VI.

Adjudicatory Powers
A. Quasi-judicial power and quasi-judicial body, defined

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003

Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone

Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, an action
for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing
Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale
of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs
to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the
Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of
the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process
of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the
prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the
prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid
card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they
prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular
No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its
quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in
invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative
function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by

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an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international
or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts.25 This is within the
scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine
in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.26
Judicialx power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power.
This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial
manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or
reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188

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Facts: The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public elementary school.
As the school year was then about to end, the "Committee On the Rating Of
Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school
for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the
school Principal, as chairman, and the members of the committee deliberated
and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr.
as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises
were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third
placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as
counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made,
by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, committee members along with the District Supervisor and the
Academic Supervisor of the place.

Issue: WON the committee committed grave abuse of discretion

Held: "'NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION”

"Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of
teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to the real grave
abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of
errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected by means of certiorari.

WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS? It is difficult, if not impossible,

precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is
considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the
law as to the right to a writ of certiorari. it is clear, however, that it is the nature
of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which
performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or
quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly
and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to

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courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the
officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public
character.

The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are
administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise
of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative
duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a
measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that
the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the
legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever
an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those
questions, he acts judicially.

Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. VS. Oil Industry Commission 145 SCRA 433

Facts: Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a "Sublease

and Dealer Agreement" entered into with petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (hereinafter known as Shell) originally in the year 1965 and
superseded in the year 1969. The latter was filed and registered with the OIC.

While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual commitments, Manuel B. Yap
defaulted in his obligations upon failure to pay for his purchases of gasoline and
other petroleum products. Petitioner Shell sent demand letters to respondent
Manuel B. Yap who continued to ignore these demands letters forcing petitioner
Shell to exercise its contractual rights to terminate the contract. Petitioner Shell
sent respondent Yap the required 90-day written notice to terminate their
contract as provided for by Sec. 5 of their "Sublease and Dealer Agreement."

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Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil courts, OIC
persisted in asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a decision stating it has
jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged contractual right of petitioner to declare
Yap's contract terminated. The OIC negated the existence of such right because
the stipulation is an "unfair and onerous trade practice." Respondent OIC also
allowed respondent Yap reasonable time from receipt of the decision within
which to pay his judgment debt to petitioner as adjudged in a Civil Case.
Petitioner Shell moved for a reconsideration but respondent OIC denied it.

Issue: WON Respondent OIC has jurisdiction to hear and decide contractual
disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company.

Held: the OIC has no jurisdiction. The contentions of petitioner are well-
founded. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will reveal that there is no
express provision conferring upon respondent OIC the power to hear and decide
contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company. It is of
course a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly
empowered, administrative agencies like respondent OIC, are bereft of quasi-
judicial powers.

As We declared in Miller vs. Mardo, et al (2 SCRA 898):

" . . . It may be conceded that the Legislature may confer on administrative
boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions, but in so
doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave
no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to
be valid, only to those incidental to, or in connection with, the performance of
administrative duties which do not amount to conferment of jurisdiction over a
matter exclusively vested in the courts."

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 B. Distinguished from judicial power

Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483

Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila
Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers
(ACT) undertook what they described as amass concerted actions" to "dramatize
and highlight' their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the
latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass
concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on
September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government
to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the
Secretary of Education. Through their representatives, the teachers participating
in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to
return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the
DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did
not comply and to hire their replacements. "For failure to heed the return-to-
work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively
charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer
the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days
'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807' and temporarily replaced. An investigation
committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D.
807."

Issue: WON the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction, adjudicatory

powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain
specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violation involving civil or
political rights.

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Held: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such
power.
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the
power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of
any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it
may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted
by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any
person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may
be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. "x x 'It may be said generally
that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what
the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and
whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine
those questions, he acts judicially.'x x."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC

Luzon Development Bank vs Association of LDB Employees 249 SCRA 162

Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and
the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an
arbitration case to resolve the following issue:

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Issue: WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.

Held: It is to be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary

arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter. The state of our present law
relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties," while the
"(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders." Hence, while there is an
express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No.
6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary
arbitrator.
What’s the ruling?

C. Distinguished from administrative function

Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs CA 171 SCRA 348

Facts: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the
President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar salting"
activities in the country. PADS issued search warrants against certain companies.

Issue: WON the PADS is a quasi-judicial body issue search warrants under the
1973 Constitution?

