Waste Heat Boiler (101-C) Leakages &

Possible Causes
Paper Abstract: Waste Heat Boiler 101-C is an essential part of Ammonia Plant in Kellogg design.
Almost every plant is facing the problems of no flow, reverse flow and tube leakage. These problems are
more significant on the plants where production capacity has been increased. In this article flow in the
risers is considered. How flow is checked and a method is proposed to establish and maintain equal flow
in both the risers.

Author: Ishfaq Ahmad Gondal

Dawood Hercules Chemicals Ltd. Lahore Pakistan

B – The Problem
Introduction
At Dawood Hercules, failure of the waste heat
boiler (101-C) has been the cause of production loss.
A - Dawood Hercules Chemicals Ltd. (dh) Tripping details are provided in a separate table. Table
# 1 elaborates the no. of trippings and the duration.

I nitially it was a joint venture of Dawood group

of Pakistan and Hercules of USA. This fertil-
izer plant was installed and commissioned in
1970. Initially its production was 625 MTPD of Am-
monia and 1100 MTPD of Urea with the brand name of
PROCESS DESCRIPTION
Ammonia Flow sheet is attached at the end for
Buber Sher ( The Lion). The Ammonia plant is basi- ready reference.
cally a Kellogg design. The Ammonia plant was re- • Natural Gas as Feed Gas is compressed in
vamped in 1991 for energy conservation and 30% ca- 1102-J & preheated in 101-B convection Sec-
pacity increase. Urea production was increased to 1350 tion
MTPD and Ammonia to 825 MTPD. • H2 is mixed into feed gas and de-sulphurized to
make it sulphur free
Facilities • De-sulphurized Natural Gas after mixing with
steam is reformed in Two steps:
The present plant facilities are:
• 825 MTPD ammonia plant 1. Primary Reforming
• 1350 MTPD granular urea plant 2. Secondary Reforming
• Utility plant provides 15MW Thermal Genera-
tion and also has a water treatment plant. 1 - Primary Reformer (101-B)
All Hydrocarbons except 11 % (approx.) CH4 are
Raw Material converted into H2, CO2 and CO in the presence of heat
and Nickel catalyst – 815OC & 33.5Bar (15000F & 485
The basic raw material is natural gas supplied at Psig)
battery limit by Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd.
(SNGPL). The gas requirement is about 45 MM SCFD

