattacharji, a former
narcotics commissioner of India who has investigated the Afghan situation for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The Afghan farmer will not switch to alternative crops as long as there is a market for his opium. The United States and British governments are vigorously opposed; instead they favor tough eradication tactics and more encouragement to farmers to grow wheat, cotton or fruit. Theyre growing a poison, sir one that kills Afghanistans neighbors and corrupts officials, Thomas A. Schweich, chief of the State Departments Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, said in a telephone interview. There needs to be better and more forceful eradication. There is an American precedent for buying. In the late 1960s, the Nixon administration, fighting a heroin epidemic, pressured Turkey, then the worlds chief grower, to eradicate its poppy crops. Unable to do that (both because of corruption and because peasant farmers vote) Turkey in 1974 started licensing farmers to grow for the morphine trade, and the United States in 1981 gave protected-market status to Turkey and India, obligating itself to

buy 80 percent of the raw material for American painkillers from them. Why not, the Senlis Council and others argue, let Afghanistan join the legitimate supply chain? In the British press, there is some serious
discussion of the Senlis proposal. But in the United States, the idea has attracted little attention. The council attributes this partially to the lobbying power of the religious right and law enforcement groups, both of which react with horror to any talk of legalization. Its almost theological, their opposition to our idea, said Norine MacDonald, the councils founder. Also, both she and Mr. Bhattacharji said, with a $600 million annual budget for eradication, the field attracts

paramilitary contractors with deep connections to the Bush administration, including Blackwater USA and DynCorp International, both of whom train Afghan anti-narcotics police.

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Opium should be licensed for the production of medicine Dr. Frederic Grare, Southeast Asia Scholar, February 2008, Centre for International Governance Innovation
This is the context in which the draft Senlis proposals were presented to the press in Kabul in March 2005. Placing its study in the legal framework established by the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, which contains provisions for the legal production of opium for medicinal purposes,5 the Senlis Council asserted that "current policy choose(s)

to destroy a valuable natural resource, rather than turning it into a powerful driver for economic development" (Spivack et al., 2005b: 22). It called for the licensing of opium in Afghanistan for the production of medicine as an economically viable and controllable response to the extraordinary nature and scope of the illegal economy. This call was then followed by ten operational recommendations to the international community: The New York Times and several Asian newspapers published op-eds supporting the recommendations of the report. The former European Commissioner for Human Rights, Emma
Bonino, was particularly active in promoting the idea on the eve of the London donors' conference for Afghanistan. Finally,

in January 2006, a resolution of the European Parliament called on the London donors' conference to "take into consideration the proposal of licensed production of opium for medical purposes, as already granted to a number of countries" (Bonino, 2006b).

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Drug CP Impact Module Farmers

Policy of Opium Eradication Harms Farmers more than Drug Dealers Dr. Frederic Grare, Southeast Asia Scholar, February 2008, Centre for International Governance Innovation Forced eradication is traditionally the US government's preferred anti-narcotics policy. Faced with crop destruction, farmers supposedly have increased incentive to abandon illicit cultivation in favor of growing legal products. Related activities such as transportation of illicit drugs, then decline. Financial resource flows
to warlords and terrorists dry up. The entire production and "commercial" chain is thus dismantled (Felbab-Brown, 2005: 62). As we have noted, however, everyone involved in Afghanistan's reconstruction and the war on drugs well understands that it is counter-productive to target farmers directly. The approaches adopted in Afghanistan rely on a combination of interdiction, eradication, and alternative livelihood interventions. The US president's National Drug Control Strategy, for example, focuses on "promoting alternative livelihoods for farmers, strengthening drug law enforcement and interdiction programs, supporting capacity building for Afghan institutions" In this strategy, "eradication efforts [are] tied to development of alternative livelihoods where practical" (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2004). While public information is also a pillar of this approach, eradication and alternative livelihoods are obviously the central elements of this policy. The effort is complemented by the inclusion of capacity-building programs in law enforcement and justice reform. The eradication policy is based on the conviction that "in addition to the obvious reason, eradication is needed to begin installing in the minds of the populace that the government is serious about not tolerating opium cultivation and that, by extension, there is significant monetary risk in planting opium poppy" (Ibid). Its objective is to reduce production by 20 per cent per year. The alternative livelihoods strategy is also of central importance. As indicated before, there is consensus in the international community that targeting farmers should be avoided so as to preserve a highly fragile political situation. The concept of alternative livelihoods emerged in 2002 from a number of factors. In particular, these included: an analysis of the weaknesses of the "alternative development" strategies4 of the past; recognition of the immensity of the opium problem; and the availability of substantial international aid allocated to reconstruction and development (Mansfield and Pain, 2005: 4). The objective is to address the causes of cultivation through a wider state-building and development agenda. Implicit in the concept is the recognition that opium poppy cultivation will not contract simply by enhancing licit livelihoods opportunities. Supporting agriculture is therefore an essential component of the strategy, but providing social and physical infrastructure as well as credit is also a key component of the wider strategy. All these elements combined in 2005 to produce a sharp decline in opium-cultivated areas. The result was spectacular in Badakhshan and Nangahar provinces. In Nangahar, poppy cultivation declined by 95 per cent. Overall, opium-cultivated areas contracted by some 27,000 hectares. However, due to favourable weather conditions, actual opium production declined by only 2.1 per cent.

Critics argue that, as the root causes of poppy cultivation have not been addressed, this decline is not sustainable. In some districts, farmers have announced that they will resume poppy cultivation if they do not receive
further assistance (Labrousse, 2005a: 304). Officials in charge of the counter-narcotics operations are cautious regarding the future. Some experts contend, however, that a resumption of poppy cultivation in 2006 by some farmers should not necessarily be considered a failure, as it will take time for alternatives to become sustainable (Ibid).

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Drug CP Impact Module Taliban

Legalization of Poppy Could Cut into Taliban Drug Profits Spiegel, Journalist, March 27 2007, Spiegel Online
Corruption. Crime. Addiction. And money for the Islamist Taliban insurgency. The list of ills engendered by opium and heroin production in Afghanistan is long. So too is the list of buyers -- the country accounts for over 90 percent of all opium produced on the planet. And international efforts to cut that output have proven fruitless. But a change of strategy may be on the horizon . Governments in Berlin, Paris and Rome, along with NATO

leadership are discussing a potentially explosive new idea: the legalization of Afghanistan's opium production. The plan envisages farmers being able to sell their poppies to officially licensed buyers for the same price they currently get from the drug barons. The product could then be sold to the pharmaceutical industry for pain medication and other products. "We are not bringing drug cultivation under control with the concepts we have had up to now," a NATO general responsible for Afghanistan told SPIEGEL. A quick glance at production statistics proves the general's point. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) found that the amount of raw opium produced in Afghanistan in 2006 had increased by 49 percent over the previous year to around 6,100 tons . Much of the proceeds -- an estimated $3 billion -- are pumped back into the Taliban , as the Islamists continue to gain ground against NATO and US forces in the southern part of the country. Worse, battling opium production is made more difficult by the country's instability. Zalmai Afzali, a spokesman for Afghanistan's Ministry of Counter Narcotics told Reuters earlier this month:
"If we do not have peace in the coming months, we will probably end up with another boom in opium production for 2007." The UN also suspects that many in the Afghan government may be complicit in the opium trade. Afghan President Hamid Karzai's brother is likewise suspect. So far, the coalition forces and the Afghan government have focused on trying to eradicate the poppies used to produce opium and heroin and attempting to convince poor farmers to plant something else.

The US likewise prefers destroying poppy crops. The strategy, though, has served to force many desperate farmers into the arms of the Taliban. Legalization, though, could pose its own risks. Critics of the plan
warn that as long as some members of the state apparatus are in the pay of the drug barons, the legalized cultivation of poppies could just serve to increase their income.

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Drug CP Impact Module Taliban Ext.

Poppy Licensing Supports Stability and Development and Would Harm Taliban
Reza Aslan, Middle East Correspondent/Author, December 18 2008, CBS News

Afghanistan may be one the poorest countries in the world, but by legalizing and licensing opium production it could conceivably become the Saudi Arabia of morphine. It is a measure of just how great a failure the counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan has been that, after six consecutive years of record growth in poppy production, including a staggering 20 percent increase last year alone, American and U.N. officials are actually patting themselves on the back over a 6 percent decline in 2008. We are finally seeing the results of years of effort, said Antonio Maria Costa, who heads the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

Yet this meager decline has almost nothing to do with international eradication efforts and everything to do with the law of supply and demand. As The New York Times reported in November, the Taliban have begun
forcibly curbing poppy production and stockpiling opium in order to boost prices, which had fallen sharply due to a glut in the market. Indeed, Afghanistan has produced so much opiumbetween 90 to 95 percent of the worlds supply

that prices have dropped nearly 20 percent. The truth is that the poppy eradication effort in Afghanistan, which consists mostly of hacking away at poppy fields with sticks and sickles, or spraying them from above with deadly herbicides, has been nothing short of a disaster. All this policy has managed to achieve (excluding that vaunted 6 percent decrease ) is to alienate the Afghan people, fuel support for the Taliban, and further weaken the government of president Hamid Karzai,
whose own brother has been linked to the illegal opium trade. Meanwhile, poppy cultivation is now such an entrenched part of Afghanistan's economy that in some parts of the country, opium is considered legal tender, replacing cash in day-to-day transactions. In spite of all this, the U.S. State Department is planning to expand its crop eradication campaign. Last year, President Bush tapped the former ambassador to Columbia, William Wood, to become U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. Wood, whose nickname in Columbia was Chemical Bill, because of his enthusiasm for aerial fumigation, has been charged with implementing in Afghanistan the same crop eradication program thatdespite five billion dollars and hundreds of tons of chemicalshas had little effect on Colombia's coca production.

It is no exaggeration to say that we have a better chance of defeating the Taliban than putting a dent in Afghanistans opium trade. So then, as the saying goes: if you cant beat them, join them.
The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), a policy think-tank with offices in London and Kabul, has proposed abandoning the futile eradication efforts in Afghanistan and instead licensing farmers to legally grow poppies for the production of medical morphine. This so-called Poppy for Medicine program is not as crazy as it may

sound. Similar programs have already proven successful in Turkey and India, both of which were able to bring the illegal production of opium in their countries under control by licensing, regulating, and taxing poppy cultivation (The Taliban, which taxes poppy cultivation under their control at 10 percent, made $300 million dollars last year.) The global demand for poppy-based medicine is as great as it is for oil. According to the International Narcotics Control Board, 80 percent of the worlds population currently faces a shortage of morphine; morphine prices have skyrocketed as a result. The ICOS estimates that Afghanistan could supply this market with
all the morphine it needs, and at a price at least 55 percent lower than the current market average. Thus far, the Bush Administration has balked at this idea, despite a warm reception from the Afghan government and some NATO allies. There is a fear in Washington that such a proposal would contradict Americas avowed war on drugs. But the opium crisis in Afghanistan is not a drug enforcement problem, it is a national security issue: Licensing and

regulating poppy cultivation would not only create stability and economic development, it could sap support for the Taliban and help win the war in Afghanistan.

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Drug CP Popular
Middle East Narcotics Legalization Supported by Empirical Precedents Anne Applebaum, Journalist, January 16 2007, Slate
Now NATO is fighting a war to eradicate opium from Afghanistan. Allegedly, this time around the goals are different.

According to the modern British government, Afghanistan's illicit-drug trade poses the "gravest threat to the long term security, development and effective governance of Afghanistan," particularly since the Taliban are believed to be the biggest beneficiaries of drug sales. Convinced that this time they are doing the morally right thing, Western governments are spending hundreds of millions of dollars bulldozing poppy fields, building up counternarcotics squads, and financing alternative crops in Afghanistan . Chemical spraying may begin as early as this spring. But, in retrospect, might history not judge this war to be every bit as destructive and wasteful as the original Opium Wars? Of course, right now it isn't fashionable to argue for any legal form of opiate cultivation. But look at the evidence. At the moment, Afghanistan's opium exports account for somewhere between two-thirds and one-third of the country's GDP, depending on whether you believe the United Nations or the United States. The biggest producers are in the southern provinces where the
Taliban is at its strongest. Every time a poppy field is destroyed, a poor person becomes poorerand more likely to support the Taliban against the Western forces who wrecked his crops . Every time money is spent on alternative crops, it has to be distributed through a corrupt or nonexistent local bureaucracy. To date, the results of all this are utterly dispiriting. According to a U.S. government report from December 2006, the amount of land dedicated to poppy production grew last year by more than 60 percent. So central is the problem that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has called opium a "cancer" worse than terrorism. Spraying may make things worse: Not only will it cause environmental and health damage, Western planes dropping poisonous chemicals from the sky will feel to the local population like a military attack. Yet by far the most depressing aspect of the Afghan poppy crisis is the fact that it exists at allbecause it doesn't have to. To see what I mean, look at the history of Turkey, where once upon a time the drug trade also threatened the country's political and economic stability. Just like Afghanistan, Turkey had a long tradition of poppy cultivation. Just like Afghanistan, Turkey worried that poppy eradication could bring down the government. Just like Afghanistan, Turkeythis was the era of Midnight Expresswas identified as the main source of the heroin sold in the West. Just like in Afghanistan, a ban was tried, and it failed. As a result, in 1974, the Turks, with

U.S. and U.N. support, tried a different tactic. They began licensing poppy cultivation for the purpose of producing morphine, codeine, and other legal opiates. Legal factories were built to replace the illegal ones.
Farmers registered to grow poppies, and they paid taxes. You wouldn't necessarily know this from the latest White House drug strategy reportwhich devotes several pages to Afghanistan but doesn't mention Turkeybut the U.S.

government still supports the Turkish program, even requiring U.S. drug companies to purchase 80 percent of what the legal documents euphemistically refer to as "narcotic raw materials" from the two traditional producers, Turkey and India. Why not add Afghanistan to this list? The only good arguments against doing soas opposed to the silly, politically correct, "just say no" argumentsare technical: that the weak or nonexistent bureaucracy will be no better at licensing poppy fields than at destroying them, or that some of the raw material will still fall into the hands of the drug cartels. Yet some of these problems can be
solved by building processing factories at the local level and working within local power structures. And even if the program only succeeds in stopping half the drug trade, then a huge chunk of Afghanistan's economy will still emerge from the gray market, the power of the drug barons will be reduced, and, most of all, Western money will have been visibly spent helping Afghan farmers survive instead of destroying their livelihoods. The director of the Senlis Council, a group that studies the drug problem in Afghanistan, told me he reckons that the best way to "ensure more Western soldiers get killed" is to expand poppy eradication further.

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34 Poppy Reduction Impossible Paul Eckert, staff writer for Reuters, 8/3/07 U.S Sees Uphill fight against Afghan Opium Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0332324120070803 Accessed July 1, 2010
The $420 million spent by U.S. government agencies on poppy eradication in the war-torn country in 2006 was "dwarfed by the roughly $38 billion 'street value' if the entire Afghan poppy crop were converted to heroin," it said .The report by

State Department Inspector General Howard Krongard said initial U.S. eradication goals for 2007 in Afghanistan, the source of about 90 percent of the world's opium, were "not realistic." The Taliban, which
ruled Afghanistan under strict principals of Islamic law, drastically reduced poppy growing throughout the country in the years before it was ousted by the U.S.-led 2001 invasion for harboring al Qaeda militants.But in recent years poppy growth has increased dramatically, especially in southern provinces where the Taliban has encouraged the profitable crop.A U.S. government assessment team that visited seven locations in Afghanistan "found no realistic possibility of outspending economic incentives in the narcotics industry ," the report said.It added that "security in the poppy producing provinces was viewed as a growing concern and necessitated further reliance on inadequate air support for execution of counternarcotics programs." Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher told reporters on Thursday, ahead a visit to Washington next week by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, that "The poppy issue this year is: There is going to be a lot of production in Afghanistan."But Boucher, the top U.S. diplomat for South and Central Asia, said that growth of the raw material for heroin was increasingly concentrated in the "areas of the insurgency" and that production was decreasing in areas where Karzai's U.S.-backed government has established control. "So you'll probably go this year from six poppy-free provinces to at least double that number," said Boucher. Opium production

in Afghanistan rose by as much as 50 percent last year, according to a United Nations estimate. This year's crop, recently harvested, could easily equal that, the United Nations says. The Afghan and Western
governments accuse Taliban insurgents of offering protection to opium farmers in return for taxing their crop and then using the funds to fend off Afghan and foreign troops.

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Drug War Good Stability

Drug War is key to Success and Stability in Afghanistan Rachel Ehrenfeld, writer for Forbes Magazine, 2/26/09 Stop the Afghan Drug Trade, Stop Terrorism Forbes Magazine
http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/26/drug-trade-afghanistan-opinions-contributors_terrorism_mycoherbicides.html Accessed July 1, 2010 "The fight against drugs is actually the fight for Afghanistan ," said Afghan President Hamid Karzai when he took office in 2002. Judging by the current situation, Afghanistan is losing. To win, the link between narcotics and terrorism must be severed . That is the necessary condition for a successful strategy to undermine the growing influence of al-Qaida, the Taliban and radical Muslim groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is all about money--more precisely, drug money. The huge revenues from the heroin trade fill the coffers of the terrorists and thwart any attempt to stabilize the region .Though not traded on any stock exchange, heroin is one of the most valuable commodities in the world today. While a ton of crude oil costs less than $290, a ton of heroin costs $67 million in Europe and between $360 million and $900 million in New York, according to estimates based on recent Drug Enforcement Administration figures.Since its liberation from Taliban rule, Afghanistan's opium production has gone from 640 tons in 2001 to 8,200 tons in 2007. Afghanistan now supplies over 93% of the global opiate market."This is a source of income for the warlords and regional factions to pay their soldiers," warned former Afghan Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalili in a May 2005 interview with Reuters. "The terrorists are funding their operations through illicit drug trade, so they are all interlinked." In 2004, the G-8 designated Britain to lead counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Its three-year eradication policy was designed specifically not to alienate the local population. It dictated the crop eradication be done "by hand." Moreover, the

British entrusted the provincial governors with the eradication process, even though Afghan provincial governors, many of whom are powerful warlords, have been engaged in the drug trade for decades. Not surprisingly, the eradication effort failed miserably. Comment On This Story The exponential growth in narcoterrorism in Afghanistan led to a well-entrenched narco-economy, strengthening the power of tribal warlords, the Taliban and al-Qaida . The growing
violence led NATO leaders, who met in Budapest in October 2008, to agree to allow their military forces to strike the drug traffickers. However, NATO troops were not ordered to attack; in fact, NATO's European allies are "averse" to drug eradication programs for fear of alienating the local population and because of the risks associated with such operations.

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NATO FL [1/3]
1. NATO obsolete no one listens to it anymore and your impact has not happened Amos Perlmutter, December 6, 1993 staff writer for Insight on the News and for Foreign Affairs and a political science and
sociology professor at American University and editor of the Journal of Strategic Studies NATO must face the fact it is obsoletereason for existence ended with the demise of the Cold War- Column Insight on the news http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_n49_v9/ai_14716548/

For nearly 50 years, NATO was a success in its stated mission, a remarkable achievement in the annals of alliances. Ironically, it has become the major victim of its most singular triumph -- stopping international communist aggression, a threat that no longer exists. Today, NATO appears to be in a state of
confusion, a victor with no parades and testimonials, a behemoth without a purpose. As might be expected, however, NATO has no desire to die. There's a little bit of Alice in Wonderland at work here -- the Cheshire cat is gone but its smile remains. NATO has become an entrenched and far-flung bureaucracy with large chunks of valuable property in terms of bases, depots, military installations, ammunition and weapons stores. It is filled with talented personnel, including some of the top security, intelligence and military minds in Europe. Not unlike the U.S. military, the alliance is trying to find a new direction and identity for itself. There are several arguments for keeping NATO intact, all of them contradictory and tinged with nostalgia. The first rationale centers on Russia reemerging as an empire and once again threatening the peace of Europe -- if not today, then very soon. The alliance would transfer troops from Germany to the Russian border with Poland and Ukraine to guard against that eventuality. This is sheer madness. It means that all military strategy would continue to be designed as if the Cold War were still in place, a fact that would be duly noted by the Russians. A second rationale takes the opposite tack and envisions Russia joining NATO. To what purpose, one might ask? To defend the United States and Germany against former Soviet republics? That's not likely. The third rationale is based on the idea that the United States, given its current neoisolationist mood, would be replaced by Germany and Russia as the most powerful military guarantor of European security. That assumes that Germany's will -- shaky and very hesitant at the moment -- matches its economic and military might and that other European states would consider Germany as Europe's major interventionist state. No current German politician on the left or the right would even contemplate the return of Germany as the military power in Europe or as acting as the leading power in NATO, taking over the position that the United States has filled. These rationales are nothing short of preposterous. One only need look at the alliance's role in pacifying and negotiating serious conflicts raised by ethnic and nationalist forces seeking their consolidation in the Cold War interregnum. Germany actually precipitated the Yugoslavian breakup by prematurely recognizing Croatia and Slovenia. It then demonstrated no inclination to use its power and act as a firefighter either in the Croat-Serb war or in Bosnia. NATO, with Germany as a crucial player, has failed to bite the bullet on the most serious crisis in Europe.What is the need for NATO? The balance of power in Europe and its security can be maintained by the European Community and its military structure. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland are pushing to enter NATO, but it appears that what they really want is to join the EC for its economic support. Defending the borders of Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria against Russia should be the natural function of the European Community, not the alliance -- if the EC is willing, of course. If no troops were sent to protect and defend Poland or to back the revolts in East Germany and Hungary against Soviet forces, Europe and the U.S. hardly are likely to become involved in Russian hegemonial drives involving Soviet republics . If NATO was unable to intervene in Bosnia except for

negligible air strikes, how would it tackle situations in Georgia or Armenia that are infinitely more complex? It's entirely a pipe dream. The realities of contemporary international relations , with the United States on an inward retreat and Germany unwilling to become Europe's America, leaves NATO with no reason to exist. 2. Empirically Denied countries have broken with NATO and there hasnt been an impact

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NATO FL [2/3]
3. TURN: NATO increases European instability and conflict LA Times , March 16, 2010 NATO Credibility at Stake LA Times http://articles.latimes.com/2001/mar/16/local/me-38386
Accessed July 1, 2010

For months, armed ethnic Albanians have been stirring trouble in the buffer zone that separates Kosovo from Serbia. NATO forces policing the three-mile-wide area have done little to stop ethnic Albanians from converting the zone into a training camp for its guerrillas and a staging ground for armed forays into Macedonia. Serbian soldiers moved into the buffer zone Wednesday under an agreement between NATO and Belgrade. Sending Serbs in to keep peace increases tension in the area and undermines NATO credibility. The ethnic Albanian guerrilla leaders operating in the zone agreed to a cease-fire but at the same time disclaimed control over their disorganized factions. The guerrillas are responsible for dozens of Serbian police and civilian casualties in the buffer zone, but more important, they are poisoning relations between neighbors and ethnic groups in the region. Continued violence stoked by ethnic Albanians poses particular danger for adjacent Macedonia, where the gunmen have been fomenting unrest within the Albanian minority. Ethnic Albanians make up more than a quarter of Macedonia's population and have learned to live with the Slavic majority. Insurgency by the Albanian militants threatens the delicate ethnic balance and could engulf the former Yugoslav republic in the next Balkan ethnic bloodletting. The Macedonian government is desperately urging NATO forces in Kosovo, which include 4,600 U.S. troops, to prevent the guerrillas from crossing the border, and for a good reason. In two days of fighting earlier this week, the guerrillas moved to within 12 miles of the Macedonian capital, Skopje.Instead of curbing the ethnic Albanian insurgency, the presence of Serbian soldiers in the buffer zone may in fact increase the likelihood of violence and draw the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into a conflict--on the side of Serbia--against those it is there to protect: ethnic Albanians. The Albanian population harbors aspirations of one day becoming part of Greater Kosovo and deeply distrusts the unreformed Serbian military. Clearly, disarming the ethnic Albanian guerrillas and sealing the borders to stem the flow of arms are key priorities, but the job should be carried out by NATO troops. With former Joint Special Operations Command chief General Stanley McChrystal in charge of what will soon be over 150,000 U.S. and NATO troops in the Afghanistan-Pakistan war theater, Washington will conduct its largest counterinsurgency operations since those in Indochina in the 1960s and early 1970s. NATO, established in 1949 supposedly to confront the Soviet Union and its allies in Central Europe, is waging its first land war almost 3,000 miles east of its former border with the Warsaw Pact.

