ECOMOG AND NIGERIAS FOREIGN POLICY

By

Gani Joses Yoroms

Professor of International Relations,
Geopolitics and Global Governance
National Defence College Nigeria
PMB 323, Herbert Macaulay Way, Abuja, Nigeria
yoromsgani@yahoo.com

1
 ECOMOG AND NIGERIAS FOREIGN POLICY

By Gani Joses Yoroms

1. Introduction
Nigerias Foreign policy has generated a lot of discourse in recent time. This is
because of the serious attention and commitment Nigeria has engaged herself in tackling
intractable conflicts and issues on the continent of Africa and the world at large. The
foundation of this was rooted on the principle of Africa as the Centre- Piece of Nigerias
foreign policy, which has been in practice since independence and was only concretized
during the Murtala Obasanjo regime. The concept, which was spelt out in the Adedeji
Report on Nigerias Foreign Policy attempts to refocus the architecture of Nigerian
Foreign policy since independence. It is believe Nigerian Foreign policy had no focus,
but was only pursued on the maniac quest for liberating Africa from colonial rule as a
poorly articulated manner. The Murtala Obasanjo military administration, pursued the
principle with vigour in the 1970s. This principle runs up to the early 1980 during the
civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari.

However, when the military junta led by Major-General Muhammadu Buhari took
over power on the 31st December 1983 it dismissed the Shagaris administration and
became less enthusiastic in formulating and pursuing foreign policy on the basis of Africa
as a centrepiece of Nigerian Foreign policy. According to the Foreign Policy spoke
person of the regime, Ibrahim Gambari, the principle:
was imprecise and weak in its implementation. Several questions were
raised which were not adequately addressed, let alone resolved by the
administration. Should we, for example, be a fire brigade, available at
anytime and place on the continent, to put out conflagration?
Alternatively, should we respond selectively to crisis areas on the
continent that are closer to home or closer to our fundamental security
and national interests objectives? Or should we do both? 1

It was at this point that the regime threw up the concept of Concentric Circle as a priority
of Nigerias foreign policy. According to Buhari:
the pattern of concentric circles may be discernable in our attitude and
response to foreign policy issues within the African continent and in the
world at large. At the epicenter of these circles are the national economic
and security interests of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which are
inextricably tied up with the security, stability and the economic and
social well-being of our immediate neighbours. One of our principal
priorities is to put on more constructive footing relations with our

2
 neighbours with whom we share identical goals of regional stability and
peace 2

In other words Nigerias foreign policy since independence has been reactive to
events as they occur in the international scene rather than addressing fundamental issues.
In the end Nigeria is found to be blowing cold, hot or firm; depending on the
circumstances she found herself. These reactive measures resulted in a cautious and
vague action of the First Republic regime of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa or sensational
radicalism of General Murtala, which popularly challenged the western imperialism when
he addressed the extraordinary summit of African Heads of state and government at
Addis Ababa in 1976, with his famous speech on Africa has come of Age. 3 The bottom
line is that there is no concrete understanding and approach to Nigerias foreign policy.
Each regime come with what is best and administerable. There are alternating and
constant changing phases of Nigerias foreign policy. On this pattern the pursuit of
foreign policy was carried out on the basis of Crisis Decision rather than on a dynamic
programme policy noted. As Otubanjo clearly noted:
This change in the scope of Nigerias relations with the world was, to be
sure, a matter of circumstance rather than of will. It was not the result of
any calculated decision or deliberate act of the Nigerian government.
Rather, Nigeria was lucky to be at the confluence of events in the
international system. (Emphasis mine) 4
The grace to be at the confluence of events therefore, tend to create circumstances
for Nigeria to demonstrate her ability and be firm about it in order to avoid shame-based
foreign policy. On the surface this may explains the fact of circumstantial turning point in
Nigerias foreign policy when she initiated, sponsored and led a multinational ECOWAS
force to intervene in the Liberian crisis and subsequent conflicts, which had assumed sub
regional dimension. However, at a deeper level it is also believed that ECOMOG
emerged at a level in which a charismatic leadership of General Ibrahim Babangida, and
later General Sani Abacha intended to foster a kind of defence mechanism against a
splinters that were threatening their personal interests rather than national or regional
interests 5.