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 70 2005

2 - Secondary Reforming (103-D)
1. Air from 101-J compressor, after heating and
mixing steam, is introduced into 103-D
2. Partially reformed gases from 101-B with 11
% (approx.) unconverted CH4 is mixed with air
3. All O2 of air is burned with H2, leaving behind
N2 required for NH3 production generating
great amount of heat.
4. Temperature in combustion zone rises to about
2000oF
5. Remaining CH4 slipped from primary reformer
is further reformed leaving behind only 0.45 %
CH4
6. Reformed gases having mainly H2, N2, CO and
CO2 at about 1769oF and 445Psig enter waste
heat exchanger (101-C)
Importance in Process
1. Process gases from 103-D exit at 1769oF which
contain a huge amount of heat energy. Where
as down stream process vessel, HTS requires
low temperature of about 650oF
2. About 165 MMBtu/hr of heat equivalent to 5.5
MMSCFD NG, has to be removed from the
process gases
Heat Recovery
1. Due to high energy cost it is strongly desirable
to recover heat for useful purpose
2. In an Ammonia plant it is usually recovered to
produce HP steam in two steps:
• Primary Waste Heat Exchanger (101-C)
Recovers about 149 MMBtu/hr
• Secondary Waste Heat Exchanger (102-C)
Recovers about 15MMBtu/hr
Primary Waste Heat Exchanger (101-C)
1. Dawood Hercules Ammonia Plant is designed
by M.W. Kellogg
2. Our 101-C is M.W. Kellogg’s Bayonet Design,
fabricated by Hitachi, Japan
3. Shell side has process gases and Tube side has
high pressure Boiler water
4. It produces steam about 67% of the total am-
monia plant steam production.
2005
OPERATION OF 101-C WASTE HEAT
BOILER
101-C is a bayonet type heat exchanger having 255
bayonet 1 inch diameter inner tubes and 2 inch diameter
scabbard tubes. Water flows from boiler drum 101F
through down-comer into water chamber then it enters
the inner tube at the top and flows down through the
bayonet inner tubes. At the bottom of the inner tube,
flow is diverted upward in the scabbard-bayonet annu-
lus towards the outlet (steam chamber) and then rises to
boiler drum (101F) through the risers. Fig.#1
Initially boiler drum 101F, down-comer, risers and
101-C are filled with water. Heating starts at the bot-
tom of tubes in 101-C by injection of hot gases from re-
former into `shell side of 101-C. Water starts heating
and starts rising up through the outer tubes and cold
water flows down, through the inner tubes. Hot water
rises into the steam chamber and goes to boiler drum
101F via risers. Hot water mixes with cold water in the
risers (only during startup – during operation hot water
+ steam bubbles traverse the risers), heating it thus de-
creasing the density it becomes light hence it starts ris-
ing up and reaches 101F boiler drum. Ideally hot water
should rise through both the risers in the form of steam.
During start up only cold shots will be given in the
down-comer to start steam generation and establish the
flow in the risers. Ideally water should flow down
through the down-comer into 101-C, and should rise
into both the risers to the boiler drum.
Balancing Modernization and Revamp
(BMR). In 1991 it was decided to increase the capacity
of the plant from 1100 tons per day to 1350 tons per
day. For this a thorough study was carried out. New
equipments were added and some old components were
replaced. Major changes were made on Urea plant.
This waste heat boiler had been operating normally
till BMR in 1991, when capacity was increased so the
load of 101-C was increased also. During BMR study
M/s Kellogg declared that no modification was required
in 101-C as it could take the additional load. Unfortu-
nately the things shaped otherwise and Dawood Hercu-
les had to face problems of 101-C leakage, causing pro-
duction loss and had to bear heavy maintenance costs.
Table # 1 indicates details of trippings.
101-C Instrumentation
Refer to attached drawing fig#1showing instrumen-
tation for the measurement of density and water circula-
tion between 101-F (steam drum) and101-C (heat ex-
71 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
changer). 101-C heat exchanger is not only working as
simple heat exchanger but also as an energy pump,
which takes water from 101-F through down-comer
heats it in 101-C tubes and sends back to 101-F through
two risers (north and south side risers). Originally two
instruments were provided on the 101-C to measure the
density of water in the down-comer and the pressure
difference between the inlet (down-comer) & outlets
(north side riser and south side riser), which is the indi-
cation of water circulation through 101-C.
Tags and range of the instruments installed on 101-C;
a) DRe-8 (For density of water in down-comer)
Range=0–7 PSI
b) PDRe-36 (For pressure differential between
down-comer lower point & riser)
Range=0–20 PSI
c) Change over valves fig 1 --were installed for
checking the ∆P of the risers with respect to
the down-comer using same PDRe36.
DRe-8
DRe-8 (density recorder) is installed on down-
comer. The distance between the two process points on
down-comer is 46 feet. A density measuring instrument
(differential pressure transmitter) is installed in line of
the bottom process connection. The low side of the
transmitter is connected with bottom process point ‘A’
and the high side of the measuring instrument is con-
nected with top process point ‘B’ on the down-comer as
shown in Fig#1. The principal of density measurement
is that density is inversely proportional to the ∆ P.
Average reading on recorder is 80% = 5.6 Psig
CALCULATIONS
Height between taps of down-comer = 46 feet
Specific gravity of water in hot leg = 0.687
Specific gravity of water in cold leg = 1
Pressure in high chamber of Transmitter
= (46 x 1 x 0.4335) = 19.94 Psi
Pressure in low chamber of Transmitter
= (46 x 0.687 x 0.4335) = 13.70 Psi
Pressure across the Transmitter
= (19.94 -13.70) = 6.24 Psi
very close to average
Instrument calibration range
= 0 – 7 Psi
PRCe-18 Steam Pressure in (101F)
= 1334 Psig
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
TI-3-32 (in 101F) Steam Temperature
= 582.6oF
Calculation based on Kellogg’s formula
[0.4335x H x (D1 – D2)] / D1 = R
D2=D1- {RD1/ (0.4335 x H)}
Where
H = Height between taps in feet on down-comer
= 46ft
R = Down-comer differential recorder reading
? in Psi
D1 = Density of cold leg (upper leg of DP cell)
= 62.15 lbs/ft3
D2 = Density of hot leg (down-comer)
= 43.5 lbs/ft3
( Density of water at 1334 Psig & 582.6oF
=43.5lbs/ft3 )
With this the reading of Dre-8
= [0.4335 x 46 x (62.15 – 43.5)]/62.15
= 5.9 Psig
Alternate taking the Reading of Dre-8
= 5.6 (80%) =
At 900 Psi, 534 oF in 101F Drum
H= 46, D1= 62.15, R=5,
D2 from table = 46.9 lbs/ft3
At 1300Psi & 582oF R at DRe-8 = 5.6Psid,
D2 from table ≈ 43.5 lbs/ft3 = 0.321 (62.15 - D2)
D2 = 62.15 -17.45 = 44.7 lbs/ft3
This is very close to the reading from the table this in-
dicates that Dre-8 is showing correct reading
[0.4335 x 46 x (62.15 – 43.5)]/62.15 = 5.9 Psid
PdRe 36 (for ∆P)
Differential pressure transmitter was installed with
HP side connected to point “A” of the down-comer and
the LP side was connected to points “C” & “D ” on the
risers and the selection of the risers was through change
over valves as shown in fig#1.
72 2005
Changes in Instruments Comparison of Readings
A set of readings of these instruments are given below
Initially the instrumentation was not proper because DRe-8 = 6.03 DRe-9N= 9.8 DRe-9S= 15
the reference points ‘C & D’ on these risers were at an PDRe 36 N = 0 PDRe 36 S = 3.7
elevation of (161 + 62) = 223 ft Where as they should Using Kellogg formula
have been at the elevation of the lower point ‘A’ of the D2=D1- {RD1/(0.4335 x H)
down-comer i.e., at 161ft elevation. Fig.#1 indicates the (1psi= 2.307ft of water or 1ft of water=1/2.307=0.4335 psi)
location. Two new points ‘ E & F’ were created on both
the risers. DRe R ∆P Psi H ft D1 D2
DRe8 6.03 46 62.15 43.36
DRe 9N 9.8 62 62.15 39.49
DRe 9S 15 62 62.15 27.46
DRe (8, 9N, 9S) for Densities
Density of down-comer (DRe 8) is 43.36 lbs/ft3 very
Initially density of the down-comer was measured high. Density of the north riser (DRe-9N) is close to the
only and DRe 8 was installed for this purpose between down-comer and it is higher than the south riser. Fur-
point s’A&B’. Two more density recorders DRe 9N ther PDRe 36 N indicates 0Psi ∆p between down-comer
and DRe9S were provided to measure the density of and the north riser. All this indicates that there is no
both the risers and this provided the clear indication of flow in the north riser and all the flow is through south
the difference in the density. It helps in monitoring the riser.
flow in the risers. DRe9N was connected between E &
C (62ft. apart) on the North riser and DRe9S was con- Layout Difference Between the Risers
nected between F & D(62ft. apart) on the south riser. Flow of any fluid follows easy path, i.e., the path
Refer fig #2 with least resistance. Ideally both the risers should be of
exactly equal length, diameter and shape only then they
can share equal flow. Physically both the risers are not
PdRe 36N, 36S (for ∆P)
of equal length hence there is a difference of 1Psi be-
tween both the risers when measured at the 2 points
Initially there was only one Transmitter ‘ PdRe 36 ‘
keeping the elevation reference the same for both the
for the measurement of ∆P between the riser and the
risers. This gives clear indication that resistance for
down-comer. PdRe 36 was installed between point ‘A’
steam in both the risers is not exactly the same. The
on the down-comer and points ‘C&D’ on the risers for
riser providing path for the steam has less density and
this purpose.Selection of the riser was through change
higher surface temperature as compared to the other
over valves. See Fig# 1. The reference points‘C&D’ on
riser which is not functioning properly.
the risers were not at a proper elevation. The points on
This is the major reason that mostly only one riser
the risers were at a height of 61ft above the sample
is functioning properly; the 2nd riser almost always
point ‘A’ of the down-comer. This set up was also
works as dead column which is clearly indicated by the
modified. Two new points (E & F) were provided on
densities of both the risers.
the risers at an elevation of 161ft. Now E, F & A
(shown in fig #2) were at the same elevation.
To indicate ∆P between down-comer and risers Temperature Comparison
PdRe36N and PdRe36S were provided to measure ∆P
of both the risers with respect to the down-comer this Measurement of surface temperatures indicates the
new arrangement facilitated to indicate the factual posi- same. The temperature of the riser with the steam flow
tion of the behavior of both the risers and the down- will be higher than the temperature in the down-comer
comer. PdRe36N was connected between points ‘A’ of and the temperature of the riser without steam flow will
the down-comer & ‘E’ of the North riser. PdRe36S was be less than temperature of the other riser. or very close
connected between points ‘A’ of the down-comer & ‘F’ to that of the down-comer. In our case skin temperature
of the South riser. All these indications were displayed of north riser is less than that of south riser.
on a monitor via a PLC. This was to provide compari-
son of all the indications. fig # 3 shows sample print out
of PLC display.

2005 73 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 Density Comparison
If the densities are compared, density of the riser
with steam flow will be less than the density in the
down-comer & the density of the riser without steam
flow will be very close to the density of the down-
comer. It is functioning as dead column which is
blocked by the steam pressure in the steam chamber and
in the 101F boiler drum. Density of down comer is
43.36 lbs/ft3 Density of the north riser is 39.49 lbs/ft3
and the density of the south riser is 27.46 lbs/ft3. This
clearly indicates that flow is through south riser only.
North riser is behaving as dead column almost.
The density of one riser remains almost very
close to the density of down-comer, hence very less
∆P between the two. further the skin temperature of
this riser is also much less than the other one. This
clearly indicates that this riser is without proper
flow and behaving as dead water column.
In original Kellogg design the density of the down-
comer and one riser is measured. It has not been con-
sidered important to measure the ∆P of the second riser
and the down-comer. At the start of the process, to es-
tablish the flow, cold shots are injected in the down-
comer using MICe 32 and is continued till flow is es-
tablished in one riser at least.
Physically both the risers are not of equal length
furthermore the number of bends and inclinations are
also not the same. This is the major cause of difference
in behavior of both the risers.
In our plant lengths are :
North riser 14” dia
(3’8” + 12’6” + 16’6” + 64 + 12 + 9’6”)ft = 116’10”
South riser 14” dia
(3’8” + 12’6” + 16’6” + 9’ + 63’ + 12’ + 7’6”)ft = 113’10”
Down-comer 16”dia
(17’ + 11’6” + 50’ + 5’ + 20’ + 8’8” + 4’6”)ft = 117’8”
The required behavior of this waste heat boiler 101-
C is such that the water should flow from boiler drum
101F via down-comer in to the water chamber where all
the inner tubes are connected. This cold water goes to
the hot gas chamber in 101-C via inner tubes. All the
inner tubes open up in the outer tubes of the 101-C
shell. Refer Fig# 1 for detail. Here the water is heated
and flow is diverted upwards through outer tubes into
steam chamber from where it goes to boiler drum ‘101-
F’ via risers.
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
Failures of 101-C
Under normal design 101-C is capable of delivering
the required steam without any major failure. M/s Kel-
logg’s report indicates that 101-C has failed frequently
only in those plants where the capacity / production has
been increased i.e. it has failed on the plants where ever
BMR has been carried out and all the modifications in
101-C like baffles etc have failed. The reason being that
under normal design any fluctuation in the steam load
could be catered for without any damage to 101-C. But
after BMR, the load on 101-C also increases so it has
not been able to withstand fluctuations in the steam
load. Since mostly the 101-C has been working on one
riser only and the second riser has been working as
dead water column and at the time of fluctuations in
steam load there are possibilities for the cold water of
the dead column to enter tubes via the steam chamber
and causing the leakage of 101-C tubes. As there is
possibility of reverse flow during sudden fluctuations in
steam load.
Efforts to establish flow in both Risers
Low or maldistributed circulation in 101-C causes
following problems:
• Over heating of tubes
• Rupture/Failure of tube
• Deposition of non-corrosive Sodium Iron Phos-
phate on the tube running at high temperature
for long duration
In this design of 101-C it is highly desirable to
avoid reverse flow or no flow. Furthermore flow should
be established in proper sequence i.e., down-comer
should provide path for the water from 101F to 101-C,
and both the risers should share the steam flow from
101-C to 101F.
For this reason cold shot injection via MICE 33 is
an essential part of 101-C design and it is used during
startup only. Cold shots are provided till the flow is es-
tablished in the riser. This effort helps in establishing
flow in one riser only as both the risers are not similar
inshape.
Flow in the second riser
To establish the flow in proper sequence, a drain
of 2” dia with a valve on it was created in the north
riser without flow. When some of the water was drained
the steam flow established from that riser also. Since
the drain was not controlled so the flow balance drifted
and the steam flow in the original riser was reduced.
74 2005
 It was concluded that a better way to establish flow
in both the risers is to create drains on both the risers
and regulate the drains using controller and control
valves. Controller will compare the ∆P of both the ris-
ers. Readings of PDRe36N and PDRe36S are to be
used. Controller will be used to drain the riser having
less ∆P and will regulate the flow till ∆P for both the
risers is equal. So if drain from both the risers is con-
trolled by using control valves it is possible to maintain
steam flow from both the risers. This will eliminate the
reverse flow or no flow from any riser and will also
help in reducing the losses caused by fluctuation in
steam requirement. So the same size of drain (2inch
dia) was also created on the second riser and a valve
was installed.
Both the drains could not be tried as such opera-
tions can be carried out during plant shut down only
and at that time required control valves and the control-
ler were not available.
It was also proposed to install a controller and two
control valves, one on each drain point and the error
signal to be generated by a controller by comparing the
∆P of both the risers. That is the pressure difference of
both the risers compared to the down-comer should be
almost equal to ensure the same behavior of both the
risers. With this arrangement reverse flow can be
avoided and both the risers behave normal and equally
share the steam flow.
Controlled drains are to be provided on both the ris-
ers. Alternately both the difference in densities can be
used to drain the riser with higher density till both the
densities are the same. This will confirm that both the
risers are working normal and that the possibility of the
reverse flow is eliminated.
This controller setup can be used only when steam
generation has started and flow has established in one
riser atleast and MICe 32 has been closed. After this
these controller and drain control valves will be used.
Comparison of two plants
Two cases were compared 101-C at Dawood Her-
cules plant and 101-C at Pak Arab Multan. Table # 2
provides detailed information. On checking it was
found that in both the cases only one riser is function-
ing properly i.e., the steam flow from 101-C to 101F is
via one riser only, and that the second riser is behaving
as dead column. Before BMR there was not appreciable
leakage problem at Dawood Hercules plant but after
BMR, 101-C leakage has escalated and has been cause
of lot of production loss. There were many leakage
2005
events after the BMR as detailed in the leakage history
( table #1). In case of Pak-Arab Fertilizer Multan,
though only one riser is functioning and the second
riser is only a dead column of water, but the size of the
101-C and its down-comer and risers is such that load
fluctuations have little effect and it is working trouble
free, and they have not faced any leakage problem so
far. The comparison table#2 shows the major differ-
ences:
BMR – Modifications & Chemical Cleaning
The following points related to 101-C were carried
out during BMR of 1991;
o Modifications in risers of auxiliary heater
o Kellogg advised chemical cleaning of
whole circuit
o Not-failed Bundle A replaced with Bundle
B in Sep.1991
o Chemical cleaning was carried out by M/S
Keller & Bohack, Germany
o Chemicals Used: Caustic soda, detergent,
lithosolvent, citric acid, hydrazine, ammo-
nia
o Dislodging of old magnetite layer
o System was not properly flushed by M/S
Keller & Bohack
FAILURE HISTORY
Since commissioning in October 1971, the 101-C
failed twice until Ammonia Plant was revamped in
1991 for energy conservation and 30% capacity in-
crease. However, M. W. Kellogg considered this (101-
C) heat exchanger appropriate to handle the increased
heat load on 101-C after-BMR. Risers of Auxiliary
Heater were Modified In BMR. On Kellogg’s recom-
mendation, the whole circuit including steam drum,
down-comers, risers, 101-C, secondary waste heat
boiler 102-C, 103-C and auxiliary heater was chemi-
cally cleaned. Chemical cleaning was carried out by
M/S Keller & Bohack, Germany. However they could
not flush out properly the old magnetite layer detached
from the inner walls of the circuit during chemical
cleaning. Afterwards, 101-C faced frequent failures and
its operation became unpredictable.
Table #1 shows the 101C failures at our plant.
In 2001 There were 6 failures of 101-C
Deposit Found in One Not Failed Tube of Bundle in
2001
75 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
 • A dark grey deposit was found in one not failed
tube.
• The sample was provided to M/S Nalco along-
with the laboratory analyses reports of boiler
water for the service life of the bundle A. The
deposit was found to contain sodium (as
Na2O), phosphorous (as P2O5) and iron (as
Fe2O3) as analyzed by Nalco.
• Nalco reviewed the boiler water analyses re-
ports and revealed that the control is in accor-
dance to the desired congruent phosphate
treatment control.
• In consideration to the above, Na/PO4 ratio was
strictly controlled around 2.6 as recommended
by Kellogg.
• Revised boiler water limits in 2001:
pH PO4 Na:PO4
9.3-9.6 3-6 ~2.
Similarly There were 8 trippings in 2004
Pre-Failure Events of Shut Downs in 2004
1. Failure on 23rd February 04 (Bundle A):
During Plant Annual Turnaround in Jan-Feb
2004, new retubed Bundle A was installed.
Overhauling of the governor of syn gas com-
pressor turbines 103-JTs was carried out by
M/S Siemen’s Vendor Service Man. Plant was
started and 101-C was taken into service on
17th February. .Vendor Service Man per-
formed calibration of 103JTs governor which
produced pressure variations in high pressure
steam circuit. Plant remained at low load due to
new Prill Tower commissioning activities. It
was noted that the governor was not respond-
ing for high speed at high front end load. On
23rd February. Vendor Service Man again
checked/calibrated the governor. The same
day, 101-C failed when plant front-end load
was 93%.
2. Failure on 7th March 04 (Bundle B): After
failure of Bundle A, standby Bundle B was in-
stalled and taken into service on 25th February.
103JTs governor was not properly responding
so Vendor Service Man was again invited. As
instructed by Vendor Service Man, syn gas
compressor was stopped on 5th March for
checking turbine governor control system.
Compressor was restarted on the same day and
stopped again on 6th March for checking gov-
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
ernor control oil system. Compressor was again
started and stopped as instructed by Vendor
Service Man and then restarted. Bundle B
failed on 7th March when plant front end load
was 95%.
3. Failure on 6th July 04 (Bundle A): Bundle A
was installed and was taken into service on
10th March. Plant load was gradually increased
to 101%. On 6th July, high vibration with ab-
normal sound in 103-BJT appeared. As one Re-
former tube leakage was also suspected so the
Plant was emergency shutdown. During shut-
down, leakage in 101-C was detected.
4. Failure on 15th July o4 (Bundle B): Bundle B
was installed and taken into service on 10th
July. On 13th July, The plant faced an emer-
gency at 86% front end load when MICe-32
(1500 Psig steam letdown valve) opened itself
and 575 Psig PSV operated. During this emer-
gency, 1350 Psig steam pressure suddenly
dropped to about 900 Psig. On 15th July at
0615 hrs, above incident again occurred and
101-C failed at 0930 hrs at 97% front end load.
5. Failure on 20th July o4 (Bundle A): Bundle A
was installed and 1” drain was provided on
north riser piping at about 12 feet above the
riser nozzle at 101-C. It was intended to estab-
lish flow in north riser as well. The plant was
started on 18th July. During startup, drain was
partially opened that established proper flow in
north riser but unfortunately this resulted in re-
duced flow in south riser. On 19th July electric
power failure caused total Plant shutdown. The
plant was restarted. Proper flow in north riser
was observed although the bleeder was not
opened. However negligible flow was observed
in south riser. On 20th July, the 101-C failed
when plant front end load was just 77%.
6. Failure on 18th August (Bundle B): Bundle B
was installed and was taken into service on
23rd July. Plant load was gradually increased
to 96.3 % load. It failed on 18th August. No
pre-failure abnormality was observed.
7. Failure on 16th October (Bundle A): Bundle
A was installed and taken into service on 21st
August. Plant load was increased gradually in
steps to 93.7%. The plant operated smoothly
and 101-C failed on 16th October. In this inci-
76 2005
 dent dark-grey deposit was found in two not-
failed tubes. Deposit sample was sent to M/S
Nalco for investigation. The deposit analysis
report as received from M/S Nalco was sent to
M/S KBR. Please note that in first 6 failures,
no deposit was observed in the failed as well as
not-failed tubes.
8. Failure on 23rd October (Bundle B): Bundle
B was installed and taken into service on 20
October. Plant load was increased gradually in
steps to 80.5%. The plant operated smoothly
till 101-C failed on 23rd October.
Kellogg’s 1997 Study on 101-C
Kellogg was asked to study the causes of failures
and briefed below.
1. Dawood Hercules provided to Kellogg
a. 2 samples of tubes failed on 02-12-
1991(Burst tube) and 16-11-1995 (Perforated
tube)
b. Water samples
c. boiler water analytical reports and water
chemistry limits
d. Operating process conditions.
2. Kellogg provided tube samples to Lloyd’s
3. Lloyd’s report concluded
1. Burst tube: Severe overheating leading to a
short term creep failure. The cause of the over-
heating could not be determined, however, tube
bursts are normally attributed to reduced water
flow or blockage.
2. Perforated tube:
a) It is possible that the failure is due to
low pH of boiler water.
b) Corrosion caused metal loss which
had penetrated the tube walls
c) 2 layers scale on inner surface was ob-
served. Inner layer, 0.02 mm thick,
was of iron oxide whereas outer layer
showed, in addition to iron oxide, ele-
ments associated with water chemistry.
Kellogg’s Comments and Recommendations (report
dated 13-09-1997)
2005
1. To avoid debris reaching the tubes, plug the
drain notches in the internal stand pipe of
down-comer.
2. Install mud strainer in down-comer.
3. pH/phosphate relationship used by Dawood
Hercules, Na:PO4 ratio of 2.2, is below the
normally accepted Kellogg’s practice of using
Na:PO4 ratio of 2.6.
4. Kellogg recommended Dawood Hercules to
modify their existing water specifications
inline with Kellogg’s specifications. (pH=
9.5~9.8, PO4= 5~10 ppm)
5. The highest heat flux is calculated to be
134,000 BTU/ft2Hr that is not considered ex-
cessive as new boilers are now designed for a
maximum flux of 140,000 BTU/ft2Hr.
6. To allow the Ammonia Plant to be further up-
graded, above 130%, it is necessary to fit new
boiler
7. Two options for new 101-C:
a. Floating head unit very similar to the type
being installed on modern plants.
b. Similar to existing design with more tubes
and larger shell diameter
Drain notches of 101-C down-comer were plugged.
1. As per Kellogg’s advice in 1998, Nalco was
consulted for having expert opinion on water
chemistry and control.
2. Comparison of Dawood Hercules water
specifications with recommendations of Kel-
logg and Nalco :
pH PO4 Na:PO4
Dawood Hercules 8.7-9.2 2-10 2.2-2.4
Kellogg 9.5-9.8 5-10 ~2.6
Nalco 9.2-9.8 6-10 2.3-2.6
Total No. of analyses from 1998 to date = 90
No. of Analyses below Na:PO4 of 2.3 = 68
Percentage = 76%
Waste Heat Boiler Review By KBR
M/S Kellogg Brown & Roots (KBR) were also asked
for rectification of the fault.
1. Provided to Kellogg Brown & Roots (KBR):
a) Process data: Existing and new revamp
b) Failure history & brief detail of 101-C tube
failures since 1971
c) Detail of deposits found once in 2001 & once
in 2004
77 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
 d) Boiler water specifications
e) Laboratory analysis reports for the following
periods
i. 01 May 2004 – 23 June 2004
ii. 21 August 2004 – 16 October 2004
f) Isometrics (Down-comer and Risers)
g) Mechanical drawings (101F & 101-C)
2. KBR’s Comments & Recommendations:
a) Phosphate hideout is an unlikely possibility
b) Based on review of the daily analytical reports,
the control and results are excellent
c) The phosphate feed should be increased
d) Better limits are pH = 9.2 – 9.5 and PO4 = 4 –
10 ppm
e) Deposit formation was not related to improper
water chemistry or treatment control
f) There is no evidence to suggest an overfeed of
phosphate resulting in the deposit
3. The cause of the deposits in tubes A-28 and A-29
are as follows:
i. Local hot spot developed
ii. Localized, non-corrosive sodium iron
phosphate deposit began to form
iii. Gradual build up over time (the photo
seems to show layers of material)
never got hot enough to fail ( Photo
#1)
iv. End cap material is probably deposited
material that fell off
4. Nalco should be asked to provide a specific
polymer dispersant to help prevent deposits
from forming.
5. KBR does not believe that the current fail-
ures are related to steam drum internals.
6. Increased heat load and consequently the
higher heat flux after BMR did not contribute
in frequent failures after BMR.
7. We believe the circulation rate to the auxil-
iary boiler is adequate and its performance is
not related to the current failures on 101-C
8. If one riser has no active flow and the other
has two phase flow, KBR have calculated
that the vaporization rate would be 17-21%
whereas the desired vaporization rate would
be 12%. The higher vaporization rate will re-
sult in lower water flow to the 101-C and re-
sult in velocities in the tubes to be 40-70%
lower than normal.
9. Installing the zig zag baffle will restore the
vaporization rate to the normal and provide
higher water velocities in the boiler tubes.
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
10. Sudden pressure surges in the boiler system
can cause magnetite to spall from the boiler
tubes and other components which can lead
to solids present in the system which could
lead to tube leakage.
11. Install a mud strainer & blow down at down-
comer to avoid debris entering the tubes
Conclusions of the reports
1. Kellogg’s 1997-Study declared that the exist-
ing 101-C is adequate for increased heat load
after BMR. In our opinion its adequacy is
marginal as KBR has recommended installing
higher capacity 101-C with increased area by
46% for ammonia capacity increase by just
9.2%.
2. Kellogg pointed out that the waste heat boilers
with increased heat load are more susceptible
to failures caused by inadequate boiler water
quality or dirt in the system due to the higher
heat fluxes.
3. Dawood Hercules 101-C with its increased heat
load has become more sensitive to plant emer-
gencies particularly in the existing situation
with uneven risers flow.
4. Since 1980, KBR had started installing their
floating head design waste heat boiler in new
plants to eliminate the possibility of frequent
failures experienced by Bayonet design.
5. Inadequate water circulation due to uneven
flow in the risers causes tube overheating with
consequent tube failures.
6. In KBR’s opinion, the cause of the deposits is
the localized overheating of tubes and not the
phosphate overfeeding.
7. History of 101-C failures indicates that the
soundness of tube bundles is seriously affected
by Plant emergencies.
8. For enhanced capacity of 890MTPD ammonia,
KBR in their recent report dated 11 November
2004 has recommended to change down-comer
piping from 16” to 20” and the risers from 14”
to 16” to improve water circulation.
9. The 16” down-comer piping is still a major
bottleneck to supply required boiler water to
existing 101-C particularly during Plant emer-
gencies.
78 2005
 Following table indicates ICI comments
Causes of Failures (ICI's paper on 'Bayonet Tube Boiler
Failures')
Classification Possible Reason for Failure
Mechanical defects Foreign body – materi-
als/insulation
Plugged tube – plug leaked
Faulty welding
Fault in metal
Mal-operation Loss of boiler feed water rates/loss
of boiler level
Start-up & shut Leaks found either at start-up or
down during shut down – Reverse Cir-
culation
Tube corrosion Poor water treatment

Boiler feed water Poor water treatment Loss of

dope chemicals
Unknown Reverse Circulation

All the efforts so for have failed and there is no

proper solution of the problem. M/S KBR has already
started replacing the existing design with improved ver-
sion of their own. This is indirect admission of the
failure of this design. It is proposed to try this control
valves and controller arrangement before going for
expensive replacement of the complete 101-C. This
method ensures establishment of flow in both the
risers it ensures remedy of no flow or reverse flow.

2005 79 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 Table-2 Dawood Hercules – 101-C Comparison with Pak-Arab-Multan
Dawood Hercules 101-C Pak-Arab
Description
Before BMR After BMR 101-C
Gas Flow lb/hr 226,306 269,101 300,935
Heat Exchanged MM Btu/hr 116.5 149 154
2
Heat Transfer Area Ft 2680 2680 3825
No. of Tubes 255 (148 S /107 L) 255 (148 S /107 L) 322
Down- comer size inch 16 16 24
Riser Size inch 2 x 14 2 x 14 2 x 20
Tube Side Water Flow lb/hr 2,100,000 1,778,405 2,920,395
Steam Production lb/hr 210,443 262,171 284,836
Water/Steam Ratio 9.98 6.78 10.25

Fig # 3

DRe-8 LRe-23
PDRe-36

FRe-23

FRe-26

PDRe-36

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 80 2005

 Table 1 : Failures of 101-C at Dawood Hercules - 1972 to 2004
Load Failed
Year No. of failures Failed on Service life Bundle
% Tubes
1972 1 17 Aug. Oct. 1971 – Aug. 1972 A 106 1
1985 1 22 Aug. 17-Aug-72 to 22-Aug-85 B 70 1
After BMR 1990
1991 1 of 2 21 Nov. 17-Nov. to 21 Nov.. B 80.8 2
1991 2 of 2 02 Dec. 28-Nov to 02 Dec. A 90 1
1992 1 of 4 18 Mar. 14 Dec. 91 to 18 Mar 92 B 91 4
1992 2 of 4 25 Mar. 24 Mar. to 25 Mar. A 74 2
1992 3 of 4 5-Apr 03 Apr. to 05 Apr. B 60 1
1992 4 of 4 30-Apr 13 Apr to 30 Apr. A 95 3
1993 1 of 1 17-Apr 23 Sep 92 to 17 Apr. 93 B 100 1
1994 1 of 1 28-Dec. 23-Apr-93 to 28-Dec-94 A 46.2 1
1995 1 of 1 16-Nov. 28-Jan. to 16-Nov. A 102.6 2
1996 1 of 1 24-Aug. 7-Feb-96 to 24-Aug-96 A 64.1 1
1997 1 of 1 14-Mar. 3-Feb-97 to 14-Mar-97 B 101.9 1
2000 1 of 1 18-Jan 6-Feb-98 to 18- Jan-2000 A 99 1
2001 1 of 6 15th Mar. 11-Feb-00 to 15 Mar.01 A 102.6 2
2 of 6 22nd Mar. 20 to 22-Mar. B 102.6 3
3 of 6 3rd April 27-Mar. to 3-Apr. A 86 1
4 of 6 7th April 3- to 7-April B 76.9 1
5 of 6 12th July 16-Apr. to 12 Jul A 91.5 2
6 of 6 29th Dec. 18-Jul to 29 dec A 68.8 1
2004 1 of 8 23-Feb. 17- Feb. to 23-Feb A 93 1
2 of 8 7-Mar. 25- Feb to 7- Mar. B 95 2
3 of 8 6-Jul. 10- Mar. to 6- Jul. A 101 1
4 of 8 15-Jul. 10- to 15- July B 97 1
5 of 8 20-Jul. 19- to 20- July A 77 1
6 of 8 18-Aug. 23-Jul. to18-Aug. B 96 2
7 of 8 16-Oct 21-Aug to 16-Oct A 93 3
8 of 8 23-Oct. 20- to 23- Oct. B 80.5 1

2005 81 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 Photo #1

65

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 82 2005

 Natural
Gas
H2

650 0F Hydrotreater
540 & Sulphur Removal
PSIG Desulphurizer

Steam

1500 0F Convert 90%

Primary To Urea Unit
Reformer CH4 to H2, CO & CO2
Air

To Utility
1800 0F Secondary Add N2 and Unit
Reformer convert remaining
CH4
Steam Syn. Gas
Turbine Compressor
BFW 1500# Convert H2
Waste Heat Steam
575# & N2, to NH3
Boiler
Steam Ammonia
900 0F Converter
0
635 F 1800
440 psig Shift Convert CO to PSIG
Converters CO2
Ammonia
CO2 to Separate &
Remove Separation
CO2 Re- Urea Unit liquefy NH3
&
CO2 from gases moval System from uncon-
Refrigeration
verted gases -28 0F
Convert traces Ammonia
Methanator
of CO & CO2 to CH4 to Urea Unit

2005 83 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 TI-3- PRCe
32 -18 STEAM OUT 580 deg F , 1334 psig

LRCe-
101-F 23

7 FT

D
C

MICe
33
B

For Cold
Shot

DOWN-COMER
NORTH RISER

SOUTH RISER
LDA - 4
LOW DENSITY ALARM
SET AT 25 %

PDRe-36
dia 16"

dia 14"
dia 14"

DRe-8
62 FT
46 FT

RECORDER

Change over
A PDRe

Valves
DRe 8 36
3 FT
4 FT
MF
MF L H
H L WATER IN
RANGE = 0 - 20 PSIG

RANGE = 0 - 7 PSIG

GAS OUT
688 deg F

Readings on 19 April 2001

PRCe-18 = 1334 psig 101 C
TI-3-32 = 580 deg F
DRe-8=83 %=5.81 psid
PdRe-36=48 %=9.6 psid (N)
PdRe-36= 43 %=8.6 psid(S)
LRCe-23= 60%

GAS IN
PDRe-36 ROSEMOUNT 1151-DP5
1708 deg F
DRe-8 FISHER & PORTER 10B2496 400 psig

dh 101- C INSTRUMENTATION Fig-1 C:\101 -C\VisioDocument

E&I PDRe - 36 / DRe – 8 Kellogg

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 84 2005

 FRCe TI-3- PRCe
23 32 18 STEAM OUT 580 0F , 1334 psig

LRe-
101-F 23

7 FT

D
C

MICe
33
NORTH SIDE RISER
B
For Cold Shot

SOUTH SIDE RISER

dia 16" DOWNCOMER

62 FT
LOW DENSITY ALARM

dia 14"
SET AT 25 %

dia 14"
controller
LDA - 4

46 FT
CV-b CV-a
New New
drain drain

161ft
E
Elevation

DRe 8

4 FT A
3 FT F
H L
RANGE = 0 - 10 PSIG WATER IN
PDRe DRe
36-S 9-S

PDRe H L
DRe
GAS OUT RANGE = 0 - 7 PSIG
L H
9-N 36- N RANGE = 0 - 20 PSIG
667 deg F

H L
101 C

L H
RANGE = 0 - 20 PSIG RANGE = 0 - 7 PSIG

L H
DRe-8: A -B
DRe-9 North E -C
North Riser length DRe-9 South: F -D
PDRe-36 North: E - A
South Riser length PDRe-36 South: F - A
GAS IN
1727 deg F

dh 101- C INSTRUMENTATION Fig-2 C:\101-CVisioDocument

E&I PDRe-36(N,S)& DRe-8 Dre-9(N,S)

2005 85 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL