SO ORDERED.

ESTRELLA TAGLAY, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY AND LOVERIE PALACAY,
RESPONDENTS. Subsequently, the case was transferred to the RTC of Digos City where petitioner was brought
to trial.
DECISION
Witnesses were then presented by the prosecution. Prior to the presentation of the final
PERALTA, J.: witness for the prosecution, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner contended that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case,
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court because the MCTC erroneously transferred the case to the RTC instead of dismissing it.
seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City, Petitioner also argued that the RTC's lack of jurisdiction was further aggravated when she was
Branch 18, dated March 9, 2004 and June 7, 2004, in Criminal Case No. FC-71-02. The March not arraigned before the RTC.
9, 2004 Order denied herein petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, while the June 7, 2004 Order
denied her Motion for Reconsideration. On March 9, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order[7] ruling that it acquired jurisdiction over
the case when it received the records of the case as a consequence of the transfer effected by
The instant petition arose from a Criminal Complaint[2] for Qualified Trespass to Dwelling filed the MCTC; that the transfer of the case from the MCTC is authorized under Administrative
by private respondent against herein petitioner with the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court Matter No. 99-1-13-SC and Circular No. 11-99; that there is no doubt that the offended party
(MCTC) of Sta. Maria-Malita-Don Marcelino, Davao del Sur on June 19, 2001. is a minor and, thus, the case falls within the original jurisdiction of Family Courts pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369. The RTC also held that even granting that there was defect or
Finding probable cause to indict petitioner, the Public Prosecutor assigned to handle the case irregularity in the procedure because petitioner was not arraigned before the RTC, such
filed an Information[3] against her on November 19, 2001. The Information reads as follows: defect was fully cured when petitioner's counsel entered into trial without objecting that his
client had not yet been arraigned. Furthermore, the RTC noted that petitioner's counsel has
cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution. Consequently, the RTC denied petitioner's
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses ESTRELLA TAGLAY of the crime of Qualified Trespass to Motion to Dismiss.
Dwelling as defined and penalized under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
committed as follows: Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC via its
Order[8] dated June 7, 2004.
That on June 2, 2001 at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon at Tibangao, Malita, Davao del
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforesaid accused, a Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
private person and without any justifiable reason and by means of violence, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into the dwelling of Loverie Palacay without Petitioner raises two main grounds.
her consent and against her will and once inside maltreated, boxed and choked her, to her
damage and prejudice. First, petitioner contends that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because
Circular No. 11-99, which authorizes the transfer of Family Courts cases filed with first-level
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4] courts to the RTCs, is applicable only to cases which were filed prior to the effectivity of the
said Circular on March 1, 1999. Petitioner argues that all Family Courts cases filed with first-
Upon arraignment on June 7, 2002, petitioner pleaded not guilty.[5] Pre-trial conference was level courts after the effectivity of the said Circular can no longer be transferred to the RTC;
set on August 13, 2002. instead they should be dismissed. Considering that the Information in the instant case was
filed with the MCTC on November 19, 2001, petitioner avers that the MCTC should have
However, on August 15, 2002, the MCTC issued an Order,[6] to wit: dismissed the case instead of ordering its transfer to the RTC.

Second, petitioner insists that she should have been arraigned anew before the RTC and that
It appearing that private complainant Loverie Palacay was a minor on June 2, 2001, the date her arraignment before the MCTC does not count because the proceedings conducted therein
of the incident, since she was born on August 7, 1983, per Certification dated August 15, 2002 were void.
issued by Municipal Registrar Josephine A. Marquez, this case, upon manifestation of
Prosecutor Perfecto P. Ordaneza and pursuant to Republic Act. No. 8369 and Circular 11-99, is The petition is meritorious.
hereby transferred to Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Digos City, for proper disposition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that, generally, a direct recourse to this Court in a
petition for certiorari is highly improper for it violates the established policy of strict
observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.[9] While this Court has concurrent jurisdiction
with the RTCs and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an
unrestrained freedom of choice as to which court the application for the writ will be
directed.[10] There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs.[11] This Court is a court of last resort and must so remain
if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and
immemorial tradition.[12] A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to
issue these extraordinary writs is allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[13]
However, it is also settled that this Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a
petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, so warrant.[14] Under the present circumstances, the Court will take cognizance of this
case as an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts, considering that the Information
against petitioner was filed way back in November 2001.[15] Any further delay in the resolution
of the instant petition will be prejudicial to petitioner. Moreover, the principle may be relaxed
when pure questions of law are raised as in this case.[16]
Now, on the merits of the petition.
It is significant to point out, at this juncture, the well-entrenched doctrine that the jurisdiction
of a tribunal over the subject matter of an action is conferred by law.[17] Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action.[18] The Family Courts Act of 1997, which took effect on November 23, 1997.[19] Section
5 (a) of R.A. 8369 clearly provides that Family Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over
criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not
less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of
the commission of the offense. In the present case, there is no dispute that at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense on June 2, 2001, private respondent, who is also the
private complainant, was a minor. Hence, the case falls under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of Family Courts.
Anent the first issue raised, the Court agrees that the Resolution of this Court in
Administrative Matter No. 99-1-13-SC and Circular No. 11-99, issued pursuant thereto, is
applicable only to Family Courts cases which were filed with first-level courts prior to the
effectivity of the said Resolution on March 1, 1999.[20] This is evident in the language used by
the Court in the third "Whereas" clause of the subject Resolution wherein it was stated that
"pending the constitution and organization of the Family Courts and the designation of
branches of the Regional Trial Courts as Family Courts in accordance with Section 17
(Transitory Provisions) of R.A. 8369, there is a need to provide guidelines in the hearing and
determination of criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of Family Courts which have
heretofore been filed with first-level courts." The operative word, as correctly cited by
petitioner, is "heretofore" which means "before this" or "up to this time."[21] Moreover,
Section 1 of the same Resolution directs all first-level courts, within ten (10) days from receipt
of a copy of the subject Resolution, to take an inventory of all criminal cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts which were filed with them (first-level courts), to prepare an
appropriate inventory and to submit the same to the Court Management Office of the Office
of the Court Administrator. Logic dictates that only those cases which were filed prior to the
issuance of the Resolution shall be included in the inventory and, therefore, shall be subject
to transfer by first-level courts to the appropriate RTCs. The necessary implication then is that
all cases filed with first-level courts after the effectivity of the Resolution on March 1, 1999
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In the present case, the Information was filed
against petitioner on November 19, 2001. Thus, the MCTC is already bereft of any authority to
transfer the case to the RTC as the same no longer falls under the coverage of Circular No. 11-
99. What the MCTC should have done was to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
More importantly, what justifies the dismissal of the case is that the Information filed with
the MCTC cannot be used as a basis for the valid indictment of petitioner before the RTC
acting as a Family Court, because there was no allegation therein of private complainant's
minority. To proceed to trial before the RTC on the basis of the Information filed with the
MCTC would be an exercise in futility as there is an infirmity in the Information constituting a
jurisdictional defect which cannot be cured. There is no point in proceeding under a defective
Information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction.[22] The Information filed with
the MCTC must thus first be amended and thereafter filed with the RTC. Pending the filing of
such Information, the RTC has not yet acquired jurisdiction because while a court may have
jurisdiction over the subject matter, it does not acquire jurisdiction over the case itself until
its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of a valid Information.[23]
The Court also agrees with petitioner in her contention in the second issue raised that she
should have been arraigned by the RTC.
It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However, the MCTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the present case. It is settled that the proceedings before a court
or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void. [24] Considering that
the MCTC has no jurisdiction, all the proceedings conducted therein, including petitioner's
arraignment, are null and void. Thus, the need for petitioner's arraignment on the basis of a
valid Information filed with the RTC.
It is also true that petitioner's counsel participated in the proceedings held before the RTC
without objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned. However, it is wrong for the RTC
to rely on the case of People v. Cabale,[25] because the accused therein was in fact arraigned,
although the same was made only after the case was submitted for decision. In the similar
cases of People v. Atienza and Closa[26] and People v. Pangilinan,[27] the accused in the said
cases were also belatedly arraigned. The Court, in these three cases, held that the active
participation of the counsels of the accused, as well as their opportunity to cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses during trial without objecting on the ground that their clients had not
yet been arraigned, had the effect of curing the defect in the belated arraignment. Moreover,
the accused in these cases did not object when they were belatedly arraigned. The same,
however, cannot be said in the instant case. There is no arraignment at all before the RTC. On
the other hand, the arraignment conducted by the MCTC is null and void. Thus, there is
nothing to be cured. Petitioner's counsel also timely raised before the RTC the fact that her
client, herein petitioner, was not arraigned.

Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[28] The purpose
of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of
why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.[29] As an
indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or
brushed aside peremptorily.[30] Otherwise, absence of arraignment results in the nullity of the
proceedings before the trial court.[31]

As a final note, it may not be amiss to stress that at all stages of the proceedings leading to his
trial and conviction, the accused must be charged and tried according to the procedure
prescribed by law and marked by observance of the rights given to him by the
Constitution.[32] In the same way that the reading of the Information to the accused during
arraignment is not a useless formality, so is the validity of the information being read not an
idle ceremony.[33]

Criminal due process requires that the accused must be proceeded against under the orderly
processes of law.[34] In all criminal cases, the judge should follow the step-by-step procedure
required by the Rules.[35] The reason for this is to assure that the State makes no mistake in
taking the life or liberty except that of the guilty.[36]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Digos City, Branch 18, dated March 9, 2004 and June 7, 2004, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one rendered dismissing the Information in Criminal Case No. FC-71-02,
without prejudice to refiling the same in the proper court.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174461
BRION, J.:
We decide the appeal filed by petitioner Leticia I. Kummer assailing the April 28, 2006
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CR No. 27609. The CA decision affirmed the
July 27, 2000 judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan, finding the petitioner and her co-accused Freiderich Johan I. Kummer guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1130.
The Facts
The prosecution's evidence revealed that on June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m.,
Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of the petitioner. Mallo
knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself by saying, "Auntie, ako si Boy
Mallo."
The petitioner opened the door and at this point, her son and co-accused, Johan, using his left
hand, shot Mallo twice using a gun about six (6) inches long.[3] Malana, who was with Mallo
and who witnessed the shooting, immediately ran towards the west, followed by Mallo.
When Malana turned his back, he saw the petitioner leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo,
hitting the latter's back and causing him to fall flat on the ground.[4]
Thereafter, the petitioner went inside the house and came out with a flashlight. Together
with her co-accused, she scoured the pathway up to the place where Mallo was lying flat.[5] At
that point, the petitioner uttered, "Johan, patay na," in a loud voice.[6] The petitioner and her
co-accused put down the guns and the flashlight they were holding, held Mallo's feet and
pulled him to about three (3) to four (4) meters away from the house. Thereafter, they
returned to the house and turned off all the lights.[7]
The following morning, policeman Danilo Pelovello went to the petitioner's house and
informed her that Mallo had been found dead in front of her house. Pelovello conducted an
investigation through inquiries among the neighbors, including the petitioner, who all denied
having any knowledge of the incident.
The prosecution filed an information[8] for homicide on January 12, 1989 against the
petitioner and Johan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1130. Both accused were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the trial on the merits
accordingly followed.
The petitioner denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her children, Johan,
Melanie and Erika, were already asleep in the evening of June 19, 1988. She claimed that they
were awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house, a gun report, and the
banging at their door.
Believing that the noise was caused by the members of the New People's Army prevalent in
their area, and sensing the possible harm that might be inflicted on them, Johan got a .38 cal.
gun from the drawer and fired it twice outside to scare the people causing the disturbance.
The noise continued, however, with a stone hitting the window and breaking the glass;
another stone hit Melanie who was then sick. This prompted Johan to get the shotgun placed
beside the door and to fire it. The noise thereafter stopped and they all went back to sleep.
In its judgment dated July 27, 2000, the RTC found the prosecution's evidence persuasive
based on the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and Malana who
both testified that the petitioner shot Mallo. The testimonial evidence, coupled by the
positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan and on the petitioner's right
hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, led the RTC
to find both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Johan, still a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was released on the
recognizance of his father, Moises Kummer. Johan subsequently left the country without
notifying the court; hence, only the petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction with the
CA.
She contended before the CA that the RTC committed reversible errors in its appreciation of
the evidence, namely: (1) in giving credence to the testimonial evidence of Cuntapay and of
Malana despite the discrepancies between their sworn statements and direct testimonies; (2)
in not considering the failure of the prosecution to cite the petitioner's motive in killing the
victim; (3) in failing to consider that the writer of the decision, Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino,
was not the judge who heard the testimonies; and (4) in considering the paraffin test results
finding the petitioner positive for gunpowder residue.
The CA rejected the petitioner's arguments and affirmed the RTC judgment, holding that the
discrepancies between the sworn statement and the direct testimony of the witnesses do not
necessarily discredit them because the contradictions are minimal and reconcilable. The CA
also ruled that the inconsistencies are minor lapses and are therefore not substantial. The
petitioner's positive identification by the eyewitnesses as one of the assailants remained
unrefuted. The CA, moreover, held that proof of motive is only necessary when a serious
doubt arises on the identity of the accused. That the writer of the decision was not the judge hit. According to the petitioner, these and some other trivial and minor inconsistencies in the
who heard the testimonies of the witnesses does not necessarily make the decision testimony of the two witnesses effectively destroyed their credibility.
erroneous.
We find these claims far from convincing. The Court has consistently held that inconsistencies
In sum, the CA found Malana and Cuntapay's positive identification and the corroborative between the testimony of a witness in open court, on one hand, and the statements in his
evidence presented by the prosecution more than sufficient to convict the petitioner of the sworn affidavit, on the other hand, referring only to minor and collateral matters, do not
crime charged. affect his credibility and the veracity and weight of his testimony as they do not touch upon
the commission of the crime itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even serve to strengthen the
On further appeal to this Court, the petitioner submits the issue of whether the CA credibility of the witnesses, as these may be considered as badges of truth rather than indicia
committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC's decision convicting her of the crime of of bad faith; they tend to prove that their testimonies have not been rehearsed. Nor are such
homicide. inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for no person has perfect faculties of
senses or recall.[9]
In essence, the case involves the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses and the
sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence. A close scrutiny of the records reveals that Malana and Cuntapay positively and firmly
declared in open court that they saw the petitioner and Johan shoot Mallo. The
inconsistencies in their affidavit, they reasoned, were due to the oversight of the
administering official in typing the exact details of their narration.
Our Ruling
It is oft repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes, an
affidavit is incomplete, resulting in its seeming contradiction with the declarant's testimony in
We find the petition devoid of merit. court. Generally, the affiant is asked standard questions, coupled with ready suggestions
intended to elicit answers, that later turn out not to be wholly descriptive of the series of
The petitioner's conviction is anchored on the positive and direct testimonies of the events as the affiant knows them.[10] Worse, the process of affidavit-taking may sometimes
prosecution eyewitnesses, which testimonies the petitioner submits to be both inconsistent amount to putting words into the affiant's mouth, thus allowing the whole statement to be
and illogical. The petitioner essentially impugns the credibility of the witnesses on these taken out of context.
grounds. The petitioner moreover claims that her conviction was based on doctrinal precepts
that should not apply to her case. The court is not unmindful of these on-the-ground realities. In fact, we have ruled that the
discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on
Variance between the eyewitnesses' testimonies in open court and their affidavits does not the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally
affect their credibility incomplete.[11] As between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter
prevails because affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the
In her attempt to impugn the credibility of prosecution eyewitnesses Malana and Cuntapay, testimony given in court.[12]
the petitioner pointed to the following inconsistencies: First, in paragraph 7 of Malana's July
21, 1988 affidavit, he stated that after hearing two gunshots, he dived to the ground for cover In the present case, we find it undeniable that Malana and Cuntapay positively identified the
and heard another shot louder than the first two. This statement is allegedly inconsistent with petitioner as one of the assailants. This is the critical point, not the inconsistencies that the
his declaration during the direct examination that he saw the petitioner and Johan fire their petitioner repeatedly refers to, which carry no direct bearing on the crucial issue of the
guns at Mallo. Second, the July 22, 1988 affidavit of Cuntapay likewise stated that identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Indeed, the inconsistencies refer only to minor
he heard two burst of gunfire coming from the direction of the petitioner's house details that are not critical to the main outcome of the case. Moreover, the basic rule is that
and heard another burst from the same direction, which statement is allegedly inconsistent the Supreme Court accords great respect and even finality to the findings of credibility of the
with his direct testimony where he claimed that he saw the petitioner shoot Mallo. Third, in trial court, more so if the same were affirmed by the CA, as in this case.[13] We find no reason
his affidavit, Malana declared that he ran away as he felt the door being opened and heard to break this rule and thus find that both the RTC and the CA were correct in giving credence
two shots, while in his testimony in court, he stated that he ran away after Mallo was already
to the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay. both confirmed in their direct testimony before the RTC that they saw the petitioner fire a
gun at Mallo. This was again re-affirmed by the witnesses during their cross examination. The
It is not necessary for the validity of the judgment that it be rendered by the judge who fact that their respective affidavits merely stated that they heard the gunshots does not
heard the case automatically foreclose the possibility that they also saw the actual shooting as this was in
fact what the witnesses claimed truly happened. Besides, it has been held that the claim that
The petitioner contends that the CA, in affirming the judgment of the RTC, failed to recognize "whenever a witness discloses in his testimony in court facts which he failed to state in his
that the trial court that heard the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay was not the same affidavit taken ante litem motam, then an inconsistency exists between the testimony and the
court that rendered the decision.[14] affidavit" is erroneous. If what were stated in open court are but details or additional facts
that serve to supplement the declarations made in the affidavit, these statements cannot be
We do not share this view. ruled out as inconsistent and may be considered by the court.

The rule is settled that the validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneous solely because
the judge who heard the case was not the same judge who rendered the decision. In fact, it is
not necessary for the validity of a judgment that the judge who penned the decision should
actually hear the case in its entirety, for he can merely rely on the transcribed stenographic
notes taken during the trial as the basis for his decision.[15]
Thus, the contention - that since Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino was not the one who heard the
evidence and thereby did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
- must fail. It is sufficient that the judge, in deciding the case, must base her ruling completely
on the records before her, in the way that appellate courts do when they review the evidence
of the case raised on appeal.[16]Thus, a judgment of conviction penned by a different trial
judge is not erroneous if she relied on the records available to her.
Motive is irrelevant when the accused has been positively identified by an eyewitness
We agree with the CA's ruling that motive gains importance only when the identity of the
assailant is in doubt. As held in a long line of cases, the prosecution does not need to prove
the motive of the accused when the latter has been identified as the author of the crime.[17]
Once again, we point out that the petitioner was positively identified by Malana and
Cuntapay. Thus, the prosecution did not have to identify and prove the motive for the killing.
It is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed for no apparent reason at all,
and that friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a crime. [18]
The petitioner attempts to offer the justification that the witnesses did not really witness the
shooting as their affidavits merely attested that they heard the shooting of Mallo (and did not
state that they actually witnessed it). We find this to be a lame argument whose merit we
cannot recognize.
Thus, in light of the direct and positive identification of the petitioner as one of the
perpetrators of the crime by not one but two prosecution eyewitnesses, the failure to cite the
motive of the petitioner is of no moment.
At any rate, we find it noteworthy that the lack or absence of motive for committing the
crime does not preclude conviction where there are reliable witnesses who fully and
satisfactorily identified the petitioner as the perpetrator of the felony, such as in this case.
There is no absolute uniformity nor a fixed standard form of human behavior
The petitioner imputes error to the CA in giving credence to the testimonies of Malana and
Cuntapay on the claim that these are riddled not only by inconsistencies and contradictions,
but also by improbabilities and illogical claims. She laboriously pointed out the numerous
improbabilities that, taken as a whole, allegedly cast serious doubt on their reliability and
credibility.
She alleged, among others: (1) that it was abnormal and contrary to the ways of the farmers
in the rural areas for Cuntapay to go home from his corral at about 9:00 p.m., while
everybody else goes home from his farm much earlier, as working late in the farm (that is,
before and after sunset) is taboo to farming; (2) that the act of the petitioner of putting down
her gun in order to pull the victim away does not make any sense because a criminal would
not simply part with his weapon in this manner; (3) that it is highly incredible that Malana,
who accompanied Mallo, was left unharmed and was allowed to escape if indeed he was just
beside the victim; (4) that it is unbelievable that when Malana heard the cocking of guns and
the opening of the door, he did not become scared at all; (5) that Malana and Cuntapay did
not immediately report the incident to the authorities; (6) that it was highly improbable for
Malana to turn his head while running; and (7) that it was unusual that Cuntapay did not run
away when he saw the shooting.

That Malana and Cuntapay have been eyewitnesses to the crime remains unrefuted. They We rule, without descending to particulars and going over each and every one of these
claims, that without more and stronger indicators, we cannot accord them credit. Human
nature suggests that people may react differently when confronted with a given situation.
Witnesses to a crime cannot be expected to demonstrate an absolute uniformity and
conformity in action and reaction. People may act contrary to the accepted norm, react
differently and act contrary to the expectation of mankind. There is no standard human
behavioral response when one is confronted with an unusual, strange, startling or frightful
experience.[19]
We thus hold that the CA was correct in brushing aside the improbabilities alleged by the
petitioner who, in her present plight, can be overcritical in her attempt to seize every detail
that can favor her case. Unfortunately, if at all, her claims refer only to minor and even
inconsequential details that do not touch on the core of the crime itself.
Public documents are admissible in court without further proof of their due execution and
authenticity
A public document is defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as follows:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation [in] evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
(a) bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;
(b)Documents acknowledge[d] before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
therein.[20]
In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin Rubio who was
presented in court to identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist who actually
conducted the paraffin test on the petitioner, the report may still be admitted because the
requirement for authentication does not apply to public documents. In other words, the
forensic chemist does not need to be presented as witness to identify and authenticate the
chemistry report. Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report are prima facie evidence
of the facts they state, that is, of the presence of gunpowder residue on the left hand of
Johan and on the right hand of the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the petitioner herself
admitted the presence of gunpowder nitrates on her fingers, albeit ascribing their presence
from a match she allegedly lighted.[21] Accordingly, we hold that the chemistry report is
admissible as evidence.
On the issue of the normal process versus the actual process conducted during the test raised
by the petitioner, suffice it to say that in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that the forensic chemist who conducted the report observed the regular procedure. Stated
otherwise, the courts will not presume irregularity or negligence in the performance of one's
duties unless facts are shown dictating a contrary conclusion. The presumption of regularity in
favor of the forensic chemist compels us to reject the petitioner's contention that an
explanation has to be given on how the actual process was conducted. Since the petitioner
presented no evidence of fabrication or irregularity, we presume that the standard operating
procedure has been observed.
We note at this point that while the positive finding of gunpowder residue does not
conclusively show that the petitioner indeed fired a gun, the finding nevertheless serves to
corroborate the prosecution eyewitnesses' testimony that the petitioner shot the victim.
Furthermore, while it is true that cigarettes, fertilizers, urine or even a match may leave
traces of nitrates, experts confirm that these traces are minimal and may be washed off with
tap water, unlike the evidence nitrates left behind by gunpowder.

Public records, kept in the Philippines, [or] private documents required by law to [be]
(c) Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is
entered therein.
merely a formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is required
All other writings are private. [emphasis and underscore ours]
The petitioner claims that she was not arraigned on the amended information for which she
The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document. As a was convicted. The petitioner's argument is founded on the flawed understanding of the rules
public document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence on amendment and misconception on the necessity of arraignment in every case. Thus, we do
without further proof of its due execution and genuineness; the person who made the report not see any merit in this claim.
need not be presented in court to identify, describe and testify how the report was
conducted. Moreover, documents consisting of entries in public records made in the Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. Section 14 provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form
or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After
the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged
in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion
by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall
state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of
a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the
accused [would] not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial. [emphasis and underscore ours]
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great,
is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the
accused since the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint
or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood,
would no longer be available after the amendment is made, when any evidence the accused
might have would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any
evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as
amended.[22]
In People, et al. v. Borromeo, et al.,[23] we ruled that the change of the date of the commission
of the crime from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981 is a formal amendment and would not
prejudice the rights of the accused because the nature of the offense of grave coercion would
not be altered. In that case, the difference in the date was only about two months and five
days, which difference, we ruled, would neither cause substantial prejudice nor cause surprise
on the part of the accused.
It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the
offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense.[24] The act
may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near as to the actual date at which
date the offense was committed, as the information will permit. Under the circumstances, the
precise time is not an essential ingredient of the crime of homicide.
Having established that a change of date of the commission of a crime is a formal
amendment, we proceed to the next question of whether an arraignment is necessary.
Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the
nature and cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is based on
the constitutional right of the accused to be informed.[25] Procedural due process requires
that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed of the reason for his indictment,
the specific charges he is bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could be possibly
meted against him. It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time, is given the
opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only imperative that he is
thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the
nature of the imputed crime.[26]
The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This
however, we hastily clarify, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal
amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged
in the original complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not
cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect the substantial
rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.
We further stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with
the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose
of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned the first time. The
subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the accused simply
because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the
prosecution.
Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently
show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a
difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the
jurisprudence cited above, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide
is a formal amendment - it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the
essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment,
and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is still
available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the
petitioner. This is also true with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner.
The effected amendment was of this nature and did not need a second plea.
To sum up, we are satisfied after a review of the records of the case that the prosecution has
proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption
of innocence has been successfully overcome.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated April 28, 2006, convicting the
petitioner of the crime of homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Leticia I.
Kummer.

SO ORDERED.
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present motions filed by C/Insp. Salvador C. Duran, Sr., Supt. Arturo H.
Montano and Margarita B. Tugaoen (accused), seeking reconsideration of our February 14,
2011 Decision which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the conviction of Salvador Duran, Sr., Arturo Montano,
and Margarita Tugaoen in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 20192 is hereby AFFIRMED.
The conviction of Van Luspo in Criminal Case No. 20192 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and he is
hereby ACQUITTED. The bailbond posted for his provisional liberty is hereby CANCELLED.
Salvador Duran, Sr., Arturo Montano, and Margarita Tugaoen are further ORDERED to jointly
and severally indemnify the Philippine National Police of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Let us briefly recall the facts.
On August 11, 1992, the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership (ODC) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) issued two (2) Advices of Sub-Allotment (ASA), amounting to five million
pesos each, for the purchase of combat, clothing, and individual equipment (CCIE items) for
the PNP's North Capital Command (CAPCOM).[1]
Upon receipt of the ASAs, P/Supt. Arturo Montano (Montano), Chief Comptroller, North
CAPCOM, directed Police Chief Inspector Salvador Duran, Sr. (Duran), Chief, Regional Finance
Service Unit, North CAPCOM, to prepare and draw 100 checks of P100,000.00 each, for a total
of P10,000,000.00. The checks were all dated August 12, 1992 and payable to four different
entities[2] that are all owned and operated by Margarita Tugaoen (Tugaoen) who later
collected the proceeds of the checks from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Cubao
Branch.
In her March 5, 1993 sworn statement, Tugaoen admitted that she received the P10 million
worth of checks as payment for the previously accumulated PNP debts and not for any CCIE
items that she delivered.[3] P/CInsp. Isaias Braga, Chief Logistics Officer, North CAPCOM, and
Rolando Flores, Supply Accountable Officer, North CAPCOM confirmed the non-delivery of
the CCIE.
After the PNP, General Headquarters, Office of the Inspector General (GHQ-OIG), and
subsequently the Ombudsman, conducted an investigation on the CCIE North Capcom
transaction, the Ombudsman for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (now Ombudsman for
the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices) recommended the filing of an Information
for 100 counts of Malversation of Public Funds against several PNP officials, including the
accused.
On January 26, 2004, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed an Information, but this
was for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019,[4] the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Information alleged that the accused, among others, conspired with each
other and with bad faith and manifest partiality caused undue injury to the government by
causing the payment of P10,000,000.00 to Tugaoen for the CCIE items that were not actually
delivered.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, the accused filed a demurrer to evidence,
primarily questioning the admissibility of the checks (and its accompanying documents) and
Tugaoen's sworn statements. The Sandiganbayan denied the demurrer to evidence.[5]While
none of the accused took the witness stand, Montano and Tugaoen maintained the
inadmissibility of the evidence.[6]
The Sandiganbayan found the accused guilty as charged.[7] The court found that the
prosecution successfully established the elements of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. First, the
accused are public officers, except Tugaoen who, however acted in conspiracy with her co-
accused. Second, the accused acted with evident bad faith by splitting the payment of
P10,000,00.00 into 100 checks for P100,000.00 despite the fact that the ultimate payee is one
and the same and contrary to the accused's claim that they are authorized to sign the checks
regardless of amount. At the same time, the splitting of payment violates Commission on
Audit (COA) Circular No. 76-41.[8]
Second, by issuing the checks, the accused made it appear that there were legal transactions
between PNP and the four business establishments owned by accused Tugaoen on the
purchase and delivery of CCIE items despite the lack of documents to support these alleged
transactions.
Third, undue injury is present in the amount of P10,000,000.00 for the supposed purchases of
CCIE items that were never delivered to the end-users.
The Court upheld the conviction of the accused on appeal. The Court ruled that Montano and
Duran's bad faith was evident from their "failure to prepare and submit the required
documentation ordinarily attendant to procurement transactions and government
expenditures, as mandated by Section 4(6) of P.D. No. 1445."[9] The element of undue injury
was likewise established by the prosecution's evidence showing that the North CAPCOM did
not receive the ten million pesos worth of CCIE items despite Tugaoen's admitted receipt and
encashment of the checks. part. As he himself stated in his petition and in his present motion, his position as Chief of the
Regional Finance Service Unit of the North CAPCOM imposed on him the duty "to be
responsible for the management and disbursement and accounting of PNP funds." This duty
Duran's Motion for Reconsideration evidently gives him the discretion, within the bounds of law, to review, scrutinize, or
Duran reiterates that his alleged participation in the conspiracy is not sufficient to establish countercheck the supporting documents before facilitating the payment of public funds.
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The act of issuing 100 checks at P100,000.00 does not
prove that he conspired with his co-accused because he only acted in accordance with the His responsibility for the disbursement and accounting of public funds makes him an
instruction and assurance of his superior, co-accused Montano, and in pursuance of his accountable officer. Section 106 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 requires an accountable
ministerial duty of preparing and counter-signing the checks.[10] In other words, he was acting officer, who acts under the direction of a superior officer, to notify the latter of the illegality
in good faith in preparing and counter-signing the checks.[11] of the payment in order to avoid liability. This duty to notify presupposes, however, that the
accountable officer had duly exercised his duty in ensuring that funds are properly disbursed
Duran argues that he cannot be faulted for the lack of documentation accompanying the and accounted for by requiring the submission of the supporting documents for his review.
transaction. He claims that the lack of documentation is "none of [his] business"[12] since
documentation matters pertain to the office of his co-accused, Montano, as Chief Comptroller By relying on the supposed assurances of his co-accused Montano that the supporting
of North CAPCOM.[13] The Court erred in imputing bad faith on him based on "the acts documents are all in order,[20] contrary to what his duties mandate, Montano simply assumed
enumerated by [the] Court" in its Decision because these acts "do not fall within the ambit of that these documents exist and are regular on its face even if nothing in the records indicate
his sworn duties."[14] that they do and they are. The nature of his duties is simply inconsistent with his "ministerial"
argument. With Duran's failure to discharge the duties of his office and given the
circumstances attending the making and issuance of the checks, his conviction must stand.

Montano and Tugaoen's Motion for Reconsideration
Montano and Tugaoen alleged that the Court erred in imputing bad faith on them based on
documentary evidence that shows the absence of supporting documents[15] to the
transactions because these documents are inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. None
of the persons who executed these documents testified in open court.[16]
The prosecution failed to show that Montano and Tugaoen conspired with those charged in
the information.[17] The splitting of the checks cannot be the basis of conspiracy because to
begin with, the admissibility of the secondary evidence of the checks is in question. The
accused ask the Court to review the admissibility of these secondary pieces of evidence. [18]
Accused Tugaoen's admission that she did not deliver any CCIE items as contained in her
statement is inadmissible under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. [19]
Court's Ruling
We clarify that the Court's finding of bad faith is not premised on Duran's failure "to prepare
and submit" the supporting documents but for his failure to require their submission for his
review. While the preparation and submission of these documents are not part of his
responsibilities, his failure to require their submission for his review, given the circumstances,
amply establishes his bad faith in preparing and issuing checks that eventually caused undue
injury to the government.
Tugaoen's statement before the PNP investigating committee is admissible in evidence
On the issue raised by Tugaoen and Montano on the admissibility of the checks and of the
statements made by Tugaoen before the investigating committee, we note that these
arguments are mere rehashes of the arguments that they raised before the Sandiganbayan in
their Motion to Dismiss and in this Court in their Petition for Review. We maintain our ruling
that the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in this regard.

In an attempt to prove the applicability of the best evidence rule rather than the exception -
We deny the motions. entries in the regular course of business - on the secondary evidence of the checks, Tugaoen
and Montano direct the Court's attention to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan in another
Signing the checks is case involving the issuance of checks in the aggregate amount of Php20 million as cash
not a ministerial duty advances intended as payment for CCIE items for the use of PNP personnel of Region 7. In
that case, the Sandiganbayan rejected the admissibility of the microfilm copies of the checks
Contrary to Duran's claim, affixing his signature on the checks is not a ministerial duty on his
presented by the prosecution on the ground that it violates the best evidence rule, and
eventually acquitted the accused.[21]
We do not and cannot share their positions.
It is inappropriate for the accused to rely on a lower court's decision (although involving some
factual similarities with the present criminal case) that was rendered after this Court had
already made its own ruling, affirming the accused's conviction. To begin with, in our judicial
hierarchy, only the pronouncements of this Court are doctrinal and binding on all other
courts. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take
their bearings. Our judicial system does not work the other way around.
For our present purposes, we are only called upon to determine whether the Sandiganbayan
committed an error of law in convicting the petitioners of the crime for which they were
charged. The legal correctness of its decision in another case does not only lack the force of
jurisprudence but is not even an issue before us. It would do well for the petitioners not to
confuse themselves. With the admissibility of the checks in evidence and the prosecution's
evidence on the manner and circumstances by which they were prepared, we find no reason
to disturb our finding that conspiracy exists and that the accused acted in bad faith.
The prosecution was also able to prove injury to the government through the testimony of
Tuscano (the Supply Accountable Officer of the PNP) that the delivery of P10 million worth of
CCIE items for North CAPCOM in 1992 is not supported by the available record. This
testimony in turn finds support from accused Tugaoen's own statement that she did not
deliver any CCIE in exchange for the checks that she encashed (and from the written
declarations of P/CInsp. Isaias Braga, Chief Logistics Officer, North CAPCOM, and Rolando
Flores, Supply Accountable Officer, North CAPCOM).
Tugaoen though questions the admissibility of her statement before the investigating
committee that she did not deliver any CCIE items in exchange for the checks on the ground
that it violates her right under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
In People v. Marra,[22] we held that custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated
by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant manner. The rule on custodial investigation begins
to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
and the interrogation is then aimed on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody
and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions that tend to elicit
incriminating statements. The situation contemplated is more precisely described as one
where
After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which
at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police
headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange and
unfamiliar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and
means that experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for
it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the
officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence xxx.[23]
Accordingly, contrary to the accused Tugaoen's claim, the fact that she was "invited" by the
investigating committee does not by itself determine the nature of the investigation as
custodial. The nature of the proceeding must be adjudged on a case to case basis.
The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the investigation where Tugaoen made her statement
was not a custodial investigation that would bring to the fore the rights of the accused and
the exclusionary rule under paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
investigator's reminder to Tugaoen of her Miranda rights during the investigation cannot be
determinative of the nature of the investigation. Otherwise, following the logic of this claim,
the law enforcer's own failure or even disregard of his duty to inform an individual he
investigates of his custodial investigation rights would suffice to negate the character of an
investigation as legally a custodial investigation. Ultimately, the nature of the investigation
must be determined by appreciating the circumstances surrounding it as a whole.
In the present case, the investigation conducted by the PNP GHQ-OIG, was prompted by the
report from the COA regarding disbursement irregularities for CCIE items in Regions VII and
VIII, North CAPCOM. In short, it was simply a general inquiry to clear the air of reported
anomalies and irregularities within the PNP which a constitutional body found and reported
as part of its constitutional power and duty. Naturally, this investigation would involve
persons with whom the PNP had contracts that are subject of the COA scrutiny. That what
was conducted is an ordinary administrative (and not custodial) investigation is supported by
the fact that the investigating committee also took the statements of other PNP officials who
ended up not being charged with a crime. In this regard, the Sandiganbayan correctly
observed:
The most crucial question to answer that could have absolved the accused from liability is
whether the subject purchases of CCIE items were truly "ghost purchases", as contended by
the prosecution. It is very ironic that no single end user among thousands of police officers
and men came forward to attest and declare to the world that indeed he received the CCIE
items subject matter of the case, thereby leaving the prosecution's theory reinforced and
unrebutted.

The admitted non-delivery of the CCIE items by the supposed contractor, Tugaoen, well
explains why Duran had to argue in vain that the making and issuance of the checks were
ministerial on his part (despite his clear responsibility for the "management and disbursement
and accounting of PNP funds"). Accordingly, the fact that none of the persons who executed
the documents cited by the Court in its Decision testified in open court is not fatal to the
accused's conviction. As we already observed in our February 14, 2011 Decision, the
prosecution sufficiently discharged its burden of proof based on the confluence of evidence it
presented showing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motions for reconsideration are DENIED with
FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.
BERSAMIN, J.: it attesting to having verified the signature of the depositor, she presumed that the
withdrawal was genuine. She posted and released the money to the accused.
The court should prescribe the correct penalties in complex crimes in strict observance of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. In estafathrough falsification of commercial documents, On the same day, November 8, Zialcita instructed Misa to visit another depositor, Milagrosa
the court should impose the penalty for the graver offense in the maximum period. Cornejo, whom they feared was also victimized by the accused. Their worst expectations
Otherwise, the penalty prescribed is invalid, and will not attain finality. were confirmed. According to Cornejo, on November 3, she went to the bank to deposit a
check and because there were many people there at the time, she left her passbook with the
Antecedents accused. She returned days later to get it back, but the accused told her that she left it at
The petitioner, a bank teller of the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family) at its branch in home. Misa now showed to her a withdrawal slip dated November 4, 1993 in which a
Malibay, Pasay City, appeals the affirmance of her conviction for four counts signature purporting to be hers appeared. Cornejo denied that it was her signature. As with
of estafa through falsification of a commercial document committed on separate occasions in the slips affecting Matuguina, the initials of the accused were unquestionably affixed to the
October and November 1993 by forging the signatures of bank depositors Amparo Matuguina paper.
and Milagrosa Cornejo in withdrawal slips, thereby enabling herself to withdraw a total of
P65,000.00 and P2,000.00 from the respective savings accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo. Zialcita reported her findings posthaste to her superiors. The accused initially denied the
claims against her but when she was asked to write her statement down, she confessed to
The antecedent facts were summarized in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals her guilt. She started crying and locked herself inside the bathroom. She came out only when
(CA),[1] as follows: another superior Fed Cortez arrived to ask her some questions. Since then, she executed
three more statements in response to the investigation conducted by the bank's internal
auditors. She also gave a list of the depositors' accounts from which she drew cash and which
As culled from the evidence, Matuguina and Cornejo left their savings account passbooks with were listed methodically in her diary.
the accused within the space of a week in October November 1993 when they went to the
bank's Malibay branch to transact on their accounts. Matuguina, in particular, withdrew the The employment of the accused was ultimately terminated. The bank paid Matuguina
sum of P500 on October 29 and left her passbook with the accused upon the latter's P65,000, while Cornejo got her refund directly from the accused. In the course of her
instruction. She had to return two more times before the branch manager Cynthia Zialcita testimony on the witness stand, the accused made these further admissions:
sensed that something wrong was going on. Learning of Matuguina's problem, Zialcita told
the accused to return the passbook to her on November 8. On this day, the accused came up (a) She signed the withdrawal slips Exhibits B, C, D and H which contained the fake signatures
with the convenient excuse that she had already returned the passbook. Skeptical, Zialcita of Matuguina and Cornejo;
reviewed Matuguina's account and found three withdrawal slips dated October 19, 29 and
November 4, 1993 containing signatures radically different from the specimen signatures of (b) She wrote and signed the confession letter Exhibit K;
the depositor and covering a total of P65,000. It was apparent that the accused had
intervened in the posting and verification of the slips because her initials were affixed (c) She wrote the answers to the questions of the branch cluster head Fred Cortez Exhibit L,
thereto. Zialcita instructed her assistant manager Benjamin Misa to pay a visit to Matuguina, and to the auditors' questions in Exhibit M, N and O;
a move that led to the immediate exposure of the accused. Matuguina was aghast to see the
signatures in the slips and denied that the accused returned the passbook to her. When she (d) Despite demand, she did not pay the bank.[2]
went back to the bank worried about the unauthorized withdrawals from her account, she
met with the accused in the presence of the bank manager. She insisted that the signatures Judgment of the RTC
in the slips were not her, forcing the accused to admit that the passbook was still with her On July 13, 1998, the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City (RTC) rendered its judgment, [3] finding
and kept in her house. the petitioner guilty as charged, and sentencing her to suffer as follows:

Zialcita also summoned Juanita Ebora, the teller who posted and released the November 4
withdrawal. When she was asked why she processed the transaction, Ebora readily pointed
to the accused as the person who gave to her the slip. Since she saw the accused's initials on
 In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, involving the withdrawal of P20,000.00 from the account
of Matuguina, the indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prison
(a)
correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 20 days of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay BPI Family P20,000.00 and the costs of suit;
In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving the withdrawal of P2,000.00 from Cornejo's
account, the indeterminate sentence of three months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
(b)
one year and eight months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family
P2,000.00 and the costs of suit;
In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving the withdrawal of P10,000.00 from the account
of Matuguina, the indeterminate sentence of four months and 20 days of arresto
(c)
mayor, as minimum, to two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to pay BPI Family P10,000.00 and the costs of suit; and
In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, involving the withdrawal of P35,000 from Matuguina's
account, the indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision
(d)
correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay BPI
Family P35,000.00 and the costs of suit.
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner contended in the CA that: (1) her conviction should be set aside
because the evidence presented against her had been obtained in violation of her
constitutional right against self-incrimination; (2) her rights to due process and to counsel had
been infringed; and (3) the evidence against her should be inadmissible for being obtained by
illegal or unconstitutional means rendering the evidence as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its decision[4] affirming the judgment of the RTC, to
wit:
In summary, we find no grounds to disturb the findings of the lower court, except the
provision of the dispositive portion in case 94-5525 requiring the accused to pay BPI Family
P2,000. This must be deleted because the accused had already paid the amount to the
depositor.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the modification
that the award of P2,000 to the complainant in case 94-5525 be deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner still insists that her conviction was invalid because her
constitutional rights against self-incrimination, to due process and to counsel were denied. In
behalf of the State, the Office of the Solicitor General counters that she could invoke her
rights to remain silent and to counsel only if she had been under custodial investigation,
which she was not; and that the acts of her counsel whom she had herself engaged to
represent her and whom she had the full authority to replace at any time were binding
against her.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
We first note that the petitioner has accepted the findings of fact about the transactions that
gave rise to the accusations in court against her for four counts of estafa through falsification
of a commercial document. She raised no challenges against such findings of fact here and in
the CA, being content with limiting herself to the supposed denial of her rights to due process
and to counsel, and to the inadmissibility of the evidence presented against her. In the CA,
her main objection focused on the denial of her right against self-incrimination and to
counsel, which denial resulted, according to her, in the invalidation of the evidence of her
guilt.
Debunking the petitioner's challenges, the CA stressed that the rights against self-
incrimination and to counsel guaranteed under the Constitution applied only during the
custodial interrogation of a suspect. In her case, she was not subjected to any investigation by
the police or other law enforcement agents. Instead, she underwent an administrative
investigation as an employee of the BPI Family Savings Bank, the investigation being
conducted by her superiors. She was not coerced to give evidence against herself, or to admit
to any crime, but she simply broke down bank when depositors Matuguina and Cornejo
confronted her about her crimes. We quote with approval the relevant portions of the
decision of the CA, viz:
The accused comes to Us on appeal to nullify her conviction on the ground that the evidence
presented against her was obtained in violation of her constitutional right against self-
incrimination. She also contends that her rights to due process and counsel were
infringed. Without referring to its name, she enlists one of the most famous metaphors of
constitutional law to demonize and exclude what she believes were evidence obtained
against her by illegal or unconstitutional means evidence constituting the fruit of the
poisonous tree. We hold, however, that in the particular setting in which she was
investigated, the revered constitutional rights of an accused to counsel and against self-
incrimination are not apposite.
The reason is elementary. These cherished rights are peculiarly rights in the context of an
official proceeding for the investigation and prosecution for crime. The right against self-
incrimination, when applied to a criminal trial, is contained in this terse injunction no person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In other words, he may not be required to
take the witness stand. He can sit mute throughout the proceedings. His right to counsel is
expressed in the same laconic style: he shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel. This means inversely that the criminal prosecution cannot proceed without having a
counsel by his side. These are the traditional rights of the accused in a criminal case. They
exist and may be invoked when he faces a formal indictment and trial for a criminal
offense. But since Miranda vs Arizona 384 US 436, the law has come to recognize that an
accused needs the same protections even before he is brought to trial. They arise at the very
inception of the criminal process when a person is taken into custody to answer to a criminal
offense. For what a person says or does during custodial investigation will eventually be used
as evidence against him at the trial and, more often than not, will be the lynchpin of his
eventual conviction. His trial becomes a parody if he cannot enjoy from the start the right
against self-incrimination and to counsel. This is the logic behind what we now call as
the Miranda doctrine.
The US Supreme Court in Miranda spells out in precise words the occasion for the exercise of
the new right and the protections that it calls for. The occasion is when an individual is
subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his
freedom in a significant way. It is when custodial investigation is underway that the certain
procedural safeguards takes over the person must be warned prior to any questioning that he
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law,
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning.
We must, therefore, be careful to note what the Miranda doctrine does not say. It was never
intended to hamper the traditional law-enforcement function to investigate crime involving
persons not under restraint. The general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process, as
the US Supreme Court recognizes, which is not preceded by any restraint on the freedom of
the person investigated, is not affected by the holding, since the compelling atmosphere
inherent in in-custody interrogation is not present.
The holding in Miranda is explicitly considered the source of a provision in our 1987 bill of
rights that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, a provision identical in language and spirit to the earlier Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution. People vs. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2. As we can see, they speak of the
companion rights of a person under investigation to remain silent and to counsel, to ensure
which the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine had also to be institutionalized by declaring
that any confession or admission obtained in violation of these rights is inadmissible. But to
what extent must the rights to remain silent and to counsel be enforced in an investigation
for the commission of an offense? The answer has been settled by rulings of our Supreme
Court in Caguoia and in the much later case of Navallo vs Sandiganbayan 234 SCRA 175
incorporating in toto the Miranda doctrine into the above-cited provisions of our bill of
rights. Thus, the right to remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only in the context in
which the Miranda doctrine applies when the official proceeding is conducted under the
coercive atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. There are no cases extending them to a
non-coercive setting. In Navallo, the Supreme Court said very clearly that the rights are
invocable only when the accused is under custodial investigation. A person undergoing a
normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation and, hence, the audit examiner
may not be considered the law enforcement officer contemplated by the rule.
By a fair analogy, the accused in the case before us may not be said to be under custodial
investigation. She was not even being investigated by any police or law enforcement
officer. She was under administrative investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in
purely voluntary manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in any manner. She was free
to stay or go. There was no evidence that she was forced or pressured to say anything. It was
an act of conscience that compelled her to speak, a true mental and moral catharsis that
religion and psychology recognize to have salutary effects on the soul. In this setting, the
invocation of the right to remain silent or to counsel is simply irrelevant.
The accused makes a final argument against her conviction by contending that she did not get
effective legal representation from her former counsel who was already old and feeble when
the case was being heard. In fact, the records show, her counsel died during the pendency of
the case, an octogenarian at that. One can truly make a case from one's lack of a competent
and independent counsel, but we are not prepared to say that the accused was so poorly
represented that it affected her fundamental right to due process. Except for the several
postponements incurred by her counsel, there is really no showing that he committed any
serious blunder during the trial. We have read the transcripts of the trial and failed to get this
impression. The evidence against the accused was simply too overwhelming. We may take
note that once, the trial court admonished the accused to replace her counsel due to his
absences, but she did not. She must live by that.[5]
Considering that the foregoing explanation by the CA was justly supported by the records,
and that her investigation as a bank employee by her employer did not come under the
coverage of the Constitutionally-protected right against self-incrimination, right to counsel
and right to due process, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the
conviction of the petitioner by the RTC.
The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial
document was established beyond reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage of
the bank depositors who had trusted in her enough to leave their passbooks with her upon
her instruction. Without their knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal slips that she
signed, and misrepresented to her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been
verified in due course. Her misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to receive the
amounts stated in the withdrawal slips. She thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa,
by defrauding BPI Family Savings, her employer, in the various sums withdrawn from the bank
accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo; and falsification of a commercial document, by forging
the signatures of Matuguina and Cornejo in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the
depositor concerned had signed the respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the
amounts. Such offenses were complex crimes, because the estafa would not have been
consummated without the falsification of the withdrawal slips.
Nonetheless, there is a need to clarify the penalties imposable.
According to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,[6] the penalty for a complex crime is that
corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Otherwise, the penalty will be void and ineffectual, and will not attain finality.
In the four criminal cases involved in this appeal, the falsification of commercial documents is
punished with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two years, four
months and one day to six years) and a fine of P5,000.00.[7] In contrast, the estafa is
punished according to the value of the defraudation, as follows: with the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period (i.e., four years,
two months and one day to eight years) if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but
does not exceed P22,000.00, and if such amount exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty is imposed
in the maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total shall
not exceed 20 years, in which case the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be, in connection with the accessory penalties that may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of the Revised Penal Code; with the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (i.e., six months and one
day to four years and two months) if the amount of the fraud is over P6,000.00 but does not
exceed P12,000.00; with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period (i.e., four months and one day to two years and four
months) if the amount of the fraud is over P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00; and with
the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two months and one
day to six months) if the amount of the fraud does not exceed P200.00.[8]
In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, estafa was the graver felony because the amount of the fraud
was P20,000.00; hence, the penalty for estafa is to be imposed in its maximum
period. However, the RTC and the CA fixed the indeterminate sentence of two years, 11
months and 10 days of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 20
days of prision mayor, as maximum. Such maximum of the indeterminate penalty was short
by one day, the maximum period of the penalty being six years, eight months and 21 days
to eight years. Thus, the indeterminate sentence is corrected to three years of prison
correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor, as
maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving P2,000.00, the estafa is punished with four months
and one day of arresto mayor in its maximum period to two years and four months of prision
correccional in its minimum period. The falsification of commercial document is penalized
with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two years, four months
and one day to six years) and a fine of P5,000.00. The latter offense is the graver felony, and
its penalty is to be imposed in the maximum period, which is from four years, nine months
and 11 days to six years plus fine of P5,000.00. The penalty next lower in degree is arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (i.e., four months
and one day to two years and four months). Thus, the indeterminate sentence of three
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year and eight months of prision
correccional, as maximum that both the RTC and the CA fixed was erroneous. We rectify the
error by prescribing in lieu thereof the indeterminate sentence of two years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to four years, nine months and 11 days of prision
correccional plus fine of P5,000.00, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving P10,000.00, the RTC and the CA imposed the
indeterminate sentence of four months and 20 days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as maximum. However, the penalty for
the falsification of commercial documents is higher than that for the estafa. To accord with
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for falsification of commercial documents
(i.e., prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of P5,000.00) should
be imposed in the maximum period. Accordingly, we revise the indeterminate sentence so
that its minimum is two years and four months of prision correccional, and its maximum is
five years of prision correccional plus fine of P5,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, where the amount of the fraud was P35,000.00, the penalty
for estafa (i.e., prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, or four years, two months and one day to eight years) is higher than that for
falsification of commercial documents. The indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months
and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as maximum,
was prescribed. Considering that the maximum period ranged from six years, eight months
and 21 days to eight years, the CA should have clarified whether or not the maximum of eight The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
years of prision mayor already included the incremental penalty of one year for every
P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00. Absent the clarification, we can presume that the SO ORDERED.
incremental penalty was not yet included. Thus, in order to make the penalty clear and
specific, the indeterminate sentence is hereby fixed at four years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one
year incremental penalty. In other words, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence is
seven years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor.

The CA deleted the order for the restitution of the P2,000.00 involved in Criminal Case No. 94-
5525 on the ground that such amount had already been paid to the complainant, Milagrosa
Cornejo. There being no issue as to this, the Court affirms the deletion.

The Court adds that the petitioner is liable to BPI Family for interest of 6% per annum on the
remaining unpaid sums reckoned from the finality of this judgment. This liability for interest is
only fair and just.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on
August 18, 2005, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:

In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
(1) three years of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days
of prision mayor, as maximum;

In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to four years, nine months and 11 days
of prision correccional plus fine of P5,000.00, as maximum;

In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two
(3) years and four months of prision correccional, as the minimum, to five years of prision
correccional plus fine of P5,000.00, as the maximum; and

In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
(4) four years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven years, eight months and 21 days
of prision mayor, as maximum.

The Court ORDERS the petitioner to pay to BPI Family Saving Bank interest of 6% per
annum on the aggregate amount of P65,000.00 to be reckoned from the finality of this
judgment until full payment.