In this case, it is possible to query whether ECOMOG emerged as a result of

programme policy of the government or a crisis decision of the regime(s) to shield some
overhanging threats? It is within this context that this chapter attempts to understand the
circumstantial turning point in Nigeria foreign policy, which led to the formation of
ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as a crisis decision. The chapter
analyses the ECOWAS Peace Plan which led the ECOMOG operation, and the challenges
that these have for Nigerian foreign policy. The most fundamental question is, how
constructive and beneficial was the ECOWAS Peace Plan to Nigerias foreign policy? It
finally concludes by understanding how as crisis decision, ECOMOG has been
transformed as a major issue both for Nigeria and the sub regional diplomatic outreach.

ECOMOG as a Crisis Decision

3
 The behaviour and action taken by a nation in her foreign policy emanate from
either Programme Policy Decision or Crisis Decision. 6 In liberal democratic regimes
most foreign policy actions and implementations are rationalized on the basis of
bureaucratic politics or ideological dynamics. Whereas Crisis decision is an omnibus
approach that emerges in time of emergences. Though it is common in authoritarian
regime there is a manifest of it in democratic system when there is an overhanging
situation in which one state confronts another with a demand for a change in the status
quo and threatening the use of violence, possibly a nuclear war. 7 The decision taken in
such a crisis situation is ideologically omnibus, rather than on bureaucratic politics. The
closest experience was during the Cuban Missile Crisis when the United States reacted
swiftly to the presence of Russian nuclear missiles in her strategic waters. Even so, the
United States made use of its bureaucracies rather than depending on a solo presidential
order. Indeed Crisis Decision is easily taken in authoritarian regime and might inform the
basis in which ECOMOG emerged in the sub-region. However, Crisis Decision is
superintended by dramatis personae that act on certain stimuli as a survival strategy
which are at the end rationalized as national/regional interests. How did ECOMOG
emerge as a crisis Decision in Nigerias foreign policy?

There are two schools of thoughts that attempt to provide understanding of

Nigerias role in the Liberian crisis. The first school posits that Nigerias involvement in
the crisis was based on her national interest. It argues that Nigeria has vested interest in
the sub-region in term of regional security and therefore maintains a hegemonic interest
in ensuring peace and security for the economic development of the region 8. Indeed
Nigeria has been an advocate for the building an African Regional Peace keeping System
to intervene in internal conflict so as to deter weak and vulnerable member states of the
region being driven into the laps of extra African powers in search for their defence and
security 9. But did the prosecution of the sub-regional conflicts meet this rational
objective which Nigeria had earlier set out for herself? This question is relevant to our
understanding of the second school of thought.

The second school of thought argues that the intervention was indeed an attempt
by the regime of Babangida to defend and protect a personal friend, Samuel Doe who was
entangled by a domestic conflict. As for General Abacha, it was to redeem the tarnished
image of his regime. For Babangida, within the period, which he came to power he
overlooked the nonchalant approach his predecessors, Shehu Shagari and Muhammadu
Buhari, had meted to the Liberia President, Samuel Doe. In fact Shagari was pained by
the bloody killings in the coup that brought Doe to power on the 12th April 1980 and
decided to stay away from him. Buhari preoccupied himself with domestic economic
problem and had no time for Doe either. In effect Babangidas effort to have courted a
keen relationship with Doe within an interval of his assumption to office made the
speculation about his relationship with Doe appear real. Apart from the Ibrahim
Babangida Post Graduate School of International Relations at the University of Liberia,
the regime of Babangida paid off USD30 Million debt which Liberia owe the African
Development Bank, invested a US4.5Million in the Liberian National Oil and constructed
the Liberian section of the Trans-African Highway Scheme which was later named as
Babangida highway 10. As for General Abacha, his human rights records were appalling

4
to the international community. In order to regain his credibility he saw the regional
crises as a safe valve for him to find re-entry into the comity of nations.

The Liberia crisis started like any other conflict on the continent. The then
President of Liberia, Samuel Kayon Doe sought normal assistance from his friend
General Ibrahim Babangida to contain the crisis. President Babangida might not have
considered the implication of his assistance and the regional dimension of his action.
Thus, as alleged by Charles Taylor the transfer of arms by Babangida to Does
government during the crisis were later captured by the rebels under his control. 11 This
exacerbated the conflict as the rebels turned on Nigeria and Nigerians as targets of
attacks. Nigerian government also reacted sharply as the Vice President Admiral
Augustus Aikhomu was quoted as saying Taylor was a bloody rebel and should be shot
12. Taylor had also promised that he was embarking on a regional revolution to topple all
authoritarian and repressive regimes in the sub-region. This too had propelled Babangida
to be on his toes against allowing armed civil groups to topple a government in the sub-
region. However, as Aning queried how do we interpret the hectic series of activities
undertaken by the Babangida (as well as Abacha) government in Liberia and the su-
bregion either as a narrow regime interest or broader national perspectives? 13. It is
indeed difficult to provide a rational interpretation. Meanwhile Nigerian foreign and
military policy analysts have pointed out that there are three dimension of threat
perceptions which are not only interacted but linked to Nigeria; such as national, sub-
regional and the continent frontiers. These threats affect her vital interests in the area of
socio-political, economic and cultural levels. Accordingly, they are threats that may
affect areas that are strategically vital to Nigeria. They come in the form of escalated
national crisis in contiguous states in the West African sub-region, which often
reverberates in Nigeria 14. General Babangida agrees and noted that:
There is no doubt that when certain events occur in this sub region,
depending upon their intensity and magnitude, which are bound to affect
Nigerias politico-military and socio-economic environment, we should
not stand by We believe that if the events are such that they have the
potential to threaten stability, peace and security of the sub-region Nigeria
in collaboration with others, in this sub-region is duty bound to react or
respond in appropriate manner necessary to either avert the disaster or
take adequate measures to ensure peace, tranquility and harmony. 15

This not withstanding, Akindele had earlier noted that the regime had had
recourse to using Nigerias sub regional status and power as a means to enforce national
interest in the light of its regime stability, which at the end lacked vigorous foreign policy
that ordinarily should have been backed up by a broad domestic support 16. In a manner of
owing up to the question of regime interest, Babangida alluded that
In government parlance, what security means is any measure, offensive or
defensive taken to protect the state from acts to annoy the head of
government .You can take any measures to stop the country from being
subjected to acts of sabotage or terrorism. You can take measures to make
sure that the head of government or state or president does not get
annoyed. It is all part f security 17

5
Taking a detour from the views presented by the schools of thoughts, it must be noted
that ECOMOG scenario was unprecedented in Nigerias foreign policy. Historically there
are three key factors that have hitherto been grounded in Nigerias foreign policy. These
are decolonisation, Liberation struggle and Non Alignment. Peacekeeping has always
been seen as normal diplomatic routine without being concretely tied up to specific
issues. Therefore, the idea of ECOMOG was a sort of path breaking measure in Nigerian
foreign policy, which has never been tried before. In the light of this, it is possible that
several doubts and questions have to be raised, given the poor performance of the
economy as a result of the introduction of structural adjustment , the precarious political
system as well as the social crisis that had attended the domestic scene. The ECOMOG
scenario was broadly seen as a diversionary by the generality of the public, which
believed that it was a tactics by the regimes of Babangida and Abacha to give less or zero
-attention to the contradiction within the domestic politics
The domestic crisis, which ECOMOG generated, made it possible for decision to
be taken as crisis decision. Because ECOMOG decision did not flow from bureaucratic
programme policy the attempt to scurry over its implementations and get things done
with alacrity ended up being unnecessarily bureaucratic and cumbersome to tackle. This
is seen in the manner the operation was carried out and the long period it took to get out
of Liberia in the first instance.
In fact, at a point it was feared that Liberia was becoming Nigerias Vietnam. The
effect of the crisis decision was felt in the course the operability of ECOMOG mandate,
troop deployment, command and control, logistics among others, which Nigeria had to
take to fire brigade approach. This was duplicated in Sierra Leone without lessons learnt
of the previous experiment. First of all we must understand the policy in place. What
type of peace plan did ECOWAS evolve to bring about peace in the sub-region? How did
Nigeria build herself into this process? And did it provide constructive benefits for
Nigeria?

ECOWAS Peace Plan

The summit of ECOWAS heads of state and government, which took place in
Banjul, The Gambia in May 1990, was unique as it attempted to create olive branch for
peace in the sub-region. At the Banjul summit General Babangida proposed and it was
accepted by members that ECOWAS should set up the Standing Mediation Committee
(SMC) to tackle intractable conflicts in the sub-region. Members of the SMC were drawn
from Ghana, Mali, Togo, Nigeria and The Gambia. The first meeting of the Committee at
ministerial level took place in Freetown, Sierra Leone in July 1990. It was to fashion out
the peace plan. The meeting had problem in reaching a unanimous decision on the type of
ceasefire, the structure of the interim government to replace Doe or involve him, and the
effective means of deploying sub-regional peacekeeping forces to Liberia. Nigeria and
Ghana favoured military action while the other members preferred the traditional method
of sending interposition force between the warring parties.
At the summit of the Heads of state and government of the SMC in Banjul, The
Gambia, 6-7th August 1990, those who favoured the use of military force had outweighed
those against it. Accordingly, it was Nigeria that decided to push ahead for military option
18
. Though Nigeria gained grounds militarily but without securing the political backing of

6
the full ECOWAS membership. This subsequently split ECOWAS apart. And apart from
Ghana, Guinea and The Gambia that supported Nigeria, most Francophone members of
ECOWAS like Senegal and CoteDIvoire reserved their feelings, but Burkina Faso was
vehement in her opposition and spoke against it on behalf of the Francophone zone. Togo
and Mali later declined their initial commitment to send troops to join ECOMOG forces
in Liberia.
Unfortunately too, Doe who had earlier requested for the regional peace keeping
forces was also scarred when the SMC had made provision in the mandate for an interim
government. At the same time Charles Taylor felt the forces were an occupation force
because the idea of an interim government was equally intended to deny him quick access
to power, having encircled the presidential mansion as well as being in control of larger
portion of the Liberian territory. The differences, lack of agreement and delay in releasing
the mandate affected the peace process. As noted by James Jonah, at the time ECOWAS
plan was tabled before the UN Security Council the three African members (Ethiopia,
Zaire and Cote DIvoire) did not favour UN involvement in the crisis. 19
The controversial mandate set out from the SMC meeting in Banjul included the
following which carried covert understanding for peace enforcement under the pretext of
peace keeping:
i. Protect life and property
ii. Maintain essential services
iii. Provide security to the interim government in Liberia
iv. Monitor elections, and
v. Conduct normal policing duties
The mandate did not go down well with Charles Taylor .He did not only discard it but
issue his own order of peace keeping that required:
a. The immediate departure of Doe from Liberia
b. Inclusion of Taylor in any Interim government since the rebel group, National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) of Charles Taylor already has effective control
of sizeable portion of Liberia
c. Reorganisation of the composition of the membership of SMC
d. Effective participation of the OAU and the UN in peacekeeping exercise, and
e. Harmonious interaction between the chairman of ECOWAS and the warring
paries in order to obtain from commitment to ceasefire

It is clear that from the foregoing there is a disconnection in the peace process.
This subsequently affected the concentration of effort that would provide constructive
benefits that could be derived from ECOMOG operations in the sub region. This made it
possible for one to reach a conclusion that the peace plan was a recipe for disaster
because the speed with which ECOMOG was constituted and deployed suggest that the
ECOWAS leadership did not give diplomacy a chance 20. The point is not that there
wouldnt have been a disagreement in the course of formulating the peace plan but rather
the deeply embedded contradictions between the peacemakers seems to be more
profound as not only to exacerbate the conflict they intend to resolve, but also turn them
to become factions among the warring parties. This affected not only their concentration
for a constructive Peace plan but also the operations in the fields, as these fundamental
differences transcended to the operation level. At the end it did not only take more time to

7
achieve the peace in Liberia but it also led to the multiplication of conflicts in the sub-
region.

ECOMOG Operations

Despite the contradiction in the peace plan ECOMOG was deployed under Operation
Exodus commanded by Lt General Arnold Quainoo of Ghana. The problem was however
compounded by General Quainoo who, in spite of the mandate is said to have set
condition to be met before he send his troops to Liberia. Quainoos condition included 21
i.) Effective ceasefire in place with the factions signing up to it.
ii.) . All logistics required for the operation to be in place before troop
deployment, and
iii.) Prior to deployment troops must be physically, mentally and psychologically
alert and ready for the operation
His action might be correct and was in line with the UN tradition of peacekeeping. But it
goes to show that he was the wrong person the SMC had recruited to do the job, hence he
was brought up under the UN Ceasefire School. While these conditions were not met
Quainoo, however, in the usual military tradition took the order to deployed his troop in
anticipation, which did serious damage as Samuel Doe died against the wishes of those
who had wanted the immediate use of force. They had anticipated it . But as to whether
Quainoo took the order to deploy his troops at the end was as a result of his military
tradition or upon a covert directive that he should not resist the arrest of Doe even by his
opponents, is another hurdle that needs to be investigated in another work 22. If this was
actually true, the swift reaction, which Nigeria took on the way to replace Quainoo, did
not manifest it, except if it was still part of the covert actions. Indeed, the death of Doe
heightened tension and the tempo of the enforcement as Nigeria threw caution,
compromise and diplomacy to the wind and forcefully took over the ECOMOG field
command. General Joshua Dogo-Yaro took over with Operation Liberty, which though
cleared some military hurdles in the field but affected the politico-diplomatic goals for
achieving the ECOWAS Peace Plan.
There were checkered period of stalemates after Operation Liberty that required
herculean diplomatic patching, as ECOWAS began to mend fences. The Bamako summit
of 1990 provided a temporal respite as the actual ECOWAS mandate was approved in
principle. It was only then that the UN Security Council began to show interest on the
ECOWAS Peace Plan in principle. Even at that CoteDIvoire that had initially worked
against the intervention from the UN, began to put pressure for the UN involvement in
order to disposed ECOWAS and indeed Nigeria, the right to dominance in the Liberian
peace process. Accordingly, the Ivorien Foreign Minister Amara Esy went to New York
and asserted to the UN officials that my president wants the UN to independently take
this peace keeping responsibility 23
The UN has been skeptical deploying her troops alongside regional peacekeeping
forces. Though it eventually did through resolution 866 of September 1993, its fears were
confirmed when the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was in
better position in terms of facilities than ECOMOG. However, despite the presence of
UNOMIL, ECOMOG still bore the burden of the not only maintaining the peace but also

8
protecting the UN Observers. It was clear that though the two peacekeeping forces were
coexisting with overlapping functions, ECOMOG troops were not happy because having
come out of the 1992 Operation Octopus they expected better treatment than the
Observers.
Meanwhile the series of peace actions taken in diplomatic circles range from the
expansion of SMC to Committee of Five and later Committee of Nine, followed by other
meetings in Yamoussoukro, Cotonou and culminating in the Abuja Accords which helped
to douse tension for a while. At the same time, because the inability to carry out the
community burden was not carefully planned, and given the long period it has taken to
resolve the conflict, Nigeria and member states of ECOWAS decided to invigorate the
Abuja Accords which stage-managed Charles Taylor to power through an orchestrated
election in 1997. Tom Ikimi, the Foreign Affairs minister of Nigeria at the heat of the
crisis noted this when he said:
When the foreign ministers of Committee of Nine met in Accra in May 1996 the
meeting was held in an atmosphere of frustration. The sub-region showed obvious
signs of fatigue and there were firm calls for the withdrawal of ECOMOG from
Liberia entirely. But concerns for ordinary Liberians were overwhelming and we
had no option but to recommend to the heads of state of our sub-region further
commitment to the peace process. That was why in August 1996 the Committee of
Nine meeting in Abuja agreed on a mechanism for returning Liberia to the Abuja
Agreement. 24
At the time ECOWAS was busy organising elections it was warned that the election of
Charles Taylor would not only set dangerous precedence but also provide easy access for
Charles Taylor to continue his clandestine activities in the sub-region 25 . This was not
heeded, as no sooner had Taylor graft the presidency the first target was to send
ECOMOG out of Liberia. The second step was to engineer the conflagration of conflict
around the Mano River region, which spread from Sierra Leone, to Guinea Bissau, Cote
DIvore and the sprinkling of it in Guinea.

Unfortunately, when ECOMOG left Liberia it moved over to Sierra Leone to join already
standing 4,000 Nigerian troops earlier deployed from Liberia. The Liberian peace process
may be weak but that of Sierra Leon was worst of, as there was no mandate. What
ECOMOG did was to duplicate its mandate in Sierra Leone. Meanwhile, most Nigerian
backers in the peace process, especially Ghana, had shown sign of fatigue and were not
ready for another peace enforcement except Nigeria bears all of the burdens. Indeed the
domestic configuration in Nigeria too made Abachas regime to see, the Status of Force
Agreement (SOFA) with Sierra Leonean government not withstanding, the sub-regional
peace outreach as a means to gain international recognition for his regime which has
suffer international credibility. Abacha had taken over power in Nigeria under extreme
political crisis after the annulment of June 12 presidential election. His credibility was
under question both at domestic and international arena. He needed image-saving
mechanism.
In the light of the above, ECOMOG put up serious resistance in the operation in
Sierra Leone despite the poor condition of facilities to restore the democratic regime of
Tejan Kabbah that was toppled on the 25th May 1997. Thus together with logistics
provided by Sandline International ECOMOG led Sandline and Kamajors local hunters

9
to confront the Fodeh Sankohs rebel Revolutionary United Force (RUF) and Major
Johnny Koromas ACRF. At the end Tejan Kabbah was successfully restored back to
power on the 10th March 1998.

Challenges
The operation of ECOMOG portends several challenges to Nigeria and the
Nigerian foreign policy in general. In this chapter we shall limit ourselves to three. These
are the administration of Nigerian foreign policy, the military and the future peace
operation of this nature.
First, the running and the administration of Nigerian foreign policy were
militaristic and combative. Indeed, Nigeria has interests n the sub-region whether
personal or national, but she did not apply the diplomatic measures in meeting her
interests. Thus at the end Nigeria ended up in the self-glorification of her performance in
ECOMOG. Apart from the way Nigeria bulldozed her self into taking over the ECOMOG
command the behaviour of some of the officials lacked diplomatic decorum. As James
Jonah opined:
A more severe constant complaint was the perceived brusque manner in
which Chief Tom Ikimi executed his task as chairman of both the
committee of Nine and the ministerial Committee of Five. An allusion has
already been made to the change in the understanding of the role of the
UN in the conduct of elections in Liberia. It was widely felt that it was his
personal wish to play down the role of the UN in the election process.
Equally during negotiations at ministerial meetings he often wanted to
play down the role of the representative of Sierra Leone in the discussion
on how to remove the junta. This did not go down well with the Sierra
Leon delegation 26

Jonah added that:

However, it will be necessary in the future for Nigeria to take into
account the contributions of other African states. This was not always
openly the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone and it was the cause of
annoyance, particular in the manner in which ECOMOG headquarter
staffs were organised as well as the alleged lack of full consultations with
senior military officers of troop-contributing countries 27

The administration of field operations was poorly carried out. Nigerian troops though
better equipped but lack food and were always complaining . This later could be the
cause of pilfering among Nigerian soldiers and the basis for the accolade which
ECOMOG stands for Every CAR OR moveable Object Gone.
Another area of concern was when, at the heat of operation Octopus, General
Tunji Olurin run out of ammunitions and Abuja directed him to come to collect some at
the Murtala Mohammed Airport, Lagos. Surprisingly on arrival he got C130 Cargo
aircraft stocked with rotten tomatoes. This was demoralizing for the troops. And the
interval enabled NPFL rebels to break into Nigerian battle lines .
Secondly, there is no doubt that the Nigerian contingents were extraordinary in
their performance in the sub-regional peace operations. Their effort to cope with lack of

10
military equipment, logistics, training and interoperability was indeed magnificent.
Soldiers and officers also had to cope with language barrier. In fact on general plain the
combat readiness and morale of the soldiers was very low. This affected the credibility
and efficiency of the operation. Because the soldiers were not trained on peace operations
the order of battle strategies was affected, result Nigerian contingents were involved in
indiscriminate aerial bombing raids especially during the operation 120 Hours in Liberia
and the naval bombardment of Freetown, which led to the killings of thousands of
civilians. This indeed damaged the reputation of the soldiers as peacekeeping force.
Thirdly, which is related to the above, is the image of Nigeria in future peace
keeping. The damage ECOMOG has done to Nigerias credibility might have informed
the government of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo to withdraw Nigerian troops when he
assumed office in 1999. His predecessor, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, though a
military president, had contemplated to do the same. Though General Abubakar did keep
his words but resented pressure to send Nigerian troops to be part of ECOMOG
intervention in the crisis in Guinea Bissau. Never the less , there is the need to fashion out
a new concept or blue print for Nigerias participation in future peace keeping is
important because Nigerias troops would still be required in sub-regional peace keeping .
For instance the rebels (RUF) would have re-taken the government of Tejan Kabbah in
2000 if Chief Olusegun Obasanjo had withdrawn the Nigerian troops as it was being
decided. But Nigeria needs to establish a credible participatory process in peace keeping
The issue of training is very important because it has impact for Nigerias
participation in future peacekeeping operations. Nigeria needs to begin to give focused
attention to, and should begin to prepare against the eventual situation of this nature, in
order to avoid crisis decision in future Apart from Operation Focus Relief that offered
training for the soldiers that were later deployed to Liberia for ECOMILI operation
nothing seems to have been done to reorientate men and officers for future operations.

From the analyses shown so far, the ECOMOG emerged as a crisis decision. This
has implications for its acceptability at the international level at the time it should. This
was so as the rapidity with which ECOMOG forces were mobilized and assembled did
not make room for the traditional period of 30 days when the resolution was adopted as
provided by the UN, and 90 days in the case of complex peace keeping operations. The
failure to keep the time frame affected the physiology and the psychological disposition
of the forces. Because the troops were not debriefed to defend peace they instead saw
themselves as fighting war. For instance, even in the case of disarmament in Liberia
before the 1997 elections, ECOMOG mounted series of raids to recover weapons forcibly
rather than keep open its disarmament site as was done by UNOMIL Though it recovered
more weapons than UNOMIL however, the later gained more credibility than
ECOMOG.
Though the dramatis personae might have achieved their expectations, Nigeria is
left not only to suffer the consequences but also to put up with the repairs of the damage
that had been created. This is because countries within the sub-region find it difficult to
identify with Nigeria in future peace operations. The worrisome question is , what
attitude and behaviour did Nigeria input into the operation process that makes her
contingents to be repugnant by other member states in the sub-region and beyond? It
seems Nigeria is tolerated not because she is accepted always as a friend to member

11
states of the sub region, but because she has become an aberration, an evil genius that
cannot be done away with. In this case Jonah counsel that
Nigeria has a comprehensive and achievable policy objective in Africa and was
prepared to do what ever it takes to attain this goal. No one should take lightly
the perception in Nigerias foreign policy goals that it stands for the protection of
the African continent. Perhaps, there is a need to recognise Nigeria as a benign
hegemon on the continent. 28

Indeed nations that take crisis decision are bulldogs. They spend resources that are
not accounted for. In the case of ECOMOG, resources were disbursed from several
sources liker the presidency, Ministry of Defence and other supportive efforts by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Emergency and Management Agency (NEMA) and
probably the dual exchange rate used by the military government 29 . But there is no
account elsewhere indicating records of expenses during the Babangida, Abacha and
Abdulsalami regimes. Though Tom Ikimi mentioned in 1994 that $4 billion was spent so
far. This figure later rose to $12 billion in 1999 as Chief Olusegun Obasanjo took over
power without proper accountability.
ECOMOG suffered some credibility because the dramatis personae had played
up their interests above the state. Indeed leadership interest cannot be ruled out in any
policy objective but it must be situated within the context of national interests. But when
personal interests override national interest it is apparent,and this can draw a lot of
criticism. Thus, in spite of the criticism ECOMOG had received, Nigeria has glorified
herself over her performance in the sub regional peace operations. Indeed, some
successes of ECOMOG operation have also been acknowledged world wide but Nigeria
must learn the lessons of her performance in ECOMOG operations. In international for a
where ECOMOG has been discussed, its successes and failures are mentioned.
Nevertheless Nigeria must move from self-glorification of her success in ECOMOG to
the level of transforming her foreign policy towards meeting common objectives of
regional security in West Africa. This is needed because the controversy that surrounded
the disagreement among the sub regional leaders as to whether Nigeria should lead the
peace-keeping forces into the regional crisis in Cote dIvore is a signal to the fact that
little interest is being shown to Nigerias leading role in regional peace keeping. As the
disagreement lingered France came in to replace Nigeria, making the reality out of the
historical assumption that France and Nigeria are rival powers in the sub-region.
Conclusion
In the light of the above, it is important to note that Defence and Foreign policies
are symbiotic .The essence is that defence is used to achieve foreign policy objectives of
any nation. Therefore, military actions in form of peace operation especially the type that
has been undertaken in the sub-region through ECOMOG must be placed within the
purview of foreign policy objectives. Therefore, key policy makers must rationalize any
diplomatic action that has to do with peace operation. In doing so, the tendency to
achieve efficiency, economy of efforts and credibility in the management of defence and
foreign policies become apparent. This makes government policy to be on track and
distanced from decisions taken in crisis situation. Crisis decisions policy has the tendency
to cause more affection than planned or programmed policy drawn from broader national
objectives which are intended for effectiveness and efficiency. The outcome may be slow

12
but it is assuring. Unlike crisis decision that creates a muddling success that is
questionable at the end programme decision is carefully strategize on some synergies.
This is not to beret the success of ECOMOG and Nigerias effort. What has been
demonstrated here is that ECOMOG, in spite of its successes creates a post-triumphal
depression, which makes it difficult for Nigeria to reap the benefits. But the constructive
benefits involve learning from the past mistakes for future operation. The new democratic
dispensation should provide a reorientation in the pursuit of Nigerias foreign policy
towards constructive concentricism. This could be possible if the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs together with the Ministry of Defence convene a workshop to assess Nigerias
performance in order to realise the future objectives of peace operations.

13
REFERENCE

1. Ibrahim Gambari, 1989 Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making: Nigeria
After the Second Republic, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highland, p.13
2. Ibrahim Gambari, 1986, Concept and Conceptualisation in Nigerias foreign
policy making since independence Nigerian Journal of Policy and strategy, June,
p. 73
3. One should acknowledge the contribution of Mr. Olu Adeniji, the present
Honourable Minister of Foreign Affair to this radical speech when he was a career
diplomat in the ministry of Foreign Affairs
4. Femi Otubanjo, 1989, Phases and Changes in Nigerias Foreign Policy in A. B
Akinyemi etal (eds) Nigeria since Independence: The First 25 Years Vol..X
International Relations Ibadan, Heinemann
5. See Gani Yoroms, 2001, Regime Interest and mechanism for Conflict
Management in West Africa: The Case of Nigeria in ECOMOG, Ph.D
Dissertation, Department of Political Science Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria
6. John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, 1974 How American Foreign Policy is Made,
Praeger Publishers, New York, Washington
7. Ibid
8. Eboe Hutchful, 1996, The ECOMOG experience WITH peacekeeping in West
Africa in Mark Malan (ed) Whither Peace making in Africa, ISS Monograph
April, P.70
9. Nathan Pelscovit, 1985, Peace Keeping: The African Experience in Harry
Wiseman(ed) Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals, Pergamun Press NY, P.256
10. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, 1999, Security in the West African Sub-region: An
Analysis of ECOWAS Policies in Liberia published Ph.D Dissertation, Institute
of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
11. Ibid
12. This was stated by Ambassador AA Ajakaye , who was the Nigerian Ambassador
in Liberia during the thick of the crisis. He stated this at the Seminar on Naval and
Airforce Operations in ECOMOG , organised by AFSTRAG at the Command
and Staff College, Jaji, 5th March 2002
15. Ibrahim Babangida , 1991, For their Tomorrow we Gave our Today: Selected
speeches of IBB, Safari Books, Ibadan, p.272
16. Aning Opcit
17. 4Ibrahim Babangida, 1995, Im the EVIL Genius Interview Tell, Magazine
Lagos No. 13 June

18. Robert Mortimer, 1996, ECOMOG, Liberia and Regional Security in West Africa
in Edmond Keller and Donald Rotchild (eds) Africa in the New International
Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security, Boulder, Lynne
Rienner
19. James Jonah, 200, Security Cooperation between ECOWAS and the United
Nations, IPA/ECOWAS Conference, Abuja
20. Clement Adibe, 1997, The Liberian Conflict and ECOWAS UN Partnership
Third World Quarterly vol. 18, No. 3 pp. 474;Aning Opcit

14
 21. Adebajo Adekeye, 1995, Peacekeeping Operations in Maritime Area: A Liberian
(ECOMOG) Experience paper presented at the International workshop on Peace
keeping as security strategy :Chad and Liberia case studies ,Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs, Lagos October 9-13 p.7 . See also Aning Opcit. P.216.
22. . Hutchful Opcit
23. James Jonah Opcit
24. Tom Ikimi, 2003, Liberia: Nigerias Dilemma The Guardian, Lagos, August 11, P.11
25. Gani Joses Yoroms and Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, 1997, West African Regional
Security in the Post Liberian Conflict Era: Issues and Perspectives CDR working
Papers, Copenhagen, Denmark, No.97.7
26. James Jonah Opcit pp. 28-29
27. Ibid
28. Ibid p. 29
29. Wuyi Omitoogun, 2000, Making Democratic control work; Defence spending in
the National Economy :The Nigerian Experience Roundtable on Democratic
Control of Military Establishment in Nigeria and South Africa, September 20-222
Johannesburg South Africa p.8

15