HAZID Worksheet FORM

HAZID WORKSHEET
Project : ANOA PHASE 4 - AGX COMPRESSION RECONFIGURATION PROJECT

Node Description : DLB Activities in the vicinity and moored alongside AGX Platform
Date of HAZID Study : 25 May 2012
Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

No Type of Event Potential Hazards Consequences (Existing and Recommended Control REC # Recommendation Action Party
Measures)
S L R S L R
1 Anchor Handling Work Boat collision with Boat damage / lost boat 5 2 HR 1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure 1 1 LR
(Running the platform / AHT Personnel injury 2. Reliable / maintained work boat
Messanger Line 3. Weather limit
Under the 4. Adequate illumination of work area
Bridge) using 5. Trained work boat operation
Work Boat 6. Maintain good communication
7. JSA for work boat operation
8. FRC/MOB Boat ready at all time
9. Suitable PPE: include work vest
2 Running Lost control of wire due Damage to redundant 3 2 MR 1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure 3 1 LR
Anchor / Anchor to failure of umbilical / subsea structure 2. DP Vessel as AHT
Wire comunication or control 3. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with
system MWS approval)
4. Competence Vessel Captain
5. Maintain good communication between
Anchor Tower and AHT
AHT collision with the Damage to vessel or 5 3 HR 1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure 3 1 LR
platform / complex complex (damage to riser) 2. JSA for Anchor Handling
Personnel injury 3. Weather limit for Anchor Handling
Schedule delay 4. Parachute Buoy
5. DP Vessel as AHT
6. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with
MWS approval)
7. Competence Vessel Captain
8. Maintain good communication between
Anchor Tower and AHT
9. Weather limit
10. Briefing about the facility for all Vessel
Captain including the location of risers
11. Secondary AHT standby in the field at all
time
HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 1 of 16
HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
Drop/Drag Anchor on Damage Subsea Facility 5 3 HR 1. Subsea / Seabed Survey DONE 3 1 LR
Subsea Facility Environmental HC 2. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure and
Discharge Approved Anchor Pattern
Potential fire/explosion 3. Anchor on Deck of AHT
Company reputation 4. Mooring Analysis
5. BMS/Survey Equipment Calibration
6. Pull test the anchors
7. Continue anchor wire tension monitoring by
Anchor Tower
8. Shut Down & Depressurize West Lobe line
9. Compliance with POI Marine Procedure
3 DLB Approach / DLB colission with Damage to both DLB and 5 2 HR 1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure (Step 3 1 LR
Final Departure platform and riser Platform by Step DLB Approach to AGX)
of AGX Personnel injury / Lost of life 2. Weather limit
Schedule delay 3. Maintain good communication with all
Environmental impact parties
4. Final approach only after all anchors are
installed / laid and DAY Light only.
5. Shut Down the platform and Depressurize
West Lobe line during Final Approach
6. AGX Riser is inside the Jacket
7. Responsible person on DLB monitoring the
gangway tip during final approach
8. Minimize personnel on AGX during DLB
final approach
9. Complete GO and No GO Checklist for the
DLB Final Approach to AGX
10. Anchor removal for final departure is

the reverse of anchor installation. (Meeting
will be performed with relevant parties
including MWS for removal anchors).
HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
4 DLB Crane Dropped loads / objects Damage asset causing HC 5 4 HR 1. Approved Lifting Procedure 4 1 MR
Operation on Topside of AGX / leak 2. Certified and good condition Crane (include
Subsea Facilities Personnel injury MWS inspection/approval)
Schedule delay 3. Certified and good condition Rigging
Environmental delay 4. Certified and experienced Crane Operator
and Rigging Personnel
5. Maintain good communication among
parties involved
6. All lift within the SWL of the crane / rigging
7. Weather limit
8. Stay clear from load
9. Suitable PPE
Crane Boom collision Damage asset causing HC 4 3 HR 1. All Cranes will be under the control of the 3 1 LR
with the AGX Topside leak Project (CTR).
and/or with Other Crane Personnel injury 2. Designated Person In Charge for Every Lift
Schedule delay 3. Good illumincation
4. Procedure control for Cranes Operations
(SIMOPS)
5. Detail planning meeting for Crane
Operations
6. Trained and experienced Crane Operator
7. Maintain good communication among all
involved parties
Crawler Crane fall over Damage asset causing HC 3 2 MR 1. Weather limit 3 1 LR 1 1. Risk Assessment to be Timas/POI
the side due to bad leak / Environmental impact 2. Barge rails in place performed for using the
weather related during Personnel injury 3. Certified and good condition crane Crawler Crane for Personnel
lifting (overloaded / Schedule delay 4. Certified and good condition rigging Transfer related to the
dynamic load) equipment visibility (ability of the Crane
5. Certified and experienced Crane Operator Operator to see the FROG)
6. Operate cranes within the design limit
2 2. Review Crawler Crane Timas

