HANNAH ARENDT - ON POWER

The concept of power lies in the extension of the concept of action in The Human Condition:
it can be considered the closing piece of action, because the specific role that Arednt
ascribes to power is precisely the preservation of the space of appearance that arises in
acting and speaking together.
Power is in a certain sense the answer of the ‘many’ to the initiative of the ‘few’. The close
connection between both concepts - “action and power mutually define each other”
enables us to clarify both the non-hierarchical and non-instrumental character of Arendt’
concept of power through her concept of action.
This capacity to act in concert for a public-political purpose is what Arendt calls power.
Power needs to be distinguished from strength, force, and violence. Unlike strength, it is
not the property of an individual, but of a plurality of actors joining together for some
common political purpose. Unlike force, it is not a natural phenomenon but a human
creation, the outcome of collective engagement. And unlike violence, it is based not on
coercion but on consent and rational persuasion.
Power answers to what Arendt calls “sheer human togetherness”, a life “with others and
neither for or against them”. This thought enables us to understand two characteristics of
power: on the one hand, its spontaneous, unpredictable character- “power springs up” –
which answers to the spontaneous, ‘natal’ character of action; on the other, power does not
rest upon subjugation and obedience, but upon consent and support.
Thus, power corresponds to the human ability not just to act, but to act in concert. The basic
formula concerning power says in fact that power can never be the property of an
individual: power “belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long a the group
keeps together.”
For Arendt, power is a sui generis phenomenon, since it is a product of action and rests
entirely on persuasion. It is a product of action because it arises out of the concerted
activities of a plurality of agents, and it rests on persuasion because it consists in the ability
to secure the consent of others through unconstrained discussion and debate. Its only
limitation is the existence of other people, but this limitation, she notes, “is not accidental,
because human power corresponds to the condition of plurality to begin with”. It is
actualized in all those cases where action is undertaken for communicative (rather than
strategic or instrumental) purposes, and where speech is employed to disclose our
intentions and to articulate our motives to others.
Moreover, the power structure itself precedes and outlasts all aims, so that power, far from
being the means to an end, is actually the very condition enabling a group of people to think
and act in terms of the means-end category
Power is also not something that can be relied upon at all times or accumulated and stored
for future use. Rather, it exists only as a potential which is actualized when actors gather
together for political action and public deliberation. It is thus closely connected to the space
of appearance, that public space which arises out of the actions and speeches of individuals.
Indeed, for Arendt, “power is what keeps the public realm, the potential space of
appearance between acting and speaking men, in existence.” Like the space of appearance,
power is always “a power potential and not an unchangeable, measurable and reliable
entity like force or strength … [it] springs up between men when they act together and
vanishes the moment they disperse”
Power, then, lies at the basis of every political community and is the expression of a
potential that is always available to actors. It is also the source of legitimacy of political and
governmental institutions, the means whereby they are transformed and adapted to new
circumstances and made to respond to the opinions and needs of the citizens.
The legitimacy of political institutions is dependent on the power, that is, the active consent
of the people; and insofar as governments may be viewed as attempts to preserve power
for future generations by institutionalizing it, they require for their vitality the continuing
support and active involvement of all citizens.
Hence, she advocates the necessity of participation in civic affairs to check the authoritarian
and totalitarian trends. Moreover, political power is not merely for the advancement of the
individual preferences, rathe coordinating each other’s preferences and working for the
common end.
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VIOLENCE
Arendt has distinguished between power and violence. Just like power can be clarified
through action, violence can be clarified through work or fabrication. Hannah Arendt’s
analysis of violent action is that of an instrumental, mute and solitary activity, which can
destroy but never generate power, and which therefore can never be more than a poor
substitute for acting together.
She has given some hallmarks of violence.
First, non-instrumental and non-materializable power, violence is essentially instrumental
and material. Violent action is thoroughly governed by the categories of means and end,
and therefore, inescapably relies on instruments. As an essentially instrumental activity,
violence can derive its accountability or justification exclusively from the end it serves.
Second, violence is mute. Therefore, she says that where violence rules absolutely, not only
the laws but everything and everybody must fall silent. This muteness makes violence
politically marginal, and even an anti-political phenomenon.
Moreover, violence is characterised by its preference for isolation. Its extreme form is ‘One
against All’, such as in tyranny.
However, her priority of power over violence is not absolute. Sometimes power needs
violence to maintain itself. Arendt seems to recognise this, but nowhere elaborates it.