Art XIII Case Digests

1. Grace Poe vs. Comelec, GR. No. 221697, March 8, 2016 - Patrick
Facts: A day after Grace Poe filed her COC for the purpose of running for the President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, Estrella Elamparo filed a
petition to cancel said COC. Elamparo contented that Poe, being a foundling, committed material
misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Issue: Is the declaration of foundlings as natural born Filipino citizens in keeping with social justice?
Ruling: Yes. In upholding foundlings as natural born Filipino citizens, the court specially considered
several provisions of the present Constitution: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII,
Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions
contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.

2. Villanueva vs JBC - Melanie

FACTS:
Judge Villanueva applied for the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC branches. The
JBC however informed him that he was not included in the list of candidates for such position because
the JBCs long-standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge of first-level courts before one can
apply as judge for second-level courts. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court.
ISSUE:
Does the JBCs five-year requirement violate the constitutional provision on Social Justice and
Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment?
RULING:
Yes. As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees
to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President
may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a
great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit
on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the
judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and
providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.

3. Fuji TV vs Espiritu - Cole

Facts: In 2005, Arlene S. Espiritu was engaged by Fuji Television Network, Inc. as a news
correspondent/producer.Arlenes employment contract initially provided for a term of one (1) year but
was successively renewed on a yearly basis with salary adjustment upon every renewal. Sometime in
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January 2009, Arlene was diagnosed with lung cancer. She informed Fuji about her condition. In turn,
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the Chief of News Agency of Fuji, Yoshiki Aoki, informed Arlene "that the company will have a problem
renewing her contract.After several verbal and written communications, Arlene and Fuji signed a non-
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renewal contract. Arlene affixed her signature on the nonrenewal contract with the initials "U.P." for
"under protest."14

On May 6, 2009, Arlene filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and attorneys fees with the National
Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. She alleged that she
was forced to sign the nonrenewal contract when Fuji came to know of her illness and that Fuji
withheld her salaries and other benefits for March and April 2009 when she refused to sign. 15
 Issue: What is the level of constitutional regulation and protection afforded to contracts of
employment? Are there factors that may vary the level of protection?
Ruling: Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides full protection to labor:
ARTICLE XIII. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
LABOR
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate
in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their
mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor
to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments, and to expansion and growth.

The level of protection to labor must be determined on the basis of the nature of the work,
qualifications of the employee, and other relevant circumstances.

4. DCWD v. Aranquez, GR No. 194192, June 16, 2015 - Bonife

FACTS: Petitioner is a GOCC in Davao City. Respondents are officers and members of Nagkahiusang
Mamumuno sa Davao Water District (NAMADACWAD). They were charged with several
administrative cases. During the anniversary, aside from wearing t-shirts with the inscription CNA
ihatag na, Dir. Braganza Pahawa na! at the beginning of the Fun Run at Victoria Plaza; they
continued to wear the same inside the premises of the DCWD office during the office hours.
ISSUE: Was the concerted mass action of the DCWD employees well within their rights and in keeping with
Sec. 3, Art. XIII of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING: YES. Under Sec 5 of the Omnibus Rules the operative phrases are "any collective activity" and
"work stoppage or service disruption." Without the intent at work stoppage or service disruption, the
concerted activity is not prohibited. The time and place of the activity are not determinative of the
prohibition. Whether done within government hours, a concerted activity is allowed if it is without any
intent at work stoppage. It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with
inscriptions on CNA incentives was not to effect work stoppage or disrupt the service. As pointed out
by the respondents, they followed the advice of GM Gamboa "to be there" at the fun run. Respondents
joined, and did not disrupt the fun run. They were in sports attire that they were allowed, nay required,
to wear. Else, government employees would be deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression.

5. Security Bank vs Singson, GR 214230 Feb 10, 2016 - Luigi

Facts: Dismayed by his frequent transfer to different branches, respondent tendered his resignation.
However, SBSC rejected the same in view of its decision to terminate his employment on the ground
of habitual neglect of duties. Consequently, respondent instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal with
prayer for backwages, damages, and attorney's fees. Petitioners maintained that respondent was
validly dismissed.
Issue: Is respondent entitled to separation pay as a measure of social justice?
Ruling: NO. The general rule is that separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice
only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious
misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust,
commission of a crime against the employer or his family, or those reflecting on his moral character.
These five grounds are just causes for dismissal as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code.

6. Land Bank vs Eusebio - Courtney

Respondent Eusebio offered to sell the entire 790.4-hectare parcel of land he purchased from Taada
to the DAR, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, for 19M. Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
revalued it at P3M. Respondent rejected this.
The DAR then took physical possession of the property and distributed it to recognized farmer-
beneficiaries. Eusebio and Taada filed before the RTC-SAC an action for determination and payment
of just compensation against the DAR and the LBP.
Is the just compensation guaranteed to a landowner under, Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the
Constitution the same as the just compensation embodied in Section 9, Art. III of the
Constitution?
Yes. The "just compensation" guaranteed to a landowner under, Section 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution is precisely the same as the "just compensation" embodied in Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution. The clear intent of the Constitutional guarantee of just compensation, whether
understood within the terms of Article III, Section 9 or of Article XIII, Section 4, is to secure to any
owner the "full and fair equivalent" of the property taken. Regardless of whether the taking was
pursued in the "traditional" exercise of eminent domain or in its "revolutionary" exercise in the context
of the States agrarian reform program, just compensation has but one meaning and the State is
obligated to pay the "fair and full price of the property" even if the property is taken for social justice
purposes.

7. Delfino vs Anasao, GR No 197486, September 10, 2014 - Amzie

Facts: Delfino owned 35.4 hectares of land in Laguna (20.8 is coconut land and 14.6 rice land. He
sold all coconut land leaving him with the rice land where 98 have tenants. The tenanted portion,
titled by the respondents, was placed under Operation Land Transfer under PD 27. After full payment
of amortizations to the Land bank of the Phil, farmer beneficiaries where issued Emancipation Patents
(EP). Prior to EP registration Delfino filed an Application for Retention over the 14.6-hectare rice land,
to which the DAR Sec gave him a maximum of 5 HA as his right of retention. Respondent then filed
an MR for the DAR Sections order arguing that the order cancels the EP and deprives them
ownership to the landholdings they acquired pursuant to PD 27. However, MR was denied and
petition for review in the CA was also denied.
Issue: In Agrarian Reform, is retention by landowners and constitutionally guaranteed right? If in the
affirmative, is it absolute?
Ruling: Yes, the right of retention is constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification
by the legislative. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the
rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not
meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.
Although, it is not absolute. Section 6 of R.A. 6657 defines the antur and incidents of the landowners
right to retention, thus:
Sec. 6 Retention Limits - Except as otherwise provided in this Act xxx in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the
landowner, subject to the following qualifications: 1.) that he is fifteen (15) years of age; and 2.) that he
is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm. Provided, that landowner s whose land have
been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by
them thereunder; Provided, further, tha toriginal homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs
who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas
as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
8. SAMMANA vs. Tan, G.R. No. 196028, Apr. 18, 2016 - Ish
Petitioner (Samahan ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda ng Sitio Naswe, Inc) is an association of farmers
and fishermen in Sitio Talaga, Barangay Ipag, Mariveles, Bataan. They filed a Petition to revoke an
order to lift the Notice of Coverage and stop the acquisition proceedings on of a land in Ipag which
respondent Tomas Tan was the highest bidder. It was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was
not a real party in interest to the case.

Is social justice in the land reform program also applicable only to farmers and farmworkers?
No. Social justice in the land reform program also applies to landowners, not merely to farmers and
farmworkers. This is precisely why the law RA No. 6657 and the applicable rules provide for the
procedure for determining the proper beneficiaries and grantees or awardees of the lands covered or
to be covered under the CARP.
These procedures ensure that only the qualified, identified, and registered farmers and/or
farmworkers-beneficiaries acquire the covered lands which they themselves actually till (subject to the
landowners retention rights as protected by the law). Conversely, these procedures likewise ensure
that landowners do not lose their lands to usurpers and other illegal settlers who wish to take
advantage of the agrarian reform program to acquire lands to which they are not entitled.

9. DAR vs. WOODLAND, G.R. No. 188174 June 29, 2015 - Myles
FACTS: Woodland owns a parcel of land covered under TCT-113207 with an area of 10.0680
hectares located at Subasta, Calinan, Davao City. On 11 December 2003, the DAR issued a Notice of
Coverage (NOC) placing 5.0680 hectares under the coverage of the CARL for having exceeded the
retention limit provided by law. To this effect, TCT-113207 was cancelled and a new Certificate of
Ownership was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Woodland filed with the RTC a
Complaint for "Declaratory Relief, Annulment of the Notice of Coverage under R.A. 6657 under the
contentions that the issuance of the NOC was illegal, because R.A. 6657 had already expired on 15
June 1998 and that pursuant to Section 5 of the law, the agency had a period of ten (10) years to
implement the CARP from the time of its effectivity on 15 June 1988. The RTC ruled that the issuance
of NOC of DAR was already a breach of RA 6657, since the NOC was issued beyond the 10-year
implementation period provided by law. Further, that RA 8532 merely amended the funding sources
portion of RA 6657, and not its entirety.
ISSUE: Is R.A. No. 8532 which authorized the DAR to issue Notices of Coverage and Acquisition after
15 June 1998, or beyond the 10-year implementation, valid and constitutional?
RULING: Yes. It is valid land acquisition efforts by the DAR beyond the original 10-year period of the
CARP that was first set to end in 1998. R.A. No. 8532 actually extended CARP beyond its original 10-
year land acquisition period to end in 2008. Woodlands view that DARs authority to issue NOCs and
NOAs was limited to 10 years by CARL runs afoul of Article XIII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution
seeking just distribution of agricultural land, read the decision. The fact that Section 63 falls under the
chapter on Financing only emphasizes its general applicability. Hence, the phase until the year 2008
used in RA 8532 unmistakably extends the DARs authority to issue NOCs for the purpose of
acquiring and distributing private agricultural lands. RA 9700, which in 2009 further extended the
program until June 2014, specifically mandated the extension of acquisition and distribution of all
agricultural lands. Had there been no prior extension from 1998 to 2008, how else could the CARP
have been extended by RA 9700 until 30 June 2014? There could have been an extension only if the
program sought to be extended had not expired.

10. Ferrer vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015 - Jason
Facts: Respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011 to impose an
additional 0.5% tax on assessed value of all lands in Quezon City exceeding P100, 000.00 which shall
accrue to the Socialized Housing Program of the City Government. Petitioner then files a petition for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) seeking to declare unconstitutional the said
ordinance on Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) with the belief that Quezon City Council exercised quasi-
judicial function because the ordinances ruled against the property owners who must pay the SHT,
exacting from them funds for basic essential public services that they should not be held liable.
Issue: Can the Socialized Housing Tax be justified by social justice?
Ruling: Yes. Contrary to the petitioners submission, the 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses the
view that the use of property bears a social function and that all economic agents shall contribute to
the common good. The court already recognized this in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. vs Hon.
Atienza, Jr. Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the needs of
the owner, but also a social function insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the other members of
the society.

11. Alangdeo vs City Mayor of Baguio - Dam

Facts: Respondent Ernesto Lardizabal filed a complaint for demolition before the City Engineers
Office of Baguio City questioning the ongoing construction of a residential structure and garage
extension by petitioners on a parcel of land at Barangay Atok Trail, Baguio City, allegedly owned by
Mariano Pangloy and Ernestos father, Juanito Lardizabal. Upon investigation, the City Engineers
Office found out that the construction had no building permit. Consequently, the City Mayor issued,
through the Secretary to the Mayor, Demolition Order No. 05, series of 2005 (DO No. 05) directing
the City Demolition Team to summarily demolish the said structures.
Issue: Is DO No. 05, which ordered the summary demolition of petitioners structures, valid and
tenable?
Ruling: No, DO No. 05 is invalid and untenable. DO No. 5 states on its face that it was issued in
accordance with Section 3, paragraph 2.5 (a) of the IRR Governing Summary Eviction. Section 2 of
the Summary Eviction IRR provides that only new squatter families whose structures were built after
the effectivity of RA 7279 and squatter families identified by the local government unit (LGU) as
professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates shall be subject of summary eviction. In
this case, petitioners cannot be considered as new squatters, since, although their structures were
built after March 28, 1992, they or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied, and were claimants of
the subject property long before the said date. Neither have they been identified by the LGU as
professional squatters nor members of a squatting syndicate. Thus, since petitioners do not fall under
the coverage of the said IRR, the issuance of DO No. 05 had no legal basis at the onset.

12. Imbong vs Ochoa, GR No 204819, April 8, 2014 - Rhea

Facts: The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the
Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of
the government program that promotes contraceptive use. Petitioners argue that, rather than
promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the
RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles and
definition of terms of the law.
Issue: By giving priority to the poor, does the Reproductive Health Law violate the equal
protection clause of the 1987 Constitution?
Ruling: No. By giving priority to the poor, Reproductive Health Law is not a violation and
does not violate the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution. It is in fact in
accordance to Section 11, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution which recognizes the distinct
necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority
in addressing the health development of the people.

13. Manila Memorial Park vs DSWD, GR 175356, Dec. 3, 2013 - Luigi

Facts: Section 4 of R.A. 7432, as amended by R.A. 9257, states that establishments may claim the
20% mandatory discount to senior citizens as tax credit. Manila Memorial Park, Inc. and La Funeraria
Paz-Sucat, Inc. allege that the tax deduction scheme under R.A. 9257 violates Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution which provides that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation."
Issue No.1: Does the tax deduction scheme under RA 7432, violate Article XIII, Section 11 of the
Constitution because it shifts the States constitutional mandate or duty of improving the welfare of the
elderly to the private sector? Is it in the nature of an exercise of police power or eminent domain?
Ruling: NO. The right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the
precept for the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the
regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as x x x reminder[s] that the right to property can
be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good. Undeniably, the success of
the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other private
establishments concerned. This being the case, the means employed in invoking the active participation of the
private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related.
Without sufficient proof that the assailed law is arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the same
would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court has decided to refrain from quashing a
legislative act.
As such, the 20% senior citizen discount has not been shown to be unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory.
Thus, the Court upheld its validity and found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a
valid exercise of the police power of the State.

14. KMU vs Aquino - Dam

Facts: On September 2013, PhilHealth issued the three assailed circulars fully implementing the new
premium rates for 2014:
1. PhilHealth Circular No. 0024, s. 2013 was issued on September 30, 2013, increasing the
minimum annual premium rate for the IPP to Php2,400.00 for members with a monthly income of
Php25,000.00 and below.
2. PhilHealth Circular No. 0025, s. 2013 was issued on September 30, 2013, adjusting the annual
premium rate for the OWP to Php2,400.00 for all land-based OFWs, whether documented or
undocumented.
3. PhilHealth Circular No. 0027, s. 2013 was also issued on September 30, 2013, for the Employed
Sector. It retained 2.5% at the premium rate and the Php35,000.00 salary bracket ceiling.
Thus, PhilHealth adjusted the minimum rates for members to Php2,400.00 to ensure financial
sustainability of the Program. On January 30, 2014, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National
Federation of Labor Unions - KMU (NAFLU-KMU), Violeta Espiritu, and Virginia Flores filed the
present petition for certiorari with an application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a
Preliminary Injunction against the implementation of the new rates.
Issue: Are PhilHealth Circular Nos. 0027, 0025, and 0024, all s of 2013, which adjusted the premium
contribution rates for the National Health Insurance Program, issued with grave abuse of discretion?
Ruling: No. Grave abuse of discretion is present when there is such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where power is exercised arbitrarily or
in a despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of
positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a legal duty or act at all in contemplation of law. On the
contrary, PhilHealth acted with reasonable prudence and sensitivity to the public's needs. It postponed
the rate increase several times to relieve the public of the burden of simultaneous rate and price
increases. It accommodated the stakeholders and heard them through consultation. In the end, it even
retained a lower salary bracket ceiling (Php35,000.00 instead of Php50,000.00) and a lower rate
(2.5% rather than the planned 3%).

15. Enrile vs Sandiganbayan - PAtrick

Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, Aug. 18, 2015
FACTS: On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan because of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). On the day the
Sandiganbayan issued the arrest, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) and was later on confined at the Philippine
National Police (PNP) General Hospital. Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because:
(a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he
was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion
perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously
considered.
ISSUE: Will the grant of bail to Enrile be in keeping with the national commitment to
uphold the fundamental human rights?
RULING: Yes. The Court is mindful of the Philippines responsibility in the international community
arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it
to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail.

16. Cudia vs PMA, GR 211362, February 24, 2015 - Courtney

FACTS: Cadet I CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, belonging to the
A Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class. He was supposed to graduate with honors as
the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy cadet graduate, and be
commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine Navy.
He was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was late for 2 minutes in his ENG 412 class;
for which he incurred the penalty of 11 Demerits and 13 Touring hours. He was also reported to the
Honor Committee for violation of the Honor Code. The Honor Committee then constituted a team to
conduct the preliminary investigation on the violation; Cudia was found guilty.

Issue: In entering the PMA did Cudia surrender his fundamental human rights?

Ruling: No. The Court concur with the stand of petitioners. To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his
fundamental human rights, including the right to due process, is, for petitioners contrary to the
provisions of Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, E.O. No. 178 (as amended by E.O. 1005),
AFP Code of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor System, military
professionalism and in general, military culture. They maintain that the HC, the CRAB and the PMA,
grossly and in bad faith misapplied the Honor Code and the Honor System in deciding Cadet ICL
Cudias case considering that these should not be implemented at the expense of human rights, due
process and fair play. Further, under the doctrine of Constitutional supremacy, they can never
overpower or defy the 1987 Constitution since the former should yield to the latter.