A CASE STUDY OF CO2 REMOVAL SYSTEM

PROBLEMS/FAILURES IN AN AMMONIA PLANT

The paper addresses the various problems/failures experienced in the CO2 removal
system of an Ammonia Plant in a short span operation of less than one year. Probable causes
of failures and the corrective steps taken to avoid such failures in future, have also been
discussed.

V.K. BALI and A.K. MAHESHWARI

IFFCO Aonla Unit, Bareilly

Uttar Pradesh, India

INTRODUCTION

Located at Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh in India, Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative Ltd,
operates two Ammonia plants, each with a name plate capacity of 1350 MTPD of ammonia.
Both of these plants have been designed based on Haldor Topsoe technology with steam
reforming of natural gas and/or naphtha. Ammonia-1 is designed for natural gas feed stock
and was commissioned in 1988. Ammonia-2 was commissioned in December,1996 and is
designed for both Natural Gas & Naphtha feed stocks. The Benfield process was selected for
the CO2 removal system of Ammonia-1 which has been converted into Giammarco- Vetrocoke
(GV) dual activator system in April,1997 for achieving lower CO2 slip and energy savings.
For Ammonia-2 plant, the GV dual activator low energy process has been selected for CO2
removal system from the design stage. The paper describes the problems/failures experienced in
the CO2 removal system of Ammonia-2 plant during very first year of its operation.

PROCESS TECHNOLOGY ADOPTED FOR CO2 REMOVAL SYSTEM

CO2 removal system of Ammonia Plant has a conventional design based on the GV dual
activator process. The process comprises of single stage absorption and two stage
regeneration. Figure-1 shows the CO2 removal system flow sheet.

Carbon dioxide is removed by absorption in hot aqueous potassium carbonate solution

containing approximately 30 wt% potash (K2CO3) partly converted into bicarbonate
(KHCO3). The solution further contains dual activators to effectively improve the overall
performance of the system . Vanadium oxide is used as corrosion inhibitor.

The process gas from the shift reactors is passed to the Vetrocoke Absorber which
contains stainless steel packing material distributed in 5 beds. The absorption is carried out in
one stage. The major part of the circulating solution is fed without cooling to the middle of
absorber at about 241° F (116 °C). The remaining solution is fed to the top of absorber after
cooling to about 140° F ( 60 °C). In the lower zone of absorber, the bulk of the CO2 is
absorbed. In the upper zone,the reduced stream of cold solution is used to get low CO2
slippages due to the low CO2 vapour pressure of the dual activated solution.

The solution leaving the absorber bottom, loaded with CO2 is called the rich solution. The
rich solution is transferred to a two stage regeneration system operating at low pressures. The
rich solution is depressurised through the hydraulic turbine and is sent to the top of the 1st
Regenerator operating at 14.2 psig (1.0 Kg/cm2g) pressure. A stream of rich solution extracted
from the top of 1st Regenerator is depressurised through a control valve and enters the top of
the 2nd Regenerator,working at low pressure of 1.42 psig (0.1 Kg/cm2g).

CORROSION CONTROL IN CO2 REMOVAL SYSTEM

GV solution along with CO2 at boiling temperature is very corrosive and would normally
require stainless steel equipment. However, carbon steel equipment with passivation
layers (oxidation layers) are being used successfully. The desired passivation layer is
formed by controlled passivation in two phases called static passivation & dynamic
passivation. The layer formed is tight, magnetic & tenacious and protects the carbon steel
surfaces from corrosion. However, rubbing with hard sharp edges can scratch the layer. The GV
system uses vanadium as corrosion inhibitor. The recommended concentration of total
vanadium is around 0.5% by weight as V2O5.

The hot potassium carbonate inhibited with vanadium can be safely operated, but is very
sensitive for corrosion. In order to maintain the electro-chemical potential required for
protection of passivation layer of metallic surfaces, it is necessary to keep 30 to 40% of the
total vanadium in the pentavalent form and never be allowed lower than 20% . This ratio is kept
by means of the oxidation unit which treats a side stream solution with air.