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Held: the court ruled that PADS was not granted by law to issue a warrant of
arrest. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other
than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rule making
It is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to
determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper
reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal
of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential
Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the
Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that
is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm
called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and
salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the
prosecution of such activities, but nothing more.

Cojuangco vs PCGG 190 SCRA 226

Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all
persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to the above
directive the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a thorough study
of the possible involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy
funds. Upon the creation of the PCGG under EO. 1 issued by President Aquino,
the PCGG was charged with the task of assisting the President not only in the
recovery of illgotten wealth or unexplained wealth accumulated by the former
President, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates but
also in the investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President
may assign to the Commission from time to time and to prevent a repetition of
the same in the future.
Petitioner alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary
investigation of the complaints filed by the Solicitor General without violating

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petitioner's rights to due process and equal protection of the law, and that the
PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary investigation.

Issue: WON the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has the
power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the anti-graft and corruption
cases filed by the Solicitor General against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other
respondents for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds.

Held: the court ruled in the negative. Considering that the PCGG, like the courts,
is vested with the authority to grant provisional remedies of (1) sequestration,
(2) freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is indispensable that, as in
the case of attachment and receivership, there exists a prima facie factual
foundation, at least, for the sequestration order, freeze order or takeover order,
an adequate and fair opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation
or nullification. Both are assured under the foregoing executive orders and the
rules and regulations promulgated by the PCGG.
The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG may be divided
into two stages. The first stage of investigation which is called the criminal
investigation stage is the fact finding inquiring which is usually conducted by the
law enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence and interview witnesses
after which they assess the evidence and if they find sufficient basis, file the
complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation. The second stage is the
preliminary investigation stage of the said complaint. It is at this stage, as above
discussed, where it is ascertained if there is sufficient evidence to bring a person
to trial.
It is in such instances that we say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge
at the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a
law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary
investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public prosecutor.

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 The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be
promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for
intervention and that the records of the same should be forwarded to the
Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has primary
jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation
and take appropriate action.

Sideco vs Sarenas, 41 Phil. 80

Facts: Two parties, Crispulo Sideco on the one hand, and Leocadio Sarenas and
Rufino Sarenas on the other hand, claim the exclusive right to the use of the
waters flowing through the estero for irrigation purposes. The claim of Sideco
goes back to 1885 when the predecessor in interest of his father constructed a
dam in these waters; the use of the dam was afterwards interrupted by outside
causes such as imprisonment and war, but again reasserted in 1911, 1915, and
1916. Exactly what the two Sarenas' contention is not quite clear on the facts
before us. However, it appears that they made application to the Director of
Public Works, only to meet with the opposition of Sideco, and that the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, granted the two Sarenas the right, in preference to all other
persons, to use the waters of the estero Bangad. Sideco then took the
proceedings to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. After trial, judgment
was entered, dismissing the complaint and the appeal of Sideco and confirming
the decision of the administrative authorities, with the costs against the plaintiff.
The further appeal of Sideco to this court, while conceding the correctness
of the findings of the trial court, squarely challenges its judgment.

Issue: WON the Director of public works has jurisdiction over the case?

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Held: Administrative machinery for the settlement of disputes as to the use of
waters is provided by the Irrigation Act, as amended. Controversies must be
submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and Communications through the
Director of Public Works. The "decision" of the Secretary thereon is final "unless
appeal therefrom be taken to the proper court within. thirty days after the date
of the notification of the parties of said decision. In case of such appeal the court
having jurisdiction shall try the controversy de novo." (See. 4.) A more extensive
method is also provided, somewhat akin to our cadastral system, which makes it
the duty of the Director of Public Works to make a technical examination of
streams and to prepare a list of priorities. In the performance of this work, the
Director of Public Works or any official especially authorized by him, may
examine witnesses under oath, and can issue for this purpose subpoenas and
subpoenas duces tecum. (Secs. 8, 41.) Certificates signed by the Secretary of
Commerce and Communications are then granted each appropriator. (Secs. 9,
18.) "Appeal" lies from the "decision" of the Director of Public Works, as
approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, to the Court of
First Instance of the province in which the property is situated. Such action must
be brought within ninety days of the date of the publication of the approved list
of priorities. (Sec. 10.)
DECISION OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AS PART OF JUDICIAL
RECORD.-The decision of the Director of Public Works, affirmed by the Secretary
of Commerce and Communications, containing as it does the technical findings of
officers especially qualified in irrigation engineering, should invariably be made a
part of the judicial record because (1) the determination of these officials would
be most useful to the courts, and (2) the exact date of the decision is of moment
since it decides whether the appeal was taken in time.

