Webinar: Specification of passive fire protection

using Phast/Safeti and CFD

2 April 2019

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Your presenters

James Pickles Rune Natten Kleiveland

Product Owner Phast and Safeti CFD Product Manager / Principal
Specialist

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Agenda

▪ Background to Passive Fire Protection in the oil & gas industry

▪ How we can use Phast/Safeti to identify high escalation risk areas – a screening analysis

▪ How we can use CFD for detailed analysis / optimization

▪ Questions

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Background in the oil & gas industry

▪ What is escalation?
– An event that becomes worse due to release of additional inventory
▪ Passive fire protection is a barrier to escalation

▪ Too little: high escalation risk from jet fires or pool fires

▪ Too much: high cost of installation and maintenance

▪ Optimal: define acceptance criteria to focus efforts on protecting areas

most exposed to escalation risk

▪ Poll question

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Hypothetical problem

▪ Passive fire protection across a 40-year old gas terminal is Muster

point
beginning to degrade.

▪ The operator does not understand the original basis for PFP at the
terminal – there doesn’t seem to be a philosophy.

▪ Operator wants a clear philosophy on PFP and to know which PFP

they should maintain/replace and which they could remove.

Control
room

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The solution

▪ Utilise the site’s QRA model (in Safeti) to identify the areas with the highest jet fire and pool fire
escalation risk

▪ Assess the consequences of escalation

▪ Combine this information to provide guidance on the areas where PFP would provide the most
benefit

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How do we do it?

Muster
▪ First, define the rulesets: point

▪ Risk-based approach

▪ Apply/maintain PFP where escalation frequency > 10-4 per

year AND escalation would result in fatalities at either the
control room or the muster points

▪ Where the escalation frequency is between 10-4 and 10-6 per

year AND escalation would result in fatalities at either the Control
room
control room or the muster points, apply/maintain PFP
where it is reasonably practicable.

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How do we do it?

▪ Then, apply the rulesets:

▪ Risk effect levels in the QRA model.
– Provides frequency contours for a specified thermal radiation

For example: frequency contours for 180 kW/m2

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How do we do it?

▪ Escalation scenario assumed to involve impingement of a flame on pipework or equipment (e.g. a

vessel) causing rupture of the pipework or release of the contents of the equipment
instantaneously.
▪ Identify the escalation scenarios that could cause fatalities at either the control room or the
muster point.

Escalation scenario Distance to Fatalities in Escalation risk Escalation risk

fatality control room > 10-4 per > 10-6 per
criterion or at muster year year
point
Rupture of slug catcher 8” pipework 90 m No Yes Yes

Separator BLEVE 150 m Yes Yes Yes

Rupture of separator 12” pipework 120 m Yes No Yes

Suction scrubber BLEVE 130 m Yes No No

Rupture of compressor 10” pipework 170 m Yes Yes Yes

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What does this give us?

▪ Prioritization / screening of escalation scenarios / equipment that would benefit from PFP

▪ Operator wants a clear philosophy on PFP and to know which PFP they should maintain/replace
and which they could remove.

▪ This information can be used as a basis for CFD analysis

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Further possibilities

▪ We have not discussed the impact of time

– The risk plots are based on fires at t = 0
(conservative)
– Fire size likely to decrease with time.

– Define the duration of a fire required to cause

escalation (e.g. 10 minutes)

– Setup time-varying leak models and specify the “time at which release rate is calculated”
– The risk effect contours will be based on the fire sizes at the specified time.

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Further possibilities

▪ We have not discussed the impact of isolation and blowdown

– Setup time-varying leak models and specify isolation
and blowdown capability
– The risk effect contours will then factor in this
capability

Isolation Blowdown

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Further possibilities

Without blowdown @ escalation time With blowdown @ escalation time

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Further possibilities

▪ This provides a quantified benefit of the isolation and blowdown system, leading to a reduced
need for PFP.

▪ Similarly, it identifies the equipment that would still benefit from PFP even in the presence of a
fast performing isolation and blowdown system.

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Summary

▪ Use Safeti to show frequency contour plots (“risk effect levels”) for a given thermal radiation level
– Provides an indication of the escalation risk

▪ Identify high risk areas

▪ Determine consequences of escalation

▪ Based on defined criteria, make recommendations for PFP

▪ Further detailed analysis using CFD

▪ Poll question

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Optimization of passive fire protection (PFP)

Case study

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Why apply CFD? (Computational Fluid Dynamics)
▪ CFD is especially interesting to solve near field problems;

▪ The congestion/confinement of an installation plays important role in fire results;

▪ Obstruction can prevent radiation from reaching other areas and/or increase the radiation
locally, leading to more accurate results.

▪ KFX™:
– CFD simulator for fires and gas dispersion
in complex geometries.

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Why spend money optimising PFP design?
▪ More PFP does not always increase safety level.
– PFP makes it difficult to inspect piping and
equipment.
– Corrosion and wear can be difficult detect.
– Significant weight increase.

– (Can increase heat loads to unprotected objects) Sufficient amount of

Typical amount of
PFP used on North
Sea platforms"
PFP to achieve the
I ncreasing! required safety level"
Safety"

▪ A detailed analysis may show that additional fire Acceptable!

protection is required in certain areas.

Safety Level"

“Waste of M oney”

▪ Up to 70% reduction in amount of PFP if designed Amount of passive fire protection, PFP"

with an advanced methodology compared to

prescriptive methodology. Advanced Fire Design

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Case study - the problem

▪ New built offshore production platform.

▪ Design of Passive Fire Protection (PFP) layout established in early design stage.
– Based on a simplified analysis
– All deck beams to be fully protected
– All critical pipe supports to be protected

▪ Process layout and piping changed during engineering and building phase.
▪ Delays during building phase
▪ At time of delivery:
– No PFP on deck beams
– No PFP on pipe supports
– PFP on some of the vessel supports

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Objective

▪ Investigate whether un-protected support structures for piping and process equipment can
withstand heat loads from dimensioning fires.

▪ Which structures will need additional fire protection?

▪ Detailed study focusing on specific critical areas.

▪ Could typically be a continuation of a Safeti QRA based PFP study as presented earlier.

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Conventional methodology

▪ Use dimensioning accidental loads from regulations:

– NORSOK S-001:

▪ First assumption:
– All parts of the module may experience the same high heat load, at the same time.
– Same intensity during the entire fire scenario.
– Conservative approach

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Methodology – Part 1 - Fire simulations with KFX™
▪ Selection of fire scenarios.
– (Representative selection, impossible to
simulate everything)
– From a risk analysis (QRA)
– Probabilistic method.
– Scenario based.
– Selection:
– Leak position.
– Leak rate.
– Release direction.
– Composition.
– Wind conditions.

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 Methodology – Part 1 - Fire simulations with KFX™

▪ Captures the time development. Pool fire,

▪ Captures the interaction between fire and scenario 3
structure.
– Impingement.
– Buoyancy. After 3
minutes
▪ Detailed representation of heat loads to
structures and process equipment.
– Shielding.
– Radiation and convective heat loads.
– Region with high heat loads
– Part of object which experience high heat After 30
loads. minutes

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KFX™ Methodology – Part 2

▪ Heat loads from KFX™ as input to a structural response simulation

– KFX™: High resolution heat load data for realistic fire scenarios
– USFOS: Calculation of resulting temperature increase (Fahts) and the structural response
– Buckling, sagging, collapse, etc.
KFX™ USFOS

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Results, KO-drum supports, Mechanical response Fahts/Usfos

Temperature response Mechanical response

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Pipe supports, Mechanical response Fahts/Usfos

Temperature response Mechanical response

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Design criteria – rule set

▪ Yielding and failure of the pipe support itself is not a design criterion for the PFP study
– Avoid escalation

▪ The fire simulations have demonstrated that the extent of the credible fires is limited.
– Limited number of support structures that will fail for one scenario.

▪ The process piping in this module can handle far longer free spans
– Generally not necessary to protect the supports.
– (Assess pipe connections, welded vs flanged.)

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Results – Ruleset for pipe supports

▪ Overall result: Pipe supports do not need PFP

▪ For the following special cases the supports

should be protected with PFP:
– Always for safety critical components (ESV
etc. )
– Close to pipe intersections.
– Where heavy objects are attached to the
pipe.

Very limited amount of additional PFP required

Significantly less PFP than original design

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Summary – PFP case study

▪ ”State of the art” simulation tools for fire scenario and structural response.
– KFX™ and FAHTS/USFOS
▪ Detailed representation of the fire, thermal fluxes, affected area, and the structural
consequences.
▪ Make an overall strategy for use of PFP based on realistic fire scenarios and the actual capacity of
the structure.
▪ Apply PFP where it is required
– To avoid escalation.
▪ PFP solution optimized specifically for this process module
▪ Significant reductions in amount of PFP compared to traditional methods for PFP design.

▪ Complementary to a study with Safeti

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PFP design – Safeti and KFX methodology

▪ Combination of Safeti and KFX

– Efficient methodology for design and optimization of passive fire protection

1. Safeti study
– QRA
– Identify dimensioning fire scenarios.
– General PFP design, based on Safeti risk effect levels.
– Identify critical areas, safety and cost.

2. KFX analysis for optimization of PFP in the critical areas

– Together with Usfos

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