1
LEGAL ETHICS
DIGESTS
ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2001
LAWYER
1. Duty to the Court/Negligence of a
Lawyer
In Re: Vicente Y. Bayani
A.C. No. 5307. August 9, 2000
Facts: Atty. Vicente Bayani was the
lawyer for the appellant in a criminal
case. He failed to submit his proof of
service in his appellant's brief which
subsequently caused the inability of the
appellee to file his own brief. The IBP
was order to investigate on the matter
and despite repeated notices, Bayani
failed to submit the proof of service and
his answer to the IBP's query. Hence,
this administrative complaint.
Held: GUILTY. Atty. Bayani's failure to
submit proof of service of appellant's
brief and his failure to submit the
required comment manifest willful
disobedience to the lawful orders of the
Supreme Court, a clear violation of the
canons of professional ethics. It appears
that Atty. Bayani has fallen short of the
circumspection required of a member of
the Bar. A counsel must always
remember that his actions or omissions
are binding on his clients. A lawyer
owes his client the exercise of utmost
prudence and capability in that
representation. Further, lawyers are
expected to be acquainted with the
rudiments of law and legal procedure
and anyone who deals with them has
the right to expect not just a good
amount of professional learning and
competence but also a whole-hearted
fealty to his client's cause. Having been
remiss in his duty to the Court and to
the Bar, Atty. Bayani was suspended
from the practice of law for 3 months
and until the time he complies with the
Order of the Supreme Court to submit
the required proof of service.
2. Duty to Client/Accounting of Client’s
Money/Negligence
Teodulfo B. Basas vs. Atty. Miguel
I. Icawat
A.C. No. 4282. August 24, 2000
Facts: Atty. Miguel Icawat was the
lawyer for Teodulfo Basas and some
other laborers in their complaint against
their employer. The NLRC rendered an
adverse decision. Basas and his fellow
workers, however, insisted that they
appeal the decision. Atty. Icawat,
however, failed to file the required
memorandum of appeal. Basas filed an
administrative complaint, also alleging
that Atty. Icawat issued a receipt for an
amount less than that which they had
paid him.
Held: GUILTY. Respondent's failure to
file the memorandum of appeal
required by the NLRC Rules of
Procedure reveals his poor grasp of
labor law. Respondent practically
admitted that he did not file the
memorandum. His failure to file the
memorandum clearly prejudiced the
interests of his clients. Respondent
manifestly fell short of the diligence
required of his profession, in violation of
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates that a
lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03
further provides that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. For his
failure to issue the proper receipt for
the money he received from his clients,
respondent also violated Rule 16.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
which states that a lawyer shall account
for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client. The
Court fined Atty. Icawat in the amount
of PhP 500, with a warning that a
repetition of the same offense or a
similar misconduct will be dealt with
more severely.
3. Duty of Lawyer to Client/Proper
Conduct
Teodoro R. Rivera vs. Atty. Sergio
Angeles
A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000
Facts: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the
legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and 2
others in a civil case. Rivera and his 2
co-plaintiffs received a favorable
decision. Atty. Angeles received almost
PhP 50,000 from one of the defendants
in the case as partial fulfillment of the
judgement against the latter. Atty.
Angeles, however, never told his clients

LEGAL ETHICS
DIGESTS
ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2001
of the amount he had received and
never remitted the same to him,
leaving them to discover such fact on
their own. Rivera and his co-plaintiffs
filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Angeles.
Held: GUILTY. Atty. Angeles was not
disbarred but the Court ruled that his
act amounted to serious misconduct.
The Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of integrity and good moral
character as part of a lawyer’s
equipment in the practice of his
profession. For it cannot be denied that
the respect of litigants for the
profession is inexorably diminished
whenever a member of the Bar betrays
their trust and confidence. The Court is
not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to
be paid for the legal services he has
extended to his client but such right
should not be exercised whimsically by
appropriating to himself the money
intended for his clients. There should
never be an instance where the victor
in litigation loses everything he won to
the fees of his own lawyer. For deceit in
dealing with his client, Atty. Angeles
was suspended from the practice of law
for 1 year.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Attys.
Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P.
Salayon
A.C. No. 4690. August 29, 2000
Facts: Attys. Antonio Llorente and
Ligaya Salayon were election officers of
the COMELEC and held the position of
Chairman and Vice-Chairman
respectively for the Pasig City Board of
Candidates. The respondents helped
conduct and oversee the 1995
elections. Then Senatorial candidate
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the
respondents tampered with the votes
received by them by either adding more
votes for particular candidates in their
Statement of Votes (SoV) or reducing
the number of votes of particular
candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed
an administrative complaint for their
disbarment. Respondents argued that
the discrepancies were due to honest
mistake, oversight and fatigue.
Respondents also argued that the IBP
Board of Governors had already
exonerated them from any offense and
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that the motion for reconsideration filed
by Pimentel was not filed in time.
Held: GUILTY. Respondents do not
dispute the fact that massive
irregularities attended the canvassing
of the Pasig City election returns. The
only explanation they could offer for
such irregularities is that the same
could be due to honest mistake, human
error, and/or fatigue on the part of the
members of the canvassing committees
who prepared the SoVs. There is a limit,
we believe, to what can be construed as
an honest mistake or oversight due to
fatigue, in the performance of official
duty. The sheer magnitude of the error
renders the defense of honest mistake
or oversight due to fatigue, as
incredible and simply unacceptable.
Indeed, what is involved here is not just
a case of mathematical error in the
tabulation of votes per precinct as
reflected in the election returns and the
subsequent entry of the erroneous
figures in one or two SoVs but a
systematic scheme to pad the votes of
certain senatorial candidates at the
expense of the petitioner in complete
disregard of the tabulation in the
election returns. A lawyer who holds a
government position may not be
disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his
duties as a government official.
However, if the misconduct also
constitutes a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the
lawyer’s oath or is of such character as
to affect his qualification as a lawyer or
shows moral delinquency on his part,
such individual may be disciplined as a
member of the bar for such misconduct.
Here, by certifying as true and correct
the SoVs in question, respondents
committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the
Code which stipulates that a lawyer
shall not engage in “unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” By express provision of
Canon 6, this is made applicable to
lawyers in the government service. In
addition, they likewise violated their
oath of office as lawyers to “do no
falsehood.” The Court found the
respondents guilty of misconduct and
fined them PhP 10,000 each and issued
a stern warning that similar conduct in
the future will be severely punished.

LEGAL ETHICS
DIGESTS
ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2001
Misrepresentation and Non-payment of
IBP Dues
Soliman M. Santos, Jr. v. Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas
A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000
Facts: Complaint for misrepresentation
and non-payment of bar membership
dues. It appears that Atty. Llamas, who
for a number of years now, has not
indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR
Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all,
he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060”
but he has been using this for at least 3
years already. On the other hand,
respondent, who is now of age, averred
that he is only engaged in a “limited”
practice of law and under RA 7432, as a
senior citizen, he is exempted from
payment of income taxes and included
in this exemption is the payment of
membership dues.
Held: GUILTY. Rule 139-A requires that
every member of the Integrated Bar
shall pay annual dues and default
thereof for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership and if
nonpayment covers a period of 1-year,
default shall be a ground for removal of
the delinquent’s name from the Roll of
Attorneys. It does not matter whether
or not respondent is only engaged in
“limited” practice of law. Moreover, the
exemption invoked by respondent does
not include exemption from payment of
membership or association dues.
In addition, by indicating “IBP
Rizal 259060” in his pleadings and
thereby misprepresenting to the public
and the courts that he had paid his IBP
dues to the Rizal Chpater, respondent is
guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which
provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. His act is also a
violation of Rule 10.01 which provides
that: A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice.
Lawyer was suspended for 1 year
or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later.
A. JUDGES
3
1. Gross Ignorance of the Law
• Improper Imposition of the
Punishment of Contempt
Flaviano B. Cortes v. Judge Felina
Bangalan
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1129. January 19,
2000
Facts: Complainant was one of the co-
accused in an adultery case filed before
the sala of respondent Judge Bangalan.
In a letter-complaint, he moved for the
voluntary inhibition of respondent judge
on the ground that the latter cannot be
impartial over the criminal case
because complainant previously filed an
opposition to the appointment of
respondent as RTC judge.
For this, respondent judge issued
an order citing Complainant in direct
contempt of court, averring further that
his pleading contained derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements
"equivalent to misbehavior committed
in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the proceedings
before the same within the meaning of
Rule 71. When complainant appealed
said order in the same court, after
posting a notice of appeal, respondent
judge ordered him to submit a record
on appeal. Upon failure to do so,
respondent judge issued a warrant of
arrest against Complainant for which he
was arrested and jailed for 1 day with a
fine of P10.00.
Thus, Complainant charges
respondent judge with gross ignorance
of the law, oppressive conduct and
abuse of authority when the latter held
him in contempt of court on account of
the statements he made in his letter-
complaint which statements,
complainant insists, are absolutely
privileged in nature. Complainant
further alleges that he filed a notice of
appeal from the order of contempt but
respondent directed him to submit a
record on appeal despite the fact that
the same is not required under the
rules.
Held: GUILTY. Judge B was fined in the
amount equivalent to 1-month salary
with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same shall be dealt with more
seriously. The Court said that while it is

LEGAL ETHICS
DIGESTS
ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2001
true that the complainant attached the
administrative letter-complaint in his
letter for respondent judge to inhibit in
the criminal case, it was used merely to
support his contention in his motion for
inhibition. A judge is bound never to
consider lightly a motion for his
inhibition that questions or puts to
doubt, however insignificant, his
supposed predilection to a case
pending before him. Furthermore, the
alleged offensive and contemptuous
language contained in the letter-
complaint was not directed to the
respondent court.
A judge may not hold a party in
contempt of court for expressing
concern on his impartiality even if the
judge may have been insulted therein.
While the power to punish in contempt
is inherent in all courts so as to
preserve order in judicial proceedings
and to uphold the due administration of
justice, judges, however, should
exercise their contempt powers
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end in view of
utilizing their contempt powers for
correction and preservation not for
retaliation or vindication.
Anent the charge of gross
ignorance of the law in requiring
complainant to submit a record on
appeal, we find the respondent judge's
order to be not it accord with the
established rule on the matter.
Contempt proceedings is not one of
those instances where a record on
appeal is required to perfect an appeal.
Thus, when the law is elementary, so
elementary, not to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.
Payment of Docket Fees in Election
Cases
Alfredo B. Enojas v. Judge
Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1513. January 19,
2000
Facts: Judge Gacott is being
administratively charged in this case
with serious misconduct, inefficiency
and gross ignorance of the law. This
complaint arose when respondent Judge
dismissed an election case on the
ground of non-payment of docket fees,
although the case was had been
previously admitted and was deemed
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properly filed by the original Judge
(inhibited himself due to relationship to
one’s of the parties) whom Judge Gacott
replaced. Jugde G issued the dismissal
order relying on a case (Manchester vs.
CA) which states that - a case is
deemed commenced only upon the
payment of the proper docket fees. To
his opinion, the required fees in this
case was not yet paid by the protestant.
Hence, this complaint charging him
primarily with gross ignorance of the
law.
Held: GUILTY. Based on the facts and
circumstances attendant to the case,
the election protest was properly filed.
In fact, the original Judge already made
an order that from the deposit given by
the protestant for the expenses of
reopening the questioned ballots, an
amount shall be allocated for the
payment of the required fees. More
importantly, the Court held that the
Manchester ruling relied upon by
respondent Judge does not apply to
election cases. In a latter case
( Pahilan), the evil sought to be avoided
in the Manchester case does not exist in
election cases. Truth is, the filing fee in
an election case is fixed and the claim
for damages, to which the docket fees
shall be made to apply, is merely
ancillary to main cause of action and is
not even determinative of the court’s
jurisdiction.
While it is true that not every
error or mistake of a judge renders him
administratively liable, in this case, it is
clear that the respondent judge was in
utter disregard of established rules
amounting to gross ignorance of the
law. The Pahilan case was decided long
before the respondent made a ruling on
the election case. Thus, the respondent
judge was duty bound to adhere to, and
apply the recent ruling, and he cannot
feign ignorance thereof, because the
Code of Judicial Ethics requires him to
be an embodiment of, among other
things, judicial competence. On e of the
principal duties of a judge is to be
abreast with law and jurisprudence
since the administration of justice
requires continuous study of the law
and jurisprudence. A perusal of the
challenge order reveals that respondent
judge failed to live up to what is

LEGAL ETHICS
DIGESTS
ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2001
expected of him as a dispenser of
justice.
Granting of Bail
Romulo Tolentino v. Judge
Policarpio S. Camano, Jr.
A.M. RTJ-00-1522 January 20, 2000
Facts: Respondent Judge is being
charged with gross ignorance of the
law, grave abuse of discretion, grave
abuse of authority, violation of Canons
1, 2, and 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics and incompetence in connection
with granting bail to the accused in a
criminal case for child abuse.
The complaint alleges that
respondent Judge granted bail while
pending the holding of a preliminary
investigation. The defense moved to
quash the information against the
accused on the alleged absence of a
preliminary investigation.
Consequently, respondent Judge
ordered that a preliminary investigation
be had by the state prosecutor. During
the pendency of this, he granted bail in
favor of the defendant after several
notices of hearing to the state
prosecutor to which the latter failed to
appear. After such grant, complainant
herein now accuses respondent of
denying the prosecution the chance to
adduce evidence to show that the guilt
of the accused was strong and that bail
should not have been granted in his
favor.
Held: NOT GUILTY. There was no denial
of due process. It was not necessary to
hold hearing so that the prosecution
could show that evidence of guilt of the
accused was strong since a preliminary
investigation had been ordered by the
court. At that point, bail was still a
matter of right. Respondent judge,
knowing that bail was indeed a matter
of right at that stage, nevertheless set
the hearing for the petition for bail four
times. However, complainant failed to
appear and present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused was
strong. It thus appears that complainant
is actually the one who was remiss in
the performance of his duties.
Considering that the case was referred
to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for preliminary investigation,
the accused could be considered as
5
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
Thus, respondent judge’s decision
granting bail to the accused was proper
and in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
Issuance of an Order of Release
Jesusa Santiago vs. Judge Eduardo
Jovellanos
Margarita Sanchez vs. Judge
Eduardo Jovellanos
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1289. August 1,
2000
Facts: Jesusa Santiago and Margarita
Sanchez were complainants in two
different criminal cases before the MTC
of San Ildefonso, Bulacan and the RTC
of Rosales, Pampanga, respectively.
The suspects in each of the criminal
cases were caught by authorities and
detained. However, both suspects were
released by order of Judge Eduardo
Jovellanos, presiding judge of the MCTC
of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan. The
complainants questioned both Orders
for Release issued by Judge Jovellanos,
alleging that the requirements for the
bailbond had not been fulfilled and that
the said judge had no jurisdiction to
order the release.
Held: GUILTY. There are two defects in
the Orders for Release signed by Judge
Jovellanos. First, in both cases, the
detainees had not registered the
bailbond in accordance with the Rules
of Criminal Procedure. One may not be
given provisional liberty if the bailbond
is not registered with the proper office.
Secondly, Judge Jovellanos did not have
jurisdiction to order the release of the
detainees. The Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide that when a suspect
is arrested outside of the province, city
or municipality where his case is
pending, he may either apply for bail
with the court where his case is pending
or with any RTC in the province, city or
municipality where he was arrested. If a
RTC judge is not available, he may
apply for bail with any MTC or MCTC in
the place where he was arrested. In this
case, Judge Jovellanos entertained
motions for bail and ordered release for
suspects whose cases were not pending
in his court nor were they arrested
within his jurisdiction. As an advocate of
justice and a visible representation of

LEGAL ETHICS
DIGESTS
ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2001
the law, a judge is expected to keep
abreast with and be proficient in the
interpretation of our laws. A judge
should be acquainted with legal norms
and precepts as well as with statutes
and procedural rules. Unfamiliarity with
the Rules of Court is a sign of
incompetence which goes against
Canon 3, specifically Rule 3.01, of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Having
accepted the exalted position of a
judge, Judge Jovellanos owes the public
and the court he sits in proficiency in
the law. He must have the basic rules
at the palm of his hands as he is
expected to maintain professional
competence at all times. Judge
Jovellanos was suspended for 1 year
without pay issued the warning that
similar conduct in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
Grant of a Motion for
Reconsideration
Gloria Lucas v. Judge Amelia A.
Fabros
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31,
2000
Facts : Complainant Lucas was
the defendant in an ejectment case
pending before respondent judge. She
alleges that Judge Fabros granted the
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
after the case had been dismissed the
case for failure of plaintiff and her
counsel to appear at the Preliminary
Conference. She averred that it is
elementary, under Section 19(c) of the
Rules of Summary Procedure, that a
motion for reconsideration is prohibited,
but respondent judge, in violation of the
rule, granted the motion for
reconsideration. She added that,
notwithstanding the fact that the
respondent herself had pointed out in
open court that the case is governed by
the Rules on Summary Procedure, the
judge ordered the revival of the case
out of malice, partiality and with intent
to cause an injury to complainant. Thus,
the instant complaint, charging
respondent judge with Gross Ignorance
of the Law and Grave Abuse of
Discretion
Held: NOT GUILTY. The SC held that
respondent judge not guilty of gross
6
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
discretion.
As a rule, a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
under Section 19 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure. This rule,
however, applies only where the
judgment sought to be reconsidered is
one rendered on the merits. Here, the
order of dismissal issued by respondent
judge due to failure of a party to appear
during the preliminary conference is
obviously not a judgment on the merits
after trial of the case. Hence, a motion
for the reconsideration of such order is
not the prohibited pleading
contemplated under Section 19 (c) of
the present Rule on Summary
Procedure. Thus, respondent judge
committed no grave abuse of
discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance
of the law, in giving due course to the
motion for reconsideration subject of
the present
Imposition of Proper Penalty
Felicidad Dadizon vs. Judge Aniceto
Lirios
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1295. August 1,
2000
Facts: Felicidad Dadizon was the
complainant in a prosecution for
Falsification of a Public Document (Art.
172, RPC) which was tried and decided
by Judge Aniceto Lirios of the MTC of
Naval, Biliran. Judge Lirios convicted the
accused, Pablo Suzon, and sentenced
him to a straight penalty of 7 months
imprisonment and imposed a PhP 1,000
fine. Dadizon questioned the
punishment meted by the said judge,
alleging that the straight penalty of 7
months is way below the penalty
provided by law. Judge Lirios defended
his decision, stating that he had to
appreciate the mitigating circumstance
that Suzon was already 70 years of age.
Held: GUILTY. As judge of thirty-three
(33) years, respondent should have
known that the Indeterminate Sentence
Law provides for the imposition of a
prison sentence in the minimum and
maximum term for offenses punishable
by the Revised Penal Code or the
special laws. The offense committed
was Falsification by a Private Individual
and Use of Falsified Document

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punishable under Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides for
a penalty of imprisonment of prision
correccional in its medium and
maximum periods (ranging from 2
years, 4 months and 1 days to 6 years)
and a fine of not more than Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
Respondent Judge appreciated one (1)
mitigating circumstance (old age),
which is merely an ordinary mitigating
circumstance. The imposition of a
straight penalty of seven (7) months by
respondent Judge is clearly erroneous.
While a judge may not always be
subjected to disciplinary action for
every erroneous order or decision he
renders, that relative immunity is not a
license to be negligent or abusive and
arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory
prerogatives. It is true that a judge may
err in fixing the minimum and
maximum terms of an indeterminate
sentence. However, the unawareness of
or unfamiliarity with the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
duration and graduation of penalties
merit disciplinary action from reprimand
to removal. Every judge should know
that in applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law for offenses penalized
under the Revised Penal Code, the
indeterminate sentence should have a
fixed minimum and maximum. And
when the law is so elementary, not to
know it or to act as if one does not
know it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. Judge Aniceto Lirios was fined
in the amount of PhP 5,000 and issued
stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely by the Court.
Application of Rules of Procedure
Alfonso C. Ortiz vs. Judge Alex L.
Quiroz
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1259 August 4,
2000
Facts: Alfonso Ortiz initiated a criminal
complaint against Inocencia Hernandez
for malicious mischeif and grave
threats. The case was assigned to Judge
Alex Quiroz, presiding judge of Branch
69 of the MTC of Pasig City. Before trial,
however, Judge Quiroz ruled that the
case would be governed by ordinary
rules of procedure rather than the
summary rules of criminal procedure
7
because the case fell within the
exceptions in P.D. 1508. Ortiz filed an
administrative complaint against Judge
Quiroz, arguing that the summary rules
not the ordinary rules should be
followed for his case.
Held: GUILTY. Under the Revised Penal
Code, grave threats is penalized with
imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day to
6 months (arresto mayor) and a fine not
exceeding PhP 500, if the threat is not
subject to a condition (Article 282).
Malicious mischief, on the other hand, is
penalized with imprisonment of 2
months and 1 day to 6 months (arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum
periods) if the value of the damage
caused exceeds PhP 1,000 (Article 329).
In this case, the alleged damage to
complainant was estimated to be PhP
50,000. Thus, the subject criminal cases
should have been tried under the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
considering that such rule is applicable
to criminal cases where the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense
charged is imprisonment not exceeding
6 months or a fine not exceeding PhP
1,000 or both, irrespective of other
imposable penalties, accessory or
otherwise or of the civil liability arising
therefrom [Section 1 B(4), Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure]. Respondent
judge, therefore, erred in applying the
ordinary rules of procedure instead of
the rules of summary procedure. A
judge has a duty to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. In fact,
the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates
that judges must be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence.
He must have the basic rules at the
palm of his hand and be proficient in
the interpretation of laws and
procedural rules. Judge Quiroz was
reprimanded, with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely.
Issuance of a Writ of Execution
Teresita Jason vs. Judge Briccio
Ygana
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1543. August 4,
2000
Facts: Teresita Jason was the defendant
in an ejectment case before the MTC of

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Pasig City. Having received an adverse
judgement, Jason appealed the decision
to Branch 153 of the RTC of Pasig City,
presided by Judge Briccio Ygana.
Respondent judge affirmed the decision
of the MTC and subsequently issued a
Writ of Execution for the judgement.
The Sheriff of Branch 153 executed
upon some personal properties of Jason
and gave a Notice to Vacate. Jason filed
an administrative complaint against
Judge Ygana, arguing that the Writ of
Execution should have been issued by
the court of origin and not the appellate
court.
Held: GUILTY. The case should have
been remanded back to the MTC for
execution. The rule is that if the
judgment of the metropolitan trial court
is appealed the regional trial court and
the decision of the latter is itself
elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose
decision thereafter become final, the
case should be remanded through the
regional trial court to the metropolitan
trial court for execution. The only
exception is the execution pending
appeal which is not evident from the
records of this case. A judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules; it is imperative that he
be conversant with basic legal
principles. Canon 4 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics requires that the judge
should be studious of the principles of
law. Canon 18 mandates that he should
administer his office with due regard to
the integrity of the system of the law
itself, remembering that he is not a
depository of arbitrary power, but a
judge under the sanction of law. Judge
Ygana was fined PhP 10,000 for gross
ignorance of the law.
Conducting Hearings for Probation
Carlos B. Creer vs. Judge Concordio
Fabillar
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1218. August 14,
2000
Facts: Respondent Judge Concordio
Fabillar, acting presiding judge of the
9th MCTC of Giporlos-Quinapundan,
Eastern Samar, convicted Carlos Creer
of grave coercion. Creer appealed the
conviction to the RTC where it was
affirmed. Creer subsequently filed a
8
Motion for Reconsideration. Creer was
then apprehended and jailed by order
of Judge Fabillar. Creer alleged that
respondent judge made him sign an
application for probation which the said
judge denied. The RTC subsequently
reversed the conviction of Creer and
ordered his release. Creer filed an
administrative complaint against Judge
Fabillar, charging the latter with gross
ignorance of the law for conducting
hearings for probation despite his
pending appeal.
Held: GUILTY. The rule is that no
application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction. At the time
complainant applied for probation, an
appeal had already been perfected.
Although respondent Judge eventually
denied the application, the fact still
remained that he had acted on it by
asking the probation officer to conduct
a post-sentence investigation instead of
outrightly denying the same as so
explicitly mandated by the law.
Observance of the law, which he is
bound to know and sworn to uphold, is
required of every judge. When the law
is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to
his office to know and to simply apply
it; anything less than that would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the
law. Judge Fabillar was suspended from
service for 6 months without pay and
ordered to pay a PhP 20,000 fine. He
was further warned with the most
severe penalty for another infraction by
him.
• Order of Acquittal
Fredesminda Dayawon v. Judge
Maximino A. Badilla
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1309. September
6, 2000
Facts: Ms. Fredesminda Dayawon
charged Judge Maximino A. Badilla of
the Municipal Trial Court of Pili,
Camarines Sur, with "Gross Ignorance
of the Law and Incompetence" relative
to Criminal Case for estafa.
Complainant averred that
respondent Judge acquitted the
accused and declared her to only be
liable civilly, despite Alamos’
admittance in open court that she had

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received the subject goods from
complainant to be sold on commission
basis with the obligation to remit the
proceeds of the sale or to return the
items, if unsold, but had failed to
comply seasonably therewith despite
demand. Complainant stressed that
these admissions, together with the
finding that the accused had acted in
bad faith, were clearly sufficient to
convict the accused of the crime of
estafa.
Held: GUILTY. A judge is called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules; so long as he remains
on the bench, it is imperative that he
continues to be conversant with the
basic law and maintain the desired
professional competence.
The Court finds it fit, however, to
reduce the recommended fine of
P5,000.00 to P2,000.00 considering that
no nefarious motive on the part of
respondents judge has been shown.
• Issuance of Hold Departure
Order
Re: Hold-Departure Order Dated
August 9, 1999 Issued by Judge
Salvador B. Mendoza, MCTC, Poro-
San Francisco-Tedela-Pilar, Poro,
Cebu Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Salvador B.
Mendoza
A.M. No. 00-1281-MTJ. September
14, 2000
Facts: MTC Judge Mendoza issued a
Hold Departure Order in Criminal Case
No. T-1806, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Arnie Pena Osabel."
pending before him in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Poro-San Francisco-
Tedela-Pilar, Poro, Cebu. The Secretary
urged the Court Administrator to look
into the fact that the order in question
was issued in violation of Supreme
Court Circular No. 39-97 dated June 19,
1997.
Held: GUILTY. Circular No. 39-97 limits
the authority to issue hold-departure
orders to the Regional Trial Courts in
criminal cases within their exclusive
jurisdiction.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be
9
"faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence." The Court
has not been remised in reminding
judges to exert diligent efforts in
keeping abreast with developments in
law and jurisprudence. Needless to
state, the process of learning the law
and the legal system is a never-ending
endeavor, hence, judges should always
be vigilant in their quest for knowledge
so they could discharge their duties and
responsibilities with zeal and fervor.
2. Habitual Tardiness
Antonio Yu-Asensi vs. Judge
Francisco D. Villanueva
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1245. January 19,
2000
Facts: Complainant charges Judge
Villanueva for serious misconduct
and/or inefficiency particularly violating
the Canons of Judicial Ethics on
promptness and punctuality. Judge
V had been consistently late for 45
minutes to 1 1/2 hours during
scheduled hearings, thus delaying the
cause of complainant where he was the
plaintiff in a reckless imprudence case.
Due to his tardiness, C's lawyer had
also been compelled to extend trial
even beyond the prescribed period
provided for by law.
Held: GUILTY. Habitual tardiness
amounts to serious misconduct and
inefficiency in violation of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics. Several SC Circulars
have been issued which enjoin judges
to be punctual in the performance of
their judicial duties, recognizing that
the time of litigants, witnesses, and
attorneys are of value, and that if the
judge is not punctual in his habits, he
sets a bad example to the bar and
tends to create dissatisfaction in the
administration of justice. Furthermore,
Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates: "A judge shall
dispose of the court's business
promptly and decide cases within the
required periods."
3. Gross Inefficiency and Duty/Liability
over Court Personnel
Atty. Martin Pantaleon v. Judge
Teofilo Guadiz

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DIGESTS
ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2001
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1525 January 25,
2000
Facts: In this case, respondent Judge is
charged with Gross Inefficiency, Neglect
and Delay in Elevating the Records of
Civil Case No. 88-2187, to which the
complainant was the plaintiff’s counsel.
After receiving an adverse decision,
complainant filed a Notice of Appeal
within the reglementary period and
consequently, respondent Judge issued
an order for the transmittal of the
records of the case to the appellate
court. However, despite constant follow-
up by counsel, three years have passed
and the records of the case have not
been transmitted.
In his Answer, respondent judge
contends that the court stenographer
misplaced the transcript of the
testimony of one of the witnesses,
hence the record could not be
transmitted to the Court of Appeals. He
further averred that complainant should
have invited his attention by filing the
proper motion or by writing a personal
letter informing him of the non-
transmittal of the records within three
months from the date of his order of
transmittal.
Held: GUILTY. A judge cannot hide
behind the incompetence of his
subordinates. He should be the master
of his own domain and take
responsibility for the mistakes of his
subjects.
The non-transmission of the
records by reason of inefficiency of the
staff cannot exonerate respondent
judge from administrative liability. As
administrative officer of the court, a
judge is expected to keep a watchful
eye on the level of performance and
conduct of the court personnel under
his immediate supervision who are
primarily employed to aid in the
administration of justice as required by
Canon 3, Rule 3.09 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
In the case of Re: Judge
Fernando Agdamag, the Court stated:
“he (judge) sits not only to judge
litigated cases with the least possible
delay but that his responsibilities
include being an effective manager of
the court and its personnel. He is
presumed to be cognizant of his
10
responsibilities as a worthy minister of
the law. At the very least, he is
expected to keep abreast with his
docket.”
Certainly, a delay of three years
in the transmission of court records to
the appellate court, where only a period
of 30 days is required, is inexcusable.
Acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosilo
v. Dante dela Cruz Rivera, Sheriff
III, Branch 34, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Quezon City
A.M. No. P-00-1424. September
25, 2000
Dante dela Cruz Rivera, Sheriff III,
Branch 34, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Quezon City vs. Acting Judge
Reynaldo B. Bellosilo, Branch 34,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon
City.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1316. September
25, 2000
Facts: Sheriff Dante Rivera allegedly
falsified his Personal Data Sheet. For
this, respondent Judge accused him of
dishonesty and subsequently prevented
him from reporting for work. Afterwhich,
respodent Judge filed an administrative
complaint against the sheriff.
Held: GUILTY. A judge has no authority
or power to prevent an employee from
reporting for work. If indeed
complainant Rivera committed
falsification in the accomplishment of
his personal data sheet, the most that
Judge Bellosillo could have done was to
file an administrative charge against
complainant Rivera, which he later on
did but after the complainant Rivera
filed an administrative charge against
him (Judge Bellosillo) for conduct
unbecoming.
While a judge may have supervision
over his employees, he should not
however exercise his authority over
them in an oppressive or despotic
manner. Judge Bellosillo should have
realized that it is the Supreme Court
which has the authority to
discipline/dismiss his subordinate. The
most that he can do is merely to file an
administrative complaint against the
erring employee.

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4. Impartiality and Impropriety of a
Judge
• Issuance of Conflicting Orders
Daniel & Suprema Dumo v. Judge
Romeo V. Perez
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1242 January 20,
2000
Facts: Spouses Dumo filed this
administrative complaint against
respondent Judge Perez for gross
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion and patent partiality.
Respondent MTC Judge issued a
Writ of Execution to enforce the
decision of a case involving quieting of
title and recovery of ownership of real
property. However, said writ was
returned unsatisfied because the herein
complainants was the actual owners
and occupants of the questioned
property without being impleaded in the
original case. Subsequently, respondent
Judge issued an order stating that
complainants shall not be affected by
said writ because they were not made
parties to the case. Despite such order,
he moved on to issue a Writ of
Possession in favor of the original
plaintiff (Espinas). As a consequence,
Espinas used such Writ of Possession
against the herein complainants in
order to eject them from their property
and deprived them from the enjoyment
of the same.
The crux of this controversy
therefore is the issuance of respondent
Judge of conflicting orders, which
according to complainants, showed
patent partiality over Espinas, the
original plaintiff in the case for quieting
of title.
Held: GUILTY. First of all, respondent
Judge is guilty of ignorance of the law.
As a municipal trial court judge, he
obviously had no jurisdiction over the
action for quieting of title and recovery
of ownership filed by Espinas against
the original defendants. It must be
stressed that the case was NOT for
ejectment over which MTC’s have
original jurisdiction, but for quieting of
title and/or ownership falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial
courts. The question of jurisdiction if so
basic and elementary a matter that a
11
judge’s ignorance of it is simply
inexcusable.
Secondly, the judge’s act of
issuing conflicting orders is likewise
inexcusable. After declaring that the
Writ of Execution cannot be made
enforceable against herein
complainants as they were not made
parties to the case, he reversed himself
nevertheless by issuing the Writ of
Possession. Under said writ of
possession, it was patent that he was
contradicting his previous ruling by
ordering therein “to eject all adverse
occupants,” which of course, was so
broad to affect all persons including
herein complainants. The issuance of
said writ gave rise to the suspicion of
partiality or bias in favor of Espinas.
The presumptions of regularity
and good faith in the performance of
judicial functions on respondent’s part
are negated by the circumstances of
record. While a judge cannot be made
liable for any criminal, civil, or
administrative charge for an erroneous
decision rendered in good faith and in
the absence of fraud, it is imperative
that he should have basic knowledge of
the law. Judges must keep abreast of
the laws and jurisprudence to be able to
render justice and maintain public
confidence in our legal system.
More importantly, judges should
not only be impartial but should also
appear impartial. Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct provides that: “a
judge should also avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all
activities.” A judge should so behave at
all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. (Rule 2.01,
Canon 2).
Leopoldo G. Dacera, Jr. vs. Judge
Teodoro A. Dizon
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573. August 2,
2000
Facts: Leopoldo Dacera, Jr. was the
complainant in a prosecution for
Qualified Theft filed with Branch 37 of
the RTC of General Santos City with
Judge Teodoro Dizon presiding. The
prosecutor later filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the grounds that Dacera had
executed and signed an Affidavit of
Desistance from pursuing the

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prosecution. Dacera, however, opposed
the Motion to Dismiss, alleging that
Judge Dizon had unduly influenced him
to sign the Affidavit of Desistance and
that he had not been fully appraised of
the consequences of his actions in
doing so. The Supreme Court assigned
an Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals to investigate into the matter.
Held: NOT GUILTY. The investigation did
not find any conclusive evidence that
Judge Dizon was personally biased in
favor of either party in the disposition of
the case in question. It must be noted
that respondent judge did not actually
dismiss the case upon motion of the
prosecutor and even voluntarily
inhibited himself upon motion of Dacera
to disqualify him. However, the
investigation did reveal that Judge
Dizon had made telephone calls to
Dacera and even had discussions with
him inside his chambers in order to
verify the truth about the Affidavit of
Desistance. While there is no clear
proof of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations, the acts of
respondent in calling and meeting with
the complainant still leave much to be
desired and are deserving of reprimand.
A judge is not only required to be
impartial; he must also appear to be
impartial. Fraternizing with litigants
tarnishes this appearance. Canon II of
the Code of Judicial Conduct basically
provides that judges should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities and should
so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. It is clear
that the acts of the respondent judge
have been less than circumspect. He
should have kept himself free from any
appearance of impropriety and should
have endeavored to distance himself
from any act liable to create an
impression of indecorum. The complaint
filed by Dacera against Judge Dizon, Jr.,
was dismissed for lack of merit.
However, respondent Judge was
admonished to refrain from making
calls to any parties-litigant and/or
counsel with cases pending in his sala
and sternly warned that a repetition of
the same will be dealt with more
severely.
12
William R. Adan vs. Judge Anita
Abucejo-Luzano
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1298. August 3,
2000
Facts: William Adan was the
complainant in 2 criminal cases for
Grave Oral Defamation tried and
decided by Judge Anita Abucejo-Luzano
of the MCTC of Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Occidental. Respondent judge convicted
the accused and sentenced them
accordingly. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration, however, respondent
judge reversed her decision and
rendered a judgement for acquittal.
Adan questioned the reversal of the
conviction, alleging that Judge Abucejo-
Luzano had modified her judgement
because having received new
information from the accused, she
conducted a personal ocular inspection
of the place where the crime was
committed without the presence of the
parties involved.
Held: GUILTY. Respondent Judge should
have known that an ex-parte ocular
inspection without notice to nor
presence of the parties and after the
case had already been decided was
highly improper. If respondent Judge
had entertained doubts that she wished
to clarify after the trial had already
terminated, she should have ordered
motu proprio the reopening of the trial
for the purpose, with due notice to the
parties, whose participation therein is
essential to due process. Thus, it is
error for the judge to go alone to the
place where the crime was committed
and make an inspection without
previous knowledge or consent of the
parties. The conduct of the ex-parte
inspection, the result of which
apparently influenced her to reconsider
her earlier decision, was highly
improper as she, in effect, admitted
additional evidence without giving the
prosecution a chance to object to its
introduction or to controvert the same.
Her actions show an ignorance of the
law and proper procedure to be
followed for a situation such as this.
Furthermore, respondent judge has
opened herself to charges of partiality
and bias by meeting with the accused
privately. No matter how noble her
intentions may have been, it was

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improper for respondent judge to meet
the accused without the presence of
complainant. Respondent Judge has
failed to live up to the norm that judges
should not only be impartial but should
also appear impartial. She thus violated
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which provides that a judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all activities. Judge
Abucejo-Luzano was fined PhP 10,000
and issued a stern warning that any
similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
Gross Misconduct amounting to
Violation of a Constitutional Right/
Serious/Grave Misconduct
Atty. NapoleonS. Valenzuela v.
Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1241 January 20,
2000
Facts: Respondent Judge is being
charged with gross violation of the
constitutional right of subject accused
to assistance by counsel of her own
choice, gross misconduct, oppression,
partiality and violation of the Code of
Judicial Ethics.
In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly
granted bail to the accused despite not
being accompanied and represented by
her counsel at that time. It appears that
Judge granted bail without the
assistance of the counsel of record,
Atty. Valenzuela and he even suggested
that the latter should be replaced by
another counsel. Aghast by such
decision, Atty. V filed his Notice of
Withdrawal, in conformity with his
client’s decision, Meriam Colapo.
Subsequently, he filed the instant
administrative complaint against
respondent Judge. To support his
position, he attached an Affidavit
allegedly executed by his client Colapo.
However, during the hearing of the
case, he failed to present Colapo as
Witness as she was allegedly out of the
country although she was willing to
testify at that time.
Held: NOT GUILTY. On the issue of
granting bail without the assistance of
counsel, the Court held that it was valid
and sufficiently based on the
Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela.
13
With regard to the alleged act of
respondent Judge suggesting to the
accused that she should change her
counsel (complainant Atty. V) and
recommending a different lawyer, the
Court found that the evidence adduced
by the complainant was insufficient to
substantiate the charges against him.
The only evidence offered by
complainant was the Affidavit of his
client Meriam Colapo, and it cannot be
the basis of a finding of guilt even in an
administrative case. The complainant’s
failure to present his principal witness,
in the absence of other evidence to
prove his charges was fatal and said
Affidavit cannot be given credence and
is inadmissible without the said affiant
being placed on the witness stand.
The employment or profession of
a person is a property right within the
constitutional guaranty of due process
of law. This applies also to Judges.
Respondent judge cannot therefore be
adjudged guilty of the charges against
him without affording him a chance to
confront the said witness, Meriam
Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due
process would be infringed.
Erlinda Sy vs. Danilo Norberte
A.M. No. 00-1398-P. August 1, 2000
Facts: In her civil case versus
Antoinetta Galvez, complainant Erlinda
Sy obtained a writ of preliminary
attachment against all properties of the
former. She alleged, however, that
respondent Danilo Norberte, Sheriff of
Branch 125 of the RTC of Kalookan City,
tipped off Galvez about the said writ.
She further alleged that Norberte
actively assisted Galvez in the removal
of her personal property from the
latter's residence. Sy filed a complaint
with Branch 125 of the RTC of Kalookan
City which was submitted for
investigation.
Held: GUILTY. The investigation
revealed that Norberte was positively
identified and seen by the complainant
Sy and 2 other witnesses in the act of
helping Galvez remove her personal
property from her residence. Norberte's
alibi did not prove to be credible. The
offense of serious or grave misconduct
refers to such misconduct that shows
the element of corruption, clear intent

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ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2001
to violate the law or flagrant disregard
of established rules. In tipping off and
assisting Galvez, Norberte's actions are
an attempt to circumvent a valid court
order. Even if Norberte did not tip off
Galvez, his mere presence at the scene
is punishable. Being an officer of the
Court, respondent sheriff should have
refrained from actuations though
innocent and in good faith which may
result in suspicion of impropriety and
may consequently taint the good image
of the judiciary. The nature and
responsibilities of officers of the
judiciary are not mere idealistic
sentiments but true working standards
and attainable goals that should be
matched with actual deeds. They are
expected to serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency and to conduct
themselves with propriety and decorum
at all times. Norberte was suspended
for 1 month without pay and issued the
warning that similar conduct in the
future will be punished more severely.
In Re: Procedure adopted by Judge
Daniel Liangco
(A.M. No. 99-11-158-MTC. August
1, 2000)
Facts: RTC Judge Pedro Sunga of San
Fernando, Pampanga received
information about irregularities in the
disposition of jueteng cases before the
MTC's of the said region. Upon
investigation, Judge Sunga discovered
that of the 55 jueteng cases filed in July
1999, 53 were assigned to Branch 1 of
the MTC of San Fernando presided by
Judge Daniel Liangco. Noting that
statistical improbability that 53 out of
55 jueteng cases should be assigned to
only 1 Branch, Judge Sunga demanded
a written explanation as to how such a
situation had come about. In his letter,
Judge Liangco explained that it has
been his practice to automatically take
over all jueteng cases without the need
for raffling. The reason he cited is that
the accused in such cases are deprived
of their liberty and that by
automatically assigning these cases to
his branch, the accused can file motions
for bail and the same can be
entertained immediately without
waiting for the raffle. In short, because
of the need for provisional liberty, all
14
jueteng cases are considered to be
automatically raffled to his branch so
that he may entertain motions for bail
and the accused can be immediately
released upon filing of the bond. The
Supreme Court ordered further
investigation of the case and placed
Judge Liangco on preventive
suspension.
Held: GUILTY. Judge Liangco clearly
violated Supreme Court Circular No. 7
which provides: "All cases filed with the
Court in stations or groupings where
there are two or more branches shall be
assigned or distributed to the different
branches by raffle. No case may be
assigned to any branch without being
raffled." There is no connection at all
between respondent’s alleged desire to
facilitate the release of such accused on
bail and his questionable act of
retaining the records of the cases for
direct assignment to his own sala. For
after granting bail to the accused, his
alleged purpose of immediately
extending provisional liberty to the
accused shall already have been
served. There is thus no need or
justification to retain the records of the
cases and consider them “raffled off” to
his own sala. The questioned acts of
respondent Judge Liangco constitute a
clear breach of his duty as a judge. The
Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that:
“A judge should so behave at all times
as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.” Respondent judge’s manner
of automatically assigning jueteng
cases to its own branch without the
benefit of raffle, casts doubt on his
integrity as a judge and erodes the
confidence of the people in the judicial
system. A judge’s official conduct and
his behavior in the performance of
judicial duties should be free from the
appearance of impropriety and must be
beyond reproach. Judge Liangco was
suspended from service for 6 months
without pay and issued the warning
that similar conduct in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.
6. Neglect of Duty/Abuse of Authority

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Zenaida S. Beso v. Judge Juan
Daguman
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28,
2000
Facts: In a Complaint-Affidavit dated
December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso
charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with
solemnizing marriage outside of his
jurisdiction and of negligence in not
retaining a copy and not registering the
marriage contract with the office of the
Local Civil Registrar.
In his comment, the respondent
judge alleged that the marriage of the
complainant had to be solemnized in
Calbayog City though outside his
territory as municipal Judge of Sta.
Margarita, Samar because : 1)
physically indisposed and unable to
report to his station in Sta. Margarita; 2)
complainant said she had to fly abroad
that same day; 3) that for the parties
to go to another town for the marriage
would be expensive and would entail
serious problems of finding a organize their dockets in order to
solemnizing officer and another pair of
witnesses or sponsors; 4) if they failed
to get married on August 28, 1997,
complainant would be out of the
country for a long period and their
marriage license would lapse and
necessitate another publication of
notice; 5) if the parties go beyond their
plans for the scheduled marriage,
complainant feared it would complicate
her employment abroad.
Held: GUILTY. The authority of a judge
to solemnize marriage is only limited to
those municipalities under his
jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no
longer within his area of jurisdiction.
Additionally, there are only three
instances, as provided by Article 8 of
the Family Code, wherein a marriage
may be solemnized by a judge outside
his chamber[s] or at a place other than
his sala, and the circumstances of this
case do not fall in any of these
exceptions.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer,
respondent Judge neglected his duty
when he failed to register the marriage
of complainant to Bernardito Yman.
Such duty is entrusted upon him
pursuant to Article 23 of the Family
Code which provides:
15
"It shall be the duty of the person
solemnizing the marriage to
furnish either of the
contracting parties the original of
the marriage certificate referred
to in Article 6
and to send the duplicate and
triplicate copies of the
certificates not later than
fifteen days after the marriage,
to the local civil registrar of the
place where the
marriage was solemnized. xxx"
Lastly, a judge is charged with
exercising extra care in ensuring that
the records of the cases and official
documents in his custody are intact.
There is no justification for missing
records save fortuitous events. The
records show that the loss was
occasioned by carelessness on
respondent Judge’s part. This Court
reiterates that judges must adopt a
system of record management and
bolster the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business. It is, in fact,
incumbent upon him to devise an
efficient recording and filing system in
his court because he is after all the one
directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his official functions.
7. Prompt Disposition of Cases/
Inefficiency/Abuse of Authority
State Prosecutor Romulo Tolentino
vs. Judge Nilo Malanyaon
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1444. August 3,
2000
Facts: Judge Nilo Malanyaon, presiding
judge of Branch 30 of the RTC of
Camarines Sur, dismissed 5 separate
criminal cases for lack of evidence and
also refused to issue warrants of arrest
on the ground of lack of probable
cause. Acting State Prosecutor for
Camarines Sur Romulo Tolentino
assailed the orders for dismissal and
the refusal to issue the warrants for
arrest alleging that Judge Malanyaon
had abused his authority and knowingly
rendered unjust orders. Tolentino also
complained that several motions had
been filed before respondent judge and
have yet to be resolved and decided
upon.

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Issues: (1) Did Judge Malanyaon
exercise grave abuse of discretion and
act in excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the criminal cases?
(2) Was Judge Malanyaon guilty
of unreasonable delay for failing to act
on the motions filed by State Prosecutor
Tolentino?
Held: (1) NO. The allegations that
respondent judge had violated Canons
1, 2 and 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Conduct are without merit. Good faith
and absence of malice, corrupt or
improper consideration are sufficient
defenses protecting a judicial officer
charged with ignorance of the law and
promulgation of an unjust decision from
being held accountable for errors of
judgment on the premise that no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the administration of justice
can be infallible. There is no proof of
grave abuse of discretion. These
charges were dismissed by the Court.
(2) YES. The motions/incidents
were left unacted upon from 3 to 5
months and were still pending when the
administrative complaint was filed
against respondent. Respondent should
be aware of his duties as an arbiter of
justice. Under Rule 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, a judge shall dispose
of the court's business promptly and
decide cases within the required
periods. While the prosecutor in this
case is not without fault, the
respondent cannot escape
responsibility for his inaction of the
pending motions before him. Even
assuming arguendo that the various
motions filed by the prosecutor were
considered to be mere scraps of paper
or without merit, the judge must
nevertheless resolve on those matters
promptly by granting or denying them.
It is the duty of the judge to rule upon
the motions filed before him even if his
actions are merely to deny them.
Respondent judge was found guilty for
his failure to resolve pending motions
and/or incidents and, accordingly, a
penalty of reprimand was imposed upon
him with the warning that a repetition
of the same or similar violation will be
dealt with a more severe penalty by the
Court.
16
Juan Luzarraga vs. Hon. Amaro M.
Meteoro
A.M. No. 00-1572. August 3, 2000
Facts: Juan Luzarraga was the plaintiff
in a civil case assigned to Branch 41 of
the RTC of Camarines Norte. After the
said plaintiff had rested his case and
presented his evidence, the case was
transferred to the newly-created Branch
64 of the RTC of Camarines Norte,
presided by Judge Amaro Meteoro. It
was only 2 years later that Judge
Meteoro proceeded with the
presentation of the defendant's
evidence. The case was finally
submitted for decision a year later.
After an elapse of more than 7 months
without a decision on the case,
Luzarraga filed an administrative
complaint against Judge Meteoro.
Respondent judge pleaded for the
understanding and compassion of the
Court, citing that his branch had more
than 300 cases pending before it, that
he had trouble recruiting and training
competent personnel and that he had
suffered a stroke.
Held: GUILTY. More than one year had
already elapsed since the submission of
the case and respondent Judge has not
decided the same despite the Motion
for Early decision filed the complainant.
The Court has consistently held that the
failure of a judge to decide a case
within the required period is not
excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency and non-observance of said
rule is a ground for administrative
sanction against the defaulting judge.
Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges
to dispose of the court's business
promptly and to decide cases within the
periods fixed by law. The failure to
render a decision within the 90-day
period constitutes serious misconduct in
derogation of the speedy administration
of justice. When circumstances arise
that would prevent the judge from
disposing a case within the
reglementary period, all that he has to
do is to file an application with the
Court asking for a reasonable extension
of time within which to resolve the
case. However, the record of this
administrative matter does not show
that respondent made an attempt to

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make such a request. Instead, he
preferred to keep the case pending,
thereby inviting suspicion that
something sinister or corrupt is afoot.
That he was burdened with a heavy
case load and is a stroke victim, serve
only to mitigate the penalty, not to
exonerate him. Judge Meteoro was
fined P20,000 with the warning that a
repetition of the same shall be dealt
with more severely. He was further
directed to decide the subject case
within a non-extendible period of 30
days from receipt of resolution, and to
submit to the Office of the Court
Administrator a copy of his decision
within 10 days from promulgation
thereof.
Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the RTC, Branches 87
and 98, Quezon City
A.M. No. 99-11-423-RTC. August 16,
2000
Facts: On September 15 to 17, 1999,
the Office of the Court Administrator
conducted an audit and physical
inventory of pending cases in Branches
87 and 98 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, presided over by Judge
Elsie Ligot-Telan and Judge Justo M.
Sultan, respectively. The audit team
reported that Judge Ligot-Telan had a
well-managed docket. Judge Sultan,
however, was a different story. Of the
57 cases submitted for decision, 34
were already beyond the reglementary
period, some of which involve detention
prisoners. It was observed that the said
branch gave the least preference to
cases submitted for decision, and it has
no effective docket system and
recording of cases. In fact, the Branch
Clerk of Court had not submitted the
required docket and inventory of cases
for a number of years. Records did not
show that Judge Sultan ever requested
for an extension of time within which to
decide the cases submitted before him.
Held: GUILTY. The Court reiterates that
failure to decide cases within the
required period is inexcusable and
constitutes gross inefficiency which is a
ground for administrative sanction
against the defaulting judge, either by a
fine or suspension from the service,
depending on factors that tend to
17
aggravate or mitigate his liability. This
is in accordance with the mandate that
the judge shall dispose of the business
of the court promptly and decide cases
within the prescribed periods.
Conformably, the rules require the
courts to decide cases ready for
decision within 3 months from date of
submission. The Court is not unmindful
of the Herculean task trial judges are
faced with the perennial clogged
dockets of the lower courts. However,
this should not be an excuse for them
to abdicate their duty to dispense
justice. Judges must adopt a system of
record management and organize their
dockets in order to bolster the prompt
and efficient dispatch of business.
Furthermore, if the caseload of the
judge prevents the disposition of cases
within the reglementary periods, he
should ask this Court for a reasonable
extension of time to dispose of the
cases involved. This is to avoid or dispel
any suspicion that something sinister is
going on. The Court fined Judge Sultan
PhP 20,000 to be taken from his
retirement benefits.
Dominga D. Quillal-Lan vs. Judge
Alicia L. Delos Santos
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1269. August 24,
2000
Facts: The daughter of complainant
Dominga Quillal-Lan was the defendant
in a Forcible Entry case before Judge
Alicia Delos Santos of the MTC of Digos,
Davao del Sur. The complainant alleges
that respondent judge failed to decide
the case within the mandatory 30-day
period as provided by the Rules on
Summary Procedure. Judge Delos
Santos avers that she was on sick leave
and therefore could not be expected to
decide upon the case within the said
period.
Held: GUILTY. There is no doubt that a
case of Forcible Entry falls within the
Rules of Summary Procedure and as
stated therein, must be decided within
30-days. Respondent should have
rendered judgment in the forcible entry
case before she went on leave. Delay in
the disposition of cases covered by the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
defeats the very purpose of said rule,
which is the expeditious and

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inexpensive determination of cases.
Failure to decide such cases on time
renders the rationale for the rule
meaningless and inutile. Respondent
appears to be remiss in her duties as
judge when she failed to render
judgment in the case as mandated by
the rules. Under Rule 3.05 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, she is required to
dispose of the court’s business
promptly and to decide cases within the
required time frame. We have time and
again reminded judges to comply with
the rules regarding the period to decide
cases, in pursuance of the Court’s oft-
repeated policy of speedy disposition of
quality justice for all. Judge Delos
Santos was fined PhP 1,000 and issued
a warning that similar conduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Cob C. Dela Cruz v. Judge Rodolfo
M. Serrano
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1582. September
4, 2000
Facts: Complainant contends, among
others, that it took one (1) year and
five (5) months instead of three months
to render a decision in civil case. The
civil case was submitted for decision on
April 1996, but the decision thereon
was only promulgated on October 8,
1997.
Held: GUILTY. It is not disputed that it
took respondent Judge one (1) year and
five (5) months, after Civil Case No. 908
was submitted for decision, to decide it
which is way beyond the three-month
period mandated by the Constitution.
Section 15 (1) of Article VIII of the
Constitution provides that all cases filed
before the lower courts must be
decided or resolved within three (3)
months from date of submission. The
Code of Judicial Conduct likewise
provides that a judge “should
administer justice impartially and
without delay” [Rule 1.02.] and directs
a judge to “dispose of the court’s
business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods.” [Rule
3.05.]
It is an oft-repeated maxim that
justice delayed is often justice denied.
Thus, any delay in the administration of
justice may result in depriving the
litigant of his right to a speedy
18
disposition of his case and will
ultimately affect the image of the
judiciary. A delay in the disposition of
cases amounts to a denial of justice,
brings the court into disrepute and
ultimately erodes public faith and
confidence in the judiciary.
Rolando Sulla v. Hon. Rodolfo C.
Ramos
A.M No. MTJ-00-1319. September
27, 2000
Facts: Dr. Rolando A. Sulla charging
respondent Judge Rodolfo C. Ramos,
presiding judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Jaro, Leyte, with unreasonable
delay or refusal to render a decision in
criminal Case No. 8121. The case was
submitted for decision in April 1997.
But as of May 21, 1999, date of
complainant’s letter, and despite
constant requests for its early
resolution, respondent Judge Ramos has
not rendered any decision in the said
case.
Held: GUILTY. This Court has
consistently impressed upon judges the
need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously pursuant to Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of
the Constitution. Judges are presumed
to be aware of Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which calls for a judge
to be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence. Rule 3.05
admonishes all judges to dispose of the
court’s business promptly and decide
cases within the period fixed by law.
8. Negligence/Incompetence of a Judge
Norma Esguerra vs. Judge
Guillermo Loja
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1523. August 15,
2000
Facts: Norma Esguerra was the
complainant in a criminal case for
Falsification of a Public Document tried
before Judge Guillermo Loja of Branch
26 of the RTC of Manila. Complainant
alleged that Judge Loja failed to decide
the case within the 90-day
reglementary period and further
accused him of falsifying his certificate
of service in order to make it appear
 19
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that he had decided the case. Judge his personal and private dealings with
Loja countered by stating that he had other people, to preserve the court’s
indeed decided upon the case but good name and standing. It cannot be
rather, the decision was just not dated. overstressed that the image of a court
of justice is mirrored in the conduct,
Held: GUILTY. A careful study of the official and otherwise, of the personnel
facts shows that Judge Loja is guilty who work thereat, from the judge to the
only of SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE and not of lowest of its personnel. Court
the administrative complaint filed employees have been enjoined to
against him. There is no clear proof that adhere to the exacting standards of
the respondent judge falsified his morality and decency in their
certificate of service simply because his professional and private conduct in
decision was dated. Even assuming that order to preserve the good name and
there was a slight delay in deciding the integrity of courts of justice.
case, it must be taken into Respondents DISMISSED from
consideration that Judge Loja has a service.
heavy case load (almost 800 cases
pending) and that this is the first JUNE 1998-1999
offense by a judge who provided long
and consistent service to the Judiciary. A. JUDGES
The Court fined Judge Loja PhP 2,000
and issued a warning that similar 1. Good Faith in Rendering Decisions
conduct in the future will be more
severely punished. Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero v. Hon.
Adriano Villamor (296 SCRA 88)
9. Duty of Court Employees
Facts: Carlos and his counsel,
Marta Bucatcat v. Edgar Bucatcat Guerrero, charged respondent with
and Gene Jaro gross ignorance of the law and
A.M. No. P-93-985. January 28, knowingly rendering an unjust
2000 judgment after they lost a civil and a
criminal case tried by respondent. They
Facts:Marta T.Bucatcat (complainant) were also thwarted on appeal.
charged her husband, Edgar Y. However, in the pleadings before the
Bucatcat, and Gene S. Jaro CA, they used abusive language in
(respondents), Court Interpreter describing the respondent’s acts,
respectively, of the Third Municipal hence, respondent judge cited them for
Circuit Trial Court of Gandara, Samar, direct contempt, which was later set
with immorality. Complainant avers aside by the SC.
that she is the legal wife of respondent
Bucatcat. She claims that respondents Held: Case dismissed. The order of
are having an illicit relationship with direct contempt may only be
each other. Moreover, respondents considered as an error of judgment. A
allegedly have two (2) children together judge may not be administratively
and that respondent Jaro, at the time of charged for mere errors of judgment, in
the filing of the letter-complaint, was the absence of showing of any bad
pregnant with their third child. faith, malice or corrupt purpose.
Moreover, judges cannot be held to
Held: GUILTY. There is sufficient account criminally, civilly, or
evidence to hold respondents administratively for an erroneous
liable for immorality for decision rendered by them in good
maintaining an illicit relationship with faith.
each other. Every employee of
the judiciary should Impartiality
be an example of integrity, uprightness Re: Inhibition of Judge Eddie R.
and honesty. Like any public servant, Rojas (292 SCRA 306)
he must exhibit the highest sense of
honesty and integrity not only in the Facts: Atty. Rojas was appointed a
performance of his official duties but in judge. One of the criminal cases he

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inherited was one in which he acted as
prosecutor. He explained that his delay
in inhibiting himself from presiding on
that case was because it was only after
the belated transcription of the
stenographic notes that he
remembered that he handled that case.
He also says that the counsels did not
object and he never held “full-blown”
hearings anyway.
Held: Judge is filed & reprimanded.
The Rules of Court prevent judges from
trying cases where they acted as
counsel without the consent of the
parties. This prevents not only a conflict
of interest but also the appearance of
impropriety on the part of the judge. A
judge should take no part in a
proceeding where his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. He should
administer justice impartially & without
delay. The prohibition does not only
cover hearings but all judicial acts (e.g.
orders, resolutions) some of which
Judge Rojas did make.
Carlito D. Lazo v. Judge Antonio V.
Tiong (300 SCRA 214)
Facts: Judge Tiong was accused of
failing to inhibit himself in a criminal
case because he was related within the
fourth degree of affinity to the accused.
The judge claims he did so in the hopes
that his presence would allow the
parties to settle amicably.
Held: Judge reprimanded. A judge
should take no part in a proceeding
where his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned. Also, Rule 137, Rules of
Court, provides that no judge or judicial
officer shall sit in any case in which he,
inter alia, is related to either party
within the sixth degree pf consanguinity
or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree computed according to
the rules of the civil law. Under this
provision, the Presiding Judge is
mandated to disqualify himself from
sitting in a case. He cannot exercise his
discretion whether to inhibit himself or
not.
2. Speedy Administration of Justice
Baltazar D. Amion v. Judge Roberto
S. Chiongson (301 SCRA 614)
20
Facts: A is a policeman charged with
murder. During the trial, J ordered that
he be represented by counsel de officio
because A’s attorney was ill. A then
charged J with ignorance of the law &
oppression because the fact that the
counsel de officio did not know the
particulars of the case meant that A
would be denied due process.
Held: Complaint dismissed. The Code
of Judicial Conduct mandates that a
judge should administer justice
impartially and without delay. A judge
should always be imbued with a high
sense of duty & responsibility in the
discharge of his obligation to promptly
administer justice. In this case, the
reason J appointed a FLAG lawyer was
because A’s lawyer had postponed
several hearings because he was ill or
out of town. Also, A had various
lawyers during the said case who
always postponed the hearings for
various reasons such as illness, lack of
knowledge of the case or unavailability
for trial. These are all legal but clearly
dilatory means used by the complainant
to delay the case for 4 years. J should
be commended for his efforts to
expedite the case.
Fe T. Bernardo v. Judge Amelia A.
Fabros (307 SCRA 28)
Facts: B accused F of inaction in an
unlawful detainer case for 7 months
when the rules on summary procedure
call for a decision in 30 days. F does not
deny the inaction but says B has no
standing as she is only the attorney-in-
fact of the plaintiffs to the civil case.
Held: FINED. Judges must decide cases
expeditiously, especially in summary
proceedings. She should either ask for
additional time to decide or devise an
efficient filing system to expedite
decision. Finally, standing or personal
interest of the complainant is
immaterial in administrative cases
which involves the public good.
Dolores Gomez v. Judge Rodolfo A.
Gatdula (293 SCRA 433)
Facts: Gomez is the complainant in 2
different criminal cases before Judge

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Gatdula. When she petitioned the SC to
change the venue of 1 of the cases,
Respondent suspended the scheduled
hearings in both cases. When required
by the SC to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be taken
against him, he delayed his comment
thereto. He eventually explained that
the suspension of hearing was made
because the request for change of
venue was pending in the SC.
Held: Judge Gatdula acted vindictively
& oppressively, apparently irked by the
request of petitioner. He need not have
suspended both hearings as the change
of venue only involved one case. His
delay in commenting on the change of
venue also effectively delayed both
cases by 5 months. His acts are not
free from the appearance of
impropriety, let alone beyond reproach,
as required by Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics.
Re: Cases Left Undecided by Judge
Narciso M. Bumanlag, Jr. (306 SCRA
50)
Facts: Upon retirement, B left 7 criminal
and 3 civil cases undecided within the
90-day period required by section 15,
Article VIII of the Constitution. He said
his failure was due to a serious illness.
Held: FINED. Members of the bench
have a duty to administer justice
without undue delay. Failure to do so
within the reglementary period
constitutes a neglect of duty warranting
administrative penalties. If hindered by
illness, a judge should inform the Office
of Court Administrator and ask for
additional time to decide in order to
avoid the sanctions. However, if there is
no malice or bad faith, and the judge is
prevented by factors beyond his
control, the penalty will be mitigated.
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the Regional Trial
Court – Branch 24, Ipil, Zamboanga
del Sur; Branch 2, Isabela, Basilan;
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Labason, Zamboanga del Norte
(303 SCRA 208)
Facts: Judge Apostol had a backlog of
280 cases. Also, there had been no
21
actions on 268 other cases assigned to
him. Judge says he has constant
medical problems and no legal
researchers to help him. These and the
peace and order problems in his locality
prevent him from expediting.
Held: Fined for gross neglect of duty.
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides
that a judge should administer justice
without delay and dispose of the court’s
business promptly and decide cases
within the reglementary periods. If his
health problems were preventing him
from doing his duty, he should have
retired early so a healthier successor
could act on the case load.
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the RTC, Branch 68 of
Camilang, Tarlac (305 SCRA 61)
Facts: Judge R was due for compulsory
retirement. The OCA found that he had
many pending cases, some of which
were undecided beyond the 90-day
period.
Held: FINED but penalty mitigated. Rule
3.05 of Canon 3 enjoins all judges to
attend promptly to the business of the
court and decide cases within the time
fixed by law. A judge is mandated to
render judgment not more than ninety
(90) days from the time the case is
submitted for decision. Failure to render
the decision within the prescribed
period of ninety (90) days from
submission of a case for decision
constitutes serious misconduct and
gross inefficiency. However, since after
being reminded of this, Judge R cleared
most of his docket (even those not
overdue for decision) before retiring,
the fine is mitigated.
Atty. Raula A. Sanchez v. Judge
Augustine A. Vestil (298 SCRA 1)
Facts: Complainant charged RTC Judge
Vestil with falsifying his monthly
certificate of service submitted to the
SC by stating that he has no pending
case submitted for decision or
resolution that has gone beyond the
NINETY (90) day period allowed by law
when in fact there were numerous civil
& criminal cases which the respondent
failed to resolve within the said period.

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Respondents say most of the cases
were either inherited & substantially
heard by other judges, or that they
require further study or whose
stenographic notes were yet to be
transcribed – and these are excepted
from being included the certificate by a
proviso contained therein.
Held: Respondent Judge suspended
and fined. Judges are mandated to
decide cases seasonably. Judges who
cannot comply with such mandate
should ask for additional time,
explaining in their request the reasons
for the delay. Neither the proviso nor
the fact that notes are to be transcribed
is a valid defense for not deciding
within the required time. The SC has
consistently held that the failure of a
judge to decide a case within the
required period is not excusable and
constitutes gross inefficiency & the non-
observance of said rule is ground for
administrative sanction against the
defaulting judge.
B. LAWYERS
1. Assisting in the Speedy
Administration of Justice
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
(293 SCRA 622)
Facts: Judgment was rendered against
the petitioner ordering it to reconvey
the cemetery to the rightful owners.
Despite the final decision of the SC,
petitioner was able to prevent the
execution for 17 years, and thus render
the judgment ineffectual. They filed
several petitions and motions for
reconsideration with the trial court and
the CA despite the fact that it would
never prosper as the trial court’s
decision had long become final before
the said petitions were filed.
Held: Petition denied. While lawyers
owe their entire devotion to the interest
of the client and zeal in the defense of
their client’s right, they are also officers
of the court, bound to exert every effort
to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. They should
not misuse the rules of procedure to
22
defeat the ends of justice or unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.
The facts and the law should advise
them that a case such as this should
not be permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested judicial
dockets. They do not advance the
cause of law or their clients by
commencing litigations that for sheer
lack of merit do not deserve the
attention of the courts.
Duty to Protect Client’s Interest
Development Bank of the
Philippines and Asset Privitization
Trust v. Court of Appeals and
Continental Cement Corporation
(302 SCRA 362)
Facts: CCC filed an injunction suit to
prevent the DBP and APT from
foreclosing on its mortgages. During
trial, DBP & APT were unable to appear
for cross-examining CCC’s witnesses
because the respective counsels were
unprepared, unavailable or ill. The
lower court decided this as a waiver,
hence judgment was rendered for CCC.
DBP & APT filed this petition alleging
denial of due process.
Held: Petition denied. There can be
no denial of due process where a party
had the opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but did not do so. Counsel
for APT was absent on several
occasions because of withdrawal of
previous counsel, unreadiness to
conduct the cross-examinations and
serious illness. The withdrawal of APT’s
previous counsel in the thick of the
proceedings would be a reasonable
ground to seek postponement of the
hearing. However, such necessitates a
duty on the part of the new counsel to
prepare himself for the next scheduled
hearing. The excuse that it was due to
the former counsel’s failure to turn over
the records of the case to APT, shows
the negligence of the new counsel to
actively recover the records of the case.
Counsel should have taken adequate
steps to fully protect the interest of his
client, rather than pass the blame on
the previous counsel. A motion to
postpone trial on the ground that
counsel is unprepared for trial
demonstrates indifference and

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disregard of his client’s interest. A new
counsel who appears in a case in
midstream is presumed and obliged to
acquaint himself with all the antecedent
processes and proceedings that have
transpired prior to his takeover. Also,
even if counsel had been ill with
dengue, he chose not to notify his co-
counsels who could have conducted the
cross-examination.
2. Falsehood/Forum-shopping/Dilatory
Tactics
Ban Hua U. Flores v. Atty. Enrique
S. Chua (306 SCRA 465)
Facts: Chua was charged with many
offenses. The evidence was found to
support the charges that he notarized a
forged deed of sale, that he caused to
be published an advertisement of a SEC
decision in order to bring ridicule and
shame upon a corporation, that he filed
a civil case knowing that the reliefs he
prayed for were probably granted in the
SEC case – thus belying his certification
against forum shopping. He has also
been previously reprimanded for bribing
a judge and for consistently using
dilatory tactics to prolong a litigation.
Held: DISBARRED. He has thus violated
Rules 10.01, 12.02, 12.04 (foisting or
commission of falsehood, forum-
shopping and causing in court
proceedings), Canon 19 (failing to
resort to lawful means in representing
his client), 27, 3.01 and 13.02 (causing
undue publication of a pending action).
He had an active role in committing
fraud since he falsely stated that the
person making the deed of sale
appeared before him and stated that
the same was his free act and deed-
when evidence shows the signature was
forged; also, he prolonged a family
dispute by using dilatory tactics and
placing an advertisement in order to
ridicule his opponents – in violation of
Rule 1.04 that lawyers should
encourage their clients to end a
controversy by a fair settlement. A
lawyer must uphold the integrity of the
profession. He brings honor to it by
honesty and fair dealing and by
performing his duties to society, the
bar, the courts and his clients.
23
3. Good Moral Character
Tomas Cabulisan v. Judge Adrian N.
Pagalilauan (297 SCRA 593)
Facts: Cabulisan filed an administrative
complaint against respondent for grave
misconduct committed as follows : (1)
peeping into the bathroom where
Marilyn C. Dumayas, a public health
nurse, and daughter of the owner of the
house where he was boarding, was then
taking a bath; (2) having a mistress in
the neighboring town; and (3) allowing
local practitioners to write decisions for
him.
Held: Respondent filed for voyeurism,
other charges dismissed for lack of
evidence. People who run the judiciary,
particularly justices and judges, must
not only be proficient in both the
substantive and procedural aspects of
the law, but more importantly, they
must possess the highest degree on
integrity and probity and an
unquestionable moral uprightness both
in their public and private lives. By
committing the acts in question,
respondent violated the trust reposed in
him and utterly failed to live up to the
noble ideals and rigid standards of
morality required in the judicial
profession.
15
Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty.
Ciriaco C. Sayson (300 SCRA 129)
Facts: respondent was accused of
having appropriated for his own benefit
the amount of P 2, 5000.00
representing the amount which was
delivered by the Resurreccion to the
respondent as compensation or
settlement money of a case for
homicide thru reckless imprudence.
Sayson did not turn over the amount to
his client, the Complainant in the
criminal case, forcing Resurreccion to
pay the same amount again. Sayson
was later convicted for estafa.

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Held: Sayson DISBARRED. Good moral
character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the
legal profession, but it must also
remain extant in order to maintain
one’s good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity.
Acts of moral turpitude (i.e. done
contrary to justices, honesty &
good morals) such as estafa or
falsification render one unfit to be
a member of the legal proession.
Also, Sayson’s acts of delaying the
hearings before the OSG and the
IBP reinforce this view.
Abuse of Authority
Rosalia Villaruel, et al v. Grapilon,
et al: In the Matter of the Petition
to Remove Atty. Jose A. Grapilon as
President, IBP (302 SCRA 138)
Facts: G was accused of 16 IBP
employees who sought his removal as
IBP President for: Immorality,
questionable disbursements of funds,
dishonesty, failure to turn over IBP
donations from private individuals,
refusal to turn over records and money
pertaining to the Employees’ Loan
Savings Association, Appropriation of
Office Property, Extending loans to IBP
employees, oppression/harassment,
appointment of unworthy employees
and relatives and organization of a
secret society. The issue regarding
legal ethics is whether the SC can
assume jurisdiction or should it be
considered a labor dispute under the
jurisdiction of the NLRC.
Held: Charges dropped. All the
accusations of the petitioners were
either unsubstantiated or refuted by
controverting evidence. As to the issue
of jurisdiction, the SC has previously
assumed administrative jurisdiction
over the IBP president. If the petitioners
allege that the IBP terminated them as
an act of reprisal and with malice or
bias, this would constitute gross abuse
of authority and serious misconduct –
warranting the use of the SC’s
supervisory powers over the IBP. Lastly,
even if there was no wrongful act, G is
ordered to transfer the funds of the
savings and loan association to an
account in their name to prevent the
24
appearance and suspicion of
impropriety.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Jesus Conducto vs. Judge Iluminado
C. Monzon (291 SCRA 619)
Facts: Respondent judge was charged
with gross ignorance of the law. He
refused to suspend the mayor due to
criminal charges against the latter for
the crime of unlawful appointment. The
judge opined that an official cannot be
suspended for something that has
happened in a previous term. Settled
jurisprudence says this only applies to
administrative, not criminal cases.
Held: Fined for P5000. While judges
should not be disciplined for inefficiency
on account merely of occasional
mistakes or errors of judgment, it is
imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles. A judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules; it is imperative that he
be conversant with the basic legal
principles and aware of well-settled and
authoritative doctrines. Also, if he did
the act deliberately, he violated Canon
18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
directs a judge to administer his office
with due regard to the integrity of the
system of the law itself, remembering
that he is not a depository of arbitrary
power, but a judge under the sanction
of law. An RTC judge cannot overturn a
settled doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court, otherwise, litigation
would be endless.
Gross Immoral Conduct
Julieta B. Narag vs. Atty.
Dominador M. Narag (291 SCRA
451)
Facts: Atty. Narag’s spouse filed a
petition for disbarment in the IBP
alleging that her husband courted one
of his students, later maintaining her as
a mistress and having children by her.
Atty. Narag claims that his wife was a
possessive, jealous woman who abused
him and filed the complaint out of spite.
IBP disbarred him, hence, this petition.

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Held: Narag failed to prove his
innocence because he failed to refute
the testimony given against him and it
was proved that his actions were of
public knowledge and brought disrepute
and suffering to his wife and children.
Good moral character is a continuing
qualification required of every member
of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to
meet the exacting standard of moral
integrity, the Supreme Court may
withdraw his or her privilege to practice
law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of
Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only a
condition precedent to the practice of
law, but a continuing qualification for
all members. Hence when a lawyer is
found guilty of gross immoral conduct,
he may be suspended or disbarred.
Grossly immoral means it must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree or committed under
such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common
sense of decency. As a lawyer, one
must not only refrain from adulterous
relationships but must not behave in a
way that scandalizes the public by
creating a belief that he is flouting
those moral standards.
Remedios Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro
L. Tapucar (293 SCRA 331)
Facts: Respondent was previously
dismissed as CFI judge for maintaining
and cohabiting with his mistress.
Despite this, he later married the same
woman and had children with her. He
even made statements displaying
contempt for the SC and mocking the
law and said court. Petitioner, his
lawful wife, filed a letter-complaint for
disbarment against her husband. IBP
disbarred him.
Held: Disbarred (ratio is the same as
the Narag case). A judge is a visible
representation of the law and, more
importantly of justice. Ordinary citizens
consider him as a source of strength
that fortifies their will to obey the law.
A judge should avoid the slightest
infraction of the law in all actuations,
lest it be a demoralizing example to
others. Likewise, an attorney is also
invested with public trust. As officers of
the court, lawyers must ensure the faith
25
and confidence of the public that justice
is administered with dignity and civility.
A high degree of moral integrity is
expected of a lawyer in the community
where he resides. The Court may
disbar or suspend a lawyer for
misconduct whether in his professional
or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity, and good demeanor,
thus proving unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court. The power to
disbar, however, is one to be exercised
with great caution and only in a clear
case of misconduct which seriously
affects the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and
a member of the bar. Keeping a
mistress, entering into another
marriage while a prior one subsists, as
well as abandoning and/or mistreating
complainant and their children, show
his disregard of family obligations,
morality and decency, the law and the
lawyer’s oath. Such gross misbehavior
over a long period of time clearly shows
a serious flaw in respondent’s
character, his moral indifference to
scandal in the community, and his
outright defiance of established norms.
Gross Misconduct
Erlinda Alonto-Frayna v. Judge
Abdulmajid Astih (300 SCRA 199)
Facts: Judge Asith did not act on the
case of the herein complainant for over
2 years despite the orders and
directives of the Office of the Court
Administrator to resolve it without
delay. In addition, when asked to
explain his actions before the SC,
respondent failed to reply.
Held: A Judge who deliberately and
continuously refuses to comply with the
resolution of the SC is guilty of gross
misconduct & insubordination. It is
gross misconduct & even without
outright disrespect for the SC for the
respondent judge to exhibit indifference
to the resolutions requiring him to
comment on the accusations contained
in the complaint against him.
Furthermore, failure to render a
decision beyond the 90 day period from
its submission constitutes serious
misconduct to the detriment of the
honor & integrity of his office & in

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derogation of a speedy administration
of justice.
Romulo F. Manuel v. Judge
Demetrio d. Calimag (307 SCRA
657)
Facts: M charged C with selling him a
stolen car, for which he was arrested.
Held: CASE DISMISSED. No evidence to
substantiate the charges. The SC also
said that to warrant dismissal for
misconduct, it must be shown that the
misconduct is serious and has a direct
relation to his official duties amounting
to misadministration, or intentional
neglect and failure to discharge said
duties. The judicial acts complained of
must be so corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law.
Felicidad L. Oronce, et al. v. Court
of Appeals, et. al. (298 SCRA 133)
Facts: During a dispute over land,
Flaminiano illegally took possession of
the property in litigation using abusive
methods. She was aided by her
husband, a lawyer. The illegal entry
took place while the case was pending
in the CA & while a writ of preliminary
injunction was in force.
Held: Atty. Flaminiano’s acts of
entering the property without the
consent of its occupants & in
contravention of the existing writ or
preliminary injunction & making
utterances showing disrespect for the
law & this Court, are unbecoming of a
member of the Bar. Although he says
that they “peacefully” took over the
property, such “peaceful” take-over
cannot justify defiance of the writ of
preliminary injunction that he knew was
still in force. Through his acts, he has
flouted his duties as a member of the
legal profession. Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he is
prohibited from counseling or abetting
“activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.”
Re: Leaves of Absence Without
Approval of Judge Eric T Calderon,
Municipal Trial Court Judge of
Calumpit, Bulacan (302 SCRA 92)
26
Facts: Administrative case against
Judge C for incurring leaves of absence
for an almost straight period of 3 years.
His excuse is that he was suffering from
a lingering illness of malignant
hypertension. However, despite the fact
that medical certificates were
presented in his favor, most were made
by his personal doctor (an orthopedic
doctor). Also, the tests given by the
Court physician contradict the diagnosis
given by his doctor.
Held: Guilty of gross misconduct and
abandonment of office, judge
dismissed. Judge C should have been
more conscious of his court duties, as
well as more cautious of his actuations,
than he has shown in the performance
of his functions and the discharge of his
responsibilities to the Court and the
citizenry. Further, he should have been
aware that, in frequently leaving his
station, he has caused great disservice
to many litigants and has denied them
speedy justice. From the record it could
be fairly concluded that he had
habitually abandoned his sala for no
justifiable excuse at all. The doctrine of
res ipsa loquitor , that the Court may
impose its authority upon erring judges
whose actuations, on their face, would
show gross incompetence, ignorance of
the law, or misconduct, is patently
applicable to the instant case.
Republic of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals (296 SCRA 171)
Facts: Petitioner filed a case for
recission against the Quetulios and
Abadillas alleging that the former sold
the land that had already been
expropriated. The Quetulios did not file
an answer, but at the hearing on the
motion for default, co-defendant
Hernando was permitted by the judge
to appear as counsel for the defendants
and file an answer.
Held: Case reinstated. Evidently, when
respondent Hernando appeared before
the trial court and filed the
Answer/Motion to dismiss, he was still
under suspension from the practice of
law. A suspended lawyer, during his
suspension, is certainly prohibited from
engaging in the practice of law, and if

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he does so, he may be disbarred. The
reason is that, his continuing to practice
the profession during his suspension
constitutes a gross misconduct and a
willful disregard of the suspension
order, which should be obeyed though
how erroneous it may be until set aside.
Impropriety
Flaviano B. Cortes v. Judge Emerito
M. Agcaoili (249 SCRA 423)
Facts: Respondent was charged with
impropriety and gross ignorance of the
law. In a case for illegal logging, he
dismissed the case and returned
illegally cut timber to the defendants
because the search warrant was invalid.
He was also seen in eating and drinking
in the company of said defendants, and
this supposedly influenced his decision.
Held: Judge Agcaoili is fined and
suspended. Respondent erred in
returning the seized articles – even
though the warrant was invalid, illegal
articles (illegally cut lumber) are not
returned to the possessor. He also
violated Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code
of Judicial Ethics – i.e. to avoid
impropriety or even or even the
appearance of impropriety. Even
though it was not proven that he was
influenced by the defendants (the
dismissal was proper), he should not
have fraternized with litigants who had
a pending case before him. To do so
erodes public confidence in the integrity
and independence of the judiciary. A
judge must avoid even the semblance
of impropriety.
Carlos Dionisio v. Hon. Zosimo V.
Escano (302 SCRA 411)
Facts: E posted an advertisement for
waitresses and singers to work at his
restaurant at the RTC bulletin board. He
also conducted interviews for this in his
sala. He was later caught when a
reporter from “Hoy Gising!” taped an
interview which revealed that he
intended to operate a drinking pub with
scantily clad waitresses.
Held: SUSPENDED. Rules 2.00, 5.02 and
5.03 provide that a judge should avoid
impropriety and even the appearance
of impropriety. He should also refrain
27
from financial and business dealings
that tend to reflect adversely on the
court’s impartiality, interfere with the
proper performance of judicial
activities, or increase involvement with
lawyers and litigants. He should also
manage financial interests so as to
minimize the number of cases giving
grounds for disqualification. Finally, the
halls of justice should not be used for
unrelated purposes.
Benalfre J. Galang v. Judge
Abelardo H. Santos (307 SCRA 582)
Facts: S was a judge and the
publisher/columnist for a tabloid; he
was also a writer for another paper. G
charges him with using his columns to
ventilate his views. He has repeatedly
used insulting and inflammatory
language against the governor and the
provincial prosecutor and legal adviser.
Held: JUDGE DISMISSED. While S has
the right to free speech, his writing of
vicious editorials compromise his duties
as judge in the impartial administration
of justice. They reflect both on his office
and on the officers he ridicules. The
personal behavior of a judge in his
professional and everyday life should
be free from the appearance of
impropriety. Improper conduct erodes
the public confidence in the judiciary.
Benjamin Sia Lao vs. Hon. Felimon
C. Abelila III (295 SCRA 267)
Facts: in a family dispute over a parcel
of land, respondent judge committed
acts of forcible entry, attempted to
deny complainant of possession despite
a lease in the latter’s favor. He also
gave firearms to his men in order to
assault complainant’s workers.
Respondent also fled from police when
called in for questioning.
Held: Respondent DISMISSED. A judge
is the visible representation of the law
and the embodiment of the people’s
sense of justice and that, accordingly,
he should constantly keep himself away
from any act of impropriety, not only in
the performance of his official duties
but also in his everyday actuations. No
other position exacts a greater demand
on moral righteousness and uprightness

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of an individual than perhaps a seat in
the judiciary. A judge must be the first
to abide by the law and to weave an
example for the others to follow.
Spouses Benedicto & Rose Godinez
v. Hon. Antonio Alano and Sheriff
Alberto Ricardo Alano (303 SCRA
259)
Facts: G charged A with committing
irregularities in a civil case for sum of
money. In said case, a writ of
preliminary attachment was issued and
the effects seized were kept in Judge
A’s house. The court investigator found
that the writ was improperly issued
because the allegations of fraud and
attempts to abscond in the affidavit
were bare assertions and not
substantiated by the facts.
Held: FINED. The writ was issued in
error. But in order to merit a
disciplinary sanction, the error or
mistake committed by a judge should
be patent, gross, malicious, deliberate,
or done in bad faith. Absent a clear
showing that the judge has acted
arrantly, the issue becomes judicial in
character and would not properly
warrant the imposition of administrative
punishment. Judge A is fined for storing
the effects in his house and their intent
to charge storage fees. Judges should
avoid impropriety of the appearance of
impropriety.
Gregorio & Teresita Lorena v. Judge
Adolfo Encomienda (302 SCRA 632)
Facts: Spouses Lorena were evicted
from the property of Judge E’s brother.
They refused to vacate. The mayor
invited the parties to a conciliation
meeting but they still refused. The
owners allowed them to stay on the
condition that they sign a written
promise to leave after the grace period.
When L refused, E phoned him and tried
to convince him to sign. L still refused,
E then said: “mga tarantado, mabulok
kayo sa kalabos!” and slammed the
phone down. L accuses E and his
conspirators of abuse of authority for
later throwing them in jail.
Held: REPRIMANDED. Although the
charges against E were refuted by
28
evidence, the serious nature of the
tasks of judges requires them to be
circumspect in both their public and
their private dealings. As they are
“expected to rise above human
frailties” they must, in all their
activities, avoid not only impropriety
but even the appearance of
impropriety. Hence, E should not have
called L by [hone – which gave the
impression of undue pressure and
influence. He should not have cursed L
over the phone as a judge’s behavior
must be beyond reproach.
Office of the Court Administrator
vs. (Judge) Florentino S. Barron
(297 SCRA 376)
Facts: Judge Barron was arrested
during an entrapment operation when
he tried to solicit bribes from an
American national in exchange for
ruling in the latter’s favor in a pending
case.
Held: Judge dismissed. A judge should
always be a symbol of rectitude and
propriety, comporting himself in a
manner that will raise no doubt
whatsoever about his honesty. The
conduct of respondent shows that he
can be influenced by monetary
considerations. His act of demanding
and receiving money from a party-
litigant constitutes serious misconduct
in office. It is this kind of gross and
flaunting misconduct, no matter how
nominal the amount involved, which
erodes the respect for the law and the
courts.
Sarah B. Vedana vs. Judge Eudarlo
B. Valencia (295 SCRA 1)
Facts: Complainant is the court
interpreter and a relative of respondent
judge. She claims that he kissed and
fondled her when she went to his sala
to inform him that the cases for the day
were ready for trial.
Held: Respondent guilty of violating
Canons 2, 3 and 22 of the Code of
Judicial Ethics. The Code mandates that
the conduct of a judge must be free of a
whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of his
judicial duties, but also to his behavior

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outside his sala and as a private
individual. A public official is also
judged by his private morals. A judge,
in order to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at
all times. A judge’s official life can not
simply be detached or separated from
his personal existence.
Negligence
Corazon T. Reontoy v. Atty.
Liberato R. Ibadlit (302 SCRA 604)
Facts: On January 28, 1998 the SC
found Ibadlit administratively liable and
suspended him from the practice of law
for 1 year for failing to appeal within
the reglementary period the decision
rendered against his client. His reason
was, an appeal would only be futile. SC
declared that it was highly improper for
him to have adopted such opinion. SC
said that a lawyer was without authority
to waive his client’s right to appeal and
that his failure to appeal within the
reglementary period constituted
negligence and malpractice, proscribed
by Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which
provides “(a) lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.” This is a motion
for reconsideration.
Held: Suspension lowered to 2 months –
his arguments are partly persuasive, he
believed in good faith that his client’s
case was weak and that she accepted
his explanation that the adverse
decision was not worth appealing
anymore. Besides, it was only several
years later that she complained when
no more relief was available to her.
Also, complainant had reasonable
opportunity to hire another counsel for
a second opinion whether to appeal
from the judgment or file a petition for
relief, that he did not commit to handle
his client’s case on appeal and that the
testimonies of complainant and her
brother were unpersuasive. This is also
his first offense.
People of the Philippines v.
Sevilleno ( 304 SCRA 519)
29
Facts: In a criminal case for rape with
homicide, the accused pleaded guilty.
However, the 3 PAO lawyers assigned
as counsel de officio did not perform
their duty. The first did not advise his
client of the consequences of pleading
guilty, the second left the courtroom
during trial and thus did not cross-
examine the prosecution witnesses. The
third postponed the presentation of
evidence for the defense, and when he
did appear, he said he would rely solely
on the plea in the mistaken belief that it
would lower the penalty to reclusion
perpetua.
Held: Case remanded. Canon 18
required every lawyer to serve his client
with utmost dedication, competence
and diligence. He must not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in this regard renders him
administratively liable. In this case, the
defense lawyers did not protect, much
less uphold, the fundamental rights of
the accused.
N.B. Case remanded because of error
by the judge in not using searching
questions to find if the plea was made
knowingly.
Rodolfo P. Velasquez v. CA & PCIB
(GR No. 124049, June 30, 1999)
Facts: As an incident in the main case,
V appointed his counsel as attorney-in-
fact to represent him at the pre-trial.
Counsel failed to appear, hence V was
declared in default. The order of default
was received by counsel but no steps
were taken to have it lifted or set aside.
Held: Binding on V. V was also guilty of
negli8gence because after making the
special power of attorney, he went
abroad and paid no further attention to
the case until he received the decision.
Thus, no FAME which will warrant a
lifting of the order.
Property Under Litigation
Regalado Daroy vs. Esteban Abecia
Facts: Daroy was plaintiff in a forcible
entry case. He hired Abecia as his
lawyer and won. To satisfy the award
for damages, a parcel of land of the
defendant was sold to Daroy at an

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execution sale. The land was then sold
to Daroy’s relative, who then sold it to
Abecia’s wife. He now claims that these
sales are void because Abecia forged
his signature on the deeds of sale. IBP
disbarred Abecia.
Held: Reversed. The evidence shows
that Daroy was a party to the sale at
the time ot was made and did not
“discover” it 9 years later as he
claimed. He was not defrauded <real
issue the parties thought that
because the land had been acquired at
a public sale to satisfy a judgment in a
case in which respondent was
complainant’s counsel, the latter could
not acquire the land. The parties made
this arrangement to circumvent Art.
1491 of the Civil Code which prevents
lawyers from acquiring property and
rights that may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take by
virtue of their profession. The
prohibition in Art. 1491 does not apply
to the sale of a parcel of land acquired
by a client to satisfy a judgment in his
favor, to his attorney was not the
subject of the litigation. While judges,
prosecuting attorneys, and others
connected with the administration of
justice are prohibited from acquiring
“property or rights in litigation or levied
upon in execution” the prohibition with
respect to attorneys in the case
extends only to “property and rights
that may be the object of any litigation
in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession.”
Qualifications
Ruferto Gutierrez and Maritess
Passion vs. Judge Estanislao S.
Belan
(294 SCRA 1)
Facts: Concerned citizens of Binan
Laguna charged respondent MTC judge
with conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. They claim he
committed perjury for failure to disclose
a previous charge for two criminal
offenses in his written application to the
JBC.
Held: Judge is dismissed. Every
prospective appointee to the judiciary
must apprise the appointing authority
of every matter bearing on his fitness
30
for judicial office, including such
circumstances as may reflect on his
integrity and probity. These are
qualifications specifically required of
appointees to the judiciary by Article
VIII, Sec. 7(3) of the Constitution. The
act of concealing the two criminal cases
against him is a clear proof of his lack
of the said qualification and renders
him unworthy to sit as a judge- even if
he was ultimately acquitted. He is not
being chastened for having had a
pending criminal case at the time of his
application for a judicial position but for
his dishonesty and misrepresentation in
the process of seeking that office.
Unlawful Conduct
Cleto Docena vs. Atty. Dominador
Q. Limon (295 SCRA 262)
Facts: Respondent was petitioner’s
lawyer in a civil case. During that case,
he asked the petitioners to post a
supersedeas bond to stay execution of
the appealed decision. Petitioners
forwarded the money to Limon. Later,
the case was decided in their favor.
They were unable to recover the money
because the clerk of court said no such
bond had ever been filed. IBP
suspended him for one year. Hence
this petition.
Held: Disbarred (see Canon 1.01 and
16.01). Respondent’s allegation that
the money was payment of his fees was
overcome by other evidence. The law
is not a trade nor craft but a profession.
Its basic ideal is to render public service
and to secure justice for those who seek
its aid. If it has to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideal,
lawyers should not only master its
tenets and principles but should also,
by their lives, accord continuing fidelity
to them. By extorting money from his
client through deceit, Limon has sullied
the integrity of his brethren in the law
and has indirectly eroded the people’s
confidence in the judicial system. He is
disbarred for immoral, deceitful and
unlawful conduct.
Victor Nunga v. Atty. Verancio
Viray (306 SCRA 487)
Facts: N accused V of notarizing
documents without a commission. It

LEGAL ETHICS
DIGESTS
ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2001
appears that in 1987 and 1991 he
notarized deeds of sale of property
between the bank he works for and his
minor son. At those times, he was not
commissioned as a notary public.
Held: SUSPENDED. Notarization is
invested with public interest because3
it converts a private document into a
public one. Notarizing without
commission is a violation of the
lawyer’s oath to obey the laws (the
Notarial Law) and by making it appear
that he is so authorized is a deliberate
falsehood which violates the lawyer’s
oath and Rule 1.01 (CPR) that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Atty. Prudencio Penticostes v.
Prosecutor Diosdado Ibañez (304
SCRA 281)
Facts: Pascual was sued for non-
remittance of SSS benefits. She gave
the contested amount to respondent,
who was supposed to forward the same
to the SSS and drop the charges.
Respondent did not forward the
amount. He only remitted the amount
after his complaint for misconduct was
filed with the IBP.
Held: REPRIMANDED. A high sense of
morality, honesty and fair dealing is
expected and required of a member of
the bar. Rule 1.01 provides that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
While Pascual may not strictly be
considered a client of respondent, the
rules relating to a lawyer’s handling of
funds of a client is still applicable, thus,
lawyers are bound to promptly account
for money or property received by them
on behalf of their clients and failure to
do so constitutes professional
misconduct. Also, even if he was acting
as a prosecutor, Canon 6 provides that
these canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of
their official tasks.
Attorney’s Fees
Renato S. Ong & Francia N. Ong v.
Court of Appeals, Inland Trailways,
Inc. & Philtranco Service
Enterprise, Inc. (301 SCRA 387)
31
Facts: Renato Ong was injured during a
vehicular collision. He was awarded
damages by the trial court. On appeal,
the CA, the awards for actual damages,
moral damages & attorney’s fees were
reduced because (1) the cost &
feasibility of corrective surgery had not
been adduced in evidence, (2) the
document relied upon to prove actual
damages was not formally offered in
evidence and (3) no evidence but the
bare assertion of counsel was put
forward to prove damages for unearned
income.
Held: Attorney’s fees is an indemnity
for damages ordered by a court to be
paid by the losing party to the
prevailing party, based on any of the
cases authorized by law. It is payable
not to the lawyer but to the client,
unless the 2 have agreed that the
award shall pertain to the lawyer as
additional compensation or as part
thereof. The Court has established a
set of standards in fixing the amount of
attorney’s fees. Counsel’s performance,
however, does not justify the award of
25 percent attorney’s fees. The nature
of the case was not exceptionally
difficult, and his handling of the case
was sorely inadequate, as shown by his
failure to follow elementary norms of
civil procedure & evidence. It is well-
settled that such award is addressed to
sound judicial discretion and subject to
judicial control.