CONSOLIDATED CASES

FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL

2016

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FEU JD4102
Republic v. PIATCO G.R. No. 181892, April 19, 2016

FACTS:

The case stemmed from a complaint filed by the Republic for the expropriation of the NAIA-IPT
III structure and did not include the land, which the Republic already owns. The RTC issued a writ of
possession in favor of the Republic, it was based on the latter’s manifestation that it had deposited with the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), the amount of P3 Billion, representing the NAIA-IPT Ill's assessed
value. The RTC ruled, inter alia, that the LBP should immediately release to PIATCO the amount of US$62
Million, to be deducted eventually from the just compensation. In the course of the proceedings, the RTC
allowed Takenaka and Asahikosan to intervene. Takenaka and Asahikosan based their intervention on the
foreign judgments issued in their favor in the two collection cases that they filed against PIATCO. Takenaka
and Asahikosan prayed: (a) hold in abeyance the release of just compensation to PIATCO until the London
awards are recognized and enforced in the Philippines; and (b) order that the just compensation be deposited
with the RTC for the benefit of PIATCO's creditors.

ISSUE: Whether or not the intervenors could claim just compensation.

HELD:

No, PIATCO is the sole recipient of the just compensation even though Takenaka and Asahikosan actually
built the NAIA-IPT III. The Court did not grant Takenaka and Asahikosan's prayer to set aside a portion of
just compensation to secure their claims, as it would be preempting the Court's ruling in the enforcement
case, specifically, G.R. No. 202166, which is still pending before the Court. Further, the Republic shall
only have ownership of the NAIA-IPT III after it fully pays PIATCO the just compensation due. However,
the determination of whether the NAIA-IPT III shall be burdened by liens and mortgages even after the full
payment of just compensation is still premature.

In computing the just compensation, the Court applied the depreciated replacement cost method
consistent with Section 10 of RA 8974 IRR and the principle that the property owner of the expropriated
property shall be compensated for his actual loss.
Benjamin L. Vergara, Jina Sarvida & Josephine P. Saballa vs. Atty. Eusebio Otadoy

GR NO. 192320

April 4, 2016

Facts:

On January 12, 2004, petitioner filed a civil action for damages against respondent Atty.
Atadoy Jr., and other 3 defendants. They alleged that they were unjustly detained as a result of
Atty. Atadoys practices.

Petitioner filed a Motion to admit amended complaint which the RTC granted. Thereafter
defendant was declared in default and petitioner was allowed to present evidence de parte. Atty.
Atadoy filed several motions for reconsideration of RTC’s order. Meanwhile, petitioner presented
evidence. RTC granted Atty. Otadoy’s motion to set aside default order. The court scheduled pre-
trial conference but Atty. Otadoy filed a motion to postpone the pre-trial conference to April 20,
2007 claiming that he will be attending a lecture in Zamboanga as a minister of church on March
4-11, 2007. Without waiting for a ruling upon that motion, Atty. proceeded to attend the lecture.
During the pre-trial conference, petitioner opposed the motion to postpone filed arguing that Atty.
failed to file a pre-trial brief and motion was filed late. Petitioner moved that (1) he be allowed to
present evidence ex parte and (2) that the court must adopt evidence that had previously presented.

RTC granted the motion and the case was submitted for Resolution. Atty. Atadoy filed his
pre-trial brief only on April 11, 2007 and a motion for reconsideration on April 20, 2007 which
RTC denied. Thereafter, he filed a motion for certiorari but was also denied.

Issue: Whether or not the motion to postpone should be granted.

Held:

Yes. While under Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, counsels and parties are mandated to appear at
pre-trial, their non-appearances may be excused only if there is a valid cause. In this case, it appears
that Atty. Otadoy failed to attach proof that he attended the alleged lectureship despite
opportunities to submit evidence. Thus, there is no valid cause to grant the motion of
postponement. However, the rules of procedure have their own reasons for their existence, to
ensure prompt, speedy and orderly dispensation of justice. This compelling reason must be
weighed and balance against admittedly weightier need to give litigants their day in court. When
procedural rules are at point of being abused such as when litigant fails to establish valid cause to
postpone proceedings, procedural rules cannot and must be brushed aside. Hence, the petition to
postpone was granted.
People vs Dela Cruz

FACTS:

On October 22, 2009, a confidential informant went to Jose Abad Santos Police Station, Manila
Police District and informed PO1 Ronnie Tan, PO3 Ryan Sulayao and PO3 Eric Guzman about the illegal
drug activitied being conducted by the accused. Said claimant claimed to have access to appellant. They
informed their station commander, P/Supt. Remigio Sedanto, who are tasked to conduct a buy-bust
operation. The operation went on, hence, appellant was arrested because of the operation.

On the other hand, appellant denied the allegations. He said that at the time the police arrived, he
went to his friend and joined them in playing cara y cruz. They tried to run but eventually got arrested.
They requested that he be brought to the barangay but they were brought directly to the police station. He
thought that he was only charged with illegal gambling but then, he was charged with illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.

The RTC held to convict the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC gave credence to the
testimonies of the police officers as they were given in a clear and convincing manner showing that the
officers were at the place of the incident to accomplish exactly what they had set out to do, which was to
conduct a legitimate buy-bust operation on appellant.

On appeal, the accused, argued that the warrantless arrest was unlawful for he was not caught
selling dangerous drugs but merely committing an illegal gambling. However, the CA sustained his
conviction. The CA ruled that it was no time in the arraignment that he raised the issue on the unlawful
arrest and only in the appeal. Hence, jurisprudence dictates that he should be estopped from assailing said
irregularity, for issues not raised in the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal without
offending the basic rules of fair play.

ISSUE: Whether or not the was an unlawful warrantless arrest

RULING: There was no unlawful warrantless arrest. The Supreme Court ruled that warrantless arrest
may be made when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. Here, testimonies were presented by the prosecution narrating, in detail,
how the police officers personally witnessed the sale by appellant of the dangerous drug, being actual
participants of the buy-bust operation. Indeed, a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, in which the
violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only
authorized, but duty-bound, to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been
part of or used in the commission of the crime. Appellant’s plain denial unsubstantiated by any credible
evidence will just simply fail. Therefore, there was no unlawful warrantless arrest.
Rappler, Inc. v. Andres Bautista

G.R. No. 222702 April 5, 2016

FACTS

Rappler, Inc. signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to sponsor the Presidential and Vice-
Presidential debates. Alleging that it is being discriminated particularly as regards the MOA provisions on
live audio broadcast via online streaming, Rappler argues that the MOA grants radio stations the right to
simultaneously broadcast live the audio of the debates, even if the radio stations are not obliged to perform
any obligation under the MOA. However, the right to broadcast by online live streaming the audio of the
debates is denied to the petitioner and other online media entities which also have the capacity to live stream
the audio of the debates.

Rappler filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against COMELEC Chairman Andres Bautista to
nullify MOA provisions on the ground of violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner has the right to live stream the debates

RULING

Yes, Rappler has the right to live stream the debates because the exercise to do so is its contractual right
under the MOA. Under the MOA, as long as it complies with the copyright conditions for the debates, it
can live stream the debates.

The MOA recognizes the right of other mass media entities, not parties to the MOA, to reproduce the
debates subject to the same copyright conditions. The freedom of the press to report and disseminate the
live audio can no longer be infringed or subject to prior restraint. Such freedom of the press to report and
disseminate the live audio of the debates is now protected and guaranteed under Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that, “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom…of the press.”

The petition was partially granted. The COMELEC Chairman was directed to allow the debates to be shown
or live streamed unaltered on the petitioner’s website subject to the copyright condition that the source is
clearly indicated.
CONSOLIDATED CASES
FOR THE MONTH OF
AUGUST 2016

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FEU JD4102
National Grid Corporation of the Philippines v. Ofelia m. Oliva, G.R. No. 213157, August
10, 2016

FACTS:

On September 24, 2009, NGCP received from the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City, three
(3) Final Notices of Demand, and all dated September 16, 2009, addressed to National Power
Corporation/Transco stating Notices of Delinquency for all properties in 2008 and failure to pay
the amount demanded would result in the Public Auction of the properties. Pursuant to Sec. 252
of the Local Government Code, petitioner NGCP paid the total amount demanded under protest
on November 11, 2009 for P2, 792,862.41. The written protest was filed on the same day at the
office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City dated October 6, 2009. The LBAA ruled in favor of the
City Assessor and dismissed NGCP’s petition for being filed out of time.

NGCP filed a notice of appeal with memorandum on appeal with the CBAA. NGCP argued that
(1) its petition before the LBAA was timely filed; (2) it had the legal personality to file the petition
before the LBAA; and (3) NGCP is exempt from payment of the real property taxes subject matter
of the second and final notices o f demand dated 16 and 21 September 2009 in the total amount of
P 2,792,862.41.

The CBAA dismissed NGCP’s appeal. The CBAA found NGCP liable for real property taxes on
the subject properties for the year 2009.

The CBAA denied for lack of merit NGCP’s motion for partial reconsideration in an Order
promulgated on 16 November 2011.

NGCP filed a verified petition for review dated 1 December 2011 with the CTA. NGCP reiterated
in its petition before the CTA the prayer in its motion for partial reconsideration before the CBAA.

The CTA-EB partly granted NGCP’s petition in its Decision promulgated on 13 November 2013.
The CTA-EB affirmed CBAA decision.
The NGCP and the City Treasurer of Cebu City filed their respective motions for partial
reconsideration.

The CTA-EB denied the motions for partial reconsideration of both parties. It found no reason to
reverse or modify its decision. The CTA-EB reminded the City Treasurer of Cebu City that taxes
are not debts, and that NGCP cannot be made liable for real property taxes incurred by
NPC/TRANSCO.

Hence, this petition was instituted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NGCP is liable for the payment of real property taxes on the subject properties and
whether the correct amount of taxes was paid and collected.

RULING:

Yes, NGCP is liable for the payment of real property taxes on the subject property. Amount of real
property taxes on the subject properties for two different periods: the years 2001 to 2008 for
NPC/TRANSCO, and the year 2009 for NGCP are incorrectly calculated.

According to the clause in a separate opinion in PLDT v. City of Davao:

Tax exemptions must be clear and unequivocal. A taxpayer claiming a tax exemption must
point to a specific provision of law conferring on the taxpayer, in clear and plain terms,
exemption from a common burden. Any doubt whether a tax exemption exists is resolved
against the taxpayer. Tax exemptions cannot arise by mere implication, much less by an
implied re-enactment of a repealed tax exemption clause.

The Court held that tax exemptions must be clear and unequivocal, and must be directly stated in
a specific legal provision.
In the present case, Section 9 of RA 9511 provided for NGCP’s tax liabilities and exemptions. The
“in lieu of all taxes” clause is strictly limited to the kind of taxes, taxing authority, and object of
taxes specified in the law. Section 9 of RA 9511 states that NGCP’s payment of franchise tax is in
lieu of payment of “income tax and any and all taxes, duties, fees and charges of any kind, nature
or description levied, established or collected by any authority whatsoever, local or national, on its
franchise, rights, privileges, receipts, revenues and profits, and on properties used in connection
with its franchise.” Section 9 of RA 9511 clearly stated that the NGCP’s “in lieu of all taxes”
clause includes taxes imposed by the local government on properties used in connection with
NGCP’s franchise.

NGCP took control of the subject properties in 2009 based on the applicable tax provisions in
NGCP’s franchise.

NGCP’s payment of franchise tax exempts it from payment of real property taxes on properties
used in connection with its franchise. However, NGCP’s tax exempt status on real property due
to the “in lieu of all taxes” clause is qualified: NGCP shall be liable to pay the same tax as other
corporations on real estate, buildings and personal property exclusive of their franchise. The phrase
“exclusive of this franchise” means that real estate, buildings, and personal property used in the
exercise of the franchise are not subject to the same tax as other corporations.

Therefore the case is remanded to the CBAA for the assessment and computation of the correct
amount of real property taxes on the subject properties for two different periods: the years 2001 to
2008 for NPC/TRANSCO, and the year 2009 for NGCP.
For the years 2001 to 2008, the CBAA should determine whether NPC/TRANSCO owned and
used the subject properties in connection with the transmission of electricity, and assess the subject
properties in accordance with the Local Government Code. For the year 2009, the CBAA should
determine whether the subject properties are used in connection with NGCP’s franchise. Properties
used in connection with NGCP’s franchise are exempt from tax, in accordance with NGCP’s
franchise. Properties not used in connection with NGCP’s franchise should be assessed and
subjected to real property tax, in accordance with the Local Government Code.
G.R. No. 220732. September 6, 2016.
Elmer G. Sindac, Petitioner,
v.
The People of the Philippines, Respondent
Ponente: Perlas-Benrabe, J.
Case:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and the Resolution of the CA,
which affirmed the Decision of the RTC of Quezon City in a criminal case, finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.”
Facts:
PNP Real conducted surveillance operations on petitioners alleged drug trade from March
to April 2017. In a briefing, PNP Real two policemen saw petitioner headed for Brgy. Poblacion
Uno, prompting them to follow him. Thereafter, they saw petitioner meet with a certain Cañon,
who sold and handed over a plastic sachet to him. The two policemen rushed to the scene and were
able to apprehend only petitioner. The policemen then arrested petitioner after initially determining
that such substance, in white crystalline form, was shabu. The said arrest was recorded, the seized
item was marked in the presence of petitioner and a chemical test was prepared, which proved that
it was shabu. Petitioner denied the allegations, contending that a certain PO3 Peñamora ordered
him to get off a tricycle bound for Brgy. Ungos and then invited him to the police station, to which
he complied. Petitioner further contends that he was made to undress and was frisked by the
policeman, who found nothing. Furthermore, the policeman left with his wallet and phone, and
when he returned, his wallet was searched anew and a sachet of shabu was found. Petitioner was
made to sign a blank piece of paper which is a receipt for evidence seized. Petitioner pleaded not
guilty upon the arraignment.
The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for all the elements of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs had been established. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed with the CA.
The CA affirmed petitioner’s conviction. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the shabu obtained from petitioner is admissible in evidence.

Ruling:

No, the shabu purportedly seized from petitioner constitutes inadmissible evidence.
Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines provides that evidence
obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.
In this case, the Court finds it highly doubtful that the arresting officer was able to
reasonably ascertain that any criminal activity was afoot so as to prompt a conduct a lawful
warrantless search. Based on the records, the arresting officer admitted that he was about five to
ten meters away from the scene when the latter alleged that the sachet contained shabu. The
policemen had proceeded to apprehend petitioner solely on account of information retrieved from
previous surveillance operations they conducted against petitioner.
Therefore, since the shabu seized from petitioner constitutes inadmissible evidence in
violation of Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, and given that
the confiscated shabu was the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court finds petitioner’s
conviction to be improper and therefore acquits him. In other words, evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
Decision:
Petitioner was ACQUITTED from the crime.
Emilio A. Aquino Vs. Carmelita Tangkengko G.R. No. 197356

FACTS:
The petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus in the Regional Trial
Court in Malolos City, Bulacan in order to recovery parental custody of his son. The alleged that
he had been married to the late Lovely Tangkengko-Aquino in 1997, and their marital union had
borne the minor Azilimson; that they had initially resided in Malabon but had subsequently moved
to Bulacan in July 2001 to live with her family; that by 2004, their marital bliss had started to fade
following their constant quarrels arising from the conflict between him and some members of the
family of Lovely, particularly his mother-in-law and his brother-in-law, respondent Ranillo, the
latter having physically hit him at one point; that the conflict had forced him to leave the conjugal
dwelling in Bulacan in order to live in his sister's Quezon City residence; that even so, he had
continued to give support to Azilimson, and, in tum, Lovely had allowed their son to stay with him
in Quezon City on weekends; that his access to Azilimson had become scarce since the death of
Lovely on April 22, 2005; that the respondents had refused to inform him of the whereabouts of
Azilimson despite his continuous demands; and that the respondents had thus deprived him ofthe
rightful custody of his son. The respondents denied that they had not deprived the petitioner of the
lawful custody of his son, and countered that Azilimson's stay with them in Bulacan had been with
the petitioner's consent because he had abandoned his son with them since the death of Lovely;
and that they had then assumed the responsibility of raising and taking care of Azilimson.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner used the proper remedy of habeas corpus?

HELD: No, a petition for annulment of judgment initiated under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is
a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances provided the petitioner has failed to avail
himself of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by law without fault on his part. It
has often been stressed that such action is never resorted to as a substitute for the petitioner's own
neglect in not promptly availing himself of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies. The CA
did not fail to stress in its assailed resolution of March 10, 2011 that Section 1 of Rule 47 postulated
that the petition for annulment of judgement was available only when the ordinary remedies of a
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies were no longer available through
no fault of the petitioner. It consequently pronounced that the petitioner could no longer avail
himself of the remedy simply because he had already brought the petition for relief from judgment
pursuant to Rule 38. He had thereby foreclosed his recourse to the remedy of annulment of the
judgment under Rule 47.
Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis A.C. No. 9920

FACTS:
Two (2) undercover agents from the judicial audit team, posing as a couple, went to the Palace of
Justice to ask about the marriage application for a certain "Meloy." process. They were told by the
guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for meloy. Fearing that the male undercover would be
recognized by the court employees in Branch 4, the two agreed that only the female undercover
Helen assured the female undercover that their marriage process could be would go inside the
court. She was then assisted by a woman named Helen. She also claimed that it was possible for
the marriage to be solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated when
the marriage license became available hurried. The Office of the Court Administrator found that
the respondent judges in that case connived with the court personnel, who acted as "fixers"
marriages despite irregularities in the requirements provided under the law. In solemnizing
marriages. The judges heedlessly kept solemnizing In the Resolution dated July 10, 2007, this
Court treated the judicial audit team's memorandum as an administrative complaint against the
respondent judges, including Tormis. The judges were directed to file their comments on the
charges against them.
In her Tormis denied the charges against her. She claimed that the action of the Office of the Court
Administrator was an "entrapment." According to her, there was nothing wrong with solemnizing
marriages on the same date the marriage license was issued. In view of the pro forma affidavits of
cohabitation, she relied on the Tormis asserted that she should not be blamed for assuming that the
affidavits were true since judges are not handwriting experts. Tormis also claimed that Baguio-
Manera's affidavit was hearsay. She averred that when Baguio-Manera and her husband was asked
about the affidavit, they confirmed the truthfulness of their statements, particularly that they had
been living together for five (5) years. Lastly, Tormis blamed the filing clerks for the irregularities
in the number of marriages solemnized in her sala.

ISSUE: Whether or not the affidavit seized is admissible as evidence?

HELD: An affidavit is commonly recognized as hearsay evidence. Since it is often prepared not
by the affiant but by another person who makes use of his or her own language in writing the
statements, it is generally rejected "Courts take judicial notice of the fact that an affidavit does not
purport to contain a unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify. complete narration
of facts." Court testimonies, therefore, are favored. Plaza and Dela Cerna failed to appear in the
proceedings before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The Office of the Bar Confidant noted that
their testimonies would have supposedly confirmed the charge against respondent regarding the
alleged irregularities in the solemnization of verified the existence and veracity o f their affidavits.
Plaza's and Dela Cema's testimonies would have likewise. Similarly, Atty. Rullyn Garcia failed to
appear in the proceedings. His purported testimony would have disproved the accusation that
Plaza's and Dela Cema's testimonies were executed with his intimidation. Due to their absence,
Plaza's and Dela Cema's allegations in their affidavits were Nevertheless, despite the
inadmissibility of the affidavits, this Court in Judge Necessario, et al. upheld the finding of the
judicial audit team that respondent committed irregularities in the solemnization of marriages. This
Court ruled that these findings had sufficient basis and were supported by evidence, pertinent laws,
and jurisprudence. Respondent was held guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and gross
ignorance of the law warranting her dismissal, had she not been previously dismissed from Service.
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALFI) v. HON.
JANETTE L. GARIN

FACTS:

The subject petitions sprouted from Imbong v. Ochoa and other cases 1 (lmbong) where
the Court declared Republic Act No. 10354 (RH Law) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(RH-IRR) as not unconstitutional, except with respect some of its provisions.
On May 28, 2014, barely two (2) months after the promulgation of the Court's decision in Imbong,
the petitioners, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) assured the petitioners that both the
Department of Health (DOH) and the FDA were taking steps to comply with the decision of the
Court and that it would inform them of any developments. Controversy began in September 2014,
when petitioner Rosie B. Luistro chanced upon the FDA's Notice inviting Marketing Authorization
Holders (MAH) of fifty (50) contraceptive drugs to apply for reevaluation/re-certification of their
contraceptive products.
Petitioner believed that the contraceptives enumerated in the Notice fell within the
definition of "abortifacient" under Section 4(a) of the RH Law. The same opposition also
questioned some twenty-seven (27) other contraceptive drugs and devices that had existing FDA
registrations that were not subjects of any application for re-evaluation/re-certification. ALFI then
filed its main opposition to all seventy-seven (77) contraceptive drugs.
On November 27, 2014, notwithstanding the pending opposition of the petitioners, the FDA issued
two (2) certificates bf product registration for the hormonal contraceptives, "Implanon" and
"Implanon NXT." The petitioners claimed that their requests had remained unanswered. Hence,
the petitioners instituted the subject petition for certiorari, for violating the Court's
pronouncements in lmbong.
The petitioners also contend that due to lack of any procedure, rules and regulations and
consultations for re-evaluation/re-certification of contraceptive drugs and devices, the FDA
violated the rudimentary requirements of due process. Invoking the Court's power under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, they seek that the Court "promulgate rules and/or disapprove
(or approve) rules of procedure in order to adequately protect and enforce the constitutional right
to life of the unborn".
The petitioners contend that these certificates of product registration were issued in haste because
they were released just three (3) days after the Senate Committee on Finance required FDA
certifications. The petitioners further aver that even before the issuance of these certificates, the
DOH, as early as February 2015, had been administering Implanon in Cebu City. The petitioners
allege that despite the Court's declaration that several portions of the RH Law and the RH-IRR are
µnconstitutional, the DOH has not effected any amendment in the RH-IRR.
The petitioners assert that the actions of the FDA and the DOH violate the right to life of the
unborn and, thus, must be restrained to ensure their protection.
The respondents, through the OSG, argued that petitioners failed to establish not only the direct
injury that they had suffered. The OSG also contended that the petitioners violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts for failing to allege any special and compelling reasons to justify their direct
resort to the Court. Thus, the OSG explained that the re-certification process conducted and the
conclusions arrived at by the FDA:
1. Lay outside the ambit of a Rule 65 petition;
2. Did not require any notice and he'aring; and
3. Need not comply with the standard of substantial evidence required in quasi-judicial
proceedings.
The OSG asserted that the recertification process undertaken by the FDA was not without
basis, as the FDA was guided not only by the RH-IRR Law, but also by Bureau Circular (BC) No.
5, series of-1997, Administrative Order (AO) No. 2013-0021, AO No. 67, series of 1989, AO No.
2006-2021, AO No. 2005-0030, BC No. 2006-005, BC No. 2006-007, among many others.
The petitioners averred that the applications for registration and/or re-certification were granted
by the FDA without observing the basic tenets of due process - without due notice, without public
hearing and without any supporting evidence in the face of clear and irrefutable evidence of the
abortifacient character of the registered/re-certified drugs. Any uncertainty as to the adverse effects
of making contraceptives universally accessible should be resolved in a way that will preserve and
promote life and health. The petitioners pray that the TRO be maintained.

ISSUE:
Whether or not FDA and DOH observed due process when they implemented the re-
implementation and re-certification of 77 contraceptives, following the Imbong vs. Ochoa ruling.
HELD:

The Court held that the FDA certified, procured and administered such contraceptive drugs and
devices, without the observance of the basic tenets of due process, without notice and without
public hearing. Due to the failure of the respondents to observe and comply with the basic
requirements of due process, the Court is of the view that the certifications/re-certifications and
the distribution of the questioned contraceptive drugs by the respondents should be struck down
as violative of the constitutional right to due process.
One of the guarantees sacrosanct in this jurisdiction is that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. An essential component of the Bill of Rights,
the Due Process Clause, undoubtedly occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law.

Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural due process. In order that
a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be
compliance with both the substantive and the procedural requirements thereof. Substantive due
process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to ~is
property. Procedural due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures or
steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and
without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it. Although
administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally, administrative
proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to
due process in investigations and hearings.
Rather than provide concrete evidence to meet the petitioners' opposition, the respondents
simply relied on their challenge questioning the propriety of the subject petition on technical and
procedural grounds. The mere fact that the RH Law was declared as not unconstitutional does not
permit the respondents to run roughshod over the constitutional rights, substantive and procedural,
of the petitioners. The law tasks the FDA as the primary agency to determine whether a
contraceptive drug or certain device has no abortifacient effects, its findings and conclusion should
be allowed to be questioned and those who oppose the same must be given a genuine opportunity
to be heard in their stance.
 It is a cardinal precept that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, the
courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party's right to due process raises a
serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial
of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right
is void for lack of jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 218578, August 31, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ENRICO BRIONES
BADILLA, Accused-Appellant.

Facts:
On September 6, 2010, around 10:15 p.m., PO2 Paras received a phone call from a
concerned citizen informing him that someone was indiscriminately firing a gun at BMBA
Compound, 4 Avenue, Caloocan City. PO2 Paras and his companions, PO2 Ronquillo, PO3
th

Baldomero and PO2 Woo, responded to the call and reached the target area around 10:25
p.m. There they saw a male person, later identified as appellant Enrico Briones Badilla, standing
along the alley. Appellant was suspiciously in the act of pulling or drawing something from his
pocket; thus, as a precautionary measure, and thinking that a concealed weapon was inside his
pocket, PO2 Paras immediately introduced himself as a police officer, held appellant's arm, and
asked the latter to bring out his hand from his pocket. It turned out that appellant was holding a
plastic sachet with white crystalline substance. PO2 Paras confiscated the plastic sachet from
appellant, informed him of his constitutional rights, and arrested him. Appellant and the
confiscated plastic sachet were brought to the Station Anti-Illegal Drags-Special Operation Task
Group (SAID-SOTG) Office where PO2 Paras marked the plastic sachet. Thereafter, PO2 Paras
turned-over appellant and the seized item to PO2 Espadero who placed the seized item in a much
bigger plastic sachet. PO2 Espadero then prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination of the
seized item, and another request for drug test on the urine sample taken from appellant. The white
crystalline substance was found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug, while the urine sample taken from appellant was found positive for methylamphetamine.

The defense, on the other hand, presented appellant as its sole witness and offered a
different version of what transpired on the day of the arrest. Appellant narrated that on September
6, 2010, around 10:30 in the evening, he was walking along 4 Avenue, Caloocan City when a
th

male person called him. Recognizing the man as a police officer who frequented their place, he
approached the man. When he got near the man, the latter's companion poked a gun at him. By
instinct, he shoved the gun away and it fell on the ground. According to appellant, the police officer
then arrested him, shoved him aboard the police vehicle, and brought him to 3 Avenue, Caloocan
rd

City. When the police officers failed to see their target person at the said place, they left and went
to the police station where he was told that he would be charged with a non-bailable offense. He
only saw the plastic sachet containing shabu in court. He denied the accusations against him and
stated that he was arrested because the police officers thought he would fight back when he shoved
the police officer's gun. The police officers asked P20,000.00 from him allegedly because they
knew that his father had a junk shop business, but he refused to give them money. He questioned
the positive result of the drug test because allegedly no examination was conducted on his person.

The RTC held in its decision that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, however it affirmed the
appellant's conviction but with modification as to the penalty imposed. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether there is a valid warrantless arrest?

Held:
Yes, there is a valid warrantless arrest. In any event that an accused was arrested during
the commission of a crime, which instance does not require a warrant, is commonly known as in
flagrante delicto. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and, (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

In this case, the police officers was led to the place where appellant was when he was
arrested was triggered by a phone call from a concerned citizen that someone was indiscriminately
firing a gun in the said place. Under the circumstances, the police officers did not have enough
time to secure a warrant considering the "time element" involved in the process. To obtain a
warrant would be impossible to contain the crime. In view of the urgency of the matter, the police
officers proceeded to the place. There, PO2 Paras saw appellant, alone in an alley which used to
be a busy place, suspiciously in the act of pulling something from his pocket. Appellant's act of
pulling something from his pocket constituted an overt manifestation in the mind of PO2 Paras
that appellant has just committed or is attempting to commit a crime. There was, therefore,
sufficient probable cause for PO2 Paras to believe that appellant was, then and there, about to draw
a gun from his pocket considering the report he received about an indiscriminate firing in the said
place. Probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that a crime
has been committed or about to be committed.

Thus, thinking there was a concealed weapon inside appellant's pocket and as precautionary
measure, PO2 Paras immediately introduced himself as a police officer, held appellant's arm, and
asked the latter to pull his hand out. Incidentally, appellant was holding a plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance. PO2 Paras then confiscated the plastic sachet from appellant, informed
him of his constitutional rights, and arrested him. When an accused is caught in flagrante delicto,
the police officers are not only authorized, but are duty- bound, to arrest him even without a
warrant. And considering that appellant's arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from
it were likewise lawful.

Moreover, the established rule is that an accused may be estopped from assailing the
legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his
arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived. In this case, appellant is deemed to have waived any objection thereto
since he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court when he entered a plea of not
guilty during the arraignment without any questioned raised in the legality of his arrest, and
thereafter actively participated in the trial.

Therefore, the warrantless arrest was valid and legal.

Limkaichong vs. Land Bank
G.R. No. 158464
Aug. 2, 2016

Facts:
The petitioner was the registered owner of agricultural lands with a total area of 19.6843
hectares situated in Guihulngan, Negros Oriental. For purposes of placing those lands within
the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, in Dumaguete City sent to her several
Notices of Land Valuation and Acquisition by which her lands were valued for acquisition by
the DAR. After the petitioner rejected such valuation of her lands, the DARAB conducted a
summary administrative proceeding for the determination of just compensation and affirmed
the said valuation after such determination. The petitioner filed in the RTC of Dumaguete City
a complaint for the fixing of just compensation for her lands and prayed that the DARAB
valuation be set aside and declared null and void.

Issue:
Is the petitioner entitled to equal protection and treatment accorded to other landowners who had
been given the chance to be heard on their claim for re-valuation?

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner is entitled. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." Respondent LBP is tasked
with the responsibility of initially determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the
just compensation to be paid to the landowners for their taking. By way of notice sent to the
landowner pursuant to Section 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer to acquire the land
sought to be placed under agrarian reform. If the concerned landowner rejects the offer, a summary
administrative proceeding is held, and thereafter the provincial adjudicator (PARAD), the regional
adjudicator (RARAD) or the central adjudicator (DARAB), as the case may be, fixes the price to
be paid for the land, based on the various factors and criteria as determined by law or regulation.
The procedure for the determination of just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 may be brought
upon to the RTC acting as the SAC.
Cunanan v Court of Appeals GR no 205573 August 17, 2016

Facts :

January 27, 2009 – Yolanda Mercado filed a petition for reallocation of home lot originally
awarded to Alejandro Lorenzo in DAR-Regional Office under TCT 150056.

April 8, 2010 – DAR dismissed the said petition

May 13, 2010 – Mercado filed a Motion for reconsideration to set aside the April 8, 2010 decision

October 13, 2010 – DAR grant the motion for reconsideration, for she was able to show that
Lorenzo and his heirs are absentee land lords

December 1, 2010 – DAR issued a finality of the decision of October 13, 2010

In Apil 2011 - Helan Lorenzo Cunanan inquired in DAR Tarlac the status of home lot under TCT
no 150056 and she was shocked that is has already been transferred under TCT no 288509 and she
was surprised that a finality was issued.

May 13, 2011 – Cunanan filed a motion to quash order of finality and other orders, alleging the
she was not furnished by the copy of order and the said finality.

June 13, 2011 – without waiting for the resolution, Cunanan filed a petition for a relief of
judgement. She stated, among others, that she came to know of the decision, which was based
solely on the evidence presented by Mercado, only on April 14, 2011; that she could not have
possibly answered the subject petition for reallocation and gone to trial because she was not served
the summons and notices or furnished copies of orders; that she had a good and substantial defense,
and the property should not be reallocated; that she inherited the subject property from
her father and never abandoned the same; and, that if given the opportunity, she would
present proof in support of her position

On June 14, 2011 – Cunanan filed her petition for injunction and prohibition with preliminary
injunction before the Court of Appeals.

On October 5, 2011 – Cunanan received a copy of September 26, 2011 which dismissed the
petition for failure to observe the following rules :
 (1) to pay the deficient amount of P150.00 as payment
for docket and other legal fees; (2) to indicate the
date of issuance of counsel for petitioner's MCLE Certificate of Compliance; and (3)
to submit an affidavit of service and registry receipts issued by the mailing office as proof
that copies of the pleading were sent to the other parties as required under Sec. 13, Rule 13
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

On January 17, 2012 the entry of judgement was issued and received by Cunanan on Feb 8, 2012.

On the other hand, the motion to quash order of finality and other orders filed by Cunanan before
the DAR was dismissed of being moot an academic, citing that the relief sought by the petitioner
in the DAR and CA are one and the same and since the case has attained finality in the CA there
is no need for the case to be decided.

Issue : Whether or not the Cunanan’s right to procedural due process has been violated?

Held :

Yes, The court set aside all decision of the Court of Appeals and DAR and remanded the case to
DAR. A review of the case discloses that when Cunanan learned that the DAR-R03 had cancelled
TCT No.

288509 in her name and that it had issued an order of finality, she lost no time in questioning the
order. As
earlier pointed out, she averred that she was never notified of the proceedings or furnish
ed copies of any pleadings. For said reason, she argues that the DAR-R03 never acquired
jurisdiction over her person and that
its assailed order deprived her of her property in violation of her constitutional right to
due process, rendering all proceedings and orders null and void.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL v. GREGORIA ADOLFO et al.
G.R. No. 198160, August 31, 2016

The Facts

The subject of this case is a parcel of land owned by petitioner Victoria P. Cabral, situated at
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Accordingly, Emancipation Patents were issued covering portions of Lot
4, and the corresponding TCTs were subsequently issued in favor of the respondents.

To these issuances, Cabral initiated a petition for the cancellation of the said EPs and TCTs against
the respondents before the PARAD of Bulacan. Cabral argued among others that: (1) the EPs were
issued without due notice and hearing.

PARAD rendered its Decision in favour of Cabral. Aggrieved, the respondents appealed the
aforesaid PARAD decision to the DARAB Quezon City. The DARAB affirmed the PARAD's
decision. Hence, the respondents filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA granted the
petition and reversed and set aside the rulings of DARAB. Cabral moved for reconsideration but
it was denied. Hence, this petition.

The Issue

Whether the issuance of Emancipation Patent violates petitioner’s right to due process.

Ruling of the Court

Cabral contends that she was never notified that her lot would be placed under the coverage of the
OLT program; hence, her constitutional right to due process of law was violated.

In Heirs of Dr. Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the Court ruled that there must be an actual
notice to subject a property under the agrarian reform program, that lack of notice violates the
essential requirements of administrative due process of law, and that the enactment of P.D. No. 27
is not a statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice or com production as to
dispense with actual notice to the landowner.anr

The Court further held that the importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the
agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with
the essential requirements of administrative due process of law.nr

Here, a perusal of the records showed that, indeed, Cabral's right to due process was violated since
she never knew about the coverage of her lot under the OLT program. The Court already noted
that the respondents failed to establish their entitlement to the EPs, thereby casting doubt on its
validity, as well as on the TCTs that were issued to them. The respondents have likewise adduced
no proof of any amortization payments on the subject landholding, and even claim that Cabral's
charge of lack of just compensation is immaterial to the petition. Conversely, the mere fact that no
compensation was paid itself voids their EPs, which means that the respondents cannot avoid the
duty to prove that their subject lots have been paid for. Petition is GRANTED.
CONSOLIDATED CASES
FOR THE MONTH OF
SEPTEMBER 2016

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FEU JD4102
G.R. Nos. 190015 & 190019, September 14, 2016

GERALDINE MICHELLE B. FALLARME AND ANDREA MARTINEZ-GACOS,

Petitioners, v. SAN JUAN DE DIOS EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, INC., CHONA M.
HERNANDEZ, VALERIANO ALEJANDRO III, SISTER CONCEPTION GABATINO,
D.C., AND SISTER JOSEFINA QUIACHON, D.C., Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioners were hired by San Juan de Dios Educational Foundation, Inc. (respondent
college), for full-time teaching positions at the start of the first semester of School Year (SY) 2003-
2004 as signified by a memorandum. The memorandum did not specify whether they were being
employed on a regular or a probationary status.

Despite having served as a faculty member since SY 2003-2004, Fallarme and Martinez-
Gacos were asked only on 1 March 2006 to sign an appointment contract "Appointment and
Contract for Faculty on Probation" and with effectivity period on the second semester of SY 2005-
2006. The appointment contract specified the status of Fallarme and Martinez-Gacos as
probationary faculty members.

After the expiration of the contract, respondent college informed them that the contract
would not be renewed for the first semester of SY 2006-2007, an exercise of the school's
"administrative prerogative”.

Petitioners submitted a letter to respondent Hernandez, questioning the nonrenewal of their

respective employment contracts. Not satisfied with the reply, they filed a Complaint against
respondents for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, back wages, and damages before the labor arbiter.

Respondents claimed that petitioners had been remiss in their duties. Specifically, both of
them reportedly sold computerized final examination sheets to their students without prior school
approval. Allegedly, Fallarme also sold sociology books to students, while Martinez-Gacos served
as part-time faculty in another school and organized out-of-campus activities, all without the
permission of respondent college. These infractions supposedly prevented it from considering their
services satisfactory.
 The labor arbiter ruled that petitioners were regular employees who were entitled to
security of tenure.

Upon respondents' appeal, the NLRC reversed the Decision of the labor arbiter. It held that
petitioners had failed to meet the third requirement for regularization as prescribed by the 1992
Manual; that is, they had not served respondent college satisfactorily.

The CA affirmed the NLRC Decision. It upheld respondent college's administrative

prerogative to determine whether or not petitioners were entitled to regularization on the basis of
respondents' academic freedom. Furthermore, the award of P20, 000 as indemnity to each of the
petitioners was upheld.

Upon the denial by the CA of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners have now come
before this Court via this Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not on the basis of a valid cause for dismissal, the proper dismissal procedure was
observed.

RULE:

No, the proper dismissal procedure was not observed.

The Court finds that the dismissal was for a valid cause based on the infractions committed
by petitioners in connection with their jobs as established by substantial evidence, and their willful
disobedience or conduct. However, for termination based on a just cause, as in this case, the law
requires two written notices before the termination of employment: (1) a written notice served by
the employer on the employee specifying the ground for termination and giving a reasonable
opportunity for that employee to explain the latter's side; and (2) a written notice of termination
served by the employer on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the latter's termination.
 In this case, the respondent completely deviated from the two-notice rule. The records show
that respondent college effectively dismissed petitioners by sending them a written notice
informing them that the school would no longer renew their contracts for the forthcoming semester.
The letters were abruptly sent and lacked any specification of the grounds for their termination.
Neither did the letters give petitioners the opportunity to explain their side. To aggravate the
matter, upon their inquiry into the reason behind their termination, all that respondent college cited
was its supposed "administrative prerogative," which was a misplaced claim.

Therefore, although the dismissal of petitioner was for a valid cause, nevertheless, the
respondent college failed to comply with the proper procedure for their dismissal in violation of
procedural due process.
Banco De Oro, Bank of Commerce, China Banking Corporation, Metropolitan Bank &
Trust Company, Philippine Bank of Communications, Philippine Nation Bank, Philippine
Veterans Bank and Planters Development Bank vs. Republic of the Philippines,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Secretary of Finance,
Department of Finance, The National Treasurer and Bureau of Treasury (G.R. No. 198756.
January 13, 2015)

FACTS:

This case involves P35 billion worth of 10-year zero-coupon treasury bonds issued by the
Bureau of Treasury (BTr) denominated as the Poverty Eradication and Alleviation Certificates or
the PEACe Bonds. These PEACe Bonds would initially be purchased by a special purpose vehicle
on behalf of Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO), repackaged and sold at a
premium to investors. The net proceeds from the sale will be used to endow a permanent fund to
finance meritorious activities and projects of accredited non-government organizations (NGOs)
throughout the country. In relation to this, CODE-NGO wrote a letter to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) to inquire as to whether the PEACe Bonds will be subject to withholding tax of
20%. The BIR issued several rulings beginning with BIR Ruling No.020-2001 (issued on May
31, 2001) and was subsequently reiterated its points in BIR Ruling No. 035-200119 dated August
16, 2001 and BIR Ruling No. DA-175-0120. The rulings basically say that in determining whether
financial assets such as a debt instrument are deposit substitute, the “20 or more individual or
corporate lenders rule” should apply. Likewise, the “at any one time” stated in the rules should be
construed as “at the time of the original issuance.”

With this BTr made a public offering of the PEACe Bonds to the Government Securities
Eligible Dealers (GSED) wherby RCBC won as the highest bidder for approximately 10.17 billion,
resulting in a discount of approximately 24.83 billion. RCBC Capital Capital entered into an
underwriting agreement with CODE-NGO, whereby RCBC Capital was appointed as the Issue
Manager and Lead Underwriter for the offering of the PEACe Bonds.

In October 7, 2011, BIR issued BIR RULING NO. 370-2011 in response to the query of
the Secretary of Finance as to the proper tax treatment of the discounts and interest derived from
 Government Bonds. It cited three other rulings issued in 2004 and 2005. The above ruling
states that the all treasury bonds (including PEACe Bonds), regardless of the number of
purchasers/lenders at the time of origination/issuance are considered deposit substitutes. In the
case of zero-coupon bonds, the discount (i.e. difference between face value and purchase
price/discounted value of the bond) is treated as interest income of the purchaser/holder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the imposition of the 20% final withholding tax violate the non-impairment clause
of the Constitution?

Whether or not it constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law?

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that Bureau of Treasury is REPRIMANDED for its continued
retention of the amount corresponding to the 20% final withholding tax despite this court's
directive in the temporary restraining order and in the resolution dated November 15, 2011 to
deliver the amounts to the banks. Bureau of Treasury is also hereby ordered to immediately release
and pay to the bondholders the amount corresponding-to the 20% final withholding tax that it
withheld

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and its flexibility is called
upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence,
it is disregarded when:

there is a violation of due process,

the issue involved is purely a legal question

the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,

there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,

there is irreparable injury,

the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter,

to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,

it would amount to a nullification of a claim,

the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,

when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,

when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies also finds no application when the exhaustion
will result in an exercise in futility. In this case, an appeal to the Secretary of Finance from the
questioned 2011 BIR Ruling would be a futile exercise because it was upon the request of the
Secretary of Finance that the 2011 BIR Ruling was issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Here, the nature and importance of the issues raised167 to the investment and banking industry
with regard to a definitive declaration of whether government debt instruments are deposit
substitutes under existing laws, and the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and compelling
circumstances to justify resort to this court in the first instance.
DRUGSTORES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

v. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY AFFAIRS

G.R. No. 194561, September 14, 2016

Facts

On March 24, 1992, Republic Act No. 7277, entitled "An Act Providing for the
Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Disabled Persons and their Integration into
the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons," was passed into law.

On April 30, 2007, Republic Act No. 9442 was enacted amending R.A. No. 7277. The
Title of R.A. No. 7277 was amended to read as "Magna Carta for Persons with Disability" and all
references on the law to "disabled persons" were amended to read as "persons with disability"
(PWD). Specifically, R.A. No. 9442 granted the PWDs a twenty (20) percent discount on the
purchase of medicine, and a tax deduction scheme was adopted wherein covered establishments
may deduct the discount granted from gross income based on the net cost of goods sold or services
rendered.

On May 20, 2009, the DOH issued A.O. No. 2009-0011 specifically stating that the grant of 20%
discount shall be provided in the purchase of branded medicines and unbranded generic medicines
from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the PWDs.

Issue

Whether or not PWD discount is a valid exercise of police power.Whether or not PWD discount
is a valid exercise of police power.

Whether or not PWD discount is an invalid exercise of power of eminent domain for failure to
provide just compensation.

Whether or not the implementing rules and regulation violate the due process clause.
Whether or not PWD discount violate the equal protection clause.

Rule:

No. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent
domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but
has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances assuring the greatest benefits.

Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. On the other hand, the power of eminent domain is the
inherent right of the state to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just
compensation. In the exercise of police power, property rights of private individuals are subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.

Under Social Justice and Human Rights of the Constitution, the State shall adopt an
integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.
The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

The PWD mandatory discount on the purchase of medicine is supported by a valid

objective or purpose as aforementioned. It has a valid subject considering that the concept of public
use is no longer confined to the traditional notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with
public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience.

As in the case of senior citizens, the discount privilege to which the PWDs are entitled is
actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens belong. The means
employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose
or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Also, the means employed to provide a
fair, just and quality health care to PWDs are reasonably related to its accomplishment, and are
not oppressive, considering that as a form of reimbursement, the discount extended to PWDs in
the purchase of medicine can be claimed by the establishments as allowable tax deductions.

The petitioners contend that R.A. No. 7227, as amended by R.A. No. 9442, violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because it fairly singles out drug stores to bear the
burden of the discount, and that it can hardly be said to "rationally" meet a legitimate government
objective which is the purpose of the law.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. A law is
not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so
that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences,
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

Subject to the determination of the courts as to what is a proper exercise of police power
using the due process clause and the equal protection clause as yardsticks, the State may interfere
wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular, a large discretion is necessarily
vested in the legislature to determine, not only what interests of the public require, but what
measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
G.R. No. 218891, September 19, 2016

EDMUND BULAUITAN Y MAUAYAN,* Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

FACTS:

October 3, 2003, the Philippine National Police of Solana, Gagayan constituted a team to
implement a search warrant issued by Executive Judge Vilma T. Pauig to search Bulauitan's
residence. They went first to the the house of Barangay Chairman Jane Busilan, who in turn,
assigned Kagawad (Kgd.) Jerry Soliva (Kgd. Soliva) and Kgd. Herald de Polonia (Kgd. Polonia)
as search witnesses. Upon arriving at Bulauitan's residence, the search team was met by Bulauitan's
two (2) children and housekeeper, who informed them that Bulauitan was not home. This
notwithstanding, the search team explained to the children and housekeeper the reason for their
presence, prompting the latter to allow them inside the house and conduct the search. SPO2 Baccay
then proceeded to Bulauitan's room and there, discovered three (3) heat-sealed plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting that the contents are shabu, the search team
showed the sachets to the children and housekeeper and photographed the same. SPO2 Baccay
then gave the sachets to P/Insp. Bulayungan, who in turn, handed them over to PO3 Tagal who
wrapped the confiscated items with a piece of paper for transport to the Solana PNP Station. When
Bulauitan arrived at his residence, the search team effected his arrest and took him to the police
station with the seized sachets. Upon arrival thereat, PO3 Tagal prepared the police blotter and
request for laboratory examination, marked the sachets with his initials, and delivered the same to
forensic chemist S/Insp. Myrna Madriaga Tulauan of the PNP Crime Laboratory. A qualitative
examination revealed that the three (3) plastic sachets contained an aggregate of 0.22 gram of
shabu.

In his defense, Bulauitan denied owning the sachets allegedly recovered by the search team
in his house. He narrated that in the morning of the fateful day, he went with his wife to Tuguegarao
City to tend to their meat shop. Upon reaching his house, the policemen informed him that they
recovered shabu from his room, and thus, arrested him. Upon arraignment, Bulauitan pleaded not
guilty to the charges against him. The RTC found Bulauitan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:

WON Bulauitan's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, should be upheld.

HELD:

NO. The Court is of the view that Bulauitan's conviction must be set aside. Under Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause,
absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section
3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other
words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and
seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree.

It must, however, be clarified that a search warrant issued in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not give the authorities limitless discretion in
implementing the same as the same Rules provide parameters in the proper conduct of a search.
Section 8, Rule 126 of the aforesaid Rules, states that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. —

No search of a house, room or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

The testimonies given in the case at bar ultimately prove that: (a) Bulauitan was not in his
residence when the search was conducted; (b) his daughter, Maria, was not able to witness SPO2
Baccay's search of Bulauitan's room as PO3 Tagal kept her in the living room and even instructed
her to leave the house to contact her parents; and (c) Kgd. Soliva and Kgd. Polonia neither
witnessed the search as they remained outside Bulauitan's residence. Accordingly, the search
conducted therein by the search team fell way below the standard mandated by Section 8, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus deemed unreasonable within the purview
of the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution. As a consequence, the three (3) plastic sachets
containing an aggregate amount of 0.22 gram of shabu recovered therefrom are inadmissible in
evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the
very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Bulauitan must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated
from all criminal liability.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PANGAN

GR No. 193837

September 21, 2016

FACTS:

On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was
sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the Regional
Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. Petitioner never got
to serve his sentence and hid for about nine years.

Then, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat
Detention Cell. Four days thereafter, he filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the RTC of
Angeles City, impleading respondent (Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga). Petitioner
contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that, a) the straight penalty of
two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3,Article 93 [of the]
Revised Penal Code, and (b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for
almost nine years, his criminalliability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89
of the Revised Penal Code.

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied since there was no evasion of the
service of the sentence. Evasion presupposes escape during the service of the sentence consisting
in deprivation of liberty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty already prescribed

HELD: NO.

The period of prescription of penalties – the succeeding Article 93 provides – "shall

commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". Article
157 of the RPC discussed how evasion of service of sentence was perfected. It is provided therein
that,
"The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon
any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment. To consider properly the meaning of evasion service
of sentence, its elements must be present these are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment;
(2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service
of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. For, by the express terms of the statute, a
convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by
reason of final judgment."

That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the second
sentence of Article 157. It provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken
place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by
using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with
other convicts or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another
expression of the term "jail breaking."

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of
Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means the unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his
custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped
therefrom.

In this case, the petitioner was never brought to prison. As the record would show, even
before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. He now begs for
the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he
failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to
become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's
guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed.
He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ESMAEL ZACARIA y WAGAS

G.R. No. 214238 September 14, 2016

FACTS:

On I 5 May 2004 at around 3:30 p.m., upon a tip-off received by Senior Police Officer 2
Rito A. Montederamos (SP02 Montederamos), Senior Police Officer I Allan B. Balingit (SPOI
Balingit), and Police Officer I Jesicar L. Maglacion (POI Maglacion) of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Police Senior Inspector Christine S. Tan (S/Insp. Tan) formed a
team of agents to conduct a buy-bust operation to entrap accused-appellant Zacaria.

Acting as poseur-buyers, SPO2 Montederamos, together with an informant, went to

Victoria Plaza in Davao City to meet Zacaria. After the introduction, SPO2 Montederamos showed
the money to Zacaria, the latter handed one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
to SPO2 Montederamos, who immediately called the other police officers. SPO2 Montederamos
held Zacaria, but the latter manage to escape and board a taxi. The police officers chased Zacaria
and when they were finally able to catch up with him at the back of Victoria Plaza, the police
officers recovered another sachet containing white crystalline substance from him.

The police officers brought Zacaria to the PDEA Office for booking and documentation.
SPO2 Montederamos turned over the seized items to Police Officer 1 Janmark V. Malibaran (PO1
Malibaran), the Desk Officer for recording. After the recording, the seized items were returned to
SP02 Montederamos who taped, initialed, wrote the name of Zacaria, and placed it inside a
cellophane before placing them in his locker in their office.

On I 7 May 2004 at around 2:30 p.m., in the presence of Zacaria, an elected public official, media
man, and representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the inventory of the seized items
was conducted. Thereafter, the seized !terns were delivered to the PDEA Crime Laboratory in
Davao City for examination, which tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.
Two sets of Information were filed against Zacaria: (I) Criminal Case No. 54,425-2004 for
possession of dangerous drugs; and (2) Criminal Case No. 54,426-2004 for sale and delivery of
dangerous drugs.
During arraignment, Zacaria pleaded not guilty. The defense filed a Motion for Admission to Bail
which the RTC denied. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) SP02 Montederamos and (2) POl
Maglacion, who testified on the arrest, procedure of the inventory, and preservation of the seized
items; and (3) Police Senior Inspector Ma. Julieta Gernel Razonable (S/Insp. Razonable), a
Forensic Chemical Officer, who testified that the seized items tested positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.

On the other hand, the defense presented the following witnesses: (1) accused appellant Zacaria,
(2) Bai Norma Saluang Al Hadja, and (3) Zacaria’s wife, Guiaria lngo Zacaria.

Zacaria testified that on May 15, 2004 at around 2:00 or 3:00 PM, while walking around
Victoria Plaza to buy some stocks for his ready-to-wear business, he was suddenly grabbed by a
man in civilian clothes, forced to board a vehicle, blindfolded, and handcuffed. According to
Zacaria, he was treated violently and the arresting officers asked him to disclose the names of his
companions in exchange of his freedom. Bai Norma Saluang Al Hadja and Zacaria's wife, Guiaria
Ingo Zacaria, corroborated Zacaria’s Testimony.

The RTC rejected Zacaria’s contention that the allegation was baseless because the
prosecution failed to prove that there was indeed a sale of shabu as there was no simultaneous
actual exchange of the money and the shabu. RTC held that it is not necessary to present the buy-
bust money. Mere delivery of the drug purchased is sufficient. Based on the totality of evidence,
the RTC found Zacaria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of Sections 5 and 11 of R.A.
No. 9165.
 The CA affirmed the RTC Decision. it is enough that the prosecution was able to present
evidence that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with presentation in court of the
corpus delicti as evidence. "What is material in prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti as evidence." The CA averred that the fact that no money changed hands is not afatal defect.
There is no requirement that in buy-bust operations, there must be a simultaneous exchange of the
marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.

ISSUE: Whether or not Zacaria’s warrantless arrest was valid and lawful.

RULING: Yes, the arrest was valid and lawful. Zacaria’s warrantless arrest as a product of a buy-
bust operation is valid because he was caught in flagrante delicto. His contention that there was no
simultaneous actual exchange of the money and shabu was immaterial.

The elements of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or sale of illegal drugs: (1) the
identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment for it, are present. Also, the prosecution adequately established the existence of
all the elements of the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article
II of the same Act, to wit: (1) the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited
or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.

Hence, Zacaria’s warrantless arrest was valid and lawful as a product of a buy-bust
operation.
CONSOLIDATED CASES
FOR THE MONTH OF
OCTOBER 2016

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FEU JD4102
G.R. No. 207898, October 19, 2016

ERROL RAMIREZ, JULITO APAS, RICKY ROSELO AND ESTEBAN MISSION, JR.,
Petitioners, v.POLYSON INDUSTRIES, INC. AND WILSON S. YU, Respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Po!yson Industries, Inc. (Polyson) is a domestic corporation engaged in the

business of manufacturing plastic bags for supermarkets, department stores and the like. The
Petitioners, were employees of Polyson and were officers of Obrero Pilipino (Obrero), the union
of the employees of Polyson. Polyson received a rush order from one of its clients for the
production of 100,000 pieces of plastic bags, due to the volume of work and limited time required,
the Respondent need workers to work overtime. Some of the workers who signed up weren’t able
to work overtime. Thus, the management asked for an explanation. After evaluation, the
management informed petitioners that it has decided to terminate petitioners' employment on the
ground that they instigated an illegal concerted activity resulting in losses to the company. NLRC
ruled that Petitioner were illegally dismissed. Polyson then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was granted and set aside the previous ruling. The NLRC found that Polyson was able to
present sufficient evidence to establish that petitioners' termination from employment was for a
valid cause, as they were found guilty of inducing or threatening their co-employees not to render
overtime work, and that petitioners' dismissal was in conformity with due process requirement.
The CA denied petitioners' petition for certiorari and affirmed the March 28, 2012 Resolution of
the NLRC.

ISSUE: WON petitioners' dismissal from their employment was valid.

HELD:

YES. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the above findings, which were affirmed by
the CA. The Court is not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of the factual findings of the NLRC
in the absence of clear showing that these were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis. In the
present case, petitioners failed to convince this Court that the NLRC's findings that they instigated
the slowdown are not reinforced by substantial evidence. Verily, said findings have to be
maintained and upheld. This Court reiterates, as a reminder to labor leaders, the rule that union
officers are duty-bound to guide their members to respect the law.wred Contrarily, if the officers
urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly-constituted authorities, their dismissal from
the service is a just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts. In any case, a review of the records
at hand shows that the evidence presented by Polyson has proven that petitioners are indeed guilty
of instigating two employees to abstain from working overtime.

The Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contention that they are not guilty of "illegal concerted
activity" as they claim that this term contemplates a "careful planning of a considerable number of
participants to insure that the desired result is attained." Nothing in the law requires that a
slowdown be carefully planned and that it be participated in by a large number of workers. The
essence of this kind of strike is that the workers do not quit their work but simply reduce the rate
of work in order to restrict the output or delay the production of the employer. It has been held that
while a cessation of work by the concerted action of a large number of employees may more easily
accomplish the object of the work stoppage than if it is by one person, there is, in fact no
fundamental difference in the principle involved as far as the number of persons involved is
concerned, and thus, if the act is the same, and the purpose to be accomplished is the same, there
is a strike, whether one or more than one have ceased to work.

With respect to procedural due process, it is settled that in termination proceedings of employees,
procedural due process consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must
furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be
effected: (1) the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought; and (2) the second informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss
him. The requirement of a hearing is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard,
and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted. In the present case, Polyson was able to
establish that these requirements were sufficiently complied with.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JEHAR REYES,

G.R. No. 199271,

October 19, 2016

FACTS:

Jehar, charged with and convicted of illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, RA 9165, assails
his conviction before the Supreme Court, contending that the illegal sale of shabu had not been
established beyond reasonable doubt; that the buy-bust operation had not been carried out in
accordance with law; that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty did not
apply because the law enforcers had deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as
provided for in the law; that the arresting police officers had failed to make an inventory report of
the confiscated items; that the markings on the confiscated items were not clearly established; that
the procedural lapses of the police officers created doubt as to the identity of the confiscated items;
and that, consequently, the Prosecution did not establish the elements of the crime charged.

The facts showed that he was arrested on or about 2:00 PM of November 27, 2002 by a
team of policemen led by the poseur-buyer, PO2 Villahermosa, the back-up police officer, POI
Miro, allegedly conducted a buy-bust operation from Jear by posing as drug addicts and buying
from him P1,000.00 worth of shabu. The lower courts ruled him liable as charged for selling three
sachets of shabu with markings “JR-b”, “JR-1” and “JR-2”.

The Issue:

Whether or not the police officers followed strictly the chain of custody in illegal drugs cases.

The Ruling:

No. The Police Officers did not followed the strictly chain of custody

According to Violation of the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 is always presumed

innocent of the crime charged against him. This presumption of his innocence, which has been
enshrined in Section 14, Article III (The Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, ensures that: “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” It
underlies our system of criminal justice, and far outweighs any other presumption, particularly one
that is essentially a rule of evidence. . . .

The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no reason
exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. . . .

Accordingly, acquit the accused on the ground that the Prosecution did not establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not
be properly presumed in favor of the policemen because the records were replete with indicia of
their serious lapses. As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of performance by a police officer
must be inferred only from an established basic fact, not plucked out from thin air. . . .”

Therefore. The respondent was acquitted.

G.R. Nos. 177857-58, October 05, 2016

PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), MANUEL V.

DEL ROSARIO, DOMINGO P. ESPINA, SALVADOR P. BALLARES, JOSELITO A.
MORALEDA, PAZ M. YASON, VICENTE A. CADIZ, CESARIA DE LUNA TITULAR,
AND RAYMUNDO C. DE VILLA, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, SURIGAO DEL SUR FEDERATION OF

AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES (SUFAC) AND MORO FARMERS ASSOCIATION
OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR (MOFAZS), REPRESENTED BY ROMEO C.
ROYANDOYAN, Intervenors.

G.R. No. 178193

DANILO B. URSUA, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

The Coconut Industry Investment Fund Holding Company (CIIF) sold its common shares
roughly 33 million for a price of P 3,313,326,600 to Andres Soriano III of the SMC Group, which
is payable in 4 installments. SMC Group paid an initial purchase price of P500 million to UCPB
as administrator of CIIF. It was transacted through stock exchange and the shares were then
registered in the name of AHSI. On April 7, 1986 PCGG sequestered the shares of stock, because
of it SMC suspended its payment. UCPB attempted to rescind the sale by filing a complaint in
Regional Trial Court but was denied for lack of jurisdiction. Andres Soriano III of SMC and
Ramon Sy for UCPB , in a joint letter informed PCGG that the two groups would give PCGG an
arbitration fee in the form of 5.5 million SMC shares to support CARP and it was approved.

Both SMC and UCPB filed a Joint petition for the Approval of the Compromise Agreement
with the Sandiganbayan, PCGG and OSG prayed that the petition be an incident of the civil case
for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth against Marcos, Cojuangco Jr., et al. PCGG did not object to
the implementation of the agreement. SMC and UCPB filed a Joint Manifestation of
Implementation of Comprise Agreement and Withdrawal of Petition asset by the conditions made
by PCGG. However, Conjuanco et al filed a motion to nullify the said agreement. SMC filed a
Manifestation that the 25,450,000 shares were treasury stocks. Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
to deliver the 25 million shares to PCGG and it denied SMC motion for Reconsideration. It divided
the civil case into 8 cases, 2 of which is base on the sequestered SMC shares. Republic filed its
motion for Partial Summary Judgement which was granted holding that the coco levy fund is a
public fund. SMC filed a Complaint in Intervention praying that the block shares CIIF should be
excluded from treasury shares and it was denied. The CIIF shares be considered as public fund
including the sequestered shares. The Republic filed an Urgent Motion to direct SMC to comply
with the resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic can direct SMC to comply with the resolution.

RULING:

No. Republic cannot direct SMC to comply with the resolution. According to the 1987
Constitution Bill of Rights Section 1:

“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”

In this case SMC was never made a party to the civil case filed by republic to recover SMC
shares of the stock registered in CIIF. It was not given a chance to justify or be heard, to ventilate
its claim for the 25 million shares it has in its possession even though they volunteered to
participate in the said case. Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. SMC need not be a party because its interests
have already been clearly and finally addressed by this court. This view, however, fails to consider
that SMC's interests over these 25.45 million shares have not yet been addressed precisely because
SMC was not impleaded in the case when its legal presence is an absolute prerequisite before a
prejudicial and confiscatory decision can be issued against it. In other words, the non-joinder of
SMC as a party in CC 0033-F did not confer upon this court jurisdiction over the juridical person
of SMC and so the court is without power to order SMC to comply with any pronouncement made
in the case involving, adversely at that, its property.

The Court has emphasized the well-entrenched principle that a judgment rendered without
jurisdiction cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation.
The question of jurisdiction, the Court has repeatedly explained, is not a mere question of
technicality or a simple matter of procedure but an element of due process Indeed, it is unsporting,
nay the height of injustice and a clear violation of the due process guarantee, to order SMC to
comply with any decision rendered in CC 0033-F when it was never given the opportunity to
present, explain, and prove its claim over the presently contested shares. Therefore, Republic
cannot direct SMC to comply with the resolution.
A.C. No. 4269

October 11, 2016

DOLORES NATANAUAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO P. TOLENTINO,

Respondent.

FACTS

Complainant Dolores alleged that she is a co-owner (with her siblings Rafaela, Ernestina, and
Romulo [Dolores, et al.]) of a parcel of land with an area of about 50,000 square meters located in
Tagaytay City. On January 3, 1978, they sold this land to Alejo Tolentino (Alejo) for P500,000.00.
At the time, the title to the property had not yet been issued by the Land Registration Commission.
The parties thus agreed that payment for the same shall be made in installments, as follows:
P80,000.00 upon the execution of the contract and the remaining balance in two (2) installments,
payable one (1) year after the issuance of the title and then one (1) year thereafter.

On August 9, 1979, and after the execution of the contract of sale between the parties, the Register
of Deeds of Cavite issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-107593 in Alejo's favor.
Despite several requests from Dolores, et al., Alejo, however, failed to settle the remaining
obligation. Thus, on May 14, 1991, Dolores, et al. filed a case against Alejo and his wife Filomena,
docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1188, for the recovery of possession of immovable property,
declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, and damages.

On March 30, 1993, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) promulgated a Decision in Civil Case No.
TG-1188 declaring the rescission of the contract of sale. Consequently, it ordered: (1) the
reconveyance of the land back to Dolores, et al.; (2) the cancellation of TCT No. T-107593; (3)
the issuance of a new title in favor of Dolores, et al.; and (4) the payment of damages by Alejo and
Filomena.

Sometime in June 1993, Dolores discovered that the TCT No. 107593 under Alejo's name was
issued not on the basis of the January 3, 1978 contract but on a Deed of Sale dated August 3, 1979,
purportedly executed by their father Jose Natanauan (Jose), Salud Marqueses, Melquides Parungao
and Asuncion Fajardo (Jose, et al.). She further discovered a Joint Affidavit dated August 6, 1979,
purportedly executed by Jose, et al. attesting to the absence of tenants or lessees in the property
and another Deed of Sale dated March 9, 1979, executed between Dolores, et al. as vendors and
Atty. Tolentino as vendee covering purportedly the same property.

Dolores claims that the foregoing documents were falsified as Jose, who died in Talisay, Batangas
on June 12, 1977, could not have signed the Deed of Sale dated August 3, 1979 and the Joint
Affidavit dated August 6, 1979. Furthermore, the Deeds of Sale were all notarized by Notary
Public Perfecto P. Fernandez (Perfecto) who Dolores later on discovered was not commissioned
as a notary public for and in the City of Manila for the year 1979.

It was also around the same time that Dolores discovered that the title to the property has been
subsequently registered, under TCT No. T-21993, in the name of Buck Estate, Inc., where Atty.
Tolentino is a stockholder, and mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation for Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).

Thus, on June 1, 1994, Dolores filed the present disbarment complaint against Atty. Tolentino and
Perfecto for their alleged acts of falsification. In her complaint, Dolores attached an Affidavit dated
December 2, 1980, where Alejo and Filomena attested that the subject property never belonged to
them in truth or in fact, the true and absolute owner of the same being Alejo's brother, Atty.
Tolentino. Notably, this Affidavit bears Atty. Tolentino's conformity.

In a Resolution dated July 18, 1994, this Court required respondents to file their Comment within
ten (10) days from notice.

Despite several attempts, a copy of the Resolution was not served on Perfecto due to lack of
knowledge as to his whereabouts. Atty. Tolentino, on the other hand, was able to file the required
Comment through his then-counsel Atty. Tranquilino M. Fuentes (Atty. Fuentes).

In his Comment, Atty. Tolentino specifically denied having any participation in the falsification
of the Deed of Sale dated August 3, 1979, and vehemently denied any participation in the
transactions, deeds of sale and other documents covering the subject property. Atty. Tolentino
claimed that there was no specific or concrete allegation of fact in the Complaint as to how he
colluded with Alejo and Filomena in the commission of the alleged falsifications. He further
pointed out that: (1) he does not appear as party to any of the falsified documents; and (2) it was
not alleged that he benefited from the same. Atty. Tolentino also averred that Buck Estate, Inc. did
not acquire the property from Alejo and Filomena, but rather bought the same in a 1990 auction
sale after the property was foreclosed due to the latter's failure to pay their loan obligations. He
further alleged that he does not personally know his co-respondent Perfecto and has never dealt
nor met with him in any capacity.

In her Reply, cralawred Dolores countered that Atty. Tolentino cannot disclaim knowledge or
participation of the falsification as the latter, in fact, also misrepresented before the Supreme Court
that he is the absolute owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of the March 9, 1979 Deed of
Sale notarized by Fernandez. To support this, Dolores cited this Court's decision in Banco De Oro
v. Bayuga involving the same subject property.

In the meantime, and in the course of her efforts to locate respondent Perfecto, Dolores discovered
that Perfecto was not a member of the Philippine Bar as evidenced by a Certification dated March
18, 1996 issued by then Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Erlinda C. Verzosa. Neither has
he been commissioned as notary public for and in the City of Manila since 1979 to 1996.

On December 4, 1996, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and recommendation. Due to
Atty. Tolentino's repeated failure and refusal to appear on the scheduled hearings, Dolores was
allowed to give testimony and present her evidence ex-parte.

ISSUE

Whether there was a violation of Atty. Tolentino's constitutional right to due process
RULING

The Court resolves to deny Atty. Tolentino's motion and affirm the IBP Resolution with
modification.

There was no denial of due process and opportunity to be heard.

Atty. Tolentino, like any respondent in a disbarment or administrative proceeding, is entitled to

due process. The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard, hence, denial of due
process means the total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have one's day in court. As a rule, no
denial of due process takes place where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to
present his case.

Rule 138, Section 30 of the Revised Rules of Court also provides:

Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. - No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard
by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation,
the court may proceed to determine the matter ex-parte.

Contrary to his claims, Atty. Tolentino was not denied due process or deprived of an opportunity
to be heard. The records show that his then counsel Atty. Fuentes filed a Comment on his behalf.
He also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 13, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board, and
a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. His participation through pleadings and motions
cured whatever defect that may have attended the issuance of notices regarding the proceedings
held before the IBP.

In Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, we held that any defect in the
observance of due process is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration and that denial of
due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who was afforded the opportunity to be
heard.51 We likewise reiterated that defects in procedural due process may be cured when the
party has been afforded the opportunity to appeal or to reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.

The practice of law is neither a natural nor a constitutional right but a privilege bestowed by the
State only upon the deserving and worthy for conferment of such privilege. (Alcantara v. De Vera,
A.C. No. 5859, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 674, 679)

The Court finds Atty. Roberto P. Tolentino GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oath, and Canons
1, 7, and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with a STERN
WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.
COMMO. LAMBERTO R. TORRES (RET.), Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 221562-69, October 05, 2016

Facts:

From 1991 to 1993, Lamberto R. Torres was the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff for Logistics
under the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy. From 1991 to 1992, the Commission
on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit at the Headquarters of the Philippine Navy (HPN). The
COA issued Special Audit Report uncovering an alleged overpricing of medicines at the HPN or
its units, and triggering a Fact-Finding Investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office
of the Ombudsman commenced a preliminary investigation against petitioner and several others
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

After petitioner's retirement Tanodbayan Simeon V. Marcelo recommended a new fact-finding

investigation. Notices of the new preliminary investigation were, however, sent to petitioner's old
address in Kawit, Cavite. Thus, petitioner was not informed of the proceedings in the new
preliminary investigation. It was only sometime in July 2014, when petitioner was about to travel
to the United States, that he learned of the pending cases before the Sandiganbayan by virtue of a
hold departure order issued against him. Petitioner was thereafter allowed to file a Counter-
Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he prayed for the dismissal of the case on
the ground that his constitutional rights to due process and speedy trial were violated by the
inordinate delay of the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
Motion to Quash, anchored on the alleged violation of petitioner's right to speedy disposition of
cases.
Ruling:

Yes. Section 16, Article III of the Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "All persons
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies." The right to a speedy disposition of a case is deemed violated only when
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive,
a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. The constitutional
guarantee to a speedy disposition of cases is a relative or flexible concept. It is consistent with
delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.

In the present case, the lapse of time in the conduct of the proceedings is tantamount to a vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delay, which we find to be in violation of petitioner's constitutional
right to speedy disposition of cases. We find it necessary to emphasize that the speedy disposition
of cases covers not only the period within which the preliminary investigation was conducted, but
also all stages to which the accused is subjected, even including fact-finding investigations
conducted prior to the preliminary investigation proper. Considering that the subject transactions
were allegedly committed in 1991 and 1992, and the fact-finding and preliminary investigations
were ordered to be conducted by Tanodbayan Marcelo in 2004, the length of time which lapsed
before the Ombudsman was able to resolve the case and actually file the Informations against
petitioner was undeniably long-drawnout. Any delay in the investigation and prosecution of cases
must be duly justified. The State must prove that the delay in the prosecution was reasonable, or
that the delay was not attributable to it. In the present case, respondents failed to submit any
justifiable reason for the protracted conduct of the investigations and in the issuance of the
resolution finding probable cause. In the present case, petitioner has undoubtedly been prejudiced
by virtue of the delay in the resolution of the cases filed against him.
GONZALO PUYAT & SONS, INC. vs. RUBEN ALCAIDE (deceased), substituted by
GLORIA ALCAIDE, representative of the Farmer-Beneficiaries

G.R. No. 167952

October 19, 2016

Facts:

Petitioner Gonzalo Puyat and Sons, Inc. is the registered owner of 14 parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 43.7225 hectares located at Barangays Langkiwa and Timbao, Bian, Laguna. On
April 14, 1998, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage over
the subject landholding informing petitioner that the subject properties were being considered for
distribution under the governments agrarian reform program. The corresponding Notice of
Valuation and Acquisition was issued informing petitioner that a 37.7353-hectare portion of its
property is subject to immediate acquisition and distribution to qualified agrarian reform
beneficiaries and that the government is offering P7,071,988.80. Petitioner argued that the
properties were bought from their previous owners in good faith; that the same remains
uncultivated, unoccupied, and untenanted up to the present; and, that the subject landholdings were
classified as industrial, thus, exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Respondents said that the classification of the land as industrial did not exempt
it from the coverage of the CARP considering that it was made only in 1997; the HLURB
certification that the Municipality of Bian, Laguna does not have any approved plan/zoning
ordinance to date; that they are not among those farmer-beneficiaries who executed the waivers or
voluntary surrender; and, that the subject landholdings were planted with palay. DAR Secretary
Hernani A. Braganza, issued an Order in favor of the respondent declaring that the subject
properties are agricultural land; thus, falling within the coverage of the CARP. Respondents filed
a Motion for the Issuance of an Order of Finality of Judgment praying that an Order of Finality be
issued for petitioners failure to interpose a motion for reconsideration or an appeal from the order
of the DAR Secretary. Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Finality. Petitioner’s counsel then
filed a Manifestation with Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Early Resolution informing the DAR of his
new office address and praying that the petition be resolved at the earliest convenient time and that
he be furnished copies of dispositions and notices at his new and present address. On November
5, 2001, the DAR issued an Order denying the motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioner
filed an appeal before the Office of the President. the Office of the President rendered a Decision
in favor of petitioner. Thus, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject land is an agricultural land and can be subject to expropriation.

Ruling:

Consequently, the determination of whether or not petitioners landholdings are agricultural land is
yet to be determined. As found by the Office of the President in its August 8, 2003 Decision, before
the DAR could place a piece of land under CARP coverage, there must first be a showing that it
is an agricultural land, i.e., devoted or suitable for agricultural purposes. Corolarilly,
Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1998, which outlines the steps in the acquisition of lands,
details that in the 3rd step, the Department of Agrarian Reform Municipal Office (DARMO)
should conduct a preliminary ocular inspection to determine initially whether or not the property
maybe covered under the CARP, which findings will be contained in CARP Form No. 3.a, or the
Preliminary Ocular Inspection Report. From the foregoing, a preliminary ocular inspection is
necessary to determine whether or not a subject landholding may be considered under the coverage
of the CARP even before a Notice of Coverage is prepared by the MARO. However, a perusal of
the undated CARP Form No. 3.a

Thus, the question of whether or not petitioners properties could be covered by the CARP has not
yet been resolved. Until such determination, it follows that petitioners landholdings cannot be the
proper subject of acquisition and eventual distribution to qualified farmer-beneficiaries. However,
these involve factual controversies, which are clearly beyond the ambit of this Court. Verily, the
review of factual matters is not the province of this Court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts, and is not the proper forum for the ventilation and substantiation of factual issues. Covering
the subject properties would reveal that the appropriate check boxes for Land Condition/Suitability
to Agriculture on whether the subject properties are presently being cultivated/suitable to
agriculture or are presently idle/vacant were not marked. Also, the MARO failed to mark any of
the check boxes for Land Use to indicate whether the subject properties were sugarland, cornland,
un-irrigated riceland, irrigated riceland, or any other classification of agricultural land. As an
exercise of police power, the expropriation of private property under Republic Act No. 6657 puts
the landowner, not the government, in a situation where the odds are practically against him. The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law was not intended to take away property without due process
of law. The directive of the Office of the President for the Department of Agrarian Reform to
ascertain whether or not petitioner's landholdings may be placed under the CARP was just and
proper.
October 05, 2016
G.R. No. 191823
DEE JAY'S INN AND CAFE AND/OR MELINDA FERRARIS, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LORINA RAÑESES, Respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner Ferraris, the owner and manager of petitioner DJIC, engaged the services of
respondent and a certain Moonyeen J. Bura-ay (Moonyeen) as cashier and cashier/receptionist,
respectively, for a monthly salary of P3,000.00 each.

Respondent filed before the Social Security System (SSS) Office a complaint against
petitioner Ferraris for non-remittance of SSS contributions. Respondent also filed before the
NLRC City Arbitration Unit (CAU) XII, Cotabato City, a complaint against petitioners for
underpayment/nonpayment of wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay,
13thmonth pay, and moral and exemplary damages.

After conciliation efforts by the Labor Arbiter failed, the parties were ordered to submit
their respective position papers. On September 8, 2005, respondent filed her position paper, which
already included a claim for illegal dismissal.

On February 21, 2006, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners, but
granted respondent's claim for 13th month pay. The Labor Arbiter did not give much credence to
respondent's charge of illegal dismissal because there was no positive or unequivocal act on the
part of petitioners to support the assertion that respondent was dismissed.

The Labor Arbiter also pointed out a procedural defect in respondent's charge of illegal
dismissal against petitioners:

Besides, the [respondent] did not aver illegal dismissal as the same was not pleaded
in her verified complaint. She cannot be allowed to prove the same. The rule is
 clear that the "verified position papers shall cover only those claims and causes of
action raised in the complaint x x x" (Rule V, Section 4, Par. 2, Rules of Procedure
of the NLRC, as Amended). Incidentally, there is no prooflinking to the allegation
of dismissal.

The NLRC issued a Resolution dated August 30, 2006, dismissing the appeals of
respondent and Moonyeen for lack of merit and affirming en toto the Labor Arbiter's Decisions
dated February 20, 2006 and February 21, 2006.

In its Decision dated April 29, 2009, the Court of Appeals granted respondent's Petition.
On the basis that any doubt should be resolved in favor of labor, the Court of Appeals held that
respondent was illegally dismissed.

The Court of Appeals, citing Rule V, Section 7(b) of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC and Tegimenta Chemical Phils. v. Buensalida, also ruled that the filing of the position paper
was the operative act which foreclosed the raising of other matters constitutive of the cause of
action; and respondent, by averring facts constituting her alleged dismissal in her position paper,
had properly pleaded a cause of action for illegal dismissal, which should have been given
cognizance by the Labor Arbiter.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a cause of action belatedly
included in the position paper and not originally pleaded in the complaint can still be given
cognizance.

Ruling:

No. A cause of action belatedly included in the position paper and not originally pleaded
in the complaint can still be given cognizance.

The record shows that respondent filed her complaint sometime in January 2005 and
position paper on September 8, 2005. During said period, the 2002 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as
amended by NLRC Resolution No. 01-02, was still in effect. The 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure
of the NLRC only took effect on January 7, 2006.

Section 4, Rule V of the 2002 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, provides:

Section 4. Submission of Position Papers/Memoranda. - Without prejudice to the

provisions of the last paragraph, Section 2, of this Rule, the Labor Arbiter shall
direct both parties to submit simultaneously their position papers with supporting
documents and affidavits within an inextendible period of ten (10) days from notice
of termination of the mandatory conference.

These verified position papers to be submitted shall cover only those claims and
causes of action raised in the complaint excluding those that may have been
amicably settled, and shall be accompanied by all supporting documents including
the affidavits of their respective witnesses which shall take the place of the latter's
direct testimony. The parties shall thereafter not be allowed to allege facts, or
present evidence to prove facts, not referred to and any cause or causes of
action not included in the complaint or position papers, affidavits and other
documents. (Emphases supplied.)

Stated differently, the parties could allege and present evidence to prove any cause or
causes of action included, not only in the complaint, but in the position papers as well. As the
Court explained in Tegimenta Chemical Phils. v. Buensalida:

[T]he complaint is not the only document from which the complainant's cause of
action is determined in a labor case. Any cause of action that may not have been
included in the complaint or position paper, can no longer be alleged after the
position paper is submitted by the parties. In other words, the filing of the position
paper is the operative act which forecloses the raising of other matters
constitutive of the cause of action. This necessarily implies that the cause of
 action is finally ascertained only after both the complaint and position paper
are properly evaluated.

A cause of action is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the

defendant in violation of the primary right of the plaintiff. A complaint before the
NLRC does not contain specific allegations of these wrongful acts or omissions
which constitute the cause of action. All that it contains is the term by which such
acts or omissions complained of are generally known. It cannot therefore be
considered as the final determinant of the cause of action. (Citation omitted.)

In the more recent Our Haus Realty Development Corporation v. Parian, which
cited Samar-Med Distribution v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court further
expounded:
Our Haus questions the respondents' entitlement to SIL pay by pointing out that this claim
was not included in the pro forma complaint filed with the NLRC. However, we agree with the
CA that such omission does not bar the labor tribunals from touching upon this cause of action
since this was raised and discussed in the respondents' position paper. In Samar-Med Distribution
v. National Labor Relations Commission, we held:

Firstly, petitioner's contention that the validity of Gutang's dismissal should not be
determined because it had not been included in his complaint before the NLRC is
bereft of merit. The complaint of Gutang was a mere checklist of possible causes
of action that he might have against Roleda. Such manner of preparing the
complaint was obviously designed to facilitate the filing of complaints by
employees and laborers who are thereby enabled to expediently set forth their
grievances in a general manner. But the non inclusion in the complaint of the
issue on the dismissal did not necessarily mean that the validity of the dismissal
could not be an issue. The rules of the NLRC require the submission of verified
position papers by the parties should they fail to agree upon an amicable settlement,
and bar the inclusion of any cause of action not mentioned in the complaint or
position paper from the time of their submission by the parties. In view of this,
 Gutang's cause of action should be ascertained not from a reading of his
complaint alone but also from a consideration and evaluation of both his
complaint and position paper. (Citations omitted.)

The Court observes herein that respondent could not have included the charge of illegal
dismissal in her complaint because she filed said complaint (which were for various money claims
against petitioners) in January 2005, and petitioners purportedly dismissed her from employment
only on February 5, 2005. However, since respondent subsequently alleged and argued the matter
of her illegal dismissal in her position paper filed on September 8, 2005, then the Labor Arbiter
could still take cognizance of the same.

Therefore, a cause of action belatedly included in the position paper and not originally
pleaded in the complaint can still be given cognizance.
 CONSOLIDATED CASES
FOR THE MONTH OF
DECEMBER 2016

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FEU JD4102
G.R. No. 207132

December 06, 2016

ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL CLINICS FOR OVERSEAS WORKERS, INC.,

(AMCOW), REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. ROLANDO VILLOTE,
Petitioner, v. GCC APPROVED MEDICAL CENTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. AND
CHRISTIAN CANGCO, Respondents.

FACTS:

DOH issued Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 2001 (AO 5-01) which directed the
decking or equal distribution of migrant workers among the several clinics who are members of
GAMCA. AO 5-01 was issued to comply with the Gulf Cooperative Countries (GCC) States'
requirement that only GCC-accredited medical clinics/hospitals' examination results will be
honored by the GCC States' respective embassies. It required an OFW applicant to first go to a
GAMCA Center which, in turn, will refer the applicant to a GAMCA clinic or hospital.
Subsequently, the DOH issued AO No. 106, Series of 2002 holding in abeyance the
implementation of the referral decking system. The DOH reiterated its directive suspending the
referral decking system in AO No. 159, Series of 2004. In 2004, the DOH issued AO No. 167,
Series of 2004 repealing AO 5-01, reasoning that the referral decking system did not guarantee the
migrant workers' right to safe and quality health service. DOH Secretary Francisco T. Duque III
expressed his concern about the continued implementation of the referral decking system despite
the DOH's prior suspension directives. The DOH directed the "OFW clinics, duly
accredited/licensed by the DOH and/or by the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PHILHEALTH) belonging to and identified with GAMCA x x x to forthwith stop, terminate,
withdraw or otherwise end the x x x 'referral decking system.'" GAMCA questioned the DOH's
Memorandum No. 2008-0210 before the Office of the President (OP). Thereafter, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 8042, as amended by RA No. 10022, took
effect. Pursuant to Section 16 of RA No. 10022, the DOH, through its August 23, 2010 letter-
order, directed GAMCA to cease and desist from implementing the referral decking system and to
wrap up their operations within three (3) days from receipt thereof. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether the DOH-CDO letters prohibiting GAMCA from implementing the referral
decking system embodied under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 10022 violates Section 3, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution for being an undue taking of property.

RULING:

The exercise of the State's police power limits individual rights and liberties, and subjects them to
the "far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number." Though vast and
plenary, this State power also carries limitations, specifically, it may not be exercised arbitrarily
or unreasonably. Otherwise, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, the
advancement of the public good.

To be considered reasonable, the government's exercise of police power must satisfy the
"valid object and valid means" method of analysis: first, the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, requires interference; and second, the means
employed are reasonably necessary to attain the objective sought and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. These two elements of reasonableness are undeniably present in Section 16 of RA No.
10022. The prohibition against the referral decking system is consistent with the State's exercise
of the police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of
the people. Public interest demands State interference on health matters, since the welfare of
migrant workers is a legitimate public concern.

The guarantee under Section 16 for OFWs to be given the option to choose a quality
healthcare service provider as expressed in Section 16 (c) of RA No. 10022 is guaranteed by the
prohibition against the decking practice and against monopoly practices in OFW health
examinations. Section 16 likewise requires employers to accept health examinations from any
DOH-accredited health facility; a refusal could lead to their temporary disqualification under
pertinent rules to be formulated by the Philippine Overseas Employment Authority (POEA). These
rules are part of the larger legal framework to ensure the Overseas Filipino Workers' (OFW) access
to quality healthcare services, and to curb existing practices that limit their choices to specific
clinics and facilities. Separately from the Section 16 prohibition against the referral decking
system, RA No. 10022 also prohibits and penalizes the imposition of a compulsory exclusive
arrangement requiring OFWs to undergo health examinations only from specifically designated
medical clinics, institutions, entities or persons. Section 5, in relation to Section 6 of RA No.
10022, penalizes compulsory, exclusive arrangements98 by imprisonment and fine and by the
automatic revocation of the participating medical clinic's license.

These consequences cannot but apply to the violation of the prohibition against the referral
decking system under RA No. 10022. If, under the law, the DOH can suspend, revoke, or refuse
to renew the license of these hospitals upon the finding that they violated any provision of law
(whether those found in RA No. 4226 or in RA No. 10022), it follows- as a necessarily included
lesser power - that the DOH can likewise order these clinics and their association to cease and
desist from practices that the law deems to be undesirable.