Vleck 1

Peter Vleck
PG331
Erickson
Word Count: 3765
Global Hegemony: Holding te Course on a !ne Way "treet
#e $nited "tates %inds itsel% in an odd &osition in tis day and age: 'e stand at te to& o%
a uni&olar 'orld order( yet seem unsure o% 'at to do 'it tis &osition) "ince te colla&se o% te
"o*iet $nion and te ending o% te Cold War( tere as e+isted no single state or block o% states
tat could realistically callenge te &o'er o% te $nited "tates) ,or te %irst time in istory(
tere e+ists a global egemon) -ut a .uestion still lingers: sould te $nited "tates attem&t to
continue its acting role as a global egemon( or sould it engage in a controlled slide back into a
role o% an o%%sore balancer( 'ile letting oter regional &o'ers %ill te role in areas 'ere te
$nited "tates ad &re*iously e+erted it/s control0 Pro&onents o% te si%t to'ards o%%sore
balancing argue tat doing so 'ould allo' te $nited "tates to continue to a*e a ma1or role in
te international community( 'ile also circling te 'agons so to s&eak( by dra'ing back &o'er
assets %rom teir current %ar %lung &ositions scattered across te globe) Wile tis idea is not
'itout merit( it do'n&lays or e*en ignores te negati*e as&ects o% tis global 'itdra'al
outrigt)
PRIMACY: A PREAMBLE AND HISTORY
#e &osition tat te $nited "tates currently occu&ies as te only global egemon is
inerently a2ardous( but it is not 'itout its ad*antages) "te&&ing back %rom a &osition o%
&rimacy is( and al'ays as been( a risky ting to do) #e earliest recorded discourse on tis to&ic
comes %rom #ucydides/ .uintessential istory The Peloponnesian War) !n te e*e o% te
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outbreak o% te 'ar &ro&er( Pericles argues on te to&ic o% te 4tenian Em&ire tat 56ou cannot
abdicate %rom it( e*en it someone %ear%ul under te immediate circumstances makes tis u&rigt
dis&lay o% is &olitical indi%%erence7 %or you no' old it like a tyranny tat seems un1ust to
ac.uire but dangerous to let go)8
1
4tens 'as in a &erilous &osition: tey ad made &o'er%ul
enemies in teir rise to a &osition o% &rimacy in Hellenistic Greece) #o ste& do'n %rom tis
&osition on te e*e o% 'ar 'ould only ser*e to make 4tens and te city9states o% te %ormer
:elian ;eague a&&ear 'eak) Wile it may not a*e been te best idea to create tis em&ire( te
%orces allied against tem no' &osed too great a treat to ignore( and te only o&e %or 4tens to
'eater te bre'ing storm o% "&arta te Pelo&onnesian ;eague 'as to old onto 'at it ad and
%igt %or its li%e)
#e $nited "tates is in a di%%erent situation no' tan 4tens 'as in some t'o and a al%
millenia ago) $nlike te rise o% 4tens and its em&ire( te $nited "tates as not tram&led on
oter states( sub1ugating tem or &utting te uncoo&erati*e &o&ulace to te s'ord) #e $nited
"tates seemingly inerited its &osition as a global egemon) <n is landmark &iece The Shield of
Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History, Pilli& -obbit &ro&osed a conce&t tat e called
te ;ong War) #e ;ong War teory lent a common tread to all o% te con%licts o% te 3=
t

century( and did a great deal to make sense o% te &olitical stri%e tat de%ined &ost9im&erial
&eriod) 4ccording to -obbit( te con%licts o% te 3=
t
century took &lace largely to 5determine
'at kind o% state 'ould su&ersede te im&erial states o% Euro&e tat emerged in te 1>
t

century)8
3
#ree ri*al and utterly incom&atible %orms o% go*ernment 'ould rise out o% te ases
o% te im&erial state system tat ad &re*iously dominated te %ace o% Euro&ean &olitics:
,ascism( Communism( and :emocratic Ca&italism)
World War < marked te deat o% te <m&erial state( and te a%termat o% te 'ar sa' t'o o% te
1 #ucydides( The Peloponnesian War( trans) "te*en ;attimore ?<ndiana&olis: Hackett( 1>>@A( 1=5 ?3:63A)
3 -obbitt( Pilli&) The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History( 3B) n)d)
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&re*iously mentioned models ?,ascism and CommunismA come to &rominence( and into direct
con%lict 'it te :emocratic Ca&italist states %or 'at 'ould be te %uture standard o% national
go*ernments) #'o decades later( World War << 'ould mark te end o% ,ascism as a contender in
te ;ong War( 'it te de%eat o% te 4+is &o'ers at te ands o% te allies) Ho'e*er( a%ter te
"econd World War( te ;ong War 'ould grind to a standstill as te t'o remaining su&er&o'ers(
te $nited "tates( su&&orted by its C4#! allies7 and te "o*iet $nion( along 'it its Warsa'
Pact allies( engaged in te %orty year stando%% tat 'as te Cold War) E*entually( George ,)
Dennan/s strategy o% Containment 'ould gi*e rise to te conditions tat caused te $""E to
crumble under its o'n 'eigt( and te ;ong War 'ould %inally see its conclusion)
#e $nited "tates 'as te %lag9bearer %or te :emocratic Ca&italist states o% te 'orld(
and 'as te last &o'er standing in te nearly century long con%lict o% te ;ong War) 4lmost by
de%ault( te $nited "tates became te %irst global egemonic &o'er in tis ne'ly uni&olar 'orld(
and te :emocratic Ca&italist system tat ad been s&read by te $nited "tates under te
doctrines o% te Farsall Plan and Containment became te dominant state model in te
international system) #e $nited "tates ad eiter assimilated ?in te case o% Germany( <taly( and
Ga&anA teir de%eated %ormer com&etitors( or sim&ly outlasted tem ?as 'as te case 'it te
"o*iet $nion and te states o% te Warsa' PactA) ,orms o% communism still e+isted in &ractice(
but it no longer e+isted as a ma1or ri*al to te $nited "tates( as te remaining communist states
largely %ound 'ays to ta& into te ca&italist global market( and as a result ad %ound a 'ay to
coe+ist 'it an oter'ise ri*al &olitical and economic ideology)
4s suc( it sould be clear tat te $nited "tates is not in a &osition o% imminent danger
suc as te &osition tat 4tens %ound itsel% in on te e*e o% te Pelo&onnesian War) #e treat
&osed by te abandonment o% te current &osition o% global egemon tat te $nited "tates olds
is not a direct treat to te 'ell being and continued e+istence o% te $nited "tates( but rater one
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to te system tat as %lourised under te direction and sa%eguarding o% te $nited "tates) #e
abandonment o% te current egemonic system 'ould &lace te current nature o% te international
system in an unclear &osition( and treatens to critically destabili2e te already &recarious
regional balance o% &o'er in a number o% key areas o% interest across te globe)
THE DANGERS OF OFFSHORE BALANCING
#e core argument te logic o% o%%sore balancing is tat it 'ill allo' te $nited "tates to
reduce te bot te necessary .uantity and te *ulnerability o% its military assets( 'ile still
maintaining te *ast ma1ority o% its global strike ca&abilities and remaining an im&osing %orce
tat can inter*ene i% necessary)
-y ado&ting a grand strategic %ocus o% o%%sore balancing( it is true tat te $nited "tates
could trim te %at( so to s&eak( in its military) 4s it stands( te $nited "tates &ossesses assets %or
bot tactical and strategic mobility ca&ability at ome( and at bases s&read out across te globe)
<% te $nited "tates 'as to 'itdra' its military &resence %rom te rest o% te 'orld( some o% te
strategic air9 and sea9li%t assets in our &ossession 'ould likely become redundant: rater tan
a*ing to maintain te ca&ability to trans&ort troo&s( *eicles( and 'ar materiel %rom regional
bases to 'ere tey are needed( all mobility assets( as 'ell as military assets in need o% trans&ort(
'ould be centrali2ed in te $nited "tates)
4dditionally( it is .uite accurate to say tat by 'itdra'ing our %or'ard de&loyed assets(
'e can more easily &rotect tem) #is is es&ecially true in te current international &olitical
climate) History as so'n tat our military assets are at teir most *ulnerable 'en tey are
%or'ard de&loyed to areas o% interest) Wile te s&eci%ics o% te incident are still te sub1ect o%
%ierce debate( te sinking o% te $"" Faine( 'ile it 'as stationed in Ha*ana Harbor( el&ed
s&ark te "&anis94merican War) #e $nited "tates 'as dra'n into World War << 'en te
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Paci%ic %leet 'as attacked at ancor in Pearl Harbor by te <m&erial Ga&anese Ca*y)
3
Fore
recently( te *ulnerability o% our o*erseas assets as been demonstrated by te 1>@6 bombing o%
te $" Farine barracks in -eirut( ;ebanon7 and te 3=== attack on te $"" Cole 'ile it 'as
docked in te Port o% 4den( 6emen) Wit tese instances in mind( it is nig im&ossible to argue
tat our military assets are sa%er 'en tey are de&loyed o*erseas)
Ho'e*er( te outlook is certainly more bleak %or te claims tat a%ter si%ting to o%%sore
balancing te $nited "tates 'ould maintain te intimidating global strike ca&abilities and timely
inter*ention abilities tat so de%ine our &osition as a global egemon) #e current state o%
mobility tat te $nited "tates &ossesses is largely due to our %or'ard de&loyed assets) #e $"
4rmy ,!E"C!F as a total o% eigteen di*isions( ten acti*e and eigt in reser*e) !% te ten
acti*e duty di*isions( only te %our di*isions o% te HV<<< 4irborne Cor&s are designated as
being ra&id de&loyment ca&able: te 3
rd
<n%antry ?in%antryA( te 1=
t
Fountain ?ligt in%antryA(
@3
nd
4irborne ?airborne in%antryA( and 1=1
st
4irborne ?airborne ca&able( modular ligt in%antryA
di*isions) 4s recently as 3==3( te 1=
t
Fountain :i*ision 'as critici2ed %or being un&re&ared
de&loy( some t'o years a%ter it 'as deemed un%it to de&loy and mo*ed do'n te de&loyment list
B
%ollo'ing re&orts by te Heritage ,oundation and C-" Ce's) 4s it stands( te $" 4rmy is
'ould not be ca&able o% ra&idly de&loying and resol*ing a situation 'itout %or'ard de&loyed
assets 'itout a ma1or reorgani2ation and years o% retraining) #is reorgani2ation could
realistically in*ol*e con*erting all o% our acti*e di*isions into ra&id de&loyment ca&able
di*isions( and getting to te &oint 'ere e*ery di*ision is able to maintain a state o% o&erational
3 <t is &era&s 'ort noting tat te stage %or te 4merican entry into te 'ar ad been set some time &rior to te
attack at Pearl Harbor( and tat te attack 'as merely te catalytic e*ent tat %inally ga*e President Eoose*elt
casus belli) Ho'e*er( tis does not detract %rom te %act tat te %leet 'as more in all likeliood more *ulnerable
'en moored in Pearl Harbor tan it 'ould a*e been ad te Paci%ic ,leet been moored in one o% te ma1or
&orts on te West Coast o% te $nited "tates)
B :a*id H) Hack'ort( 5Co -ad $nits( !nly -ad ;eaders)8 Guly 3( 3==3( tt&:II'eb)arci*e)orgI'ebI3==>=611=3
5635Itt&:II''')military)comIEesourcesIEesource,ileVie'0%ileJHack'ortK=7=3=3)tm ?accessed Fay 3(
3=13A)
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readiness tat as not been acie*ed 'it only %our ra&id de&loyment di*isions) "im&ly &ut( i%
te $nited "tates is to 'itdra' its %or'ard de&loyed assets( 'e must also massi*ely o*eraul
te o&erational readiness o% tese units and ensure a constant state o% massi*e ra&id de&loyment
ca&ability)
THE ISSUE OF IMMEDIACY
#is brings us to te issue o% immediacy: i% te $nited "tates is to 'itdra' its %or'ard
de&loyed %orces( does it still &ose a credible treat to inter*ene in a timely manner sould a
con%lict arise( regardless o% 'ere it takes &lace0 <n sort( not likely) <t is im&ossible to truly
1udge 'at our ca&ability in tis res&ect 'ould be until a crisis actually emerged( but tere e+ists
bot a istorical and tecnological &recedent %or tis %orecast)
<n te 1@
t
and 1>
t
centuries( Great -ritain %ound itsel% in an increasingly ad*antageous
&osition to act as an o%%sore balancer) 4s a island( it ad no great need %or a large standing army(
and could instead de*ote its resources to building a na*y second to none( and a smaller( but
entirely &ro1ectable land army to utili2e eiter in de%ense or in continental con%licts) #o ensure its
o'n national security( Great -ritain ad only to maintain te balance o% &o'er on mainland
Euro&e( and a*e te ca&ability to 1um& in and balance against any &o'er tat treatened to
gro' too large) Ho'e*er( as tecnology ine+orably ad*anced( tis strategy became less and less
e%%ecti*e) <n World War <( te -ritis 4rmy 'as able to arri*e 1ust in time to tro' o% te
"clie%%en Plan( and &re*ent te encirclement o% te ,renc %orces by te massi*e German
%lanking maneu*er) #'o and a al% decades later( %aced 'it an almost identical task( te -ritis
%orces %ound temsel*es landing in ,rance 1ust in time to stage a %igting retreat and 'itdra'
back across te Englis Cannel at :unkirk) #e German Blitzkrieg tactics( and te macinery
necessary %or it to succeed( ad %inally e+&osed te 'eakness in te strategy o% balancing: 'at
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good is a balancing &o'er i% a belligerent &o'er can end a 'ar be%ore any oter nations a*e
time to res&ond0 Wit modern tecnologies( con%licts a*e te &otential to start and end e*en
%aster: te $nited "tates 'as able to %orce <ra. to negotiate a cease%ire 'itin 1== ours o%
beginning ground o&erations in !&eration :esert "torm)
#e Gul% War &ro*ides an interesting look at bot sides o% tis debate) Wile it is
occasionally ?and < 'ould argue erroneouslyA used as e*idence %or te %ailings o% egemony by
&ro&onents o% o%%sore balancing( it is a muc more com&licated issue tan tat) #e 'ar began
'it a massi*e miscommunication bet'een te $nited "tates and <ra.( 'ic destroyed any
cance o% deterrence) Prior to te 'ar( te $nited "tates did not a*e su%%icient %orces in teater
to e*en react a%ter <ra. in*aded Du'ait) Wat immediately %ollo'ed( !&eration :esert "ield( is
&era&s te best modern e*idence as to 'y o%%sore balancing is not a *iable grand strategy)
"tarting on 4ugust 7
t
( 1>>=( te $nited "tates began building u& %orces in neigboring "audi
4rabia( &rimarily to de%end "audi 4rabia sould "addam Hussein decide to continue is
o%%ensi*e( but ultimately as a staging ground %or te liberation o% Du'ait) <t took until late
Ganuary o% te %ollo'ing year %or te $nited "tates and its allies to begin o%%ensi*e air o&erations
against <ra.i %orces( and until late ,ebruary to build u& te necessary %orces and establis clear
o&erational &lan %or te liberation o% Du'ait)
#is 'as( .uintessentially( a balancing action) <nitially( te $nited "tates 'as unable to
deter <ra. %rom taking 'at 'as already at its %ingerti&s) ,rom tis &oint( it took o*er %our
monts to amass te necessary military assets to begin limited o%%ensi*e o&erations( and anoter
mont to build u& te critical mass to begin %ull scale combined o%%ensi*e o&erations) Had te
e.ui&ment used by te <ra.i army not been 'oe%ully outdated 'en com&ared to te tird9
generation main battle tanks and %ourt9generation %igters %ielded by te $nited "tates and its
allies( it could a*e been an e+ceedingly costly con%lict %or bot sides( rater tan a com&lete
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rout)
<n te case o% te Gul% War( te s&eed at 'ic te $nited "tates 'as able to res&ond is
sim&ly not acce&table) Witout radical im&ro*ements to our o&erational readiness( as &re*iously
alluded to( te 4merican res&onse in te Gul% War &ortrays a %airly accurate &icture o% our
ca&abilities to inter*ene going %or'ard sould 'e coose to si%t to a strategy o% o%%sore
balancing) 4s it stands( te $" Ca*y maintains ele*en aircra%t carriers in order to %ield rougly
al% o% tem at any gi*en time( 'ile te remainder o% te %leet rotates %or re%itting) <t is sim&ly
not %easible to e+&ect e*en our 'orld class carrier %leet to be able to make a substantial im&act
sould a con%lict arise)
#e same goes %or our ea*y armor: our main battle tanks are &rimarily sea mobile( and i%
'e 'ere not to a*e tanks %or'ard de&loyed( it 'ould take an inordinate amount o% time to get
te necessary ea*y armor assets into a teater o% combat) 4s critical an issue as te ra&id
de&loyment ca&abilities o% our in%antry di*isions is( tis ca&ability is largely useless 'itout also
a*ing ra&id de&loyment ca&able armor and air assets) $n%ortunately( tere is a *ery key line
dra'n %or modern armor assets: our current ligt armor assets( 'ic are air mobile and able to
be ra&idly de&loyed 'it in%antry di*isions( are 1ust tat( ligt armor) ;igt armor stands no
cance against ea*y armor( e*en outdated main battle tanks 'ould be more tan a matc %or our
modern ligt armored %igting *eicles) 4t te same time( te necessary ea*y armor is too
ea*y to be e%%ecti*ely airli%ted 'it ra&id de&loyment ca&able di*isions: our current ea*y
airli%t ca&able &lat%orms( te C95 Gala+y and C917 Globemaster <<< can only trans&ort t'o
5
and
one
6
combat ready F1 4brams main battle tanks( res&ecti*ely)
7
<t took as long as it did to amass
5 5,actseet: C95 Gala+y)8 $nited "tates 4ir ,orce( 4ir Fobility Command) :ecember 3>( 3=11( tt&:II''')a%)
milIin%ormationI%actseetsI%actseet)as&0idJ@B ?accessed Fay B( 3=13A)
6 5,actseet: C917 Globemaster <<<)8 $nited "tates 4ir ,orce( 4ir Fobility Command) :ecember 3>( 3=11(
tt&:II''')a%)milIin%ormationI%actseetsI%actseet)as&0idJ@6 ?accessed Fay B( 3=13A)
7 ,or re%erence( it 'ould a*e taken te entirety o% our strategic airli%t ca&ability ?including utili2ing all reser*e
and 4ir Cational Guard ea*y airli%t &lat%ormsA rougly %our round tri&s to deli*er te re.uired number o% main
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te %orces necessary %or !&eration :esert "torm because te lions sare o% te o*er 1(@== F1
4brams/ ad to be trans&orted by sea( as our strategic airli%t ca&abilities 'ere tied u& in te
trans&ortation o% &ersonnel and materiel) "trategic Fobility is de%ined as te ability to arri*e ?or
deli*erA in a timely( cost e%%ecti*e( and e%%icient manner) <t could easily be argued tat it is
im&ossible to %ul%ill te de%inition o% "trategic Fobility %or our %orce o% main battle tanks based
on te current state o% our strategic airli%t ca&abilities)
REACTIVE INTERDICTION
,inally( tere remains one more systemic &roblem 'it o%%sore balancing: it relies on a
&olicy o% reacti*e interdiction) #at is( as an o%%sore balancer( te $nited "tates 'ould 'ait until
a con%lict ad already started be%ore in*ol*ing itsel%) 4s te Gul% War e+am&le so'ed( e*en i% a
global egemon as %or'ard de&loyed military assets( i% you don/t a*e te rigt amount in te
rigt &laces( you are el&less to inter*ene in a de*elo&ing con%lict) "ould it ado&t a &olicy o%
o%%sore balancing( te $nited "tates 'ill a*e to o&e tat it can &re*ent con%licts and
ameliorate international s.uabbles 'itout any immediate treat o% %orce) :eterrence 'itout a
credible treat o% %orce sould be ranked as one o% te most di%%icult tasks to accom&lis in te
%ield o% international relations) 4ny state tat %inds its goals at odds 'it te $nited "tates/ goal
%or te region 'ould go troug a decision &rocess similar to te one tat "addam Hussein %aced
in 1>>=: 1A Will te $nited "tates 'ant to inter*ene0 3A Ho' long 'ill it take te $nited "tates
to mobili2e te military assets necessary to inter*ene0 3A <n te e*ent o% a con%lict( can a military
*ictory be acie*ed be%ore $" inter*ention can occur0 BA <n tis e*ent( 'ill te $" still a*e te
resol*e necessary to commit to a %igt a%ter te initial con%lict is o*er0 5A "ould te $" still
a*e te resol*e to enter te %igt( 'ould it be &ossible to make te cost o% suc an engagement
battle tanks %or !&eration :esert "torm)
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&roibiti*ely costly so as to deter te $nited "tates %rom inter*ening0 -y lea*ing tese .uestions
o&en to inter&retation by &otential aggressors( te $nited "tates 'ould a*e already inerently
destabili2ed te international system)
THE POWER VACUUM AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
#e %inal consideration to make in regards to te merits o% ado&ting a strategy o% o%%sore
balancing concerns 'at 'ould a&&en in te regions 'ere te balance o% &o'er 'as
&re*iously maintained by immediate $" &resence) 4s it stands( te balance o% &o'er in almost
e*ery region o% te 'orld is stabili2ed by te &resence o% te $nited "tates) Countries in regions
stabili2ed by te $nited "tates a*e gro'n accustomed to tis stability) Were te $" to &ull out(
te counter'eigt tat as el&ed maintain te balance o% a number o% regions 'ould be se*ered)
#e %irst( and most ob*ious reaction( to tis occurrence is tat states tat &re*iously ad teir
security guaranteed by te &resence o% te $nited "tates 'ould attem&t to build u& teir military
in order to ensure teir o'n security( 'ile states tat 'ere less 'elcoming o% te $" &resence in
te region migt attem&t to scale u& teir military to become te ne' big dog on te block)
Wile tese systems migt stabili2e( it is not unrealistic to &ro1ect regionali2ed arms races
occurring around te globe) -ut 'at o% states tat cannot kee& u& in a con*entional arms race(
eiter due to ca&ital or social constraints0 <n a nation like "audi 4rabia( it 'ould not be an o&tion
to train and arm a large &ortion o% te &o&ulace( as te &o&ulace migt ten re*olt) #e more
attracti*e o&tion migt be to seek nuclear 'ea&ons( 'ic 'ould ensure te sur*i*al o% te state
%rom domestic treats 'ile also maintaining te balance 'itin te country and &rotecting it
%rom domestic treats) "out Dorea and #ai'an bot ga*e u& teir nuclear &rograms a%ter te
$nited "tates e+tended its 5nuclear umbrella8 to co*er te states in .uestion( but i% te $" 'ere
to &ull back %rom tis direct and e*er &resent commitment( tese t'o states emerge as likely
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candidates to restart &re*iously abandoned nuclear &rograms)
THE ENDGAME
4s it stands( te international &olitical climate is %ar %rom broken( and as te old adage
states( it makes no sense to try to %i+ it) #e $nited "tates( as 'ell as countless oter nations( as
&ros&ered under te current international system) <t 'ould make little sense at tis &oint to
disru&t te tenuous balance tat 'e a*e acie*ed only a%ter nearly a century o% con%lict) #e
$nited "tates e+ists in a com%ortable &osition at te moment( and our myriad o% allies and
bene%iciaries a*e come to &ros&er under tis system) Wile time may dictate tat te $nited
"tates 'ill e*entually regress into a &osition o% an o%%sore balancer( it 'ould be un'ise to
*oluntarily make tis cange) Wile te international system may rigt itsel% and return to a
com%ortable e.uilibrium &eace%ully( it 'ould be best to not take tis cance) #e $nited "tates is
not a egemon because it e+cels in any one category( but rater because it e+cels in all
concei*able categories)
@
<t sim&ly does not make sense to not take ad*antage o% tis &osition %or
as long as it is sustainable)
@ G) Gon <kenberry( Ficael Fastanduno( and Wiliam C) Wol%ort( 5$ni&olarity( "tate -ea*ior( and "ystemic
Conse.uences(8 World Politics 61( no) 1 ?3==>A: 1)