Ocampo vs US 234 US 91

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 D. Distinguished from legislative power or rule-making

Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848

Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as

part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution
embodied the following pertinent provisions:
"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the
like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from
any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or
similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every
examination day including the examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions.
Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy filed in their own behalf and in behalf of all others similarly situated
like them, with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter
from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitutional.

Issue: WON the Resolution is unconstitutional

Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is
not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be
eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them
of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-
when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the
review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the

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examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten
branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of
such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be
terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed
out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if
violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These
are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the
examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should
not be curtailed.

E. Rationale for vesting administrative agencies with quasi-judicial

power

C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs Hibionada 191 SCRA 268

Facts : The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville Development

Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to private respondent Efren
Diongon. The installment payments having been completed, Diongon demanded
the delivery of the certificate of title to the subject land. When neither the
petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against them for
specific performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental. The case was set for initial hearing. It was then that C.T. Torres
Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the
competent body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. The motion to dismiss was denied by the court contending
that it had jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue : WON the trial court have jurisdiction over the case.

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Ratio : P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," provides that the
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive authority to regulate the real
estate trade and business.

P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the
National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its
decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the
agency as follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real

estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for
in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision

lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner developer,
dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory

obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified

by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and
competently to the pressing problems of the modem world.

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 F. Scope of quasi-judicial powers of an administrative agency

GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799

Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6)
employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly been found
to be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. Five
of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The
Board found the dismissals to be illegal because affected without formal charges
having been filed or an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and
ordered the remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary
proceedings. The GSIS appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By Resolution,
the Commission ruled that the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal. GSIS
appealed to the SC and affirmed the decision of the CSC with a modification that
it eliminated the payment of back salaries until the outcome of the investigation
and reinstatement of only 3 employees since the other two had died. The heirs
of the deceased sought execution of the order from the CSC which was granted.
GSIS opposed and came to the SC on certiorari contending that the CSC does
not have any power to execute its resolution or judgment.

Issue : WON the CSC had powers to execute its resolution or judgment.

Ratio : The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit, is a constitutional commission invested by the Constitution
and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but also
with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal.

The Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting,

approving and putting into effect simplified rules of procedure on administrative

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disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant to the authority granted by the
constitutional and statutory provisions. The provisions are analogous and entirely
consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in the Chairman by PD 807,
subject to policies and resolutions adopted by the Commission. In light of all the
foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny
to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority to enforce or order
execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it
has been exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the
authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see
that what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or
agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge
cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of
authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless
the law otherwise provides.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of
disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then pending,
against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the binding force of
the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and purposes, it makes
exoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition precedent to payment
of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a useless
exercise.

Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Facts : This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the
Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of
the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said
petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of

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the Province of Tayabas. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Commission.

Issue : WON Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in

assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly?

Ratio : The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei
the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted
to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of
its exclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Provident Tree Farms vs Batario, Jr. 231 SCRA 463

Facts : PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine

corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its
plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to a local match
manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with the state
policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec.
36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like PTFI a set of
incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and

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"wood-derivated" products. Private respondent A. J. International Corporation
(AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from Indonesia, which the
Bureau of Customs, and two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore.
Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department of
Natural Resources and Environment issued a certification that "there are
enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at
reasonable price." PTFI then filed with the Regional Court of Manila a
complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining
order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the
latter from importing matches and "wood-derivative" products, and the Collector
of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. AJIC moved to dismiss
the case asseverating that the enforcement of the import ban under Sec. 36, par.
(1), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of
Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel
the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.

Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the

legality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative
proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with
it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the

courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
purposes of the regulatory statute administered.

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In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to
hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual
matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has
become well nigh indispensable . . .

Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation 178 SCRA 164

Facts : Private respondent Taclin V. Bañez offered to sell to petitioner Enriqueto

F. Tejada a 200 square meter lot owned by respondent corporation. Private
respondent suggested that petitioner pay a reservation fee of P20,000.00, which
would form part of the consideration in case they reach a final agreement of sale
and which amount was to be returned to the petitioner should the parties fail to
reach an agreement. After paying the reservation fee, the respondent
corporation changed the terms of monthly amortization which resulted in the
demand of the petitioner for the return of his reservation fee. Respondent
refused to return the same and petitioner brought suit with the RTC for a
collection of sum of money. Respondents herein filed a motion to dismiss
contesting the jurisdiction of the RTC to hear the case. The same was denied
and respondents appealed to the CA who decided in their favor. Petitioner
argues that inasmuch as there is no perfected contract of sale between the
parties, the claim for recovery of the reservation fee properly falls within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts and not that of the HSRC.

Issue : WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the recovery of reservation fee.

Ratio : The RTC has no jurisdiction. Under Presidential Decree No. 1344, the
NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims involving refund and
other claims filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the

20
project owner, etc. There is no such qualification in said provision of law that
makes a distinction between a perfected sale and one that has yet to be
perfected. The word "buyer" in the law should be understood to be anyone who
purchases anything for money. Under the circumstances of this case, one who
offers to buy is as much a buyer as one who buys by virtue of a perfected
contract of sale. Said powers have since been transferred to the HLRB.

Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, it is therein

provided that the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving refund
filed against project owners, developers, and dealers, among others.

When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all

controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are
deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or
body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. Since in this case the action for refund of
reservation fee arose from a proposed purchase of a subdivision lot obviously the
HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

Cariño vs. CHR 204 SCRA 483

Ruling : Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as
it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim
that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in
question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no
power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass
concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are

21
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying
on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue
those actions and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the
Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations
warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances
complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each
individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said
acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted
to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission.

G. Classification of adjudicatory powers

2. Directing powers. Illustrated by the corrective powers of

public utility commissions, powers of assessment under the
revenue laws, reparations under public utility laws and awards
under;
3. Enabling powers. The grant or denial of permit or
authorization;
1. Dispensing powers. The authority to exempt from or relax a
general prohibition, or authority to relieve from affirmative duty.
The licensing power sets or assumes a standard, while the
dispensing power sanctions a deviation from a standard;
2. Summary powers. To designate administrative power to
apply compulsion or force against person or property to effectuate
a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to authorize such action;

22
 3. Equitable powers. An administrative tribunal having power to
determine the law upon a particular state of facts has the right to
and must consider and make proper application of the rules of
equity.

VII. The Power to Issue Subpoena

Carmelo vs Ramos 6 SCRA 836

Facts :

Issue :

Ruling :

Section 13 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code

Caamic vs Galaon 237 SCRA 390

Facts : Respondent MTC judge issued a subpoena against Caamic which required
her to appear before his sala under the penalty of law. Caamic was surprised for
she was not aware of any case filed against her. When she appeared at the date,
time and place stated in the subpoena, she was berated by the respondent and
demanded 8K from her. Said amount was the amount of the life insurance policy
of one Edgardo Sandagan. Said subpoena was issued upon request by Generosa
Sandagan who sought the help of respondent because she could not get a share
of the proceeds of the life insurance policy of her dead husband whose
beneficiary was Caamic.

23
Issue : Propriety of the subpoena issued by the respondent judge.

Ruling : Respondent should have known or ought to know that under Section 1,
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena "is a process directed to a person
requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or
at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for taking of
his deposition." Although the subpoena he caused to be issued purports to be in
a form for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not, in fact, issued in
connection with a criminal case or for any other pending case in his court nor for
any investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant to law or by direction of
this Court. It was designated for a specific purpose, viz., administrative
conference. That purpose was, in no way connected with or related to some of
his administrative duties because he knew from the beginning that it was for a
confrontation with the complainant as solicited by Generosa. Sandagan for the
latter to get a share in the death benefits of Edgardo Sandagan which was
received by the complainant. Generosa had not filed any action in respondent's
court for her claim; neither is there any case in respondent's court concerning
such death benefits. What Generosa wanted was for respondent to act as
mediator or conciliator to arrive at a possible compromise with the complainant,
which was, obviously, non-official and absolutely a private matter. Not being
then directly or remotely related to his official functions and duties,
accommodating the request and using his official functions and office in
connection therewith was, by any yardstick, improper.

In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the questioned
"subpoena duces tecum " that the complaining party is afforded his full rights of
redress.

Universal Rubber Products vs CA 130 SCRA 104

24
Facts : Private respondents herein sued herein petitioner for unfair competition
in the lower court. During the trial and after the presentation of some of private
respondents’ witnesses, they requested the court for a subpoena duces tecum as
regards to the books of herein petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash the
subpoena on the ground that it can only be regarded as a “fishing bill” to
discover evidence against herein petitioner and that such is not applicable in a
case for unfair competition. The trial court denied the same.

