Case No.

9
Radiola Toshiba Philippines vs Intermediate Appellate Court
GR No. 75222, July 18, 1991

Case No. 10 | Midterms Case No. 1

Manuel T. De Guia vs Commission on Elections
GR No. 104712, May 6, 1992

Statutory rule: In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every Statutory Rule: A construction that gives to the language in a statute
part be given effect.
meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was
enacted should be rejected.
Facts:
The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Facts:
Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980 by the Court
Petitioner Manuel De Guia is a member of the Sangguniang Bayan
of First Instance of Pasig. However, an insolvency proceeding in the Court of the Municipality of Paranaque. He contends that under par(d) of Sec. 3
of First Instance of Angeles City was commenced four months after the of Ra 7166, members of the Sangguaniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang
issuance of the said attachment. Petitioner contends that its lien on the Bayan shall be elected at large in the May 1992 elections.
subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not
dissolved thereby.
Issue: W/N par(d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that
elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and SB shall be elected at
Issue: W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings large.
against the respondent spouses even though it commenced four months
after said attachment.
Held:
No. Par (d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 refers only to elective officials of the
Held:
Sangguniang Panlungsod which are single district cities and Sangguniang
No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila. The law specifically stated
period - one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments that provinces with only one legislative district should be divided into two
entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Also, and therefore should necessarily be elected by districts. Par (d) should be
there is no conflict between Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute is interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the
susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such interpretation of the petitioner would make the act of the statute in
reasonable and beneficial construction that will render the provision singling out the single district provinces as useless or meaningless. The
thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.
key to open the door to what the legislature intended in the language of a
state is its purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute.
Statutes should then be construed in light of the object to be achieved. A
construction should be rejected that gives the language used in a statute a
meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was
enacted.

Case No. 11 | Midterms Case No. 2

Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas vs CA
GR No. 78687, January 31, 1989

Case No. 12 | Midterms Case No. 3

B/Gen Jose Commendador, et al. vs B/Gen Demetrio Camera, et al.
GR No. 96948, August 2, 1991

Statutory Rule: Between two statutory interpretations, that which better

serves the purpose of the law should prevail.
Statutory rule: When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
Facts:

Facts:
The parents of Elena Salenillas, one of the petitioners, were
Petitioners are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
grantees of free patent. The subject property was later sold to Elena were charged with violations of Articles of War in relation with their alleged
Salenillas and her husband, petitioners in the instant case. On December 4, participation in a failed coup detat. Their case was referred to General
1973, the property of petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National Court Martial No. 14. At a hearing, petitioners manifested their desire to
bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay their loan, the exercise their right to raise peremptory challenges against the President
property was foreclose by PNB and was bought at a public auction by and the members of the general court martial invoking Art. 18 of CA No.
private respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to408. GCM No. 14 ruled that peremptory challenges had been discontinued
repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent under PD 39.
states that the sale of the property disqualified petitioner from being legal
heirs vis-a-vis the said property.
Issue: W/N the right to peremptory challenge provide by Art. 18 of CA No.
408 has been discontinued under PD 39.
Issue:
W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 Held:
of the Public Land Act.
No. Although PD 39 disallowed peremptory challenged allowed
under CA No. 408, PD 39 however was issued to implement General Order
Held:
No. 8 issued during martial law to create military tribunals. With the lifting
Yes. Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act provides that "everyof Martial Law, General Order No. 8 was revoked and military tribunals
conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead were dissolved. As such, the reason for the existence of PD 39 ceased
provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or automatically. When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
legal heirs within a period of five years from the date or conveyance." The Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.
provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction
made by respondent contravenes the very purpose of the act. Between
two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the
law should prevail.

Case No. 13| Midterms Case No. 4

Lydia O. Chua vs The Civil Service Commission, NIA
GR No. 88979, February 7, 1992

Case No. 14 | Midterms Case No. 5

City of Manila and City Treasurer vs Judge Amador E. Gomez, Et Al.
GR No. L-37251, August 31, 1981

Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
Facts:

Facts:
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary
The Revised Charter of Manila fixes the annual realty tax at 1.5%.
separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Sec. On the other hand, the Special Education Fund Law imposed an annual
2 provides for who are qualified to avail of the benefits of RA 6683 which additional tax of 1% on the assessed value of real property in addition to
includes, "all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees." the real property tax regularly levied thereon but the total real property
Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits tax shall not exceed 3% Since the maximum limit imposed is 3%, the
of the program filed and application with the respondent NIA which was municipal board of Manila imposed an additional .5% to fix the total
denied due to the fact that she is a co-terminus employee. Her appeal with imposable tax on real property at 3% which is divided into the following:
respondent Commission was likewise denied.
1.5% as per charter of Manila, 1% as per Special Education Fund law and .
5% as per order of the municipal board. Private respondent Esso
Issue: W/N petitioner's status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from Philippines paid the additional one-half percent realty tax under protest
the benefits of Ra 6683 (Early Retirement Law)
and later filed a complaint for recovery of the said amount. It contended
that the additional one-half percent is void because it is not authorized by
Held: No. There is no substantial difference between a co-terminus the city charter or any law.
employee and a contractual, casual or emergency employee for all are
tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career and temporary. The Issue: W/N the additional one-half percent imposed by the City of Manila is
Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the valid or legal.
constitution if the SC were to sustain respondent's submission that the
benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who Held:
are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The doctrine of
Yes. The Real Property Tax Law imposes that a city council, by
necessary implications should be applied in this case.
ordinance, may impose a realty tax of not less than one-half perfect but
not more than two percent of the assessed value of real property. The
additional one-half percent then is legal. Furthermore, the doctrine of
implications sustains the contention of the City of Manila that the
additional one-half percent is sanctioned by the Special Education Fund
Law when the same states that the total real property tax shall not
exceed a maximum of three per centum. The doctrine of necessary
implications means that that which is plainly implied in the language of a
statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.

Case No. 15 | Midterms Case No. 6

People of the Philippines vs Guillermo Manantan
GR No. L-14129, July 31, 1962

Case No. 16 | Midterms Case No. 7

JM Tuason and Co., et al. vs Hon. Herminio Mariano, et al.
GR No. L-33140, October 23, 1978

Statutory rule: The rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est can
operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly Statutory rule: Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb
established.
what has been settled. Matters already decided on the merits cannot be
relitigated again and again.
Facts:
Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of the Facts:
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code which provides that No justice,
Respondents Aquial claimed ownership of a parcel of land located
judge, fiscal. shall aid any candidate in any manner in any election, in Quezon City having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged that it had
except to vote. Defendant contends that this provision excludes justice of been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of
the peace and as such, he is excluded from this prohibition. Because of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Petitioners Tuason
this, the lower court dismissed the case against him. The Solicitor General pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court
appealed.
of Land Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the
titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the
Issue: W/N a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Section 54 land registration proceeding.
of the Revised Election Code.
Issue: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid.
Held: Yes. Although petitioner argues that when Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code omitted the words justice of peace from the Revised Held:
Administrative Code provision from which it was taken and thus making the
OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already
intention of the legislature clear in the omission, the word judge in the decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs Tuason,
former provision was qualified or modified by the phrase of first instance. Alcantara vs Tuason and Pili vs Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also
The term judge in Section 54 is not modified or qualified, making it applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 735. Considerng the
broader and more generic to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past
the Courts of First Instance, Courts of Agrarian Relations, Courts of precedents and do not disturb what has been settled), the court ruled that
Industrial Relations and justices of the peace. The rule of casus omissus respondents cannot maintain their action without eroding the long settled
has no applicability to the case at bar for the maxim only applies and holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to
operate if and when the omission has been clearly established.
attack.

Case No. 17 | Midterms Case No. 8

Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs Intermediate Appellate Court
GR No. L-72005, May 29, 1987

Case No. 18 | Midterms Case No. 9

Juanito Pilar vs Commission on Elections
GR No. 115245, July 11, 1995

Statutory rule: The rule is well recognized that where the law does not
Statutory rule: When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
distinguish. The rule, founded on logic, is corollary of the principle that
general words and phrases of a statute should ordinarily be accorded their Facts:
natural and general significance.
On March 22, 1992, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Facts:
Isabela. Three days later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a
Private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires Inc. filed a complaint result, respondent Commission imposed a fine of P10,000.00 for failure to
for a collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation. During thefile his statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner contends
pendency, private respondent attached some of the properties of Varian that it is clear from the law that the candidate must have entered the
Industrial corporation upon the posting of a supersedes bond. The latter in political contest, and should have either won or lost.
turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner Philippine British Assurance
so the attached properties were released. The trial court then rendered a Issue: W/N petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of
decision favorable to the private respondent and Writ of execution was contributions and expenditures since he was a "non-candidate", having
issued in favor of private respondent. The same was however returned withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing.
unsatisfied as varian failed to deliver the attached personal properties
upon demand. Sycwin thus prayed that petitioner corporation be ordered Held:
to pay the value of its bond which was granted.
Yes. Sec. 14 of Ra 7166 states that "every candidate" has the
obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. As the
Issue: W/N the counter bond issued through petitioner corporation covers law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate
execution of a judgment pending appeal.
pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate"
must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his
Held:
campaign, but also to who who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of
The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 57 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their
the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond certificate of candidacy".
limited its application to a final and executory judgment. It applies to the
payment of any judgment that may be recovered by plaintiff. It is a
recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Since the law did not make any distinction nor intended any
exception, when it speaks of "any judgment" which may be charged
against a counter bond, it should be interpreted to refer not only to a final
and executory judgment but also a judgment pending appeal.

Case No. 19 | Midterms Case No. 10

People vs Judge Antonio Evangelista and Guildo Tugonon
GR No. 110898, February 20, 1996

Case No. 20 | Midterms Case No. 11

Cecilio De Villa vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 87416, April 8, 1991

Statutory rule: If the law makes no distinction, neither should the court.

Statutory rule: When the law does not make any exception, courts may not
except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.

Facts:
Private respondent Guildo Tugonon was charged and convicted of Facts:
frustrated homicide. He filed a petition for probation. However, the Chief
Probation and Parole Officer recommended denial of private respondent's
Petitioner Cecilio De Villa was charged before the RTC of Makati for
application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Bouncing Checks Law.
the trial, he had already waived his right to make his application for Petitioner contends that the check in question was drawn against his dollar
probation. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's recommendation and account with a foreign bank and as such, it is not covered by the Bouncing
granted private respondent's application on April 23, 1993.
Checks Law..
Issue: W/N respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by Issue: W/N a foreign check drawn against a foreign account is covered by
granting private respondent's application for probation despite the appealBP 22.
filed by the private respondent.
Held:
Held:
Yes. The law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case
Yes. Private respondent filed his application for probation on since what the law only specifies is that checks drawn and issued in the
December 28, 1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered by Philippines, though payable outside thereof are within the coverage of the
the prohibition that "no application for probation shall be entertained or law. It is a cardinal rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts
granted if the defendant has perfect the appeal from the judgment of should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does
conviction" and that "the filing of the application shall deemed a waiver of not make any exception, courts may not except something unless
the right to appeal." having appealed from the judgment of the trial court compelling reasons exist to justify it.
and applied for probation after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his
conviction, private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of
probation. Furthermore, the law makes no distinction between meritorious
and unmeritorious appeals so neither should the court.

intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature

and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction.

Case No. 21 | Midterms Case No. 12

Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs Pedro Jimenez
GR No. L-14787, January 28, 1961

Case No. 22 | Midterms Case No. 13

RP vs Eutropio Migrinio and Troadio Tecson
GR No. 89483, August 30, 1990

Statutory rule: General terms may be restricted by specific word, with the
result that the general language will be limited by specific language which Statutory rule: Applying the rule in statutory construction known as
indicates the statutes object and purpose. The rule is applicable only to ejusdem generis, that is where general words follow an enumeration of
cases wherein, except for one general term, all the items in an persons or things, such general words are not to be construed in their
enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of
the same kind or class as those especially mentioned.
Facts:
Petitioner corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparationsFacts:
and household remedies. They import materials including stabilizers and
Acting on information received which indicated the acquisition of
flavors is among those petitioner imports. For every importation, wealth beyond his lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required
petitioner pays 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for private respondent Lt. Col. Tecson to submit his explanation or comment,
the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA together with supporting evidence thereto. Private respondent was unable
601, the Exchange Tax Law. However the same law also provides that to provide supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody
foreign exchanged used for xxx importation to the Philippines of xxx of his bookkeeper who ha gone abroad. The anti-graft Board was created
stabilizers and flavors xxx shall be refunded to any importer making by the PCGG to "investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
application therefore. Petitioner now seeks a refund of the 17% special of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service." Private respondent
excise tax they paid in the total sum of P113,343.99.
mainly argues that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in
Executive Orders No. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A are acts of his alone and not
Issue: W/N the foreign exchange used by petitioner in the importation of connected with being a crony, business associate or subordinate. Hence,
dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.
tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law so as to entitle it to a refund.
Issue: W/N private respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the
Held:
Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of RA 3019 and 1379.
Yes. The refusal to deny refund was based on the argument that all
the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class, Held:
namely: food products, book supplies/materials and medical supplies and
No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the term
that for petitioners to be exempt, the stabilizers and flavors they use "subordinate" as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys close
must fall under the category of food products. Respondent contends that association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar
since petitioners use these as toothpaste, the same is not a food product. to the immediate family member, relative and close associate in E) 1 and
Court ruled that although stabilizers and flavors are preceded by items the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent or nominee in EO 2.
that might fall under food products, the following which were also included
are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, industrial starch and more.
Therefore, the law must be seen in its entirety. The rule of construction that
general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by a particular
recital does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is

Note: Ejusdem Generis General words followed by an enumeration of

persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be
held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned.

Case No. 23 | Midterms Case No. 14

PP vs Vicente Echavez, Jr. et al.
GR Nos. L-47757-61, January 28, 1990

Case No. 24 | Midterms Case No. 15

Vera vs Cuevas, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the PH

Statutory rule: Rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory Rule: The familiar rule of Ejusdem Generis
construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain.
Facts: Defendant Commissioner on Internal Revenue required the private
Facts:
respondents Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers and
16 persons were charged with squatting which is penalized by Consolidated Milk Company and Milk Industries, Inc. to withdraw from the
Presidential Decre No. 772 which provides that any person who with the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription
use of force, xxx succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of required by Section 169 of the Tax Code, which essentially imposes this
another against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, requirement on all milk products from which the fatty party has been
shall be punished by imprisonment xxx The lower court denied the motion removed totally or in part. Private respondents protest by alleging that
and ruled that agricultural land is not part of PD 772 on the basis of filled milk is not skimmed milkwhich is required under the law. The lower
ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) since its preamble does not court favored the private respondents on the ground of ejusdem generis.
mention the Secretary of Agriculture.
Issue: W/N Section 169 of the Tax Code applies to filled milk.
Issue: W/N PD 772 applies to agricultural lands
Held:
Held:
No. Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The
No. PD 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble use of the specific and qualifying terms skimmed milk in the headnote
shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or and condensed skimmed milk in the text of the cited section, would
more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to- restrict the scope of the general clause all milk, in whatever form, from
do individuals. But the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part. In other words,
usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the decree is the general clause is restricted by the specific term skimmed milk under
unmistakeable. It stated that the rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are
for statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.
uncertain.
Furthermore, there is a difference between skimmed milk and filled milk in
that skimmed milk is milk wherein all fatty part is removed while filled milk
is milk wherein all fatty part is likewise removed but replaced by a fat
substitute like coconut oil.

Case No. 26 | Midterms Case No. 17

Case No. 25 | Midterms Case No. 16
Dra. Brigida Buenaseda vs Secretary Juan Flavier
San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue GR No. 106719, September 21, 1993
GR No. 147749, June 22, 2006
Statutory Rule: Noscitur a socciis. Where a particular word is equally
Statutory Rule: The express mention of one person, thing, act or susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made
consequence excludes all other. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with
which it is associated.
Facts:
SPMC is a corporation engaged in the business of milling, Facts:
manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other similar products. It
The private respondents filed an administrative complaint with the
was assessed and ordered by the Commission of Internal Revenue to pay Ombudsman against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-graft and
the total amount of P8,182,182.85 representing deficiency in millers tax Corrupt Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing
and manufacturers sales tax. SPMC opposed on the ground that they are the preventive suspension of the petitioner, who were employees of the
exempted under Section 168 of the Tax Code on the ground that the national center for mental health. The respondents argue that the
purchaser of their products, UNICHEM, exports their products.
preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is
contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the 1987 Constitution, while
Issue: W/N SPMC is exempted from the payment of 3% millers tax.
petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only recommend to the
Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of
Held:
officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by
No. The language of the exemption did not warrant the his office.
interpretation advanced by SPMC for nowhere did it provide that the
exportation made by the purchaser of the materials was covered by the Issue: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend
exemption. The proposes interpretation of SPMC unduly enlarged the government officials working in other offices other than that of the
scope of the exemption clause. Where the law enumerate the subject or Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints.
condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its
effects all those not expressly mentiond. Expressio unius est exclusio Held:
alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded
Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of
therefrom. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. When
not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had intention not to the Constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power to "recommend the
restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
suspension" of a public official or employees, it referred to "suspension" as
a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in
said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal,
demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitur a sociis, the word
"suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with
which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of

various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by

considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is
associated.

Case No. 28 | Midterms Case No. 18

Manolo P. Fule vs Court of Appeals
GR No. L-79094, June 22, 1988

Case No. 29 | Midterms Case No. 19

Purita Bersabal vs Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador
Gr No. L-35910, July 21, 1978

Statutory rule: Use of word may in the statute generally connotes a

Statutory rule: Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while permissible thing while the word shall is imperative.
those in the affirmative are mere directory.
Facts:
Facts:
Private respondents filed an ejectment suit against the petitioner.
Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued The subsequent decision was appealed by the petitioner and during its
and made out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said check was pendency, the court issued an order stating that counsels for both
dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was alreadyparties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within which to file their
closed, thus in violation of BP 22, the Bouncing Checks Law. Upon the memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for decision by the
hearing, prosecution presented its evidence and the petitioner waived his court. After receipt, petitioner filed a Motion Ex Parte to Submit
right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum confirming the stipulation of Memorandum within 30 days from receipt of Notice of Submission of the
facts which was not signed by both petitioner nor by his counsel. He was transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which
convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, the appellate court.
was granted by the court. But the respondent judge issued an order
dismissing the case for failure to prosecute petitioners appeal. Petitioner
Issue: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the filed a motion for reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but
stipulation of facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel.
the court denied it.
Held:

Issue: W/N the mere failure of an appellant to submit the mentioned

Yes. The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 4, states that No memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground
agreement or admission made or entered during pre-trial shall be used of failure to prosecute.
against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and
counsel. By its very language, the rule is mandatory. Negative words and Held:
phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are
The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the
merely directory. Therefore, the signature of the petitioner and counsel is mere failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides
mandatory. Also, penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the that Courts shall decide.. cases on the basis of the evidence and
accused. Case is re-opened to receive evidence in favor of the accused.
records transmitted from the city courts: providedparties may submit
memorandum.. if so requested. It cannot be interpreted otherwise than
that the submission of memorandum is optional. Being optional, a party
may choose to waive submission of the memoranda. As a general rule, the
word may when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to
confer discretion; while the word shall is imperative, operating to impose
a duty which may be enforced.

Case No. 30
Jenette Marie Crisologo vs Globe Telecom, Cesar Maureal
GR No. 167631, December 16 2005

Case No. 31 | Midterms Case No. 20

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (South) vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 117188, August 7, 1997

Statutory rule: The word must in a statute like shall is not always
Statutory rule: Statutory rule: Use of word may in the statuted generally imperative and may be consistent with an exercise of discretion.
connotes a permissible thing while the word shall is imperative
Facts:
The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (North
Association) was registered with private respondent Home Insurance and
Guaranty Corporation as the sole homeowners organization in the said
subdivision but it did not file its corporate by-laws. Later, it was discovered
that there were two organizations within the subdivision: the North and
South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the president of North
Association that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of
non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This
resulted in the registration of the South Association, herein petitioner. The
North Association complained and got a favorable result from respondent
HIGC declaring the registration of petitioner association (the South
Assocciation) cancelled and respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said
decision. Hence, petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue: W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month
from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution.
Held:
No. The legislatures intent is not to automatically dissolve a
corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. The wor must in a statute is
not always imperative but it may be consistent with an exercise of
discretion. The language of the statuted should be considered as a whole
while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the word must or
shall.

Case No. 32 | Midterms Case No. 21

PNB vs Court of Appeals
222 Scra 134, May 17, 1993

Case No. 33 | Midterms Case No. 22

ALU-TUCP vs NLRC, National Steel Corporation
GR No. 109902, August 2, 1994

Statutory rule: A week means a period of seven consecutive days without Statutory rule:
regard to the day of the week on which it begins.
Facts:
To secure payments of his loan, private respondent mortgages two
lots to petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, petitioner bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest
bidder at the auction sale. Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the
Registry of Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said
lots to a third party.
The notices of sale of private respondents foreclosed properties
were published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of a
newspaper Daily Record. The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday,
while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and a Saturday respectively.
Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be
published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks.
Issue: W/N the petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly
publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
Held:
No. it must be conceded that Article 13 of the NCC is completely
silent as to the definition of what is a week. In Concepcion vs Andueta, the
term week was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of
seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it
begins. The petitioner bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of
publication. Auction sale of petitioner bank is void and of no legal effect.

Case No. 34
Acting Commissioner of Customs vs Manila Electric Company, CTA
Gr No. L-23623, June 30, 1977
Statutory Rule: