C H A P T.E R - 1.

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 AURAHGZES AND THB »Oimi«EAST FROKPTXER

ThQ ascendancy o£ Aurangzeb as the Mu^aX Entperor

introduced s i g n i f i c a n t changes in the policy o£ the Covemment
towards stated and t e r r i t o r i e s i n the country* An iinperiaXist
in h i s a t t i t u d e , the Emperor was v i n d i c t i v e towards th© r u l ^ s
v^o h ^ so long r e s i s t e d the suzerainty o£ the Mu0ial3« The
ire,
internal challenges innnediately a£ter t^ie assumption Q£ power,
were also no inean. Everyv^ere, lawlessness caused tumults,
the ryots refused to pay the revenue, the aamindars disobeyed
the local governors or t r i e d t o rob and conquer t h e i r r i v a l s .
Thus the l o c a l r u l e r s , e s p e c i a l l y in the north-east, violated
the f r o n t i e r s and made inroads i n t o the imperial t e r r i t o r y .
During the viceroyship for two terms in Deccan,
Aurangzeb v i r t u a l l y trained himself in the art of practical
p o l i t i c s as well as diplomatic s k i l l f rcan ^ ^ association
with n i r Jumla, \Aio followed a policy tdiolly divorced from
e t h i c a l considerations and mainly guided by exi^^ncies of the
given time and circumstances* As such, Aurangzeb*s aggressive
Deccan policy was rooted in the counsel and co-operation cS
nit Jisnla, the wagir of Golkonda and then prime (Minister of
the imperial Murals* (^hus both the o f f i c i a l s began t o act
as a centre of gravity in the imperial p o l i t i c s of Mughals
A

1. Sir J.N. sarkar, A\irangib, v o l . 1 , 11* p.l79>

F . B e m i e r , Trevel's in the Mogul Empire^ pp« 167-66.
 40

vho used t o formulate t h e i r grand strategy in collaboration

witti eacYu) Jagsdidh Marayan Sarkar ri^itXy sayss
"Aurangzeb had t o rely on Mir Jumla for inducing
the Emperor aiah Jahan to approve of an aggresslkve
p o l i c y against the Deccan by counteracting the
mechinations of Dara« always friendly t o the
Sultans, and opposed to the viceroy and the wazir .
and xsho ^^eilded a great Influence over the Emperor •«»

AURAKG2EB IN MAKING
Aurangzeb was promoted t o the viceroyship of Deccan in
July 1636 and completed the f i r s t term in May 1644« with h i s
seat at Aurangabad, "During these eight years he paid four
v i s i t s t o h i s father in Northern India, leaving sane great
noble, usually h i s maternal uncle Shaista Khan, t o act for him."
Host probably Aurangzeb was intriguing to g e t a h i t t e r position
i n the imperial s e a t . But the Emperor Shah Jahan in col labor a->
t i o n with Dara transferz^d Aurangzeb to Gujrat as Governor.
The main intention was t o embarass him in controlling that
turbulent province.* There he acquired considerable experience
of ^ackling the robber t r i b e s and r e b e l s . Ihe Qnperor did not
l i k e the long»8tay of Aurangsseb at Gujrat. Because the
popularity o£ Aurangzeb could cause menace t o the future r i s e
of Dara. .\urangzeb was accordingly transferred to Balk and
BadaJchsan. in tibis north-tt^est front Aurangzeb had to face
acute hardship i n subduing the (Qaback t r i b e s . No substantial
gains were made; rather i t Incurred heavy l o s s e s . Aurangzeb

2 . J.N. sarkar. Life of Mir Jural a, p.loB; s.K. Bhuyan(tr)

Annals of the Delhi Badshati'sa'be, p . 153.
3 . Sir J.N. Saxlsar, <^.cit.,, p . 2 9 .
« From Feb. 1645 t o Jan. 1647.
4* I b i d . , p . 4 6 .
 41

was discredited and naturally the Xcnperial authority took an

opportunity to condemn Aurangzeb In further assignment.

By March 1648 Aurangz^ was posted as Governor o£

Multan and s i n ^ and^maintained that post upto July/ 1652.
For the first time, Aurangz^ came in contact ^ith the hostile
Afgan and Beluch clans* Aurangzeb was not the man to brook
disorder and disobedience, t^hatever damages done in the
preceding assignment were repaired by the present campaign
o£ Multan and sindh *^very«^ere lawless men and frcmtier clans
felt that they had got a new master (Aurang^b), %tio could not
be safely def ined*** j As Viceroy he not only displayoS

')adminiatrative capacity but also as successful general^ Even

^^ — — ——

i n economic matters, he envisaged some plans f o r the enrichment

of Imperial exchequer. But h i s Qandahar a e r a t i o n s in 1649
and 1652 met with f a i l u r e not because of negligence. Rather
the imjiSrial authority did not grant any power t o act in
discretion. The l a s t viceroyship of Aurangzeb was completed
m the Deccan t^Aiere he took real training.^ As such the second
v i c e royalty oi Deccan, (1653-1656) was a crucial period in
the p o l i t i c a l career of Aurangzeb. The experiences that
acquired were put into operation f o r mastering the art of
p o l i t i c a l chess-board of the imperial government. Indeed,
Mir Jumla came forward t o train Aur^gzeb t o acquire the most
coveted imperial throne, contrary to the intentions of Shah
jahan, Aurangzeb ^nerged successful in the war of succession
5 . Ibid., p.66.
6 . Ibid., p.94.
 42

f o r the Hudhal throne among four b r o t h e r s . When A^P^a £ o r t

surrendered> Aurangzeb became t r u l y t h e sovereign, and t h e
wh<*e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e staff submitted t o him, A ©rand darbar
was now h e l d ( l o t h June 1658) In h i s camp, and c£q;>tlve Shah
jahan presented him a sword named ' A l a m g l r ' . The hlcfh grandees
and o t h e r l i t t e r l a l o f f i c e r s came In troops t o t h e c o u r t o£
Aurangzeb In t h e hqp© of (pattron^fe and eadti received favour
7 — . , ,,
s u i t e d t o h i s rank* As wurad BaJcsh, t h e younger b r o t h e r of
Aurangzeb, was v i o l e n t l y preparJUig a r e b e l l l c n and was waiting
f o r an opportunity t o c a r r y h i s f u t i l e p l a n s , Aurangzeb made
him a p r i s o n e r a t Mathura and t h u s freed the people from
mischief and tumult; the c a p t i v e was sent t o the f o r t of
8
Delhi under Shaikh Mir.
Dara shukcih, t h e e l d e s t son of Shah Jahan and t h e
f a v o u r i t e t o be t h e successor of Enqperor, took asylum In S>unjab
on c e r t a i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . F i r s t l y , Punjab was the land of
' m i l i t ^ soldiers. Moreover, from t h e north-west fr<»»tler
provinces t h e s e r v i c e s of t h e h a r d i e s t mercenaries could be
properly u t i l i s e d . Secondly, he had p a s t experiences as t h e
Viceroy of Punjab. Besides, Lahore f o r t contained Immense
wealth and war m a t e r i a l s . But Aurangzeb was v i g i l a n t i n keeping
h i s eagle eyes upon Dara. He took personal i n i t i a t i v e in
chasing Dara t/^o was camping i n d i f f e r e n t places such as
Fiultan, Sewan.,, sindh and then t o Q i j r a t . Meantiid\ile, Aurangzeb
h a l t e d a t Multan and turned back towards Delhi because an
7 . S i r J . N . Sarkar ( t r ) , Maasir^i-Alamgirl, p . 3 ,
8. Ibid., p.4.
9. Sir J.N, Sarkar, Aurangzlb, vol^11, p,275.
 43

alarming s i t u a t i o n had been developed i n the e a s t by Shuja*s

invasion tAilch required h i s presence there, entrusting the
campaign t o divisional commanders. Dara made an att^npt t o
capture Agra £ort £rom the ^loest ^ l l e Aurangz^ camping in
the Punjab. The b a t t l e of Dsoral (Ajmir« March 1659) shattered
h i s hopes and he £led t o Gujrat and ultimately was mads prisoner
by Malik Jiwan# an A£gan aide>de-<:amp o£ Aurangzeb and brought
t o I3elhi i n Aug, 1659. The doomed prince's agent unsuccessfully
t r i e d to save h i s l i f e by running t o different mediators.
Dara was put t o death in the Qasae year and in 1661« h i s son,
Sulaiman Shukoh f e l l i n t o the clutches of Aiurangzeb viho
ordered him t o be removed t o the £ortress of Gwalior, tAiere
he was k i l l e d by poisoned t o death.^^ V^ tL-^flZ!!li

The next r i v a l of Aurangzeb for the Imperial throne was

Prince Shuja, the severed son o£ Shah J ^ a n ^o served in the
cap^:ity c^ viceroy i n Bengal subsh for two terms. In 1649 A.D.
prince Shuja was re-appointed for the seccaid term t o the
13
Wigamat of Bengal by ShSh Jahan. As the Governor of Bengal
he was involved in the administration of the north-east frontier
of the Mughals and h i s contention for the throne of Delhi
immediately attracted the attention of Aurangzeb to the north-
east, ^hen the news of Shah Jahan*s i l l n e s s reached him,
Shuja did not f a i l to register h i s claim t o the Mughal throne.
However, he could be s a t i s f i e d with the pact with sulaiman
1 0 . I b i d . , p.289.
1 1 . I b i d . , pp. 337-38.
1 2 . w. I r v i n e , (tr> s t o r i a Do Mogor, Vol. 1, p.360.
1 3 . A, salam ( t r ) , Riagu-s-salatin, p . 2 1 5 .
 Shukoh, son of Dara, effected In May 1638 that made hlro the
supr^Bie authority, over Bengal, Bihar« Orissa up t o the eaat
of Mungir. The news of the reverses faced by Dara and the
def ecto assxnnptlon of power by Aurangzeb prevailed upon him
t o march towards Delhi* But the struggle between Aurangzeb
and Dara had terminated before &huja*s arrival and Aurangzeb
already mounted the imperial throne and he could use the
e n t i r e army of Hindustan against Shuja, / I n the b a t t l e of
At
y<\t . . .

Khajwa (Jan 1659) Prince shuja was defeated by Aur.^gzeb jby

•^winning over the general and commanders of Shuja by brib^ and
temptations.! Meantdhile« Aurangzeb's p o s i t i o n was strengthened
by the arrival of Mir Jumla from Deccan* "Being i n constant
attendance on the Emperor during the b a t t l e , as h i s ri€lht>
hand man, he offered him timely advice regarding the t a c t i c a l
moves and i n s t i l l e d hope and courage into h i s mind during
c r i t i c a l monents."^^ Shuja was now forced t o take to f l i ^ t
and f o r t i f y i n g the passes of Teliagadi and Sakrigal.i, he
entrenched himself at Rajmahal (Akbamagar) • ' Aurangzeb«
however, returned t o Delhi apprehending danger frcan Jaswant
S i n ^ yit\o was reported t o have taken h i s position in favour
of captive Sh€kh Jahan.' On the eve of h i s departure, Mir Jumla
18
was provided with a large force t o pursue Prince Shuja.
Aurangzeb also bestowed special powers and p r i v i l e g e s t o
Mir Jumla probably with two-fold 6 b j e c t i v e s . Firstly,

14. Sir J.N. Sarkar, o p . c i t . , Vol.11, p.294.

15. A. salam (tr) , < ^ . c i t » , pp.217-20.
16.. J.N. sarkar, oy>.eit.«^ p . 150.
17. A. salam ( t r ) , o p . c i t . , p.220.
18. w. Irvine .(t6), qpTcIt., V o l . 1 , p.3l69 s.K. Bhuyan (tr)
O p . c i t . , *. V:..14pp. l46-47; F. B e m i e r , o p . c i t . , pp. 108-9
 45

14ir Juinla xtfould explore and u t i l i s e a l l the potential sources

t h a t are available in order t o end the physical existence of
the f u g i t i v e Prince Shuja and.his legacy. Secondly, Mir oruiola
vfould chalk out a new strategy in order t o exosute the
aggressive p o l i c y in the north e a s t f r o n t i e r s of Bengal,
fiir Jvunla ^aa also asked t o guide Sultan t^Uhanimad, f irst«>>bom
son o£ Aurangzeb in the campaign, and was given the siapreine
19
coaDninand t o execute the operation. "Reinforcements were soon
despatched under Mir Jucila,. as j o i n t eoininander»in«Chie£, raising
the pursuing force t o 30,CX)0 nsen." Prince Shuja displayed
remarkaible f e a t in respect of courage and war s t r a t e g y , ^t
due t o irony of f a t e , he had t o r e t r e a t from place t o p l a c e .
F i n a l l y , he bade farewell even t o h i s eastern capital Dacca
in May 1660 along with h i s family and few f a i t h f u l o f f i c i a l s
and took shelter in Aracan. 21 This f a t e of prince Shuja was
occassloned by a multiple of f a c t o r s . The diaracter and
strength of the new Emperor and the e f f i c i e n c y of h i s deputy,
Nawab Mir Jumla, t^re knovm to the c h i e f t a i n s and samindars i n
Bengal, most of v^om shifted t h e i r allegiance t o the new
22
administration. Ihe Mughal o f f i c e r s i n the province l i k e the
Faujadars and Thanadars a l s o ^g^serta^ ^ u j a and confirmed
t h e i r l o y a l t y t o the Nawab. Prince Shuja pushed h i s way t o
Arakan through south»eastem frontier and t h i s ep£sode brought
the eastern kinc^om of Tripura into the forefront. T^ing

1 9 . w. Irvine ( t r ) , o p . c i t . , v o l . l , pi316.
2 0 . s i r J.N, sarkar, o p . c i t . , v o l * l l , p.351; H. Blochmann,
o p . c i t . , p.351.
2 1 . Sir J.N, sarkar, c-itud.;.., pp. 376-77.
2 2 . J.N. Sarkar, o p . c i t . , 209.
 46

t h e advantage of the confusion caused by t h e war o£ Succession

Raja KalyanmaniKya^ M^O had e a r l i e r submitted t o Shuja*
proclaicDed h i s independence and regained some p o r t i o n s of t h e
\),i>-' 23
western p l a i n t h a t had ceded t o the Hu^hals. Kalyanmanikya
died i n 1660 hJ>, (saka 1S82)« and was succeeded by h i s son
24
Govindamanikya t ^ o was t h e defecto n i l e r of t h e kingdom during
t h e l a s t years of h i s f a t h e r ' s reign and was instrumental in
throwing away t h e M u ^ a l yoke. Prince Shuja* t h e r e f o r e * turned
t o {JakShatra Roy, the s t e p b r o t h e r of Govindamanikya encouraged
him t o dethrone Govindeonanikya and promised him m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t .
Makshatra Roy accordingly r e b e l l e d a g a i n s t h i s brother b u t
meanvtxile Shuja was dislodged from h i s a u t h o r i t y i n Dacc^ and
no h e l p could be accorded t o t h e r e b e l l e d p r i n c e . And Shuja
a l s o could secure no h e l p f o r s h e l t e r from Tripura then r u l e d
by an unfriendly Govindamanikya, The imperial a u t h o r i t i e s were,
however, perhaps under t h e impression t h a t ShuJa had entrenched
himself in Tripura or was i n league with t h e r u l e r s of Tripura
and Araoan. Aurangzeb, t h e r e f o r e , in a l e t t e r addressed t o
Govindamanikya demanded t h a t the l a t t e r Should capture shuja
and hand him over t o Mir Jurola, To quote the l e t t e r s
'*1 hope you w i l l capture him and send him c a r e f u l l y
under the s u r v e i l l a n c e of your army o f f i c e r s and
therdt>y o b l i g e me, so t h a t the age-old f r i e n d s h i p
may continue t o e x i s t . Otherwise you w i l l t a k e i t
f o r c e r t a i n t h a t as a r e s u l t of t h e s t a y o£ t h a t
imprudent rash i n your t e r r i t o r y , our happy r e l a t i o n -
s h i p w i l l be breached by c o n f l i c t s . I do b e l i e v e
t h a t t h i n g s w i l l be done in acc<M:dance with my l e t t e r . "

2 3 . Tripura D i s t r i c t GaaetteersC v, , { K , D . Menon^jp.87.

2 4 . Rajmala. Education D i r e c t o r a t e , T r i p u r a , p p . 76-78.
 47

MeanvSiile ^ u j a had s e n t h i s son s u l t a n Bang t o t h e King o£

Aracan f o r h e l p and the l a t t e r s e n t s u l t a n Bang bacX t o h i e
f a t h e r wlt^ a number of war boats«_ Ccatroanded by Portuguesel
subjects up t o t h e cSvittagong f r o n t i e r vSiere the Aracanesd
f r o n t i e r met Mu^fhal Bengal.25 This* however, being unable t o
reckon with t h e fsughals and as no h e l p was forthcoming from
T r i p u r a , ffih^ Suja u l t i m a t e l y f l e d t o Aracan with h i s family and
f o l l o w e r s . 26 Though t h e Aracanese King i n i t i a l l y promised him
h e l p , t h e d i f f e r e n c e of opinion c r e p t in between the two when
t h e King demanded t h e d a u ^ t e r of t h e Prince and a l s o t h e s e r v i c e s
of h i s sons and o f f i c i a l s . Shuja then planned t o proceed t o
Macca and according t o mtch records ('Dag p e g i s t e r * , p . l l S ) ,
he s t a r t e d f o r T r i p u r a . N e v e r t h e l e s s , he was chased by the
AracanesjLand k i l l e d i n t h e j u n g l e s e i t h e r of Tripura o r
Chittagong h i l l tr^t.^''

Govindaroanlkya, Raja of T r i p u r a , on t h e other hand«

incurred t h e d i s p l e a s u r e of Aurangz^ and Mir Jumla having
f a i l e d t o c a p t i v i e e Shah Shuja v^o h a i already escaped t o
Aracan. The rebel claimant t o tixe throne of T r i p u r a , Nakshatra
Roy managed t o secure t h e support of t h e Mughals and possibly
xtfith the h e l p of Mir Jumla, ad believed by the h i s t o r i a n s of
T r i p u r a , ' ^ occt^ied Udaipur and u l t i m a t e l y succeeded i n dethron-
ing Govindamanikya. The royal c h r o n i c l e of T r i p u r a , however,
c l a i m s t h a t CJovindaroanikya v o l u n t a r i l y abdicated in favour cf

2 5 . w. Invine ( t r ) , q p . c i t . . Vol. I , p.350j P . B e m i e r ,

o p . c i t . , pp 109*1&.' • •'
2 6 . *Dagh R e g i s t e r * , by c a s t e a l B a t a v i a , e d . J , A . van der
C h i j s , t h e Hague, pp ie5o06 as c i t e d by w. I n v i n e , c ^ . c i t . ,
v o l . I p . 3 5 6 ; F . B e r n l e r , o p . c i t . , pp I09«10.
2 7 . w. I r v i n e ( t r ) o p . c i t . . Vol. I , p 357? F . B e r n l e r , < ^ . c i t , p l l 2 »
2 8 . N.R.Roy Choudhury, Tripura throucQi t h e Ages, p . 4 1 ,
 48

Nakahatra Roy, although I t d e s c r i b e s f i ^ - c e b a t t l e bet%;een

Raxndev, son of Govindamanikya, and Nakshatra Roy, 29 Be t h a t
as may b e , Nakshatra Roy began h i s reign as the Raja o£ Trlpura
i n 1661 A.D># and assumed t h e name o£ Chatramanikya as knotim
30
from h i s c o i n s , presvtmably as an a l l y of t h e l ^ u ^ a l s ,
Oovindamanikya was thus forced t o be a f u g i t i v e and ^ultimately
obtained asylum i n the Araeanese c o u r t v*iere, according t o
scane t r a d i t i o n s he met- ?>rince shuja aaasS'^e l a t t e r presented LVv
^—^31
a precious sword and a alroond> TJ-^Jallignmei^ if a t a l l any,
between t h e two f u g i t i v e p r i n c e s could not c e r t a i n l y pose, any
t h r e a t t o t h e H u ^ a l s o r t h e i r a l l y i n Trlpura because, as i t
h a s already been mentioned, p r i n c e shuja was k i l l e d s h o r t l y
after* Govindamanikya c o u l d , however, stage h i s come back t o
Trlpura a f t e r a few y e a r s , b u t t h i s t o o not without t h e
b l e s s i n g s of t h e Mu^flials as w i l l be described l a t e r on*

(jawab Mir Jumla t h u s conpleted the immediate task of

c l e a r i n g h i s new province from t h e t h r e a t of Shuja and could
c o n s o l i d a t e h i s a u t h o r i t y i n the e a s t e r n f r o n t i e r . The u n c e r t a i n -
t i e s , and r e s u l t a n t a n x i e t y , however, p r e v a i l e d i n t h e M u ^ a l
camp as t h e news of Shuja's death was concealed f o r some time
by h i s followers vAio a l s o spread the f a l s e news t h a t he had
fled into jungle. Aurangzeb could be sure of t h e death of
Shuja only v*ien i t was confirmed by t h e Dutch f a c t o r s . Moreover,
"these u n c e r t a i n t i e s and expectation came t o an end i n time

2 9 . K,C. Siliha, Rajroala, pp 84«92.

3 0 . N.R, Roychoudhury, o p . c i t . , p 4 2 .
3 1 . I b i d , , p . 42,
 49

t h r o u ^ t h e evidence o€ many persons £rcm AraKan, t*io had been

p r e s e n t a t t h e unh^;^>y p r i r t e e ' s death."^^ Thus t h e l u s t 08
S4u^al throne kindled among t h e four sons of i l l - f a t e d Shah Jahan
was terminated making Aurangzeb, the indisputed roaster of t h i s
roi^ty Empire.

MIR .JUKtA IN BENGAL

Mir Jumla consolidated h i s p o s i t i o n as t h e Governor of
Bengal and was destined t o supervise north»eastern policy of
t h e M u r a l s under Aurangzeb. He had a l s o acquired p r a c t i c a l
knowledge of Bengal and i t s f r o n t i e r s t a t e s vdiile pursuing
p r i n c e Shi^a f o r long seventeen months. The action of t h e new
S u b ^ d a r makes i t c l e a r t h a t *diile t h e f r o n t i e r policy of Shuja
was d e f e n s i v e , Mir Jurola's p o l i c y was aggressive as well as
33
offensive. The s t r e n g t h of h i s aggressive a t t i t u d e was i n
t h e h i 0 i l y i m p e r i a l i s t i c policy of h i s Emperor. On becoming the'
Qmperor^ Aurangzeb reshuffled t h e policy i n r e s p e c t of ^ p o i n t m e n t
of P r o v i n c i a l Governors and other high o f f i c i a l s . The reas<m
behind t h i s change was t o eliminate t h e l o y a l t i e s towards the
popular ^egim^of Dara, Shuja and Murad r e s p e c t i v e l y . Obviously#
most of t h e p r o v i n c i a l Governors and h l ^ o f f i c i i were replaced
by those who had firm f a i t h and l o y a l t y in Aurangzeb's paramountey,
botlLJLn-the--centr^~and~prov4«ci3l-l^ The immediate
problems of t h e Emperor seemed t o be three«i^old in nature*
F i r s t l y # t h e a u t h o r i t y i n north«-east f r o n t i e r s had t o be r e -
asserted, secondly, t h e Deccan problem was mounted by the r i s e

3 2 . w . l n v i n e , < t r ) , g p . c i t . , v o l . 1, p 358? P B e m i e r ,
o p . e i t . , pp 112«»114.
3 3 . F . B e m i e r , o p . c i t . , p 169,f 5.K, Bhuyan led) paashah^
Buranji, p 75.
 so

of^Karathas under Shlvaji* ThlrdXy, the Afgan tribes In the

north«.w9st frcamtler ^aere In rebellicnis s t a t e . One of the major
administrative changes made by Aurangzeb at h i s second coronation
(July« 1659) was the posting of Shaista Rhan to the viceroyalty
o£ the Deccan« i n the place of Prince Muazzaro. He was s p e c i f i c a l l y
directed to sijppress Shivaji* Muhammad Amir Khan, son of
Hir Jumla, was given the charge to crush the chronic rebellions
of north-west frontier provinces reasserting forward frontier
policy* ^orth«>east f r o n t i e r was entrusted t o Mir Jumla tidio
devoted h i s f u l l energy t o assert imperial prestige as well as
%o extend the bounds of the entire upto the royal seat of Assam.35

NORTH-EASTERN POLICE
Aurangseb's attitude towards the s t a t e s on Mughal'
f r o n t i e r s was based mainly on the expansion of imperial boundary
as well as assertion of Mughal prestige and authority. The
application of ^ l i s p o l i c y was directed in the Deccan« the north-
west and the north-east with different varitable magnitude
depending on g e o - p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s . To assess h i s frontier
p o l i c y by one scale w i l l be over-simplification of the ^ o l e
issue« though some elements are common. Aurangzeb could not
f r e e l y apply h i s personal discretion in asserting the expanding
imperial policy towards^eccan as well as^north-xsjest f rcmtier
during h i s v i c e r o y ^ i p « because of r e s t r i c t i o n s and interrt^tions
of the Imperial a u t h o r i t i e s . But the supreme authority of the
imperial Mughals he was now free to design and implement h i s

3 4 . Sir JJ<!. sarkar, Auranggib, vol.. IV, p 54.^

3 5 . S. T a l i s h , Fathiyya-i-ibriyyai Mss No D 72# Asiatic
s o c i e t y of Calcutta, pp 6-15.
 51

own sch©8)@« Aurangeeb unearthed h i s tnae guide in the

intriguing personality o£ eair Juinla* As a matter o£ £act«
Aurang^b's personal p o l i t i c a l missions and diplonatic schones
ti^ere processed and materialised in di££er@nt phases «mder the
steward^ip of t h i e ^ r s i a n general .^^ Ho MJonder, Aurangzeb's
expanding frontier policy towards the north-eastern s t a t e s
^as solely entrusted t o » i r J ^ l a . HOo^ever'^
" i t was the coromcm belief t h a t Aurangseb ordered i^ir
Jumla i n t o ASS^D t h a t he mi^it be got r i d o£« dread-
ing that« as he had throvin the kingd<an of Gullcandsh
i n t o confusion* and had knoim how t o arrange for the
conquest of Dara and the destiruction of shivaji* he
mic^t l i k e t ^ i ^ attesDpt by h i s devices t o place
som^ane else on the nogul throne"«37

Althmigh difference of opinion ^as occasionally noticed betti/een

the Emperor and the subahdar* there i s a reason to believe that
14ir Jumla ^ijoyed the f u l l confidence and support of Auranga^.

The appointment of Stir Jumla as Governor of Bengal had

some special significance*, only the persons in x4iom the Emperor
had firm f a i t h t ^ r e selected as Viceroy« subject to the l i m i t a .
Itions of iooperial decrees 8ix>nsored by Aurangseb* (^ir Jumla wa@
'ireputed as a man of iofty integrity« imperial j u s t i c e and a
c h e r i ^ e r of the subjects*^ unlike other Governors« he raas
given s^pedal h o n ^ ^ and specific responsibilities* ihe Emperor
conferred on him the t i t l e o£ Khani>i«pKhanan and sipah salary a
roansab of 7000 and a b e l t together with a special beje\«:eied

36* w* Zrvine« ( t r ) op«cit>> ^ ^ ^ - 1 « p 217* P » Bemter, op»cit,»

p . 109'*, ^
37* w* Xrvine« ( t r ) # op^cit.,, vol* I I , p 9l> p , Bemier,
>*cit** pp 169*71; S ^ . Bhuyan ( t r ) , op^cit»# pp 133«»S3*
38* J.H. 5erHar« opj^cit%3 p 113.
 52

sword*
"Aurangz^ also asked Mir Jumla t o devote himself
t o the e f f i c i e n t administration o£ the province
by pacifying the cross section of people, chastising
the unruXy nobles« regulating the a r t i l l e r y « and
e s p e c i a l l y the nawwara ( f l o t i l l a ) « securing the
s a f e t y of t r a f f i c on the roads and highways and i s s u -
ii^g^T^bll calculated regulations concerning various
other matters »**^o

The aforesaid d i r e c t i v e s amply j u s t i f y the truth that Mir Jurola

was vested with supreme authority concerning p o l i t i c a l « military
and economic a£fairs of Bengal and the adjoining t e r r i t o r i e s *

I t i s pertifient t o note that Aurangzdb had t a c t i c a l l y

snatched a l l the material wealth that Mir Jumla had acquired
from Karnatak and GolHonda, Now the Entperor's greed turned
towards Bengal subah t o reap the l a s t f r u i t s from the aged
viceroy* The normal revenue of Bengal province was about four
41
crores, next to Bijapur and toolkan^. Since the war of
succession* the requisite revenues of Bengal Svhsih were not
deposited in th^ imperial exchequer* Consequently Mir Jianla CKJT'^
f^ vJl<3^»-

was obliged to exploit all the available sotizces of revenue and '^
thereby to give economic r e l i e f t o Aurangzeb's campaigns in the
North-west and Deccan fronts* Undoubtedly« Mir Jt)mla responded
t o the wishes of the Emperor with a l l s i n c e r i t y and never deviated
from the task entrusted to him. The Emperor also possibly
directed Mir Jumla t o carry the banner of Islam in the Hindu
Kingdons of North-east frontier* Because "he was charged with

39* Sir J*N*. sarkar, (tr)., Maasir-i-Alamgiri, pp 16-19»

S.K. Bhuyan (tr) op*clt.,, pp 151-53*
40* J*N* Sarkar, op^cit*, P ^ 9 * ,
41* W. Irvine <tr) op*cit^» Vol I I l # pp 2BBmB9} P. B e m i e r ,
o p * c i t . , p 437.'"^
 53

t h e e f f e c t i v e chastisement of the r a t h e r r e f r a c t o r y zaroindara

of Assajn and of t h e Ma0\», vdio I l l - t r e a t e d and oppressed t h e
Mussaltnans." [jFor about t h r e e years* t h a t he was p r e s e n t i n
t h e province f o r barely a year and a half (way 1660 - Nov 1661)
^ e i n g absent on campaigns i n Cooch Behar and Assam from Noveinber
166ll) During t h i s Short period« he s H i l l f u l l y u t i l i s e d t h e
m i l i t a r y resources of t h e European powers. He a l s o used t h e
sexrvices of English* t h e Dutch and the Portuguese and t h e i r
ships in h i s norUweastem can^aigns. He a l s o employed an
Englishman« Thomas P r a t t , in b u i l d i n g b o a t s and making ammunition
43
for river f i t t i n g * This proves t h a t t h e gamindars of Bengal
who used t o supply war boat's and man«povar f o r imperial campaign
tsrere i n a c t i v e and d i s l o y a l a t t h i s stage* A number of bordering
aamindars and t r i b u t o r y Rajas vdthdrew t h e i r necks from the
c o l l a r of obediencef and not only neglected t o send any p a r t of
t h e i r revenues t o t h e Imperial t r e a s u r y , but even invaded the
44
provinces•

9<ieanv)hile, the Ahem monarch JayadhvaJ-SinsPti, tidio was a l s o

on t h e a l e r t t o t a k e advantage of the d i s s e n s i o n s amongst the
t^ughals, r a i s e d a strong army, threw two b r i d g e s over t h e Kallang
r i v e r and advanced towards GaUhati. After o c c i ^ a t i o n of Gauhati,
t h e Ahan army m a r c h ^ a g a i n s t t h e western Koches and a f t e r a
moderate c o n f l i c t , defeated them twice and drove them across
45
t h e sankosh r i v e r . The Ahom monarch extended h i s plunders and

4 2 . J . N . s a r k a r , o p ^ c i t . , p 209.
•{9th May 1660 - 3 l 8 t March, 1663),
4 3 . w. I r v i n e ( t r ) , o p . c i t . , v o l . i i , p.Bo,
4 4 . c« Stewart, The H i s t o r y of Bengal, p 287.
4 5 . E . G a i t , A History of Assam, p 130; Alarogimama, pp 679-*eo.
 54

l a i d the country waste altcost upto the v i c i n i t y of Dacca, and

carried away with th^n a nuictber o£ the inhabitants as slaves
46
^«^ich was naturally considered as i n s u l t to the Mughal Government.
V3ayadhwaj S i n ^ tried t o Keep the Mughal viceroy ^ gog<^ humour.
* He sont on onissary t o Mir Jumla with c o s t l y presents and made
a gesture for peace. He put the entire blame for the subversion
of the Wuc(hal authority in Kamrup on the shoulders of Prannarayan,
the Raja of Kooch Behar ( c . l 6 3 3 » 6 6 ) , then a l^u^al vassal on the
p l e a that he had taken possession of the imperial territory in
order to prevent i t from f a l l i n g into the hands of Kooch Behar*
AS a matter of fact« the Ahom mcaiarch was only gaining time for
further aggressions* But t h i s strategy was smelt by Mir JumHf
who began necessary preparations for the fresh north-eastern
venture. 47

t A s Mir Jumla was t i l l then apprehending danger from

acan «^ere f u g i t i v e Shuijia had taken shelter^ Naturally he
was anxious to invade Aracan after the end of the rainy season*
and directed Rashid Khan to operate the north<»east campaign in
the early part of 1661 and t o take delivery of Kamrup from the
46
Ahoros. On h i s approach« the Ahoms aband<med Dhubri, and
fell back beyond the Manas river« but he sustained snare and
waited f o r reinforcentent b ^ o r e taking possession of the tract
which they had abandoned. The Ahon monarch gave severe
punishment to the retreated commanders and there Appointed
Baduli Phiakan to be Neog PhuHan as well as ccanmander in c h i e f .
4 6 . . C . Stewajrt* o p . c i t . » p 288,
4 7 . E. Gait, o p . c i t . , p 13li Alarogimama, p 680; . . . ..^t
4 8 . H. Blochmann, Koch-Bihar, Koch-Hajo and Assam, in the l6th
and 17th century according t o the Akbarnama, the ipadlshnama
aha"fe-ath'iya:>'i:>l^riYa.^ vol.xt.1 ,"1872, p 65i'.-
 33

Be vas particularly ordered t o drlvo out Rashld tq:ian £t<M the

e o i l of s^ughal Kemrup* ^ i r Juroia x(ras not incXlAed to forgive
the disloyalty o£ a vassal ruler» prannarayan of Roo^ B^ar* .
so a second war front was operated under the ^neralsliip of
Raja suian Sing« the Rajput Chiefs subsequently re«.inforced by
t^iraa Beg shujai« to Chastise the Koch niler* Both the
cornmandere ^ r e interrupted by the Ahon and Koch force®
respectively* So t h e r e a f t e r , Kir Jumla was conpelled to follow
an intensive aggressive policy towards t h i s frontier« based on
strong military and naval forces* As mentioned G&rli&c, nix
Jumla put more s t r e s s on the recruitment of European residents
both in the land and naval army. This was icnperative necessity
as the existing riu^al armies of Bengal were s^agre and they
had been deii^ralised and the morale of the ^^neral subjects
was a t i t s lowest ebb during the period of c i v i l war* (moreover«
t o contest with the agelong Hindu Kingdoms on the frontier of
Bengal # a strong naval force was bound to be formed* so the
Mughal viceroy kept Aracan campaign pending and on the n i 0 i t
of 1st Noveitiber 1661# started from Dacca (Khisirpur) accoaxtpani^
with D i l i r Khan on h i s h i s t o r i c Assam cait^aien*31

Evidently« the crucial years beginning from January 1659

to November 1661 marlced the formative period of (9ir Jumla*s
north<»eastem frontier policy^ The esnperor Aurangzeb was too
49. S*K,v Bhuyan« (ed> Kamrupar 8uranji» p 6Z^
50* I b i d . , p 75%
5 1 . SJC. Bhuyan« (ed) Assam Buranji^i^ p Ttt s,, T a l i ^ , op.cit'^,
p 11> J.N.. sarhar, op.citu* pp 225«26y g»^ Bemier,: o p . c i t . ,
pp 171-72.
 56

much etigrossed in condolidatiiig h i s linperial pother and prestige

j u s t aSter the elosuire o£ the war o£ succ^aslon and a t the saste
tiioe threatened by the ainbitlous Rajputs in the north as well
as the gra^^ Maratha menace ln^eccan# Moreover, the traditional
northx'west policy oi the nusSials was t o be pureued with a laote
vigorous push in v l e ^ Q£ the rebel and h o s t i l e A£gan t r i b e s ,
^ o c H l n g alanningli^ a t the frontiers* so the Etoperor had
ultiUnately t o tdi^e h i s cantp in Kashmir in order t o r e v i t a l i s e
the conventional frontier policy keep;tog in viet? o& the maintenance
o£ p o l i t i c a l equilibrium* Aurangseb personally raided and
eupervised the s t r a t e g i e s and military operations according t o
the e^dgendea o£ time and situation i n the v u l n e r ^ l e frontiers
of Horth^T^st, the gatewaty o£ a l l the p r e e n i n g dynastic i n t n ^ r s
o£ India* In vieter o£ the ^^sove condition, Auranga;^ %7ae not
in a position, at the o u t s e t , to pay personal attention in the
i n t r i c a t e affairs of northi-east India but t o hesnk on the ambitious
Persian general, ^i^io took the unexpected assignment of viceroy«»
ship i n Bengal by the loperial ^ g r ^ ^ of his@unni Master i n
Kay 1660.

owse Aurangz€fb was f i n a l l y confinoed of the death news

of exiled Prince Shuja, the Aracan campaign was put under
suspension^, Most probably, the cause of the r^/ision of in^perial
policy was on the ^apprehension t h a t the p r o l o n g ^ stay of the
aggrieved viceroy in the hot bed of Bengal ajbah mid^t create
e i t h e r p o l i t i c a l convulsions or radical revolution endangering
mfmm»^»mmmilm

S2* Sir J^« sarkar ( t r ) , ofij^cit^,. wp 18*19^

 57

the s t a b i l i t y of Mu^al r u l e . Taking a l l these unseen factors

i n t o consideration, the irnperial order was issued t o execute
the Horth-eastern canpaign on p r i o r i t y b a s i s * However, the
astute Viceroy did not leave the seat of Bengal at the outset*
Rather Rashid Khan and Baja Sujan Singh were directed and
deputed by Mir Juinla to accomplish the d i r e c t i v e s of the imperial
assignment of North->eastern campaign. "^ Hir Jumla, however could
not reconcile the ill^motivated |nd>anoevres of the imperial
authority. Sndeed, he was considered as the main p i l l a r and
brain t o Aurangzeb s p e c i a l l y during the crucial period i n
between 16S6 t o 1660 because he had l i m i t l e s s wealth. Now the
Shia viceroy of Bengal completing about seventy summers c^ h i s
l i f e , could not maintain the equilibrium of discretion vtien
Aurangzeb's imperial atathority d^nanded the o s c i l a t i n g energies
54
of the new viceroy, defying a l l canons of e t h i c s . In obedience
t o the imperial mandate, the aggrieved general«>cum»viceroy had
t o carry out the duties with mixed feelings.^ fiom Mir'Jumla had
no substantial quantvsn of cc^pper of tide«.over the tuff and acute
problems of the province of Bengal as well as the challenge of
the frontier Hindu sovereigns.. To consolidate the present
incunbancy, i t was an imperative necessity to i n j e c t and impose
h i s e a r l i e r policy c^ Deccan in the Soil of Bengal subah and the
f r o n t i e r Kingdons. AS a matter of f a c t , nir'a Deccan formulae
were not applicable either i n Bengal subah ruSnich was already rent
with c o n f l i c t i n g l o y a l t i e s or in North-east regions ti^ere ethnical
— • 11 r • 1 I iL [I II 1 H" • Ti I I 1 - I II ill L u ]i —-T " 'I—r" -^ i i » i\ gi m'

53., A., salam, o p . c i t . , pp 223-.24> Alarogimama, pp 678»80.^

5 4 . W.. I r v i n e , o p . c i t . , vol^ I , p 179^,
 38

d i v e r s i t i e s trere too rnu«^ pronounced t o accept any tioroogeneous

paraniountcy• However, Mir too l i k e hiS(;fbrmi Master was lured
by the dazzling prospects o£ acquiring the treasures both front
Bengal Subah and unescplored ^iiealth of the entire north-east
frontier s t a t e s . But t h i s wild verdure was too cnuch d i f f i c u l t
t o be accompliaihed e s p e c i a l l y in t^orth-east Zndia, as the
aspirant was t o s t a r t from Dacca, ^i^ere he had stayed only for
53
eighteen tnonths (May 1660 • November 1661) .

Further, the p o l i t i c a l and economic conditions of Bengal

3ubah was in a f l u i d s t a t e r i ^ t from the Viceroyalty of Prince
Shuja (1639-1637) and t h i s unavoidable wounds were aggravated by
the t!2^ar of Succession. The feudal eeoncanic structure of Bengal
Subah becameC^^ne^a Corruptions in a l l phases of the c r o s s -
section of l i f e became rampant. The reactionary forces of
c o n f l i c t i n g l o y a l t i e s towards Aurangzeb*s authority created a
vacuxim e s p e c i a l l y in Bengal Subah. The in^erial revenues fron
Bengal were in arrears since 1637. Curiously enou0\, the
contumacious masses alike e>cpres8ed t h e i r gestures of superficial
l o y a l t i e s e s p e c i a l l y during the period of interregnum following
war of succession. C<»isequently, the din of rebellion and
d i v i s i v e forces became r i f e «hen ex-wazir of Golkonda was seated
56
i n the cagpacity of Viceroy at Dacca (Jahangimagar) . Again,
t o chastise the age long powerful n i l e r s and d i i e f t a i n s of North-
e a s t India, representing |gtefo^enjOgg> nature, i t v i t a l l y
required considerable time f a c t o r s , substantial finance (^ladition,
» W W H W ^ I l M i l l 111 •••OiWHW.M»Wfci||i 1 1 1 — W W Ml m WHMillW^Wl W l W h l l U l W l l l l - -II — . ^ —I—i—»«iWi»l •»••• Mli^l—W—I.

5 5 . I b i d . , p 317,
5 6 , I b i d . , p 319.
 59

t o traln«a nten and war materials• \ As already referred t o that A ' ^ ^ ^ .

\ I —(inw • J i l l i-Ti I..

the Bengal Subah \9as on the brink of financial bankruptcy]! But

the rulers and c h i e f t a i n s were ccanparatlvely maintaining p o l i t i c a l
and econanlc s t a b i l i t y than the counterpart of l^u^al province.
Zt I s because the l4ughal«Ah09» b i l a t e r a l treaty of 1639 was
more f avourabi^to Kud^.als e s p e c i a l l y In trade and as such the
Hu^al authority pursued a d e f i n i t e policy of non«»lnterventlon
In Morth«>east India* ensuring the t e r r i t o r i a l Integrity and
uninterrupted commercial a c t i v i t i e s of the frontier rvilers*
Hovjever* the terms of t h i s treaty were put In abeyance since
57
the war of succession*
9

Xn fact* the concerted plan of north«>eastem campaign

was conceived by the emperor Aurangzeb ^ l l e I t had t o be
-^^xecuted by h i s so long general Mir Jumla* although I t was not
pre<-concerted by the two^lplcniats • Again the course of actions
.and modelltles of conducting the Morthoeastem campaign*
projected l a t e r on altogether different attitude of the Emperor
Vho exercised the imperial authority as the supreme of the
Mu^al army.. But none of the Imperial forces and economic
resources were made available to Mir Jumla because of the con*
centratlon of l i o n parts of (iughal corps Into other frontiers..
Yet the viceroy was expected to mean h i s own business by
husbanding the stagnant resources on the spot,,^ indeed* I t was
a formidable and herculean task Involving r i s k s for Mir Jumla
^ o required t o c o l l e c t a sound finance within the time bound
l i m i t of e l 0 i t e e n months only before he could launcih the
h i s t o r i c campaign of North->east India by t<lovember 1661 In the

57.^ H. Goswarol* (ed) Puranl Assam Buranjl* p 16&..

 60
CO

l i n e s of integrated operation. Eixenthou^, t b i s Viceroy

was given s o l e l y the independent charge coupled with some
prerogative powers in formulating the policy matters of Bengal
subah as well as Morth-East frontier s t a t e s , but the Persian
Statesman started h i s policy shakily at the i n i t i a l stage under K<^
adverse conditions as c i t e d e a r l i e r . Now, Fiir was t o be guided
only by h i s own wisdom and experiences vAiat-so-ever, inorder t o
/ 59
overcome a l l the vinf oreseen problems and hurdles .h@=3EE3S=zcp#eee-.
Above a l l , North«east India was t o offer Mir Jumla
altogether a different terrain, unfamiliar plateau, treacherous
weather, turbulent rivers with tqpward current, streamlets,
(mverijpg lands, unfavourable climate e t c * , ^ o u t «hich he must
have ascertained the factual reports from the traders, preachers,
faujdars, petty c ^ f i c i a l s of the frcmtier ^ju^ogesj He a l s o
c o l l e c t e d the news of stored wealth of the htiom rulers from
microspic number of muslim s e t t l e r s of Ahon Kingdom* He was
a l s o provided with s o l i d informatione^ about the frontier Kingdom
fran Rashid Khan and Raja Sujan sin0i, the two generals of
twin operations vHnom t^ir had despatched before f o r diplomatic
transactions as well as r a i d s . To Hir Jumla, i t was not viable
and practicable t o formulate a ready made war plan or t o pursue
the traditional policy of military campaign «*iich he had been
following i n the Deccan and northern India4| Therefore, the
p o l i c y concerning north-eastern campaign developed from time to
time and with every new turn of events, i t had undergone changes
before i t could take a f i n a l shape and h i s success and f a i l u r e
a l s o varied accordindiy) t o the extent he could master strong
his limited resources inorder t o execute h i s policy f To
^8. S.K. Bhuyan, (ed) Assam Buranji, p 76;>
59,, I b i d . , p 77*
60. WTTrvine ( t r ) , o p . c i t ^ , v o l ^ I , p 92^,
 61

understand the predixsament vrhich b e f e l l him in the North«-east

Zndla« i t i s desirable t o {nake brie£ comparative estimate of
(4U^aX jn9rth«»east and north^v^est policy i n the l i ^ t o£ «ihi^
the new re«orientation of Wir Jurola's policy can be better
appreciated i n i t s formation period referred to*
a

NORTH EAST AND NORTH WEST

On h i s accession to the Mu^al throne the Shre%^ Emperor«
Aurangzeb was c a l l e d upon t o reckon with the two traditional
f r o n t i e r s of the empire/ the north*east and north»west« both to
pacify the r e b e l l i o u s conduct of frontier Chiefs and t o articulate
h i s policy of imperial expansionism. The use of d ^ e n s i v e
diplomatic weapon was the common feature in the North«west
frontier but t h i s doctrine was not conducive t o the rulers and
c h i e f t a i n s with heterogenous character in the North<»east'*
Gonsequently, the policy was o s c i l a t i n g l i k e pendulum from
defensive t o offensive and v i c e v e r s a . Again in North-west«
the policy was mainly of punitive character and the Mughal
a u t h o r i t i e s had to patch up peace by pensioning of the h o s t i l e
t r i b a l leaders fropo time t o time, overlooking t h e i r depredations.
But in the North-east the policy was based on aggrandisement
and annexation* The retributary measures of North-west were
more or l e s s sustained v&ieteaa in north-east these v^re mere
61
transitory .T The Mughal authority used t o take the advantage
of the i n t e r - t r i b a l jealousy with a view t o root out the perpetual
source of i r r i t a t i o n created by the plundering raids of the
rebel pathans and the p o l i t i c a l indoetrinati^i continued t o

6 1 . Sir J , N. Sarkar, Auranggeb, Vol.; H I , pp 241-47.

 62

be a dcaninant factor in dealing with the inhabiting t r i b e s i

but i n the t3orth«««a8t such a policy could not be very meaningful
as the xrulers and cihidBtains were backed by sound p o l i t i c a l
organisation. The maintenance of p o l i t i c a l equilibrium and
s t a b l e government with sound financial b a s i s / obviously/ evoked
and excited the jealousy of Mughal a u t h o r i t i e s . The benevolent
monarchy of North-east India« devoid of r e l i g i o u s fanaticism*
i n t e n s i f i e d the jealousy of Mughal rulers most of vAion vere the
b e l i e v e r of autocarcy based on r e l i g i o u s bigotry* Freed £r<m
the traditional Shia-Sunni c o n f l i c t of the north«v>est« the
Muc^al authorities in the North-east had to r e s o r t to determined
s t r e s s and strain i n consolidation of the Hchananadans in the
Brahmaputra* Sunna and Barak v a l l e y s . The pan»Xslamic policy
could be exercised in the foot h i l l s c£ Tripura* Khasi and J a i n t i a
h i l l s and Oaro h i l l s in phased and calculated manner. Nevertheless^
the main object of North*-east policy was t o control a n d c g ^ j ^ c l ^ ^
a l l the trades and the conmercial routes and centres so as t o
f i l l iqp the gap of both provincial ex<*hequer of Bengal subah
fand the t o t t e r i n g Imperial treasury with booty and revenues.^^
r

'contrary t o the north»west where p o l i t i o a l s t a b i l i t y and border

security were the s o l e aims., In fact* economic imperialism was
put into operation under the coverage of f r o n t i e r policy in the
f e r t i l e regions of North-Easti Strategic position of the two
f r o n t i e r s was pole asunder i n the s ^ ^ i t e e n t h and eighteenth
centuries., In fact*, the basic problems of the two pulsatlve
63
and s e n s i t i v e fronts differed i n sc<^>e and magnitude^v
62.. w. Irvine (tr) , op.clttf* vol i l l * p lo9i;
6 3 i F . Bemier* o p . d t . . * p 38o>; Wi!= Irvine ( t r ) o p . d t . *
v o l . II* pp 412-13,-
 63

The e a r l i e r Mughal authorities could not properly

v i s u a l i s e these tf^ fronts i n proper perspective* Thus on the
accession o£ Aurangzeb, the problems o£ the above £roants took
d i f f e r e n t turn* Tlils new Etoperor also put over-efni*iasis by
inegnifying the problenns ofi N<Mrth-«est# and diverting and
draining an^ay the best forces of the country upto 16G0 A»D*
^8 a result* the Mughal authorities under Aurangzeb also f a i l e d
t o make proper and r e q u i s i t e assessnent and importance i n the
North->east f r o n t i e r p o l i c y . In t h i s frontier* the fiughal
authorities continued t o handle and analyse the strategic
v a l i ^ s mere_jon simple equations* No matter* %dien the Hughal
authorities were in i l l u s i o n * the European free hooters and
traders under the coverage of the respective factors exploited
the f l u i d s i t u a t i o n and step by s t e p took available advantages
on the plea that they icould extend t h e i r possible assistance
in r e a l i s i n g the dreams of the Mughals* As the f i n a l phase
of Mu^al^s north»west frontier policy began t o r o l l under the
stewardship of emperor Aurangzeb* the tdieels of fortune turned
otherwise* To the Enperor* the s t r a t e g i c value of North-
e a s t front was v^decreasing t^ereas to the Eurqpean factors
i t was i n ascending scale* Of course* the Emperor pretended
t o r e v i t a l i s e the North-eastern frcmtier policy* though based
on the principle of exigency *„

64* F* Bemier* cy*cit«* p 168,