Issue : WON the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is proper in a case for
unfair competition.

Ratio : A case for unfair competition is actually a case for injunction and
damages. As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for infringement of a
trademark, complainant is entitled to an accounting and recovery of defendant's
profits on the goods sold under that mark, as incident to, and a part of, his
property right, and this rule applies in cases of unfair competition. In such case,
the infringer or unfair trader is required in equity to account for and yield up his
gains on a principle analogous to that which charges as trustee with the profits
acquired by the wrongful use of the property of the cestui que trust, and
defendant's profits are regarded as an equitable measure of the compensation
plaintiff should receive for the past harm suffered by him.

in order to entitle a parry to the issuance of a "subpoena duces tecum, " it must
appear. by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be
produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court,
and that the precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has
been so designated or described that it may be identified. A "subpoena duces
tecum" once issued by the court may be quashed upon motion if the issuance
therof is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books. documents

25
or things does not appear, or if the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is
issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of production thereof.

In the instant case in determining whether the books subject to the subpoena
duces tecum are relevant and reasonable in relation to the complaint of private
respondent for unfair competition.

Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27

Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged with
several others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it opened 3 boxes without
the presence of the persons and/or parties indicated in its Resolution. After
appearing and showing cause why they should not be punished for contempt,
the COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for imprisonment and imposing a fine.
Masangcay filed a petition for review with the SC.

Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his acts.

Ruling : When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise

the power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in
nature. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did
not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the
power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is
inherently judicial in nature.

The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and administer all
laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and
decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the
elections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot be classified

26
as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article
VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial
functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law come under its
jurisdiction.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in
the, administration of justice.

The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and
attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably
limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that
power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has
been held invalid.

VIII. The Power To Punish For Contempt

People v. Mendoza 92 Phil 570

Camelo v. Ramos 116 Phil 1152

IX. Power to impose penalties

Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller 99 Phil 762

Facts: Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Department Store
situated at 615 Escolta, Manila. This store was owned and operated by Yu Ki
Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen Yang. Pursuant to section 5(b) of the

27
Industrial Peace Act, Nena Micaller filed charges of unfair labor practice against
her above employers alleging that she was dismissed by them because of her
membership in the National Labor Union and that, prior to her separation, said
employers had been questioning their employees regarding their membership in
said union and had interfered with their right to organize under the law.

The employers denied the charge. They claimed that the complainant was
dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious disrespect to
the management and her co employees so much so that several criminal charges
were filed against her with the city fiscal of Manila who, after investigation, filed
the corresponding information’s against her and the same are now pending trial
in court.
The Court of industrial relation ruled in favor of Nina Micaller and impose fine
against the petitioner.

Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to impose the
penalties prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875.

Ruling: This is against the due process guaranteed by our Constitution. It may be
contended that this gap may be subserved by requiring the Court of Industrial
Relations to observe strictly the rules applicable to criminal cases to meet the
requirements of the Constitution, but this would be tantamount to amending the
law which is not within the province of the judicial branch of our Government.

In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to impose the penalties
provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 is lodged in ordinary courts,
and not in the Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding the definition of the
word "Court" contained in section 2 (a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the
industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal
and should be nullified.

28
The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial
Relations in dealing with unfair labor practice cases negates those constitutional
guarantees to the accused. And this is so because, among other things, the law
provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not
be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Act that the Court (of
Industrial Relations) and its members and Hearing Examiners shall use every and
all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively
and without regard to technicalities of law, or procedure." It is likewise enjoined
that "the Court shall not be bound solely by the evidence presented during the
hearing but may avail itself of all other means such as (but not limited to) ocular
inspections and questioning of well-informed persons which results must be
made a part of the record". All-this means that an accused may be tried without
the right "to meet the witnesses face to face" and may be convicted merely on
preponderance of evidence and not beyond reasonable doubt.

CAB v. PAL 63 SCRA 524

X. Power in deportation and citizenship cases

Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 756

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
I. Jurisdiction

A. Definition
People vs Mariano 71 SCRA 600

29
Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of chastity. He filed an
appealed contending that he married the victim therefore his criminal liability
should be extinguished. The Attorney-General entered an opposition to said
petition wherein, after discussing the scope of article 448 of the Penal Code and
Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Legislature amending said article, he concluded
that the marriage of the accused with the offended party cannot extinguish his
liability as perpetrator of the crime of abuse against chastity.

Issue: Whether or not section 2 of Act No. 1773 includes the crime of abuse
against chastity among those cases in which criminal liability is extinguished by
the marriage of the accused with the offended party.

Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No. 1773 was that
the marriage of the accused or convict with the offended party should extinguish
the criminal liability in the cases of seduction, abduction and rape and those
involving offenses included in said crimes, such as frustrated or attempted
seduction, abduction or rape. This is clear and logical. If the liability for a crime is
extinguished in the graver cases, it must be extinguished, and for a stronger
reason, in the lesser crimes.
Now then, if the crime of abuse against chastity is not denominated rape, it is
only for the lack of the intention to lie, both crimes being identical in every other
respect, though of different degrees of gravity. We therefore conclude that the
crime of abuse against chastity is included in the crime of rape mentioned in
section 2 of Act No. 1773 and, consequently, the marriage of the accused with
the offended party in the present case has extinguished his criminal liability.

B. Extent of jurisdiction of administrative agencies performing quasi-

judicial acts
Chin vs LBP 201 SCRA 190

30
Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512

Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of

Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the absence of
five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election
Supervisor walked out.
The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino Secretary-
Vicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales.
Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to
respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the
election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its mullification in view of several
flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. Respondent Secretary
issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC in
Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as
early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the
Department of Local Government.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied by
respondent Secretary. In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks the
reversal of the resolutions of respondent for being null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an

election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of
Association of Barangay Councils, Assuming that the respondent Secretary has
jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not he committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?

Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to

entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no

31
question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as
set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code. "(3) Promulgate rules
and regulations necessary to carry out department objectives, policies, functions,
plans, programs and projects;"

It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly

empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of judicial powers. The
jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions
of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves.
Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations."

There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by

necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the
power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the
katipunan ng mga barangay. Construing the constitutional limitation on the
power of general supervision of the President over local governments, We hold
that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity
of the election of the officers of the katipunan.
To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or
the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government
officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan
activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local
governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved.

I. Procedure to be followed

Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code

A. Source of authority to promulgate rules of procedure

32
Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution

Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara won. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as
member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received
the most number of votes, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent
Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against
the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other
things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National
Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be
nullified.

Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

Ruling: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the Constitution. If we concede the power claimed in
behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of
the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down

33
the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the
commission would be ineffective.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to
its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also included. The
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of
its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

B. Limitations on the power to promulgate rules of procedure

First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30 –lourdes

C. Technical rules not applicable

Kanlaon Construction Enterprises vs NLRC 279 SCRA 337

Facts: This is a labor case involving Kanlaon for illegal termination of

employment of publics respondents. The arbitration’s decision is appealed to the
NLRC. Public respondents in their appeal questioned the validity of the NLRC’s
decision on the ground that the NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably
interpreted the principle that the NLRC and its Arbitration Branch are not strictly
bound by the rules of evidence.
In brief, it was alleged that the the decision is void for the following reasons: (1)
there was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and
Atty. Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent petitioner at the

34
hearings before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent Commission; (3) the
decisions of the arbiters and respondent Commission are based on
unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were rendered in violation of
petitioner's right to due process.

Issue: WON publics respondents’ claim is tenable.

Held: The labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due process,
be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are
precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and
inexpensive settlement of labor disputes. The decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is annulled and set aside and the case is
remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for further proceedings.

Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635

Ruling: The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical

rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform
its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief
claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute,
but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination
which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13,
ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been
especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into
effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural

35
requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.

Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757

Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision of the
defunct Court of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch VI, which
declared null and void its decision in Administrative Case No. 48 dismissing
private respondent Simplicio C. Ibea and instead ordered then Municipal Mayor
Braulio Sto. Domingo of San Juan, Rizal to reinstate said respondent to his
former position as policeman of the same municipality with back salaries from
the date of his suspension up to the date of his actual reinstatement.

Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that respondent
Simplicio C. Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police
Commission decided Administrative Case No. 48 even without stenographic notes
taken of the proceedings of the case.

Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as falling short of

the legal requirements of due process, because it decided the subject
administrative case without stenographic notes (which were not taken by the
Board of Investigators) of the proceedings of the case, was in error. Rep. Act No.
4864 does not provide that the Board of Investigators shall be a "board of
record," and as such it does not provide for office personnel such as clerks and
stenographers who may be employed to take note of the proceedings of the
board. The proceeding provided for is merely administrative and summary in
character, in line with the principle that "administrative rules of procedure should
be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims

36
and defenses." The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be
present in an administrative investigation, provided that the parties are heard
and gven the opportunity to adduce their respective evidence.

D. Justiciable controversy and forum shopping

SEC vs CA 246 SCRA 738

Facts: The petition before this Court relates to the exercise by the SEC of its
powers in a case involving a stockbroker (CUALOPING) and a stock transfer
agency (FIDELITY).
The Commission has brought the case to this Court in the instant petition for
review on certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred in setting aside
the decision of the SEC which had (a) ordered the replacement of the certificates
of stock of Philex and (b) imposed fines on both FIDELITY and CUALOPING.

Held: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has both regulatory and
adjudicative functions. Under its regulatory responsibilities, the SEC may pass
upon applications for, or may suspend or revoke (after due notice and hearing),
certificates of registration of corporations, partnerships and associations
(excluding cooperatives, homeowners' associations, and labor unions); compel
legal and regulatory compliances; conduct inspections; and impose fines or other
penalties for violations of the Revised Securities Act, as well as implementing
rules and directives of the SEC, such as may be warranted.
The SEC decision which orders the two stock transfer agencies to "jointly replace
the subject shares and for FIDELITY to cause the transfer thereof in the names
of the buyers" clearly calls for an exercise of SEC's adjudicative jurisdiction. The
stockholders who have been deprived of their certificates of stock or the persons

37
to whom the forged certificates have ultimately been transferred by the
supposed indorsee thereof are yet to initiate, if minded, an appropriate
adversarial action. A justiciable controversy such as can occasion an
exercise of SEC's exclusive jurisdiction would require an assertion of a
right by a proper party against another who, in turn, contests it. The
proper parties that can bring the controversy and can cause an
exercise by the SEC of its original and exclusive jurisdiction would be
all or any of those who are adversely affected by the transfer of the
pilfered certificates of stock. Any peremptory judgment by the SEC,
without such proceedings having initiated, would be precipitat.

The question on the legal propriety of the imposition by the SEC of a P50,000
fine on each of FIDELITY and CUALOPING, is an entirely different matter. This
time, it is the regulatory power of the SEC which is involved. When, on appeal to
the Court of Appeals, the latter set aside the fines imposed by they the SEC, the
latter, in its instant petition, can no longer be deemed just a nominal party but a
real party in interest sufficient to pursuant appeals to this Court.
Section 2.5 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188
Villanueva vs Adre 172 SCRA 876
Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs CA 251 SCRA 257
First Phil. Int’l Bank vs CA 252 SCRA 259
R. Transport Corp. vs Laguesma 227 SCRA 826
Galongco vs CA 283 SCRA 493
E. Institution of proceedings; acquisition of jurisdiction
Section 5, Rule 7 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Santos vs NLRC 254 SCRA 675
Matanguihand vs Tengo, 272 SCRA 704
F. Pre-trial conference; default
Section 10 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code

38
Auyong vs CTA 59 SCRA 110
G. Hearing
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160
Section 11.1 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
Simpao vs CSC 191 SCRA 396
Alejandro vs CA 191 SCRA 700
H. Evidence
Section 12.3 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
State Prosecutor vs Muro 236 SCRA 505
1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
People vs Bacalzo 195 SCRA 557
2. Clear and convincing evidence
Black’s Law Dictionary 5th ed. P. 227
3. Preponderance of evidence
New Testament Church of God vs CA 246 SCRA 266
4. Substantial evidence
Velasquez vs Nery 211 SCRA 28
Malonzo ns COMELEC 269 SCRA 380
I. Decision
Section 2.8, 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Marcelino vs Cruz 121 SCRA 51
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300
1. Form of decision
Mangca vs COMELEC 112 SCRA 273
Malinao vs Reyes 255 SCRA 616
Sections 2.13 and 2.12 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
2. Publication of decisions
Section 16.1.2 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
3. Finality, promulgation and notice of decision

39
Section 15 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Robert Dollar Company vs Tuvera 123 SCRA 354
Lindo vs COMELEC 194 SCRA 25
Jamil vs COMELEC 283 SCRA 349
Section 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Zoleta vs Drilon 166 SCRA 548
4. Collegiate decision, requirement to be valid
Mison vs COA 187 SCRA 445
Aquino-Sarmiento vs Morato 203 SCRA 515
5. Finality of decisions
Section 15 Chapter III Book VII Admin Code of 1987
Administrative Order No. 18 Section 7
Uy vs COA 328 SCRA 607
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative vs Torres 286 SCRA 666
6. Application of the doctrine of res judicata
Republic vs Neri 213 SCRA 812
Brillantes v Castro 99 Phil 497
Ipekdjian Merchandising vs CTA, L-15430, 30 Sept. 1963
Teodoro vs Carague 206 SCRA 429
J. Administrative appeal in contested cases
Section 19, 20, 21, 22 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Mendez vs CSC 204 SCRA 965
PCIB vs CA 229 SCRA 560
Diamonon vs DOLE 327 SCRA 283
De Leon vs Heirs of Gregorio Reyes 155 SCRA 584
Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22
Reyes vs Zamora 90 SCRA 92
Section 23 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals 94 SCRA 261
Ysmael v. Dep Exec Sec 190 SCRA 673

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 K. Execution
Divinagracia vs CFI 3 SCRA 775
GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799
Vital-Gozon vs CA 212 SCRA 235
II. Due process of law in administrative adjudication
A. Substantive and procedural due process, defined
Santiago vs Alikpala 25 SCRA 356
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160
Albert vs CFI of Manila 23 SCRA 948
B. Cardinal primary requirements of due process
Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635
Fabella vs CA 282 SCRA 256
Air Manila vs Balatbat 38 SCRA 489
C. Necessity for notice and hearing
Philippine Movie Pictures Wokers’ Association vs Premiere Productions, Inc., G.R.
No. L-5621, 25 March 1953
Mabuhay Textile Mills vs Ongpin 141 SCRA 437
Go vs NAPOLCOM 271 SCRA 447
D. Cold neutrality of a judge
Zamboanga Chromite Mining Co. vs CA 94 SCRA 261
E. Prior notice and hearing, essential elements of procedural due
process
Villa vs Lazaro 189 SCRA 34
RCA Communications vs PLDT 110 Phil 420
Section 11 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Bolastig vs Sandiganbayan 235 SCRA 103
F. Notice and hearing, when dispensed with
1. Where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, the preventive
suspension of public servant facing administrative charges;

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Central Bank vs CA 220 SCRA 536
Estate of Gregoria Francisco vs CA 199 SCRA 595
Sitchon vs Aquino 98 Phil 458
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action; where
the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice
and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person
affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of
a delinquent taxpayer and the replacement of a temporary
appointee;
Lastimosa vs Vasquez 243 SCRA 497
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the
right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Asprec vs Itchon 16 SCRA 921
Banco Filipino vs Central Bank 204 SCRA 767
G. Notice and hearing in rate-fixing
Vigan Electric Light vs PSC 10 SCRA 46
H. Motion for reconsideration as a cure
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
i.Right to counsel, not a due process requirement
Lumiqued vs Exevea 282 SCRA 125
III. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
A. Definition and objective
Industrial Enterprises vs CA, 184 SCRA 426
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003
B. Distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies
Felizardo vs CA 233 SCRA 220
C. Effect of doctrine
Villaflor vs CA 280 SCRA 327
Machete vs CA 250 SCRA 176

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Director of Lands vs CA 194 SCRA 224
Provident Tree Farms vs Batario 231 SCRA 463
Philippine Veterans Bank vs CA 322 SCRA 139
D. When doctrine does not apply
Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 260
IV. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
A. Definition and purpose
Rosales vs CA 165 SCRA 344
Gonzales vs Secretary of Education 5 SCRA 657
Carale vs Abarintos 269 SCRA 132
B. Effect of failure to exhaust remedies
De los Santos vs Limbaga 4 SCRA 224
Republic vs Sandiganbayan 255 SCRA 438
Factora, Jr. vs CA 320 SCRA 530
C. When applied
Ang Tuan Kai vs Import Control Commission L-4427, 21 April 1952
D. Exceptions to the doctrine
Sunville Timber Products vs Abad 206 SCRA 482
Gonzales vs Hechanova, 60 OG 802
Paat vs CA 266 SCRA 167
Corpus vs Cuaderno L-17860 30 March 1962
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003
Marinduque Iron Mines v. Sec. of Public Works
8 SCRA 179
Bueno vs Patanao 9 SCRA 794
Continental Marble Corp. vs NLRC 161 SCRA 151
Kilusang Bayan vs Dominguez 205 SCRA 92
Almine vs CA 177 SCRA 796
Tapales vs President of UP 7 SCRA 553
Quintos v. National Stud Farm 54 SCRA 210

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Soto v. Jareno 144 SCRA 116
Sunga v. NLRC 173 SCRA 338
Sabello v. DECS 100 SCRA 623
Montes v. Civil Service Board of Appeals 101 Phil 490

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