Proliferation Pathways:

Critical Indicators of WMD Pursuit

Introduction

For the second phase of the proliferation Pathways study, Stratfor has been tasked to
provide an analysis of the processes state and non-state actors follow in the decision to
acquire and deploy Weapons of Mass Destruction. The second phase builds off of the first
phase of the project, in which Stratfor identified the critical state and non-state actors
with the likely capability and intent to pursue the development and/or deployment of
WMD.

The state and non-state actors identified in the first phase of the project as being (1.)
capable of developing WMD, (2) possessing the intent to acquire or develop WMD, and
(3) posing a threat to U.S. security or interests comprise Al Qaeda, Cuba, Iran,
Kazakhstan, North Korea, Serbia, Syria, Uzbekistan and Venezuela. In addition to these
nine state and non-state actors, for the second phase of the proliferation pathways project,
we have looked at Russia and China as potential proliferators of WMD technology or
material.

In assessing the critical factors that can be identified as precursor indicators that a
particular actor has started down the path of WMD acquisition or development, we
looked at two elements – technological markers and geopolitical markers.

* Technological Markers

Technological markers include chemicals, biological agents, technologies, materials and

equipment necessary for a successful WMD program. There are well established lists of
precursor equipment, material and expertise necessary for the development of WMD
systems, from the Convention on Chemical Weapons Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals, to the
specialized biological laboratory and industrial equipment to the International Atomic
Energy Agency’s lists of dual-use nuclear equipment and technology. These lists of
equipment, chemicals, materials and knowledge are well distributed, well known, and the
items contained within well monitored.

In the first phase of the project, we reduced the list of Chemical, Biological, Radiological
or Nuclear Weapons that can feasible be deployed in a “mass destruction” capability. The
list was short, given the technological constraints on the systems. WMD-level chemical
weapons were primarily nerve agents, including VX, Soman, Sarin and Tabun. Biological
agents with a WMD-level potential included Smallpox, Ebola, Marburg, Plague,
Botulism and Anthrax. Radiological weapons did not match the definition of WMD
(though tere is a view of the potential psychological and associated economic damage
potential by a radiological device). Nuclear weapons are the one device that nearly
always fits the WMD category.

But even with this reduction of the list of potential devices, the number of potential
precursor technologies remained vast. Trough internal analysis and communication and
consultation with relevant experts and agencies, Stratfor parsed the lists looking for the
“Holy Grail” of precursors – something that was available from only an extremely small
number of suppliers and, if acquisition were identified, would offer nearly undeniable
proof of the pursuit of WMD. Unfortunately, there is no such Holy Grail component.

For this study, while reference will be made to these technological precursors, there is
little value added in rehashing or second-guessing such existing monitoring systems.
Monitoring the supply and spread of the precursor technologies and materials is a
necessary step in identifying (and, if so deemed necessary, preventing) the spread of
WMD technologies. But many of the precursor technologies have “benign” applications
as well. Identification of the transfer of such technologies, then, provide a starting point
for a more in depth assessment of the supplier and receiver, but still leave a very large
number of items to focus on.

* Geopolitical Markers

Geopolitical markers are political, security and social factors that encourage or restrain
state and non-state actors from pursuing WMD capabilities, or participating in the spread
of such technologies. We have kept with the initial model of the proliferation pathways
study, winnowing the list of potential proliferators to focus on the high risk, high threat
actors. We have looked at the intent, operational history and principals and targeting
criteria for each of the critical actors, laid it against a ten-year forecast framework, and
sought to identify critical inflection points and behavioral cues for the various actors that
would indicate and increased likelihood of the proliferation of WMD.

There are two simultaneous trends emerging in the international system that make the
spread of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, a more pressing concern over the next
decade. The first is the shifting patterns of Russian behavior. Moscow’s push to reassert
Russian influence and authority in it’s near abroad, and the inability or disinterest of the
United States and Europe to offer a significant counter to many of these Russian
overtures, is bringing new pressures to bear, particularly in Central Asia. At the same
time, there is growing competition between Russia and China over Central Asian
resources and loyalties. This is raising the potential for Central Asian states, particularly
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, to pursue WMD systems that give them a greater sense of
independence.

The second trend is a shift in global attitudes toward the expansion of nuclear weapons
systems. The acceptance of India as a nuclear weapons state by the United States, the
unpunished North Korean nuclear test, the open discussions of potential nuclear weapons
development in Japan – these are all signs of a change in the undercurrent of the nuclear
weapons debate. This is shifting the perception of non-nuclear states as to the potential
repercussions of heading down the nuclear path. If the perceived “cost” of nuclear
weapons development is lowered, the perceived benefits may outweigh the risks. The
decision to pursue nuclear weapons, then, becomes easier.

Findings: Identifying Markers

The core purpose of the Proliferation Pathways project is to identify markers that, if seen,
could indicate a state or non-state actor is pursuing the acquisition of development of
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Spotting such activity does not guarantee an actor is on
the proliferation pathway, but it does provide a trigger for closer observation and
intelligence gathering on the identified actor, thus allowing for more efficient and focused
allocation of resources.

In determining where to look for potential proliferators, most studies look to either
technological transfers or a perception of subjective intent to identify those state and non-
state actors most likely to pursue WMD. We have modified this somewhat for the current
study, looking at technology, but shifting away from the more subjective basis of intent to
an objective view of intent.

We have defined intent as an objective element – not what an actor says it will do, but the
geopolitical realities that shape the necessities of the actor and enable or constrain certain
courses of action. The choices, imperatives and actions of state and non-state actors are
shaped by geography, ethnicity, support base, alliance structure, resources, opponents and
numerous other factors, most of them not alterable by the actor. This, intent is very
different than desire, and even further removed from statements.

Technological Markers

CHEMICAL

Nerve agents are the only chemical weapons that can realistically be used as weapons of
mass destruction. Nerve agents are generally divided into two categories, G-agents and V-
agents. The high lethality G-agents include soman (GD), sarin (GB) and Tabun (GA). The
most lethal V-agent known is VX. The more lethal the agent, the fewer commercial
applications its precursors have. G-agents are easier to produce than V-agents

Many of the precursors to these agents are listed under the Chemical Weapons
Convention's schedule. Schedule 1 chemicals have no legitimate commercial uses outside
of making chemical weapons. Schedule 2 chemicals have limited commercial
applications. Schedule 3 chemicals are readily obtainable and have legitimate commercial
applications.

All of the key precursors of nerve agents can be made from very basic starting materials,
such as phosphorus, chlorine, and fluorine in facilities that are not particularly large and
could be part of an existing industrial complex. One indicator of the production of these
precursors is the relatively large amount of energy that would be required.

In any chemical weapons program the key phases are acquisition, synthesis, formulation,
testing, loading, and waste disposal. While the actual synthesis steps for a particular
chemical may not be especially distinctive, the handling, testing, 'packaging' and disposal
of these highly toxic materials often leaves the most easily detectable traces.

In general, all nerve agents except for tabun have a bond between the methyl group and
the phosphorus group of chemicals in them. Therefore, there is the need for a
methylphosphorus precursor or a precursor to the methylphosphorus precursor such as
trimethyl phosphate. This means that the methyl compound can be the giveaway to nerve
agent production.

The crash of an Israeli cargo plane in the Netherlands is an example of this. On Oct. 4 a
747 belonging to the Israeli airline El Al crashed in the Amsterdam suburb of Bijlmer,
killing 43 people. The cargo allegedly included 190 liters of Dimethyl Methyl
Phosphonate, and other precursors for sarin, leading to speculation that Israel was
producing the agent.

Therefore anyone buying significant quantities of methyl-phosphorus compounds should

be regarded with suspicion. They have few industrial uses and no agrochemical uses. If a
suspect that is already being watched is observed acquiring methyl-phosphorus
compounds, it should be regarded as very significant.

Disposal of the by-products would be another indicator that could give away a covert
chemical weapons program. Disposal of by-products has to take place at all phases of
chemical weapon production. Therefore, treatment and disposal of the waste products is
an important consideration. This poses other technical problems.

Indicators of a chemical weapons by-product disposal might come from air, water or soil
samples. Most by-products are toxic but not lethal, such as QF and DL. These materials
can be incinerated, but it must be done at very high temperatures in order to eradicate any
traces. With very volatile materials such as sarin, it might be possible to do stand-off
monitoring of plant vapors by airborne spectroscopy.

A more likely approach would be monitoring of sewage discharges for

methylphosphonates, which are quite stable in water. An example of indicators or
chemical weapons production in water can be found in the controversy over chemical
weapons disposal operations at the Newport Chemical Depot in Indiana. Disposal of
wastewater from the facility has caused controversy because methylphosphonates, which
result from neutralization of VX are very persistent in water.

Looking for spillage in the soil is more difficult. Evidence of the illicit activity can be
found in the soil near production sites in the form of various methylphosphonate
derivatives, The CIA reportedly used this approach in detecting such compounds in soil
samples from the El Shifa Pharmaceutical Co, plant in Khartoum. However, access to the
suspect site is required to detect this indicator.

BIOLOGICAL

There are six biological agents that are WMD feasible including smallpox, Ebola,
Marburg, plague, botulism, and anthrax.

Much of the technologies that support the production and development of organisms and
toxins into biological warfare agents are dual-use and are very difficult to pin-point tell-
tale purchases of technologies intended for the production of these agents for nefarious
purposes.

For the purposes of conducting an offensive biowarfare program, the production of high
concentrations of biological organisms or performing aerosolization experiments requires
a series of controls that can be identified. These controls include the implementation of
scientific measures and in acquiring the seed strain, in engineering controls, and in the
use of medical measures.
Scientific controls require a sufficient knowledge base of PhD scientists trained in
molecular and cellular biology, virology, and bacteriology trained to accurately and safely
conduct biowarfare research and weaponization. Once the scientific capability is
acquired, a second necessary precursor to the development of WMD-feasible biological
agents is in acquire a sufficient amount the seed strain of the organism. Acquiring
sufficient amounts of the seed strain is no easy task, though, and is therefore a
considerable precursor requirement.

Acquiring the smallpox virus has two known stores, at secure laboratories at the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta and at the State Research Center for
Virology and Biotechnology in the Novosibirsk region of Russia. The seed strain of the
Marburg virus is found in infected African green monkeys in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, while the natural reservoir of the Ebola virus originates from gorillas and
chimpanzees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, the Philippines,
Uganda, and Sudan. Guinea pigs have been proven successful in research as a rodent
model to host of the Ebola and Marburg viruses. These non-human primates are
identifiable precursors.

Engineering controls include manipulating the agents within a biosafety-secure facility

maintained to biosafety level 3 or 4 standards. BL 4 conditions are required for
extremely infectious and hazardous agents, such as Ebola, Marburg, smallpox, plague,
and botulism. BL4 conditions include a negative-pressure environment with airlocks,
protective clothing, and other systems to inactive agents in waste and exhaust air. The
individuals working within a high-risk biowarfare program setting would utilize other
safety mechanisms including using powered air-purifying respirators (PAPRs), though
these can be bought off the shelf for a few hundred dollars per copy which make PAPRs
as a control as less reliable precursor.

Technical hurdles towards the weaponization process include machining the agent into an
aerosol. This process requires the scientist to have a refined machining capability that
can manipulate the agent into a dry powdered form that is highly concentrated, of
uniform particle size, of low electrostatic charge, and treated to reduce clumping in order
for the bacteria to penetrate the spaces of the deep lung.

Medical controls are to prevent laboratory-acquired infections during the high-risk

process of aerosolization and weaponization. Avoiding the risk of exposure or disease to
the scientist manipulating the biological agent are critical safety measures to take. A
failure to maintain sufficient protective measures can result in the death of the scientists
who face high-risk exposure while weaponizing the agents. The scientist can become
infected after a high-risk exposure during the centrifugation and aerosolization process.

Because of the high-risk infection setting, it is critical to vaccinate people working with
or around these agents. The acquisition of an effective vaccine is a necessary component
to reduce/eliminate the likelihood of laboratory-acquired infections from agents in a high-
risk offensive BW program and is therefore a significant precursor to signal the existence
of an offensive biowarfare program. Smallpox itself was a virus that was declared
eliminated in 1980, the U.S. private market has no incentive to investment the time and
money needed to develop a smallpox vaccine. Under this circumstance an actor
developing a smallpox vaccine would signal an intent to deliberately disseminate the
smallpox.

NUCLEAR

Fissile material is the one distinguishing and ultimately limiting factor of a nuclear
weapons program. It is at once the most technically difficult, time-consuming and
expensive component of a nuclear device or weapon.

Weapons grade highly enriched uranium (HEU of eighty percent or higher of the isotope
U235) can be bought, stolen, or created through an enrichment process. The sale or
transfer of HEU is currently carefully controlled by the nuclear weapons states (a further
discussion of indicators that such transfers may take place is included in the discussion of
geopolitical markers). The theft of HEU is extremely difficult, with stocks being closely
monitored. Such monitoring, particularly in places like the former Soviet Union and
Pakistan, should be increased.

Enrichment is a path of long-term investment and focus, with many technical markers
that, combined with geopolitical markers, can indicate a probability of development
along the nuclear path. The secure facilities, funds and expertise represent an enormous
commitment of national resources for all but the most advanced and wealthy developed
nations. The consequences of being caught by the international community are
substantial, weighing on the decision making process to pursue development.

A plutonium program presents a much more substantial investment, including the

construction of a nuclear reactor, fuel handling and storage facilities and a reprocessing
plant. These represent enormous investments of time, money and expertise, simply
beyond the reach of the majority of nations.

Significantly, no nuclear weapons state since France has independently constructed

its first nuclear reactor. The reactor was always either of foreign design and
constructed abroad or foreign assistance was essential to its design and fabrication.

The early steps in a plutonium-based weapons program are virtually identical to those of
a civilian power program, but taken with geopolitical markers, can indicate the ultimate
direction of the nation.

International efforts in understanding and monitoring nuclear proliferation have actually

left the world with few surprises in the last few years. Intelligence estimates raised
concerns about Pakistan nearly a decade before Islamabad’s first test, as was the case
with North Korea. In this sense, none of tests of the youngest nuclear powers were truly
startling.
What is perhaps most important in monitoring the path toward a nuclear weapons
program is the transfer of technology and expertise, which can substantially decrease the
time from inception to completion. Sponsor state assistance with civilian nuclear power
generation has been quite common over the years. But it is direct or indirect sponsor state
assistance with military nuclear technology that has figured prominently into many
successful nuclear weapons programs.

While both Israel and South Africa were involved at one point in the Eisenhower
administration’s “Atoms for Peace” program of technology sharing, it would be another
nation that carried them through. Israel specifically found the civilian assistance
insufficient for its purposes and began to look elsewhere, ultimately settling with France.

In the early years of the Cold War, the U.S. was far outpacing the U.S.S.R. in almost
every faucet of the nuclear arms race – weapons, delivery systems and missile
technology. Despite the fact that the first Sputnik space probe was launched Oct. 4, 1957,
the modified R-7 missile on which it was launched was too expensive to field in
meaningful numbers, had a long pre-launch sequence and poor accuracy. Thus Moscow
was in an extremely poor strategic position vis a vis Washington, with its hundreds of
long-range strategic bombers.

This was surely a major motivation for sharing nuclear weapons technology with China,
which began well before Sputnik in 1954. Soviet assistance went so far as to promise a
sample atomic device, although such a device was probably not delivered before the two
communist nations’ paths began to diverge and Soviet weapons assistance was cut in
1959. However, this direct assistance allowed the Chinese to test their first device in 1964
and their first thermonuclear weapon only 32 months later – twice as fast as any other
nation in history.

French assistance to the Israelis also began militarily, following the humiliation of the
1956 Suez crisis, during which both nations received poorly veiled threats of nuclear
attack from the Soviets. French Prime Minister Guy Mollet allegedly intimated privately
afterwards that France ‘owed’ Israel assistance with a nuclear weapon. Not only was
Israel vulnerable in a hostile region with no strategic depth, but it claimed a unique right
to nuclear weapons as a means of an existential guarantee of self preservation following
the Holocaust. Nevertheless, foreign assistance was also cut early, when Charles de
Gaulle decided to end the program upon entering office. But it would not be until June of
1960, only months after France’s first nuclear explosion, that de Gaulle’s will was finally
implemented. By which time, Israel was already well on its way to a functioning French-
built reprocessing facility at Dimona and completed construction on its own.

Israeli assistance to South Africa and Chinese assistance to Pakistan is less well
documented, and Chinese assistance was not necessarily of a military nature. However,
the now well chronicled back-channel network of Dr. Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan, the
Pakistani nuclear scientist that orchestrated the sale of nuclear weapons technology to
Iran, Libya, North Korea and elsewhere, seems indicative of the same motivation that
drove Moscow and Paris to share weapons technology – a common strategic interest.
Khan may have been the first to share nuclear technology as an individual, rather than as
a representative of the state. Pakistan may also, of course, have approved his dealings in
detail and later disavowed any knowledge of them. But ultimately, the world of nuclear
powers and aspiring nuclear powers has become substantially less lonely since the 1950s
and 60s. Instead of one nation with similar strategic interests, there are likely several.

One implication of the unipolar international system and U.S. dominance is that more
nations have a shared interest in distracting and overloading Washington. Nuclear
proliferation has become an effective means of accomplishing this goal – witness the way
Iran and North Korea have passed U.S. ire back and forth over the past few years.

It has been this shared strategic interest that has motivated nuclear powers in the past to
share their ultimate weapon. The lists of potential proliferators and potential discontents
continues to grow.

Geopolitical Markers

There are currently very robust systems in place to monitor technological markers of
WMD proliferation. In addition to the technological markers, a more consistent
monitoring of behavior of high-risk states offers clues threat may precede visible
technological markers or add weight to suspicions that state or non-state actors are
pursuing WMD.

For this study, we identified Al Qaeda, Cuba, Iran, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Serbia,
Syria, Uzbekistan and Venezuela as the high-risk countries for WMD development over
the next five to ten years. North Korea is already clearly well on its way toward
possessing nuclear weapons, and is already believed to have chemical and biological
devices. There is little that will convince North Korea to reverse its course toward nuclear
weapons development now that it has already tested a preliminary device.

Iran is currently on its way toward a nuclear weapons program, following the enrichment
path. Cuba and Venezuela may cooperate on the production of chemical weapons, though
Venezuela is a far cry from heading down a nuclear path, limited by technology and
countries to assist in a nuclear program. Further, Venezuelan moves toward a nuclear
program will bring a swift response from the United States, given the proximity.

Syria may seek a WMD deterrent system, likely chemical, as it has a shorter time-frame
for development. There is a growing competition for influence in Central Asia, by Russia,
China and the United States. As this develops, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which
possessed nuclear weapons when part of the Soviet Union, may resume dormant
programs. And Serbia, fearing ethnic isolation, may also attempt to pursue a chemical
weapons program.

In the decision making process for each of these state and non-state actors, there is a cost-
benefit analysis that takes place. The pursuit of WMD has an economic, technological,
social and political cost, and can lead to ostricization and isolation, or even preventive
military actions. There must be a sense of overwhelming need to pursue the programs,
particularly a nuclear program, that outweighs the risks. In looking at each of the
following high-risk cases, we lay look at the core intent of the state and nonstate actors, at
the operational history and principals, and at what could motivate the pursuit of WMD
and the changes in behavior that could indicate a shift in that direction.

State and NonState Actors

IRAN

Iran has a proud military tradition of being the only power in the Mideast whose borders
and ethno-linguistic identity have more or less stayed intact throughout the 20th Century.
The country still looks at the Persian Achaemenid Empire of Cyrus the Great that began
in 550 B.C. as its golden moment in history (celebrations of this anniversary continue to
this day). This reinforces the extent to which Iran is determined to reassert itself as a
global player.

