日支之战乃支那挑起

-----驳斥“日本侵略者论”

作者：茂木弘道, 历史事实传播协会干事长

翻译：热血汉奸吴三桂
校订注脚翻译：东瀛刀

热血汉奸吴三桂论坛荣誉出品：http://rxhj.orgfree.com/phpBB3/

译者热血汉奸吴三桂注：本 PDF 为支文全文在先，便于大家阅读，英文原版本附录于后。需要说明的是，

支文译本段落甚至包括标点符号都几乎完全按照英文原版排序，便于英文爱好者参照英文原文双语阅读和
提出宝贵意见。

简介，
卢沟桥事变一般被认定为日支战争的开端，的确，卢沟桥事变可被视为日支
纷争的导火索，但事变本身仅是些许的冲突，不能视作全面日支战争的发端。1937
年 8 月 13 日，上海的蒋介石政权，在抗日民族统一战线行动中，以 3 万支那正
规军对驻扎于此地保护日本侨民的日本海军陆战队发动的全面进攻才被公认是
日支战争全面爆发的起点。
那么，是谁引发了中日之战？
1937 年 8 月 31 日，《纽约时报》驻上海记者哈利特・阿本德如是报道：

外国人支持日本
在为避免爆发局部冲突而召开的会议上，多个外国政府观察员和政府官员一致同意，日军已表现出
最大限度的克制。陆战队在抵沪数天之后闭门不出，严格驻守于自方的营地之中，尽管此举在一定
程度上会危及到日本人生命财产的安全。
8 月 13 日前在上海与会的一位外国官员认为，尽管对于早前 7 月份北平附近的冲突谁先开火存在争
议，然而对于此次上海的局地战，所有的证据均指向一处，日军并不愿重蹈覆辙，于此地再燃战火。
他们表现出自制和耐心，竭尽所能避免事态进一步恶化。尽管如此，日军却实实在在地被意图让外
国管区和外资卷入这场冲突的支那军队逼入了战局。

纽约时报这篇报道的主调是顺应时代风潮谴责日本，同情支那。不过仍指
出上海战事的发端源于支那单方面的军事行动。
大约有 3 万名日本人生活在上海的租界，从事生产和贸易，2200 名日本海
军陆战队员驻扎于此地保护居民。支那军队违反停火协议 1 ，大批士兵潜入租界
外围的非军事区，为此日方紧急召集 2000 余人的增援部队，而这支登陆部队正
是上海那篇报道中提到的 2000 人的日军陆战队。
8 月 9 日，支那军人杀害了驾车执行巡查任务的大山勇夫中尉 和一等水兵
齐藤屿藏支那方面一口咬定是他们在遭到袭击后出手反击，还出示保安队员的尸
体作为证据，然而，其弹痕明确地显示保安队员并非死于日本人之手。据《毛泽
东：鲜为人知的故事》 （2005 年，张戎与乔·哈利戴合著）书中透露，这一事件
是为了迫使蒋介石对日军发动攻击，由上海南京卫戍军司令官张治中将军以及渗
入到国民党高层指挥部内部的支共党员精心策划的。 2
包围租界区的支那正规军以精锐的第 88 师为主，总数超过 3 万人。于 13
号展开攻势，14 号支那军队开始实施联合轰炸。以后我会说明诸如此类的攻击
是如何诱发全面战争的。总之，明显是支那军队发动了战争。日本被拽入一场本
不情愿的战争之中是再清楚不过的事实。依据国际法的条款，正规军对平民和按
照协议驻留的军人发动猛烈攻击是一种侵略行为，即便该攻击发生于本国的领土
内。

卢沟桥事变也是支那精心策划的。
《纽约时报》的这篇报道称，对于谁该为七月初在北平郊外爆发的冲突负责
一事上可能存有争议，这场冲突演变为日后事件之诱因。但事实上，它明显也是
支那精心策划的一场冲突。
这一事实被明确地写入枪击事件四天之后、于 7 月 11 号达成的局部停火协
议 3 当中。总共三条的停火协议中的第一条协议写到： “29 路军代表向日军表达

1
The Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement, agreed to between Japan and China on May 5, 1932, after the
first Shanghai Incident. A committee was formed of American, British, French, and Italian members
working alongside Chinese and Japanese members to observe that the terms of the treaty were carried
out. The location for stationing troops of both Japan and China was decided by the agreement.
注① ：1932 年 5 月 5 日，第一次上海事变后，日本和支那缔结《上海停战协议》。美、英、法、
意各国委员组成的委员会成立，与日本、支那的委员一道监督各项条款的贯彻实施。日支
两军各军的驻扎地便是由该协议决定的。

2
But on 9 August, at Shanghai airport, an army unit hand-picked by ZZZ [=Zhang Zhizhong] killed a
Japanese marine [sic.] lieutenant and a private [sic.]. A Chinese prisoner under sentence of death was
then dressed in a Chinese uniform and shot dead at the airport gate, to make it seem that the Japanese
had fired first. The Japanese gave every sign of wishing to defuse the incident, but ZZZ still bombarded
Chiang with requests to launch an offensive, which Chiang vetoed.‖ Mao, p. 198.

注② ： 但 8 月 9 日，在上海机场，由 ZZZ[=张治中]亲自挑选的一个别动队杀死了一名日本海军
中尉和一名二等兵。为了制造日本人先开火的假象，一名穿着支那军军服的支那人死刑囚，
被枪杀于机场门口。日本人展示出希望平息这一事件的意向，但 ZZZ 仍在接连不断地炮击，
并要求蒋下达攻击命令，被蒋介石否决。（张戎，《毛传》,第 198 页）

3
Agreed to by Qin Dechun, acting commander of China‘s 29th Route Army, and Matsui Kyûtarô, head
of the Japanese Army Beijing Special Military Agency.
注① ：由支那29军副军长秦德纯与日军北平特务机关长松井久太郎所缔结的局地停火协议
歉意，声明将会惩办肇事者，今后相关的负责人将采取措施，杜绝此类事件的发
生”，支方明确为此事负责。29 路军是由宋哲元将军统帅的，控制支那北方地区
的一支约 15 万人的军队。与此相对，日本驻军 4 的人数只有区区 5600 人，说日
军以压倒性的优势迫使对方签署一项不合理的停火协议是说不通的。后来，支那
方面耍赖称协议并不存在，乃极为荒谬之事。首先，协议有原档存在。此协议第
三条写到：“鉴于此事件是在所谓的“蓝衣社”，共产党，及其他各类抗日组织的
指示下发动的，今后我们会对那些人采取措施，严密监视他们的行动”。此后，
拟定协议的具体细节的工作仍在继续，最终在 7 月 19 日签署了协议。事实上，
在支那方面多次出现违反停火协议的行动的状况下，日本仍严格遵守停火协议的
具体细节与条款。对于支那方面否定停火协议的存在，我们无能为力。换句话说，
日本不仅未曾策划卢沟桥事件，且全部责任都在支那一方。

支那的攻击有其必然性
首先，日本完全没有理由发动攻击。无需赘言，以区区 5600 驻军去进攻拥
有 15 万军人的 29 路军简直就是疯狂，此外，若论及日军的全部兵力，在日本本
土、满洲、朝鲜和支那，大致上约有 25 万人。相比之下，支那有 210 万人的军
队。其中 50 万军队在德国军事顾问的指导下接受了现代化的战术训练和装备。
此外，日本最大的假想敌是苏联，而苏联则拥有 160 万庞大的军队，其中 40 万
部署在苏联的远东地区。考虑到所有的这些因素，在北支地区挑起战事对日本而
言是极不明智的，而且也根本没有任何类似的计划。
然而，在当时的支那，对日主战论占据着绝对优势。除农民之外，支那的城
市居民热切地渴望战争，且对胜利充满信心。查阅支那当时出版的所有报纸，此
种状况可谓一目了然。 《日支战争：支那渴望战争，日本不渴望战争》5 一书当中
有着详细描述。当时的主战派大致可分为三类：第一类是激进的知识分子、学生
和城市居民，第二类是支共党徒，第三类是地方上的军阀。作为知识分子以及其
他人主导的激进舆论的支持者，支那共产党和地方军阀利用这些人反对蒋介石政
权的姿态，一力主战，以创造有利的局面 。
支那共产党尤其把抗日视作其最为有力的政治武器。1931 年 11 月成立于江

4
According to the Boxer Protocol, agreed upon by eight nations, including Japan, Great Britain,
America,and France, in 1901 after the Boxer Rebellion was put down, stationing troops for the defense
of the residents in the Beijing and Tianjin areas was allowed. At the time, America stationed 1,200 and
France 1,800, while Japan stationed 5,600. This was because the Japanese living in the Beijing area
were more populous — some 33,000. Looking at the civilian-to-military ratio, Japan was 6:1, America
2:1, and France was 1:3. Proportionally speaking, Japan had far and away the smallest military force.
注② ：1901 年义和团运动被镇压之后，包括日本、英国、美国和法国在内的 8 个国家，依据在
《辛丑条约》中达成的协议，被允许在北京和天津地区驻军保护侨民。当时，美国驻军 1200
人，法国驻军 1800 人，日本驻军 5600 人。这是因为居住在北京地区的日本侨民的人数比
其他国家要多——大约有 33,000 人。以军民比率来看，日本是 6:1，美国是 2:1，法国是 1:3。
从比例上看，日本的驻军规模最小。
5
Kitamura Minoru and Lin Siyun, Nitchû Sensô: Sensô o nozonda Chûgoku, sensô o nozomanakatta
Nihon (The Second Sino–Japanese War: The China that wanted war, and the Japan that did not want
war) (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyûjo, 2008), pp. 3, 72–90.
注③ ：《日支战争：支那渴望战争，日本不渴望战争》（立命馆大学教授北村稔与南京大学毕业
的林思云合著，PHP 研究所 2008 年于东京出版 ）第 3 页，第 72 至 90 页
西瑞金的中华苏维埃共和国于 1932 年 4 月 26 日以苏维埃中央政府的名义发表抗
日宣言（9 月 18 日，苏维埃政权还通电发表了一份正式的宣战公告）。此外，1935
年 8 月，遵照共产国际“反法西斯统一战线”的指示，他们发布了抗日救国宣言。
紧接着，1936 年 12 月，西安事变爆发，前去督战“剿共”的蒋介石，在西安市
被负责“剿共”的东北军司令少帅张学良诱捕，蒋介石被迫与支那共产党合作，
展开抗日运动，国共对抗路线逆转，全境抗日热情高涨。

卢沟桥事变接踵而至
有鉴于此，仅存的问题便是何时何地会发生一场并不意外的针对日本人的袭
击了。1937 年 7 月 7 日，卢沟桥事变爆发。

日军第 8 中队的 135 名士兵事前通告 29 路军，将在卢沟桥附近干涸的河床

上进行战术演习。如附图所示，战术演习在卢沟桥前方，距离卢沟桥城墙（宛平
县城墙）及河堤上的支那驻军碉堡约 400 米外的一处地点实施。晚上 10:40 分左
右，正当演习结束之际，从后方 400 米开外，几发枪弹射入日军阵地。此后，从
堤防那边又射过来十几发枪弹。几个小时后的凌晨 3:25 分，又是三次枪击。5:30
分，在支那军四度枪击之后，日军终于出手还击，此时已是首次被弹的 7 小时之
后了。
因此，29 路军在 11 号签署的停火协议中承担责任是理所当然的。
如前所述，停火协议中写明：“鉴于是事件是在所谓的“蓝衣社”、共产党，
及其他各类抗日组织的指示下发动的，今后我们会对那些人采取措施，严密监视
他们的行动”。29 路军的上层也无法确定是谁开的枪， 但他们强烈怀疑是共产
党干的。
一直在呼吁彻底抗日的支那共产党，显然是企图持续制造冲突。而事实上当
时共产党自身处境堪忧。诚然，随着西安事变的爆发，蒋介石停止剿共，并承诺
与共产党建立合作关系。但是他却向共产党提出一个又一个的苛刻条件。半年之
后的 1937 年 6 月左右，国民党和共产党之间的关系已处于崩溃的边缘。美国记
者埃德加斯诺写道：

“然而，到了 1937 年 6 月，蒋介石瓦解挫败了一度强大的东北军，其嫡系部队进驻陕西，再次对红军

形成合围之势，红军此刻似乎将再度面临抉择，要么彻底投降，要么被围歼，要么撤退到北方的荒漠地带”
。
6

共产党为了摆脱困境，决心孤注一掷。一大批党员 7 混入 29 路军的各个级

6
Edgar Snow, Random notes on Red China, 1936-1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1957.
Preface. 注⑥：埃德加・斯诺著 《红星照耀中国》 1957 年哈佛大学出版社，剑桥分社出版，
前言。

7
Thanks to Chinese publications it is now clearly known that a large number of Communist Party
members had slipped into place in the 29th Route Amy, including four staff officers (one of whom was
the deputy chief of staff, Zhang Kexia), the local deputy propaganda chief, the intelligence bureau chief,
battalion commanders, and others. Wang Jianying, ed., Zhonggong zuzhi ziliao bian [Compiled
documents on the Chinese Communist Party organization] (Hongqi Publishers, 1983); He Husheng et
al.,ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhi guan zhi [People‘s Republic of China workers‘ and officials‘
aspirations] (Zhongguo Shehui Publishers, 1993).
别当中，煽动反日情绪，那些受其蛊惑的官兵制造了 7 月 7 日晚 10:40 分的枪击
事件。

共产党策划卢沟桥事变的铁证—7.8 通电
目前已百分之百清楚的是共产党策划了这一系列的事件。7 月 8 日，枪击事
件后仅一天，共产党便以中央委员会的名义从延安向全国的要人（以蒋介石为首
的）、报纸、国民党政府下属机关、军队、以及其他组织和团体发出长文电报。
在共产党的正史中，它被特称为“7.8 通电”。此外，在同一天，同样的电报以毛
泽东以及其他六位军事将领的名义被送至蒋介石、宋哲元将军等人的名下。
如前所述，日军的首次还击是在 8 日清晨 5:30 分。在当时的通讯环境下，8
日日军还击，8 日这一情报到手，起草一份包含事件经纬的长文，获得中央委员
会的批准，并作为共产党正式官方通电发往全国各地等等，是绝不可能办得到的。
唯一的可能性就是这份电报事前已拟定好了。
事实上，它的确在事前已预备好。时至今日证据依然存在。支那派遣军情报部
北平分部部长秋富重次郎大佐说“卢沟桥事件发生当晚，天津的特别情报班的通
讯员截获了一份相信是位于北京大学构内的一个无线电台发往延安共产党军事
委员会总部的紧急无线电传。连续重复了三次“成功了！”， (产经新闻 1994.9.8,
晚间版) ，他说他们当时不知道这是什么意思。现在已经明了了。无线电传向延
安汇报在卢沟桥的策谋已大功告成。延安立即着手拟定电文，紧接着，8 日清晨，
在证实日军已开始反击之后，共产党向全国各地发送了大量的长文电报。挑起战
争的罪魁祸首正是支那共产党。
在埃德加斯诺的记述当中，卢沟桥事变似是日军引发的，把共产党从 6 月份
的巨大困境中解救了出来。他写道：

现在支那共产党再次迎来了千载难逢，绝处逢生的良机，在接下来的一个月里，由于日本“时机巧合”
大举入侵支那，共产党才得以摆脱险境。这让蒋介石别无选择，只得搁置全歼共产党的其他作战计划。

尽管战争是支那共产党自己策谋的，他们却一再声称日本进攻支那乃“天赐
良机”。如前所述，卢沟桥事变是支那人引爆的。重要的是，仅有 5600 人的日
本军队不可能发动攻击，也没干过这种事。11 日停火协议已经达成，但支那方
面无论是军队抑或不明身份的人士却一再违反该协议。还发生过诸如廊坊事件，
广安门事件这样的支那军队大肆破坏停火协议的事件。7 月 27 日，自事件发生
以来一直奉行“矛盾不扩大”方针的日本政府最终决定向支那内陆派遣三个师团，
并于 28 日向 29 路军发出宣战布告。

支那共产党策谋激化卢沟桥事变
尽管日军发起全面攻击一事并不属实，斯诺却在其书中透露这正是共产党所
期望的。他们对蒋介石被迫放弃剿共作战感到欣喜，但其真正的目的是不断逼迫
蒋介石和日本开战。卢沟桥事变之后共产国际发布的指令 8 中有两条写道：

注⑦：从中国现在的出版物当中清楚地了解到，包括四名参谋(其中一人是 29 路军副参谋长张
克侠), 地方宣传处副处长；情报处长；营长等人在内的一大批共产党员已混入 29 路军阵营。王
建英编 《中共组织资料汇编》(红旗出版社，1983 年出版);何虎生等人主编《中华人民共和国职
官志》(《中国社会出版社，1993 年)。
8
Comintern Order (Directions to the Chinese Communist Party), July, 1937. All five items appear in:
1. 必须坚决反对就地议和，推动日本与支那之间的全面战争。
2. 必须采取一切手段达成上述目标，必须除掉那些就地议和，向日本人妥协，背叛支那解放事业的重要
人物。

我们可以清楚地看到，除了打破支那共产党困境的直接目的之外，卢沟桥事
变的真正目的是造成日本和支那之间的全面冲突。支那共产党号召对日抗战，
但并不直接和日本军队交火，促使日军和蒋介石军队爆发全面战争才是他们
的真实目的。如此一来，支那共产党便能达成保卫苏联的目标。当日支双方
精疲力竭，两败俱伤之时，共产党获胜的长远之计便得以实现。不言而喻，
一九四九年，履行这一（共产国际的）全球战略的支那共产党终于实现了这
一最终目标。

北支事变和通州屠杀
这场冲突正如共产党期待的那样不断扩大，蒋介石的南京政府也在拟定计
划派兵北上，如前所述，日本被迫改变其“局地矛盾不扩大”的政策，7 月
27 日决定派出 3 个师团，28 日向 29 路军宣战。尽管兵力上相比悬殊，但在
满洲的关东军和朝鲜驻军的支援下，日军迅速控制了平津地区全境（北京和
天津地区）。
然而，兵力悬殊的日军转移后，中国军保安队伺机对城内的日本居民展开
了一场大屠杀。北京以东 12 公里的通州城内，居住着约 420 名日本平民。7
月 29 日，日军守备队出击附近的南苑，仅留下 110 名队员。城内由亲日的殷
汝耕自治政府的支那军保安队驻守。看到这种状况，保安队突然冲进城内袭
击残留的少数守备队员和普通居民，实施了一场惨无人道的野蛮大屠杀。后
来得知保安队第一大队队长张庆余,第二大队队长张研田事前与国民党有勾
结。
支那军队对包括老少妇孺在内的数量众多的无辜日本平民实施了诸如抢
劫，暴力殴打，强奸，屠杀等各式各样的残酷暴行，遇难者总数共达 250 人
。
在日本餐馆“旭轩”里，7-8 名日本妇女全部遭到强奸，赤身裸体，私处裸露着被射杀，其中 4-5 人下
身还被插入刺刀，大部分日本男人的尸体看上去像是被绳子给勒死的，墙上溅满了血迹,此等惨状，罄竹难
书。（30 日赶到事发地点从事救援工作的目击证人，第二连队队长萱岛高在东京审判中的证词）。
在近水楼（一家小旅店）的门口，我看到了一具看起来像是老板娘的女人的尸体。腿朝门口，赤身裸
体，脸上只盖着一张报纸。我记得她看上去像是进行过顽强的抵抗，上半身和下半身裸露在外，身上有 4-5
处被刺刀捅入的伤口，她的阴部像是被锐器挖开，到处都是血。旅店后面的一个日本人住家，两个人— 一
位家长及孩子被残忍的杀害，孩子的所有手指都被斩断。在南门附近的一个日本商店里，看起来像是店主
的人的尸体被遗弃在大街上，其胸骨外翻，五脏六腑散乱。
（第二连队步兵队代理队长桂镇雄在东京审判中
。
的证词）

Political Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Asian Development, Kominterun ni kansuru kihon shiryô
(―Fundamental documents concerning the Comintern‖).
注⑨:1937年7月，共产国际指令(对中国共产党的指令)。全部共有5条指令: 出自兴亚院政务部
(《有关共产国际的基本资料》)。
 残酷的暴行一个接着一个，其惨烈难以言表。

南京大屠杀与通州大屠杀
上述证人的证词当中并未言及南京大屠杀，但有人可能会误会他们的证词是
在说南京大屠杀。的确，后来支那人声称有过一场南京大屠杀，所叙述的故事情
节与其类似。下手的方式，残忍的事例等等，都一模一样。后文会写到南京大屠
杀，尽管从未发生过南京大屠杀，但通州大屠杀却是无可否认的事实。日本从未
发生过类似的残暴事件，而支那却发生过。查阅支那的历史，我们发现类似的惨
烈屠杀其实并非罕见。
阅读北京大学毕业的石平先生的著作《支那大屠杀史：支那人何以爱好杀
戮？》 9 ，我们得悉，在古代，中世纪，现代... 甚至是在支那共产党统治下的
今天.惨绝人寰的大规模屠杀在支那都屡见不鲜，特别有意思的是真的有过一场
南京大屠杀，不过不是发生在 1937 年，而是发生在 1864 年的太平天国起义期间，
太平天国当时的首都南京被满清大将曾国藩率军攻陷之时。曾国藩死后，他的一
位幕僚赵烈文在其《能静居士日记》中写道：

“孩童也成为杀戮的对象，众多士卒以杀戮孩童为戏，且乐在其中。至于妇人，40 岁以下者被充作兵卒淫
欲之工具，而 40 岁以上者或貌丑者则被胡乱肆意砍杀。” 10

臭名昭著的大屠杀-- 屠戮 100 万人的四川大屠戮，扬州屠城，嘉定屠城....

一个接着一个，跃然纸上，石平的书值得一读。
再重复一遍，日本历史上从未发生过类似的事件。日本人对此完全陌生，但
支那人却声嘶力竭地说南京大屠杀是日本人干的。换句话说，南京大屠杀是为了
起诉日军而编造的，是模仿支那历史上反复多次发生的大屠杀以及近期他们在通
州犯下的屠杀而虚构的故事。所以它才是一个与通州事件的情形十分相似的故
事。
后面我将提供证据来证明为什么南京大屠杀不存在，为什么南京大屠杀不可
能存在。

船津和平提案与大山中尉遇害事件
日本军队虽已控制平津地区及北部周边地区，不过参谋本部却发出指令将军
队的推进范围限制在北京以南 100 公里左右的地方。此地距离上海约 1000 公里，
日本政府的方针是终结“北支事变”，防止冲突蔓延。
日本民众听到通州大屠杀的消息怒不可遏，各种报纸头条上"暴支应惩"的呼
吁铺天盖地，对于支那人这一不可宽恕的兽行群情沸腾，要求政府采取果断措施
的呼声不断高涨。需要特笔一提的是，即万宝山事件 11 当时，有许多支那工人、

9
Shi Ping. Chûgoku daigyakusatsu shi: Naze Chûgokujin wa hitogoroshi ga suki na no ka? (A history
of massacres in China: Why do the Chinese like killing?) (Tokyo: Business-sha, 2007).
注⑩:《支那大屠杀史：支那人何以爱好杀戮？》 （石平著，2007年商业出版社出版）
10
Ibid., p. 182. 注⑪:同上，第 182 页
11
In May of 1931, over 200 Korean farmers settled in the town of Wanpaoshan. In July, more than 400
Chinese farmers attacked them with the backing of Chinese authorities. Japanese authorities set out to
protect the Koreans. Furious at this incident, Koreans attacked Chinese merchants in Seoul, Sinuiju,
and Pyongyang, killing 109.
店主、商人被愤怒的朝鲜暴乱群众杀害。相比之下，日本却并未曾发生过对神户
和横滨的支那工人、店主、商人的袭击事件。尽管震怒，但未曾有过报复性攻击
之类的行动。
然而，坚持“不扩大”方针的日本政府，即便在这般的暴行之下，如此的群
情激愤之中，仍然在天皇陛下的建议下于八月一日草拟了一份和平提案 12 。5 天
之后，获得外务、陆军及海军大臣的批准，向支那方面提交了议案。这份和平议
案是一份割舍了日支之间大部分悬而未决的事项（特别是日本在北支获得的既得
权益）的重大和解让步案。
曾任日本驻上海总领事和在华纺织同业协会会长的船津辰一郎，被任命为和
平交涉的负责人，于是这次交涉便被称为船津和平交涉。
8 月 9 日，就在日本的川越茂大使和高宋武亚洲司司长初次会谈的当天，大山中
尉遭到杀害。 如前所述，此事是南京上海卫戍部队在支共地下党员张治中的指
令下为逼迫蒋介石和日本开战而犯下的罪行。同时也是为了阻碍和平的进程。正
如预期的那样，和平交涉破裂了。

支那-苏联互不侵犯秘密条约
蒋介石准备对日战争的进程在加快。在亚历山大·冯·法肯豪森将军率领的
德国军事顾问团的指导下，50 个师的装备和训练得以现代化，在创立中央集团
军的同时，支那方面为了准备和日本开战在上海郊区构筑了由 20,000 个堡垒群
组成的被称为“塞克特防线” （以第四期德国军事顾问团团长汉斯·冯·塞克
特将军的名字命名）的坚固防御体系。蒋介石对起动一场真正的战争持谨慎态度，
他并不完全赞同张治中一类人的主战论。但是，反日情绪日渐高涨，加上谋杀大
山中尉已成既成事实，形势恶化，因此他最终下定了开战的决心。
中华民国近代史的权威，已故的伊利诺伊州立大学的洛伊德ꞏ伊斯曼（中文名
易劳逸）教授推测，蒋介石是在 8 月 7 日的一次高层军政会议上做出这一决定的。
“蒋介石在进行一场豪赌，其日后人生中最大最有争议的一场豪赌。” 13

注⑫:1931 年 5 月，200 多名朝鲜农民移居万宝山。同年 7 月，400 多名支那农民在支那当局的

支持下袭击了他们。日本当局为保护朝鲜人开始着手此事。被这起事件激怒的朝鲜人在首尔、新
义州和平壤对支那商人展开攻击，共造成 109 人死亡。
12
Draft of cease-fire negotiations: (1) The Tanggu Truce, the He–Umezu Agreement, the Qin–Doihara
Agreement, and any other extant military agreements in North China are cancelled. (2) Special areas
will be established as demilitarized zones. (3) The administrations of Ji Dong and Ji Cha are to be
terminated.(4) The strength of the Japanese forces stationed shall return to their status quo ante bellum.
Draft of diplomatic relations: (1) China must recognize or accept(acquiesce) [the existence of the state
of] Manchuria. (2) China and Japan will enter into an anti-Communist pact. (3) Repeal of the free flight
of Japanese aircraft, etc. .....
注⑬:和平交涉草案:(1)塘沽停战协议、何应钦-梅津协定、土肥原-秦德纯协议以及北支地区现存
的军事协议一律废止。(2)在特殊区域设立非军事区。(3)废止冀东、冀察两政府 (4)日本驻军的兵
力必须回复到事变前的水准。外交关系草案:(1)支那必须承认或接纳(默认)满洲国。 （作为主权国
家的存在）(2)签署日支反共协议 (3)不再准许日军军机自由飞行等等。
13
Lloyd E. Eastman, Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937–1949
(NYC: Stanford University Press, 1984), quoted in Suzuki Akira, Shin “Nankin daigyakusatsu” no
maboroshi (New illusions of the ―Nanking Massacre‖) (Tokyo: Asuka Shinsha,
注⑭:洛伊德ꞏ伊斯曼著：《火种:战争与革命中的中华民国 1937-1949 年》， (纽约:史丹佛大学
出版社，1984 年)，引自铃木明著《南京大屠杀的新幻象》(飞鸟新社东京出版, 1999 年)。
 与蒋介石的这场豪赌相比，或许更大的赌博便是 8 月 21 日支那和苏联签署
的互不侵犯条约中所附加的秘密协议 14 了。依据这项条约，截至 1937 年底，苏
联将向支那提供如下援助：360 架飞机、200 辆坦克、1500 辆卡车、15 万支步枪、
12 万发炮弹，6 千万发子弹，此外，相关领域的工程师和技术人员也将被派往支
那。这项条约的交涉迅速展开，预计最迟在 8 月初秘密条款便会生效。 苏联的
军事支援承诺，给了支那信心。尽管拥有二百一十万军队，但它们却无法自行生
产飞机、坦克等武器。抛开首战不议，一旦战事稍许绵延，军事支援便显得至关
重要。没有苏联的军事支援，蒋介石或许还下不了决心与日本开战。
的确，苏联一直像是在推动支那走向战争。正如我们从共产国际的命令中所
看到的那样，唆使支那和日本开战正是苏联的战略目标。
事实状况是日支战争的前半段，支那完全仰仗苏联的军事支援，而后半段则
依靠美英的军事援助继续战斗。并非是因为支那大陆幅员辽阔，以致战事旷日持
久，步入泥沼，而是由于列强的大规模军事支援和干涉。 显然不是由于日本人
的侵略性所致。

海军陆战队的奋战与增派两个陆军师团
8 月 13 日，3 万支那精锐部队包围租界，对驻扎在此的 4200 人的日本海军
陆战队展开进攻。人们通常认为上海 813 事变是北支战火延烧到了上海，但这种
说法与事实相去甚远。北支的日军根本没有越过防线南移，距离上海约 1000 公
里。因此它们对上海根本构不成威胁。正如纽约时报所述，上海的这场战事完全
是由支那人策谋并单方面发动的。8 月 15 日，蒋介石发布全国总动员令，建立
最高司令部，并亲任（陆海空）三军总司令，对日本发动了全面战争。
因 4200 人的日本海军陆战队无法保护 3 万名侨民，日本决定在 13 日派遣 2
个师团前往支那。15 日，由松井石根大将统率的上海派遣军成立，不过，动员、
输送花费了近 10 天的时间，才抵达上海。在增援部队到达之前，上海的海军陆
战队队员必须坚守防线，对抗十倍于几的支那精锐部队的猛攻，一旦他们被击败，
让支那军侵入租界，那将会发生什么呢？通州已有前车之鉴。或许便是第二次通
州大屠杀，成千上万的日本平民可能会遭到无情的杀戮。
23 日，陆军的一个师团终于在吴淞口登陆,而在过去的十天里，数量稀少的
日本驻军顽强地坚守了阵地，他们在作战中展示了惊人的勇气，从而阻止了上海
的大屠杀。30 多万支那军队利用 2 万多个碉堡和复杂的防御工事，让登陆支那
大陆的日军陷入苦战，三个增援师团推进缓慢，日军伤亡惨重，伤亡总数最终达
到了 41,000 名，这是日军自日俄战争亚瑟港战役以来所遭受的最严重的损失。
11 月 5 日，日本陆军第十军团采用奇袭战术在杭州湾登陆，计划切断支那军后
路，支那军队瞬即崩溃，并向南京方向溃逃。
蒋介石拒绝了德国大使奧斯卡ꞏ陶德曼调解下的和平谈判，仍然负隅顽抗。为
结束战争，攻占战略要地南京便成为必然。12 月 1 日，现中支方面军司令官松
井大将（中支方面军由上海派遣军和第十军团组成）接到攻打南京的命令。他一
路追击溃逃的支那军队，12 月 9 日，在完成了对南京城的包围之后，向城中发
布了劝降令。

攻占南京与所谓大屠杀

14
Source: The Lowdown (New York: January, 1939), p. 18.
注⑮:来源:《真相》杂志 (1939 年 1 月号，纽约发行)，第 18 页。
 在证实 24 小时的回复期限内未能得到答复之后，日本军队发起了进攻。12
日，战斗达到白热化，就在日军即将破城之际，国民党南京守军指挥官唐生智在
没有给下属下达撤退命令的情况下，于 12 日晚不顾部下，弃城而逃。南京守军
仓皇溃逃中在挹江门处对己方军队不断开火射击（国民党督战队射杀逃跑的国民
党士兵），让城内陷入一片混乱。当日军 13 日进入南京城时，绝大多数守军已
逃之夭夭，城内几乎没有遇到任何抵抗，而那些来不及逃跑的士兵则逃到安全区，
于日后酿成大患。

日军并未全部入城，而是从各部队中选拔了一批人进入南京，因此，城里绝
无任何混乱。随同军队入城的 100 多名各大通讯社的记者和摄影师们如是报道。
相反，进入南京城的各联队士兵诧异的是，整个城市像墓地一般沉寂，没有
一丝生气。此情此景被士兵们记载于各自的日记及其他文书当中。那么理所当然
几乎所有的南京市民，总计 20 万，都聚集于国际委员会管辖的安全区内，安全
区外并无市民。
国际安全区委员会保留着一份英文的活动记录，国民党的一个外事处编辑整
理后起名“南京安全区文件汇编”,由上海的 Kelly & Walsh Co.（凯利・沃而
什）公司出版发行。
南京安全区国际委员会（主席是德国人约翰·拉贝），核心成员由美国传教
士构成，反日情绪浓厚，但他们在文件中所记载的内容却极为重要：
1 南京城陷落的时候人口为 20 万，在此后的整个 12 月中，人口保持在 20
万。但南京陷落一个月之后的 1 月 14 日，统计人口为 25 万，这是没有发生任何
形式的屠杀事件的铁证。
2 在南京市民投诉的事件明细当中，有 26 起杀人事件，其中只有一起有目击
证人。而且还特意注解说明这是一起完全合法的执法杀人事件。安全区大约和纽
约中央公园面积相当，20 万人聚集在此，要是有屠杀事件，不可能没人看见，
然而目击到屠杀的人竟连一个都没有。
以上两点便足以证明所谓的大屠杀是多么的荒谬绝伦。若需更多证据，还可
15
另外追加，这是一份盖有“绝密”印章，发现于台北的国民党历史档案馆内 ，
名为《1939-1941 年 4 月国民党中央宣传部国际宣传处宣传工作纲要》的文件。
该文件是国民党内部文件，其真实性是毋庸置疑的。上面写着，在南京作战至陷
落的 11 个月里，国际宣传处在汉口邀请外国记者召开了 300 多场新闻发布会，
为谴责日军而召开的新闻发布会，一次也没有提到过南京发生过针对平民的大屠
杀或者有过非法处决俘虏的事件。如果真的有过一场屠杀，难道国民党方面会只
字不提吗？显然这是不可能的。
简而言之，南京大屠杀不过是日本在无力抵御美国的军事占领之际，炮制出
来的一个的彻头彻尾的谎言。如此这般的谎言至今仍被人们以屠杀是事实为前提
而议论，简直是可悲而又愚蠢。为制止这种愚蠢的举动，南京事件真相验证委员
会（会长加濑英明,总干事藤冈信胜）向访日的胡锦涛主席提交了一封公开信，
这封信透过新闻发布会，互联网传遍世界。(该信公表于历史事实真相网站，有

15
Higashinakano Shudô, Nankin jiken: Kokumintô gokuhi bunsho kara yomitoku (The Nanking
Incident:Decoding it from the top-secret documents of the Guomindang) (Tokyo: Sôshisha, 2006).
注⑯:东中野修道著： 《南京事件—解密国民党绝密公文》（草思社，2006年于东京出版）
日文，支文，英文 3 种版本。英文版见以下链接
http://www.sdh-fact.com/CL02_3/17_S1.pdf )
不出意外，胡锦涛迄今为止没有作出任何回应，那是因为他无法回应。有鉴于此，
南京大屠杀这段公案便可画上圆满的句号。

占领南京之后的和平条件与日本的对中姿态
占领南京之后的 12 月 22 日，日本政府决定再次透过德国驻支那大使奧斯
卡ꞏ陶德曼斡旋， 争取和平调解。基本条件是以下四条：
1 支那放弃“亲共、反日、反满”的政策，配合日满两国的反共政策。
2 在必要的区域建立非军事区和专门机构。
3 日、满、支三国之间签署紧密的经贸协议。
4 支那向日本支付赔款。
在占领南京之前的和平谈判中，并不包含赔偿条款。但在顾及到日本人民的
要求之后，它被添加在内。 尽管如此，也很难说上述条件是极为苛刻的条件。
条件并不涉及任何一块领土要求或某种特权及利益的要求。只是提到正式确立经
贸合作关系，还提到了协同反共。由于蒋介石原本就是反共的，这一反共条款很
难说是过分的条款。只不过苏联（支那最大的盟友）和支共是无论如何都无法接
受这一条款的。
蒋介石或许是顾忌到自己和苏联、支共以及美国、英国之间的关系而踌躇不
定，直至答复期限最后一天的 1 月 12 日，他也没有回应。支那的所作所为明显
是打算拖延时间，然而日本的政府首脑，首相近卫文麿，外相广田弘毅，和其他
要员面临来自陆军参谋本部的强大压力，于 16 日声明不再和蒋介石政府打交道，
终止所有的谈判。这一决定或许是受到了近卫的亲信，共产国际秘密特工尾崎秀
实的影响，也或许为了迎合认为支那无礼至极的公众舆论。
结果，日本被拖入一场与蒋介石政府的旷日持久的战争之中。但把这称之为
日本的侵略战争并不公正。首先，卢沟桥事变是支那共产党密谋策划的，而且也
是
也是其根据“坚决反对就地议和，推动日本与支那之间的全面战争”的指令，
将冲突扩大化的。在日益增长的反日情绪的笼罩之下，断然拒绝日本政府的和平
提案，在上海发动全面战争的是蒋介石政府。日支战争完全是支那挑起的。战争
爆发后，日本再次伸出橄榄枝，却被断然拒绝。主要责任在支那一方。其结果就
是继续战争。无论怎么看，称之为侵略战争都是不恰当的。依据国际法，即便是
在支那的领土之内，非法进攻的一方才是侵略者。
近卫内阁声明称：“我们将不再与蒋介石政府打交道”，不过，同年 11 月公
表的第二次近卫声明，12 月的第三次近卫声明都继续呼吁和平。
1) 第二次近卫声明-- 建立东亚新秩序（11.3.1938), 呼吁国际正义，联合
反共，日满支三国建立经贸合作关系。
2) 第三次近卫声明 （12.22.1938), 三大基本原则：睦邻友好，共同防卫，
经贸合作。
公平地说，上述声明或许是姗姗来迟。然而，这些声明从哪里能找到任何侵
略支那或者控制支那的意图？若不是蒋介石冥顽不灵，拒绝接受和平协议，一门
心思寄望于列强支持，首先是苏联，然后是美国、英国 ，会有这些问题吗？
由于蒋介石的固执，他最终败于支共，不得不逃亡到台湾。日支战争并不是
日本的侵略战争。
 给胡锦涛主席的一封公开咨询信
中华人民共和国国家主席胡锦涛阁下：
在中华人民共和国国家主席胡锦涛阁下访日之际，从希望日中两国友好相
处这一心愿出发，我们对阁下来日本访问表示衷心的欢迎。
　　本委员会长期以来，对１９３７年１２月伴随着日中两军在南京交战而发生的所
谓南京事件进行了很多的验证与研究。由此，对贵国就这一事件所发表的见解产
生了深刻的忧虑。去年「南京屠杀纪念馆」进行了大规模的扩建工程。我们对贵国
这种一边鼓吹友好、一边公然进行不利于友好活动的作法深感疑虑。本委员会根
据最近的研究结果从根本否定了「南京大屠杀」的说法。借此机会就以下五个要
点提出咨询，以便听取阁下的高见。

一、首先需要指出的是，贵国已故毛泽东主席在生前从来没有提及过所谓的“南
京屠杀”。南京战役发生的半年之后，毛先生在延安所进行的一次演讲时曾经提
到过南京战役，这一演讲的内容后来被编入了《论持久战》一书之中。在这里，毛
先生只是谈到“日本军经常对中国方面的部队进行包围，却少有进行歼灭”，而对
所谓的“屠杀”只字未提。如果当时真是发生了对３０万平民进行杀害这样一个可
称为世纪性大屠杀事件的话，毛先生怎么会对此只字不提呢？这岂不是太不自
然，太不可解了吗？对这样一个事实，阁下是怎样看待呢？

二、在南京战役开始之前的１９３７年１１月，国共合作下的国民党在其中央宣传部
内设置了一个国际宣传处。根据该国际宣传处所编《中央宣传部国际宣传处工作
概要》这一机密文件的记载，在南京战役的前后，从１９３７年１２月１日到１９３８年
１０月２４日期间，国际宣传处在汉口举行了３００次记者招待会，每次平均有３５名
的外国记者及外国使馆职员参加。但是，在这３００次的记者招待会上，国际宣传
处一次都没有提到过“在南京发生了对市民的屠杀”，也一次都没有谈到过“对俘
虏的非法杀害”。对这样的一个事实，阁下又是怎么理解的呢？如果真发生了所
谓的大屠杀的话，这难道不是非常奇怪，非常不可理喻的事情吗？

三、南京战役当时，有关国际委员会对集中到南京安全区内的南京市民进行了诸
般照料，他们的活动纪录于１９３９年以《南京安全区档案　Documents of the
NanKing Safety Zone》之名由中华民国国民政府外交顾问徐淑希编撰、上海的一
家出版社发行，并由中华民国政府国际问题研究所加以监修。根据此书记载，南
京市的人口在日本军占领之前为２０万人，日本军占领之后也是２０万人，并且在
占领一个月之后的１９３８年１月增加到了２５万人。从这样一个纪录来看，所谓的
３０万人大屠杀完全是不存在的事情。阁下难道不认为是这样吗？

四、上述的《南京安全区档案 Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone》这一出版

物，还对当时发生针对日本军之不当行为的诉讼事件进行了详细的列举和纪录。
根据这些纪录，杀人事件只发生了两起，其中被目击到的只有一起。并且，这一
起杀人事件还被注明为合法性的杀害。这样的记录与贵国所主张的３０万人屠杀
是不可两立的。对此阁下又是怎样认为的呢？

五、南京大屠杀纪念馆等中国国内的展览设施展示了被作为南京屠杀之“证据”
的一些照片，这些照片还被其它的书刊所登载。但根据后来的科学研究(验证南
京事件「证据照片」( (东中野·草思社) )等)判明，可以用来证明南京屠杀的照片一
张都不存在。如果真有这些照片存在的话，请务必公诸于众，以便大家进行验
证。

　　以上五项论点从根本否定了南京大屠杀的说法，就以上五项论点敬请阁下务
必给与答复。由于这些都是日中两国人民所共同关心的问题，我们以公开咨询信
的方式将之提出。为了日中两国子子孙孙的友好，衷心期待着阁下的回应。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　平成20年5月5日

南京事件之真实验证委员会一同
会长：加濑英明
　 秘书长：藤冈信胜
监事：富泽繁信　茂木弘道　
委员：阿罗健一 上杉千年 小林太严　杉原诚四郎　椙山 浩一　
高池胜彦　高山正之　西村幸祐　花冈信昭 　东中野修道　
沟口郁夫　宫崎正弘
 The Second Sino–Japanese War Was Caused by China
— A Criticism of the ―Japan-as-Aggressor‖ View —

by Moteki Hiromichi, deputy chair,

Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact

Introduction
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident is usually considered to have been the start of the
Second Sino–Japanese War. It is no mistake that this incident served as the trigger for
the Sino–Japanese conflict, but the incident itself was only a small conflict and it
should not be called the start of a full-blown war. What must officially be considered
to have been the start of the Second Sino–Japanese War was the concerted full-scale
attack that was the general mobilization on Aug. 13, 1937, of 30,000 regulars under
the Chiang Kai-shek government in Shanghai in opposition to the Japanese navy land-
ing force stationed there for the protection of Japanese residents.
Who, then, caused the actual war between China and Japan?
In an Aug. 31, 1937, article in The New York Times by Shanghai correspondent
Hallett Abend, we find the following:

Foreigners Support Japan

Official foreign observers and officials of various foreign governments who participated in var-
ious conferences here in seeking to avoid the outbreak of local hostilities, agree that the Japanese
exhibited the utmost restraint under provocation, even for several days keeping all of the Japa-
nese landed force off the streets and strictly within their own barracks, although the move some-
what endangered Japanese lives and properties.
―Opinions may differ regarding the responsibility for the opening of hostilities in the vicinity of
Peiping early in July,‖ said one foreign official who was a participant in the conferences held
here before Aug. 13, ―but concerning the Shanghai hostilities the records will justify only one
decision. The Japanese did not want a repetition of the fighting here and exhibited forbearance
and patience and did everything possible to avoid aggravating the situation. But they were literal-
ly pushed into the clash by the Chinese, who seemed intent on involving the foreign area and for-
eign interests in this clash.‖

The tenor of the article in The New York Times followed the general trend of the
time to be critical of Japan and sympathetic toward China. The article still states that
the start of the fighting in Shanghai was due to a one-sided strike by the Chinese army.
Some 30,000 Japanese were living in the Shanghai concession and working in
manufacturing or trade. Stationed to protect the residents was a 2,200-man landing
force from the navy. The Chinese army violated a cease-fire agreement1 in sneaking a
large number of soldiers into the demilitarized zone outside the concession, so rein-
forcements numbering 2,000 were hurriedly gathered. The ―all of the Japanese landed
force‖ mentioned in the Shanghai article are those some 2,000 landing-force troops.
On Aug. 9, the Chinese army murdered Sublieutenant Ôyama Isao and Seaman
First Class Saitô Yozô, who were in their automobile and carrying out an inspection.

1
The Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement, agreed to between Japan and China on May 5, 1932, after the
first Shanghai Incident. A committee was formed of American, British, French, and Italian members
working alongside Chinese and Japanese members to observe that the terms of the treaty were carried
out. The location for stationing troops of both Japan and China was decided by the agreement.

1
The Chinese obstinately insisted that they had been attacked and returned fire, bring-
ing out the body of a Chinese Peace Preservation Corps soldier as evidence, but the
bullet damage indicated clearly their deaths had not been because of the Japanese.
The book Mao (by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Anchor Books, 2005) explains that
the incident was orchestrated by Gen. Zhang Zhizhong, the defensive commander of
Nanking and Shanghai and a Communist Party member who had infiltrated Chiang‘s
high command, to force Chiang Kai-shek to decide to attack the Japanese forces.2
The Chinese regulars surrounding the concession numbered more than 30,000, the
core of which was the elite 88th Division. On the 13th the offensive began, and on the
14th the Chinese began simultaneous aerial bombardment as well. I will show how
these attacks led to the outbreak of full-scale war later.
In any case, it was clearly the Chinese who were the ones who set the course for
war. It is distinct truth that Japan was dragged into a war she did not want. The
launching of a concentrated attack by regular army troops against civilians and sol-
diers stationed in accordance to treaty is, speaking in terms of international law,
committing ―acts of aggression‖ — regardless of whether they are inside their own
country.

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident was also orchestrated by China

The article in The New York Times said, ―Opinions may differ regarding the re-
sponsibility for the opening of hostilities in the vicinity of Peiping early In July.‖ It
was a conflict that became the impetus for what followed, but in point of truth, this,
too, was clearly a conflict that had been orchestrated by the Chinese.
This is clearly written in the local cease-fire agreement3 that was concluded on Ju-
ly 11, four days after the actual shooting incident. The first item on the three-item
cease-fire agreement says: ―The representative of the 29th Route Army expresses his
regrets to the Japanese forces, and declares that those formerly responsible will be
punished, and those who will in future be responsible will take precautions to never
again provoke such an incident.‖ China clearly assumed the responsibility. The 29th
Route Army was a force of approximately 150,000 controlling northern China under
the command of Gen. Song Zheyuan. The opposing Japanese forces stationed there4
were no more than 5,600, so is impossible to say they were an overwhelming force in
position to press for an unreasonable cease-fire deal. Afterward, China made out as if
to say it did not exist, but that is preposterous. First of all, the document exists. The
third item on the agreement says, ―In light of the incident resulting from guidance
from the so-called Blue Shirts Society, the Communist Party, and all manner of other
anti-Japanese organizations, we will in future undertake counter-measures against
them and supervise them thoroughly.‖ The work of putting the particulars of the

2
―But on 9 August, at Shanghai airport, an army unit hand-picked by ZZZ [=Zhang Zhizhong] killed a
Japanese marine [sic.] lieutenant and a private [sic.]. A Chinese prisoner under sentence of death was
then dressed in a Chinese uniform and shot dead at the airport gate, to make it seem that the Japanese
had fired first. The Japanese gave every sign of wishing to defuse the incident, but ZZZ still bom-
barded Chiang with requests to launch an offensive, which Chiang vetoed.‖ Mao, p. 198.
3
Agreed to by Qin Dechun, acting commander of China‘s 29th Route Army, and Matsui Kyûtarô, head
of the Japanese Army Beijing Special Military Agency.
4
According to the Boxer Protocol, agreed upon by eight nations, including Japan, Great Britain, Amer-
ica, and France, in 1901 after the Boxer Rebellion was put down, stationing troops for the defense of
the residents in the Beijing and Tianjin areas was allowed. At the time, America stationed 1,200 and
France 1,800, while Japan stationed 5,600. This was because the Japanese living in the Beijing area
were more populous — some 33,000. Looking at the civilian-to-military ratio, Japan was 6:1, America
2:1, and France was 1:3. Proportionally speaking, Japan had far and away the smallest military force.

2
agreement into operation went forward, and later, on July 19, the pact was concluded.
It is true that, for her part, Japan labored to that point to observe the terms of the
agreement even while acts in violation of it frequently took place. Nothing could be
done about China‘s repudiation of the existence of the agreement. In other words, not
only did the Japanese military not set the course, the responsibility rests entirely on
the shoulders of the Chinese.

There was a need for a Chinese attack

In the first place, there was absolutely no reason for Japan to make an attack. It
goes without saying that it would be insane if the only 5,600 troops stationed there
were to plan an attack on the 150,000-man 29th Route Army. Moreover, if one were
to speak of the full might of the Japanese army — in Japan, in Manchuria, in Korea,
and in China — it would have been roughly 250,000 men. Compared to this, China
had 2.1 million. Of that number, 500,000 had received training in modern tactics and
equipment from leadership under German military advisors. In addition, Japan‘s
greatest potential enemy was the Soviet Union, and the Soviets had a large military
force of 1.6 million, 400,000 of which had been dispatched to the Soviet Far East.
Given all these conditions, it would have been foolish for Japan to open hostilities in
northern China, and there were no plans for any such thing.
In China at that time, however, there was an overwhelming predominance of those
advocating war against Japan. Excluding the peasantry, the urban residents of China
had a burning desire for war and were confident of victory. One could look at all of
the newspapers published in China at the time, and the situation would be obvious.
The book Nitchû Sensô: Sensô o nozonda Chûgoku, sensô o nozomanakatta Nihon
(―The Second Sino–Japanese War: The China that wanted war, and the Japan that did
not want war‖)5 provides a detailed account of this. Those advocating war at the time
can be broadly broken down into three groups. First were the radical intellectuals,
students, and urban citizens; second were members of the Chinese Communist Party;
third were the provincial military cliques. As supporters of the radical public opinions
of the leaders of the intellectuals and others, the Communist Party and the military
cliques used their opposition to the stance of the government of Chiang Kai-shek and
advocated war as a more profitable goal.
The Communist Party in particular used the anti-Japanese stance as their most
powerful political weapon. The Chinese Soviet Republic, established in November,
1931, in Ruijin in Jiangxi province, issued a proclamation of war against Japan in the
name of the Central Government on Apr. 26, 1932. (On Sept. 18, they also issued an
―official‖ proclamation of war by telegram.) In addition, in August of 1935, in accor-
dance with the Comintern‘s ―Anti-Fascist United Front‖ directive, they issued a dec-
laration of anti-Japanese patriotism. Then, in December of 1936, the Xian Incident
took place. Chiang Kai-shek, setting out to urge his soldiers to fight more vigorously
in the subjugation of the Communist Party, was kidnapped by Marshal Zhang Xu-
eliang, who was the north-eastern commander in charge of those activities. Chiang
was pressured into working with the Communist Party to put anti-Japanese conflict
into practice. The Nationalist Party‘s confrontational line toward the Communist Par-
ty was diverted, and the anti-Japanese sentiment swelled all the more.

And then, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred

5
Kitamura Minoru and Lin Siyun, Nitchû Sensô: Sensô o nozonda Chûgoku, sensô o nozomanakatta
Nihon (The Second Sino–Japanese War: The China that wanted war, and the Japan that did not want
war) (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyûjo, 2008), pp. 3, 72–90.

3
 Given the circumstances, it was only a matter of when and where that a not unex-
pected strike on the Japanese would happen. On July 7, 1937 the Marco Polo Bridge
Incident took place.
The 135 men of the Japanese army‘s 8th Company, having given prior notice to
the 29th Route Army, conducted maneuvers on the dry riverbed near the Marco Polo
Bridge. As the map (attachment 1) shows, the maneuvers began in front of the bridge
at a position about 400 meters distant from the Marco Polo Bridge wall (the Wanping
Fortress wall) and the embankments that were the Chinese army bunkers, and at about
10:40 PM, just before the maneuvers were to end after a 400-meter advance, several
shots were fired into the Japanese positions. After that, ten-odd shots were fired from
the direction of the embankments. A few hours later at 3:25 AM, there were three
more shots; and at 5:30, after taking fire a fourth time, the Japanese forces finally re-
sponded with their own fire. This was seven hours after the first shots had been fired.
It was therefore only natural that the 29th Route Army would admit total culpabil-
ity in the cease-fire agreement signed on the 11th.
As I have already shown, it said, ―In light of the Incident resulting from guidance
from the so-called Blue Shirts Society, the Communist Party, and all manner of other
anti-Japanese organizations, we will in future undertake counter-measures against
them and supervise them thoroughly.‖ The commanders of the 29th Route Army, too,
weren‘t completely certain who it had been that had fired the shots, but they certainly
inferred that their suspicions were that it had been members of the Communist Party.
It was natural that the Chinese Communist Party, who continued to cry for total
anti-Japanese action, would try to continue causing clashes, but the truth was that at
the time the Communist Party found itself facing a serious predicament. To be sure,
with the Xian Incident, Chiang Kai-shek had ceased attacking the Communists and he
promised to forge cooperation and connections with the Communist Party; but he
thrust strict conditions one after another at the Communist Party, and half a year later,
around June of 1937, relations between the Nationalist and Communist parties were
on the verge of a breakdown. Edgar Snow wrote,

But by June 1937. Chiang Kai-shek had scattered and demoralized the once-powerful Tung-
pei Army, moved his own forces into Shensi, and again was blockading the Reds---Once
more they now seemed to face the choice of total surrender or encirclement and disaster, or
retreat to the northern desert. 6

The Communist Party was launching itself upon an enormous gamble to break the
predicament. A large number of Communist Party members had slipped into the ranks
of the 29th Route Army7 and fanned anti-Japanese sentiment, and those caught up in
that fervor caused the shooting incident of 10:40 PM on July 7.

Immovable proof that the Communist

Party planned it: the 7-8 circular telegram

6
Edgar Snow, Random notes on Red China, 1936-1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1957.
Preface.
7
Thanks to Chinese publications it is now clearly known that a large number of Communist Party
members had slipped into place in the 29th Route Amy, including four staff officers (one of whom was
the deputy chief of staff, Zhang Kexia), the local deputy propaganda chief, the intelligence bureau chief,
battalion commanders, and others. Wang Jianying, ed., Zhonggong zuzhi ziliao bian [Compiled docu-
ments on the Chinese Communist Party organization] (Hongqi Publishers, 1983); He Husheng et al.,
ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhi guan zhi [People‘s Republic of China workers‘ and officials‘
aspirations] (Zhongguo Shehui Publishers, 1993).

4
 It is now 100 percent clear that it was the Communist Party who had caused these
incidents. On the 8th, the day after the shooting incident, the Communist Party sent a
long telegram from Yan‘an in the name of the Central Committee to all the powerful
people in China (starting with Chiang Kai-shek), the newspapers, those affiliated with
the Nationalist government, the army, and other organizations and associations. In
official Communist Party histories, it is given special mention as ―the 7-8 circular
telegram.‖ Moreover, on the same day, the same kind of telegram was sent under the
names of Mao Zedong and six other military leaders to Chiang Kai-shek, Gen. Song
Zheyuan, and others.
As I mentioned before, the Japanese army first began to return fire at 5:30 on the
morning of the 8th. It follows from circumstances of transmission at the time that
though the counter-offensive began on the 8th, for this intelligence to be in-hand on
the 8th to comprise what had transpired and to create the long text, and to gain the
approval of the Central Committee, then draw it up as an official telegram and to send
it all over the country, etc., is totally impossible. The only possibility is that it had
been prepared in advance.
In point of fact, it had been prepared in advance. Evidence to that exists today.
The chief of the China Expeditionary Force Intelligence Department Beiping (Bei-
jing) Office, Col. Akitomi Jûjirô, said: ―Late at night immediately following the inci-
dent, the Tianjin Special Intelligence Section radio operator intercepted an urgent
wireless transmission from a transmitter we believe to be on the grounds of Beijing
University to the Communist military headquarters in Yan‘an. It repeated ‗Cheng-
gong-le [success!]‘ three times.‖ (Sankei Shinbun, Sept. 8, 1994, evening edition.) He
said that at the time they had no idea what it meant. It is clear now. They were relay-
ing to Yan‘an that their stratagem at the Marco Polo Bridge had succeeded. The crea-
tion of that telegram was carried out immediately in Yan‘an. Then, on the morning of
the 8th, after having confirmed that Japan had begun firing back, they sent the long
telegram in great numbers all over the place. The criminals who started the war were
the Chinese Communist Party.
Edgar Snow wrote about the Marco Polo Bridge Incident as if the Japanese Army
had caused it, which rescued the Communist Party from their great predicament of
June. He wrote:

Now a second stroke of luck opened up the broadest and most fertile opportunities for them.
For it was in the following month that they were extricated from their precarious position
only by Japan‘s ―providential‖ major invasion of China, which gave Chiang no choice but
to shelve any and all plans for another annihilation drive.8

While they planned it themselves, they repeatedly said that the Japanese attack
had been a Godsend. As I have already presented, it was the Chinese who caused the
incident. Above all, there is no way a Japanese force numbering merely 5,600 would
have launched an attack, and that is not what happened. There was the cease-fire
agreement on the 11th, but there were repeated violations of that agreement on the
Chinese side — whether by the army itself, or by persons unknown. There were also
large-scale cease-fire violations by the Chinese army such as the Langfang Incident
and the Guang‘anmen Incident. On July 27, the Japanese government, which had con-
sistently followed a policy of non-expansion of the conflicts since the incidents oc-
curred, finally determined to dispatch three army divisions into the Chinese interior,
and on the 28th sent notice to the 29th Route Army that it was war.

8
Snow, op. cit., Preface.

5
The Communist Party that planned on
escalating the Marco Polo Bridge Incident
While it is untrue that there was a concerted attack by the Japanese military, Snow,
in his writings, let slip that the Chinese had desired exactly that. They were delighted
that Chiang Kai-shek had had no choice but to abandon his operations to wipe out the
Communists, but their true goal was going on and forcing him to fight the Japanese.
Two of the items on a Comintern order issued after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident
said:

1) You must stubbornly avoid localized resolutions and instead lead the way to full-scale
conflict between China and Japan.
2) You must use every possible measure to accomplish the above goal and you must obli-
terate important people who betray the liberation of China with their localized reso-
lutions and compromises toward the Japanese.9

We can clearly understand that in addition to aiming directly at breaking the dead-
lock of the Communist Party‘s predicament, the true goal of the Marco Polo Bridge
Incident was to create a full-scale outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China.
The Communists called for opposition against Japan, but rather than directly engaging
the Japanese military themselves, their true goal was to cause a full-scale war between
the Japanese army and the army of Chiang Kai-shek. With this, they could achieve
their objective of guaranteeing the security of the Soviet Union; and bringing about
the exhaustion and mutual destruction of both China and Japan was their long-term
strategy for realizing a Communist Party victory. It goes without saying that 1949 was
the realization of the ultimate goal of the Chinese Communist Party, which had im-
plemented this global strategy.

The North China Incident and the Tongzhou Massacre

The conflict expanded in keeping with the Communist Party‘s goal, and the Nank-
ing government of Chiang Kai-shek also went forward with plans to send the army
north. As I have already said, Japan was forced to change her policy of non-expansion
and localizing the conflict, and decided to dispatch three divisions on July 27 and no-
tified the 29th Route Army on the 28th that a state of war existed. It was an outnum-
bered military force, but with support from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and the
troops stationed in Korea, the Japanese army quickly gained total control of the Ping-
jin area (i.e., the Beijing and Tianjin areas).
Chinese Peace Preservation troops, taking advantage of an opening left by the
movement of the outnumbered Japanese army, carried out a massacre of Japanese res-
idents of the city. There were about 420 Japanese living in the town of Tongzhou,
some 12 km east of Beijing. On July 29, the Japanese defensive garrison numbered
merely 110 as their forces had made for an offensive in nearby Nanyuan. Peace Pre-
servation Troops of the autonomous government of pro-Japanese Yin Jukeng were
stationed in the town, but seeing the situation, they suddenly swooped down and at-
tacked the small remaining garrison and the ordinary townsfolk. A barbarous act of
mass slaughter unfolded. It was later established that First Unit commander Zhang

9
Comintern Order (Directions to the Chinese Communist Party), July, 1937. All five items appear in:
Political Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Asian Development, Kominterun ni kansuru kihon shiryô (―Fun-
damental documents concerning the Comintern‖).

6
Qingyu and Second Unit commander Zhang Yantian had been in contact with the Na-
tionalist Party beforehand.
All manner of brutalities such as looting, acts of violence, indignities, and slaugh-
ter were directed toward a great number of innocent people, including the old, the
young, and women. The number of the slain totaled 250.

In Asahiken (a Japanese restaurant) were seven or eight women, all of whom had been
raped. They were shot dead, naked, with their privates exposed. Four or five had been stabbed
in their privates with bayonets. Most of the Japanese men‘s bodies showed signs of having
been strangled with ropes. Blood spattered the walls. It beggars description. (Testimony given
at the Tokyo Trials by the witness Kayajima Takashi, commander of the 2nd Regiment, who
rushed to the site on the 30th to rescue the town.)
At the entrance to Kinsuiro (an inn), I saw the body of a woman who looked to have been
the proprietress. Her legs were facing the entrance, and she was covered only on her face by a
newspaper. I remember that it seemed as if she had resisted considerably; the upper and lower
parts of her body were exposed, and there were signs of four or five bayonet thrusts. It looked
like her privates had been gouged out with an edged weapon, and there was blood every-
where. ... In the house of a Japanese family behind, two people — a parent and child — had
been slaughtered. All the fingers of the child had been cut off. At the store of a Japanese citi-
zen near the South Gate, the body of what seemed to have been the proprietor had been left in
the street, his ribs exposed and his organs scattered. (Testimony given at the Tokyo Trials by
acting 2nd Regiment Infantry Commander Katsura Shizuo.)

The cruel atrocities went on and on, and there are no words to describe them.

The Nanking Massacre and the Tongzhou Massacre

These witness statements do not speak of the Nanking Massacre, but it is possible
that there are those who misapprehend that they do. To be sure, in the tale told by
Chinese afterward purporting a Nanking Massacre, stories exactly like these, the
manner in which things were done, examples of brutality and so forth, were common.
I will write about the Nanking Incident later, but although no Nanking Massacre ever
existed, it is an undeniable truth that there was a massacre in Tongzhou. An incident
of brutality the like of which had never happened in Japan happened in China. In in-
vestigating the history of China, however, we find that such brutal incidents were not
uncommon.
In reading the book Chûgoku daigyakusatsu shi: Naze Chûgokujin wa hitogoroshi
ga suki na no ka? (A history of massacres in China: Why do the Chinese like kill-
ing?)10 by Shi Ping, a graduate of Beijing University, we learn that in China excessive
by far massacres were repeated occurrences in ancient, medieval, and modern times,
and even in the present day under the Communist Party rule. Particularly interesting is
the fact that there was a Nanking Massacre. It was not in 1937, however, but in 1864
during the Taiping Rebellion, when Nanking, then the capital of the Taiping Heavenly
Kingdom, was attacked and entered by an army commanded by Zeng Guofan. After
Zeng Guofan‘s death, one of his staff officers, Zhao Liewen, wrote Neng jin ju shi riji
(Diary of a capable, quiet gentleman):

Children, too, were the object of the slaughter, and many of the rank and file soldiery
quite nearly made a game of the killing of the children and appeared to delight in it. As far as
women were concerned, those under 40 were made instruments to slake the lust of the sol-

10
Shi Ping. Chûgoku daigyakusatsu shi: Naze Chûgokujin wa hitogoroshi ga suki na no ka? (A history
of massacres in China: Why do the Chinese like killing?) (Tokyo: Business-sha, 2007).

7
 diery, while those over 40 or those with unattractive faces were cut down indiscriminately
with whatever came to hand.11

Notorious mass killings — a million slaughtered at the massacres in Sichuan, the

massacre at Yangzhou, the massacres at Jiading, and on and on — fill the pages. Shi
Ping‘s book is a must-read.
To repeat, no such incident ever took place in the entire history of Japan. Some-
thing with which the Japanese were totally unacquainted, and which the Chinese were
vehemently saying had been the work of the Japanese, was the ―Nanking Massacre.‖
In other words, the ―Nanking Massacre‖ was fabricated to indict the Japanese army; it
was a tale made-up in imitation of the accounts of the mass killings that had occurred
time and again in China as well in imitation of the recent massacre in Tongzhou
which they had perpetrated. That is why it was a story that so closely resembled the
conditions of the Tongzhou Incident.
I will later present evidence to show why there was no ―Nanking Massacre,‖ and
why there could not have been one.

The Funatsu peace initiative and the murder of Lt. Ôyama

The Japanese army had gained total control of the Beijing-Tianjin district and its
northern environs, but the general staff headquarters issued an order that the limit for
their forces‘ advance should be retained at about 100 km south of Beijing. That was a
point some 1,000 km away from Shanghai. The Japanese government‘s objective was
to end the ―North China Incident‖ and keep the conflict from spreading.
The Japanese people were enraged at the news of the Tongzhou Massacre. All the
newspaper headlines were full of demands to ―chastise the violent Chinese.‖ Public
opinion seethed against the unforgivable Chinese atrocity and voices grew louder de-
manding the government take resolute measures. There is one note that must be added
here. Namely, the murder of Chinese workers, merchants, and businessmen by angry,
rioting Koreans at the time of the Wanpaoshan Incident.12 In contrast, there were Chi-
nese workers, merchants, and businessmen in Kobe and Yokohama, but there were no
incidences of attacks on the those in Japan. There was fury, but there was nothing re-
sembling any retributive attacks.
The government, however, sticking with its non-expansion policy despite such
atrocities and such an outraged public opinion, went along with the emperor‘s sugges-
tions and drew up a peace plan13 on Aug. 1, and receiving the assent of the foreign
and army and navy ministers five days later, made the proposal to the Chinese. This
peace proposal was a momentous, conciliatory document wherein most of the pending
issues between China and Japan to that point (and in particular vested rights in north
China) were renounced.

11
Ibid., p. 182.
12
In May of 1931, over 200 Korean farmers settled in the town of Wanpaoshan. In July, more than 400
Chinese farmers attacked them with the backing of Chinese authorities. Japanese authorities set out to
protect the Koreans. Furious at this incident, Koreans attacked Chinese merchants in Seoul, Sinuiju,
and Pyongyang, killing 109.
13
Draft of cease-fire negotiations: (1) The Tanggu Truce, the He–Umezu Agreement, the Qin–Doihara
Agreement, and any other extant military agreements in North China are cancelled. (2) Special areas
will be established as demilitarized zones. (3) The administrations of Ji Dong and Ji Cha are to be ter-
minated. (4) The strength of the Japanese forces stationed shall return to their status quo ante bellum.
Draft of diplomatic relations: (1) China must recognize or accept(acquiesce) [the existence of the state
of] Manchuria. (2) China and Japan will enter into an anti-Communist pact. (3) Repeal of the free flight
of Japanese aircraft, etc. .....

8
 Funatsu Tatsuichirô, formerly Japan‘s consul general in Shanghai and at that time
the chairman of the board of the Spinning Association in China, was named to be the
person responsible for the negotiations, so it came to be called the ―Funatsu peace in-
itiative‖.
Aug. 9, the day of the first meeting between Ambassador Kawagoe Shigeru and
Gao Songwu, head of the Asia Office, was the day that Lt. Ôyama was killed. As I
mentioned already, this was an act perpetrated by the Nanking and Shanghai Defen-
sive Forces under the command of the crypto-Communist Zhang Zhizong to get
Chiang Kai-shek‘s to fight the Japanese. It was also meant to be an obstruction to the
peace process. As intended, then, peace negotiations collapsed.

The secret Sino–Soviet non-aggression pact

Chiang Kai-shek moved forward with preparations for war with Japan. While
creating a central Chinese army and modernizing the equipment and training of fifty
divisions under the direction of a corps of German military advisors led by Gen. Al-
exander von Falkenhausen, the Chinese prepared for war with the Japanese by build-
ing a solid defensive network in the Shanghai suburbs consisting of 20,000 bunkers
which came to be called the ―Seeckt Line‖ (named after Gen. Hans von Seeckt, the
fourth leader of the German advisors). Chiang Kai-shek was cautious about starting a
real war. He was not very much in sympathy with the jingoism of Zhang Zhizong and
his ilk, but anti-Japanese sentiment was growing and the murder of Lt. Ôyama being a
fait accompli added to the situation, so at last he decided to go to war.
The premier scholar of the recent history of the Republic of China, the late Prof.
Lloyd E. Eastman of the University of Illinois, surmised that it was on Aug. 7, at a
meeting where the top brass were assembled, that Chiang Kai-shek made the decision.
―Chiang Kai-shek was setting out on a great gamble, one which later would be argued
as the greatest in his life.‖14
Something that may be considered a greater gamble than the one Chiang Kai-shek
made then was China‘s secret agreement attached to the non-aggression pact,15 con-
cluded with the Soviet Union on Aug. 21. With this treaty, the following support was
to be provided by the end of 1937: 360 planes, 200 tanks, 1,500 trucks, 150,000 rifles,
120,000 artillery shells, 60 million rounds of ammunition; and in addition, engineers
and technical experts in each of these fields were to be sent to China. Negotiations for
this treaty began swiftly, and it is assumed that the secret items were set in early Au-
gust at the latest. This promise of military supplies from the Soviet Union had to have
been reassuring to China, who, though they had a large army of 2.1 million, lacked
the ability to manufacture aircraft and tanks and the like themselves. Setting aside the
beginning of the hostilities, if the fighting were to be drawn out even a little longer,
such supplies would become absolutely essential. Without them, Chiang Kai-shek
would probably not have been able make the decision to go to war.
Indeed, it would seem that the Soviet Union had been pushing China toward war.
As we can see from the Comintern orders, that was exactly in accordance with the
goals of the Soviet strategy.
The actual situation in the Second Sino–Japanese War was that China relied en-
tirely on Soviet military aid for first half of the war, and for the second half on British
and American military aid to continue fighting. It was not because mainland China

14
Lloyd E. Eastman, Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937–1949
(NYC: Stanford University Press, 1984), quoted in Suzuki Akira, Shin “Nankin daigyakusatsu” no
maboroshi (New illusions of the ―Nanking Massacre‖) (Tokyo: Asuka Shinsha, 1999).
15
Source: The Lowdown (New York: January, 1939), p. 18.

9
was so huge that the conflict went on and on and became a quagmire, but rather be-
cause of the vast military assistance and intervention from the great powers. Still less
was it because of Japanese aggression.

The naval landing force’s struggle,

and the dispatch of two army divisions
On Aug. 13, the 30,000-strong elite Chinese force encircling the concession began
its attack on the 4,200-man naval landing force stationed there. It is often said that the
fighting leapt like a flame from northern China to Shanghai, but this is a manner of
speaking that is considerably far removed from the truth. The Japanese forces in
northern China did not move southward beyond their holding line, which was 1,000
km away from Shanghai. They were therefore no manner of threat in Shanghai at all.
The battle in Shanghai was entirely the design of the Chinese who unilaterally started
it, as The New York Times described it. On the 15th, Chiang Kai-shek ordered a na-
tion-wide general mobilization, established a supreme command headquarters, and
assumed the rank of commander-in-chief of all three branches of the military — the
army, the navy, and the air force — for waging all-out war against Japan.
Since 4,200 troops could not protect 30,000 residents, Japan decided to dispatch
two divisions to China on the 13th, and on the 15th the Shanghai Expeditionary Force
under the command of Gen. Matsui Iwane was formed. Mobilization and transporta-
tion took almost ten days before they disembarked at Shanghai, however. Until then,
the naval landing force in Shanghai had to hold out against attacks from an elite force
nearly ten times their size. What might have happened if they had been beaten down
and allowed a Chinese force to penetrate the concession had already been proven in
Tongzhou. It would have been a second Tongzhou Massacre. There was a possibility
that thousands — or even tens of thousands — of civilians might have been slaugh-
tered.
One army division finally landed in Wusong near Shanghai on the 23rd. In those
ten days, the small landing force had defended their position well. They fought ama-
zingly bravely, and thereby were able to prevent a massacre in Shanghai. Due to the
over 20,000 bunkers and defensive positions, the army forces that landed on the main-
land became embroiled in a desperate campaign against nearly 300,000 Chinese sol-
diers. With the gradual drive forward by the reinforcement of three divisions, the Jap-
anese couldn‘t avoid enduring heavy losses. Casualties ultimately totaled more that
41,000 killed and injured — the heaviest losses Japan had sustained since the cam-
paign for Port Arthur during the Russo–Japanese War. On Nov. 5, the Japanese 10th
Army Corps landed at Hangzhou Bay in a surprise assault planning to cut the Chinese
army off from behind. The Chinese army immediately collapsed and made for Nank-
ing in a rout.
Chiang Kai-shek was not receptive to peace negotiations through the intermedia-
tion of German ambassador Oskar Trautmann and continued the resistance, so to
bring the war to an end it was going to be necessary to occupy the strategic base that
was Nanking. On Dec. 1, Gen. Matsui, now commander of the Central Chinese Area
Army (the Japanese Central Chinese Area Army having been formed by combining
the Shanghai Expeditionary Force and the 10th Army), was ordered to take Nanking.
He pursued the fleeing Chinese army and on Dec. 9, after achieving the encirclement
of Nanking, issued demands for the city to surrender.

The capture of Nanking and the so-called massacre

10
 After confirming that the 24-hour deadline for a reply had passed, the Japanese
army commenced its attack. At the peak of the hard fighting on the 12th, Japanese
forces were on the verge of breaking into the city. Despite not having given with-
drawal orders to his subordinates, Tang Shengzhi, the commander of Nanking‘s de-
fenses, fled the city on the night of the 12th, abandoning it and his men. There was a
great deal of chaos inside the city with the defending forces making their confused
escapes, ―friendly fire‖ going on at the Yijiang Gate (the shooting deaths of fleeing
Chinese soldiers by their supervising unit), etc. When the Japanese forces entered
Nanking on the 13th, most of the defenders had fled so there was virtually no fighting
inside the city. Those soldiers who had been too late to escape fled into to the Safety
Zone, later becoming the seeds of the problem.
The entire Japanese force did not enter the city. Rather, a selected portion of each
unit entered Nanking, so there was absolutely no disorder in the city. This is what was
reported by the more than 100 journalists and cameramen who entered the city at the
same time.
Instead, what the soldiers of the units that entered Nanking were concerned about
was that the city was silent as a graveyard and there wasn‘t a soul in sight. This is all
written in the soldiers‘ diaries and so on. This was as it had to be, as virtually all of
townsfolk of Nanking — totaling 200,000 — had assembled in the ―Safety Zone,‖
which was overseen by the International Committee. There were no townsfolk any-
where outside the Safety Zone.
The International Safety Zone Committee left an English-language record of their
activities. An agency of the Guomindang edited it and published it as Documents of
the Nanking Safety Zone by Kelly & Walsh Co. in Shanghai.
As the International Committee (headed by the German John Rabe) had American
missionaries as its core, anti-Japanese sentiment was thick, but the following things,
which they wrote in the Documents, are extremely important:
1) The population of Nanking at its fall was 200,000. Afterward throughout the
month of December it remained 200,000, but a month after the city‘s fall, on
Jan. 14, the number is recorded as 250,000. This is absolute proof that there
had been no massacre of any sort.
2) In a list of the complaints of the townsfolk, twenty-six instances of murder
were brought up. Only one of those, however, had an eyewitness, and that one
had a deliberately appended note stating that it had been a lawful killing. The
Safety Zone was about the same size as New York‘s Central Park, and
200,000 people were gathered there. If there had been a massacre it could not
have happened without being seen, but there were no eyewitnesses to any
massacre.
Exactly how false the so-called massacre was can be explained with just these two
points. For those who need more, to add another thing, there is a document bearing a
―top-secret‖ stamp titled An Overview of Propaganda Operations of the International
Information Division of the Central Propaganda Bureau of the Nationalist Party:
from 1938 to April 1941, that was discovered in the Guomindang Historical Docu-
ments Archive in Taipei.16 This was an internal document of the Guomindang, so any
hints of propaganda within it are slim. It says that the International Propaganda Office
invited foreign correspondents in Hankou to press conferences 300 times during the
eleven months encompassing the Battle for Nanking. In the press conferences, called

16
Higashinakano Shudô, Nankin jiken: Kokumintô gokuhi bunsho kara yomitoku (The Nanking Inci-
dent: Decoding it from the top-secret documents of the Guomindang) (Tokyo: Sôshisha, 2006).

11
to criticize the Japanese forces, not even one time was there any talk of a massacre of
civilians or the unlawful execution of prisoners in Nanking. If there had in truth been
a massacre, would they really have said nothing about it? It is, of course, impossible.
In short, the Nanking Massacre was nothing more than a trumped-up lie put forth
when Japan were unable to substantially resist the American military occupation. It is
simply pathetic and stupid that with such a lie as this people still talk as if the massa-
cre was a given. To put a stop to such foolishness, the Committee for the Examination
of the Facts about Nanking (Kase Hideaki, chair; Fujioka Nobukatsu, secretary gener-
al) presented an open letter of inquiry to President Hu Jintao of China when he came
to Japan. It was disseminated to the world via press conferences and the Internet. (It
appears on the website for the Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact in Jap-
anese, Chinese, and English. The English version is available at http://www.sdh-fact.
com/CL02_3/17_S1.pdf) It comes as no surprise that Hu Jintao has yet to respond to
it. That is because he cannot respond to it. With this, the issue of Nanking has been
settled.

Peace conditions after the Nanking occupation

and Japan’s posture toward China
On Dec. 22, after Nanking was occupied, the Japanese government decided once
again to try for terms of peace mediated through the good offices of Germany‘s am-
bassador to China, Oskar Troutmann. The following four points were the basic terms:
1) China would renounce pro-Communist, anti-Japanese, and anti-Manchurian
policies, and would cooperate with Japan and Manchuria‘s anti-Communist
policies.
2) Demilitarized zones will be established in required regions, and special organi-
zations will be established.
3) Close economic agreement will be executed among the three countries of China,
Japan, and Manchuria.
4) China would pay reparations to Japan.
The clause on reparations was not included in the peace talks before the occupa-
tion of Nanking, but it was included after taking into account the demands for it by
the Japanese people. Even so, one cannot say that these are particularly severe condi-
tions. These are not demands for a piece of territory or for certain special rights or in-
terests. Instead, it mentions formalizing a relationship of economic cooperation. It al-
so speaks of collaborative anti-Communism; but since Chiang Kai-shek was anti-
Communist from the start, this item can hardly be said to be a harsh one. It was just
that there was no way the Soviet Union (China‘s greatest supporter) and the Com-
munist Party would accept this one.
Chiang Kai-shek didn‘t go for the agreement probably out of concerns with his re-
lationship with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, as well as his relationship
with America and Great Britain. Even when the deadline for his reply, Jan. 12, was
reached, he did not respond. China‘s actions were apparently intended to just prolong
the process, however, and the leaders of Japan‘s government — prime minster, Konoe
Fumimaro, foreign minister, Hirota Kôki, and others, facing down strong opposition
from the army‘s general staff headquarters — declared on the 16th, ―We will no
longer deal with the government of Chiang Kai-shek,‖ and cut off negotiations. It is
possible that there was some influence here by one of Konoe‘s close associates, Ozaki
Hotsumi, who was a covert operative of the Comintern. It is also possible, however,
that this decision was made to curry favor with a public who viewed China as insolent.

12
 As a result, Japan was pulled into a protracted war against the government of
Chiang Kai-shek, but calling this Japan‘s aggressive war is a total injustice. First, the
Marco Polo Bridge Incident had been an event orchestrated by the Communist Party,
and it had also been the Communists who expanded the conflict, based on the direc-
tive to ―stubbornly avoid localized resolutions and instead lead the way to full-scale
conflict between China and Japan.‖ It had been Chiang Kai-shek‘s government who
rebuffed the Japanese peace proposals amidst growing anti-Japanese sentiment and
set the course for full scale war in Shanghai. The war was something that had been
entirely caused by China. Afterward, Japan again proposed peace, but had been flatly
refused. The onus for this is primarily on the Chinese. The result was that the war
went on. No matter how one looks at it, calling that aggression is undeserved. Ac-
cording to international law the aggressor is the one making lawless attacks — even if
it is within China‘s territory.
There was Konoe‘s declaration, ―We will no longer deal with the government of
Chiang Kai-shek,‖ but in November that year came the second Konoe declaration,
and in December yet a third Konoe declaration appealing for peace.
1) Second Konoe declaration ―The establishment of a new order in East Asia‖
(Nov. 3, 1938)
Calling for international justice, joint anti-Communism, and economic coop-
eration with the three countries of Japan, Manchuria, and China.
2) Third Konoe declaration (Dec. 22, 1938)
Three necessary fundamentals: good neighborly friendship, joint defense, and
economic cooperation.
It may be fair to say that the declaration was belated. Still, where in these declara-
tions can one find any aggression toward China, or any intention to control China?
Was not the problem in fact Chiang Kai-shek‘s stubbornness in not taking peace and
instead choosing to rely on support from powerful nations — first the Soviet Union,
and then America and Great Britain?
Because of this obstinacy, ultimately, he was undone by the Communists and
faced with having to flee to Taiwan. The Second Sino–Japanese was not a war of Jap-
anese aggression.

13
 Attachment 1

Rough map of the night-time maneuvers of the 8th Company on 7 July, 1937
Position of the hypothetical enemy

c. 300 m
50m 50m
Bunkers

1 Final position of maneuvers:

(platoon) 3 2 Site prepared for dawn assault

Co. Cdr.
Shimizu
Guards until company
has passed through Barbed wire
entanglements

Lookouts (in support) Dusk attack (observation forces)

Disruption gap exterminate the enemy front line
c. 200 m Gas
Gas zone
zone

Co. Cdr. Sterilization route

Shimizu
1 2 Preparations to support the
(platoon)
3 opening of the sterilization route

Initial position of maneuvers

Movement
c. 100 m
Rest & dinner position

Walls
of
Wanping
c. 300 m
(Walls of
Marco Polo
Bridge)
Temple
of the
Dragon King Bunkers
卍
29th Army trenches
Yongding River
c. 400 m
Paper tape
Attachment 2.

OPEN QUESTIONS FOR HIS EXCELLENCY HU JINTAO,

PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

May 5, 2008

As enthusiastic supporters of friendly relations between Japan and the PRC, we would like to
extend the warmest of welcomes to President Hu Jintao on the occasion of Your Excellency’s
visit to Japan.

For some years, our organization has been engaged in an investigation into the events that
transpired in Nanking in connection with the Battle of Nanking, which took place in
December 1937. We are profoundly concerned about the PRC’s position on and approach to
these events. Additionally, we are exceedingly uncomfortable with the duplicity of the PRC in
its pursuit of friendship with Japan on the one hand, and actions that are most unfriendly in
nature — the expansion and renovation of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall in 2007 — on
the other. Recent research has proven that there is absolutely no basis for the claim that there
was a massacre in that city. We respectfully request Your Excellency’s responses to five
important questions, which follow.

1. Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong never referred to a massacre in

Nanking. He made exactly one mention of the Battle of Nanking during a lecture
delivered at Yan’an six months after the conflict, reproduced in On Protracted War.
Chairman Mao criticized the Japanese for failing to annihilate Chinese troops after having
surrounded them. If there had been slaughter in Nanking of a magnitude so great (300,000
civilian victims) as to prompt the description “holocaust of the century,” there is not the
slightest chance that he would have been silent on the matter. What are Your Excellency’s
thoughts on the facts presented here?

2. In November 1937, during the Second United Front and prior to the Battle of Nanking, the
Nationalist Party established a new section at the Central Propaganda Bureau — the
International Propaganda Section. We would like to direct Your Excellency’s attention to
a top-secret document entitled “Outline of International Propaganda Operations,” which
states that the International Propaganda Section held 300 press conferences in Hankou
between December 1, 1937 and October 24, 1938 (a period that includes the Battle of
Nanking); they were attended by 35 foreign journalists and diplomats, on the average.
How does Your Excellency explain the fact that not once during any of these 300
conferences was a statement or announcement made to the effect that a massacre had been
perpetrated, or that prisoners of war had been unlawfully killed in Nanking? Does Your
Excellency, too, find these circumstances extraordinary?
3. The International Committee administered to the civilians remaining in Nanking, who
were gathered in the Safety Zone. Records of the International Committee’s activities
were published in 1939 as Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone by a British company in
Shanghai, under the auspices of the Nationalist Government’s Council of International
Affairs. According to those records, the population of Nanking prior to its occupation by
the Japanese was 200,000. That figure remained unchanged, at 200,000, throughout the
remainder of 1937. By the end of January, it had increased to 250,000. These statistics
completely and utterly destroy the credibility of any accusation of a massacre that claimed
300,000 victims. What are Your Excellency’s views on this matter?

4. Among the records in the aforementioned Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone are
detailed complaints about misconduct attributed to Japanese military personnel. They
include a total of 26 murders, only one of which was witnessed (to that account is
appended a note describing the “murder” as a lawful execution). Can Your Excellency
reconcile these records with the PRC’s claim of a massacre with 300,000 victims?

5. Photographs purported to be evidence of a massacre in Nanking are on display at the

Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, at other exhibitions, and in printed publications.
However, Analyzing Photographic “Evidence” of the Nanking Massacre by
Higashinakano Shudo (Soshisha, 2005) and other recent scientific research reveal that
there are no photographs attesting to a massacre in Nanking. If Your Excellency is aware
of photographic evidence of a massacre, please have it forwarded to us so that we may
examine it.

On the basis of the factual information contained in these five questions, we are completely
and totally convinced that there was no massacre in Nanking. We would greatly appreciate
Your Excellency’s responses to our questions. Please note that we have selected the
open-question format precisely because the matter at hand is clearly one of the prime
concerns of many citizens of Japan and the PRC. Our hopes for friendly relations between our
two nations, for all generations to come, rest in Your Excellency’s hands.

COMMITTEE FOR THE EXAMINATION OF THE FACTS ABOUT NANKING

Chairman: KASE Hideaki

Secretary-General: FUJIOKA Nobukatsu
Auditor : TOMIZAWA Shigenobu, MOTEKI Hiromichi
Members: ARA Kenichi, UESUGI Chitoshi, KOBAYASHI Taigan,
SUGIHARA Seishiro SUGIYAMA Kouichi, TAKAIKE Katsuhiko,
TAKAYAMA Masayuki, HANAOKA Nobuaki,
HIGASHINAKANO Shudo, NISHIMURA Kohyu,
MIZOGUCHI Ikuo, MIYAZAKI Masahiro