Operation Procedure
HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
5 Ignition Source DLB Exhaust Increase risk of 1 1 LR 1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD 1 1 LR
on DLB Fire/Explosion in the event Forward.
- Gas Release of HC release 2. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger
(10mm hole on is +16 elevation)
Gas-Gas 3. F&G and ESD System on AGX
Exchanger) with 4. ERP Procedures
20knots wind 5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G
speed toward detection system on platform is activated
the DLB 6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention
7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of
DLB
NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud
would NOT reach the DLB.
Electrical Equipment on Increase risk of 1 1 LR 1. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger 1 1 LR 3 Explore the possibility to Timas
DLB (Lights, Etc) Fire/Explosion in the event is +16 elevation) switch off the lights and other
of HC release 2. F&G and ESD System on AGX ignition source on crane
3. ERP Procedures
4. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G
detection system on platform is activated
5. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention
6. Switch off the light on Crane Boom during
the Day Light
7. Weather proof lighting/electrical system on
the barge deck and crane boom
8. DLB can be pulled / winched away (winch
speed approx 60m per minute)
9. Construction activities around process area
controlled by PTW asper integrated project
plan
DLB

HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
Crawler Crane Exhaust Increase risk of 1 1 LR 1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60 1 1 LR
Fire/Explosion in the event meters away
of HC release 2. Crawler Crane Exchaust is fitted with Spark
Arrestor
3. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger
is +16 elevation)
4. F&G and ESD System on AGX
5. ERP Procedures

Welding Machines on Increase risk of 1 1 LR 1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are 1 1 LR

DLB Fire/Explosion in the event located on DLB are 60m away from the
of HC release platform.
2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding
leads to Platform and shut down (turn off) the
welding machines on DLB.
is +16 elevation)
5. ERP Procedures
DLB

HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
Hot Works on DLB Increase risk of 1 1 LR 1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered 1 1 LR
Fire/Explosion in the event by PTW
of HC release 2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding
lead to Platform and shut down (turn off) the
welding machines on DLB.
is +16 elevation)
. ERP Procedures
DLB

COMMENT: The probability (frequency) of having leaks will be further elaborated (POI)
HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
6 Ignition Source DLB Exhaust Increase risk of 1 1 LR The release of HC with 100mm hole is 1 1 LR
on DLB Fire/Explosion in the event demonstrated to unlikely because:
- Gas Release of HC release 1. As per QRA
2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR
(100mm hole on
Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix
Gas-Gas Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check
Exchanger) with and improvement are included on the GO and NO
20knots wind GO Process.
speed toward 3. No break of containment the process system
the DLB during SIMOPS
4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during
SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved
small weights - structure lifted in around the
platform edges west and south
5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas
Exchanger
The risk of release of gas has been reduced to

ALARP, if it would occur the severity would be less.
Additional Safeguards:
1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD Forward.
2. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is
+16 elevation)
4. ERP Procedures
7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB
NOTE: based on 100mm hole during the study, the
dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT
reach the DLB Exhaust.
HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
Electrical Equipment on Increase risk of 5 1 HR The release of HC with 100mm hole is 4 1 MR 4 Requirement of Multi Gas Timas
STERN of DLB (Lights, Fire/Explosion in the event demonstrated to unlikely because: Detector on the STERN of
Etc) of HC release 1. As per QRA DLB to be captured in Project
Procedure
Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check
and improvement are included on the GO and NO
GO Process.
3. No break of containment the process system
during SIMOPS
Exchanger

ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be
less.
Additional Safguards are:

2. ERP Procedures
4. Close water tight doors on the crane tub
5. Portable Multi Gas Detector on the Stern of DLB.
6. Any lifting over the process during the SIMOPS
shall be covered by PTW, Risk Assessment.
HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
Crawler Crane Exhaust Increase risk of 5 1 HR The release of HC with 100mm hole is 4 1 MR
Fire/Explosion in the event demonstrated to unlikely because:
of HC release 1. As per QRA
Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check
GO Process.
during SIMOPS
Exchanger

less.

1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60 meters
away
3. ERP Procedures
6. Crane Crawler will be shut down upon the
detection of Gas Release after operation is
secured.
HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
Welding Machines on Increase risk of 5 1 HR The release of HC with 100mm hole is 4 1 MR
DLB Fire/Explosion in the event demonstrated to unlikely because:
of HC release resulting: 1. As per QRA
- Personnel injury
- Asset damage Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check
GO Process.
during SIMOPS
Exchanger

less.
1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are located
on DLB are 60m away from the platform.
2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead
to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding
machines on DLB.
4. ERP Procedures
7. Refer to Technical Note for Control of Welding
Machines Isolation
8. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of the
DLB.
HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
Hot Works on DLB Increase risk of 5 1 HR The release of HC with 100mm hole is 4 1 MR
Fire/Explosion in the event demonstrated to unlikely because:
of HC release resulting: 1. As per QRA
- Personnel Injury
- Asset Damage Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check
GO Process.
during SIMOPS
Exchanger

less.

1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered by
PTW
2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead
to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding
machines on DLB.
4 ERP Procedures
7. Portable Gas Detector on STERN of DLB
HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
7 Emergency (Fire) Fire as Ignition Source Increase Risk of Fire on 2 2 LR 1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the 1 1 LR
on DLB and its Impact to the Platform (AGX) if there is Platform (winch speed is approx 60m per
Safety of the Platform concurrent HC Release minute).
Complex 2. F&G System and Fire Fighting System on
the DLB
3. ERP
DLB.

Helicopter Emergency Increase Risk of Fire on 2 2 LR 1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the 1 1 LR
on DLB Platform (AGX) if there is Platform (winch speed is approx 60m per
concurrent HC Release minute).
2. F&G System and Fire Fighting System on
the DLB
3. ERP
DLB.

Failure of Main DLB cannot pull away in 3 2 LR 1. Redundancy of Generators 1 1

Generator / Black Out case required 2. Emergency Power Generator
on DLB 3. Fail Safe Brake on the anchor winches
4. AHT / Tow Tug standby in the field at all
time
5. PM System on DLB
8 Process Upset Increasing Flaring Rate Increase Radiant Heat in the 2 2 LR 1. Radiant Heat Study for AGX shows that it is 1 1 LR
on AGX due to Blow Down Event vicinity of AGX Crane safe for the Crane Operator to be inside the
Crane Cabin during Full Process Blow Down.
NOTE: No Effect anticipated 2. Proximity of DLB Crane Operator is farther
to the DLB based on Flare from the Flare Tip therefore impact of Radiant
Radiation Study Heat is minimal.
8 Process Upset
on AGX
HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
ESD Event Causing Creates changes in Process 2 2 LR 1. Process System is designed to fail safe 1 1 LR
AGX Process Instability System Pressure, 2. Process is continuosly monitored from CCR
Temperature, and Liquid 3. Process System will be maintained and
Inventory which could lead functional with no significant case to operate
to an increase potential for in place during SIMOPS
HC release 4. Contingency Plan in place such that AGX
Project Team will be asked to leave AGX until
ESD event has been rectified
5. COntingency Plan in place such that HOFO
will communicate potential for escalation to
DLB such that preparation may made for DLB
withdrawl from AGX vicinity.
Gas Release Anoa Riser Fire / Explosion 5 2 HR 1. Mitigation as per CTO Procedure 5 1 HR
Personnel Injury 2. F&G System on AGX
3. ERP Procedures
5. DLB can be pulled / winched away to clear
from platform (winch speed approx 60m per
minute)
9 Helicopter Interference with Crane Helicopter collision with 4 3 HR 1. Crane Operations on DLB will be shut down 3 1 LR
Operation on Operation Cranes / Crash and/or crane boom would be clear for
DLB Personnel injury / Lost of life Helicopter Operations
2. Trained and experienced HLO
3. Inform Crane Operators of Incoming
Helicopters
4. ERP
HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
10 Vessel Collision with the DLB / Asset damage 4 3 HR 1. Suitable Vessels (Include MWS 2 2 LR
Movement / Platform / Material Personnel injury / Lost of life inspection/approval)
alongside on Barge / Anchor Buoy / Schedule delay 2. Competent Vessel Captain
DLB Anchor Wire 3. Slack Anchor Wires if required
4. Good communication between paties
involved
5. Weather limit
6. Adequate fendering on DLB and vessels
7. Briefing to all Vessel Captain prior to
entering 500m zone
8. High Vis painted Anchor Buoys
9. Comply with POI Marine Operation
Procedure
10. Establish communication with HOFO prior
to entering 500m Zone and/or Marine
Supertindent prior to approaching DLB
11 SIMOPS DLB Crane Boom Damage asset 4 3 HR 1. All Cranes will be under the control of the 3 1 LR
Operation collision with the AGX Personnel injury Project (CTR).
Between DLB Crane Schedule delay 2. Designated Person In Charge for Every Lift
Crane and AGX 3. Good illumincation
Crane 4. Procedure control for Cranes Operations
(SIMOPS)
5. Detail planning meeting for Crane
Operations
12 Personnel Personnel being Personnel injury / Lost of life 5 3 HR 1. Certified and good condition Crane 2 1 LR
Transfer Transferred Fall from 2. Certified and good condition FROG
Height 3. Certified and good condition rigging
4. Provision of safety sling
5. No personnel transfer untill the Vessel will
be securely moored
6. Distance of free board between DLB and
vessel is small
7. Provision of tag lines
8. Familiarization for transfer using FROG
9. Maintain good communicaton among
parties involved (CO, Bunksman, and
Riggers).
10. Weather limit defined for personnel
transferring using FROG and Crawler Crane
HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
13 MAE on Pool Fire on ANOA Personnel injury / Lost of life 5 1 HR 1. All personnel shall muster to DLB including 5 1 HR
AGX/ANOA coming from ANOA 8" Impair both ANOA and AGX POI Personnel
Riser Pipeline Muster Area 2. Corrosion Monitoring and Pigging Pipeline
covered by FIMS
3. PSLL on the pipeline
4. Daily surface inspection
5. DLB will be pull / winched away
Condensate on the sea Personnel Injury / Lost of 3 1 MR 1. Level Management 1 1 LR

due SKIM pile overfilled Life 2. Daily surface inspection
3. DLB will be pull / winched away
14 N2 Operation Extreme Temperature Personnel injury 3 3 MR 1. Engineered and certified ISO Storage 3 2 MR 5 Verify the certification of the Timas / PNS
(minus 160 - minus 200 Cryogenic Tanks storage tank and inspection
C) Embrittlement 2. Scaffold and bunded area prior to mobilization offshore
3. Use of planks and tarpaulin
6 Review the N2 handling and Timas / PNS

storage procedure
N2 Spill Personnel Injury 3 3 MR 1. Engineered and certified ISO Storage 3 2 MR
Cryogenic Tanks
Embrittlement 2. Scaffold and bunded area
3. Use of planks and tarpaulin
15 3rd Party Collision with the Anchor Personnel Injury 3 2 MR 1. High Vis Anchor Buoy 3 1 LR
Vessel / Security Buoy / Anchor Wire Asset Damage 2. Standy By Vessels
Schedule Delay 3. Radar Watch
4. Intensity of Marine Activities would deter
the 3rd Party Vessel to stay away
5. Liaison Officer onboard of DLB
HAZID WORKSHEET

Measures)
S L R S L R
16 Sabotage Construction Crew Increase risk of incident 3 2 MR 3 1 LR 7 Operation to review the POI
tempering with Platform 1. Socialization of work to the offshore existing "security measures"
and DLB system construction team in advance and improve as required
2. PTW, JSA, and workpacks
3. Involve operation team during work pack
review and execution of the works
4. Maintain positive working environment,
provide motivation
5. Restriction to sensitve areas (security
measures) e.g. safety / warning signs,
socialize restricted areas during
meeting/awareness, Access Control
6. Maintain adequate supervision / QC
7. Reward program
17 Communication Clear Communication Increase risk of 3 2 MR 1. ANOA HSE Induction / Awareness 3 1 LR 8 Establish radio Timas/POI
between DLB Method NOT miscommunication / 2. Various coordination meeting e.g. daily communication channel for all
and its Support established interference leading to planning meeting parties to minimize
Vessels and incident resulting to: 3. Provision of radio communication interference
between DLB - Personnel injury 4. English speaking key personnel
and AGX/ANOA - Asset damage 5. Permission to be obtained from HOFO prior
to entering 500m zone
6. Permission to be obtained from Marine
Superintendent for approaching DLB or
entering the Anchor Pattern
7. Competent Vessel Captain
8. Briefing of all support vessels include
socialization of procedures
9. Complete GO and No GO Checklist.

HAZID Worksheet FORM

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HAZID WORKSHEET

Project : ANOA PHASE 4 - AGX COMPRESSION RECONFIGURATION PROJECT

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

10. Anchor removal for final departure is

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

2 2. Review Crawler Crane Timas

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

Welding Machines on Increase risk of 1 1 LR 1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are 1 1 LR

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to

Additional Safguards are:

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to

Additional Safguards are:

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to

Additional Safguards are:

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

Failure of Main DLB cannot pull away in 3 2 LR 1. Redundancy of Generators 1 1

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

Condensate on the sea Personnel Injury / Lost of 3 1 MR 1. Level Management 1 1 LR

6 Review the N2 handling and Timas / PNS

Initial Risk Safeguards Residual Risk

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