The discovery of oil in Iran in the early 1900s represented a major threat to Iran’s
territorial integrity, culminating in the occupation of Iran in the north by the Soviets and
the south by the British during WWII. (The British left with the signing of the 1943
Tehran declaration; The Soviets were largely unsuccessful in securing oil concessions and
consolidating their influence in the north, leading to their withdrawal in 1946.) The
occupation of Iran during this period had a profound impact on the country, as the
realization set in that the country was militarily incapable of defending itself against
outside powers and that its leaders had fatally squandered the country’s resources. By the
end of WWII, an opening was made for the United States to become the principle foreign
player in Iran and answer Iranian needs for a stronger military arsenal. Establishing a
stronghold in Iran, a Shiite power that proved to be a useful counterbalance against its
Sunni Arab neighbors, was key to U.S. strategy in the Mideast to secure energy assets and
counter Soviet expansion in the Mideast. When Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh
nationalized the country’s oil industry, the United States did not hesitate to undertake
covert action to bring his government down.

The United States made arrangements for Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to secure his
standing in Tehran and move forward with an agenda to establish closer relations with the
West. To squash any opposition to the Shah, the CIA assisted in creating Iran’s internal
security/intelligence apparatus, the SAVAK. Most importantly, the United States supplied
Iran with more than $20 billion worth of arms, ammunition, training and technical
assistance/ The Iranians were receiving the most advanced and sophisticated weaponry
from the US at the time. The U.S. determination to rebuild Iran into the strong power it
once was reached a point to where the U.S. built Iran’s first nuclear reactor.

Eventually the marginalization of the Iranian opposition, poor economic conditions and
the Shah’s unwavering alliance with the United State created a strong current of
resentment, particularly among the Islamic clergy who resented the growing
secularization of the country under the Shah. The United States’ plans for Iran were
shattered when an Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini deposed the
Shah in 1979 and set Iran on a path directly opposed to the U.S. policy. Khomeini’s
revolution basically put the country back in Iranian hands with a vow to secure the
country’s territorial integrity from outside powers.

At first, Khomeini rejected the Western-tainted military and nuclear reactor acquisitions
of the former regime. When the Shah fell in 1979, Iran had six nuclear reactors under
contract, two which were more than halfway completed. These projects came to a halt
after the revolution. Iran turned its attention to reorganizing its military structure and
created a new unit, the Revolutionary Guard as an ideologically-based corp to defend the
interests of the revolution.

Though Iran had successfully purged the country of Western influence, it had a more
immediate threat on its western flank. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein watched closely as
the new Iranian regime abandoned efforts to maintain its military arsenal. He took
advantage of Iran’s introspective years following the revolution and launched an air and
land invasion into western Iran in Sept. 1980. Iraq’s aim was to essentially double its oil
wealth with the acquisition of Iran’s western oil fields. Iran was ill-equipped and
untrained to effectively stave off Iraqi forces and took a hard hit when Iraq unleashed its
chemical weapons arsenal. When Iran resorted to attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers in the
Persian gulf, the subsequent U.S. airstrikes on Iran’s military installations dealt a serious
blow to the regime’s military capability, as well as its international standing. Iran saw
U.S. military support for Iraq during the war as the leading cause of its downfall in the
war, which eventually ended in a stalemate in 1988.

Operational History:

When the Islamic Revolution took root, Iran had to search for new avenues to
compensate for its loss of U.S. military support. There was a strong, underlying need for
Iran to avoid becoming dependent on outside powers for military assistance. It is at this
time that we see the Iranians turn toward unconventional tactics to meet its military aims:

The Basij militia – the Basij militia was a voluntary force of tens of thousands of child
soldiers created during the Iran-Iraq war. Religious fervor drew these young men to
volunteer in martyrdom oppositions, in which scores of these youths that were picked
from the poorer ranks of society were ordered to charge the mine-filled battlefield across
the Iran-Iraq border to bush back against Iraqi forces. Some were given light arms to
defend themselves, but most had nothing but their Qur’ans when they went into battle.
The strategy was successful in a military sense, but came at the expense of thousands of
lives lost – an entire generation of Iranian men was nearly wiped out.

The Basij militia today is primarily responsible for enforcing the country’s strict Islamic
code. However, these youths are on reserve for a potential military confrontation over
Iran’s nuclear program. Iran has raised the cost of a U.S. ground invasion from Iraq into
Iran by keeping on hand nearly a million young soldiers to engage in suicide operations
against invading forces. The Iranians have made it clear that the U.S. would be facing
another Iraq-style insurgency if it chooses to threaten Iran by land.

Hezbollah– Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps creates created Hezbollah in the early 80’s
in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Iran was able to successfully build
up a militant non-state actor in the heart of the Arab world to challenge Israeli and
western interference in the region. In its early days, Hezbollah was heavily engaged in
suicide attacks and kidnappings. Hezbollah has now developed a strong political wing,
and has demonstrated the military capability to resist a conventional Israeli offensive.
While Iran’s military capability may be called into question in a conventional war against
the US/Israel, it can rely on Hezbollah to get Israel to think twice before taking military
action against Iran.

Badr brigade – Created by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Badr
Organization was intended to serve as a conventional military force to fight against the
Iraqi army during the Iran-Iraq war. The Badr forces formally became the military wing
of SCIRI in 1983 in Tehran and are heavily reliant on the IRGC for arms, funding and
training. The Badr corps were crushed in a Shiite uprising in Iraq in ’91, but were kept on
reserve for the day when Saddam Hussein’s regime would fall and the Shiites could
retake power from the Sunnis – provided by the US with the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The
Badr brigades have proven to be an effective Iranian tool in Iraq – currently the most
sophisticated and capable Shiite militia in Iraq. Through its control of Shiite militant
actors in Iraq, the Iranian regime has made it clear that it can manipulate the security
situation in the country enough to raise the cost for the US to maintain a large troop
presence in the country. Moreover, the US knows that if Israel and/or the US launched air
strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, U.S. forces in Iraq would take the hit from Iran’s Shiite
militant assets.

Nuclear weaponization –The development of an indigenous nuclear weapons program is

key to Iran’s long-term strategy to consolidate its position in the region. Iran needs the
deterrent capability to ward off any threats of foreign invasion from the United States,
Russia, Israel or any other foreign power that makes its way into the region. The ease in
which the Iraqis invaded Iran in the early 1980’s reinforced the need for Iran to secure its
western flank.

More immediately, negotiations over Iran’s nuclear weapons can be used as a bargaining
chip in dealing with the United States over Iraq. Since the 2003 invasion, the Iranians
have conveniently ratcheted up the nuclear threat while maintaining security guarantees
from Russia and China in the UNSC whenever it wished to manipulate back-channel
talks it held with the US over Iraq.

Nuclear weapons also allow Iran to assert its regional prowess and reclaim its historical
position from the Arabs. By resisting Western pressure to put a cap on its program and
pushing forward with its nuclear agenda, Iran wishes to earn the respect of Muslims
across the Arab world. The development of Iran into a nuclear power also helps the
clerical regime to maintain its hold over the country by shaping the nuclear issue into a
source of national pride for Iranians.

Its status as an oil exporting country has allowed Iran to underwrite all these projects as
well as develop itself economically and militarily. The tactics of alignment with fellow
Shia, backing radical Sunni Islamists, supporting anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli agendas and
befriending other anomalous entities has allowed Iran to also forge the strategic alliance
with Syria. Perhaps the most rudimentary and underlying operational principle the
Iranians utilize is their shrewd political acumen, which allows them to take advantage of
geopolitical openings.

A key example of this is the cooperation against al-Qaeda that Tehran provided to the
United States (behind the scenes) in the wake of the Sept 11 attacks. Assisting the U.S.
invasion of Afghanistan created the conditions in which the two sides worked jointly to
effect regime change in Iraq. Additionally, the Iranians were able to use their influence
among Iraqi Shia groups and the quagmire faced by U.S. troops in the wake of the Sunni
and jihadist insurgencies to their advantage. Tehran has also adroitly maneuvered the
controversy surrounding its nuclear ambitions. Iran has utilized the nuclear issue to
secure gains in Iraq and vice-versa. Not only has it prevented the United States from
pursuing an aggressive policy on the nuclear issue, Tehran has kept the international
community divided.

Scenario-Building

1. Israel and/or the US decide to launch preventive strikes against Iran’s nuclear
facilities to set the Iranian nuclear program back several years. Israel does not
wish to be forced into a peer nuclear rivalry with the Iranians, and has a strong
interest in preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapons deterrent. The
Iranians took careful note of Iraq’s Osirak experience and strategically dispersed
its nuclear sites to decrease the chances of its programs being wiped out in a
single air offensive. Israel’s options in dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue are
limited, given the weakened U.S. position in Iraq. Israel would much rather attack
Iran in a coordinated strike with the U.S., which will be better positioned to
launch tactical nuclear bunker buster strikes on Iran’s underground facilities.
However, with U.S. forces exposed in Iraq and with a political resolution over
Iraq still well into the distance, the United States cannot afford to take the risk of
engaging Iran militarily at present.

Though Israel still has time before Iran reaches the weapons stage of its nuclear
development, it has the contingency plan in place to launch these preventive
strikes. The regional fallout for such action would be minimal, as the Sunni Arab
states (mainly Saudi Arabia) would welcome and even privately support the
crippling of Iran’s nuclear capability.
 Iran is using this window of opportunity of U.S. weakness and Israeli
preoccupation with Hezbollah to advance its nuclear program as much as
possible. Should Iran become concerned that an Israeli strike is imminent, it could
blockade the Strait of Hormuz to disrupt the world’s energy supply, which will
subsequently invite U.S. air strikes on Iranian military installations – a high
political and military risk for Iran to take. Iran would also activate its Shiite
militant assets in Iraq against U.S. forces, in Lebanon against Israeli forces with
Hezbollah and encourage Shiite uprisings in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain.
Iran would also rely on Hamas to launch attacks against Israel. Should Iran be
able to provide sufficient security guarantees for Damascus, the Syrians could
also launch attacks against Israel to force Israel to fight a multi-front war. There is
also the possibility that Iran would unleash trained forces in CONUS to launch
attacks and increase the costliness for the United States to engage in a military
confrontation. The above would obviously be a last resort scenario for the Iranians
to employ. Though Iran does have a dispersed military arsenal of conventional
and non-conventional tactics, it cannot be assured it will be able to take the hit of
a coordinated U.S./Israeli air campaign.

Iran will try to preempt any military action by showing its willingness to deal on
Iraq. If such a crisis emerges, Iran has all the switches in places to switch gears
and enter serious negotiations on Hezbollah, Hamas, its nuclear program and Iraq.
In return for its cooperation, Iran would save its nuclear program for destruction.
Even if the nuclear program is frozen, the Iranians would still have the means to
evade regulations and sanctions to continue with its nuclear agenda.

2. Iran adroitly manages to keep the US militarily constrained in Iraq and Israel’s
hands tied long enough to develop a full nuclear capability.

Though unsettling for much of the international community, a nuclear Iran is

unlikely to shift its operational strategy. At this point, Iran would have achieved
its objective of developing a strong deterrent capability to reinforce its use of non-
state actors throughout the region. Iran’s objectives of consolidating influence in
Iraq will also likely be met by the time Iran develops this capability. With the
cards in place, Iran will have positioned itself as the powerhouse of the Islamic
world. The reality of a nuclear Iran will have already set off a nuclear arms race in
the region, with Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the lead to develop their own nuclear
programs to counter Iran. For the Sunni Arab states, they cannot be assured that
Iran’s march in the region will stop at Iraq. Saudi Arabia in particular will be
concerned for the safety of its oil fields and its claim to Islam’s holiest sites in
Mecca and Medina. Given Israel’s lack of strategic depth, the cost would be too
high for Israel to engage Iran in a nuclear confrontation at this point. Nuclear
proliferation in the world’s most volatile region will undoubtedly have a major
impact on world energy markets. Though Iran would have nuclear weapons in its
arsenal, the deterrent utility of its nuclear program will allow the country to stick
 to its modus operandi of employing non-state militant actors and conventional
military tactics to achieve its strategic interests.

SYRIA

Ever since Syria became a state entity in the wake of the Ottoman defeat in World War I,
it has sought to dominate the Levant. Arab nationalism remained the basic tool of the
Syrians through the periods of French domination, its independence in 1946 and the
following three coup-ridden decades. It wasn’t until the Baath Party dominated by the
country’s minority Alawite sect consolidated its hold on power in 1970 that Syria had the
internal focus to vary its MO.

The al-Assad clan, which is a further subset of the Alawite sect and the Baath Party, has
emerged as the ruling elite in the country with Syrian President Bashar al Assad currently
at the helm. The country’s main objectives include preserving the Alawite-Baathist
regime, maintaining its territorial integrity (securing the return of the Golan Heights from
Israel, suppressing Kurdish and Sunni domestic opposition, preventing the deteriorating
security situation Iraq from posing a larger security threat through Kurdish and jihadist
non-state actors), consolidating influence in Lebanon for its own financial and political
interests (losing control in Lebanon would financially impact Syria’s ruling elite and
military generals, thus posing a threat to regime security) and finally, developing Syria
into stronger and more influential player in the Middle East (Syria competes with Saudi
Arabia and Egypt for influence), which involves a desire to engage the United States and
pull the regime out of diplomatic isolation.

Operational History

Over the course of the last 37 years, the Syrian police state has pursued its objectives
through a variety of means:

1) Domination of Lebanon to economically sustain the Syrian regime and national

security through the use of its military and intelligence apparatus and by playing off
inter-communal and intra-communal rivalries among Lebanon’s principal confessional
groups (Shia, Sunni, Maronites, Druze). A preferred intimidation tactic by the Syrians is
the use of car bombings in political assassinations.

2) Development of chemical and biological weapons programs as a

deterrent to Israel’s military superiority and the nuclear arsenal of the Jewish state. Syria
currently does not have the capability to develop a nuclear program, and has thus opted
for the “poor man’s nuke” in developing a robust chemical weapons capability.

3) Supporting radical Palestinian groups, including Hamas and the Palestinian

Islamic Jihad, and Lebanon’s radical Shiite Islamist movement Hezbollah to exert
pressure on Israel. Syria’s support for Hezbollah also helps to ensure that Syrian interests
in Lebanon are maintained and counter Saudi attempts to edge its way into the Levant.
Syria’s support for the Palestinian groups allows Syria to challenge Egyptian primacy as
the leading Arab mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

4) Backing Sunni nationalist guerillas and facilitating the movement

of jihadists in Iraq as a way to block any potential U.S. moves to effect regime change in
Damascus.

7) The al Assad clan realizes the risk of having a minority Shiite sect rule the
country, and has sought to sustain its hold on power by aligning with Iran.

8) As a police state, Syria has brutally suppressed domestic opposition forces

including Islamist, secular, and Kurdish forces.

Scenario-Building

Syria’s chemical weapons capability is unlikely to act as a solid deterrent against a

potential incursion by a foreign adversary (most likely Israel). Should Iran succeed in
securing its claim as a nuclear power, there is a strong chance that Syria could begin
development of an indigenous nuclear program within an 8-10 year time frame with
Iranian assistance.

1. Israel threatens the survival of the Syrian regime with attacks

Lacking any good opposition alternatives, Israel currently prefers to keep the al Assad
regime intact. Syria is more than a nuisance for the Israelis, but is viewed as more of
a manageable threat than other pressing concerns in the regions, including Iran,
Hezbollah, the Palestinian militant groups, the weakened U.S. position in Iraq, etc.
However, should Iran manage to consolidate its gains in Iraq and become a member
of the nuclear club, Israel will put its efforts into making sure Syria doesn’t become a
larger WMD threat. If Israel takes military action against Syria that runs a serious risk
of toppling the al Assad regime, there is a high probability that the Syrian military
would employ the use of chemical weapons to counter an Israeli offensive. Syria’s
defense would also be backed up with Hezbollah and Palestinian attacks against
Israel.

2. Syria uses chemical weapons against Israel and/or supplies a nonstate proxy with
chemical weapons

Syria learned its lesson from its participation in the 1948, 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli
wars, and understands the military and political risk of directly engaging Israel
militarily. This is what led to Syria’s preference in supporting proxy militant actors to
counter Israel. Syria does not wish to invite an Israeli attack on its soil, and has taken
great care to avoid getting directly involved in regional flare-ups. For this reason, it is
unlikely that Syria would supply its non-state allies with chemical weapons to attack
Israel. Israel would be forced to respond to a chemical attack by Hezbollah or a
Syrian-supported Palestinian group with a direct attack on Syria.
 3. Syria directly attacks U.S. forces in the region

Syria uses a dual approach in dealing with Israel – while it maintains its non-state
militant assets, it also keeps the window open for back-channel negotiations. Syria has
used the same strategy in dealing with the United States. The arrival of U.S. forces across
the Syrian-Iraqi border presented a threat and opportunity for Damascus – a threat in the
sense that U.S. forces, if given the bandwidth, could use their position in Iraq to cross
into Syria and threaten the regime; an opportunity in the sense that Syria could potentially
bring the United States to the negotiating table once it recognized Syria as an integral
player of the region with the influence to restore order in Iraq. Syria demonstrated its
direct involvement in the security situation in Iraq by facilitating the movement of
insurgents across the Syrian border in to Iraq. In addition to keeping the US too occupied
to think about Syrian regime change, this allowed Syria to give the Americans a reason to
negotiate with the al Assad government. Just as Syria is careful to avoid becoming
militarily engaged with Israel, it will take even greater precaution to avoid U.S. military
action. For this reason, it is highly unlikely that Syria would directly target U.S. forces in
the region or supply groups with chemical weapons to target U.S. forces in the region in
the interest of preserving the regime and keeping the door open for negotiations down the
road.

3. Israel and/or the US launches preventive strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities

Though Syria has increasingly relied on Iran as its main strategic ally, it will not
necessarily act on behalf of Iranian interests if the stakes are too high. Should Israel
and/or the US launch an air offensive to cripple Iran’s nuclear capability, Syria will
avoid inviting air strikes on its own soil and is more likely to rely on the support of its
non-state allies to launch attacks on Israel. Syria and Iran may be close allies, but the
Syrian regime knows Iran would be unlikely to directly act in defense of Syria if the
al Assad regime were threatened. Both Syria and Iran will rely on the use of proxy
groups to defend each other.

4. The al Assad regime falls

Should Syria make a serious miscalculation and the al Assad regime lose its grip
over the government, the country will undergo a great deal of instability, and will
likely return to its coup-ridden history. The prevention of a viable opposition force
to develop in the country severely limits the ability of a new government to exert
influence over the long-standing military and security establishment. Moreover,
any Western-inserted Syrian leader is unlikely to earn the backing of the military
and the Syrian public at large. Opening the country up to free elections runs the
risk of creating a strong Islamist presence in the government, which could use less
restraint in employing the country’s military assets. A deteriorating security
situation caused by the fall of the regime could also allow militant Islamist
elements to take root in the country. The instability that would ensue would delay
any Syrian effort to develop a nuclear capability.
Kazakhstan

State objectives: Continuation of rule for President Nursultan Nazarbayev and chosen
successor, territorial integrity, regional influence, and economic development (especially
in energy and mining sectors).

As Astana finds it harder to balance competing interests from Russia and China, and can
not count on support from the distant United States and Europe, it will seek to develop
weapons for its own security -- to ensure its sovereignty. Russian influence could also
shut out Western interests in Kazakhstan and turn Astana against its partners. However,
Kazakhstan would also feel threatened by a resurgent Russia and may acquire CBRN as a
deterrent against Moscow’s possible aggression. Astana is also likely to continue to target
Islamist insurgency on its territory and border regions. Friction could possibly develop if
Kyrgyzstan decides to usurp Kazakhstan’s influence in its economy. Kazakhstan could
also target Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, should those regimes become belligerent
toward their larger neighbor. There is some psychological competition between
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for regional hegemony. However, neither internal conflict
nor one with another Central Asian state would likely prompt Kazakhstan to develop
CBRN, even as a deterrent.

Intent:
There is a distinct possibility that tensions between Russia and China may develop into
an outright confrontation. Either Russia or China may come to feel threatened either by
the other neighbor or by a third power and increase its conventional capabilities. As both
nations currently possess WMD CBRN, a MAD scenario is likely, but not absolutely
definite. If tensions between Russia and China escalate to an outright confrontation, there
are several possibilities for Kazakhstan. One is that China and Russia will compete over
control of Kazakhstan, but Astana does not want to fall under the control of either and is
able to hold off the advance by reactivating or developing CBRN. If the decision to
develop or reactivate is made now, it would not take Kazakhstan very long to gain the
capability, given the materials, weapons and expertise remaining in the country.

Another possibility is that Russia will quickly overwhelm Kazakhstan’s defenses before
Astana has a chance to retaliate. In that case, Russia may choose to reactivate
Kazakhstan’s CBRN facilities and use them for Moscow’s purposes. Astana siding with
Moscow outright would produce a similar scenario.

Kazakhstan may also choose to side with China, in which case Russia will act very
belligerently against both countries, who together would present a significant challenge --
Moscow would seek to punish Astana for the betrayal and would try to subsume the
country. Given Russia’s need for a buffer and to protect the ethnic Russian minority in
Kazakhstan, Moscow is highly unlikely to give up on Astana. If Kazakhstan puts up an
insurmountable challenge, Moscow may use CBRN against its neighbor, especially
considering that the population is clustered in the southern half of the country, away from
the Russian border.

In the case that China becomes sufficiently weakened and no longer poses a significant
challenge to Russia, Moscow could also seek to increase its influence in Astana.
Although in that case China and Kazakhstan may seek to form an alliance to hold off
Russia, Moscow would still likely feel confident enough to challenge the two. In fact,
Russia may try to use Kazakhstan as a stepping stone to advance on China’s flanks,
ostensibly to secure Russian borders against “militant” activity by such insurgent groups
as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).

China and Russia could begin to cooperate, especially if the United States is able to
extricate itself from conflicts in the Middle East and has additional bandwidth to pressure
its two competitors. Moscow and Beijing could then jointly seek to exert more influence
on Kazakhstan, and Astana could turn to CBRN to defend its interests. While Astana is
extremely unlikely to launch an attack on Russia or China, it may keep the weapons as a
deterrent.

If the current regime in Uzbekistan falls and the country comes under the rule of Islamist
militants, Kazakhstan may seek to rearm itself as a measure of protection. However,
CBRN facilities are also present in Uzbekistan, and escalation would follow. A militant
regime in Tashkent may take advantage of the possibilities and reconstitute WMD CBRN
capability first, provoking a confrontation with Kazakhstan. However, Russia would
quickly get involved -- not only does Russia not want such conflict in its border region
and would seek to quash any escalation, but it may also take sides and destroy whichever
side is offending, installing a more palatable regime.

There is a longer-term possibility that Kazakhstan may seek to split into a northern,
ethnic Russian-dominated half and an Asian southern half. It is likely that in that case, the
northern part would either become an appendage of Russia or be absorbed. The southern
half would have closer ties with other Central Asian nations and China. The factions,
supported by rival Russia and China, could be drawn into a civil war, and the CBRN
facilities in both parts of the country could be reactivated if the conflict escalates.

Although Kazakhstan’s regime is expected to be relatively stable for the next decade, a
violent Islamist takeover is possible in the longer term, particularly if a neighboring
country such as Uzbekistan is taken over by a militant regime. In this case, the CBRN
facilities are likely to be reactivated, even if just as a deterrent. However, Russia would
not tolerate such a hostile regime on its borders, and any move toward independent action
(especially reactivating CBRN) would be met with immediate and definitive retaliation.

Kazakhstan may also become increasingly nationalistic, fueled by its domestic resources
as well as WMD CBRN capabilities. The nationalization of foreign-controlled energy
assets would be a sign of a move toward such self-reliance. Astana in this scenario would
have to impose a stronger rule over the country, as Kazakhstan is large, a lot of its area is
sparsely-populated, and there are many ethnic Russians living throughout the country.
Reviving a WMD CBRN program would be a great nationalist goal, and the existence of
such weapons would be a great deterrent to Russia, who would oppose such nationalism
on its periphery. However, this scenario is also caveated by Russian intolerance of dissent
on its borders. Even if the nationalist regime manages to stay in Russia’s good graces,
Moscow would seek to prevent Astana from developing CBRN, including using force.

Since independence, Kazakhstan has cooperated extensively with foreign and

international organization to decommission its CBRN facilities and supplies. Any change
in this behavior could be indicative of a shift toward re-developing CBRN. If Astana
decides to expand its civilian nuclear program, there is a concern that its strategic nuclear
capabilities may also increase. Likewise, increased activity at chemical or biological
facilities, such as expanded research or an uptick in import of precursors would be
indicative of a change in behavior.

A shift in the leadership from the current policy of balancing Russia, China and the
Western powers to favoring one or two over the others may lead to a more defensive
posture and a turn to WMD CBRN re-development. Russia is seeking to develop closer
relationships with other Central Asian states, such as Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. If (or
when) the regimes in those countries become more accommodating to Russian interests,
Moscow may increase the conventional capabilities in those countries and possibly even
station CBRN there. This scenario would lead Kazakhstan to assume an increasingly
defensive posture and increase its conventional and possibly WMD CBRN capabilities.
An expanded Russian alliance with Astana’s main competitor for regional primacy,
Uzbekistan, would be even more influential in leading Kazakhstan to upsurge its
capabilities. As an alternative response in this scenario, Kazakhstan may seek to align
with China and come under its protection rather than develop CBRN capability of its
own. However, the more nationalist forces as well as the desire for regime preservation
decrease the probability of that course.

Kazakhstan is most likely to favor nuclear WMD, although it has significant chemical
and biological capabilities as well. Nuclear weapons are a clear show of strength and
useful as a deterrent, while chemical and biological weapons are more difficult to deploy
and control effectively.

If Kazakhstan falls under Russian control as in any of such scenarios as above, its CBRN
capabilities would likely be used against U.S. interests. However, if Kazakhstan manages
to acquire CBRN to defend against Russian pressure or incursion, even a more nationalist
Kazakhstan would be unlikely to target U.S. interests.

State alliances: Kazakhstan’s primary ally is Russia, and Astana can not afford to stray
far from Moscow in the near future. There is a sizeable Russian minority who retains
influence, and geopolitically, Astana would be at a disadvantage if relations with Moscow
were to turn sour. However, Kazakhstan is careful to keep good relations with China as
well – cooperation with China is particularly extensive in two sectors Kazakhstan wishes
to develop, energy and mining. Regionally, Kazakhstan is on relatively good terms with
Uzbekistan, and as much as possible with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan (although there is
little direct contact). Astana is deeply involved in the economic sector of Kyrgyzstan,
with the potential to exert more political influence in the country. Astana has maintained
good relations with Kiev and Tbilisi and has done so without drawing much ire from
Moscow. Kazakhstan has cooperated with Azerbaijan extensively in the energy sector.
Kazakhstan has been working with South Korea, especially in the energy and economic
sectors, and Indian energy companies. Kazakhstan also aims to maintain good relations
with the United States and the European nations -- the Western allies are involved not
only in the energy sector but in assisting Kazakhstan with dismantling its Soviet-era
CBRN program. Astana is trying to win good will with the West by becoming more
involved in the European organizations, such as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Organization of the Islamic
Conference, NATO’s Partnership for Peace, and it is also a member of the post-Soviet
organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, Economic Cooperation
Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community
and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

State targets: As Astana finds it harder to balance competing interests from Russia and
China, and can not count on support from the distant United States and Europe, it will
seek to develop weapons for its own security -- to ensure its sovereignty. Russian
influence could also shut out Western interests in Kazakhstan and turn Astana against its
partners. However, Kazakhstan would also feel threatened by a resurgent Russia and may
acquire CBRN as a deterrent against Moscow’s possible aggression. Astana is also likely
to continue to target Islamist insurgency on its territory and border regions. Friction could
possibly develop if Kyrgyzstan decides to usurp Kazakhstan’s influence in its economy.
Kazakhstan could also target Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, should those regimes either
destabilize or become belligerent toward their larger neighbor. There is some
psychological competition between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for regional hegemony.

Operational history: In its 15 years of independence, Kazakhstan has never entered into
interstate conflict, nor used CBRN. Internally, Astana has been engaged in a crackdown
against what it deems to be Islamist groups, as well as the political opposition.
Conventional tactics have always been employed. To achieve its state goals, Kazakhstan
has sought political solutions and alliances with all of the regional and interested powers
-- Russia, China, Europe and the United States.

Kazakhstan has attempted to balance its interests and seek accommodations to as many
big regional players as possible. It maintains a significant political and economic
relationship with Russia. Kazakhstan’s energy reserves have enabled extensive economic
cooperation with China, Europe, the United States and Middle Eastern countries. Astana
has used energy to ensure not only financing of its regime, but indispensability of
Kazakhstan to its partners. Although Kazakhstan is in many ways the regional leader,
particularly in the banking industry, the state has not been belligerent in imposing its
primacy in Central Asia. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have historically competed for
regional leadership, and a conflict between the two would cause the other states,
including Russia and China, to take sides and bring the conflict to a higher level. Such a
conflict could arise due to disagreement on control of natural resources, migration (as
many citizens of other Central Asian countries come to work in Kazakhstan), or a conflict
instigated by militants.

Shifts in Kazakhstan’s behavior indicative of movement toward WMD CBRN

development would include increasingly asserting its independence from Russia, such as
spurning bilateral political, economic and defense cooperation arrangements. In this case,
Kazakhstan would have to do so quickly in order to prevent Russian preemptive action,
but Astana does have the capability to quickly spin up its resources once it makes the
decision. Economic or political pressure from Moscow would be expected to intensify,
but a confrontational response from Astana would signal a significant shift in behavior. A
shift in Kazakhstan’s economic and energy ties may be indicative of a profound change in
policy, leading to breaking ties with either Russia, China or the West. If Kazakhstan falls
under Russian influence and begins to break ties with its Western partners, it is possible
that it is on its way to allying with Russia and reactivating CBRN under Russia’s
influence and for its purposes.

Potential usage of WMD: Kazakhstan would develop CBRN under certain

circumstances and likely only for use as deterrent. Kazakhstan has enormous potential to
develop weapons systems from the Soviet times, but has so far chosen to dismantle
existing facilities or convert them to civilian use and downblend much of its supply of
HEU. However, it is likely that many CBRN components and devices remain on Kazakh
territory, as the USSR has not been very thorough in keeping track of its weapons. Astana
may resume the development of CBRN if it feels a significant threat to its territorial
integrity that can not be repelled by conventional weapons, particularly from a resurgent
Russia or strengthened competition between Russia and China. Astana prioritizes its
regime’s survival and territorial integrity, and any Russian threat that would jeopardize
those would be taken very seriously. Russia and Kazakhstan share a long border and there
is a sizeable Russian minority within Kazakhstan, so there are conceivable scenarios
where Kazakhstan would feel pressured or threatened by Russian actions. Development,
conversion or readying of CBRN would have to take place in utter secrecy, as Russia
does not tolerate independent proliferation on its periphery that would challenge its
primacy or security. Astana does exercise sufficient command over the country to control
production. Any actual deployment of CBRN would, however, bring swift retaliation
from Russia. Triggers for nuclear development would include an immediate and
insurmountable threat from Russia, which could come if Moscow perceives that Astana is
acting against Russian interests.

The cost of developing CBRN for Kazakhstan would be its close political ties with
Russia, who would be intolerant to such a challenge of its primacy and security. Although
the Central Asian country has developed a significant regional presence in the banking
and energy sectors, it still relies on Russia for transport of energy both into and out of the
country. However, Kazakhstan also has many foreign partners, including East Asian and
European countries as well as the United States. They would also not condone a re-
development of CBRN on Kazakh territory, but likely would be unable to do anything
when presented with a fait accompli. If eventually Astana has to move from its current
policy of working with Russian, Asian and Western partners, it will have to make sure to
retain good relations with at least one partner who would be able to make up for the loss
of the others.

If Kazakhstan acquires CBRN to deter a resurgent Russia’s infringement on its

sovereignty, then Russia would certainly be its priority target. A Russia-China escalation
might cause Kazakhstan to acquire CBRN in order to deter against infringement by either
neighbor. U.S. economic interests would be affected by Kazakhstan’s entry into any such
conflict, but not specifically targeted by Astana.

Targeting:
Kazakhstan is not as likely to deploy WMD CBRN, as having the weapons as a deterrent
in a conflict with Russia, China or a WMD-capable Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan is extremely
unlikely to deploy against Russia first, as that would elicit an immediate response, but
would retaliate if Russia deploys. Kazakhstan is not very likely to target China, unless
done so at Russia’s behest. That could change if China makes more aggressive moves
toward Kazakhstan, but Astana is more likely to be concerned with Beijing’s economic
domination than military aggression. Astana has the artillery or the possibility to improve
existing weapons to the point of targeting its neighbors with nuclear, chemical or
biological warheads (with nuclear being by far the more effective). If the current regime
is in place at the time of conflict with Russia, Uzbekistan or China, Astana is likely to
target military, political and economic but not civilian targets, as the current regime is
unlikely to embrace militant tactics and soft targets. If the current regime is replaced by
an Islamist one, targeting Russian and Chinese populations of “nonbelievers” may be
justified, depending on the flavor of Islamist. If Kazakhstan falls under Russian control,
its capabilities may be used to target Western and U.S. economic and strategic interests,
such as the energy infrastructure in the Caspian region or NATO troops deployed in the
vicinity.

As Kazakhstan’s intent is to perpetuate the current rule and defend its territorial integrity
and thereby existence, if Astana decides to deploy WMD CBRN (rather than the more
likely scenario of use as deterrent), it would likely be aimed at removing immediate
danger to sovereignty and independence. The most important dynamic for Kazakhstan is
to balance the forces that influence it (Russia, China and the West), and try to weaken any
power that exerts what would be perceived as a disproportionate amount of influence.
Kazakhstan would seek to convey a position of strength, yet retain its credibility so as to
still be able to balance among allies. However, Kazakhstan remains unlikely to deploy
WMD CBRN unless there is an immediate and direct danger of such an attack.
Uzbekistan

State objectives: The Karimov regime and its likely successors seek to maintain power,
maximally control the population and prevent any dissent (including the Islamist/terrorist
threat), maintain territorial integrity, and exert regional influence in Central Asia.

Intent:
The Karimov regime is increasingly autocratic and seeks to maintain control of the
country at any cost. It has sought regional leadership -- while it is the most populous
country in Central Asia and the only one bordering all of the other four, Uzbekistan has
not been able to surpass Kazakhstan in leadership as it lacks the funds. While Uzbekistan
is unable to exploit its natural resources and thus expand its economy due to political and
some technical considerations, Tashkent has sought out in turn both Russian and
European and U.S. partners. Both politically and economically, Uzbekistan has vacillated
between its former ruler and Western allies, collaborating with whoever provides the
most benefit and least pressure to the regime.

Uzbekistan’s regime, however, is inherently unstable, since President Islam Karimov

tends to remove any potential successors, as they pose a challenge. While his daughter
may eventually take over the dynasty, there remains a possibility of an unplanned change
in power. A palace coup could take place, replacing Karimov with an even more
autocratic and tyrannical persona -- current Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyayev is a
possibility. Such a leader may choose to pursue a more defensive policy in order to
solidify his control over the country and could develop WMD CBRN as a show of
strength and his or her emergence would be indicative of a possible future escalation.
However, if during such a transition Uzbekistan attempts to spurn Russian influence,
Moscow would not hesitate to depose the new regime. If the regime attempts to develop
CBRN as a measure of protection, Russia will not hesitate to destroy it.

Tashkent could also be taken over by an Islamist militancy that would likely reactivate
the country’s CBRN facilities in order to assure their primacy. Islamists would also likely
seek to spread their influence throughout the region. Both of the above scenarios of
unplanned regime change would also have to consider Russia’s reaction, who does not
want a rogue regime on its periphery. Russia intends to perpetuate its influence in Central
Asia and will not hesitate to destroy a militant group that challenges it, using its own
CBRN if it has to.

If Uzbekistan’s regime becomes increasingly unable to oppress and exterminate the

Islamist insurgency, it may eventually fall to it. An indicator of such a turn would be an
upsurge in unrest in the country. While Tashkent is currently extremely centralized in its
decision-making, an emergence of a rivalry within the power structures may also indicate
an upcoming change in strategy. Any changes in the regime’s handling of its relationship
with Russia, Asian allies or Western adversaries are also indications of changing priorities
that might indicate a move toward CBRN. It is equally possible that Uzbekistan would
welcome back Western involvement if it feels threat from Russia as that Tashkent would
closer ally with Moscow in the face of an increasing threat from the West.
Tashkent could also seek to spurn Russian influence, especially if its economic indicators
improve. If partnerships with Pakistan, South Korea or China prove to bring sufficient
benefit, Tashkent may decide that increasing Russian pressure is unacceptable and
reactivate CBRN as a deterrent against its former ruler. However, that move would
require constant and substantial support from any of the above partners, and although
they all have interest in what Uzbekistan has to offer, they would likely not be willing to
defend Tashkent against Moscow.

Alternatively, Uzbekistan may come much closer to Russia, as it joins Moscow-led

organizations and receives benefits from being a part of the club. If Russia is successful
at taking over Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan would be next on its list, and if it is successful
there, Russia could reactivate CBRN for its own purposes.

There is also a possibility that the Western forces could attempt a color revolution in
Uzbekistan. Although the population is under draconian control and any Western support
of opposition is prosecuted, the United States and Europe may decide that the regime is
weak enough to attempt to install a more conciliatory figure. Violence and civil unrest are
not unlikely under this scenario, and if the attempt is unsuccessful, the Karimov regime
may take an even more extreme stance and would seek to acquire (though not necessarily
deploy) CBRN for its own survival.

Uzbekistan has tense relations with the neighboring Tajikistan, which may escalate into
conflict, especially over water rights. If Tajikistan at that point has a close relationship
with the ethnically-related Iran, there is a danger that Tehran may share its nuclear
program with Dushanbe, especially is Uzbekistan reactivates its capabilities first. Similar
is the case if Russia wants to increase its role in Tajikistan. Any moves on the part of
Dushanbe to position itself strategically in Central Asia could serve as a cause Uzbekistan
to take a more defensive, and possibly a more aggressive posture.

If Russia stations CBRN in a Central Asian state that comes under its control, Uzbekistan
as well as Kazakhstan may seek to activate its own systems. Moscow’s act could be
perceived as jeopardizing Tashkent’s security, but the weapons are likely to be considered
for deterrent purposes.

State alliances: Part of several post-Soviet economic and military alliances, including the
Collective Security Treaty Organization. Uzbekistan is allied with Russia, following a
temporary cooling of relations during Tashkent’s stint as Washington’s strategic partner.
Relatively close relations with Pakistan, some cooperation in economic and energy
spheres with East Asian nations, including South Korea and Japan.

State targets: Tajikistan, U.S. interests and personnel, Western powers and their interests
and personnel. The regime may target Russia, Kazakhstan and China if Tashkent feels a
threat to its sovereignty or territorial integrity. Tashkent constantly targets internal
political dissent, frequently under the guise of prosecuting Islamist militancy and
religious extremism. Uzbekistan may come to target a neighboring country that would
provide refuge to its enemies, as it has previously threatened Kyrgyzstan.

Operational history: Uzbekistan has not entered into international armed conflict since
independence in 1991. However, has conducted internal operations against what the
government termed militant insurgency, using conventional weapons. Uzbekistan has
concluded extradition agreements with most of the neighboring regimes, but may become
aggressive if Tajikistan harbors wanted individuals. However, all of the Central Asian
countries have so far agreed that Islamists are their common enemy. Tashkent has used
political and economic pressure, specifically on Western interests in the country, to
achieve its goals.

Uzbekistan has exercised strong control domestically, but has fluctuated internationally.
Tashkent has alternatively partnered with Western and Russian interests, going with
whoever is more willing to support the Karimov regime and allow it to perpetuate its
policies. While Uzbekistan has sought to take advantage of what each partner has to offer,
Tashkent has not weighed economic benefit as much as it has political gains. Uzbekistan
has used its natural resources to attract partners and has used questionable legal
maneuvers to remove investors that are no longer in line with its policy.

Any change of regime other than to a chosen successor will cause instability in
Uzbekistan. Unless a successful color revolution takes hold (which is a very remote
possibility, given the weakness of opposition forces in the country), an unplanned change
in regime would likely lead to a more defensive stance. An Islamist militant regime may
be a shift toward development of WMD CBRN, but the survival of such a regime is
unlikely given its threat to Russia. Escalating conflict with Tajikistan or Kazakhstan is
also cause for concern. If there are signs that Karimov is preparing to install a successor,
he may preemptively reactivate CBRN capabilities to provide security guarantees for the
new regime.

Potential usage of WMD: Would develop and possibly use CBRN under certain
circumstances. Uzbekistan already has a very high level of development of chemical and
biological weapons facilities left over from the Soviet times. However, much of those
facilities and industries have been modified for civilian purposes or dismantled and
would need to be converted back for weaponization. Uzbekistan would develop CBRN if
it perceived an immediate and conventionally insurmountable threat to its territory or
power. While Uzbekistan is currently under limited Russian influence, the Karimov
regime has demonstrated a propensity to spurn unwanted pressure. Uzbekistan will retain
its place in Russia’s interests as part of its periphery, but Tashkent could in the future
want to deter a resurgent Moscow against infringing on its sovereignty. However, having
no common border brings Uzbekistan a greater freedom of operations. However, actual
deployment of CBRN is unlikely, as Russia would not tolerate proliferation on its
periphery and would immediately retaliate. The trigger that would make Uzbekistan
develop a nuclear weapon would be certain and overwhelming threat from Russia.
Tashkent may be able to repel a conventional attack from Russia, especially considering
the poor state of the Russian military, but Russia has the capacity to threaten Uzbekistan
with CBRN if the situation escalates sufficiently. If the Karimov regime or its successor
show hostility toward Russia, particularly by targeting Russian interests or with a hostile
response to Russian advances, Moscow would attempt to forcefully turn Tashkent back to
its side.

Uzbekistan is in many ways reliant on Russia, especially in transporting its energy

supplies for export and a significant proportion of trade. Over the past several years,
Uzbekistan has been seeking to diversify its markets, establishing relations with East
Asian nations and Pakistan. If Tashkent decides that Moscow has impinged too much on
its sovereignty, the cost of cutting off relations with Russia may be deemed acceptable to
the benefit of developing CBRN as a deterrent. Although Russia would be the likely
target of such a move, Uzbekistan also has bad relations with Western powers. Following
Tashkent’s crackdown in Andijan in May 2005, Karimov has expelled the U.S. Karshi-
Khanabad base from Uzbekistan’s territory and relations with the United States and
Europe have deteriorated since. Karimov then turned to Russia for support, but has not
completely become a peon of the Kremlin -- Tashkent demonstrates a degree of
pragmatism and would align with whichever power offers them what they want. The
reversal could easily be reversed again. Karimov is also capable of using CBR against
what he perceives to be Islamist insurgents or outside powers seeking to unseat the
regime. Uzbek authorities may also use a CBR agent against political dissenters, as the
regime is reported to be using severe methods of torture.

Targeting:
Given the ruthlessness of the current regime, Karimov would have no qualms about
targeting not only military, political and economic targets but also civilian populations.
However, strategic targets would be the most likely to serve the purpose of disabling the
hypothetical enemy. In a conflict with Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, or its own citizens,
the regime’s survival is paramount and will be defended at all costs. The same is likely
true for the regime of a chosen successor, an Islamist militancy, or whoever could take
over in a palace coup. Uzbekistan has sufficient artillery to deploy chemical or biological
warheads and may deploy tactical nuclear weapons left over from the Soviet era. If
Islamist militants are running the country, they may resort to suicide operations,
especially across Uzbekistan’s porous borders.

Uzbekistan is likely to target Kazakhstan, if that neighbor chooses to upsurge its

conventional and WMD CBRN capabilities for its own reasons. However, the possibility
of actual deployment of WMD is unlikely unless an immediate and insurmountable
danger is present. Uzbekistan is much more likely to hold CBRN as deterrent against
Kazakhstan, Russia, China or the West, as it is possible that Tashkent could perceive a
threat from any of these actors. Given Tashkent’s propensity to switch sides, it could
draw the aggression from any of its former allies.

At the same time, Uzbekistan may be able to play the sides off of each other and not re-
arm -- in such a scenario, Tashkent would draw international support and attention by
claiming that the larger actors are ganging up against the country, and seek a protective
umbrella from whoever is not supposedly against Tashkent. In such a situation,
Uzbekistan would risk becoming an instrument of its protector (U.S., China or Russia)
and target whoever is opposing the influencing state. In the more likely scenario that
Russia would extend its nuclear umbrella over Uzbekistan, the targeting scenarios would
serve to perpetuate Moscow’s goals and interests by taking aim at U.S. and Western
assets and interests.

CUBA

Cuba’s overwhelmingly primary objective is regime preservation – both under the

Castros and the Cuban Revolution as a whole. Cuba will do virtually anything to
preventing outside influence from hurting its message. Also, there will be a struggle to
maintain regime legitimacy in the wake of Fidel’s impending death.

An aggressive assault on the island could push Cuba to do anything; specifically if the
attack comes from the US. That is the primary risk – but it’s a virtually inconceivable
situation because Cuba would be heavily impacted if it did use a CBRN against the US.

According to some unconfirmed reports, Cuba started experimenting in chemical warfare

long ago. Cuba learned a lot about chemical weapon manufacturing from Vietnam, China
and the USSR. Most chemical plants are located in and around Havana. Cuba has been
accused of using CBRN, but there is little confirmation. Cuba is deeply defensive and
isolated, but it prefers guerrilla warfare to

Cuba is capable of producing a chemical, biological or radiological weapon and could

deploy if it were cornered. If it felt attacked by the US, it could, in theory, deploy.
However, Cuba would have to do so as an independent actor – it’s doubtful Venezuela –
close ally or not – could push Cuba.

Cuba is believed to have developed these chemical weapons: tabun, sarin, soman, yellow
rain, novichok, phosgene oxime, arsine trihydride, and hydrogen cyanide.

Targeting
The US, in general, would be a target. Specifically, Miami would be a hot target because
of the Cuban exile population there. Also, US petroleum installations in the Gulf of
Mexico could be an easy target. Other US interests in the Caribbean – namely, Puerto
Rico could be hit as well. It’s doubtful Cuba would avoid civilian areas.

Deployment
Cuba manufactures nothing besides agricultural goods, and thus lacks the ability to
produce missiles and ballistics necessary to deploy a chemical weapon. Cuba would need
to purchase such items.

VENEZUELA
Regime preservation is Venezuela’s ultimate goal. Chavez is insecure and postures to
make up for his shaky position; there have been coups before, so it is not out of the
question that the political system could get shaken up again. Chavez also wants regional
leadership and global dependency on Venezuela for oil.

If Venezuela were to be under a serious assault from the US, there could be some move
toward CBRN proliferation and deployment. Venezuela is highly unlikely to use CBRN
on the first strike – it would be purely retaliatory. Weakness could push Chavez to acquire
such weapons.

Venezuela is a defense based system; its army is rather well equipped especially with the
recent acquisition of military supplies from Russia. Venezuela’s focus is, and is likely to
continue to be, conventional arms. Venezuela is heavily dependent on civilian militias for
regime survival and stability within the country – namely for domestic protection.

Serious threats from the US could prove problematic and lead to some degree of
proliferation. There are already allegations that Venezuela has bought chemical weapons
from Spain. These reports are partly erroneous. Spain did sell Venezuela defense
materials, but the only chemical involved was CS (chlorobenzylidene malonitrile) gas
which is used to produce tear gas.

Also, there is some talk that Venezuela is seeking nukes from DPRK – but this is all
really implausible; Venezuela would want to buy, but DPRK isn’t keen on selling.

Regardless of Venezuela’s acquisitions, it should be noted that any weapons would be for
defense, not first strike, purposes. Even from a defense perspective, it seems unlikely that
Venezuela would proliferate. The only possibilities for it are chemical weapons – which it
could work on with Cuba – but even if Venezuela were to obtain chemical weapons, it
lacks the facilities to store these materials, the labs to develop them internally, or the
deployment mechanisms.

Targeting
Venezuela’s key targets would be Colombia and the US and it would be doubtful that
Venezuela would take care to avoid civilian areas. Any other US interest in reach would
also be targets. However, the likelihood of an attack is minimal as Venezuela depends too
heavily on the US for energy export.

Deployment
Venezuela does have some degree of metal production and manufacturing, but no
apparent capability to produce any type of missile or significant weapon. Venezuela’s
purchase of military supplies from Russia indicates a lack of ability to domestically
produce necessary items in any feasible way.
North Korea
State objectives: Regime survival. North Korea will do whatever it takes to preserve the
regime, indiscriminate of where aid comes from or whether lack of aid results in the
starvation of its own people. Second regime goal is strengthening of state, primarily
internally, to allow for regime and nation survival. Third goal is reunification, preferably
peacefully, under DPRK system.

State alliances: China is currently North Korea’s largest ally, and the perception of being
able to influence North Korea gives China greater leverage in the global community.
Russia also maintains relations with North Korea, and somewhat competes with China
for influence and the global leverage that would result. It also has alliances with other
states in the non-aligned movement, namely Iran. South Korea wants to see a peaceful
state and hopes for eventual unification; therefore it frequently runs interference for the
DPRK within the international community and against strict sanctions imposed from the
U.S. and Japan.

State targets:

UNITED STATES – The North Korean Taepodong 2 missile supposedly has the
capability to reach the mainland United States, but North Korea’s test of the missile in
July 2006 resulted in an unimpressive landing in the Sea of Japan after suspected staging
problems. In theory, though, the United States is within reach and could be attacked,
though this is unlikely because it would result in the North Korean regime being
destroyed. North Korea has yet to demonstrate the ability to miniaturize and ruggedize a
nuclear warhead. Miniaturization and ruggedization are necessary in order for a
successful ICBM attack. North Korea does not have the capability to attack the U.S. on
its own soil with WMD, but could target U.S. military bases in South Korea and Japan.
They could also target U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan with conventional weapons.
Furthermore, the U.S. flies reconnaissance missions over and near North Korea, which
could be targeted. They would do this if the regime felt threatened by an imminent attack
or if they were put on the defensive, otherwise, they prefer posturing to obtain their goal
of regime survival.

SOUTH KOREA – North Korea uses the possibility of leveling Seoul as a deterrent for

action taken against it by the international community. An attack could happen despite

both countries being Korean and ambitions for reunification. DPRK wants reunification,

but the survival of the DPRK elite is their aim in reunification, and if the regime was

threatened, it might attack. It views a unified Korea under leadership from the South as a
threat. They still have naval clashes and small incident along the DMZ with South

Korea.

JAPAN – North Korea could attack Japan if tensions escalated rapidly. There is a long-
standing Korean concern with Japanese actions, past and future. U.S. forces in Japan are
also a major target. North Korea would attack Japan preemptively or in defense.
However, an offensive attack is unlikely because they know that Japan and the U.S.
would react with the goal of the destroying the regime. However there are frequent
chances for small-scale conflicts, as Japan steps up its participation in Proliferation
Security Iniative, which would allow Japan to search planes an ships that are suspect of
carrying illegal weapons or missile technologies. There have also been naval skirmishes
in the past.

CHINA – North Korea could become actively aggressive toward China if Beijing’s
distrust turned into destabilizing manipulation or military action to preserve its interests
in North Korea. China has plans to invade North Korea if it chooses to do so. This would
only be a preemptive attack in the case of an immediate threat or defensive attack.

Operational History: North Korea has never used WMD in combat, although it has been
suggested that they have tested biological weapons on their island territories. Prior to the
Korean War they relied on guerrilla forces to infiltrate the south with security guarantees
from Russia and China, the outbreak of war came as the north led a full-frontal invasion
on the south. After the war, North Korea had the security guarantees of Russia and
China’s nuclear umbrella and undertook destabilizing infiltrations of the south, including
assassination attempts on leaders. Near the end of the Cold War they changed survival
tactics, and started their nuclear program as a deterrent. Their primary mode of operation
is to play on international fears. It is mainly posturing to ensure regime survival and the
eventual unification with the south under DPRK rule. They often antagonize the south by
firing into the DMZ or putting more troops on their side of the fences. There have also
been some skirmishes in the disputed territorial waters between the south and the north.
Their military build-up is meant to be used as a deterrent, but they would be used in a
preemptive attack. Finally, they use what Stratfor calls the Crazy Fearsome Cripple
Gambit—They present an image of instability and unreliability to sow doubt among U.S.,
South Korean and Japanese policymakers. Then they raise the specter of developing and
deploying nuclear weapons. Finally, they simultaneously project an image of weakness,
on the verge of collapse, a collapse that would have dire consequences for its neighbors.
This strategy is meant to get its neighbors and the U.S. to continue to support North
Korea for fear of a collapse, without threatening Pyongyang with a military attack.

Potential Usage of WMD: North Korea would attempt to use nuclear weapons in an
open conflict, however they have not weaponized their nuclear devices, making effective
deployment difficult, but not impossible (they could put a device in a truck or ship and
explode it). They would use chemical or biological weapons on domestic factions that
threaten to destabilize the regime and could also use such weapons against South Korea,
Japan or U.S. military targets in both countries. Such an overture however would threaten
their regime survival and increase the likelihood that other states would attack North
Korea. This is not in Pyongyang’s interests. Therefore, the most likely use of CBRN
would be nuclear devices, and only in a defensive posture. However, they could use
chemical and biological weapons on their own soil defensively to defend the regime and
make the DPRK unusable—denying the enemy the space to maneuver, and allowing
them to revert to guerilla tactics.

North Korea does not have the ability to use biological weapons on a large scale, and
lacks the technology for deployment and storage. They have produced chemical weapons
and could potentially do a potent chemical attack—they have both the agents and the
delivery capability. Again, such an attack would only be defensive. They are most
interested in preserving their regime and being able to flaunt nuclear weapons is part of
their strategy. Actually attacking a country, outside of a few minor conventional
skirmishes, is not their objective. However, if they did feel like they were going to be
attacked, they would react. Chemical weapons would not be their first weapon of choice,
but they may resort to some chemical weapons attacks in Seoul or U.S. military bases in
South Korea.

Finally, North Korea is unlikely to sell its nuclear weapons. They are primarily used for
defensive or deterrent purposes and as a bargaining chip. If they start to sell weapons,
this would increase the likelihood that they would be attacked, defeating their purpose.

Serbia

Unlike most of the other countries that we will be examining for P4, Serbia’s policy
changes are imminent. As such there are few things that can at this point be inserted into
the regional dynamic which could change Serb actions one way or another. Events will
begin quickly -- parliamentary elections are on Jan. 21 -- and should the Serbian Radical
Party win they will come to power by Feb. 21 at the latest.

At present it is impossible to predict the results of the Serb elections. The Radicals are the
single most popular party among likely voters, although that support level is only at about
30 percent. Yet because parties must gain 5 percent of the popular vote to gain
representation in the parliament, currently there are even odds that the Radicals will gain
majority control (or a coalition with a tiny party that can push them over the majority
threshold).

Assuming for the moment that the Radicals do not control the next government, Serbia is
extremely unlikely to follow a WMD/CBRN path. The leading pro-Western parties -- the
Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of Serbia and New Serbia -- have worked
together before with additional parties and would actually be more likely to form a stable
coalition (by Balkan standards) in 2007 than they were in 2003. The main goals of such a
pro-Western government would be eventual membership in both the European Union and
NATO. The prime stability question in this circumstance would not emanate from Serbia,
but from Kosovo where international efforts to manage Albanian Kosovar expectations
may falter. While such a situation would be complicated and likely bloody, it would not
involve WMD/CBRN -- certainly not on the part of Belgrade.

But should the Radicals take over government an extremely different picture arises.
Among their top goals would be formal integration with the Serb portion of Bosnia --
Republika Srpska. Despite the potential for follow on actions by the Serbs, this is a move
that the international community is unlikely to counter with anything more than
diplomatic efforts. Western militaries are overextended in Afghanistan and Iraq, and no
European power is likely to want to draw a proverbial line in the sand -- especially since
all the Serbs of Bosnia are requesting is the same right to self-determination that
Montenegro and Kosovo sought.

Flush with success, the Radical’s next likely step will be to attempt to use ethnic Serb
militias to stir up problems in the border regions of Republika Srpska that Belgrade
believes should be Serb regions. Barring robust responses from the international
community -- and considering how thinly spread Western military force is, such
responses are unlikely -- they will expand this effort both within Bosnia and to
Montenegro, another location where ethnic Serbs are a sizable proportion of the
population.

Should all these operations prove relatively successful and painless for the Serbs, the next
logical target is Kosovo with regular Serb forces likely to first move into the northern
portions where ethnic Serbs predominate. After that, it is an open question whether
Belgrade will simply attempt to retake all of Kosovo. The effort the Serbs put forth will
be inversely proportionate to Western actions to date.

Aside from the (para)military angle, the Serbs have one other very definite policy they
will follow. Belgrade will do everything in its power to first solidify a partnership with
the Russians. The two Slavic peoples share a great deal of affinity for one another that
goes well beyond ethnic ties. A core defining principle of both cultures is their
persecution and entitlement complexes. Russia feels the Europeans own them because
Russia suffered so much under Mongol rule, believing that if Russia had not suffered so
greatly that the Mongols would have gone on to conquer Europe. Serbia feels the same
about another power: Ottoman Turkey. Bound together by language, ethnicity, culture and
this complex, the two have been allies throughout most of modern history.

In the case of a Radical victory in the Jan. 21 elections this relationship would take a
more ominous -- and somewhat familiar -- turnn. During Milosevic’s rule Russia
regularly provided diplomatic cover for Serb actions throughout the Yugoslav war,
occasionally using its veto power in the U.N. Security Council to hobble Western
initiatives at a time when the West was attempting to actively intervene in the war. In
2007 with Western forces scattered and a Russian resurgence in progress, such diplomatic
cover could prove even more effective.
WMD -- specifically chemical weapons -- could provide one more bit of cover. Serbia
retains military forces capable of striking at all of its neighbors and potentially Italy as
well. Should Serbia follow the path of militancy, a chemical weapons deterrent could
prove useful to dissuading NATO from intervening on behalf of the Bosnian Croats,
Bosnian Muslims or Kosovar Albanians. Serbia sported an advanced and fielded
chemical weapons program during the Cold War that was developed indigenously. Most
of its output came from Serbia’s Pancevo facility which remains operational. The state
retains majority ownership of Pancevo***. All that remains for Serbia to relaunch a
chemical program is a political decision from Belgrade.