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NATO FL [3/3]
4. NATO collapse doesnt cause nuke war Barbara Conry, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, The Western European Untion as NATOs Successor The CATO Institute http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-239.html Accessed July 1, 2010 It is inaccurate to suggest, as NATO partisans often do, that the only alternative to Atlanticism is a return to the dark ages of the interwar era: nationalized European defenses, American isolationism, xenophobia, demagoguery, and the other evils associated with the rise of Hitler and World War II.
Former U.S. senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) warns that weakening NATO will have dire consequences. "As we have thrice before in this dreadful century, [we will] set in motion an instability that can only lead to war, shed blood, and lost treasure. Pray that we are wiser."(4) Lawrence di Rita of the Heritage Foundation similarly defends NATO as an "insurance policy" against a future world war. "If keeping 65,000 young Americans in Europe will prevent 10 times that many new headstones in Arlington cemetery once the Europeans turn on themselves again--as they have twice this century--then it's a small price to pay."(5)Such alarmism underestimates the significance of 50 years of economic and political cooperation among the West European powers and the role of pan-European institution ssuch as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It also ignores the fact that a viable institutional alternative to NATO--the Western European Union--already exists . With the proper resources and recognition on the part of Washington and the Europeans that an independent European defense is essential in the post-Cold War era, the WEU is a promising alternative to Atlanticism. Far from being a lame second choice to NATO or defense on the cheap, a robust WEU would be superior to NATO in many ways, better suited in the long run to protecting

European and, indirectly, American interests 5. NATO following US lead on War in Afghanistan Rick Rozoff, staff writer for Australia.to News Janurary 14, 2010 Afghanistan: NATO Intensifies its First Asian War Australia.to http://www.australia.to/2010/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=480:afghanistan-nato-intensifies-its-first-asian-war&catid=94:breakingnews Accessed July 1, 2010
On January 8 the Washington Post provided North Atlantic Treaty Organization secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt a column in which the two, while deferring to their big brother

in Washington - "The United States has played a central role in defending the values and the security of the Euro-Atlantic community" - nevertheless asserted that "Europe can deliver and can be a real partner for the United States. That is what is happening now in the global mission in Afghanistan ." [1]Unquestioned loyalty to the trans-Atlantic partnership with the United States is synonymous with subordination to NATO, and currently the touchstone for fealty to the military bloc is blind willingness to follow the U.S. further and yet deeper into the increasingly bloody imbroglio in Afghanistan.

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NATO FL Ext. 1
NATO no longer necessary Barbara Conry, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, The Western European Untion as NATOs Successor The CATO Institute http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-239.html Accessed July 1, 2010 That approach is wrong and potentially dangerous. NATO functioned effectively during the Cold War, but it is out of place in the new international environment. The conditions that led to its creation--the Soviet threat and the extraordinary coincidence of American and European interests in containing that threat-no longer exist. The Soviet Union is gone, and the concurrence in American and European interests has diminished dramatically; conflict, not cooperation, has been the hallmark of U.S.-European relations in the post-Cold War era. Former British diplomat Jonathan Clarke makes the provocative observation, "If NATO did not
already exist, it is doubtful that Washington would now invent it."(2)

NATO credibility shot Barbara Conry, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, The Western European Untion as NATOs Successor The CATO Institute http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-239.html Accessed July 1, 2010
No alliance has ever persisted longer than the threat that spawned it. The idea of an alliance is logically inseparable from the idea of a threat and a foe. . . . In the absence of a threat and a foe, the NATO alliance as we know it will not persist much longer.(12)

Afghanistan people are upset with failure of NATO troops New left review 2008 [New Left Review 50, March-April 2008 AFGHANISTAN: MIRAGE OF THE GOOD
WARhttp://www.newleftreview.org/?page=article&view=2713]

Talk of victory sounds increasingly hollow to Afghan ears. Many who detest the Taliban are so angered by the failures of NATO and the behaviour of its troops that they are pleased there is some opposition. What was initially viewed by some locals as a necessary police action against al-Qaeda following the 9.11 attacks is now perceived by a growing majority in the region as a fully fledged imperial occupation. Successive recent reports have suggested that the unpopularity of the government and the disrespectful
behaviour of the occupying troops have had the effect of creating nostalgia for the time when the Taliban were in power. The repression leaves people with no option but to back those trying to resist, especially in a part of the world where the culture of revenge is strong. When a whole community feels threatened it reinforces solidarity, regardless of the character or weakness of those who fight back. This does not just apply to the countryside. The mass protests in Kabul, when civilians were killed by an American military vehicle, signalled the obvious targets.

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NATO FL Ext. 2
Europeans have broken with the US already and your impact has not happened Barbara Conry, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, The Western European Untion as NATOs Successor The CATO Institute http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-239.html Accessed July 1, 2010 The most spectacular rift within NATO has been over policy toward the former Yugoslavia. Much of the dispute has centered on Washington's refusal to commit ground troops in Bosnia even as it has called for aggressive policies (such as the "lift and strike" option) that the Europeans felt would jeopardize their troops on the ground, who were serving as part of a UN "peacekeeping" force . An
unnamed French official remarked that Washington's policy was, at the very least, inconsistent. "It's nice to say you want to help the victims of aggression, but it bears no relation to what is happening on the ground. The Americans say they know what is right and what we should do, but they don't even dare to put their troops on the line."(21) London's Independent was harsher.No amount of diplomatic niceties can conceal the true implications of America's behaviour in theBalkans. The first phase of the post-Cold War era, the period when everything seemed possible, is over, from now on, the Europeans face tough security decisions and more often than not these will have to be taken without U.S. co-operation.(22) The U.S.-

European discord over Bosnia underscores that American and European interests are no longer in sync as they were during the Cold War . The dispute did not itself cause the disharmony between U.S. and European
interests. Wall Street Journal correspondent Mark Nelson recognizes the long-term significance. "With no common enemy, Europe and American are coming unglued. . . . Though Europe and America have confronted plenty of problems in the course of their common history . . . this latest rift is deeper and more fundamental."(23) And as Michael Lind of the New Republic warns, "To invent a threat in order to reunite these interests is to act against the grain of both history and sanity."(24)

Empirically Proven Russia ignores NATO already and no impact Barbara Conry, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, The Western European Untion as NATOs Successor The CATO Institute http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-239.html Accessed July 1, 2010 But Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that his country would ignore Nato's calls to prevent oil getting through and would continue supplying President Slobodan Milosevic's government with fuel.
"We cannot do anything to worsen the suffering of the people in Yugoslavia, and we will continue delivering oil in keeping with our international commitments," Mr Ivanov said. Russian special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin, who returned from Belgrade with a fresh peace offer on Thursday, backed up Mr Ivanov.

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NATO FL Ext. 5
NATO Ally, Germany, continues to support US presence in Afghanistan Angela Merkel, German Prime Minister, November 30 2008, The Local "We want Afghanistan to be able to defend itself, that it has a stable government and that its own security forces can protect the country," the chancellor told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung in an interview published Sunday. "When we've achieved that then Afghanistan won't need our soldiers anymore." "A debate over a possible withdrawal [of German troops] would play directly into the hands of those powers that aim to destabilise Afghanistan." At the same time, Merkel
reiterated her opposition to increasing the German troop contingent. Germany currently has 4,500 soldiers stationed in Afghanistan, as part of a NATO force of around 60,000, of which about half are American. Opposition to German involvement in the war in Afghanistan runs high in Germany. At least 30 German soldiers have been killed so far in seven years of fighting. The chancellor said she looked forward to a change in the US presidency, since the future president Barack Obama would spur new discussions over the conflict in Afghanistan and on Pakistan's role in the war.

Other NATO allies like Britain continue to support Afghan War effort Liam Fox, UK Secretary of Defense, June 28 2010, The Wall Street Journal
In Afghanistan today, the NATO-led operations are a direct consequence of 9/11, with troops from 46 countries, including 9,500 British forces. The Taliban gave al Qaeda sanctuary and allowed it to run terrorist training camps from Afghanistan. Now, though driven out of power, reduced and under considerable pressure, al Qaeda and their backers in the Taliban continue to pose a real threat on both sides of the border with Pakistan. Afghanistan is where the will of the international community is being tested and it is where the sacrifice continues to be significant. The brunt is being borne by America, but there are grieving families in countries across the coalition. It is understandable that our democratic societies question whether the sacrifice is worth it. We need to be clear about our objectives, and clear about how we will achieve them. We must not confuse the reason we are in Afghanistanto deny terrorists a safe

havenwith the way in which we will succeed: building an Afghanistan that is strong enough to resist on its own. We must remember that Afghanistan, just as Iraq, is not a classic war of attritionthis is counter-insurgency,
and it will not be won by military means alone. There is no group of commanders sitting patiently in a tent awaiting a delegation under a white flag offering a formal surrender. This is about reducing the threat to a level that the Afghan government can manage on its own, without the risk to the outside world that we saw graphically at 9/11. Our mission is

focused on creating a stable enough system of security and governance to achieve this. With Pakistani forces bearing down on terrorists and extremists on their side, al Qaeda and their Taliban supporters are taking a considerable hit. As the forces of the coalition surge and the Afghan National Security Forces grow and
become more effective, the challenge is being taken into the remaining strongholds of the Taliban-led insurgency. But our opponents are determined, motivated and adaptable. They will continue to test themselves against the surge in international troop numbers, seeking to prove their relevance and resilience. We can expect ground to be contested across Afghanistan, and, sadly, we can also expect more casualties across the coalition. We must hold our nerve and maintain our

resilience. If we want people to pay the price of success, we must spell out the cost of failure. If NATO left Afghanistan now, the Taliban would wrest control of parts of the country and al-Qaeda and their terrorist training camps could return. It would be a shot in the arm to violent extremists everywhere. Instability could spread across this volatile region. Failure would also damage the credibility of NATO , which has
been the cornerstone of the defense of the West for the past half-century. We would be less safe and less secure, our resolve called into question and our cohesion weakened. In the capitals of the coalition, we must recognize that tactical setbacks are not strategic defeats; that progress will be incremental, where there are more good days than bad; and that our impatience to see our troops come home should be subservient to the needs of national security. As a coalition we need to have clear messages for the Afghan people, and those messages need to be communicated by our deeds as well as our words. We are neither colonizers nor occupiers. We are not in Afghanistan to create a carbon copy of a Western democracy, and we are not there to convert the people to Western ways. We seek government of Afghanistan by the Afghans themselves. We insist only that it does not pose a security threat to our interests or allies. American and Britain have stood shoulder to shoulder many times in the past, in the face of tyranny and adversityin defense of freedom. Today in Afghanistan we stand shoulder to shoulder again, alongside our many partners and alongside

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42 The struggle against terrorism endures and is bigger than any single country or any single leader, political or military. In the long shadow of 9/11, only united will we prevail.
the Afghans themselves.

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43 NATO following US lead on War in Afghanistan Rick Rozoff, staff writer for Australia.to News Janurary 14, 2010 Afghanistan: NATO Intensifies its First Asian War Australia.to http://www.australia.to/2010/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=480:afghanistan-nato-intensifies-its-first-asian-war&catid=94:breakingnews Accessed July 1, 2010
On January 8 the Washington Post provided North Atlantic Treaty Organization secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt a column in which the two, while deferring to their big brother

in Washington - "The United States has played a central role in defending the values and the security of the Euro-Atlantic community" - nevertheless asserted that "Europe can deliver and can be a real partner for the United States. That is what is happening now in the global mission in Afghanistan ." [1]Unquestioned loyalty to the trans-Atlantic partnership with the United States is synonymous with subordination to NATO, and currently the touchstone for fealty to the military bloc is blind willingness to follow the U.S. further and yet deeper into the increasingly bloody imbroglio in Afghanistan.

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Leadership Key to NATO

TURN: US leadership in Afghanistan key to the NATO alliance Paul Gallis 2007 [Paul Gallis, NATO in Afghanistan, CRS Report for Congress, 23 October 2007.New Left Review 50, MarchApril 2008 AFGHANISTAN: MIRAGE OF THE GOOD WARhttp://www.newleftreview.org/?page=article&view=2713] More strategically, Afghanistan has become a central theatre for reconstituting, and extending, the Wests power-political grip on the world order . It provides, first, an opportunity for the US to shrug off problems in persuading its allies to play a broader role in Iraq. As Obama and Clinton have stressed, America and its

allies have greater unity of purpose in Afghanistan. The ultimate outcome of NATOs effort to stabilize Afghanistan and US leadership of that effort may well affect the cohesiveness of the alliance and Washingtons ability to shape NATOs future . [26] Beyond this, it is the rise of China that has prompted
NATO strategists to propose a vastly expanded role for the Western military alliance. Once focused on the Euro-Atlantic area, a recent essay in NATO Review suggests, in the 21st century NATO must become an alliance founded on the EuroAtlantic area, designed to project systemic stability beyond its borders

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Politics Popular Public

American favor having troops in Afghanistan Frank Newport 2009 [In U.S., More Support for Increasing Troops in Afghanistan November 25, 2009 Americans now tilt
slightly toward sending in new troops as opposed to reducing number by Frank Newport http://www.gallup.com/poll/124490/in-u.s.more-support-increasing-troops-afghanistan.aspx ] Americans over the last two weeks have become slightly more likely to favor sending more U.S. troops to Afghanistan, and slightly less likely to favor a reduction in forces. At this point, 47% of Americans would advise President Obama to increase the number of U.S. troops -- either by the roughly 40,000 recommended by the commanding general in Afghanistan or by a smaller amount -- while 39% would advise Obama to reduce the number of troops. Another 9% would opt to leave troop levels as they are, while 5% have no opinion.

Polls Support for the War in Afghanistan

Frank Newport, pollster for Gallup.com, July 25, 2008 Afghan War Edges Out Iraq as Most Important for U.S. USA TODAY/Gallup Polls

articles appear to strongly support the initial decision to go to war in Afghanistan, based on responses to Gallup's classic "mistake" question (which has been asked about U.S. conflicts since the Korean War in the early 1950s). Two-thirds (68%) affirm the basis for sending military forces to Afghanistan, saying it was not a mistake. Public supports increase of troops in Afghanistan Brian Montopoli 2009 [Poll: Americans Back Troop Surge, Oppose Withdrawal Date Posted by Brian Montopoli December 9, 2009 6:30 PM http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-5955120-503544.html] 51% of Americans approve of sending more troops to Afghanistan , a strategy the President outlined in his
speech last week. 43% disapprove. There is a noteworthy partisan dynamic to these views: members of the Presidents own party disapprove of a troop increase in Afghanistan, while two in three Republicans approve. Independents are divided. President Obama said he would begin troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011, but on this a majority disagrees with the president. 55% of the public thinks setting a deadline for troop withdrawal is a bad idea; just 41% think it is a good idea. President Obamas partisans agree with him on this point. Democrats support a

timetable for troop withdrawal, while Republicans and independents do not. However, the public would rather have U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan for just a year or two. 57% are willing for U.S. troops to stay in Afghanistan for two years or less, but just 33% are willing for them to stay longer than that or as long as it takes.

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1NC CP Surge
Text: The United States Federal Government should increase forward deployment in Afghanistan Troop Surge and Continued Occupation Necessary; Excessive Occupation Unlikely DAVID E. SANGER and PETER BAKER, Journalists, December 1 2009, New York Times President Obama said Tuesday that the deployment of 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan is part of a strategy to reverse the Taliban's momentum and stabilize the country's government. "There is no
imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has gained momentum," Obama said at the U.S. Military Academy. "Al Qaeda has not re-emerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe-havens along the border. "And our forces lack the full support they need to effectively train and partner

with Afghan security forces and better secure the population. ... In short, the status quo is not sustainable." Obama said he'd begin sending the additional troops "at the fastest pace possible" starting in early 2010 "with a goal of starting to withdraw forces from the country in July 2011." The president said additional U.S. forces bolstered by NATO troops "will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces." Senior administration officials said Tuesday that Obama has a goal of withdrawing most U.S. forces by the end of his current term, which ends in January 2013. In his speech Tuesday, Obama said his strategy had three objectives: Deny al Qaeda a safe haven Reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow Afghanistan's government Strengthen Afghanistan's security forces and government The additional troops was one way to achieve these, he said. Other
strategies will include holding Afghan government leaders accountable for corruption, focus assistance on areas that could help the lives of Afghans, and securing the country's border with Pakistan. "We are in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. That is why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border," Obama said. The president said he rejected the option of committing more forces for an undefined mission of nation-building without any deadlines. "I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what we can achieve at a reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve to secure our interests," Obama said. "Furthermore, the absence of a timeframe for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan." Obama rejected analogies with the war in Vietnam that divided America in the 1960s and 1970s. " Unlike Vietnam, we are joined by

a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action," Obama said. "Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a broad-based popular insurgency. And most importantly, unlike Vietnam, the American people were viciously attacked from Afghanistan, and remain a target for those same extremists who are plotting along its border." Obama said the U.S. has no interest in occupying Afghanistan. "We
will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens ," Obama said. "And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect -- to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron." The additional U.S. forces "will increase our ability to train competent Afghan security forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight," Obama said. "And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans."

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47 US Forces Essential to Keep the Taliban from Dominating Afghanistan David Fox, Journalist, June 7 2010, Reuters Afghanistan Standing beside a machinegun in a sand-bagged watch tower, an Afghan soldier contemplates a future once Western forces leave the country. The Taliban will capture us in five minutes, said Mohammad Azim at a Kandahar base shared by NATO and Afghan army troops, close to villages where militants easily blend in with the population. Afghanistans stability hinges to a great extent on the performance of the army, especially after U.S. troops start pulling out in 2011. Failure to pacify the Taliban could seriously damage Barack Obamas presidency. He hopes deployment of an extra 30,000 U.S. troops and
the training of Afghan troops will help get the job done. The Afghan army may face their biggest test over the next few months. Western and Afghan troops are intensifying security operations in Kandahar province to

prevent the Taliban from undermining the governments strategy of winning over the public by providing better services, infrastructure and jobs, and stamping out corruption. NATO officials say it wont
be too long before the Afghan army can take on the Taliban, even though tens of thousands of Western forces failed to defeat them in nine years of war. But a different picture emerges from an interview with Afghan army Lt. Ali Hussain, who spends much of his day on his computer studying photographs of the latest Taliban bombs. He goes over a long mental list of what the Afghan army needs to ensure the Taliban dont take over once foreign forces leave planes, helicopters, tanks, heavy weapons and night vision goggles. Aside from trying to raise the morale of poorly equipped soldiers, Hussain struggles for intelligence on the Taliban, who he says slip into villages at night to brutalize people so they dont back the state. Lt. Hussain estimates there are 25 hard core Taliban fighters in the area. Although he has an idea of who their commanders may be, it is difficult to track militants without people on the ground. One of his soldiers, Abdulwakil, just spent weeks on the frontline fighting the Taliban. They fire at us, and then we shoot at them. Eventually they lay down their weapons and they look like everybody else, he said. Hussain hopes tribal elders, businessmen and Western forces will bring investments so there are tangible incentives for people to back the government. He has taken part in nine suras, or local councils to help reach that aim. Six kilometers of road have been built under pledges made in the meetings. But a lot more needs to be done. Unlike Western forces on the base, who have endless access to chilled mineral water, he drinks from a warm bottle for lack of a refrigerator as he watches television to check on Afghanistans security situation. There may be no good news until Western troops teach Afghan soldiers to fight for themselves and money pours into Kandahar province, the Taliban heartland. When that happens is anybodys guess. Its the million dollar question, said Major Austin Douglas, Officer Commanding Bravo Company. Its not good to get peoples expectations up and give them a date.

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CP Surge Solvency
Surges success will be promising over time Kurt Volker and John Nagl, Ambassador to NATO and Think Tank Contributor, May 9 20 10, The Washington Post The counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan that President Obama committed to twice over the course of 2009 is beginning to take hold. This strategy, like the one adopted in Iraq in 2007, is much more than an additional commitment of troops and civilian experts; it focuses on protecting the local population in order to provide a secure space within which political solutions to the underlying problems driving the insurgency can develop. Counterinsurgency campaigns are not won by killing or capturing every insurgent and terrorist; while the most committed ideologues have to be killed or captured, many of the foot soldiers
and even the mid-level leaders decide at some point that renouncing violence and becoming part of the political process offer a better chance for success than continuing to fight. The increased U.S. troop commitment in south and

east Afghanistan, where the insurgency is strongest, along with more effective drone strikes and an increasing Pakistani government commitment to counterinsurgency, are putting more pressure on the Taliban and giving the Afghan government an opportunity to outgovern its enemies. During his visit to
Washington, Afghan President Hamid Karzai will discuss with Obama how the political effort is faring -- and what the United States will be willing to accept from Taliban negotiators who are seeking reconciliation with the Afghan government. Whether Karzai is able to provide effective political solutions will be the ultimate test of Obama's counterinsurgency strategy. The surge was always part of a bigger strategy to be implemented over time. This means we can't judge the surge by itself, and it's too early to judge the whole effort . As of today, here's the score sheet: Reversing the Taliban's military momentum: on track. Fighting smarter, to engage the local population: making progress, thanks to Gen. Stanley McChrystal's counterinsurgency approach. Pressuring the Taliban inside Pakistan: surprisingly successful. Training more and better Afghan security forces, so they can lead: lagging. Strengthening civilian efforts, including governance, anti-corruption policies and the economy: real problems here, especially in the relationship with President Hamid Karzai. Hopefully his visit will get us all on the same page. Implementing a regional political and economic strategy to help make Afghanistan sustainable: still on the drawing board. Our biggest liability is that regional actors and NATO allies believe we will pull out beginning in July 2011. Thus the villains play for time, the good actors hedge their bets and the allies guard their wallets. Success in Afghanistan is a

vital U.S. interest for a dozen different reasons. So we may as well be clear, for friend and foe alike: We are in for the long haul and will do whatever it takes. US increase of troops in crucial back-up for combat forces AFP 2009 [Obama approves 13,000 more troops to Afghanistan October 14, 2009 http://www.smh.com.au/world/obama-approves-13000-more-troops-to-afghanistan-20091013-gvtk.html AFP] I'm not a military expert," Karzai said. "What I'm concerned about is the protection of the Afghan people." Major deployments of support troops have not been publicised by the Pentagon and the White House in the past.
When former president George W Bush announced a US troop "surge" in Iraq, he only mentioned 20,000 combat troops and not the accompanying 8,000 support troops . The troop increase approved by Obama means that there are more US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan than during the peak of the surge in Iraq in late 2007 and early 2008. About 65,000 US forces are currently in Afghanistan and about 124,000 in Iraq. At the height of the Iraq surge, 26,000 US troops were in Afghanistan and 160,000 in Iraq, according to a troop count by The Post . The stretched

US military has had to balance competing demands from commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan for support troops, which provide crucial back-up for combat forces. The top US commander in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, has said he is moving to free up troops, aircraft and equipment for the NATOled mission in Afghanistan.

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CP Surge Solvency
Increasing troops is best strategy Kris Alingod 2008 [1:37 p.m. EST Topics: United States Kris Alingod - AHN News Write U.S. To Increase Troops In Afghanistan http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7011495845 July 3, 2008] "It has been a tough month in Afghanistan, but it's also been a tough month for the Taliban ," the President said during a press conference at the White House, according to an official transcript. "I am confident that the strategy is going to work... We're constantly reviewing troop needs, troop levels. We're halfway through 2008; as I said, we're going to increase troops by 2009." " We have doubled Afghan troops -- coalition troops have doubled from two years ago," he added. "So there is an active presence and there are more troops there than there were. But we're constantly reassessing and seeing whether or not we can change tactics in order to achieve our objective." American casualties in Afghanistan peaked to 28 in June, the highest ever since the United
States invaded it in 2001. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Navy Adm. Mike Mullen has expressed concern about the "more organized and efficient" insurgency, saying in a press conference the same day, "Violence is up

significantly from a year ago," according to the Defense Department. Mullen also reiterated his call to increase troops in Afghanistan, where 32,000 U.S. troops make up the 53,000-strong NATO-led coalition. "We are exploring a number of options and opportunities to get a better understanding of the scope of the threat and the best means with which to counter it," Mullen said. "I've made no secret of my desire to flow more U.S. forces to Afghanistan just as soon as I can. Nor have I been shy about saying those forces will not be available
unless or until the situation in Iraq allows us to do so."

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50 The Clear, Hold, Build Surge Strategy Enjoys Early Successes Gordon Lubold, Journalist, May 9 2010, The Christian Science Monitor
The surge of American forces President Obama directed to Afghanistan is under way. So far, 17,000 of the 30,000 additional forces are there, bringing the US total in Afghanistan to 86,000. The rest are expected on the ground by December, for a total of 100,000. How have things been progressing so far, and what can be expected during the next year?

The increase of Marine forces enabled the United States to conduct operations in the Marjah district of Helmand Province this winter, the first operation since the beginning of the surge . The Marjah offensive drove out some insurgents and tempered their influence in the area , at least somewhat. In Afghanistan, where progress is expected to be incremental, the offensive has been seen as a success. In the wake of initial operations, markets opened, villagers returned, and some semblance of security emerged. The next major
operation is now beginning in Kandahar, arguably the second most important cultural, political, and economic city in Afghanistan after Kabul, and considered the spiritual home of the Taliban. Those operations have begun quietly in recent weeks as more surge forces arrive. The Marjah offensive offered clues. It employed some key new strategies that will be implemented by surge forces. First, in an effort to encourage insurgents to leave, coalition forces telegraphed their intentions very publicly. It worked. For the most part, the offensive was anticlimactic.

Insurgents either left or went into hiding as the US and coalition forces arrived. This points to the coalition's shift from an emphasis on killing insurgents to protecting populations. After arriving, coalition
forces essentially built a ring around the area. This contrasts with many presurge offenses, in which troops attacked and then mostly returned to their bases. The goal of the surge is to "clear" key population centers of insurgents, then "hold" them to prevent insurgents from returning. The next step is to maintain law and order to allow Afghans to "build" normal lives. This is called a "clear, hold, build" strategy, which US forces also used in Iraq. During the surge of forces in Iraq, which began in early 2007, the number of US casualties swelled. In January 2007, for example, there were 137,000 troops in Iraq and 86 coalition fatalities, according to icasualties.org. By May 2007, there were 148,000 American troops on the ground and 131 coalition fatalities. But that trend started to change when certain factors converged to help

stabilize Iraq. One of those factors, many experts argue, was that the increasing number of troops created a critical mass to help stem the violence.

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51 The US needs to stay in Afghanistan to keep the people in Afghanistan safe Reginald Sikes 2/22 [DEFINING AFGHANISTAN POLICY AND RISK-AMERICAS ACHILLES HEEL? BY COLONEL
REGINALD L. SIKES, JR. United States AD=ADA518423&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf] Next a regional approach is key, because of the Army 22-02-2010 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?

active sanctuary that terrorist enjoy in neighboring countries and the support they receive from the transnational terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda. The U.S. must focus on disrupting insurgent safe havens, controlling borders to lessen the porous frontier regions, and building regional and international support that makes it inhospitable for terrorists and insurgents. Thus a strategy must reflect a collaborative effort between Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the transnational threat. While an increase in United States forces in Afghanistan will assist , the diplomatic
emphasis must be placed on Pakistan to pursue the Pashtun nationalists, dispossessed tribes, and Islamic extremist that seek to control the Pashtun majority in both regions. Without a collaborative effort in the region, a victory in Afghanistan would only mean a shift in the problem to the east. This in essence would exacerbate the threat of non-state Islamic fundamentalist and their quest to acquire WMD materials.

The only way that afghan will be a safe place is if the US army stays in Afghanistan Reginald Sikes 2/22 [DEFINING AFGHANISTAN POLICY AND RISK-AMERICAS ACHILLES HEEL? BY COLONEL
REGINALD L. SIKES, JR. United States Army 22-02-2010 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? AD=ADA518423&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf] Third, the security of the Afghan population is critical . This entails what many have referred to as a Vietnam Hamlet strategy and immediately incites visions of United States failure.21 Providing security, 24 hours a

day, living with and gaining trust, are the key to winning the counterinsurgency, not destroying the enemy. What demands a continued presence and a renewed emphasis on building the Afghan National Army and Police forces to protect local population centers ? It demonstrates United States resolve and more importantly will demonstrate commitment of the Karzai government to the tribal leaders and people of Afghanistan. This commitment, in fact will marginalize the political, economic, and protective allure of the Taliban, because it hardens the Afghanistan people against their tactics of provocation and intimidation. To aid in this, the legitimization of the local security forces must be presented as the Afghan solution to the problem. While this takes time, the coalition forces must be willing to
close with the Taliban and defeat them in direct combat, and the action must be followed up with rapid political and economic actions by the Karzai government. Failure to do so would only allow the Taliban to achieve driving a wedge between the people and legitimizing the government of Afghanistan.

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CP Surge Impact Module Pakistan

Premature US Withdrawal Could Destabilize Nuclear Armed Pakistan Roy Smith, Journalist, December 8 2009, The Real Military Network
Recently U.S. President Barack Obama has revealed his Afghanistan strategy to the world where extra 30,000 troops will be deployed into Afghanistan, only to expect some of their return in July 2011, during withdrawal. Analysts such as Ahmad Behzad, an Afghan MP, analyst and opponent of President Hamid Karzai has said that this strategy "could fatally destabilize Afghanistan

and nuclear-armed Pakistan, where powerful voices still back the Taliban as a strategic asset against rival India," Spacewar.com wrote. "The timetable came under fire from Obama's hawkish opponents at home and sparked fear in the region that the Taliban would sit out the surge, regroup and attack a pared down US force in 18 months' time." Behzad told AFP, "This will have a massive and destructive side effects...It will boost the morale of terrorist networks. It will make them hope they have a chance of getting power. This is ideal for the Pakistani military and fundamentalists...They will restore their rule in Afghanistan through terrorist networks." In general, many Afghans in the nation believe that the Taliban is sponsored by Pakistan's military "preparing for the day US troops leave so Islamabad can exercise influence over a Taliban government to offset regional superpower India," Spacewar.com wrote. In an interview with AFP, Pakistan's former security chief, Mahmood Shah said, "It appears that Afghanistan again will be pushed into a destabilization and naturally destabilization in Afghanistan does affect Pakistan. Visiting Pakistani professor at Johns Hopkins University, Hasan Askari suggested that "if
Pakistan's army does not do what America wants, the Americans will use their ground troops for that purpose...The problem with Pakistan is they don't have the capacity to open all four, five fronts at the same time and that is what the US is not willing to really understand." Director of Afghanistan's Center for Research and Policy Studies, Haroun Mir added,

"It's very clear that Pakistan does not want to abandon its strategic asset in Afghanistan, which is Taliban. "I'm pretty convinced that the international community could not abandon Afghanistan and leave an unstable
Pakistan with nuclear weapons and an Al-Qaeda which is having more and more control of Pakistani territory." Many Afghans in the nation believe that premature U.S. exit on July 2011 may reveal unwanted and dangerous consequences for America. "I'm pretty sure we'll have some progress with 30,000 troops. It'll put pressure on Pakistan and put pressure on Karzai to fix his administration," Mir said. Pakistan is uneasy about current U.S policies and strongly believes that U.S. won't address their concerns on perceived threat from India. Askari said, "Even here, America doesn't appear to be sensitive about it. If Pakistani cooperation is needed, then Pakistani sensitivities have to be built into this system.

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CP Surge Impact Module Minerals

US Mineral Interests Key to US and Afghani Futures James Risen, Journalist, June 13 2010, The New York Times U.S. military officials and geologists have determined that the mineral deposits in Afghanistan are worth nearly $1 trillion, the Pentagon said Monday. Vast supplies of minerals such as iron, copper and gold, all
with worldwide technological applications, are scattered over the country, according to the Defense Department. But officials caution that they won't be easy to extricate and that it will take years to turn this newfound mineral wealth into actual revenue. "It's not a quick win," the U.S. Geological Survey's Jack Medlin said at a Pentagon briefing Monday.

Pentagon and State Department officials acknowledged that extraction efforts are challenged by remote locations, a weak infrastructure, a dearth of heavy vehicles and equipment, and a strong insurgent presence. "Turning the potential of Afghanistan's mineral wealth into actual revenue will take years," State Department
spokesman P.J. Crowley said Monday. "Mineral extraction, you know, faces numerous but not insurmountable challenges." Geologists from the Geological Survey started studying the potential of Afghan mineral resources in 2004, after being presented with maps generated by the Soviet Union in the 1980s and earlier data that showed hundreds of mineral sites, according to Medlin. Crowley downplayed questions about the potential for other countries to try to exploit Afghanistan's possible wealth and acknowledged that internal corruption could pose a problem. "We're very mindful of the fact that around the world, you have a number of countries that are blessed with natural resources that may become a source of conflict and corruption," Crowley said. "We want to be sure that we have helped Afghanistan develop

effective institutions of government so that it's able to develop its mining sector, that it's generating revenue that can be turned into greater prosperity and shared opportunity for the Afghan people," he said. The financial implications of this announcement are enormous, according to economic experts. Once the minerals are mined and processed, Afghanistan could well be on its way to economic prosperity, becoming a modern economy rather than one that is narcotics-based. It would then be better capable of paying for its own
defense, among other things. "It could very well be that this country is not going to be dependent on the United States and the United States aid or foreign aid forever," said Mohsin Khan, senior fellow with the Peterson Institute for International Economics. "It's got resources, and eventually, when it starts to exploit them, it will do fine," Khan said. On Monday, the New York Times quoted an internal Pentagon memo that said Afghanistan has become the "Saudi Arabia of lithium," used in batteries for laptop computers. The exact amount of lithium in Afghan soil is still being determined. Medlin said the U.S. is making every effort to quickly help the Afghans with the necessary tools they need to facilitate commercial development of the mines. "This wealth has the potential to enable them to have a future they were not aware of,"

Medlin said.

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CP Surge Impact Module China

Premature US Withdrawal from Afghanistan Opens Door for Chinese Domination Adrienne Mong, Journalist, October 14 2009, MSNBC
The "wall" snaking before us, easily several miles long, was made of Hesco sandbags and circled a camp for Chinese workers. Though not permitted to enter the site, we could see rows and rows of neat white buildings with blue trim; the temporary structures looked exactly like the migrant workers' housing at construction sites all across China. Size apart, it was all somewhat unremarkable, except for the fact that we were in eastern Afghanistan. The Chinese workers

several hundred technicians are part of a multibillion-dollar Chinese investment in Afghanistan's largest-ever infrastructure project, the Aynak copper mine. Discovered in 1974 but virtually dormant since the start of the Soviet War in 1979 , the Aynak mine is believed to contain the world's second-largest untapped copper deposits and could propel Afghanistan into the ranks of the world's top 15 copper producers. After wooing Afghan officials from as early as 2001, a Chinese mainland joint venture finally won the rights in 2007 to develop the site over 30 years. So far, it has sunk more than $4 billion into the project. The joint venture between majority partner China Metallurgical Group Corp. and Jiangxi Copper Corp. expects production to begin by the end of 2011 with an initial annual output of 180,000 tons of copper that will eventually grow to 320,000 tons. China will have rights to half that output, which it needs to fuel its own massive economic growth. But the
mine is just outside Kabul, in Logar Province, where there has been heightened insurgent activity. Some 1,500 Afghan police are stationed on site with a new police barracks in the works. And although they say they are not attached to the project, the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division occasionally sends units to patrol the area. China of course, not being a member of NATO has no troops on the ground in Afghanistan. It's this set-up that's feeding a percolating debate about China's role in Afghanistan. In making the case for converging U.S. and Chinese interests in Afghanistan, Robert Kaplan wrote last week in a New York Times opinion piece that, "The problem is that while

America is sacrificing its blood and treasure, the Chinese will reap the benefits. The whole direction of America's military and diplomatic effort is toward an exit strategy, whereas the Chinese hope to stay and profit." In the op-ed, titled "Beijing's Afghan Gamble," Kaplan also noted, "China will find a way to benefit no matter what the United States does in Afghanistan. But it probably benefits more if we stay and add troops to the fight." No doubt the discussion will boil over after James Yeager, an American geologist, and former
congressman Don Ritter, who has an advanced degree in metallurgical engineering and studied in Moscow, hold a press briefing in Washington on Thursday. The event is provocatively titled, "Report on the Aynak Copper Tender in Afghanistan: How China Won and the West Lost." Ritter, now president of the Afghan-American Chamber of Commerce, called the Aynak bidding process flawed and colored by the fact the Bush administration "didn't have the capacity or the competency to understand the importance of [Aynak]." Speaking from his home in the Washington area, he said: "We're giving tens of billions of dollars in assistance to Afghanistan, and we're getting no credit." Ritter said the report to be presented Thursday was not done under the Chamber's auspices. NBC News asked the U.S. Embassy in Kabul for comment, but the mission was unable to provide anyone for us to interview in time for this article. Ritter says the bottom line is: "We need a policy on developing mines and minerals and oil and gas in Afghanistan. Otherwise,

it will be dominated by Chinese, who are wired to the Iranians through their oil investments, and the Pakistanis, because of the China-India competition." It all sounds like some postmodernist version of the Great
Game, with the players this time being the U.S., China and India instead of Britain, Russia and France. But an Afghan businessman who runs a construction outfit subcontracting with the joint venture, MCC-JCL Aynak Minerals Co. (also known as MCC), sees the situation differently.

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Warlords FL [1/2]
1. Plan doesnt change Afghanistans government structures means they dont solve for the reasons Karzai are bad 2. TURN: US-Karzai Cooperation Key to continue Afghanistan success Seth G. Jones, Journalist, July 15 2008, Foreign Policy Magazine He may be no George Washington, but for now Hamid Karzai is the best Afghanistans political class has to offer. Hamid Karzai looks increasingly like a man presiding over chaos. It is hard to find anyone who
believes that Afghanistans president is making much progress in his fight against militants and the endemic corruption that now plagues his government. Nearly seven years after U.S. forces entered Afghanistan, the Taliban and other insurgent groups are gaining ground in the country, the drug trade is at its highest levels ever, and most Afghans remain without basic services. According to Pentagon estimates, the level of insurgent violence is at its worst since the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban regime, marked by a 40 percent increase in violence in eastern Afghanistan. But for all of Karzais faults,

there is nobody waiting in the wings. There are, of course, political rivals across Afghanistan, such as the Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, who would love to see Karzai humbled in the presidential elections. A range of more serious candidates also appears to be considering running, including former Interior Minister
Ali Jalali, a competent technocrat who lacks significant popular support. In other words, Karzai is still the best game in town. Not only is he superior to any plausible alternative, but he is a Pashtun, retains broad multiethnic support, and is Afghanistans most popular leader. In a December 2007 poll commissioned by ABC News, the BBC, and the German broadcasting consortium ARD, two thirds of Afghans rated Karzais performance as excellent or good. Thats why the United States and other NATO countries should stop undermining Karzai now, shore up support for him as the democratically elected president of Afghanistan, and help him show progress. Ultimately, that means supporting free and fair elections and letting Afghans choose their next president. But, right now, Karzai needs urgent help on several fronts. Recent Western training efforts are a good start. Local police are temporarily removed from their districts and replaced with Afghan National Civil Order Police units, which are trained to deal with urban unrest, civil disorder, and national emergencies. After several weeks of intensive training by U.S. and other NATO tutors, they return to their districts accompanied by embedded mentors. But these efforts remain woefully inadequate. Only about one third of the international police mentoring positions have been filled, an embarrassing figure compared with recent NATO efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and even Haiti. Karzai could also use some help cleaning house. Afghans are rapidly losing patience with the corruption that has infected all levels of government. A recent Asia Foundation poll found that a startling three quarters of Afghans believe corruption is a serious problem. Most troubling, a majority think it is getting worse. Again, active American support is critical here. Corrupt government officials, including those involved in the drug trade, need to be removed from office. There is no shortage of intelligence on who they are. The most effective way to do this may be to begin with the most blatant offenders, capturing and prosecuting individuals where there is solid evidence of criminal behavior, especially involvement in the countrys drug-trafficking business. Karzai has been dragging his feet, partly due to concerns that cracking down on corruption will contribute to an already worsening insurgency. The United States can provide a critical diplomatic nudge, share intelligence, and provide much-needed political and military support for arresting corrupt officials. It can also speak out about corruption from the international donor community, whose vast sums of money have frequently lined the pockets of international contractors and Afghan expatriates, rather than going to local Afghan communities. Karzai deserves his share of the blame for the lack of progress in Afghanistan, characterized by rising corruption, the inability of the government to protect rural villages, and challenges in delivering services to the Afghan population. Many rightly claim that he

may not have been everything we hoped for in a leader. But with the Taliban and other militants making alarming gains, now is no time to cut and run from Afghanistans democratically elected president. Giving up on Karzai will only weaken an already weak state. That is in no ones interest, except perhaps the Talibans.

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3. Their Mukhopashyay evidence is in context of one tribe in Afghanistan, not in context of Afghanistan as a whole these tribal experiments should not be applied across the board 4. TURN: Warlords lead to bloodshed Karzai is much better Patrick Cockburn, Journalist, May 11 2009, The Independent
Zardad must consider himself exceptionally unlucky. Other warlords, who were once his comrades in arms, are now part of the political elite in Kabul, prominent members of the government or multimillionaire owners of palatial houses in the capital. But in the latest twist in Afghan politics, in which leaders switch sides and betray each other as swiftly as any English duke in the Wars of the Roses, Hekmetyar is reportedly about to start negotiations to join the Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai. Under a power-sharing deal, his party would supposedly fill several ministerial posts and governorships in return for abandoning the Taliban. He himself would go into exile in Saudi Arabia for three years at the end of which the US would remove him from its list of "most wanted" terrorists. A deal between Hekmetyar and President Karzai's government is not impossible, although a government spokesman has denied it. The Taliban have made plain in the past that they neither like nor trust him. It was in opposition to warlords such as him that the Taliban first arose in 1994. If Hekmetyar's party does enter the government, its members will find themselves surrounded by many familiar faces. Just before Mr Karzai went to Washington to see President Barack Obama last week, he neatly divided the opposition, and almost certainly ensured his re-election as President, by selecting as his vice-presidential running-mate Mohammad Qasim Fahim, a powerful Tajik former warlord. Human Rights Watch protested that General Fahim had the blood of many Afghans on his hands, but President Karzai stressed his courageous role in the war against the Soviet occupation. Though Mr Karzai is increasingly unpopular because of failing security across Afghanistan and the extreme corruption of his government, he is likely to win re-election easily because he has co-opted the warlords who are Afghanistan's main power-brokers. Frequently denounced for being weak and indecisive, Mr Karzai, never a

warlord himself, is again showing his skill in dancing between the rain-drops of Afghan politics. US criticism of his rule, which reached high volume a few months ago, has died away because Washington sees nobody who can replace him. Unfortunately for Afghans, the political landscape of their country gelled at the
time of the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 and has not really changed since. One reason the Taliban had been able to conquer most of Afghanistan in the 1990s, aside from the support of Pakistan, was by taking advantage of a popular reaction against warlords. Zardad ruled only a small area, but far more powerful rulers were just as cruel

and corrupt as he was. Much of northern Afghanistan was ruled by the Uzbek general, Rashid Dostum, who had been part of the Communist regime and commanded a powerful army. The Pakistani journalist and author Ahmed Rashid once arrived to interview him in a fort overlooking his capital of Mazar-e-Sharif. Noticing bloodstains and scraps of flesh in the muddy courtyard he asked the guards if they had slaughtered a goat. They explained that an hour earlier General Dostum had punished a soldier for theft. "The man had been tied to the tracks of a Russian-made tank," records Mr Rashid, "which then drove around the
courtyard crushing his body into mincemeat, while the garrison and Dostum watched." In a couple of months warlords, many from the main opposition grouping, the Northern Alliance, were the new rulers of Afghanistan. Few of them now wear uniform, but they have held power ever since. General Dostum has gone into luxurious exile in Istanbul after a murderous assault on a Turkoman leader, but he remains influential among his followers and owns a fine pink palace in the famously wealthy Kabul neighbourhood of Sherpur. Aside from Hekmetyar, most of the other warlords no longer exercise power through their private armies, but through a mafia-like control of jobs,

security services, money, contracts and land.

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Warlords FL Ext. 4
Partnership with warlords dooms any recovery plans Subodh Ata, independent foreign affairs analyst, At a Crossroads in Afghanistan Should the United States Be Engaged in Nation Building?, September 24, 2003, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb81.pdf Provincial and local leaders, better known as warlords, each backed by his own militia, have been the powerbrokers in Afghanistan since the days of the anti-Soviet resistance. (For a map depicting the areas of influence of some key
warlords and the associated ethnic groups in Afghanistan, see Figure 1.) The U.S. strategy of stabilizing Afghanistan following the collapse of the Taliban includes partner- ing with many of the warlords and securing their support for Karzais central government. The warlords agendas, however, do not paral- lel with those of the Americans . Many of the warlords have survived for decades through a combination of aid from external forces, their own ruthlessness, and a lucrative role in drug smuggling. The loyalties of these warlords are accordingly fickle, and they have little interest in supporting a strong central government that would encroach on their power . Among the warlords who collaborated with U.S. forces to oust the Taliban is Abdul Rashid Dostum who controls the Uzbek-dominated territory around Mazar-e-Sharif. Dostum is funded by Uzbekistan, and may also be in the pay of Iran. 26 Dostums militia has clashed for control of northern Afghanistan with the forces of fellow Uzbek Mohammed Atta, and with those of Tajik leaders Burnahuddin Rabbani and Mohammed Fahim. Those spo- radic battles prompted the UN to suspend aid operations in July 2002. 27 Rabbani, a former prime minister, has his own ambitions of com- ing back to power in Kabul and is reportedly trying to influence local commanders by brib- ing them. 28 In Herat, near the Iranian border, gover- nor Ismail Khan has largely supported the United States but is reported to have connec- tions to Iran, and has expressed impatience with the continued U.S. troop presence in the province. Khans militia has clashed with that of a rival warlord, Amanullah Khan, who is reportedly supported by the Taliban. 29 In this region, therefore, the United States faces an interesting dilemma, as it may be forced to choose between an Iranian-backed warlord and one connected to the Taliban. Khan is challenged to the east by Gul Agha Sherzai. Sherzais sphere of influence includes the provinces of Kandahar, Oruzgan, and Helmand, where the Taliban were strongest. Although Sherzai was bought off by mil- lions of dollars in U.S. and British money, the amount was apparently not sufficient to deter him from clashing with rivals such as Khan. 30 In eastern Afghanistan, where infiltration across the Afghan-Pakistan border is a major concern, U.S.-led stabilization efforts also face considerable obstacles. Bacha Khan Zadran, whose militia operates in Khost and Paktia provinces, collaborated initially with U.S. Special Forces in the U.S.-led Operation Anaconda to drive out massing Al Qaeda fight- ers in March 2002. In return for his support, Zadran was paid nearly a half a million dol- lars. 31 Having secured that amount, Zadran assaulted the Khost capital of Gardez, home to a U.S. base. The May 2002 rocket attack killed more than 30 civilians. Last fall, when U.S. forces asked Zadran to dismantle some check- points, rival leader Hakim Taniwals fighters took it as a cue to attack Zadrans militia. 32 Zadran, whose ambition is to rule over not only Khost and Paktia provinces, but also neighboring Paktika, has now turned against the United States. In March 2003, his militia attacked U.S. and Afghan government forces. In one of the clashes, Zadrans eldest son was killed, an incident that has only further alien- ated the warlord against the United States and the Afghan central government. 33 It is thus becoming increasingly clear that partnering with

and bribing Afghan warlords is unlikely to accelerate the nations recovery. The Soviets tried, and failed, to secure their hold on the country by buying the warlords loyalty. The United States is experiencing a similar phenomenon.

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***AFF ANSWERS***

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A2 Drug CP US
US State Department Argues that Legalization of Poppy Cannot Work Eric Green, USINFO Staff Writer, June 5 2007, America.gov Washington -- Legalizing the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan would be disastrous for that country and for the world, a U.S. State Department official says. Ambassador Thomas Schweich, the U.S. coordinator for Afghan counternarcotics and justice reform, told USINFO in a May 31 interview that legalizing poppy, which is used to make heroin, cant work in a country where poppy growing is funding an insurgency against the Afghan government. Afghanistan is the largest producer of opium globally and provides 93 percent of the worlds heroin. Legalization proposals do not withstand even modest analytical scrutiny, said Schweich, who quoted Afghan President Hamid Karzais statement that if we do not destroy poppy, poppy will destroy us. Schweich, who is also principal deputy assistant secretary of state for
international narcotics and law enforcement affairs, cited India as an example of the dangers of legal poppy being diverted to the illicit market. That country, he said, recently reduced its legal cultivation of poppy from 21,000 hectares to 8,000 hectares. The Indian government, he said, made that reduction because of the bleeding off of legal poppy to the illegal drug market. Schweich said even India, with a well-developed democracy, a functioning police force and

an established rule of law, could not control the runoff [of legal poppy] to the illegal market.
Legalizing 165,000 hectares of poppy in cultivation in Afghanistan, with its much weaker rule of law, especially in areas controlled by the Taliban insurgency, would be very, very infeasible, said Schweich. He said Pakistan virtually

eliminated its poppy problem through aggressive law enforcement, which included eradication of the crop. Pakistan achieved its desired result without legalization, said Schweich. The Senlis Council, a public
policy group based in Europe and Afghanistan, has proposed turning legally grown Afghan poppy into pain-killing medicines such as morphine. The Senlis Council said the U.S.-led international communitys counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan has aggravated the countrys security situation. Schweich said the world needs morphine and other

types of painkillers processed from poppy. But these painkillers should come from India and Turkey, which have U.N.-sanctioned licensing schemes to grow poppy legally. Another major argument against legalization, Schweich said in the interview, is the issue of the price of illegal versus legal poppy. Poppy on the legal market costs $16-$49 per kilo versus about $138 per kilo on the illegal market, giving Afghan farmers no incentive to switch to the legal market unless a system of massive subsidies is used to make up the price difference. Only 15 percent of the Afghan population now is involved in opium poppy growing, Schweich said,
but with a guaranteed high price, poppy is all anybody is going to grow. A high volume of poppy lowers its drug price and increases purity, two effects you always see with a high degree of supply for any narcotics substance, said Schweich.

He said a dramatically increased supply of legal poppy would raise the cost of a subsidy to many billions of dollars per year, with no end in sight, turning Afghanistan into a narco-welfare state. Schweich said the U.S. effort to eliminate poppy in Afghanistan has resulted in very positive trends, especially in several northern provinces -- such as Balkh where there is relatively little insurgent activity.

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Legalizing Poppy not a viable solution- Nation building the only thing that solves Gretchen Peters, author of Seeds of Terror, June 9, 2009 Afghanistan Needs Rule of Law, not Legalized Poppy http://blog.gretchenpeters.org/?p=211 Accessed July 6, 2010
I am also intrigued by recent proposals that include ideas to distribute genetically modified poppy seeds, that would not produce narcotic opium, as part of a broad effort to develop alternative livelihoods. In that case the crop could be harvested and processed to make diesel bio-fuel and animal feed. One of the studys authors tells me Afghan farmers stand

to earn almost as much as they currently do selling opium poppy on the black market and it would not have a negative impact on food production.These are good proposals but they will work only after Afghanistan has been stabilized, and rule of law is established. However if Afghanistans poppy crop were legalized tomorrow, there would neither be the infrastructure nor the resources in place to regulate the worlds largest opium crop.Who will make sure it gets sold to pharmaceutical companies and not to drug traffickers? I bet it wont be Afghanistans notoriously corrupt police, many of whom also profit off the drug trade .
who will ensure it gets harvested hygienically? Afghanistans Food and Drug Administration? Oh wait, there isnt one. Is there a bio-fuel firm thats ready and eager to build a processing plant in lawless southern Afghanistan? Are there volunteers willing to risk their lives in the war-torn poppy belt to train locals to run it? Those are only the basic obstacles. The real issue is much larger and not ours alone to assess: Its easy for us to sit here in the United States and

talk about legalizing Afghanistans poppy crop, since almost none of the opiates produced there end up on US streets (and in fact, heroin use in this country is declining, according to the National Survey on Drug Use and
Health).Folks have a different perspective on legalization proposals in places like Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia and Russia, where heroin addiction rates are skyrocketing. Russia, which has the worlds largest number of heroin addicts , has called on the United Nations to mandate that international troops in Afghanistan launch an aggressive poppy eradication campaign. It isnt possible to talk about Afghanistan in terms of wouldnt it be easier if or

shouldnt we just There will be nothing easy about stabilizing Afghanistan. And there is no silver bullet strategy to magically transform it into a Central Asian Valhalla.There is just one exit strategy for Afghanistan. Nation building from the bottom up. Afghans need roads, schools, security and a strong, clean
and stable government. Putting all that in place cant be done piecemeal. It will take money, time, coordination and patience. Im not suggesting that it will be easy. But the cost of not doing it could be unthinkable.

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61 Legalizing medical Opium is bad ANI, May 3, 2008 Asia News International, Legalize Opium Even for Medical Use Seen as Dangerous Asia News
Internatioal/MedIndia http://www.medindia.net/news/Legalizing-Opium-Even-for-Medical-Use-is-Seen-as-Dangerous-36220-1.htm Accessed July 6, 2010.

The British Minister of State for Africa, Asia, and the United Nations has stressed that there is no sense in legalizing opium production in Afghanistan even for medical. While writing in British Medical Journal, Mark Malloch-Brown said that the Afghanistan government lacked resources, institutional capacity, and control mechanisms to ensure that opium grown would be purchased legally .To combat
opiate medicines shortage, he suggested that a sustainable solution to illegal production requires economically viable legal livelihoods, security and good governance as well as a determined effort to reduce demand around the world. Moreover,

those producing opium for legal medical usage would come under direct competition with illegal traffickers that would increase opium price and promote increased cultivation . In addition, he said, that since the global demand of medical opiates is already met, therefore there is no need to increase the supply. Malloch-Brown said that it is necessary to meet the challenge of creating development initiatives and economic incentives that provide attractive legal alternatives for farmers. And this can be done by augmenting infrastructure and local government capacity, giving farmers improved access to markets, land, water, credit, food security, and employment. "Only by reducing demand [for heroin] on the
streets everywhere will the producers and traffickers on the streets of Afghanistan be given the best reason to follow their alternative livelihoods", BMJ quoted him as saying. Nearly 90 pct of the world's opium comes from Afghanistan but most of it is for the illegal market. Read more: Legalizing Opium Even for Medical Use is Seen as Dangerous http://www.medindia.net/news/Legalizing-Opium-Even-for-Medical-Use-is-Seen-as-Dangerous-362201.htm#ixzz0sucyohf1

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A2 Drug CP Afghan Opposes

Afghan Government Firmly Opposed to Poppy Legalization Irin Asia, News Outlet, September 28 2005, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs KABUL, 28 September 2005 (IRIN) - The Afghan government has rejected a call to legalise poppy cultivation in the country, following a recent report advocating for its legitimate production. "Poor security in the country means there are simply no guarantees that opium won't be smuggled out of the country for the illicit narcotics trade abroad," Afghan Minister for Counter Narcotics, Habibullah Qaderi, said in the Afghan capital, Kabul. "Without an effective control mechanism, a lot of opium would still be refined into heroin for illicit markets in the West and elsewhere," he claimed. His comments follow
Monday's report by the Senlis Council, a leading international drug policy think-tank, advocating for the legal cultivation of opium poppy in the Central Asian state. According to the Paris-based group, the opium would be used to produce essential medicines such as morphine and codeine which could help millions of people in developing countries who are unnecessarily dying in pain because they don't have access to such medicines. Moreover, the study concluded that such a plan would contribute to ending the Afghan drug crisis and help bring stability to the country. Licensing would move poppy crops away from the illegal drug trade and into the legal economy, a statement by the group said. "It's a case of turning something bad into something good," executive director of the group, Emmanuel Reinert, said. "The current drug policy in Afghanistan has completely failed to control opium production and has undermined development efforts." But according to Qaderi, this is a proposal whose time has not yet come. "The report issued today [Monday] is just a study which

will take more time to complete. It will not be possible meanwhile to cultivate any opium poppy legally," the government official reiterated. Lack of an adequate control system remains the main argument against legalisation of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Additionally, the legalisation debate could stir confusion and raise false expectations, which could be particularly detrimental for the development of drug control in Afghanistan at this point in time , the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) has warned. Afghanistan produces about 87 percent of the world's opium, most of which is smuggled to Europe, making it an integral part of the fledgling state's economy. The illegal export of opium makes up about half of the country's gross domestic product (GDP), with illegal opium estimated to be worth more than US $100 a kilogramme. Under current international law, countries are free, however, to apply for a licence from the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) to legally produce and sell opium for medical purposes. Many countries, including Australia, France, Turkey and India, already do. The estimated average annual income per poppy farmer in Afghanistan in 2003 was $3,900. In 2004, due to a fall in opium prices at farm levels, farmers earned about $1,700 that year. The average field size per farmer in Afghanistan is estimated at about 0.4 ha. Meanwhile, Reinert defended the potential role of opium. "Opium licensing is a road-map to stability," he said, warning that the current policy of eradicating poppy crops, on which many farmers survive, threatens Afghanistan's future peace and democracy after over two decades of conflict. "Eradication is counterproductive because it takes away farmers' livelihoods without replacing them. Ultimately, they will lose faith in their government and would create the same situation that allowed the Taliban to take control in the past."

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A2 Drug CP Afghan Opposes

Afghan Government Claims Degree of Success in Counternarcotics Dari Pashto, Journalist, July 5 2010, Sada-E Azadi
Drugs cultivation and smuggling is a phenomenon that challenges human society with devastating challenges. At the moment, over 16 million people are addicted to drugs whilst the money coming from drugs smuggling brings insecurity all over the world as well as increasing the crimes rate. Unfortunately, Afghanistan was haunted by drugs smugglers due to several years of war that has currently been a massive challenge against the Government of Afghanistan. The Counter

Narcotics Minister, Zarar Ahmad Muqbil, announced that 23 provinces have so far been free from poppy cultivation. "We have achievements in the eradication of poppy cultivation because it has been reduced up to 50 percent. 23 provinces have been free from poppy cultivation." The counter narcotics legal and judicial organs have been finding its legal place by each passing day and efforts are underway to enable the Afghan National Police [ANP] and Afghan National Army [ANA] prevent the drugs smugglers in a good coordination, said the Counter Narcotics Minister. The Minister emphasized that surging addiction problem all over the world creates challenges to the Governments in the fight against drugs hence the movement needs the international support. "I hope that the international community should pave the ground to enable us eradicate the poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and reduce the demands from abroad." It is believed that major portion of the money coming from drugs goes to international mafia but the people of Afghanistan suffer from its bad name. The Afghan Government emphasizes that we can not attain a prosperous and peaceful life unless we eradicate the poppy cultivation

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A2 Drug CP Afghan Opposes

Afghanistan Not Ready to Legalize Opium David Brunnstrom, reporter for Reuters, September 25, 2005 Afghanistan Not Ready for Legal Option- Minister
Reuters- Common Sense for Drug Policy http://www.csdp.org/news/news/reut_afghan_092505.htm Accessed July 6, 2010 Afghanistan Not Ready For Legal Opium - Minister

Afghanistan, the world's biggest producer of illicit opium and heroin, is not ready to adopt a controversial proposal to use its opium to help ease a global shortage of painkillers, its counter-narcotics minister says.The Senlis Council, a Paris-based non-governmental organisation, has suggested
KABUL, Sept 25 (Reuters) licensed Afghan opium production could be used to produce morphine and codeine and is to a launch a feasibility study on the proposal in Kabul on Monday.Speaking to Reuters on Sunday, Counter-Narcotics Minister Habibullah Qaderi said he was happy for Senlis to do studies, but it was too early to consider such a proposal when Afghanistan was still struggling to cut massive illegal production."As far as the licensing at this moment is concerned, I am saying no," he said.

"I'm not in favour because it jeopardises the whole of our effort ... There would be anarchy in this country now. It would create a lot of problems ."Qaderi said internationally backed efforts to control drug
production had led to a 21 percent reduction in the area under opium cultivation, but there was still a long way to go.The area sown with opium poppies was 103,000 hectares (255,000 acres) this year compared with 131,000 hectares (325,000 acres) last year.Afghanistan is the world's main source of opium and its refined form, heroin, producing 87 percent of global supply.Qaderi questioned the timing of the Senlis report." We don't want to confuse the Afghan people,

because the Afghan people would be confused, because while the government on the one hand wants to control and stop cultivation, we are talking about licensing."I think it's too early to talk about licensing."U.N. OPPOSITIONThe United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has also rejected the Senlis
Council proposal, saying it risked creating confusion among farmers and raising false expectations.Senlis has estimated the worldwide shortage of morphine and codeine at about 10,000 tonnes of opium equivalent a year, while Afghanistan produces roughly 4,000 tonnes of opium a year.However, the UNODC, while conceding there is a shortage of narcotics for medical purposes, says lawful production of opiates worldwide had considerably exceeded global consumption in the past years and could be increased should demand increase.The U.N. body argues that licit production of opium would

send the wrong message to farmers in Afghanistan, would be impossible to control, and would not offer a viable economic alternative.The United Nations has warned that the country risks becoming a "narco-state" and the multi-billion dollar drugs economy is seen as the biggest threat to its long-term stability and U.S.-led nation-building efforts.The UNODC says the opium cultivation area fell this year largely due
to government efforts to persuade farmers to stop, including a threat to destroy fields, and low prices.However, it says good weather boosted productivity of fields still planted with opium and total output of about 4,100 tonnes is down only 2.4 percent over last year.Qaderi said Afghanistan needed to concentrate on improving rural infrastructure to provide farmers with alternative livelihoods and said a lot would depend on a continuation of international assistance to the anti-narcotics effort.With the new planting season about to start, the minister said he was hopeful for a further fall in the area under cultivation after religious leaders in the key growing province of Kandahar vowed to support the government's campaign."I am hopeful we will have a further reduction," he said. "It can be the same percentage, hopefully, maybe more."

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A2 Drug CP International
International narcotics experts say Afghanistan too unstable for legalization Alix Kroeger, Journalist, November 5 2007, BBC News But officials working to stem the opium trade from Afghanistan are appalled. "Poppy is supporting terrorism and drug dealers," says Afghanistan's acting narcotics minister, Khodaidad (who, like many Afghans, has only one name). "The Senlis Council and the European Parliament are supporting insecurity in Afghanistan." Afghanistan's mullahs issued a fatwa (decree), saying people must not grow poppy because it is haram
(forbidden in Islam), he says. Opium is banned under the Afghan constitution, and the government opposes any form of legalisation. Licensing the sale of poppy for medical purposes won't get rid of the demand for illegal opium, warns a British narcotics official in Afghanistan who preferred not to be named. In fact, he believes

it would just create a new cash crop for farmers, meaning that even more opium would be grown. Many farmers grow poppy under duress, he points out. The Afghan police would be hard-pressed to stop drug traffickers from forcing farmers to divert part or all of their crop for heroin. "Afghanistan needs a rule-of-law structure to stop people growing opium," he says. "But if it had a rule-of-law structure, it wouldn't have an opium problem in the first place." A European Commission (EC) document obtained by the BBC argues that buying poppy from farmers could have a perverse effect. "Farmers could see this as an incentive to further expand production. This would not be an appropriate use of resources for the international donor community or the Afghan government." And the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
has serious reservations. "At the moment, in the Afghan context, any proposal should be taken with utmost caution," says Jean-Luc Lemahieu, the head of UNODC's Europe and West and Central Asia desk. The idea of laboratories in the villages is problematic, he says. "Where will the precursor chemicals [needed to convert poppy into opiates] come from, and who will control them?" he asks. "Who would ensure they're not diverted to other frameworks?" The Senlis Council says

there's a shortage of medical opiates on the world market, especially in developing countries, which Afghanistan can fill. But the British narcotics official disputes this. The International Narcotics Control Board, which licenses countries to produce opiates legally, has a two-year surplus, he says. "Developing countries don't have opiates, but they don't have penicillin or aspirin, either," he adds. And he questions the economic benefits the Senlis scheme would bring. The price of legal opiates on the world market is $35 to $40 a kilogram. Illegal opiates fetch nearly three times as much, around $100 a kilo. The EC says "exorbitant subsidies" could be needed to bridge the gap between legal and illegal prices. In the end, the British official says, poppy-for-medicine would undermine the authority of the Afghan government. It would be impossible to justify allowing one village to grow poppy under licence while eradicating the same crop just a few kilometres away. Counter-narcotics experts acknowledge
that similar schemes have worked in other countries which used to have a serious drug problem, such as Pakistan and Thailand. But Afghanistan, they say, just isn't ready. With violence and instability still wracking the country,

they fear that any move to legitimise poppy production could make a bad situation even worse.

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A2 Drug CP - International
Russia Advocates Continued Poppy Crackdowns in Afghanistan Alex Kennedy, Journalist, June 5 2010, The Associated Press SINGAPORE Russia urged NATO forces in Afghanistan on Sunday to crack down harder on drug production and smuggling, and offered to help put a security ring around the country. The international community should classify Afghan drugs as a threat to peace and security because they have become an important source of funds for the Taliban and other insurgent groups, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said in a speech. Insurgents and international mafia groups are earning billions of dollars "from smuggling the drugs - which we call 'white death' - to Europe, Asia and America," Ivanov told an Asia-Pacific security summit hosted by the London-based International Institute of Strategic
Studies think tank. Afghanistan supplies 90 percent of the world's opium, the main ingredient of heroin, and is also the leading global supplier of hashish. According to the United Nations, the Taliban earn about $300 million a year from the opium trade. "We are not happy with what the world community is doing in the anti-drug war" in Afghanistan, Ivanov said. He said the international community, especially "those who took responsibility for ensuring peace and stability in Afghanistan," should make a strong commitment to fight the threat. Russia is ready to "make several counter-drugs rings around Afghanistan to intercept drugs," he said, without elaborating. The United States says it

carrying on a major war against drugs in Afghanistan. Maj. Gen. Richard Mills, the commanding general in charge of U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, said recently that U.S. forces dealt a blow to the Taliban's opium business by securing deals with poppy farmers to plant legal crops. During the spring harvest, more than 17,300 acres (7,000 hectares) of poppies were swapped for legal crops around the farming community of Marjah, according to the Marine Corps. Last year, opium seizures in Afghanistan soared 924 percent because of better cooperation between Afghan and international forces. Ivanov said NATO forces must focus on Afghanistan's social and economic development to give farmers of opium poppies a better alternative to drug production. "If you burn down a poppy plantation,
you need to invest in conventional agriculture," Ivanov said. "A lot should be done to start very primitive social and economic life in Afghanistan." "If we don't that, any military presence will be in vain." Ivanov said opium-based drugs such as heroin are flooding into Europe through Afghanistan's northern border with Tajikistan. No visas are required to travel from Tajikistan to Russia, which means the drugs can flow easily through the open border, he said. Drugs also go out through the western border into Iran, but Iranian authorities are active in cracking down on drug caravans, he said. "The most popular is the northern route. It's rather easy to cross the Afghan-Tajik border. As soon as you cross the AfghanTajik border, it's easy to move it to Moscow, to London, to Paris, to Berlin, to elsewhere," he said. During the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989, drug production was minimal because the invading forces aggressively eliminated poppy production, Ivanov said. He added that Russia will continue to provide logistics and intelligence to the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan but won't commit fighting forces. "Never again will a Russian soldier enter Afghanistan," he said. "It's like asking the U.S. whether they will send troops to Vietnam. It's totally impossible."

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A2 Surge CP Defense
Additional troops wont provide greater security, and peace in Afghanistan is not going to happen Barry Kolodkin 2009 [Prospects for the Troop Surge in Afghanistan Monday November 30, 2009 US Foreign Policy Blog From Barry Kolodkin, Former About.com Guide to US Foreign Policy.
http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/b/2009/11/30/prospects-for-the-troop-surge-in-afghanistan.htm] However, additional US troops will not provide greater security for Afghan citizens in other areas of the country. Taliban fighters will likely move to areas away from US troop strength and engage in battles on their own terms. A surge of 21,000 troops in March 2009 has not proven effective. The US military considers the troop surge in Iraq a success. Senator John McCain lauded the surge during the 2008 Presidential campaign. Yet two years after the surge, General Ray Odierno, the US commander in Iraq opined that the US may not be able to declare victory in Iraq for 5-10 years, maybe ever . In Afghanistan, the US faces a more radicalized, battle-hardened

enemy, which previously repelled the Soviets, in terrain less favorable than Iraq to American armored and mechanized capabilities. NATO soldiers in Afghanistan already outnumber Taliban fighters by a margin of 12-1. The odds of the US being able to declare victory in Afghanistan or leaving a relatively stable, peaceful Afghanistan in the coming years seem remote.

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A2 Surge CP Offense
TURN: Troop surgre will increase violence and deaths Malalai Joy 2009 [Malalai Joya guardian.co.uk, Monday 30 November 2009 19.00 GMT A troop surge can only
magnify the crime againast Afghanistan If Barack Obama heralds an escalation of the war, he will betray his own message of hope and deepen my people's pain http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/nov/30/obamaafghanistan-troops] After months of waiting, President Obama is about to announce the new US strategy for Afghanistan. His speech may be long awaited, but few are expecting any surprise: it seems clear he will herald a major escalation of the war. In doing so he will be making something worse than a mistake. It is a continuation of a war crime against the suffering people of my country. I have said before that by installing warlords and drug traffickers in power in Kabul, the US and Nato have pushed us from the frying pan to the fire. Now Obama is pouring fuel on these flames, and this week's announcement of upwards of 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan will have tragic consequences. Already this year we have seen the impact of an increase in troops occupying Afghanistan: more violence, and more civilian deaths. My people, the poor of Afghanistan who have known only war and the domination of fundamentalism, are today squashed between two enemies: the US/Nato occupation forces on one hand and warlords and the Taliban on the other. While we want the withdrawal of one enemy, we don't believe it is a matter of choosing between two evils. There is an alternative: the democratic-minded parties and intellectuals are our hope for the future of Afghanistan.

TURN: Troops increase makes Afghanistan more dependent on the US QUENTIN 4/25 [Quentin US Ambassador to Afghanistan: Troop Increase A Bad Idea 04-25-2010, 01:46 PM http://www.usmessageboard.com/afghanistan/114827-us-ambassador-to-afghanistan-troop-increase-a-badidea.html]
In November 2009, Karl W. Eikenberry, the United States ambassador to Afghanistan and retired Army lieutenant general, sent two classified cables to his superiors in which he offered his assessment of the proposed U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. While the broad outlines of Mr. Eikenberry's cables were leaked soon after he sent them, the complete cables, obtained recently by The New York Times, show just how strongly the current ambassador feels about President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan government, the state of its military, and the chances that a troop buildup will actually hurt the war effort by making the Karzai government too dependent on the United States. As an expert who served two tours in Afghanistan in a command position and is intimately familiar with the realities on the ground, Lt. General Eikenberry explains why Karzai cannot be trusted as an ally, believes the U.S. want to permanently occupy and establish bases in the country (wonder how he got that idea), that the projections for our eventual exit are wildly optimistic to the point of being implausible, and that increased troop presence will be costly and counterproductive as

the inevitable increase in civilian deaths will lead further civilians to side with the Taliban and our committed, increased presence will substantially delay the Afghan government and local security forces from being ready, willing, or able to take over and make them ever more dependent on us. TURN: Troop Surge hurts access to basic health services for Afghans John Zarcostas 2009 [Surge in fighting in Afghanistan will further impede access to health care, warns WHO John Zarocostas Published 23 December 2009 The expected increase in fighting http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/339/dec23_1/b5594?
rss=1&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+bmj%2Frecent+%28Latest+from+BMJ%29]

in south east Afghanistan in the coming months following troop surges in the country is likely to further impede access to basic health services for large numbers of civilians , the World Health Organization has warned. Peter J Graaff, the agencys country representative in Afghanistan, said on 18 December that at present in excess of six million people, or nearly one fifth of the population, do not have regular access to basic health services largely because of the fighting and fear and insecurity in very large parts of the country . "There will be more active fighting, and there will be more civilians that are at risk of not having access to health care that they need," he said.

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