Hence, formation of proper passivation layer and its protection is very essential to avoid
corrosion in the GV system equipment. Any damage to the passivation layer can cause very fast
corrosion & subsequent leakages.

PROBLEMS/FAILURES EXPERIENCED

The various problems faced in the CO2 removal system of Ammonia Plant have been
presented. Each problem/failure has been dealt with separately specifying the problem/failure
faced, cause of the problem and various corrective steps undertaken to avoid such occurance
in future.

2nd Regenerator

The 2nd Regenerator is a carbon steel tower provided with stainless steel internals and
operating at a pressure of 1.42 psig (0.1 Kg/cm2g). It is a packed tower having 129 inches (3230
mm) diameter, 1643 inches (41075 mm) height and contains stainless steel packing material
distributed in two beds. Broad specifications and the general arrangement drawing of 2nd
regenerator are shown at figure-2.
Problem/failure description

Based on the failure history of this equipment in other plants, it was decided to measure the
thickness of 2nd Regenerator shell in the failure prone zones after about 9 months of
operation. While the thickness measurement was in progress between A-2 and A-7 nozzles, a
leak was observed on the other side of the shell on 11.9.97. This leak was located approximately
6 inches (150 mm) above the A-2 nozzle and 88 inches (2200 mm) circumferentially towards M-
3 manhole. Initially, a hole of approximately 0.8 inches (20 mm) diameter was observed which
enlarged to a bigger size "Eye shaped" hole within 2 hrs of start of leakage as shown in
figure-3.

Thickness measurements were carried out around the leaking hole to ascertain the extent of
thining in shell. No thinning was found even around the hole, leading to the conclusion that
the failure was localized as shown in figure 4. The area of leakage was covered and welded
with SS-304, 8" sch 10 pipe with blind and a vent to arrest the leakage. The whole exercise
was carried out while the plant was in operation and the equipment was in line.

As a preventive measure, it was decided to carry out thickness measurements around the
effected area of the shell on a regular basis. It was observed that the thickness had been reduced
to as little as 0.56 inches (14 mm) around the 8" stainless steel pipe, which had been welded to
contain the leak. Stainless steel pads were welded around the 8" stainless steel pipe to
strengthen the shell. The 2nd Regenerator was opened for inspection in October,1997. A
hole of approximately 12 inches (300 mm) diameter was observed from inside. Welding of the
cleat between SS 304 shroud and the vessel was also found broken.Photograph (PH-1) shows
the damaged 2nd Regenerator shell.

In addition to the leakage in the shell,the following upset conditions of a minor nature were also
observed in the 2nd Regenerator.

• Three segments of the steam distributor above the chimney at elevation of 644 inches
(16100 mm) were found lifted from their support beam by about 6 to 8 inches (150 to
200 mm ) as shown in Figure-5. Photograph (PH-2) shows the disturbed internals of the
steam distributor.

• The bed no.1 liquid re-distributor (Norten type) at elevation of 26750 mm was found
lifted from its support ring by about 50 mm on one side as shown in Figure-5.

Cause of the problem

The mechanical design of the fluid entry zone of 2nd Regenerator was found to be
inadequate.

The support design of the stainless steel protective shroud was inadequate for the dynamic
loads. This resulted in the shroud supports cracking and allowing the cleats of the shroud to hit
the wall which broke the protective vanadium layer on the carbon steel shell. This allowed
rapid corrosion of the shell and subsequent failure of pressure vessel (Figure 6).
Upon investigation, it was also discovered that the material of the cleats was carbon steel rather
than the stainless steel material specified on the approved drawings. Also the number of cleats
provided were at variance with the approved drawings.

It was further concluded that an internal annular passage should be avoided if possible to safe
guard the installation against even the slightest possibility of any means of damaging the
passivation layer. The welding of cleats to the shell to support the annular passage which is
likely to have some degree of vibration due to the process conditions, was identified to present
such a possibility.

Various design options

Design problems in the fluid entry zone of 2nd Regenerator were reported in 1993 in a 900
MTPD ammonia plant operating in southern part of India. The flow was directly hitting the
chimney which broke off and rubbed against the tower wall. This resulted in damage to the
passivation layer and caused corrosion which, in a short period of time, resulted in equipment
failure. Another operating problem experienced in this equipment, was the difficulty in
maintaining the proper solution level.

During the engineering and procurement phase of IFFCO-Aonla Unit,it was decided to
reengineer the inlet arrangement using a Norton type inlet arrangement and providing an
annular passage . The inlet arrangement was designed to divert the flow in two directions
horizontally to avoid direct impingement on the chimney. A stainless steel annular passage was
provided to prevent liquid impingement on the shell and possible disturbance of the
passivation layer which could cause excessive corrosion . An annular passage was provided
with an annular ring at the lower end to limit the disturbance of the surface i.e. to improve
level measurement. The above arrangement is shown in Figure-7. Photograph (PH-3) shows
the original inlet distribution arrangement.

However, ammonia plant of Aonla Unit and other similar plants based on above design have
reported failures in this equipment in the fluid entry zone.

Yet another design option has been considered which has now been adopted and is described
separately in the paper.

Repairs/modifications

• The area of 24 inches x 24 inches (600 mm x 600 mm) which was patched up from outside to
arrest leakage while the plant was in operation, was removed. A new matching plate of
the same size was welded into the shell.

• The existing nozzle entry configuration and stainless steel shroud was dismantled and
removed.

• A new arrangement of the distributor and supporting arrangement as shown in

Figure-8 was provided. This arrangement removes the possibility of damaging the
passivation layer. At the same time, it ensures that the GV solution is uniformly
distributed throughout the circumference of 2nd Regenerator and does not hit the
chimney and the surface of the tower.
Vetrocoke Absorber

The Vetrocoke Absorber is a carbon steel tower with stainless steel internals operating at 398
psig (28 Kg/cm2g) pressure. It contains stainless steel packing material distributed in five
beds. Liquid distributors and redistributors (called LRD) of stainless steel material have also
been provided. Broad specifications and the general arrangement drg.of Vetrocoke Absorber
is presented as figure-9.

The overall performance of Vetrocoke Absorber was satisfactory as the CO2 slip at the
Absorber exit was less than the design figure of 300 ppm. However, a detailed analysis of
the performance of each bed conducted in August,1997, indicated that the second bed was not
performing satisfactorily. Maldistribution of GV solution at top of the 2nd bed was thought to be
the probable cause and it was decided to open the Absorber at the earliest opportunity.

Problem/failure description

The Ammonia plant was shutdown in October,1997 and this opportunity was utilised to
open the various manholes of Absorber for inspection. The following failures were found as
observed from various manholes.

Location : M3 manhole

This manhole is located between bed No.2 and bed No.3 at an elevation of 1056 inches
(26400 mm).

The Bed no.2 liquid redistributor (Norton type) called LRD located at elevation of 1030 inches
(25750 mm ) was found buckled at the top and the J-bolts supporting the distributor had got
sheared. The LRD was raised about 6 to 8 inches (150 to 200 mm) from its support ring.

Further upward movement of the LRD was restricted by the semi-lean solution distribution
parting boxes placed above it, and by the semi-lean solution distribution pipes of nozzles A2
and A3 located at elevation of 1066 inches (26640 mm).

The distance between the LRD and the bed no.3 containing IMTP 40 stainless steel packing,
had been reduced to around 24 inches (600 mm). A few loose rings were also found at the top of
the LRD.

The parting box was also found damaged and buckled at the ends.

A few 8 inches NB nipples attached with the semilean solution distributor pipes of A2 &
A3 nozzles were also found twisted.

The details indicating the above failures are given in figure - 10.

Location : M4 manhole

This manhole is located between bed no.1 & 2 at an elevation of 631 inches (15780 mm).

The Bed no.1 liquid redistributor (Norten type) called LRD located at elevation of 610 inches
(15250 mm) which should have been below the M4 manhole level, was found hanging at
approximately 20 inches (500 mm) above the top of the manhole. The LRD was found in
distorted condition and its middle portion had taken convex shape viewed from bottom.

The whole bed no.1 had lifted up by approximately 64 inches (1600 mm) from its original
position. Loose IMTP 50 packing of Bed No.1 were found all around the M4 manhole.
Photograph (PH-4) & Photograph (PH-5) indicate the disturbed beds of Absorber.

The support beam of bed no.1 LRD with its ends distorted was found loose above manhole M4
and being stuck up at ring support of Bed No.2.

The multi-beam support plate of bed no.2 along with its supporting beam was not clearly
visible. The beam had sheared from its support bracket and entered in the IMTP 40 packing of
bed no.2 after leaving its original position.

Probable causes

• The possibility of construction defects and weak structure of the tower internals were
considered to be probable causes of the failure. The plate thickness used for bed supports
and clamps was only 2 mm. The extent of damage, however suggested that forces of
great magnitude acted in the upward direction in the Absorber. Hence the cause of the
failure can not be attributed only to the weak design . Further, Absorbers of the same
design have been reported operating satisfactorily in other plants without any
problems.

• The other possibility could be some sudden upward gas surge through the 1st & 2nd bed of
Absorber which caused the upheaval of these beds and buckling of LRDs.

The process gas entering at the bottom of Absorber might have flowed backwards through
the semi-lean inlet line via the ARC-NRV circulation line back to the solution draw -off
tray in the 2nd Regenerator. The upward lifting of the steam distributor above the
chimney in the semilean solution draw off tray and also the uplifting of the 1st bed LRD of
the 2nd Regenerator seems to support this view.

However, the above back flow could take place through this route only when both
ARC/NRV valves & the solenoid operated valves are not holding.

A study of the construction of the ARC/NRV valves indicated that a large quantity of gas
passing backward through the NRV portion and then through the ARC portion could
be possible only if the internals of the valve were severely damaged. These valves were
opened to check their condition. The springs of these valves were found broken. The discs
of these valves were also getting stuck up. The above conditions were creating possibilities
of back flow.

Each semi-lean pump had a solenoid valve at the discharge which closes when the pump
trips via the interlock I-301 A/B/C. For back flow to take place, these discharge valves
must be in open position . This can take place if the discharge valve does not close during
the tripping of the pumps, due to failure of the interlock I-301. Mal-functioning of this
interlock, however could not be confirmed.
 Further, the back flow through the above route may result in reverse rotation of the semi-
lean pumps. However, no damage to these pumps due to reverse rotation was observed.
However, the absence of a reverse rotation of the semi-lean pump could be explained by
the reasoning that the liquid passing in back flow through the valve was prevented by the
motion of the decelerating machine.

• Another probable cause for the damage in the Absorber could be the fast depressurisation of
the Absorber by sudden opening of vent valve (PV-60) located downstream of the Absorber.
This could have occured during start up/shutdown of the plant. However,
depressurisation through this route could have resulted in the failures of 3rd and 4th bed as
well. No failure in these beds, however, were found. This could be explained because the
3rd and 4th beds are inherently stronger than the 1st & 2nd beds as the diameter there is
99 inches (2480 mm) compared to 150 inches (3750 mm) at the 1st & 2nd beds, even
though the internals & fittings are of the same thickness.

Repairs/modifications

The following corrective actions have been suggested based on all probable causes of failures
as discussed above -

• All damaged internals will be replaced with next higher thickness.

• In order to prevent back flow, the solenoid valves should be interlocked with low speed of
turbines of the semilean solution pumps and lean solution pumps so that before all the
liquid is drained off, the valve would have completely closed.

• The semi-lean flow control valve (FV-22) and the lean solution flow control valve
(FV-23) should close shut on very low solution flow.

• Extreme care should be taken to ensure that the downstream vent valve (PV-60) is not
opened suddenly under any circumstances.

• An additional NRV on each of the common headers of the semilean solution line and the
lean solution line should be provided.

Hydraulic Turbines

The rich GV solution at high pressure coming from the bottom of the Absorber is let down and
flashed in the upper portion of the Ist Regenerator operating at low pressure. This let down in
pressure is carried out through hydraulic turbines to supply power to turbine driven GV
solution pumps and thus reduce the steam consumption of turbines.

Problem/failure description

It was observed that the hydraulic turbine was not developing power as per design and
thus the steam consumption of steam turbines was high. On inspection, the casing vanes of
hydraulic turbines were found to be eroded.

Probable causes
Butterfly control valves have been provided at the inlet nozzle of the hydraulic turbine. The
shaft pins of these valves have also been found to be broken probably due to flashing. The
sudden increase in volume and the two phase flow at the turbine inlet nozzle were the
probable causes of the damage to the hydraulic casing vanes.

Repairs/modification

The butterfly control valves have now been shifted away from the inlet nozzle of hydraulic
turbine to achieve laminar flow to the turbine inlet as shown in figure-11.

1st Regenerator

The 1st Regeneator is a carbon steel tower provided with stainles steel internals with
operating pressure of 14.2 psig (1 kg/cm2g). It is a packed tower having 147 inches (3680
mm) diameter, 1855 inches (46375 mm) height and contains stainless steel packing material
distributed in three beds.

Problem/failure description

The rich solution line (20") carrying rich solution from the bottom of the Absorber to the top
of 1st Regenerator through two inlet nozzles, was vibrating heavily. Frequent leaks were
observed at the welding joints at the upstream stub end of the butterfly valves provided in the
inlet lines & these leakages were recurring frequently.

Probable causes

The rich solution line is divided with two branches near the 1st Regenerator and hence enters
the vessel at two points. In both the branches, butterfly valves have been provided near the 1st
Regenerator. These valves were causing restriction in the flow & hence the vibration in the
lines. Vibration resulted in the increased load on the welding joints and the failure of the joints.

Repairs/modifications

Both the 20" butterfly valves and flanges were removed and the gaps were filled by providing
20" SS-304 spool pieces.

GV Regenerator

The GV Regenerator in CO2 removal system of Ammonia-1 has been in operation since 1988.
The plant was originally built with the Benfield process and was converted to the GV dual
activator process in 1997.

The Regenerator is a carbon steel tower provided with stainless steel internals and
operating at 14.2 psig (1.0 Kg/cm2g) pressure. It is a packed tower having 196 inches (4900
mm) diameter, 1796 inches (44900 mm) height and contains stainless steel packing material
distributed in three beds. Rich solution to the regenerator is fed through two tangential
enteries (called a necklace) as shown in figure-12. The above two inlet nozzles are welded to the
8 mm thick stainless steel liner provided to protect the carbon steel shell from severe inlet flow
conditions. Broad specifications and the general arrangements drawing of GV regenerator are
presented in Figure-12.

The CO2 removal system of Ammonia Plant has been operating normally except that the
CO2 slip was high at around 1400-1600 ppm. A consultants' expert in these systems , was called
in the last week of September,1997 to analzse the problem of high CO2 slip. Following the
recommendations of this consultant , various chemicals were added to the system to increase the
concentration of chemicals in the solution.

