Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Republic of The Philippines
Republic of The Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987
September 3, 2013
adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years,
thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. 1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated
June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad
452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters
as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 41656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting
Malabanans application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing
an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324)
Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming
part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower,
and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding
decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the
CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and
that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the
RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing
the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto), 4 the CA declared that under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR
certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March
15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanans
period of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his
heirs elevated the CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court
through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the
property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and
disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession
to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141)
and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in
Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the
application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date
back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering
that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and
declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial
hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.6 to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure
converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of
an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According
to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted"
into private property through prescription at the time of the application
without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because
Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and
occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his
predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere
classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed
sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on
the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito v. Republic8 and
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 9 they argue that the reclassification of
the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription
under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the
right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the
ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor;
and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on
February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for
almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was
declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a
clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and
Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has
enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of
the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral,
forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law
does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase
"alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to
only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations
under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-ininterest, has been in possession and occupation of the property
subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since
June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the
RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain
may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be
classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the
applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed
private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be
registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in
relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree or both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those
EN BANC
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD &
VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership
for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in
subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted
findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this
Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased
the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national
cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors,
possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more
than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to
exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have
their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as
the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and
register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973
Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the
title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in
favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973
Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein
against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in
lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at
the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were
then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative.
If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations
or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs.
Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that
case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60%
of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947
two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been
possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-ininterest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in
1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The
court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application
on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply
for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows
only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was
ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to
those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we
do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer
would have recommended an application under the foregoing
decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind
of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were
in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might
be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.
There are indications that registration was expected from all but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made,
was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for
it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section
47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become
private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of
Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title
or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned,
likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de
Sonza, 8 Manarpac
vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel
vs.
Court
of
10
Appeals and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi
doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
11
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and,
therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting
opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is
herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct
view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case
of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases
cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of
a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act
provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old
law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by
amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of
acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through
his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby
the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private
property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake.
But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine
and precedents and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases
which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write
this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors
"shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure
established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the
statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to
a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of
the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domainand
had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to
sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case
of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral
family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which
reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the
Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and
regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as
well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it,
as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and
related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited
established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up
to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We
reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of
alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without
the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso
jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property,
which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations
such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly
held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public
policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such
conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully
acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973
Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to
lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the
simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from
the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution
which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands
(except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which
imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that
the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession
thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments
redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community,
particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the
filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly
reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered
lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied
and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership
have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the
possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the
deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally
expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to
December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to
December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly
extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder
for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of
substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly
applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to
the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the
title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of
the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold
and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications
to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession
of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on
their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to
the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually,
physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory
30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is
obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required
statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally
sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the
law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although
part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be
impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently
stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted
into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable
title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act
(which needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings
for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they
lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation.
apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to
ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a
dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA
799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on
the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of
the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation
of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error in not having filed the application for registration in the
name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and
vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of
the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being
refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners
and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable
acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of
refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years
dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision
that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional
provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from
Facts:
1. Defendant through his lawyer filed an answer therein admitting the
averment in the complaint that the land was acquired by the plaintiff
through inheritance from his parents, the former owners thereof.
2.Subsequently, the defendant changed his counsel, and with leave of
court, amended the answer. In the amended answer, the admission no
longer appears. The alleged ownership of the land by the plaintiff was
denied coupled with an allegation that the defendant is the owner of the
land as he bought it from the plaintiffs parents while they were still alive.
3. After trial, the lower court upheld the defendants ownership of the
land. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant is bound by
the admission contained in his original answer.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of plaintiff is correct
RULING: NO. The original pleading had been amended such that it
already disappeared from the record, lost its status as a pleading and
cease to be a judicial admission. While the said pleading may be utilized
June 4, 2014
On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, among others,
that: "This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per
Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on
March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation." The said
plan was approved by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional
Office III, San Fernando, Pampanga, on December 3, 1998.
Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the MTC issued
the Order, dated October 10, 2002, setting the case for hearing with the
corresponding publication. After compliance with all the requirements of
the law regarding publication, mailing and posting, hearing on the merits
of the application followed.
During the trial on June 4, 2003, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon)
testified on their claim over the subject lot. Thereafter, respondents
submitted their formal offer of evidence, after which the evidence offered
were admitted by the MTC in the Order, dated July 10, 2003, without
objection from the public prosecutor.
The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.
On October 3, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision, 3 ordering the
registration of the subject property in the name of respondents. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant application to be sufficient in form and
substance and the applicants having established their right of ownership
over the subject parcel of land and are therefore entitled to registration
thereof, the Court thereby grants the petition.
Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the registration of the parcel of land
subject matter of this petition which is more particularly described in Plan
Ap-03-004226 Pulilan Cadastre and in their corresponding technical
descriptions in the name of Resureccion Castro.
Upon this decision becoming final, let an Order for the decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The MTC reasoned out that there was evidence to show that the subject
lots had been in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession,
either by the applicants themselves or their predecessor-in-interest. Such
possession since time immemorial conferred an effective title on the
applicants, whereby the land ceased to be public and became private
property. It had been the accepted norm that open, adverse and
continuous possession for at least 30 years was sufficient. The MTC
noted that evidence showed that the parcel of land involved was not
covered by land patent or a public land application as certified to by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources of Tabang, Guiguinto,
Bulacan. Moreover, it added that the technical descriptions of Lot 11247
were prepared and secured from the Land Management Sector, DENR,
Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, and were verified and found to be
correct by Eriberto Almazan, In-Charge of the Regional Survey Division.
On December 19, 2003, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA,
docketed as CA-GR. CV No. 81439. In its brief, 4 the OSG presented the
following assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of the public
domain occupied and possessed in concept of owner for a period of at
least thirty (30) years is entitled to confirmation of title; and b)
respondents failed to prove specific acts of possession.
The OSG argued that there was no proof
already segregated from inalienable lands
was only from the date of declaration of
disposable that the period for counting
possession would start.
subject of the application for registration fell within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, they
should have adduced a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records.
To bolster its argument, the OSG cites the case of Republic of the
Philippine v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,6 where the Court stated that the trial
court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof
of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly
issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in
establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. Such government
certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated
therein. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due
execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the OSG argues that
respondents failed to present specific acts of ownership to prove open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse possession in the concept
of an owner. Facts constituting possession must be duly established by
competent evidence. As to the tax declaration adduced by respondents,
it cannot be said that it clearly manifested their adverse claim on the
property. If respondents genuinely and consistently believed their claim
of ownership, they should have regularly complied with their real estate
obligations from the start of their supposed occupation.
On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA correctly found that
the subject land was alienable and disposable. The approved survey
plan of the subject property with an annotation, stating that the subject
property is alienable and disposable land, is a public document, having
been issued by the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein and are sufficient to establish
that the subject property is indeed alienable and disposable.
Respondents cite the case of Republic v. Serrano, 7 where the Court
stated that a DENR Regional Technical Directors certification, which was
annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence, constituted
substantial compliance with the legal requirement. The DENR
certification enjoyed the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to
the contrary.
Anent the second assignment of error, respondents contend that the CA
correctly applied the doctrine of constructive possession because they
acquired the subject land from their mother, Resurreccion, through a
donation inter vivos, dated July 22, 1972.Their mother, in turn, acquired
the subject land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an
absolute sale. They claim that a small hut was built in the said land and
was occupied by a worker of her mother. They countered that although
tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession
in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property which is not in his actual or constructive custody.
Position of Respondents
inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No.
2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation
to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains
part of the inalienable public domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968, appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey
Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State..."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case)
must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the
land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers
notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government
act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a
With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession
and occupation of a parcel of land by the applicant, by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier. 17 A
mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more, by
itself, is not sufficient.18
In this regard, respondents likewise failed. As the records and pleadings
of this case will reveal, the earliest that respondents and their
predecessor-in-interest can trace back possession and occupation of the
subject land was only in the year 1950,when their mother, Resurreccion,
acquired the subject land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue
of an absolute sale. Evidently, their possession of the subject property
commenced roughly five (5) years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning
date expressly provided under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus,
their application for registration of land title was legally infirm.
The respondents cannot invoke Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 which
provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.1avvphi1 The case of Malabanan v.
Republic19 gives a definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of
original registration proceedings under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree. In the said case, the Court laid down the following
rules:
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
xxxx
followed.
MENDOZA, J.:
The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.
FACTS:
Respondents filed with the MTC an application for original registration of
land over a parcel of land with an area of 10, 792 square meters, situated
in Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan, Province of Bulacan, and
more particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345, PulilanCadastre,
under Plan No. AP-03-004226.
Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a
donation inter vivos from their mother, Resurreccion L. Castro
(Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they, through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession of the subject property;
and that the property was not within a reservation.
In support of their application, respondents submitted among others a
survey plan approved by the Regional Technical Director of the Land
Management Service, Region III of the DENR stating that the land
subject of the survey was alienable and disposable land, and as certified
to by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927, was outside of any civil or
military reservation. On the lower portion of the plan, there was a note
stating that a deed of absolute sale over the subject property was
executed by a certain Luis Santos and Fermina Santos (the Santoses) in
favor of Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.
On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, that: "This survey
is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map
No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is
outside any civil or military reservation." Finding the application sufficient
in form and substance, the MTC issued the Order, dated October 10,
2002, setting the case for hearing with the corresponding publication.
After compliance with all the requirements of the law regarding
publication, mailing and posting, hearing on the merits of the application
The MTC ordered the registration of the subject property in the name of
respondents.
Later, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA. In its brief, the OSG
presented the following assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of
the public domain occupied and possessed in concept of owner for a
period of at least thirty (30) years is entitled to confirmation of title; and b)
respondents failed to prove specific acts of possession.
The OSG argued that there was no proof
already segregated from inalienable lands
was only from the date of declaration of
disposable that the period for counting
possession would start.
The
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
is
overruled.
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy of the
conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which
bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is
inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No.
2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation
to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains
part of the inalienable public domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968, appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey
Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State..."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case)
must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the
land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers
notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government
act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a
mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.
By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable."
Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to
commence and operate against the State, the classification of land as
alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must be
able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification,
expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a
proclamation issued by the President that the subject land is no longer
retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Consequently,
without an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be a
property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by
virtue of prescription. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. It is still insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either Section 14
(1) or 14 (2) of P.O. No. 1529. Under Section 14 (1), respondents failed
to prove (a) that the property is alienable and disposable; and (b) that
their possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Failing to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the subject land,
respondents all the more cannot apply for registration by way of
prescription pursuant to Section 14 (2) which requires possession for 30
years to acquire or take. Not only did respondents need to prove the
classification of the subject land as alienable and disposable, but also to
show that it has been converted into patrimonial. As to whether
respondents were able to prove that their possession and occupation
were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has
been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.
The petition is GRANTED.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Antecedents
On May 28, 1993, respondent Zurbaran Realty and Development
Corporation filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San Pedro, Laguna
an application for original registration covering a 1,520 square meter
parcel of land situated in Barrio Banlic, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province
of Laguna, denominated as Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-04-
After inspection, it was also found that (1) the land was residential; (2)
the respondent was in the actual occupation and possession of the land;
and (3) the land did not encroach upon an established watershed,
riverbank/bed protection, creek, right-of-way or park site or any area
devoted to general use or devoted to public service. 7
A certification was issued by the Records Management Division of the
Land Management Bureau stating that it had no record of any kind of
public land applications/land patents covering the parcel of land subject
of the application.8
The respondent presented Gloria P. Noel, its Vice President and
Treasurer, who testified that the respondent had purchased the land from
Jane de Castro Abalos on March 9, 1992 for P300,000.00; that the land
had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Abalos under
Tax Declaration No. 22711; that after the sale, a new Tax Declaration had
been issued in the name of the respondent, who had meanwhile taken
possession of the land by building a fence around it and introducing
improvements thereon; that the respondent had paid the real property
taxes thereon since its acquisition; that the respondents possession had
been continuous, open and public; and that the land was free from any
lien or encumbrance; and that there was no adverse claimant to the
land.9
Engr. Edilberto Tamis attested that he was familiar with the land because
it was a portion of Lot No. 8017 of Subdivision Plan Cad-455-D of the
Cabuyao Cadastre, owned by Corazon Tapalla who had acquired it from
the Hemedez family; that Tapalla had sold a portion of Lot No. 8017 to
Abalos and the remaining portion to him; and that he had witnessed the
sale of the land to the respondent.10
The respondents final witness was Armando Espela who declared that
he was a retired land overseer residing in Barangay Banlic from birth;
that he was familiar with the land which was part of a bigger parcel of
land owned by the Hemedez family; that his father, Toribio Espela, with
his assistance, and one Francisco Capacio worked on the land since
1960; that the entire landholding had originally been sugarland, but was
later on subdivided, sold, and resold until it ceased to be agricultural
land; that, in 1982, the land was sold to Corazon Tapalla who hired him
as the overseer; that as the overseer, he fenced and cleared the area;
that he was allowed to use the grassy portion for grazing purposes; that
in 1987, Tapalla sold part of the land to Abalos and the remaining portion
to Engr. Tamis; that he continued to oversee the land for the new owners;
that Abalos then sold her portion to the respondent in 1992; that since
then, the respondent took possession of the land, and he then ceased to
be the overseer; that the possession by the Hemedez family and its
successors-in-interest was open, continuous, public and under claim of
ownership; and that he did not know any person who claimed ownership
of the land other than those he and his father served as overseers. 11
Decision of the RTC
On May 12, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision, holding that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, public,
peaceful, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and occupation
of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960 and,
accordingly, granted the application for registration, viz:
WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the evidence submitted by the
applicant, this Court hereby orders the confirmation and registration of
title of the land described as Lot 8017-A of subdivision plan Csd-04006985-D, being a portion of Lot 8017 of subdivision plan Cad-455-D,
Cabuyao Cadastre situated at Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna with
an area of 1,520 square meters to be entered under the name of the
applicant Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation, a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with office
address at 33 M. Viola St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City by the
Land Registration Authority. After the decision shall become final, let an
order for the issuance of a decree of title be issued in favor of said
applicant.
SO ORDERED.12
Judgment of the CA
The Republic appealed, arguing that the issue of whether the applicant
and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land within the
required length of time could not be determined because there was no
evidence as to when the land had been declared alienable and
disposable.
On June 10, 2004, the CA promulgated its judgment affirming the RTC,
and concluded that the reports made by the concerned government
agencies and the testimonies of those familiar with the land in question
had buttressed the court a quos conclusion that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous,
exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land under a
bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960.13
Issue
Hence, the Republic appeals the adverse judgment of the CA upon the
following ground:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS GRANT OF THE
APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT RESPONDENT AND ITS
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE
PERIOD OF POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION REQUIRED BY LAW.14
The Republic contends that the respondent did not establish the time
when the land covered by the application for registration became
alienable and disposable;15 that such detail was crucial because the
possession of the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest, for the
purpose of determining whether it acquired the property by prescription,
should be reckoned from the time when the land was declared alienable
and disposable; and that prior to the declaration of the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, it was not susceptible to private
ownership, and any possession or occupation at such time could not be
counted as part of the period of possession required under the law on
prescription.16
The respondent counters that whether it established when the property
was declared alienable and disposable and whether it complied with the
30-year required period of possession should not be entertained
anymore by the Court because: (a) these issues had not been raised in
the trial court and were being raised for the first time on appeal; and (b)
factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA,
were binding and conclusive on this Court. At any rate, the respondent
insists that it had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, and
adverse possession of the property for the prescribed period of 30 years
as evidenced by the fact that the property had been declared for taxation
purposes in 1960 in the name of its predecessors-in-interest, and that
such possession had the effect of converting the land into private
property and vesting ownership upon the respondent. 17
In reply, the Republic asserts that it duly opposed the respondents
application for registration; that it was only able to ascertain the errors
committed by the trial court after the latter rendered its decision; and that
the burden of proof in land registration cases rested on the applicant who
must prove its ownership of the property being registered. The Republic
maintains that the Court had the authority to review and reverse the
factual findings of the lower courts when the conclusion reached was not
supported by the evidence on record, as in this case. 18
Ruling
The petition for review is meritorious.
State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth" are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth."
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.23
The respondents application does not enlighten as to whether it was
filed under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The
application alleged that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation
of the property in the concept of an owner, but did not state when
possession and occupation commenced and the duration of such
possession. At any rate, the evidence presented by the respondent and
its averments in the other pleadings reveal that the application for
registration was filed based on Section 14(2), not Section 14(1) of P.D.
No. 1529. The respondent did not make any allegation in its application
that it had been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, nor did it present any evidence to establish such fact.1wphi1
With the application of the respondent having been filed under Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the crucial query is whether the land subject of
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
DEVELOPMENT
Facts:
Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed with RTC an
application for original registration of land. Director of Lands opposed it
arguing that applicant and its predecessor in interest had not been in
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of
land since June 12, 1945.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Zurbaran.
On appeal to SC, the Republic appealed arguing that Zurbaran failed to
establish the time when the land became alienable and disposable,
which is crucial in determining whether Zuburan acquired the land by
prescription.
ISSUE: What are the substantive elements in filing an application for
original registration of land?
RULING:
The requirements depend on what basis the application was filed..