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03 Igor Cvejic PDF
03 Igor Cvejic PDF
DOI: 10.2298/FID1602332C
Original scientific article
Received: 21.2.2016 — Accepted: 15.3.2016
Igor Cvejić
1 Similar terms are public engagement, civic engagement and community engagement.
Public engagement is today mostly used to refer to interaction of experts with
IGOR CVEJIĆ: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade,
cvejic@instifdt.bg.ac.rs.
ENGAGING REFLEXIVITY, REFLECTING ENGAGEMENT
By contrast, a dog can desire to go out on a walk. This means not merely
that the dog is able to behave in ways that are instrumental to its going
on a walk by, for example, bringing its leash to its master or scratching
at the back door, but also that the dog cares about going on walks: this
is something that matters or has significance or importance to it, as is
clear in part from its frustration or anger at not being let out and its joy
when it finally is.” (Helm 2001: 31–32)
I will now link the problem of import with social engagement. We may say
that many activities we have, activities that can be understood as social, do
334 not necessarily involve our commitment to their goals. These could be dull
administrative or military services, or jobs we do only to get paid (for exam-
ple, a person who works ‘for’ terrorists in an illegal weapon factory to secure
means for a numerous and starving family, against or regardless of his
moral sentiments), etc. This is what Kant referred to as the private use of
reason, the limited use of reason, where objectives are not to be questioned:
“I call ‘private use’ that use which a man makes of his reason in a civic
post that has been entrusted to him. In some affairs affecting the interest
of the community a certain [governmental] mechanism is necessary in
which some members of the community remain passive. This creates an
artificial unanimity which will serve the fulfillment of public objectives
(Zwecken), or at least keep these objectives from being destroyed. Here
arguing is not permitted: one must obey.” (WA, AA 08: 37)
mentioned above and actions that are not based on a single evaluative
perspective per simpliciter, but relative to the other(s) as a subject of import.
Helm names these actions engaged actions (Helm 2009: 93). (3) We could
also make a further step, and introduce a case where an import is not rela-
tive only to a single evaluative perspective or to the others as the subject of
import, but where the group or a community itself becomes the subject of
import. Helm’s term for the latter is plural robust agency (Helm 2009: 266) – in
the context of social engagement I chose to use the term ‘social engagement
as togetherness’.
There are, of course, many actions that we do for the sake of others. Some
of them could be explained as egoistic through instrumental reasons (e.g.
I care about someone because I will have an indirect benefit from it). How-
ever, the challenge is to understand non-instrumental (non-egoistic) reasons
that we could have to care about others. Of course, there are those who
would claim that in the final instance every imaginable reason could be
ENGAGING REFLEXIVITY, REFLECTING ENGAGEMENT
2 This is understandable since Helm’s use of the concept of import is very close to
that of an emotion: emotions are intentional feelings of import (Helm 2002: 192).
3 These concepts were first introduced by Ronald De Sousa (De Sousa 1987: 115-123)
IGOR CVEJIĆ THE FORMS OF SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT REGARDING THE SUBJECT OF IMPORT
at; the focus of an emotion is the background object having import to which
a target is related in such a way as to make intelligible the target’s having
the property defined by the formal object. Perhaps an example would make
this point clearer:
“I might be afraid as the neighbor kid throws a ball that comes perilously
close to smashing a vase. Here the target of my fear is the ball, which the
emotion presents as having a formal object – as being dangerous; the
focus of my fear is the vase, for it is in virtue of both the import the vase
has for me and the relation the ball has to it (as potentially smashing it)
that the ball is intelligible as a danger.” (Helm 2002: 192)
Taking this under consideration, in the social engagement for the sake of
others I would include those social activities in which someone else is the
subject of import and those who are engaged share his/her import. Let us
provide an example. Suppose that I find helping the Roma population
worth pursuing and I am really engaged in some activities (e.g. helping
them to find a job and ensure basic income). However, after some time
spent with a Roma family, I realize that those things that I found important
are actually trivial for them, and that they find some other things, which
I find irrelevant, worth pursuing. Suddenly, my own perspective is changed,
and I am not only engaged in helping the Roma family, but I also share
ENGAGING REFLEXIVITY, REFLECTING ENGAGEMENT
the import they have, and I find some things worth pursuing only because
it is worthy of pursuit for them, i.e. I am socially engaged for them as the
subjects of import.4
4 Certainly, care for other as an agent does not have to go only in one direction.
People often mutually care for each other, which is called solidarity on a societal level
(see also Vasiljević in this volume). Moreover, sometimes a degree of caring for someone
is appropriate to the care that another gives to me, such is reciprocity in mutual caring.
Although I do not believe that this requires a specific explanation, I wanted to point to
one more possible modification of social engagement for the sake of others.
IGOR CVEJIĆ THE FORMS OF SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT REGARDING THE SUBJECT OF IMPORT
What does it mean that a ‘we’ is the subject of import? It means that things
have import for us. The crucial question here is not whether we care about
something, but how we care? Namely, this situation presupposes that I care
340 about something only in the way in which we care about something. Analogous
to the previous situation of caring about others, to care about something
we care about is to care about us, and not only about our well-being, but
about us as an agent. It means that ‘we’ as a subject of import is my focus,
and related to this focus are my subfocuses and targets. It differs from caring
about others insofar as the focus is not someone else, but ‘us’ to whom
I belong as being the part of the ‘we’. Furthermore, this implies another
difference, because someone else exists as a subject of import independently
of those who care about him/her, while some ‘we’ exists only insofar as there
are members of the ‘we’ that care about ‘us’ as the subject of import.
This idea does not evoke a completely different and separable collective
brain which is somewhere above or beyond your or my brain. However, it
does in a sense involve an idea of a phenomenologically distinct ‘collective’
mind irreducible to a single evaluative perspective, i.e. to your and my
focus on our relationship that constitutes ‘us’ as the subject of import.
References
Bratman, Michael E. (1999), “Shared Intention”, in: Faces of Intention: Selected Essays
on Intention and Agency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 109–129.
Davidson, Donald (1963), “Actions, Reasons and Causes”, The Journal of Philosophy
60(23), p. 685–700.
De Sousa, Ronald (1987), The Rationality of Emotion, Cambridge/London: MIT Press
Gilbert, Margaret (2000), “Obligation and Joint community”, in: Sociality and
Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject Theory, Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield
Helm, Bennet W. (2002), “Action for the sake of…: Caring and the Rationality of
(Social) Action”, Analyse & Kritik 24: 189–208
Helm, Bennet W. (2001), Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of
Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Helm, Bennet W. (2009), Love, Friendship & the Self. Intimacy, Identification and the
Social Nature of Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Kant, Immanuel (1900-), (WA) “Was heißt Aufklären“, in: Kants gesammelte Schriften
(Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Ed.). Berlin: G. Reimer
[later Walter de Gruyter]
NCCPE, “What is Public Engagement?” (internet), url: http://www.publicengagement.
ac.uk/explore-it/what-public-engagement (accessed 29.3.2016)
Searle, John R. (1990), “Collective Intentions and Actions”, in: Philip R. Cohen, Jerry
Morgan and Martha E. Pollack (Ed.), Intentions in Communication, Cambridge/
London: MIT Press
IGOR CVEJIĆ THE FORMS OF SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT REGARDING THE SUBJECT OF IMPORT
Igor Cvejić
Oblici društvenog angažmana s obzirom na subjekat importa
Rezime
Namera ovog rada je da se ukaže na različite forme društvenog angažmana s
obzirom na subjekat importa. Import je pojam koji je u teoriju delanja uveo Benet
Helm, a koji označava intencionalnu karakteristiku objekta, da je percipiran kao
vredan zalaganja ili izbegavanja. Međutim, prema Helmu subjekat importa može
biti individualna osoba, drugi ili grupa (plural agent). Sledeći ovu podelu možemo
razlikovati tri osnovne forme društvenog angažmana: (1) lični društveni angažman,
(2) društveni angažman za drugog-e i (3) društveni angažman kao zajedništvo.
Društveni angažman kao zajedništvo, prema tome, ne treba pobrkati sa akcijama
mnoštva koje deli usmerenost ka cilju (a koje pripadaju ličnom društvenom an-
gažmanu). Ovaj argumentativni korak omogućen je kompleksnom Helmovom
teorijom o „nama“ kao subjektu importa, nasuprot nekim savremenim teoretiča-
rima koji poriču mogućnost pluralnog agenta.