Only marginal advantage in the reduction of CO2 slip was observed. However, it was observed
that the iron content in the solution was increasing. The iron content in the solution had
increased from 67 PPM on 30 September,1997 to 127 ppm on 15 October,1997 in a very short
span of two weeks time and was a clear cut indication of heavy corrosion taking place in the
system.

V+5 to total V ratio was being maintained at the same level of around 15% as was maintained
with Benfield system. KNO2 and V2O5 however, were added to increase the ratio of V+5/V
to stop further corrosion. But iron level continued to increase in the solution.

It was observed on 18 October,1997 that GV Regenerator had started leaking from the top,
resulting in continuous GV solution droplets falling down. The leaking zone was
thoroughly inspected and the leak was arrested by welding. On 21 October ,1997 another leak
was observed about 180 Degree opposite the previous leak. An attempt was made to arrest
the leakage by providing a box around it. This was not possible as the vessel thickness had been
reduced by corrosion to the extent that welding was impossible. Thickness measurements
showed patches of reduced thickness. It was decided to shutdown the plant and carryout
a thorough inspection and repair.

Problem/failure description

The Ammonia Plant was shutdown in October ,1997 to carryout thorough inspection and
repair of GV Regenerator. On opening the Regenerator, the following observations were made.

• Black colour deposition was found above the shroud.

• Both the necklace weld joints with liner were found cracked at two places in each joint. The
length of crack was about 12 inches (300 mm).

• The liner plate had got deformed and was touching the Regenerator main shell at several
places as shown in figure-13 . The gap between the liner and the shell should be 10 mm as
per design ( figure-14).

• Heavy corrosion on the shell near and including the tray support ring was found at three
places as shown in figure-15.

• Corrosion of the shell at several places just below the lower edge of SS liner were also
found as shown in figure-15.

• Lower cleats welding with liner were found cracked.

• Some of the weldings of end plates of Omega trays were found broken. At two places, end
plates were missing. A broken piece of 690 mm x 280 mm was also found loose.

Probable causes

The following reasons put together can be attributed to the fast corrosion in the GV
Regenerator and its subsequent leakage.

• The stainless steel liner plate became deformed and was touching the shell at various
places. Cleats of the liner were also found cracked. Also there is two phase flow at the
inlet. This must have resulted in vibrations in the liner and damaged the passivation
layer. The places where there was no gap between shell & liner corrosion could be due to
stagnated solution.

• V+5/V ratio was slightly on the lower side at around 15% in comparison to the consultants
recommendations of minimum value of 20% and probably was not sufficient to give the
desired protection to carbon steel shell.

• Increase in concentration of chemicals further aggravated the situation for corrosion.

Repairs/modifications

• It was decided to cut the liner by about 8 inches (200 mm) from the bottom at the places
where there were no gaps between the liner and the shell to check for further damage
to the shell. After cutting, it was discovered that some of the shell areas and the
circumferential seal welds behind the liner were found badly corroded. Another 18 inches
wide by 80 inches long (450 mm x 2000mm) section of liner was removed to inspect the
condition of the shell. No further corrosion was observed on the shell behind the liner.

• A total of about 35 stainless steel cleats were welded behind liner to maintain a uniform
gap between the liner and the shell throughout the periphery .This was done to ensure no
further contact between the liner and shell in the future to avoid damage to the
passivation layer and to avoid stagnation of the solution.

• Some of the welding of end plates of omega trays which was found to be broken, was
rewelded.

• All the corroded areas of shell were repaired by filling material with welding. All the
repair welds were ground finish and DP tested. The 18 inches (450 mm) width liner was
rewelded in position.

• The cracks on both necklace to liner joints were also repaired & DP tested.

CONCLUSION
The failure presented in the paper were caused by a number of different factors including
design deficiencies,defects introduced during manufacturing or fabrication, service related
deterioration , and upsets during plant operation etc.

The cases presented do not indicate that a particular system or design is more prone to failures
than others. Instead,these examples must be carefully analysed to prevent their occurance in
other plants.

The awareness of the conditions which produce failures, helps the plant personnel to reduce the
potential for failures. This also helps in purchasing the most suitable equipment for a given
operation and ensuring proper design & fabrication of the equipment.

Figure-1
1ST REGENERATOR 2ND REGENERATOR VETROCOKE ABSORBER
CO2 GAS CO2 GAS

27.7 70
1. 0 0. 1 PROCESS
GAS OUT
106
4

3
3
2
106
2
70
124 1 2
1
1
HYDRAULIC
TURBINE 5
1. 2 0. 2
127

112

28 101
PROCESS GAS IN LEGEND
TEMPERATURE (DEG. C)
CO2 REMOVAL SYSTEM FLOW SHEET PRESSURE (KG/CM2G)
 Figure-2

GAS OUTLET B1 2nd REGENERATOR

RICH
SOLUTION A1
INLET
PACKING DETAILS
BED - 2
BED VOLUME (M 3) TYPE
1 81.9 IMTP 50
2 81.9 IMTP 50

BED - 1

LEAN
SOLUTION A2 SEMI-LEAN SOLUTION INLET
INLET
A3

SEMI- LEAN
SOLUTION B2 B3 LEAN SOLUTION OUTLET
OUTLET

Figure-3

2nd REGENERATOR
LEAKAGE IN SHELL DUE TO CORROSION

1800 1300 1030 900

15945 CIRCUM WELD SEAM

APPROX. 2200 M M HOLE

15100 A-2 430 M M

14200 M-3

(Development Of Shell)
 Figure-4

2ND REGENERATOR
LEAKAGE IN SHELL DUE TO CORROSION

3000 2850 1800 1300 1030 900

15945 CIRCUM . WELD SEAM
15930
15530

15100 A-2
HOLE
14850
M-3 14200
14000 A-7

THICKNESS MEASUREMENT WAS CARRIED OUT IN THE HATCHED AREA

NO REDUCTION, EXCEPT FAILURE, WAS OBSERVED

Figure-5 2ND REGENERATOR

FAILURE OF LIQUID REDISTRIBUTOR
AND STEAM DISTRIBUTOR

BED NO. 2

M ULTI- BEAM SUPPORT PLATE

26750 LIQUI D REDISTRIBUTOR FOUND
LIFTED BY 50 M M ON ONE SIDE

BED NO. 1 BED LIM ITER

IMTP 50
PACKING
M ULTI-BEAM SUPPORT PLATE

STEAM DISTRIBUTOR ( 3 SEGM ENTS

FOUND LIFTED FROM ITS SUPPORT
16100 BEAM BY ABOUT 150 M M )
MM
15100 M M
CHIMNEY
A2
 Figure-6
2ND REGENERATOR
SOLUTION INLET CLEATS
NOZZLE

SHELL
IMPINGEMENT PLATE
SHROUD

CHIMNEY
10 MM GAP
48 NOS. 20 Φ HOLES

Figure-7
2ND REGENERATOR
(Original Arrangement)

SHELL (25 M M THK ) 10 M M GAP

LINER ( 8 M M THK )

IMPINGEMENT PLATE

SOLUTION 900 φ CHIMNEY

INLET NOZZLE
(A2)

48 NOS. 20 Φ HOLES
 Figure-8
2ND REGENERATOR
(Modified Arrangement)

SHELL (25 M M THK )

496 Φ X 10 THK

SOLUTION 900 φ CHIMNEY

INLET NOZZLE
(A2)

Figure-9
VETROCOKE ABSORBER
PACKING DETAILS
2480 MM.
LEAN SOLUTION INLET M1
(A1) BED VOLUME (M3) TYPE
1 104. 9 IMTP 50
BED NO. 4 104. 9 IMTP 40
2
MULTI-BEAM SUPPORT
3 48. 3 IMTP 40
M2 4 48. 3 MELLAPACK
SEMI -LEAN BED NO. 3 250 Y
SOLUTION
INLET (A 2 & A 3) 5 11. 0 IMTP 70
M3

LIQUID REDISTRIBUTOR PLATES

BENT UPWARDS
BED NO. 2
MULTI BEAM SUPPORT GOT
3750 MM. M4 DISPLACED FROM T.S.R.

BED NO. 1 L.R.D. WAS DAMAGED &

LIFTED ABOVE M - 4
PROCESS GAS
INLET (A 4)
M5

BED NO. 5

(B2) RICH SOLUTION OUTLET

 Figure-10
VETROCOKE ABSORBER

PACKING BED NO. 2 MULTI-BEAM SUPPORT

OF BED NO. 2 LYING
LOOSE IN THE BED.

DISTORTED / DISPLACED
LRD OF BED NO. 1

DOUBLE C - BEAM
LYING LOOSE
PACKING MATERIAL T.S.R. OF MULTI-BEAM
OF BED NO. 1 SUPPORT

MANHOLE ( M 4 )

T.S.R. OF LRD

PACKING BED NO. 1

HYDRAULIC TURBINE INLET PIPING

USV USV
126 126
ORIGINAL MODIFIED
2 2
76 76
RICH GV
SOLUTION RICH GV
SOLUTION
18 18
26 26

00
11
ER 14” x 8”
8 ” HIC
”x 18
14
ER HIC
18

1070 107
0

70
8” HYDRAULIC TURBINE
INLET NOZZLE

8” HYDRAULIC TURBINE Figure-11

INLET NOZZLE
 GAS OUTLET B1 Figure-12
GV REGENERATOR
(Old Plant)
A1-2 RICH SOLUTION INLET
4900 M M
LEAKAGE FROM C - SEAM
WELD JOINT
BED - 3

PACKING DETAILS
44900 M M

BED - 2 BED VOLUME TYPE

(M 3)
1 172.5 SLOTTED RINGS
2 172.5 SLOTTED RINGS
BED - 1
3 172.5 SLOTTED RINGS

B 2-3 SOLUTION OUTLET

B4 SOLUTION OUTLET

Figure-15

GV REGENERATOR
DEVELOPMENT OF SHELL AND SHROUD
SHOWING AREAS OF CORROSION

NORTH 0 DEG 180 DEG SOUTH SHELL

M2
NECKLACE NECKLACE SHROUD
NOZZLE NOZZLE

CIR.SEAM
WELD

SHROUD
LOWER
EDGE

AREAS OF CORROSION ON SHELL TRAY SUPPORT RING

 GV REGENERATOR
SHROUD SECTIONAL VIEW

2 NOS. 10 NOS. SUPPORT CLEATS

INLET
10 MM GAP
NOZZLES
180 DEG SHELL (16 MM THK)
APART
8 MM. THICK SHROUD

SUPPORTING CIR. SEAM OF SHELL

STRIPS

8 NOS. SUPPORT CLEATS

LIQUID DISTRIBUTOR

TRAY SUPPORT RING

BED LIMITER GRID

PACKING BED NO 3

BED SUPPORT

Figure-14

Figure-13

GV REGENERATOR
DEVELOPMENT OF LINER

180 DEG
0 DEG
NORTH M2 SOUTH
NECKLAC E NECKLACE
NOZZLE NOZZLE

LINER GAP NO LINER LINER GAP NO LINER LINER GAP

EXISTS GAP EXISTS GAP EXISTS
 PH-1:2ND REGENERATOR
Damaged Shell Near Solution Inlet

PH-2:2ND REGENERATOR
Disturbed Steam Distributor
 PH-3:2ND REGENERATOR
SOLUTION INLET (Original Arrangement)

PH-4:VETROCOKE ABSORBER
Disturbed Bed
 PH-5:VETROCOKE ABSORBER
Disturbed 1st Bed Liquid Redistributor