Public International Law

1. Secretary Of Justice vs Hon. Ralph Lantion

G.R. No. 139465 - January 18, 2000
Facts:
 The Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. a
request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. for violation of
conspiracy to commit Offense, Attempt to Evade Tax, Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television,
False Statement, and Election Contribution in Name of Another.
 During the evaluation process of the extradition, the private respondent, requested the
petitioner, Secretary of Justice, to furnish him copies of the extradition request from the
U.S. government, that he be given ample time to comment regarding the extradition request
against him after he shall have received copies of the requested papers, and to suspend
the proceeding in the meantime.
 The petitioner, Secretary of Justice denied the request in consistent with Art. 7 of the RP -
US Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the
interests of the U.S. in any proceedings arising from an extradition request.
 The private respondent filed a mandamus, a certiorari, and a prohibition to enjoin the
petitioner, the Secretary of DFA, and NBI from performing any acts directed to the
extradition of the respondent, for it will be a deprivation of his rights to due process of notice
and hearing.
Issue:
 Whether or not the private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine
Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty.
Held:
 No. The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good
faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations.
 The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
 In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the
treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these
rights from a prospective extraditee.

2. BAYAN vs Exec. Sec. Ronaldo Zamora

G.R. No. 138570 - October 10, 2000
Facts:
 The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an
agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a
treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with
the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.
 The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S.
 and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel
and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
 Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement is constitutional.
Held:
 As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution
vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote
of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the
subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the
President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no
less than by the fundamental law itself. Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the
President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of ratification and entering into a treaty and
those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts - squarely fall within the
sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less
calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or
discretion.

3. International School Alliance of Educators vs Hon. Leonardo Quisumbing

G.R. No. 128845 – June 1, 2000
Facts:
 Private respondent pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other
temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program
and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the
School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally
or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from
otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that
have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
 The local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination for
receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad.
Issue:
 Whether or not Section 2(c) of Presidential Decree 732 is unconstitutional.
Held:
 The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare," "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to
regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual
but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining
agreements included, must yield to the common good. 28 Should such contracts contain
stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these
stipulations.

4. Wigberto Tanada vs Edgardo Angara

G.R. No. 118295 – May 2, 1997
Facts:
 This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers,
and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement.
 Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and
against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially
its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector
cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These
are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory
Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
 Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the
said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant
that Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and
general welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
Issue:
 Whether or not the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.
Held:
 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
 The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government
including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. As the petition alleges grave
abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be
given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

5. La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Assoc. vs Victor Ramos

G.R. No. 127882 - January 27, 2004
Facts:
 On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No.
279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from
foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may
execute with the foreign proponent.
 On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the
exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No.
7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the
procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their
terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements.
 The law prescribes the qualifications of contractors and grants them certain rights, including
timber, water and easement rights, and the right to possess explosives. Surface owners,
occupants, or concessionaires are forbidden from preventing holders of mining rights from
entering private lands and concession areas.
 On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative
Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7942.
 On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary
demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40,
giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to
respond or act on petitioners' letter.
 Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order. They allege that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100
FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares, 64 of
which applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million
hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.
Issue:
 Whether or not RA 7942 is unconstitutional as it allows fully foreign owned corporations to
explore, develop, utilize and exploit mineral resources in a manner contrary to Section 2,
paragraph 4, Article XII of the Constitution.
Held:
 The Philippines having passed to Spain by virtue of discovery and conquest,81 earlier
Spanish decrees declared that "all lands were held from the Crown." The Regalian doctrine
extends not only to land but also to "all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of
the earth." Spain, in particular, recognized the unique value of natural resources, viewing
them, especially minerals, as an abundant source of revenue to finance its wars against
other nations. Mining laws during the Spanish regime reflected this perspective.
 The adoption of the principle of state ownership of the natural resources and of the
Regalian doctrine was considered to be a necessary starting point for the plan of
nationalizing and conserving the natural resources of the country. For with the
establishment of the principle of state ownership of the natural resources, it would not be
hard to secure the recognition of the power of the State to control their disposition,
exploitation, development or utilization.
 The nationalization of the natural resources was intended (1) to insure their conservation for
Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping prevent the
extension to the country of foreign control through peaceful economic penetration; and (3)
to avoid making the Philippines a source of international conflicts with the consequent
danger to its internal security and independence.

6. The Province of North Cotabato vs The GRP

G.R. No. 183591 - October 14, 2008
Facts:
 On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.
 Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the
MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public
consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The
Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
Issue:
 Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication.
Held:
 The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from
their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the
 mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
 As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted
in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

7. Shigenori Kuroda v. Rafael Jalandoni

GR L-2662 - March 26, 1949
Facts:
 Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General during the Japanese occupation, is now
charged before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of
the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as
such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the
laws and customs of war." He comes before the Court seeking to establish the illegality of
Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit
respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of
petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents
from proceeding with the case of petitioners.
Held:
 It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of The Hague and Geneva conventions
form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law.
In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United
State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles
therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and
extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of
international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall
be a signatory.

8. Secretary Of Justice vs Hon. Ralph Lantion

G.R. No. 139465 - January 18, 2000
(Same as No.1)
Facts:
 The Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. a
request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. for violation of
conspiracy to commit Offense, Attempt to Evade Tax, Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television,
False Statement, and Election Contribution in Name of Another.
 During the evaluation process of the extradition, the private respondent, requested the
petitioner, Secretary of Justice, to furnish him copies of the extradition request from the
U.S. government, that he be given ample time to comment regarding the extradition request
against him after he shall have received copies of the requested papers, and to suspend
the proceeding in the meantime.
 The petitioner, Secretary of Justice denied the request in consistent with Art. 7 of the RP -
US Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the
interests of the U.S. in any proceedings arising from an extradition request.
 The private respondent filed a mandamus, a certiorari, and a prohibition to enjoin the
petitioner, the Secretary of DFA, and NBI from performing any acts directed to the
 extradition of the respondent, for it will be a deprivation of his rights to due process of notice
and hearing.
Issue:
 Whether or not the private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine
Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty.
Held:
 No. The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good
faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations.
 The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
 In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the
treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these
rights from a prospective extraditee.

9. Boris Mejoff vs The Director of Prison

G.R. No. L-4254 - September 26, 1951
Facts:
 Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as
a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. (The
petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the armed and
belligerent forces of a de facto government whose decrees were law furing the occupation.)
 He was arrested on March 18, 1948 as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence
Corps. and later there was an order for his release.
 But on April 5, 1948, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration declared that Mejoff had
entered the Philippines illegally in 1944 and ordered that he be deported on the first
available transportation to Russia.
 He was transferred to Cebu Provincial Jail and then Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa on
October, 1948.
 He then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that too long a detention may
justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus - denied
 Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the
Government has not found way and means of removing the petitioner out of the country,
and none are in sight, although it should be said in justice to the deportation authorities, it
was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner
Issue:
 Whether or not aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein,
even if they are "stateless".
Held:
 By its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations
of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the
right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were
 proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree
and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2):
that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9); etc.

10. Donald Baer vs Hon. Tito Tizon

G.R. No. L-24294 - May 3, 1974
Facts:
 Respondent Edgardo Gener, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for injunction with the Court of
First Instance of Bataan against petitioner, Donald Baer Commander of the United States
Naval Base in Olongapo.
 He alleged that he was engaged in the business of logging and that the American Naval
Base authorities stopped his logging operations.
 He prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from interfering with his
logging operations.
 A restraining order was issued by respondent Judge.
 Counsel for petitioner, upon instructions of the American Ambassador to the Philippines,
entered their appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of respondent Judge
on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its consent.
Issue:
 Whether or not Counsel for petitioner was correct.
Held:
 Yes. The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its
consent is appropriate. More specifically, insofar as alien armed forces is concerned, the
starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision. In dismissing a habeas corpus
petition for the release of petitioners confined by American army authorities, Justice Hilado,
speaking for the Court, cited from Coleman v. Tennessee, where it was explicitly declared:
"It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be
stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and
criminal jurisdiction of the place."

Maritime Law

1. Agustin De La Torre vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 160088 - July 13, 2011
Facts:
 Respondent Crisostomo G. Concepcion owned LCT-Josephine, a vessel registered with the
Philippine Coast Guard. Concepcion entered into a “PreliminaryAgreement” with Roland de
la Torre for the dry-docking and repairs of the saidvessel as well as for its charter
afterwards.
 While the payloader was on the deck of the LCT-Josephine scooping a load of the SAND
AND GRAVEL, the vessel’s ramp started to move downward, the vessel tiltedand sea water
rushed in. Shortly thereafter, LCT-Josephine sank.
 Concepcion demanded that PTSC/ Roland refloat LCT-Josephine. The latter assured
Concepcion that negotiations were underway. Unfortunately, this did not materialize.
 Thus, the RTC declared that the “efficient cause of the sinking of the LCT-JOSEPHINE was
the improper lowering or positioning of the ramp,” which was well within the charge or
responsibility of the captain and crew of the vessel.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Limited Liability Rule shall be applied to petitioners.
Held:
 No. With respect to petitioners’ position that the Limited Liability Rule under the Code of
Commerce should be applied to them, the argument is misplaced. The said rule has been
explained to be that of the real and hypothecary doctrine in maritime law where the
shipowner or ship agent’s liability is held as merely co-extensive with his interest in the
vessel such that a total loss thereof results in its extinction.24 In this jurisdiction, this rule is
provided in three articles of the Code of Commerce. These are:

Art. 587. The ship agent shall also be civilly liable for the indemnities in favor of third
persons which may arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods
which he loaded on the vessel; but he may exempt himself therefrom by abandoning
the vessel with all her equipment and the freight it may have earned during the
voyage.

2. Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 130068 - October 1, 1998
Facts:
 Senen Gavino boarded the M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by Petitioner, at the
quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel,
Victor Kavankov, beside him.
 When the vessel reached the landmark one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the
engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino
ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the
bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not
take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued
between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew
members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured
Gavino that there was nothing to it.
 After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern.
Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier
fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave
the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the
bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the
pier. The vessel sustained damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted
his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority.
Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident.
 Per contract and supplemental contract of the Philippine Ports Authority and the contractor
for the rehabilitation of the damaged pier, the same cost the Philippine Ports Authority the
amount of P1,126,132.25.
Issue:
 Whether or not the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for
the damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence.
Held:
 No. The Solicitor General rightly commented that the adjudicated amount of damages
represents the proportional cost of repair and rehabilitation of the damaged section of the
pier.
 Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners
are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those
in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of
a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons
or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation.

3. Monarch Insurance Co., vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 92735 – June 8, 2000
Facts:
 All cases arose from the loss of cargoes of various shippers when the M/V P. Aboitiz, a
common carrier owned and operated by Aboitiz, sank on her voyage from Hong Kong to
Manila on October 31, 1980. Seeking indemnification for the loss of their cargoes, the
shippers, their successors-in-interest, and the cargo insurers such as the instant petitioners
filed separate suits against Aboitiz before the Regional Trial Courts. The claims numbered
one hundred and ten (110) for the total amount of P41,230,115.00 which is almost thrice
the amount of the insurance proceeds of P14,500,000.00 plus earned freight of 500,000.00
according to Aboitiz. To this day, some of these claims, including those of herein
petitioners, have not yet been settled.
Issue:
 Whether or not because of its unseaworthiness and the concurrent fault and/or negligence
of Aboitiz, the captain and its crew, thereby barring Aboitiz from availing of the benefit of the
limited liability rule.
Held:
 Yes. The principle of limited liability is enunciated in the following provisions of the Code of
Commerce:
Art. 587. The shipagent shall also be civilly liable for the indemnities in favor of third
persons which may arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of goods which
he loaded on the vessel; but he may exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the
vessel with all the equipments and the freight it may have earned during the voyage.
Art. 590. The co-owners of a vessel shall be civilly liable in the proportion of their
interests in the common fund for the results of the acts of the captain referred to in
Art. 587.
Each co-owner may exempt himself from his liability by the abandonment, before a
notary, of the part of the vessel belonging to him.
Art. 837. The civil liability incurred by shipowners in the case prescribed in this
section, shall be understood as limited to the value of the vessel with all its
appurtenances and the freightage served during the voyage.
 The failure of Aboitiz to present sufficient evidence to exculpate itself from fault and/or
negligence in the sinking of its vessel in the face of the foregoing expert testimony
constrains us to hold that Aboitiz was concurrently at fault and/or negligent with the ship
captain and crew of the M/V P. Aboitiz. This is in accordance with the rule that in cases
involving the limited liability of shipowners, the initial burden of proof of negligence or
unseaworthiness rests on the claimants.

4. Isabela Roque vs Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. L-66935 - November 11, 1985
Facts:
 On February 29, 1972, the petitioners loaded on the barge, 811 pieces of logs at
Malampaya Sound, Palawan for carriage and delivery to North Harbor, Port of Manila, but
the shipment never reached its destination because Mable 10 sank with the 811 pieces of
logs somewhere off Cabuli Point in Palawan on its way to Manila. As alleged by the
petitioners in their complaint and as found by both the trial and appellate courts, the barge
where the logs were loaded was not seaworthy such that it developed a leak. The appellate
court further found that one of the hatches was left open causing water to enter the barge
and because the barge was not provided with the necessary cover or tarpaulin, the ordinary
splash of sea waves brought more water inside the barge.
 Petitioners maintain, that the loss of the cargo was caused by the perils of the sea, not by
the perils of the ship because as found by the trial court, the barge was turned loose from
the tugboat east of Cabuli Point "where it was buffeted by storm and waves."
Issue:
 Whether or not the intermediate appellate court erred in holding that the loss of the cargo in
this case was caused by "perils of the ship" and not by "perils of the sea."
Held:
 No. It must be considered to be settled, furthermore, that a loss which, in the ordinary
course of events, results from the natural and inevitable action of the sea, from the ordinary
wear and tear of the ship, or from the negligent failure of the ship's owner to provide the
vessel with proper equipment to convey the cargo under ordinary conditions, is not a peril of
the sea. Such a loss is rather due to what has been aptly called the "peril of the ship."
 Neither can petitioners allege barratry on the basis of the findings showing negligence on
the part of the vessel's crew. Barratry necessarily requires a willful and intentional act in its
commission. No honest error of judgment or mere negligence, unless criminally gross, can
be barratry.
 In the case at bar, there is no finding that the loss was occasioned by the willful or
fraudulent acts of the vessel's crew. There was only simple negligence or lack of skill.
Hence, the second assignment of error must likewise be dismissed.

5. Delsan Transport Line vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127897 - November 15, 2001
Facts:
 Caltex Philippines (Caltex for brevity) entered into a contract of affreightment with the
petitioner, Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., for a period of one year whereby the said common
carrier agreed to transport Caltex’s industrial fuel oil from the Batangas-Bataan Refinery to
different parts of the country. Under the contract, petitioner took on board its vessel, MT
Maysun 2,277.314 kiloliters of industrial fuel oil of Caltex to be delivered to the Caltex Oil
Terminal in Zamboanga City.
 On August 14, 1986, MT Maysum set sail from Batangas for Zamboanga City.
Unfortunately, the vessel sank in the early morning of August 16, 1986 near Panay Gulf in
the Visayas taking with it the entire cargo of fuel oil.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that MT Maysun was not seaworthy on
the ground that the marine officer who served as the chief mate of the vessel, Francisco
Berina, was allegedly not qualified.
Held:
 As the appellate court correctly ruled, petitioner’s vessel, MT Maysun, sank with its entire
cargo for the reason that it was not seaworthy. There was no squall or bad weather or
extremely poor sea condition in the vicinity when the said vessel sank.
 Neither may petitioner escape liability by presenting in evidence certificates that tend to
show that at the time of dry-docking and inspection by the Philippine Coast Guard, the
vessel MT Maysun, was fit for voyage. These pieces of evidence do not necessarily take
into account the actual condition of the vessel at the time of the commencement of the
voyage. As correctly observed by the Court of appeals:
At the time of dry-docking and inspection, the ship may have appeared fit. The
certificates issued, however, do not negate the presumption of unseaworthiness
triggered by an unexplained sinking. Of certificates issued in this regard, authorities
are likewise clear as to their probative value, (thus):

Seaworthiness relates to a vessel’s actual condition. Neither the granting of

classification or the issuance of certificates established seaworthiness. (2-A
Benedict on Admiralty, 7-3, Sec. 62).

6. Phil-Am General Insurance vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 116940 - June 11, 1997
Facts:
 Coca-cola loaded on board MV Asilda, owned and operated by Felman, 7,500 cases of 1-
liter Coca-Cola soft drink bottles to be transported to Zamboanga City to Cebu. The
shipment was insured with Philamgen.
 Later, the vessel sank in Zamboanga del Norte. Thus, cocacola filed a claim with
respondent Felman for recovery of damages. Felman denied thus prompted cocacola to file
an insurance claim with Philamgen. Philamgen later on claimed its right of subrogation
against Felman which disclaimed any liability for the loss.
 Philamgen alleged that the sinking and loss were due to the vessel's unseaworthiness, that
the vessel was improperly manned and its officers were grossly negligent. Felman filed a
motion to dismiss saying that there is no right of subrogation in favor of Philamgen was
transmitted by the shipper.
 RTC dismissed the complaint of Philamgen. CA set aside the dismissal and remanded the
case to the lower court for trial on the merits. Felman filed a petition for certiorari but was
denied.
 RTC rendered judgment in favor of Felman. it ruled that the vessel was seaworthy when it
left the port of Zamboanga as evidenced by the certificate issued by the Phil. Coast Guard
and the ship owner’s surveyor. Thus, the loss is due to a fortuitous event, in which, no
liability should attach unless there is stipulation or negligence.
 On appeal, CA rendered judgment finding the vessel unseaworthy for the cargo for being
top-heavy and the cocacola bottles were also improperly stored on deck. Nonetheless, the
CA denied the claim of Philamgen, saying that Philamgen was not properly subrogated to
the rights and interests of the shipper plus the filing of notice of abandonment had absolved
the ship owner from liability under the limited liability rule.
Issue:
 Whether or not the limited liability under Art. 587 of the Code of Commerce should apply.
Held:
 It was already established at the outset that the sinking of "MV Asilda" was due to its
unseaworthiness even at the time of its departure from the port of Zamboanga. It was top-
heavy as an excessive amount of cargo was loaded on deck. Closer supervision on the part
of the shipowner could have prevented this fatal miscalculation. As such, FELMAN was
equally negligent. It cannot therefore escape liability through the expedient of filing a notice
of abandonment of the vessel by virtue of Art. 587 of the Code of Commerce.
 Under Art 1733 of the Civil Code, "(c)ommon carriers, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all
the circumstances of each case . . ." In the event of loss of goods, common carriers are
presumed to have acted negligently. FELMAN, the shipowner, was not able to rebut this
presumption.

7. Oriental Assurance Corp vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 94052 - August 9, 1991
Facts:
 Private respondent Panama Sawmill Co., Inc. (Panama) bought, in Palawan, 1,208 pieces
of apitong logs, with a total volume of 2,000 cubic meters. It hired Transpacific Towage,
Inc., to transport the logs by sea to Manila and insured it against loss for P1-M with
petitioner Oriental Assurance Corporation (Oriental Assurance). There is a claim by
Panama, however, that the insurance coverage should have been for P3-M were it not for
the fraudulent act of one Benito Sy Yee Long to whom it had entrusted the amount of
P6,000.00 for the payment of the premium for a P3-M policy.
Issue:
 Whether or not Oriental Assurance can be held liable under its marine insurance policy
based on the theory of a divisible contract of insurance and, consequently, a constructive
total loss.
Held:
 The terms of the contract constitute the measure of the insurer liability and compliance
therewith is a condition precedent to the insured's right to recovery from the insurer.
Whether a contract is entire or severable is a question of intention to be determined by the
language employed by the parties. The policy in question shows that the subject matter
insured was the entire shipment of 2,000 cubic meters of apitong logs. The fact that the
logs were loaded on two different barges did not make the contract several and divisible as
to the items insured. The logs on the two barges were not separately valued or separately
insured. Only one premium was paid for the entire shipment, making for only one cause or
consideration. The insurance contract must, therefore, be considered indivisible.

8. A. Magsaysay vs Anastacio Agan

G.R. No. L-6393 - January 31, 1955
Facts:
In 1949, SS San Antonio, owned by AMInc, embarked on its voyage to Batanes via Aparri. It
was carrying various cargoes, one of which was owned by Agan. One fine weather day, it
accidentally ran aground the mouth of the Cagayan River due to the sudden shifting of the
sands below. SS San Antonio then needed the services of Luzon Stevedoring Co. to tow the
ship and make it afloat so that it can continue its journey. Later, AMInc required the cargo
owners to pay the expenses incurred in making the ship afloat (P841.40 each). The expenses,
A.M. Inc claims, fall under the General Averages Rule under the Code of Commerce, which is to
be shared by ship owner and cargo owners as well.
Issue:
Whether or not the expenses incurred in floating a vessel so stranded should be considered
general average and shared by the cargo owners.
Held:
 In the Code of Commerce, the following requisites for general average must be present:
First, there must be a common danger. This means, that both the ship and the
cargo, after has been loaded, are subject to the same danger, whether during the
 voyage, or in the port of loading or unloading; that the danger arises from the
accidents of the sea, dispositions of the authority, or faults of men, provided that the
circumstances producing the peril should be ascertained and imminent or may
rationally be said to be certain and imminent. This last requirement exclude
measures undertaken against a distant peril.
Second, that for the common safety part of the vessel or of the cargo or both is
sacrificed deliberately.
Third, that from the expenses or damages caused follows the successful saving of
the vessel and cargo.
Fourth, that the expenses or damages should have been incurred or inflicted after
taking proper legal steps and authority.
 In conclusion the Court found that plaintiff not made out a case for general average, with
the result that its claim for contribution against the defendant cannot be granted.

9. H.L. Heath vs The Steamer “San Nicolas”

G.R. No. 3066 - February 25, 1907
Facts:
 On the 19th of October, 1904, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against the steamer San Nicolas, alleging that on the 15th day of September, 1904,
the schooner Anita, owned by the plaintiff, had been in collision with the San Nicolas; that it
had been damaged by the collision, and that the San Nicolas was wholly at fault.
 On the same day, the 19th of October, the court made an order directing that the San
Nicolas be seized, and that all persons who claimed any interest in her should be
summoned to appear before the court on the 28th of October, 1904. Under this order the
ship was attached and on the 20th day of October, Esperidion G. Borja filed a document in
the proceeding in which he stated that he was the owner of the San Nicolas; that the
seizure would cause him serious damages, as the steamer was ready to sail on the same
day, and he asked that the order therefore be vacated upon his giving a bond. This bond
was given and the order vacated.
Issue:
 Whether or not such a proceeding as the one in question, directed against the ship, itself,
without naming any natural or juridical person as defendant, can be maintained in these
Islands.
Held:
 A suit against a ship, such as is permitted in the English and the American admiralty courts,
was unknown to the Spanish Law. It is true that the Spanish Law of Civil Procedure
contained certain provisions relating to voluntary jurisdiction in matters of commerce, but
none of these provisions had any application to a contentious suit of this character.
 It being impossible to maintain an action of this character against a ship as the only
defendant prior to June, 1901, it follows that if such an action can now be maintained it
must be by virtue of some provision found in the Code of Civil Procedure and which is the
only new law now in force relating to this matter. An examination of the provisions of that
code will show that no such action is authorized. It can not, therefore, be now maintained,
and the demurrer of Borja should have been sustained on that ground.

10. Keppel Cebu Shipyard vs Pioneer Insurance

G.R. Nos. 180880-81 - September 18, 2012
Facts:
 WG & A JEBSENS SHIPMGMT. Owner/Operator of M/V “SUPERFERRY 3” and KEPPEL
CEBU SHIPYARD, INC. (KCSI) enter into an agreement that the Drydocking and Repair of
 the above-named vessel ordered by the Owner’s Authorized Representative shall be
carried out under the Keppel Cebu Shipyard Standard Conditions of Contract for Ship
repair, guidelines and regulations on safety and security issued by Keppel Cebu Shipyard.
 In the course of its repair, M/V “Superferry 3” was gutted by fire. Claiming that the extent of
the damage was pervasive, WG&A declared the vessel’s damage as a “total constructive
loss” and, hence, filed an insurance claim with Pioneer.
 Pioneer paid the insurance claim of WG&A, which in turn, executed a Loss and Subrogation
Receipt in favor of Pioneer.
 Pioneer tried to collect from KCSI, but the latter denied any responsibility for the loss of the
subject vessel. As KCSI continuously refused to pay despite repeated demands, Pioneer,
filed a Request for Arbitration before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
CIAC seeking for payment of U.S.$8,472,581.78 plus interest, among others.
 The CIAC rendered its Decision declaring both WG&A and KCSI guilty of negligence, the
CIAC ordered KCSI to pay Pioneer the amount of P25,000,000.00, with interest at 6% per
annum. Both Keppel and Pioneer appealed to the CA.
 The cases were consolidated in the CA. the CA rendered a decision dismissing petitioner’s
claims in its entirety. Keppel was declared as equally negligent.
Issue:
 Whether or not KCSI should be held liable.
Held:
 Undeniably, the immediate cause of the fire was the hot work done by Angelino Sevillejo
(Sevillejo) on the accommodation area of the vessel, specifically on Deck A. As established
before the CIAC –
 Pioneer contends that KCSI should be held liable because Sevillejo was its employee who,
at the time the fire broke out, was doing his assigned task, and that KCSI was solely
responsible for all the hot works done on board the vessel. We rule in favor of Pioneer.
 At the time of the fire, Sevillejo was an employee of KCSI and was subject to the latter’s
direct control and supervision. There was a lapse in KCSI’s supervision of Sevillejo’s work
at the time the fire broke out.
 KCSI failed to exercise the necessary degree of caution and foresight called for by the
circumstances.
 The circumstances, taken collectively, yield the inevitable conclusion that Sevillejo was
negligent in the performance of his assigned task. His negligence was the proximate cause
of the fire on board M/V “Superferry 3.” As he was then definitely engaged in the
performance of his assigned tasks as an employee of KCSI, his negligence gave rise to the
vicarious liability of his employer43 under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Transportation Law

1. Commissioner of Customs vs Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. 111202-05 - January 31, 2006
Facts:
 The whole controversy revolves around a vessel and its cargo. On January 7, 1989, the
vessel M/V "Star Ace," coming from Singapore laden with cargo, entered the Port of San
Fernando, La Union (SFLU) for needed repairs. The vessel and the cargo had an appraised
value, at that time, of more or less Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000). When the
Bureau of Customs later became suspicious that the vessel’s real purpose in docking was
to smuggle its cargo into the country, seizure proceedings were instituted under S.I. Nos.
02-89 and 03-89 and, subsequently, two Warrants of Seizure and Detention were issued for
the vessel and its cargo. Respondent Cesar S. Urbino, Sr., does not own the vessel or any
 of its cargo but claimed a preferred maritime lien under a Salvage Agreement dated June 8,
1989. To protect his claim, Urbino initially filed two motions in the seizure and detention
cases: a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Lift Warrant of Seizure and Detention.
Apparently not content with his administrative remedies, Urbino sought relief with the
regular courts by filing a case for Prohibition, Mandamus and Damages before the RTC of
SFLU, seeking to restrain the District Collector of Customs from interfering with his salvage
operation. The RTC of SFLU dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because of the
pending seizure and detention cases. Urbino then elevated the matter to the CA. The
Commissioner of Customs, in response, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, advising
the CA that it intends to question the jurisdiction of the CA before this Court. The motion
was denied.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the trial court may take cognizance over the petition.
HELD:
 The Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings
and trial courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through
petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

2. Philippine Charter Insurance vs Unknown Owner

G.R. No. 161833 - July 8, 2005
Facts:
 Petitioner Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation (PCIC) is the insurer of a shipment on
board the vessel M/V “National Honor,” represented in the Philippines by its agent, National
Shipping Corporation of the Philippines (NSCP).
 The M/V “National Honor” arrived at the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT).
The International Container Terminal Services, Incorporated (ICTSI) was furnished with a
copy of the crate cargo list and bill of lading, and it knew the contents of the crate. The
following day, the vessel started discharging its cargoes using its winch crane. The crane
was operated by Olegario Balsa, a winchman from the ICTSI, exclusive arrastre operator of
MICT.
 Denasto Dauz, Jr., the checker-inspector of the NSCP, along with the crew and the
surveyor of the ICTSI, conducted an inspection of the cargo. They inspected the hatches,
checked the cargo and found it in apparent good condition. Claudio Cansino, the stevedore
of the ICTSI, placed two sling cables on each end of Crate No. 1. No sling cable was
fastened on the mid-portion of the crate. In Dauz’s experience, this was a normal
procedure. As the crate was being hoisted from the vessel’s hatch, the mid-portion of the
wooden flooring suddenly snapped in the air, about five feet high from the vessel’s twin
deck, sending all its contents crashing down hard, resulting in extensive damage to the
shipment.
 PCIC paid the damage, and as subrogee, filed a case against M/V National Honor, NSCP
and ICTSI. Both RTC and CA dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
 Whether or not the presumption of negligence is applicable in the instant case.
Held:
 No. We agree with the contention of the petitioner that common carriers, from the nature of
their business and for reasons of public policy, are mandated to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported
by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. The common carrier’s duty to
observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from the time the articles are
surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier
 for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their
acceptance, by the person entitled to receive them.

3. Monarch Insurance vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 92735 - June 8, 2000
Facts:
 All cases arose from the loss of cargoes of various shippers when the M/V P. Aboitiz, a
common carrier owned and operated by Aboitiz, sank on her voyage from Hong Kong to
Manila on October 31, 1980. Seeking indemnification for the loss of their cargoes, the
shippers, their successors-in-interest, and the cargo insurers such as the instant petitioners
filed separate suits against Aboitiz before the Regional Trial Courts. The claims numbered
one hundred and ten (110) for the total amount of P41,230,115.00 which is almost thrice
the amount of the insurance proceeds of P14,500,000.00 plus earned freight of 500,000.00
according to Aboitiz. To this day, some of these claims, including those of herein
petitioners, have not yet been settled.
Issue:
 Whether or not Aboitiz should be held liable.
Held:
 We agree with the uniform finding of the lower courts that Aboitiz had failed to prove that it
observed the extraordinary diligence required of it as a common carrier. We therefore
reiterate our pronouncement in Aboitiz Corporation v. Court of Appeals 77 on the issue of
Aboitiz' liability in the sinking of its vessel, to wit:
In accordance with Article 1732 of the Civil Code, the defendant common carrier
from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by it according to all circumstances of the case. While the
goods are in the possession of the carrier, it is but fair that it exercise extraordinary
diligence in protecting them from loss or damage, and if loss occurs, the law
presumes that it was due to the carrier's fault or negligence; that is necessary to
protect the interest of the shipper which is at the mercy of the carrier . . . In the case
at bar, the defendant failed to prove hat the loss of the subject cargo was not due to
its fault or negligence.

4. Aboitiz Shipping Corp vs New India Assurance

G..R. No. 156978 - May 2, 2006
Facts:
 Textile cargo owned by General Textile was shipped to Manila using M/V P. Aboitiz. Before
departing, the vessel was advised that it was safe to travel to its destination, but while at
sea, the vessel received a report of a typhoon moving within its path. It was at the edge of
a typhoon when its hull leaker. The vessel sank, but the captain and his crew were saved.
 The captain filed his “Marine Protest”, stating that the weather was “moderate breeze, small
waves, becoming longer, fairly frequent white horse
 General Textile lodged a claim with respondent for the amount of its loss. Respondent paid
General Textile and was subrogated to the rights of the latter.
 After investigation, the cause was found to be the vessel’s unsearworthiness.
 General filed a complaint with Aboitiz and the trial court consequently ruled in favor of the
former.
 Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which in turn, affirmed the trial court’s
decision. It moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition for
review
Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner has any liability in the loss of the cargo.
Held:
 From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, common carriers are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport according to all the
circumstances of each case. In the event of loss, destruction or deterioration of the insured
goods, common carriers are responsible, unless they can prove that the loss, destruction or
deterioration was brought about by the causes specified in Article 1734 of the Civil Code. In
all other cases, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence. Moreover, where
the vessel is found unseaworthy, the shipowner is also presumed to be negligent since it is
tasked with the maintenance of its vessel. Though this duty can be delegated, still, the
shipowner must exercise close supervision over its men.

5. PHILCONSA vs Pedro Gimenez

G.R. No. L-23326 - December 18, 1965
Facts:
 Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of Republic Act
No. 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and
sick leave to Senators and Representatives. PHILCONSA now seeks to enjoin Pedor
Gimenez, the Auditor General, from disbursing funds therefor.
 According to PHILCONSA, the provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent
the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term
of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same
provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because it allows members and officers of
Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to
one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of
reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the
government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a
gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any
case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at
the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another
attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the
Constitution.
 The Solicitor General, arguing for Congress, averred that the grant of retirement or pension
benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers does not constitute “forbidden
compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution.
The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable
vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for
computing the gratuity due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme
to increase their salary.
Issue:
 Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.
Held:
 No. The said law is unconstitutional. Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, provides:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless
otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand
 two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or
allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their
respective district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and
to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending
sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided
by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand
pesos.
 RA 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June
22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the
prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby declared
unconstitutional by the SC.

6. Poliand Industrial Ltd vs National Development Company

G.R. No. 143866 - August 22, 2005
Facts:
 Poliand is an assignee of the of the rights of Asian Hardwood over the outstanding
obligation of National Development Corporation (NDC), the latter being the owner of
Galleon which previously secured credit accommodations from Asian Hardwood for its
expenses on provisions, oil, repair, among others.
 Galleon also obtained loans from Japanese lenders to finance acquisition of vessels which
was guaranteed by DBP in consideration of a promise by Galleon to secure a first mortgage
on the vessels. DBP later transferred ownership of the vessel to NDC.
 A collection suit was filed after repeated demands of Poliand for the satisfaction of the
obligation from Galleon, NDC and DBP went unheeded.
Issue:
 Whether or not POLIAND has a maritime lien enforceable against NDC or DBP or both.
Held:
 The Court finds that only NDC is liable for the payment of the maritime lien. A maritime lien
is akin to a mortgage lien in that in spite of the transfer of ownership, the lien is not
extinguished. The maritime lien is inseparable from the vessel and until discharged, it
follows the vessel. Hence, the enforcement of a maritime lien is in the nature and character
of a proceeding quasi in rem. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application,
used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property
alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are
based. Considering that DBP subsequently transferred ownership of the vessels to NDC,
the Court holds the latter liable on the maritime lien. Notwithstanding the subsequent
transfer of the vessels to NDC, the maritime lien subsists.

7. Kilusang Mayo vs Hon. Jesus Garcia

G.R. No. 115381 - December 23, 1994
Facts:
 Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to
then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to
 charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official
rate for a period of one (1) year.
 This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009
providing, among others, that "The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus
15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in
1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis
for the expanded fare range."
 Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation
policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of
the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the
benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the
existing fares.
 On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward
adjustment of bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.
Issue:
 Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set
a fare range without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and
illegal.
Held:
 Yes. The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range
over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an
undue delegation of legislative authority.

8. Lita Enterprises vs Second Civil Cases Division

G.R. No. L-64693 - April 27, 1984
Facts:
 Ocampo and Garcia – purchased in installment from the Delta Motor Sales Corporation 5
Toyota Corona Standard cars to be used as taxicabs; they had no franchise to operate
taxicabs, so they contracted with Lita Enterprises for the use of the latter’s certificate of
public convenience in consideration of an initial payment of 1,000.00 and a monthly rental
of 200.00 per taxicab unit; the aforesaid cars were then registered in the name of Lita
Enterprises.
 One of the taxicabs driven by Ocampo and Garcia’s employee, Emeterio Martin, collided
with a motorcycle whose driver, Florante Galvez, died from the head injuries sustained
therefrom.
 A criminal case was filed against the driver Martin, while a civil case for damages was
instituted by heir of the victim against Lita Enterprises
Issue:
 Whether or not both petitioner and private respondents may seek relief in an action against
each other in this case.
Held:
 Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense, the "kabit system" is invariably
recognized as being contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and inexistent under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, It is a fundamental principle that the court will not aid either
party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them both where it finds them. Upon this
premise, it was flagrant error on the part of both the trial and appellate courts to have
accorded the parties relief from their predicament. Article 1412 of the Civil Code denies
them such aid. The principle of in pari delicto is well known not only in this jurisdiction but
also in the United States where common law prevails.
 9. Batangas CATV vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 138810 - September 29, 2004
Facts:
 On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210
granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas
City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its
subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, “provided, however, that any increase of
rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
 Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to
P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to
cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod,
pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
 Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging
that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV
operation in the Philippines.
Issue:
 Whether or not a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by
CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction
Held:
 LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the
exclusive regulatory power of the NTC. Deregulation is the reduction of government
regulation of business to permit freer markets and competition. Oftentimes, the State,
through its regulatory agencies, carries out a policy of deregulation to attain certain
objectives or to address certain problems. In the field of telecommunications, it is
recognized that many areas in the Philippines are still "unserved" or "underserved." Thus, to
encourage private sectors to venture in this field and be partners of the government in
stimulating the growth and development of telecommunications, the State promoted the
policy of deregulation.

10. Cogeo-Cubao vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 100727 - March 18, 1992
Facts:
 A certificate of public convenience to operate a jeepney service was ordered to be issued in
favor of Lungsod Silangan to ply the Cogeo-Cubao route sometime in 1983 on the
justification that public necessity and convenience will best be served, and in the absence
of existing authorized operators on the lined apply for. On the other hand, defendant-
Association was registered as a non-stock, non-profit organization with the Securities and
Exchange Commission with the main purpose of representing plaintiff-appellee for whatever
contract and/or agreement it will have regarding the ownership of units, and the like, of the
members of the Association.
 Perturbed by plaintiffs' Board Resolution No. 9 adopting a Bandera System under which a
member of the cooperative is permitted to queue for passenger at the disputed pathway in
exchange for the ticket worth twenty pesos, the proceeds of which shall be utilized for
Christmas programs of the drivers and other benefits, and on the strength of defendants'
registration as a collective body with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
defendants-appellants, led by Romeo Oliva decided to form a human barricade and
assumed the dispatching of passenger jeepneys. This development as initiated by
defendants-appellants gave rise to the suit for damages.
Issue:
 Whether or not the petitioner usurped the property right of the respondent which shall entitle
the latter to the award of nominal damages.
Held:
 Under the Public Service Law, a certificate of public convenience is an authorization issued
by the Public Service Commission for the operation of public services for which no
franchise is required by law. In the instant case, a certificate of public convenience was
issued to respondent corporation on January 24, 1983 to operate a public utility jeepney
service on the Cogeo-Cubao route. As found by the trial court, the certificate was issued
pursuant to a decision passed by the Board of Transportation in BOT Case No. 82-565. A
certification of public convenience is included in the term "property" in the broad sense of
the term. Under the Public Service Law, a certificate of public convenience can be sold by
the holder thereof because it has considerable material value and is considered as valuable
asset. Although there is no doubt that it is private property, it is affected with a public
interest and must be submitted to the control of the government for the common good.
 In the case at bar, the trial court found that petitioner association forcibly took over the
operation of the jeepney service in the Cogeo-Cubao route without any authorization from
the Public Service Commission and in violation of the right of respondent corporation to
operate its services in the said route under its certificate of public convenience.

11. Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs The Public Service Commission

G.R. No. 47065 - June 26, 1940
Facts:
 PANTRANCO, a holder of an existing Certificate of Public Convenience is applying to
operate additional buses with the Public Service Commission (PSC) has been engaged in
transporting passengers in certain provinces by means of public transportation utility.
PATRANCO applied for authorization to operate 10 additional trucks. The PSC granted the
application but added several conditions for PANTRANCO’s compliance. One is that the
service can be acquired by government upon payment of the cost price less depreciation,
and that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time.
Issue:
 Whether or not PSC can impose said conditions.
Held:
 The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action at the
same time forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of
powers and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. But due to the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of subjects of governmental regulation and the
increased difficulty of administering laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of “subordinate legislation.”
 All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the
use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition,
the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.

12. Philippine AirLines vs Civil Aeronautics Board

G.R. No. 119528 - March 26, 1997
Facts:
 Private respondent GrandAir applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
with the Board, which application was docketed as CAB Case No. EP-12711.4 Accordingly,
the Chief Hearing Officer of the CAB issued a Notice of Hearing setting the application for
 initial hearing on December 16, 1994, and directing GrandAir to serve a copy of the
application and corresponding notice to all scheduled Philippine Domestic operators. On
December 14, 1994, GrandAir filed its Compliance, and requested for the issuance of a
Temporary Operating Permit. Petitioner, itself the holder of a legislative franchise to operate
air transport services, filed an Opposition to the application.
 Petitioners argue that the respondent Board acted beyond its powers and jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of GrandAir's application for the issuance of a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity, and in issuing a temporary operating permit in the meantime,
since GrandAir has not been granted and does not possess a legislative franchise to
engage in scheduled domestic air transportation.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Board can issue the Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity or Temporary Operating Permit to a prospective domestic air transport
operator who does not possess a legislative franchise to operate as such.
Held:
 We find that the Civil Aeronautics Board has the authority to issue a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity, or Temporary Operating Permit to a domestic air transport
operator, who, though not possessing a legislative franchise, meets all the other
requirements prescribed by the law. Such requirements were enumerated in Section 21 of
R.A. 776.
 There is nothing in the law nor in the Constitution, which indicates that a legislative
franchise is an indispensable requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air
transport operator. Although Section 11 of Article XII recognizes Congress' control over any
franchise, certificate or authority to operate a public utility, it does not mean Congress has
exclusive authority to issue the same. Franchises issued by Congress are not required
before each and every public utility may operate. 19 In many instances, Congress has seen
it fit to delegate this function to government agencies, specialized particularly in their
respective areas of public service.

13. Baliwag Transit vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 80447 - January 31, 1989
Facts:
 Leticia Garcia, and her 5-year old son, Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus 2036
bound for Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the driver.
 At about 7:30 p.m., in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers saw a cargo
truck, owned by A & J Trading, parked at the shoulder of the national highway. Its left rear
portion jutted to the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road was too narrow to accommodate
the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the road obviously to serve as a
warning device. The truck driver, and his helper were then replacing a flat tire.
 Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed and failed to notice the truck
and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road. Santiago’s passengers urged him to slow
down but he paid them no heed. Santiago even carried animated conversations with his co-
employees while driving. When the danger of collision became imminent, the bus
passengers shouted “Babangga tayo!”. Santiago stepped on the brake, but it was too late.
His bus rammed into the stalled cargo truck killing him instantly and the truck’s helper, and
injury to several others among them herein respondents.
 Thus, a suit was filed against Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and Julio Recontique for
damages in the RTC of Bulacan. After trial, it found Baliwag Transit, Inc. liable for having
failed to deliver Garcia and her son to their point of destination safely in violation of Garcia’s
and Baliwag Transit’s contractual relation; and likewise found A & J and its truck driver
 liable for failure to provide its cargo truck with an early warning device in violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law. All were ordered to pay solidarily the Garcia spouses.
 On appeal, the CA modified the trial court’s Decision by absolving A & J Trading from
liability.
Issue:
 Whether or not Baliwag should be held solely liable for the injuries.
Held:
 Yes. As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when it failed to deliver
its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their destination safe and sound. A common
carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the
circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault
or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted,
the court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the
carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil
Code.

14. Benito Macam vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125524 - August 25, 1999
Facts:
 Petitioner Benito Macam shipped on board the vessel Nen Jiang, owned and operated by
respondent China Ocean Shipping Co., through local agent respondent Wallem Philippines
Shipping, Inc. watermelons valued at US$5,950.00 and fresh mangoes with a value of
US$14,273.46 bound for Hongkong with PAKISTAN BANK as consignee and Great
Prospect Company of Kowloon, Hongkong (hereinafter GPC) as notify party. Petitioner’s
depository bank, Consolidated Banking Corporation (hereinafter SOLIDBANK), paid
petitioner in advance the total value of the shipment of US$20,223.46.
 Upon arrival in Hongkong, the shipment was delivered by respondent WALLEM directly to
GPC, not to PAKISTAN BANK, and without the required bill of lading having been
surrendered. Subsequently, GPC failed to pay PAKISTAN BANK such that the latter, still in
possession of the original bills of lading, refused to pay petitioner through SOLIDBANK.
Since SOLIDBANK already pre-paid petitioner the value of the shipment, it demanded
payment from respondent WALLEM through five (5) letters but was refused. Petitioner was
thus allegedly constrained to return the amount involved to SOLIDBANK, then demanded
payment from respondent WALLEM in writing but to no avail.
Issue:
 Whether or not Private respondent has any liability over the shipped goods.
Held:
 We emphasize that the extraordinary responsibility of the common carriers lasts until actual
or constructive delivery of the cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right to
receive them. PAKISTAN BANK was indicated in the bills of lading as consignee whereas
GPC was the notify party. However, in the export invoices GPC was clearly named as
buyer/importer. Petitioner also referred to GPC as such in his demand letter to respondent
WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court. This premise draws us to conclude that
the delivery of the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which, conformably with Art. 1736
had, other than the consignee, the right to receive them was proper.

15. Spouses Teodoro and Nanette Perena vs Spouses Teresita and L. Zarate
 G.R. No. 157917 - August 29, 2012
Facts:
 Sps. Zarate, parents of Aaron Zarate, engaged the services of Sps. Pereña for the
adequate and safe transportation carriage of the former spouses’ son from their residence
to his school.
 During the effectivity of the contract of carriage, Aaron Zarate died in connection with a
vehicular/train collision which occurred while Aaron was riding the contracted carrier. At the
time of the said collision, there were no safety warning signs and railings at the site
commonly used for railroad crossing. The site of the collision was not intended by the
railroad operator for railroad crossing at the time of the collision. PNR refused to
acknowledge any liability for the collision. In Sps. Pereña’s defense, they adduces evidence
to show that they had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of Alfaro, the driver, by making sure that Alfaro had been issued a driver’s
license and had not been involved in any vehicular accident prior to the collision. The RTC
ruled in favor of Sps. Zarate and held the Pereñas and PNR jointly and severally liable for
the death of Aaron plus damages. The CA upheld the award for the loss of Aaron’s earning
capacity, plus damages, and the award for Attorney’s fees was deleted. Hence, this petition
Issue:
 Whether or not the Pereñas and PNR are jointly and severally liable for damages.
Held:
 Yes. The defense of the Pereñas that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family has no merit because they operated as common carriers and that their standard of
care was extraordinary diligence, not the ordinary diligence of a good father of a family. The
Pereñas, acting as a common carrier, were already presumed to be negligent at the time of
the accident because death had occurred to their passenger. The presumption for
negligence, being a presumption of law, laid the burden of evidence on their shoulders to
establish that they had not been negligent. There is no question that the Pereñas did not
overturn the presumption of their negligence by credible evidence. Their defense of having
observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
driver was not legally sufficient. PNR was also found guilty of negligence because it did not
ensure the safety of others through the placing of crossbars, signal lights, warning signs,
and other permanent safety barriers to prevent vehicles or pedestrians from crossing there.
Hence, the Pereñas and PNR should jointly and severally be liable for the death of Aaron
Zarate.

16. Estrellita Bascos vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 101089 - April 7, 1993
Facts:
 Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE for short)
entered into a hauling contract 2 with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corporation whereby the
former bound itself to haul the latter's 2,000 m/tons of soya bean meal from Magallanes
Drive, Del Pan, Manila to the warehouse of Purefoods Corporation in Laguna. CIPTRADE,
through Rodolfo Cipriano, subcontracted with Estrellita Bascos (petitioner) to transport and
to deliver 400 sacks of soya bean meal worth P156,404.00 from Manila to Laguna.
Petitioner failed to deliver the said cargo. Consequently, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping
Agency the amount of the lost goods. Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner
but the latter refused to pay.
Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner was a common carrier.
Held:
 The Court of Appeals, in holding that petitioner was a common carrier, found that she
admitted in her answer that she did business under the name A.M. Bascos Trucking and
that said admission dispensed with the presentation by private respondent, Rodolfo
Cipriano, of proofs that petitioner was a common carrier. The respondent Court also
adopted in toto the trial court's decision that petitioner was a common carrier, Moreover,
both courts appreciated the following pieces of evidence as indicators that petitioner was a
common carrier: the fact that the truck driver of petitioner, Maximo Sanglay, received the
cargo consisting of 400 bags of soya bean meal as evidenced by a cargo receipt signed by
Maximo Sanglay; the fact that the truck helper, Juanito Morden, was also an employee of
petitioner; and the fact that control of the cargo was placed in petitioner's care.

17. FGU Insurance Corp. vs GP Sarmiento Trucking

G.R. No. 141910 - August 6, 2002
Facts:
 G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on 18 June 1994 thirty
(30) units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by
Lambert Eroles, from the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., along South
Superhighway in Alabang, Metro Manila, to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City.
While the truck was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway in
Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall
into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
 FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion
Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes in the sum of P204,450.00 and sued GPS
and Eroles.
 FGU presented its evidence, establishing the extent of damage to the cargoes and the
amount it had paid to the assured. GPS, instead of submitting its evidence, filed with leave
of court a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground
that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier.
Issue:
 Whether or not respondent GPS may be considered as a common carrier as defined under
the law and existing jurisprudence.
Held:
 The Court finds the conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to be amply
justified. GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc.,
rendering or offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a
common carrier. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air, for hire or compensation, offering their services to the public, whether to the
public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis. The
true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, providing space for
those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. Given accepted
standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term "common carrier."

18. Aboitiz Shipping Corp. vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 84458 - November 6, 1989
Facts:
 Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia owned by petitioner Aboitiz Shipping Corp
at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. The vessel arrived at Pier 4,
North Harbor, Manila and was taken over by Pioneer Stevedoring for the latter to unload the
cargoes from the said vessel pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. An hour after
 the passengers and Viana had disembarked the vessel the crane operator began its
unloading operation. While the crane was being operated, Viana who had already
disembarked the vessel remembered that some of his cargoes were still loaded there. He
went back and while he was pointing to the crew where his cargoes were, the crane hit him
pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane resulting to his death. A complaint
for damages was filed against petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner
contends that Viana ceased to be a passenger when he disembarked the vessel and that
consequently his presence there was no longer reasonable. CA affirmed the trial court’s
order holding Aboitiz liable. Hence the petition.
Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner is still responsible as a carrier to Viana after the latter had already
disembarked the vessel.
Held:
 The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has
been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises.
Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after
reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. All persons who remain on the premises a
reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a
reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his
departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the
person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains
in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.

19. Lourdes Lara vs Brigido Valencia

G.R. No. L-9907 - June 30, 1958
Facts:
 The deceased Lara was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry who went to classify logs of
defendant Valencia in his Cotabato concession. Lara got sick of Malaria. He asked
defendant if he could take him in his pick-up back to Davao. Lara sat at the back of the
vehicle on a bag. Lara fell off and later died. CFI rendered judgment ordering defendant to
pay damages.
Issue:
 Whether or not defendant should have exercised extraordinary diligence in carrying his
passengers.
Held:
 The deceased, as well his companions who rode in the pick-up of defendant, were merely
accommodation passengers who paid nothing for the service and so they can be
considered as invited guests within the meaning of the law. As accommodation passengers
or invited guests, defendant as owner and driver of the pick-up owes to them merely the
duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their destination.
Thus, "The rule is established by the weight of authority that the owner or operator of an
automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care in its operation,
and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel.
This rule, as frequently stated by the courts, is that an owner of an automobile owes a guest
the duty to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid injuring him. Since one riding in an
automobile is no less a guest because he asked for the privilege of doing so, the same
obligation of care is imposed upon the driver as in the case of one expressly invited to ride".
 Defendant, therefore, is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty bound to
exercise extraordinary diligence as required of a common carrier by our law

20. Antonia Maranan vs Pascual Perez

G.R. No. L-22272 - June 26, 1967
Facts:
 Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated
by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, who was found guilty in the
CFI. While appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's
mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from
Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was
killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind.
Defendant Perez further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was
not liable.
Issue:
 Whether or not carrier is liable for assaults of its employees upon the passengers.
Held:
 The killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in
whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In
other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the
course of duty of the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the scope
of his duties. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.

Environmental Law

1. MMDA vs Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48 - February 15, 2011
Facts:
 The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had
fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public
officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila
Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other
forms of contact recreation.
Issue:
 Whether or not petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the
Manila Bay.
Held:
 The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process,
the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done
is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other
judicial discipline describes as “continuing mandamus ,” the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its
decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.
 2. Juan, Anna and Jose Oposa v. Hon. Fulgencio Factoran
GR. No. 101083, July 30, 1993
Facts:
 The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented
and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation
organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources.
 On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss
the complaint based on the ground that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him.
Issue:
 Whether or not defendant’s contention is correct.
Held:
 Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature
means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right
to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

3. MMDA vs Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48 - February 15, 2011
(Same as No. 1)
Facts:
 The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had
fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public
officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila
Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other
forms of contact recreation.
Issue:
 Whether or not Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water
Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a clean-up in general or are they limited
only to the clean-up of specific pollution incidents.
Held:
 PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––
Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will
adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall take such
measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet
the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be
the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean - up water pollution
 incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government
agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and
expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities
responsible for such pollution.

4. Hilarion Henares vs LTFRB

G.R. No. 158290 - October 23, 2006
Facts:
 Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Issue:
 Whether or not the respondent can be compelled to require public utility vehicles to use
compressed natural gas as alternative fuel through a writ of mandamus.
Held:
 The plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of
mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing.
Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a
duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order
owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No.
290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public
Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC
surveys."
 Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate
branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future
changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this
Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and
courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal
branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition.

5. Mustang Lumber vs CA 227 SCRA 480

G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996
Facts:
 Petitioner, a domestic corporation and with a Lumberyard was duly registered as a lumber
dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD). Its permit as such was to expire on
25 September 1990.
 Acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen
inside the lumberyard of the petitioner, the Special Action and Investigation Division (SAID)
of DENR organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at
the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the
lumberyard the petitioner's truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes
and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport
documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the
DENR compound. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the
refusal of the owner.
 Later, the team was able to secure a search warrant. By virtue thereof, the team seized on
that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and
slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber
and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.
Issue:
 Whether or not the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law
punishing the possession of lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose possession
without the required legal documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended
Held:
 The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the
respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal
documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is
penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the term timber. Lumber is a
processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in
its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared
for the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

6. Perfecto Dy vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 92989 - July 8, 1991
(Note: case has nothing to do with environmental law)
Facts:
 Wilfredo Dy purchased a truck and a farm tractor through LIBRA which was also mortgaged
with the latter, as a security to the loan.
 Petitioner, expresses his desire to purchased his brother’s tractor in a letter to LIBRA which
also includes his intention to shoulder its mortgaged. LIBRA approved the request. At the
time that Wilfredo Dy executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner, the tractor and
truck were in the possession of LIBRA for his failure to pay the amortization.
 When petitioner finally fulfilled its obligation to pay the tractor, LIBRA would only release the
same only if he would also pay for the truck. In order to fulfill LIBRA’s condition, petitioner
convinced his sister to pay for the remaining truck, to which she released a check
amounting to P22,000. LIBRA however, insisted that the check must be first cleared before
it delivers the truck and tractor.
 Meanwhile, another case penned “Gelac Trading Inc vs. Wilfredo Dy” was pending in Cebu
as a case to recover for a sum of money (P12,269.80). By a writ of execution the court in
Cebu ordered to seize and levy the tractor which was in the premise of LIBRA, it was sold
in a public auction to which it was purchased by GELAC. The latter then sold the tractor to
Antonio Gonzales.
 RTC rendered in favor of petitioner. However, CA dismissed the case, alleging that it still
belongs to Wilfredo Dy.
Issue:
 Whether or not at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, no constructive delivery was
effected since the consummation of the sale depended upon the clearance and
encashment of the check which was issued in payment of the subject tractor.
Held:
 Article 1496 of the Civil Code states that the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the
vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497
to 1501 or in any other manner signing an agreement that the possession is transferred
from the vendor to the vendee. We agree with the petitioner that Articles 1498 and 1499 are
applicable in the case at bar.

7. People of the Philippines vs Elsie Bagista

G.R. No. 86218 - September 18, 1992
Facts:
 The Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office received an information from one
of its regular informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally curly hair, and
with a height of 5’2" or 5’3", would be transporting marijuana from up north. Acting upon this
piece of information, Sgt. Oscar Parajas testified that he, Sgt. Godofredo Fider and a
civilian NARCOM agent proceeded to establish a checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles,
both private and public, coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles were
carrying marijuana leaves on board.
 After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped bus which came from Benguet. Sgts.
Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and thereupon Sgt. Parajas announced to the
passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that they were going to search their
baggages. Sgt. Parajas then proceeded to the rear of the bus while Sgt. Fider began
inspecting the bags in the front.
 While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the right side (as
one is facing the driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with black and
orange stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and discovered three (3)
bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The bag and the contents
thereof were confiscated and the woman arrested
Issue:
 Whether or not there was a valid arrest.
Held:
 The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and search all
vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential
information they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same
appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They
likewise have probable cause to search accused-appellant’s belongings since she fits the
description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by
the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during the course of said search is admissible
against Accused-Appellant.
 The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person
shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his
residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The
basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Art. III,
Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned
right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."

8. Mado Taopa vs People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 184098 - November 25, 2008
Facts:
The Community Environment and Natural Resources Office seized a truck loaded with illegally-
cut lumber and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of
abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa
and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber. Taopa, Ogalesco and
Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705,
as amended. Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the
merits, the RTC found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt. Only Taopa and
Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's
conviction was affirmed.
Issue:
 Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized
lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.
Held:
 Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi because Cuison's
testimony proved Taopa's active participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In
particular, the RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of
Taopa's house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by
Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopa's (and
Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts
of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or other forest
products without the required legal documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco
ran away at the mere sight of the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt. We are thus
convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.
 Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705,
as amended, is punished as qualified theft. The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and
possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.

9. DENR vs Gregorio Daraman

G.R. No. 125797 - February 15, 2002
Facts:
 This is a case filed by the DENR represented by Israel Gaddi against Gregorio Daraman
and Narciso Lucenecio who were caught by one Pablo opinion to transport illegal pieces of
lumber using the vehicle of one Baby Lucenecio, the Holy Cross Funeral Services, Here,
the respondents alleged that one Asan, owner of furniture shop asked the two to bring also
some pieces of wood to his house located near the funeral’s location. Opinion, a DENR
employee, saw the vehicle and inspected it, there he saw some lumber and issued an order
of forfeiture. The court granted bond and released the funeral car and lumber because it
was found out that Daraman and Lucenecio were not owners of the vehicle and lumber.
Hence, this complaint was filed.
Issue:
 Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated vehicle
Held:
 The RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the return of the disputed vehicle,
because the vehicle had already become government property by virtue of the forfeiture
Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his duly authorized
representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may order the
confiscation and disposition of all conveyances -- by land, water or air -- used in illegally
cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or abandoning forest products.
 A comparison of the provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows
that the jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products as
well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation
of forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense.
 Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of "all conveyances used
either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same" is
vested in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a
duly authorized representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and control over the
enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations.
 10. Leonardo Paat vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111107 - January 10, 1997
Facts:
 The truck of Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR because the driver of the truck
was not able to produce the required documents for the forest products.
 Jovitio Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO),
issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days to submit an
explanation. Owner was not able to submit an explanation and the order of the CENRO was
enforced.
 The issue was brought to the secretary of the DENR. While pending, the owner filed a suit
for replevin against the Layugan. Layugan filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
owner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Trial court ruled in favor of the owner. CA
sustained Trial Court’s decision.
Issue:
 Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case for Replevin.
Held:
 It is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and
the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and
special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the
very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial
intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by
the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an
unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority
to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence.