originalni
naučni
rad
doc dr Sanja Vučković
Fakultet za poslovne studije,
Megatrend univerzitet
svuckovic@megatrend.edu.rs
Prof. dr Vladimir Prvulović
Fakultet za medjunarodnu
ekonomiju, Megatrend univerzitet
vprvulovic@megatrend.edu.rs
Rad primljen: 24.09.2013.
Odobren za štampu: 22.10.2013.
UDK 336.714/.717
USPON I PAD
UNIVERZALNOG
BANKARSTVA
Rezime
Savremena kriza pokreće stare dileme o razdvajanju komercijalnog i
investicionog bankarstva. Nesumnjive činjenice o uzrocima krize govore
u prilog tezi da su zahuktali egzotični poslovi s hartijama od vrednosti
bili glavni pokretač finansijskog kraha. Najveće role imale su investicione
banke i bile su najvažniji akter na ovom segmentu tržišta, pa se kao moguće
rešenje za sprečavanje budućih finansijskih problema nametnulo razdvajanje
investicionih i komercijalnih bankarskih poslova. Glavni argument je da se ne
sme dozvoliti da novac poreskih obveznika ponovo leči probleme banaka u
privatnom vlasništu, probleme prouzrokovane lošim procenama i odlukama
ambicioznih i neopreznih menadžera. Rad se u prvom delu fokusira na razvoj
univerzalnog bankarstva i na pojašnjenje specifičnih političkih i društvenih
okolnosti za nastanak prvog zakona koji reguliše univerzalne banke. Dalje
se ukazuje na prednosti i manjkavosti ovog koncepta, da bi se u poslednjem
delu sumirali okviri novih oštrih regulatornih propisa i preporuka u ovom
segmentu finansijskog tržišta.
Ključne reči: univerzalno bankarstvo, komercijalne banke, investicione banke,
sekjuritizacija, regulacija, deregulacija, kriza
JEL: G01, G21, G24, N20
bankarstvo 5 2013
54
 original
UDC 336.714/.717 scientific
paper

THE RISE AND

DECLINE OF
UNIVERSAL
BANKING Sanja Vučković, PhD,
Assistant Professor
Graduate School of Business
Studies, Megatrend University
svuckovic@megatrend.edu.rs

Prof. Vladimir Prvulović, PhD

Graduate School of International
Economics, Megatrend University
vprvulovic@megatrend.edu.rs

Summary

The contemporary crisis has reopened the old dilemmas about the
separation of commercial and investment banking. Indisputable facts about
what caused the crisis speak in favor of the thesis that the frenzied exotic
operations with securities were the main trigger of the financial breakdown.
The biggest roles were played by investment banks, as the main players in this
market segment, hence the potential solution for preventing future financial
problems imposed itself in the form of separating investment and commercial
banking operations. The major argument is not to allow the taxpayers’ money
to once again heel the problems of private banks, problems caused by bad
judgments and decisions on the part of ambitious and imprudent managers.
In its first part, the paper focuses on the development of universal banking
and the clarification of specific political and social circumstances relevant for
the adoption of the first law regulating universal banks. The paper moves
on to indicate the advantages and disadvantages of this concept, whereas
its final section sums up the frameworks of the new stricter regulations and
recommendations in this field of the financial market.

Keywords: universal banking, commercial banks, investment banks,

securitization, regulation, deregulation, crisis

JEL: G01, G21, G24, N20

bankarstvo 5 2013

Paper received: 24.09.2013

Approved for publishing: 22.10.2013

55
Univerzalno bankarstvo: put do
zvezda
Osnovne usluge komercijalnih,
tradicionalnih ili klasičnih banaka, vekovima
unazad podrazumevaju primanje različitih
vrsta depozita od klijenata i izdavanje kredita
stanovništvu i privredi u zemlji i inostranstvu.
Ovi najstariji bankarski poslovi nazivaju se
depozitno-kreditnim. Depoziti se međusobno
razlikuju po ročnosti, vrednosti i valuti, što
bitno utiče na kamatu koju deponenti dobijaju
na uložena sredstva. Novac koji je banci duže na
raspolaganju ona vrednuje i nagrađuje više od
onog koji joj je ponuđen na kraći period. Takođe,
krediti koje banka odobrava svojim klijentima
imaju različitu namenu, ročnost, vrednost, pa i
kvalitet i, prema tome, nose različitu kamatnu
stopu koju banka na njih zaračunava. Pored
ovih osnovnih poslova, većina banaka obavlja
usluge platnog prometa, izdavanja garancija,
poslove u vezi sa finansiranjem nekog
spoljnotrgovinskog posla, menjačke poslove,
povereničke, kao i mnoge druge. Bez obzira na
broj i kvalitet usluga koje pružaju, zajednička
karakteristika svih tradicionalnih komercijalnih
banaka je u tome da su im depoziti osnovni
izvor prihoda, a izdati krediti čine najznačajniju
stavku aktive. Naplaćujući višu aktivnu kamatu
za izdate kredite i plaćajući nižu (pasivnu) za
primljene depozite, banke ostvaruju razliku u
ceni koja čini osnovni profit ovih institucija.
Takođe, banke prihoduju po osnovu raznih
provizija i naplata za ostale svoje usluge.
Nekadašnja uloga banaka vremenom se
menja. One postaju vrlo aktivan i u pojedinim
zemljama dominantan učesnik na finansijskom
tržištu. Koncept komercijalnog bankarstva,
naročito u eri industrijalizacije, pruža isuviše
mali manevarski prostor za povećane apetite,
kako samih bankara tako i njihovih klijenata.
Javlja se potreba za dodatnim izvorima sredstava.
Spektar njihovih usluga širi se shodno zahtevima
klijenata, s jedne, i prirodne težnje banke za
sticanjem što višeg profita, s druge strane.
Savremene banke širom sveta danas nude
spektar usluga svojim klijentima koji se
drastično razlikuje od poslova tradicionalnih
banaka. Pored klasičnih bankarskih, obavljaju
poslove sa hartijama od vrednosti, daju
konsultantske usluge u vezi sa investiranjem
na finansijskom tržištu, pružaju pomoć oko
organizovanja emisije hartija od vrednosti,
garantuju emisije, otkupljuju ili samo prodaju
hartije emitenata. Isto tako, aktivni su učesnici u
restrukturiranju preduzeća, promeni vlasničke
strukture, preuzimanju ili spajanju. Banke koje
se bave isključivo prethodnim nabrojanim
poslovima nazivaju se investicione banke.
Usko su povezane sa brokersko-dilerskim
poslovima i aktivno trguju svim vrstama hartija
od vrednosti. Strukturu njihove pasive čine,
pored sopstvenog kapitala, pretežno izdate
hartije od vrednosti ili pozajmljeni kapital od
drugih banaka. Njihovi najznačajniji klijenti su
investicioni i penzioni fondovi, hedž fondovi,
osiguravajuća društva, brojne korporacije.
Veliki doprinos razvoju investicionog
bankastva daje međunarodno regulatorno
okruženje, okrenuto procesima deregulacije
poslednjih decenija, razvoj tehnologije u oblasti
širenja informacija, kao i nesumnjiv napredak
kompjuterske tehnologije. Zahvaljujući broju i
raznolikosti usluga koje nude, mnoge današnje
banke dobijaju naziv „finansijski supermarketi“
ili one stop shops što nedvosmisleno opisuje da
ponuda na jednom mestu može zadovoljiti
apsolutno sve finansijske prohteve. Zahvaljujući
ovoj činjenici koja pogoduje kako komitentima
tako i bankama, banke sve više razvijaju svoje
aktivnosti na finansijskom tržištu afirmišući
time koncept univerzalnog bankarstva.
Univerzalne banke su finansijske institucije
koje se bave podjednako depozitno-kreditnim
poslovima sa stanovništvom i privredom i
poslovima sa hartijama od vrednosti. Imaju
dominantnu ulogu na finansijskom tržištu
zajedno sa ostalim institucionalnim ulagačima.
Koncept univerzalne banke ima dugu istoriju i
u mnogim razvijenim zemlјama predstavlјa i
jedini model poslovanja banaka (Pelaez i Pelaez,
2009). U manjem broju zemalјa, postojala
su regulatorna ograničenja za komercijalno
i investiciono bankarstvo pod zajedničkim
krovom. Zapravo, komercijalni i bankarski
poslovi su dugi niz godina bili fizički odvojeni
zakonskim aktima i nije postojala mogućnost
bankarstvo 5 2013
da ista banka obavlјa obe grupe finansijskih
poslova. Da bi se dobio jasniji uvid o tome da
li univerzalno bankarstvo treba, mora ili ne
sme da opstane u bankarskom sektoru i na
koji način mu doprinosi ili šteti, napravićemo
56
 Universal banking: road to stardom
The basic services of commercial, traditional
or classic banks have for centuries referred to
the taking of various types of deposits from
clients and granting of local and cross-border,
retail and corporate loans. These oldest
banking operations are known as deposit and
lending operations. Deposits differ according
to maturity, amount and currency, which
considerably determine the interest that the
depositors get for their deposited funds. A
bank values more and accordingly rewards
the money entrusted to it for a longer period
of time, as opposed to the money offered for a
shorter period. Also, loans granted by a bank
to its clients have a different purpose, maturity,
value, and quality, thereby entailing different
interest rates calculated by the bank. In addition
to these basic operations, most banks conduct
payment system services, issue guarantees,
finance foreign trade, effect foreign exchange
operations, trustee operations and many others.
Regardless of the number and quality of services
they offer, the common characteristic of all
traditional, commercial banks is that deposits
are their main source of income, whereas
granted loans stand as the most important item
of assets. By charging higher lending interest
rate on granted loans and paying lower (passive)
interest rate on received deposits, banks achieve
a difference in price which is the main profit of
these institutions. Also, banks generate profit
in respect of various fees and charges for their
other services.
The role banks had in the past has changed
over time. They have become a rather active
and, in certain countries, predominant player in
the financial market. The concept of commercial
banking, especially in the industrialization
era, offers too narrow a maneuvering space
for increasing appetites, both of bankers
themselves and of their clients. A need has
arisen for additional sources of finance. The
range of their services has been expanding
in line with the clients’ requests, on the one
bankarstvo 5 2013
hand, and with the natural inclination of banks
towards the acquisition of the largest possible
profit, on the other.
Today, modern banks all over the world
offer an array of services to their clients,
57
drastically different from the operations of
traditional banks. Alongside the classic banking
operations, they conduct securities-related
operations, provide consulting services in
respect of financial market investments, provide
assistance in organizing securities issuance,
guarantees these issuances, purchase or just sell
securities on behalf of their issuers. Moreover,
they actively participate in restructuring of
enterprises, changes in ownership structure,
mergers or acquisitions. Banks which are
primarily engaged in the above listed operations
are called investment banks. They are closely
associated to broker-dealer operations and
actively trade in all types of securities. The
structure of their liabilities, in addition to
equity, mostly consists of issued securities or
capital borrowed from other banks. Their most
important clients are investment and pension
funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, and
numerous corporations. Largely contributing
to the investment banking development is the
international regulatory environment, inclined
towards the deregulation process in the past
decades; the development of information
distribution technology, accompanied by the
evident progress of computer technologies in
general. Thanks to the number and versatility of
services they offer, many of the banks today get
nicknamed “financial supermarkets” or “one
stop shops”, which unambiguously indicates
that the offer in a single place absolutely can
satisfy all financial needs. Due to this fact,
favorable both for clients and for banks,
banks have been increasingly developing their
financial market activities, thereby promoting
the concept of universal banking.
Universal banks are financial institutions
equally dealing with deposit and lending
operations with retail and corporate clients,
and with securities-related operations. They
play a dominant role at the financial market
alongside the other institutional investors. The
concept of a universal bank has had a long
history and in many developed countries it is
the only banking model (Pelaez and Pelaez,
2009). In a few countries, there have been
certain regulatory limitations for commercial
and investment banking under the same roof. In
fact, for quite a while, commercial and banking
operations have been physically separated by
kratak osvrt na njegov nastanak. Zanimlјivo
je da su se u posmatranim sistemima (u SAD
i u Evropi) odnosi između komercijalnog i
investicionog bankarstva potpuno različito
formirali i razvijali. Zajedničko im je ipak to
što je univerzalno bankarstvo nabujalo kada
su želјe banaka za visokim profitima postale
važnije od društvenih interesa i stabilnih
finansijskih i ekonomskih tokova. Zbog toga je
priča o usponu i padu univerzalnog bankarstva
neodvojiva od sudbina poznatih poslovnih
lјudi i bankara.
Kako se koncept univerzalnog bankarstva
razvijao u Americi
Bankarski sistem Sjedinjenih Američkih
Država sve do prve polovine XVIII veka
funkcioniše u potpunosti bez ideje o formiranju
centralne banke. Prve inicijative, po ugledu na
Banku Engleske, rađaju se 1791. godina kada
se i formira Prva banka Sjedinjenih Američkih
Država. Ona funkcioniše sve do početka
XIX veka, kada se ukida odlukom Senata,
zahvalјujući velikom broju glasova koje su imale
manje federalne države u ovoj instituciji. Sličnu
sudbinu doživlјava i Druga banka Sjedinjenih
Američkih Država, koja postaje meta zapadnih
federalnih država i prestaje s radom početkom
XIX veka (Rothbard, 2002). Period nakon
neuspelih pokušaja formiranja centralne
banke karakteriše postojanje oko 7.000 manjih
nacionalnih banaka koje izdaju novac. Šarenilo
papirnih i kovanih novčanica, od kojih mnoge
vremenom gube vrednost na tržištu, konačno
prestaje krajem XIX veka kada administracija
predsednika Linkolna odlučuje da uvede
jedinstven nacionalni novac (greenbacks) koji će
izdavati autorizovane nacionalne banke i koji je
u to vreme služio prvenstveno za finansiranje
tek počelog Građanskog rata. Male banke koje
nemaju ekskluzivno pravo štampanja novca
takođe nastavlјaju sa radom, ali bez mogućnosti
da koriste svoj dotadašnji novac.
Najveću ulogu u smirivanju tržišta posle niza
Federal Reserve
manjih finansijskih kriza do 1913. godine imaju
upravo najveće banke smeštene u Nјujorku koje
počinju da posluju kao neformalna zajednica
centralnih banaka. Na čelo ovog sistema
postavlјen je bankar Džon Morgan (John
Morgan). Preteča današnjeg FED-a, ovaj sistem
dokazuje da su funkcionisanje i razvoj jedne
privrede nemogući bez centralne banke. Jačanje
javne i političke svesti o potrebi centralizacije
bankarstva na nivou zemlјe dovode i do
osnivanja Sistema federalnih rezervi (Federal
Reserve System, FED) krajem decembra 1913.
godine koji danas posluje kao centralna banka
Sjedinjenih Američkih Država.
Grupisanje najvećih, najmoćnijih i
najuspešnijih poslovnih banaka ujedno je značilo
širenje njihove uloge u finansiranju razvoja
najznačajnijih američkih korporacija u oblasti
industrije i u ostalim krucijalnim granama.
Ovo širenje moći povezuje se sa učešćem
banaka i samih bankara u delu vlasništva
mnogih vodećih industrijskih giganata. Banke
omogućavaju privredi finansiranje na različite
načine, kako putem kredita tako i putem
izdavanja hartija od vrednosti. Pomažu im oko
emisija korporativnih hartija, pokrovitelјstva
ili prodaje hartija na tržištu. Dakle, banke
i korporacije međusobno postaju vezane
neraskidivim poslovnim, a neretko i privatnim
kontaktima, a sve u ambijentu procvale
privrede početkom XX veka. Dovolјno govori
podatak da su J. P. Morgan i House of Morgan
(jedna od kompanija J. P. Morgana) kontrolisali
najveće sektore privrede Amerike. Imali su čak
126 mesta u upravnim odborima 89 kompanija
i kontrolisali su 40% ukupnog industrijskog,
finansijskog i trgovinskog kapitala Sjedinjenih
Američkih Država što je činilo oko trećine bruto
domaćeg proizvoda (Tabarrok, 1998). Krupan
bankarski kapital omogućava upravlјanje
političkim odlukama, a sami bankari time sebi
obezbeđuju još veći uticaj i bogatstvo. Moć
najvećeg konkurenta Rokfelera (Rockefeller),
jednog od klјučnih lјudi koji su imali uticaj na
stvaranje Sistema federalnih rezervi, a i ostalih
bankara (naročito njujorških), nije bila ništa
bankarstvo 5 2013
manja. Prvobitno vlasnik kompanije Standard
Oil (Standard Oil), a kasnije i mnogih drugih u
oblasti industrije, Rokfeler kupuje prvu banku
koju kroz seriju merdžera uvećava do nivoa
jedne od najvećih banaka Amerike. U to vreme
58
 means of legal provisions, leaving no possibility
for one and the same bank to conduct both
groups of financial operations. In order to
acquire a clearer insight into whether universal
banking should, must or must not survive in the
banking sector, and in which way it facilitates
it or damages it, we will briefly go back to its
origins. Interestingly enough, in the observed
systems (in the USA and in Europe) the relations
between commercial and investment banking
have had a completely different formation and
development process. What they do have in
common, however, is the fact that universal
banking flourished once the banks’ desires
for high profits gained precedence over social
interests and stable financial and economic
flows. It is exactly why the story of the rise and
decline of universal banking is inextricably
intertwined with the fates of celebrated
businessmen and bankers.
Development of the universal banking
concept in America
Until the first half of the 18th century, the
banking sector of the United States of America
functioned completely bereft of the idea about
the formation of a central bank. The first
initiatives, modeled after the Bank of England,
were born in 1791 when the First Bank of the
United States of America was established. It
operated until the early 19th century, when it
was closed according to the Senate’s decision,
owing to the majority votes of the smaller states
within this institution. Similar fate befell the
Second Bank of the United States of America,
which stopped operating in early 19th century
after it became the target of the western states
(Rothbard, 2002). The period following the
unsuccessful attempts to establish a central
bank is characterized by the existence of about
7000 smaller national banks issuing money. The
motley of banknotes and coins, many of which
lost their market value over time, finally ended
in late 19th century, when the administration of
President Lincoln decided to introduce uniform
national money (greenbacks) which was issued
bankarstvo 5 2013
by authorized national banks, and at that time
primarily used to finance the Civil War that had
just broken out. Small banks with no exclusive
rights to print money also continued their
operations, but without the possibility to use
59
the money they used until that point.
The largest role in pacifying the market after
a series of slighter financial crises up until 1913
was played by no other than the largest banks
located in New York, which started operating
as an informal union of central banks. The
banker John Morgan was appointed head of
this system. As a predecessor of today’s Fed,
this system proves that proper functioning and
development of an economy are impossible
without a central bank. The strengthened public
and political awareness about the necessity of
having centralized banking at the country level
led to the establishment of the Federal Reserve
System (the Fed) in late December 1913, which
today operates as the central bank of the United
States of America.
The consolidation of the largest, most
powerful and most successful commercial
banks at the same time implied their expanded
role in financing the development of the most
important US corporations in the field of industry
and other crucial branches. This expansion of
power is associated with the share of banks and
bankers themselves in the ownership structure
of many leading industrial giants. Banks enable
financing of economy in many ways, both by
granting loans and by issuing securities. They
provide assistance in respect of corporate
securities issuing, underwriting or selling at the
market. Thus, banks and corporations become
mutually connected by unbreakable business,
and often private ties, in the environment of
the flourishing early 20th century economy. It
is sufficient to say that J. P. Morgan and House
of Morgan (one of J. P. Morgan’s companies)
controlled the largest sectors of the US economy.
They had as many as 126 seats in the BoDs of
89 companies, thereby controlling 40% of total
industrial, financial and trading capital of the
United States of America, which amounted
to about one third of GDP (Tabarrok, 1998).
Substantial banking capital provides leverage in
political decision-making, and bankers thereby
acquire additional influence and wealth. The
biggest competitor, Rockefeller, one of the
key people who impacted the creation of the
Federal Reserve System, just like other bankers
(especially those in New York), was equally
powerful. At first the owner of Standard Oil
Company, and later of many other industrial
ova kompanija finansira izbornu kampanju
senatora Mekinlija (McKinley) i kroz njegovu
administraciju kasnije vrši ogroman uticaj na
političke odluke. Značajniji je, međutim, odnos
koji uspostavlјa sa senatorom Oldričem (Nelson
Aldrich), prvo politički, a udajom senatorove
ćerke za njegovog sina i familijarni. Oldrič je bio
i predsednik Nacionalne monetarne komisije
(National Monetary Commision), tvorac plana
(Aldrich's Plan) koji sa neznatnim izmenama
postaje poznati Glas-Stigalov zakon (Glass-
Steagall Act). On je i jedan od osnivača Sistema
federalnih rezervi. Zapada za oko i činjenica
da je Oldričev sin postao predsednik banke
sa kojom Rokfeler započinje svoju bankarsku
karijeru. A očevo bogatstvo u periodu od
trideset godina, koliko je bio senator, raste sa
50.000 na 12 miliona dolara (Tabarrok, 1998).
Međutim, tridesetih godina XX veka, SAD,
a i ostali deo sveta, suočavaju se sa do tada
najvećom ekonomskom depresijom koju je svet
poznavao. Nezaposlenost koja je dostizala preko
30%, pad industrijske proizvodnje od oko 50% i
međunarodne trgovine do 60% parametri su koji
potpuno srozavaju američku i svetsku privredu.
Kriza najpre počinje na berzi, strmoglavim
padom cena akcija kotiranih preduzeća, ali vrlo
brzo eskalira kroz realni sektor i dovodi do
kolapsa. Posle godina procvata, cene akcija su se
neprirodno pretvorile u mehur koji je u jednom
trenutku eksplodirao ostavlјajući dramatične
posledice. Krivci su se tražili na raznim
stranama. Veliki broj malih banaka je zatvoren, a
njihovi advokati su tvrdili da su oni žrtve velikih
banaka koje su svojim aktivnostima sa hartijama
od vrednosti zaslužne za stvaranje berzanskog
mehura i devastiranje čitave privrede. Drugi su
(monetaristi), pak, smatrali da se radilo o običnoj
recesiji koja je povremeno stanje svake privrede,
a da je kasnije pogrešna politika centralne
banke, restriktivno orijentisana, dodatno
proširila žarišta. Kejnzijanci su uzrok nalazili
u smanjenju tražnje i potrošnje koja nastaje kao
posledica gubitka poverenja u finansijski sektor.
Smatrali su da je vlada morala da povećava
deficit i smanjuje poreze, da bude ekspanzivno
orijentisana kako bi tražnja ponovo oživela, što
su i predlagali u jeku depresije.
Ubrzo nakon Velike depresije kreatori
ekonomske politike pokušavaju raznim
predlozima, koji na kraju prerastaju u zakone,
da savladaju zahuktalo finansijsko tržište,
naročito u sektoru bankarstva. Tridesetih
godina (1933) stupa na snagu poznati Glas-
Stigalov zakon koji u potpunosti zabranjuje
komercijalnim bankama da se bave poslovima
sa hartijama od vrednosti, kao i bilo kakvu
međusobnu povezanost ove dve grupe banaka
u smislu vlasništva ili upravlјanja (Neal i White,
2012). Poslednji segment posebno pogađa
velike banke, kao što je bila J. P. Morgan and
Company, s obzirom na činjenicu da su one
i formalno imale veliki uticaj na poslovanje
mnogih drugih banaka putem direktnog učešća
u vlasništvu ili upravlјanju. Najveća zamerka
uvođenju novog zakona bila je, skoro svima
očigledna, loša namera predlagača da se uništi
prvenstveno imperija porodice Morgan. Sve
postaje interesantnije ako se ima u vidu da je
jedan od kreatora zakona (Glas) bio u bliskim
vezama sa senatorom Oldričem koji je preko
njega i lobirao za uvođenje pomenutog zakona.
Štetu je pretrpela i konkurentska imperija, ali
se smatra da je Morganova znatno veća (što je i
bio cilј). Posledično, banka J. P. Morgana ostaje
čisto komercijalna banka, a jedan deo vlasnika
se odvaja i osniva kompaniju Morgan Stanley.
Zakon je prilično tesno izglasan u Kongresu,
ali mu je u korist išla podrška predsednika
Ruzvelta i brojne otkrivene malverzacije
velikih banaka. Naime, u isto vreme je u javnost
dospela istraga koja se vodila u Morgan grupi, a
ticala se neplaćanja poreza prethodnih nekoliko
godina, dok je konkurent Rokfeler uspeo
da se izvuče zahvalјujući bliskim vezama sa
senatorom Oldričem. Takođe, smatralo se da
postoji veliki sukob interesa kada komercijalne
i investicione banke posluju pod istim krovom
i da će u kriznim situacijama doći do moralnog
hazarda. Naime, u pokušaju da sebi obezbedi
veći profit, banka počinje da trguje hartijama
od vrednosti sa svojim klijentima. Zapravo,
očekujući promenu cene na tržištu, preko veštih,
iskusnih menadžera i bankarskih savetnika,
banka može direktno svojim klijentima da
proda hartiju za koju veruje da će joj cena
opasti. Pomenuti zakon u neizmenjenom
bankarstvo 5 2013
obliku ostaje na snazi sve do sedamdesetih
godina XX veka kada komercijalne banke sve
više vrše pritisak da se on ukine. Razlog je bio
taj što je profit komercijalnih banaka drastično
opao zahvalјujući praksi da se preduzeća
60
 companies as well, Rockefeller bought his first
bank which, through a series of mergers, he
enlarged to the level of one of the biggest banks
in the US. At that time, his company financed
the electoral campaign of Senator McKinley,
and subsequently used his administration to
exert enormous pressure on political decisions.
Somewhat more important is, however, the
relationship he established with Senator Nelson
Aldrich, which, although political at first,
after the Senator’s daughter married his son,
also became personal. Furthermore, Aldrich
was the President of the National Monetary
Commission, and the creator of the so-called
Aldrich’s Plan, which, with slight amendments,
grew into the famous Glass-Steagall Act. He
was one of the founders of the Federal Reserve
System as well. Conspicuously, Aldrich’s son
was appointed president of the bank which
marked the beginning of Rockefeller’s career
in banking. Aldrich’s wealth, during the thirty
years he spent as the Senator, accumulated from
50,000 to 12 million dollars (Tabarrok, 1998).
However, in the 1930s, the USA and the
rest of the world faced the biggest economic
depression, unprecedented until that point.
Unemployment exceeding 30%, drop of
industrial production by about 50% and
decline in international trade by 60% are the
parameters that completely devastated the US
and global economy. The crisis first broke out at
the stock exchange, with the drastic fall of listed
companies’ stock prices, but it quickly escalated
in the real sector, and caused a total collapse.
Following the years of bloom, the stock prices
artificially created a bubble which at one point
burst, leaving dramatic consequences behind
it. The culprits were sought on various sides.
Many small banks were closed, their lawyers
claiming that they had been the victims of the
leading banks whose securities-related activities
were to be blamed for the creation of the stock
exchange bubble and devastation of the entire
economy. Others (i.e. monetarists), however,
believed that it was just a regular recession,
as an occasional state of every economy, and
bankarstvo 5 2013
that the subsequent central bank’s policy,
restrictiveness-oriented, spread the contagion.
The Keynesians found the cause in the reduced
demand and consumption, resulting from the
lost confidence in the financial sector. They
61
believed that the government should have
increased the deficit and reduced the taxes, and
that it should have been expansion-oriented
in order to revive the demand, as they kept
suggesting even at the height of the depression.
Soon after the Great Depression, the
economic policy makers offered various
proposals, eventually turning into laws, in their
attempt to soothe the heated financial market,
especially in the banking segment. In the 1930s
(1933, to be precise) the famous Glass-Steagall
Act came into effect, introducing a complete
ban for commercial banks to conduct securities-
related activities, and prohibiting any affiliation
whatsoever between these two groups of
banks in terms of ownership or management
(Neal and White, 2012). The latter segment
particularly affected large banks, such as J. P.
Morgan and Company, given the fact that they
formally had a large impact on the business
of many other banks due to their direct share
in ownership or management. The principal
objection to the adoption of the new law was the
bad, and obvious to almost everyone, intention
of its proponent to destroy, first and foremost,
the empire of the Morgan family. The whole
thing becomes even more interesting when
we bear in mind that one of the creators of
the law (i.e. Glass) had close ties with Senator
Aldrich, who had lobbied for the adoption of
the concerned law. Although the competitive
empire suffered the damage as well, it is
generally believed that the damage inflicted
upon Morgan was considerably higher (as was
originally intended). Consequently, the bank
of J. P. Morgan remained a pure commercial
bank, whereas a group of owners stepped out
to establish the company Morgan Stanley. The
law was adopted in Congress with a rather tight
voting result, but it had in its favour the support
of President Roosevelt, and numerous cases of
exposed malversation in the operations of large
banks. Namely, an investigation led at that
time within the Morgan group concerning tax
evasion in the several years before got disclosed
to the public. Morgan’s competitor, Rockefeller,
managed to dodge this bullet thanks to his
close ties with Senator Aldrich. Moreover, it
was considered that a huge conflict of interests
existed when commercial and investment
banks did business under the same roof, and
osamdesetih godina okreću hartijama od
vrednosti kao atraktivnijem izvoru finansiranja
od dotadašnjeg tradicionalnog kreditiranja
putem banaka. Istovremeno, profit investicionih
banaka rapidno raste.
Najpre se 1978. godine komercijalnim
bankama dopušta prodaja komercijalnih zapisa
i osnivanje afilijacije koja ima pravo da do pet
procenata ukupnog prihoda ostvari putem
pokrovitelјstva, a kasnije se (1988) ta mogućnost
proširuje na deset procenata prihoda i to ne samo
putem poslova sa komercijalnim zapisima već i
sa hipotekarnim i municipalnim obveznicama.
Stege sve više popuštaju: dve godine kasnije,
komercijalne banke su već mogle da posluju sa
korporativnim obveznicama kao i sa akcijama
preduzeća. Vremenom dozvola za obavlјanje
poslova sa hartijama od vrednosti dostiže
čak 25% ukupnih prihoda, da bi 1999. godine
pomenuti zakon bio u potpunosti i ukinut
Gramm-Leach-Bliley zakonom. Time je i zvanično
počela nova era univerzalnog bankarstva u
Americi (Casserley i saradnici, 2009).
Univerzalno bankarstvo u Americi u proteklih
deceniju i po karakterisalo je izdvajanje velikih
finansijskih kuća, kao što su Goldman Sachs,
AIG, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns
i Lehman Brothers koje su vrlo uspešno poslovale
sve do finansijske krize 2007. godine. Nakon
izbijanja krize doživlјavaju različitu sudbinu.
Neke su bankrotirale (Lehman), neke su prodate
(Bear, Merrill, AIG), a Morgan Stanley i Goldman
Sachs nastavlјaju da posluju kao komercijalne
banke. Zajedničko za sve banke je da su zahtevale,
a neke i dobile, pomoć od države.
Čime je bilo podstaknuto bujanje univerzalnih
banaka u SAD u poslednjih tridesetak godina? Još
je administracija predsednika Regana dozvolila
liberalnije odnose na finansijskom tržištu.
Umesto vladinih programa izdavanja kredita
zajmoprimcima s niskim dohotkom, liberalizacija
je zapravo značila da se bankama dopušta da
se bave popularnim i široko rasprostranjenim
poslovima kreditiranja stanovništva. Banke su
izdavale pretežno kredite osigurane hipotekom i
vremenom cene kuća i stanova počinju da rastu.
Banke prikuplјene hipotekarne kredite sortiraju
u pulove sličnih karakteristika i na osnovu njih
izdaju dužničke hartije od vrednosti i dalјe ih
preprodaju na finansijskom tržištu. Ovo su osnovne
karakteristike procesa sekjuritizacije neposredno
pre izbijanja poslednje finansijske krize. Da bi se
hartije što lakše i skuplјe prodale na finansijskom
tržištu, neophodna je bila reputaciona potpora
koju pružaju rejting agencije. Naime, najpoznatije
rejting agencije rangiraju ovakve instrumente kao
hartije veoma visokog kvaliteta i time njihovim
izdavaocima omogućavaju veći i brži profit. Nizak
rizik hartije dobijaju na osnovu hipoteka koje su
im u osnovi, a čija cena u međuvremenu rapidno
raste. Naposletku, s padom cena nekretnina
čitav proces se piramidalno urušava i ostavlјa
posledice kako na finansijsku tako i na realnu
oblast ekonomskog života. Sumnjivo poslovanje
sa egzotičnim hartijama od vrednosti je na kraju
samo Sjedinjene Američke Države kroz program
pomoći (Troubled Asset Relief Program, TARP)
koštalo oko 400 milijardi dolara. Poslednjih godina
vodi se oštra polemika o ponovnom uvođenju
formalne barijere između poslovanja komercijalnih
i investicionih banaka (Greenspan, 2007).
Nemačka - postojbina univerzalnog
bankarstva
Nemačko bankarstvo u svojoj istoriji
nikada nije imalo zakonsko razgraničenje
komercijalnog i investicionog bankarstva. Tamo
je koncept univerzalnih banaka oduvek postojao
kao jedini oblik bankarskog poslovanja. Kraj
XIX veka karakteriše brz razvoj industrije sa
zahtevima za velikim kapitalnim investicijama
koje su mogle biti obezbeđene jedino putem
udruživanja sredstava više pojedinačnih
banaka. Udruživanjem kapitala stvara se manji
broj većih banaka (Berlin banks) koje su imale
dominaciju u finansiranju razvoja privrede, ali
bez funkcije centralne banke.
Nemačka centralna banka (Reichsbank)
od 1876. godine jedina je imala monopol nad
izdavanjem novca, ali je takođe bila zadužena
i za kreditiranje privrede na kraći rok putem
razgranate mreže svojih banaka. Zahvalјujući
brzom razvoju industrije u zemlјi, velike banke
su bile fokusirane na finansiranje korporativnih
klijenata, dok su štedno kreditne zadruge
i kreditne unije poslove sa stanovništvom
obavlјale sve do šezdesetih godina XX veka.
bankarstvo 5 2013
Banke su imale vlasnički udeo u preduzećima
koja su finansirala što se pokazalo kao mudro
rešenje u godinama hiperinflacije nakon Prvog
svetskog rata. Naime, u kriznom periodu
velike inflacije banke su izgubile skoro dve
62
 that in emergency situations there was potential
for moral hazard. Attempting to yield higher
profits, a bank starts to trade in securities with
its clients. In fact, while expecting the market
price to change, through skillful, experienced
managers and banking advisors, the bank can
directly sell to its clients the securities whose
price it believes would fall. The concerned law
remained in effect, in the same form, until the
1970s, when commercial banks started to exert
increasing pressure for it to be abolished. The
reason lay in the fact that the commercial banks’
profit was drastically diminishing due to the
practice exercised by enterprises in the 1980s
which resorted to securities as a more attractive
source of finance compared to traditional
bank lending. At the same time, the profit of
investment banks was rapidly increasing.
At first, in 1978 commercial banks were
permitted to sell commercial papers and to
establish affiliations entitled to yield up to 5% of
total income by means of securities underwriting,
and later on (in 1988) this possibility was
expanded to 10% of income, not only by means
of operations with commercial papers, but
also with mortgage-backed and municipal
bonds. The pressures of discipline were getting
lighter: two years later, commercial banks were
already allowed to trade in corporate bonds and
companies’ shares. Over time the license for
conducting securities operations reaches 25% of
total income, and in 1999 the concerned law was
fully abolished and replaced by Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act. This officially marked the beginning
of a new era of universal banking in the US
(Casserley et al., 2009).
In the past decade and a half universal
banking in the US was characterized by large
financial companies, like Goldman Sachs, AIG,
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers, which singled out in the
market and operated rather successfully until
the 2007 financial crisis. After the outbreak of
the crisis, each of them had a different fate.
Some went bust (Lehman), some were sold
(Bear, Merrill, AIG), whereas Morgan Stanley
bankarstvo 5 2013
and Goldman Sachs continued their business as
commercial banks. What all these banks have in
common is that they requested to be, and some
of them were, bailed out by the state.
What was it that boosted universal banks in
63
the US to thrive in the past thirty years or so? The
administration of President Reagan was the first
to allow more liberal relations at the financial
market. Replacing the government programs
for granting loans to low-income borrowers,
liberalization actually implied that banks were
allowed to engage in popular and widespread
retail lending operations. Banks mostly extended
mortgage-backed loans, causing the real estate
prices to start growing over time. Banks further
sorted their mortgage loans into pools with
similar characteristics, based on which they
issued debt securities and resold them at the
financial market. These are the main features
of the securitization process straight before the
outbreak of the recent financial crisis. In order
to sell securities in the financial market in the
easiest possible way and at the best price, it was
necessary to have reputational support provided
by rating agencies. Namely, the most famous
rating agencies ranked these instruments as
high-quality securities, thereby enabling bigger
and quicker profit to their issuers. Low risk was
awarded to securities based on their underlying
mortgages, whose prices were, in the meantime,
rapidly increasing. Finally, when the real estate
prices dropped, the entire process underwent
a pyramidal collapse, and had disastrous
consequences for both financial and real sectors
of the economy. Suspicious transactions with
exotic securities ended up costing the United
States of America only, through the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP), about 400 billion
dollars. In recent years harsh debates have been
led about the potential reintroduction of a formal
barrier separating the operations of commercial
and investment banks (Greenspan, 2007).
Germany - the cradle of universal banking
In its history, the German banking has never
had regulatory division of commercial and
investment banking. In Germany the concept
of universal banks has always been the only
form of banking. The end of the 19th century
was characterized by a swift development
of industry, posing requests for large capital
investments that could have been provided only
by affiliating funds of several individual banks.
Through the association of capital, a smaller
number of larger banks (the so-called Berlin
banks) were created, which achieved supremacy
trećine kapitala, a spas su predstavlјale upravo
akcije velikih industrijskih preduzeća koje
su imale u posedu. Međutim, sledeći udar
bankarske krize tridesetih godina ostavio je
veće posledice. S obzirom na činjenicu da su
poslovale sa visokim leveridžom (dugom), u
čijoj je strukturi preovladavao strani kapital,
banke su bile jako osetlјive na spolјne uticaje.
Tako se kriza austrijskog bankarskog sektora
vrlo brzo proširila na Nemačku, usled čega
neke banke proglašavaju bankrot dok je veći
broj ostalih nacionalizovala država.
Nakon Drugog svetskog rata prvo su velike
banke podelјene na veći broj manjih banaka
koje su poslovale kao univerzalne banke, da bi
im se pedesetih godina dozvolilo da se ponovo
udruže sa pravom osnivanja nacionalnih filijala.
U tom periodu banke i dalјe imaju akcije i
upravlјačke pozicije u mnogim industrijskim
korporacijama. Ovakvi odnosi su podvrgnuti
kritici sedamdesetih godina XX veka kada se
ograničava vlasničko učešće u nefinansijskim
organizacijama na 25%. I ovde se uočava konflikt
interesa u poslovanju univerzalnih banaka i
narednih godina sve više insistira na smanjenju
uticaja koje banke imaju na velika preduzeća.
Tako nemačke banke počinju da smanjuju svoje
udele u korporacijama, delimično zbog pritiska
investitora, a drugim delom zbog zaštite kapitala.
Slična situacija se održala i poslednjih godina
tako da ni danas banke nemaju znatnije učešće
u vlasništvu kompanija, kao ni na upravlјačkim
pozicijama u preduzećima.
I ovde je u središtu najnovije finansijske krize
aktuelizovano pitanje razdvajanja tradicionalnih
od investicionih banaka. Bitna razlika je što u
Nemačkoj mali broj najvećih banaka posluje sa
stanovništvom, pa im glavni izvor sredstava ne
predstavlјaju depoziti građana. Većina se bavi
investicionim bankarstvom i kao glavni izvor
na strani pasive nalaze se kratkoročne hartije
od vrednosti ili pozajmice od drugih banaka.
Univerzalno bankarstvo u Velikoj Britaniji
Britansko bankarstvo je oduvek poslovalo sa
vrlo jasnom granicom između tradicionalnih i
investicionih banaka, iako nikada nije postojala
zakonska regulativa koja je to nalagala. Tek
osamdesetih godina XX veka, u procesu izraženije
deregulacije, britanske banke počinju poslovanje
kao univerzalne finansijske institucije.
Najznačajnija institucija britanskog
bankarstva od svog osnivanja 1694. god bila
je Banka Engleske. Nјena osnovna uloga bila
je pomoć Vladi pri finansiranju i izdavanju
novčanica. Ostale banke nisu imale mogućnost
da se udružuju u veće finansijske institucije tako
da centralna banka ima dominantnu poziciju
u finansijskom sistemu Engleske početkom
XVIII veka. Pored malih banaka, postojale su
specijalizovane trgovinske banke sa sedištem
u Londonu koje su prvenstveno bile zadužene
za finansiranje trgovine i distribuciju vladinih
obveznica. Prvu bankarsku krizu Engleska
trpi na samom početku XIX veka kada se
ispolјava sva slabost i krhkost malih banaka
da prevaziđu novonastalu situaciju. Tada se
Banka Engleske po prvi put nalazi u situaciji
kreditora u krajnjoj nuždi i pruža pomoć
bankama u nevolјi kako bi ostale na tržištu.
Posle krize bankama se dozvolјava udruživanje
kapitala da bi se većim finansijskim sredstvima
lakše oduprele budućim kriznim situacijama.
Vlasnici udruženih banaka imaju neograničenu
odgovornost što se smatralo garantom
sigurnosti da će banka poslovati obazrivije i
više voditi računa o novcu svojih deponenata.
Ovakva teza ipak se nije potvrdila u praksi - u
prvoj sledećoj krizi, pedesetih godina XIX veka,
banke su privukle manje kapitala nego što bi
to bio slučaj da je odgovornost vlasnika bila
ograničena. To je zapravo značilo da investitori
nisu bili blagonakloni prema vlasnicima
banaka koje su činili lјudi različitih profila i
interesovanja. Krajem XIX veka banke dobijaju
legitimno pravo da posluju sa ograničenom
odgovornošću vlasnika.
Mali broj velikih nacionalnih banaka
pretežno okrenutih komercijalnom bankarstvu,
ograničene odgovornosti vlasnika, čini sliku
vrlo stabilnog bankarskog sektora Engleske
početkom XX veka.
Sedamdesetih godina i nešto ranije, engleske
banke počinju da šire svoje poslovanje na hartije od
vrednosti, izdaju hipotekarne kredite, dugoročne
revolving kredite preduzećima i slične poslove.
Evidentan je i proces integrisanja velikih banaka
bankarstvo 5 2013
koje počinju rad van granica Engleske. Takva
situacija ostaje do finansijske krize 2007. godine.
Tada neke najznačajnije engleske banke kao što su
HSBC, Barclay i Standard Chartered Bank uspevaju
same da se izbore sa novonastalom situacijom,
64
 Reichsbank, Berlin, 1903
in financing the economy’s development, yet
had no function of a central bank.
Since 1876 the German central bank
(Reichsbank) had the monopoly on money
issuing, but was also in charge of short-term
corporate lending via its extensive branch
network. Owing to the rapid development of
industry in the country, large banks remained
focused on financing corporate clients, whereas
savings and credit cooperatives and credit
unions conducted retail operations until the
1960s. Banks had their ownership shares in the
enterprises they financed, which turned out to be
a prudent solution in the years of hyperinflation
following the First World War. Namely, during
the large inflation crisis banks lost almost two
thirds of their capital, seeking salvation in
the shares of large industrial enterprises they
possessed in their portfolios. However, the
next shock imposed by the 1930s banking crisis
had somewhat bigger repercussions. Given
the fact that they operated with high leverage
(debt), in whose structure foreign capital was
predominant, banks were extremely sensitive
to foreign influences. Thus, the crisis in the
Austrian banking sector quickly spilled over to
Germany, as a result of which some banks went
bankrupt, whereas the majority of others got
nationalized by the state.
After the Second World War, large banks
were first divided into many smaller banks
which operated as universal banks, only to
be allowed in the 1950s to re-affiliate with the
right to establish national branches. In this
bankarstvo 5 2013
period, banks still had shares and management
positions in many industrial corporations.
Such relations were subject to criticism in the
1970s, when ownership shares in non-financial
organizations were limited to 25%. Here,
65
too, the conflict of interests was observed in
universal banks’ operations, which is why in
the following years it was increasingly insisted
upon the reduction of impact banks have on
large enterprises. Thus, the German banks
started to reduce their shares in corporations,
somewhat due to the pressure on the part
of investors, and somewhat due to capital
protection. The situation has remained similar
until recent years, so that today banks in
Germany do not have considerable shares in
companies’ ownership structure, nor do they
hold managerial positions in enterprises.
In light of the recent financial crisis, the issue
of separating traditional and investment banks
was current in Germany as well. A significant
difference, however, lay in the fact that in
Germany a few major banks actually conduct
retail operations, which is why their main
sources of funds are not retail deposits. Instead,
most of them do investment banking, the main
sources on the liabilities side being short-term
securities and loans from other banks.
Universal banking in Great Britain
Banking in Britain has always functioned
with the clear distinction between traditional
and investment banks, although there have
never been any laws or regulations to prescribe
it. It was only in the 1980s, in the process of
prominent deregulation, that the British
banks started to operate as universal financial
institutions.
The most significant institution in the British
banking, since its establishment back in 1694,
has been the Bank of England. Its main role
has been to assist the Government in financing
and money issuing. Other banks did not have
the possibility to associate into larger financial
institutions, so that the central bank occupied
the dominant position in the financial system
of England in early 18th century. In addition to
small banks, there were specialized merchant
banks seated in London, which were primarily
in charge of trade finance and government bonds
distribution. The first banking crisis hit England
at the very beginning of the 19th century, when
small banks demonstrated all their weakness
and fragility in trying to overcome the newly-
occurred situation. It was then that the Bank
of England for the first time found itself in the
dok neke druge, poput RBS, Lloyds i manje banke
koje su bile zavisne od njih, dobijaju vladinu
finansijsku pomoć kako bi opstale (Casserley i
saradnici, 2009).
Univerzalno bankarstvo i svetska
kriza
Svetska finansijska kriza direktno se povezuje
sa velikim finansijskim konglomeratima čije
rizično poslovanje, naročito u sektoru sa
hartijama od vrednosti, postaje glavna meta
najnovijih mera regulacije. Verovatno najveći
kritičar investicionog bankarstva jeste uticajni
Pol Krugman, profesor ekonomije i dobitnik
Nobelove nagrade. On ukazuje na otuđenost
savremenog bankarstva od svojih korena i
kritikuje „bankarstvo u senci“ - odbojnost banaka
da se bave tradicionalnim kreditno-depozitnim
poslovima i njihovu opčinjenost investiranjem i
hartijama od vrednosti. On smatra da bankarstvo
mora ponovo da bude „dosadno“, što znači da se
regulacijom ograniče mogućnosti da banke budu
univerzalne (Krugman, 2009).
Jasno je da na talasu prethodne kritike
različite države aktuelizuju pitanje opravdanosti
koncepta univerzalnog bankarstva. Stručna
javnost je prilično podelјena u stavovima,
ali je moguće izdvojiti argumente za i protiv
univerzalnog bankarstva kao i preporuke za
buduću regulaciju ovog koncepta.
Šta je to što zagovornici ideje o (ponovnom)
razdvajanju komercijalnog i investicionog
bankarstva zameraju univerzalnom bankarstvu,
a šta stoji kao glavni stub odbrane univerzalnog
bankarstva?
Da li banke treba da budu izložene visokom
riziku?
Investicione banke u proteklih nekoliko
decenija preuzimaju vrlo visoke rizike u
poslovima sekjuritizacije, jednim od najvećih
izdanaka procesa deregulacije koji preovladava
finansijskim tržištem tokom XX i početkom XXI
veka. Univerzalne banke nemaju barijere ni u
pogledu pribavlјanja niti ulaganja sredstava,
pa se dolazi u situaciju da je novac štediša vrlo
rizično plasiran. Banke su izdavale sumnjive
hipotekarne kredite koji sa strmoglavim
padom cena nekretnina u SAD, neposredno
pred krizu, nisu bili naplativi. Krajem XX veka
(1998) vrednost derivativnih hartija bila je dva
i po puta veća od vrednosti svetskog bruto
domaćeg proizvoda, a neposredno pred krizu
čak dvadeset puta veća (Blundell-Wignall,
2011). Imajući u vidu da država u većini
zemalјa osigurava depozite građana, nameće
se zaklјučak da su se investicione banke olako
kockale tuđim novcem, računajući na to da će
u slučaju da stvari krenu po zlu država morati
da pomogne i to novcem poreskih obveznika.
Popularizovana je krilatica „preveliki da bi
propali“ (too-big-to-fail) koja govori o postojanju
velikih i važnih finansijskih institucija, poput
nekih investicionih banaka, koje su toliko
inkorporirane u mnogim sektorima privrede da
bi njihovo bankrotstvo pretilo čitavoj privredi.
Ovakav stav dodatno olakšava rizične plasmane
jer se smatra da će država kao garant na kraju
morati da pripomogne (podstiče se moralni
hazard). To se videlo i na poslednjem primeru
spasavanja velikih bankarskih sistema, naročito
u Americi (TARP), što je i izazvalo najviše gneva
u javnosti i kreatore monetarne i finansijske
stabilnosti ponovo navelo na put odvajanja
banaka i stroge regulacije.
Međutim, treba imati u vidu i sledeće.
Poznato je takođe da mnoge hartije od
vrednosti nose niži rizik i veću likvidnost
u poređenju s kreditima. Likvidnost hartija
dozvolјava bankama da u vrlo kratkom roku
prepakuju svoj portfolio i tako izbegnu moguće
negativne posledice drastičnog smanjenja
profita. Uživajući u koristima koje im pruža
diversifikacija, banke smanjuju ukupan rizik
poslovanja što bi im bilo uskraćeno kada
ne bi imale pravo bavlјenja investicionim
bankarstvom. Sledstveno, u svojim bilansima
mogle bi da drže samo nelikvidne kredite i u
slučaju nenaplativosti da pretrpe mnogo veće
gubitke. Prethodna analiza, da zaklјučimo,
govori o tome da univerzalno bankarstvo može
da ima svoje prednosti - uspešnije upravlјanje
odnosom između rizika i profita.
Protiv teze o previše rizičnom poslovanju
univerzalnih banaka stoji i činjenica da su
univerzalne banke zapravo na meti monitoringa
bankarstvo 5 2013
(nadglednja) sa dve strane: deponenata i vlasnika
hartija od vrednosti. Zbog toga efikasnost
njihovog poslovanja mora biti veća. Iskustvo
američkog bankarskog sistema pokazalo je
da su u periodu Velike depresije propadale
66
 Bank of England
position of the lender of last resort, providing
assistance to problematic banks, so that they
could survive at the market. In the aftermath
of the crisis, banks were allowed to pool their
capital so that their larger financial funds could
help them resist future crises more easily.
The owners of affiliated banks had unlimited
liability which was deemed to be a guarantee
of security and certainty that banks would
operate more cautiously, taking better care of
their depositors’ money. This thesis, however,
did not pass the test of practice - in the first
following crisis, in the 1850s, banks attracted
less capital than it would have been the case had
the owners’ liability been limited. This actually
meant that investors were not benevolent
towards the banks’ owners, including people
of various profiles and interests. In late 19th
century banks were granted the legitimate right
to operate with limited liability of their owners.
A small number of large national banks,
mostly oriented towards commercial banking,
with limited liability of their owners, account
for the extremely stable banking sector of
England in early 20th century.
In 1970s and somewhat before that, the British
banks started to expand their operations to include
securities, mortgage loans, long-term revolving
loans to corporates, etc. What is also evident is
the process of integration of large banks, starting
to expand their business outside the borders
of England. This lasted until the 2007 financial
crisis. Then, some of the major English banks,
like HSBC, Barclay and Standard Chartered Bank,
managed to struggle with the new situation on
bankarstvo 5 2013
their own, whereas some others, like RBS, Lloyds
and smaller banks depending on them, had to be
bailed out by the government in order to survive
(Casserley et al., 2009).
67
Universal banking and the global
crisis
The global financial crisis is directly
associated with large financial conglomerates
whose risky business, especially in dealing with
securities, became the major target of the latest
regulation measures. Probably the harshest
critic of investment banking is the influential
Paul Krugman, professor of economics and
winner of the Nobel Prize. He underlines the
alienation of modern banking from its roots,
and criticizes “shadow banking” - reluctance
of banks to conduct traditional lending and
deposit operations, accompanied by their
fascination with investment and securities. He
believes that banking has to go back to being
“boring”, implying that regulation has to
limit the possibilities of banks to be universal
(Krugman, 2009).
Clearly, fuelled by the above criticism,
various countries have focused on the issue of
justifiability of the universal banking concept.
Opinions in the professional public have been
rather divided, but it is possible to list the
arguments for and against universal banking,
along with the recommendations for the future
regulation of this concept.
Why do those advocating the (repeated)
division of commercial and investment banking
disapprove of universal banking, and what is
it that stands as the main pillar of defense of
universal banking?
Should banks be exposed to high risk?
In the past several decades investment banks
have been taking really high risks in the process
of securitization, one of the main outcomes of
deregulation, prevailing at the financial market
throughout the 20th and at the beginning of the
21st century. Universal banks have no barriers
in terms of acquiring or investing funds, which
results with depositors’ money being placed at
huge risk. Banks issued dubious mortgage loans,
which, after the drastic fall of real estate prices
in the US, became non-performing. In late 1990s
(in 1998, to be precise) the value of derivatives
was two and a half times higher than the value of
global GDP, and right before the crisis broke out,
it was twenty times higher (Blundell-Wignall,
2011). Bearing in mind that in most countries
upravo male banke (njih oko 9.000) koje nisu
imale svoje afilijacije čija je osnovna delatnost
poslovanje sa hartijama od vrednosti (tj. koje
se nisu bavile investicionim bankarstvom). Isto
tako, kriza krajem osamdesetih u kojoj stradaju
prvenstveno štedno-kreditna udruženja (njih
preko 700), koja su bila usko specijalizovana
i nisu se bavila poslovima investicionog
bankarstva, suzbija tvrdnju da je univerzalno
bankarstvo kao takvo a priori generator
najnovije finansijske krize. Veliki bankarski
sistemi pružaju klijentima „uslugu po meri“
(tailor-made service) i imaju mogućnost da ih,
zahvalјujući ekonomiji obima, servisiraju po
znatno nižim troškovima nego što bi to činile
manje specijalizovane banke.
Bez obzira na činjenicu da li je univerzalno
bankarstvo najveći krivac za aktuelnu krizu
ili samo jedan od faktora u nesrećnom spletu
okolnosti, ne bi trebalo zanemariti i koristi koje
proističu iz ovakvog koncepta i, uopšte, iz inovacija
na finansijskom tržištu. Regulatori ne bi smeli da u
potpunosti suzbiju podsticaje za razvoj finansijskih
inovacija i da preteranom i prestrogom regulacijom
suzbiju interes banaka da se bave osnovnim i
srodnim bankarskim poslovima. Treba naći pravu
meru između sprečavanja „kockarskog“ ponašanja
banaka, s jedne strane, i nesputane slobode tržišta,
s druge strane.
Da li univerzalne banke doprinose
privrednom rastu?
Istorijski pregled razvoja bankarskog
sektora na najznačajnijim finansijskim tržištima
pokazuje da su banke imale veliku ulogu u
njihovom privrednom razvoju. Banke postaju
glavni finansijeri najvećih korporacija, naročito
u periodu industrijalizacije. Mobilizacija i
efikasna alokacija finansijskih sredstava po
definiciji pripada upravo intermedijatorima kao
što su banke. Shodno različitoj genezi i strukturi
bankarstva u Evropi i SAD, ova uloga dolazi
više ili manje do izražaja u različitim zemlјama.
Veliki broj radova i istraživanja ukazuje na
blisku vezu univerzalnog bankarstva, naročito
njegovog investicionog dela, i privrednog rasta.
Samo velike banke (ili sindikalizovane manje
banke) u mogućnosti su da podrže zahteve za
velikim iznosom finansijskih sredstava koji je
potreban korporacijama za kapitalne investicije.
Na primer, u periodu snažnog industrijskog
razvoja SAD (početak XX veka) izražena bankarska
koncentracija (tj. mala konkurencija između
banaka) zapravo je doprinela rastu i nije, što bi se
na prvi pogled pomislilo, usporila razvoj nauštrb
bankarskih profita (Mitchener i Wheelock, 2013).
Svojom reputacijom i poverenjem koje uživaju u
javnosti, velike banke imaju mogućnost da bez
većih napora uvedu i podstaknu trgovinu novim
instrumentima (Schilbach, 2013). Univerzalne
banke omogućavaju nastanak i širenje finansijskih
inovacija inicijalno za institucionalne klijente,
ali ovi finansijski instrumenti vrlo brzo postaju
popularni kod ostalih učesnika na finansijskom
tržištu i tako doprinose razvoju čitavog društva.
Treba izdvojiti instrumente zaštite (hedžinga)
na deviznom tržištu kao finansijsku inovaciju
namenjenu multinacionalnim kompanijama
koja biva brzo i lako prihvaćena od strane ostalih
učesnika. Poslovanje nemačkih banaka krajem XIX
i početkom XX veka bilo je pretežno orijentisano
na privredna preduzeća sa kojima se stvara vrlo
blizak odnos i međusobno poverenje. Posledično,
smanjuju se troškovi pribavlјanja informacija
o preduzećima i na taj način se osvetlјava put
nepoverlјivoj štednji da se lakše mobiliše.
Banke su u situaciji da temelјno sagledaju
poslovanje preduzeća, da odaberu bolјe i
lošije investicije i da sa tim informacijama
mnogo jednostavnije privuku kapital. U
Engleskoj je struktura finansijskog sistema
bila više okrenuta poslovima sa hartijama od
vrednosti i nije postojala tako bliska veza sa
preduzećima kao što je bio slučaj u Nemačkoj.
Posvećenost nemačkih banaka korporativnom
sektoru u velikoj meri objašnjava mnogo brži
rast industrijske proizvodnje u ovoj zemlјi pre
Prvog svetskog rata. Komparativna analiza
sa američkim finansijskim sistemom takođe
potvrđuje veću posvećenost industrijskom
razvoju i ukazuje na manje sistemske probleme
finansijskog sektora u Nemačkoj. Za razliku od
bankocentričnog nemačkog, američki finansijski
sistem je više okrenut tržištu hartija od vrednosti,
prvenstveno akcijama koje su uglavnom
bile u posedu stanovništva. Ovo predstavlјa
razlog više u prilog činjenici da je nemački
bankarstvo 5 2013
finansijski sistem kroz smanjenje informacione
asimetrije i preko veće korporativne kontrole u
preduzećima omogućavao efikasniju alokaciju
sredstava. Razvijeno američko tržište hartija od
vrednosti je, s druge strane, afirmisalo veći nivo
68
 the government insures retail deposits, the only
conclusion is that investment banks carelessly
gambled with other people’s money, counting on
it that, in case things go wrong, the government
would have to intervene, using the tax payers’
money. The catchphrase “too-big-to-fail” has
been popularized, referring to the existence of
large and important financial institutions, like
some investment banks, which have gotten
so deeply incorporated into many sectors of
economy that their bankruptcy would threaten
to bring down the entire economy. Such an
attitude additionally facilitates risky placements,
because it is considered that the government, as
a guarantor, would eventually have to intervene
(thereby instigating moral hazard). This was to be
seen in the latest example of bailing out the large
banking systems, especially in the US (TARP),
which has caused a lot of anger in the public,
and brought the monetary and financial stability
policy makers back to the path of dividing banks
and introducing strict regulation.
However, the following also has to be
taken into account. It is well known that
many securities entail lower risks and higher
liquidity compared to loans. Liquidity of
securities enables banks to repackage their
portfolio within a rather short period of time,
thereby avoiding potential adverse effects of a
drastic profit reduction. Enjoying the benefits
of diversification, banks reduce their overall
business risk, which would have been denied
to them were they not entitled to do investment
banking. Consequently, in their balance sheets
they could only hold illiquid loans, suffering
from much higher losses in case these loans
become non-performing. The above analysis,
to conclude, confirms that universal banking
may have its advantages - i.e. a more successful
management of the correlation between risk
and profit.
What also speaks against the thesis on too
risky operations of universal banks is the fact
that universal banks are, in effect, subjected
to monitoring (supervision) from two sides:
depositors and securities owners. Therefore, the
bankarstvo 5 2013
efficiency of their operations has to be higher.
The experience of the US banking system has
shown that in the period of Great Depression
the first to go bust were small banks (about 9000
of them) which had no affiliations of their own
69
whose basic activity was trading in securities
(i.e. banks which did no investment banking).
Likewise, the late 1980s crisis which primarily
hit savings and lending associations (over 700
of them), which were highly specialized and
conducted no investment banking operations,
disputes the claim that universal banking
as such is a priori the generator of the recent
financial crisis. Large banking systems provide
tailor-made services to their clients, and thanks
to the economy of scales, they are in the position
to service them at the considerably lower costs
compared to some less specialized banks.
Regardless of the fact whether universal
banking is to be blamed for the current
crisis or has just been one of the factors in
an unfortunate turn of events, the benefits
arising from this concept, and generally from
financial market innovations, should not be
neglected. The regulators should not entirely
curb the incentives for financial innovations
development, and should not let too strict a
regulation discourage the banks’ interest in
dealing with basic and associated banking
operations. The true balance needs to be
established between preventing the “gambling-
like” behavior of banks, on the one hand, and
the unrestrained freedom of the market, on the
other.
Do universal banks contribute to economic
growth?
A historical review of the banking sector’s
development in the major financial markets
has shown that banks played a huge role in
their economic development. Banks became
the main financiers of the largest corporations,
especially in the industrialization period.
Raising and efficient allocation of financial
resources by definition belongs to no other than
to intermediaries like banks. In line with the
different genesis and structure of banking in
Europe and in the USA, this role has been more
or less prominent in various countries.
Many papers and studies indicate that
there is a close connection between universal
banking, in particular its investment segment,
and economic growth. Only large banks (or
smaller, syndicated banks) are able to support
the requirements for huge amounts of financial
funds, which corporations need for the purpose
diversifikacije kao osnove za smanjenje rizika
ulaganja (Levine, 1997).
U aktuelnoj svetskoj krizi istraživanje Dojče
banke (Deutsche Bank) ukazuje da su najveći
gubitak pretrpele visoko specijalizovane banke,
bilo da su se bavile samo investicionim ili samo
komercijalnim bankarstvom, a da su univerzalne
banke imale manje finansijske probleme od njih.
I dalјe se konsoliduju, ali su pretrplјene štete i
gubici prvenstveno rezultat loše poslovne politike
menadžmenta i loših odluka (Schilbach, 2013).
U drugom istraživanju, u osnovi je potvrđena
prethodna hipoteza, s tim što su loše odluke
menadžmenta pripisane državnom vlasništvu u
propalim nemačkim bankama (Dietrich i Vollmer,
2012). U sklopu teze o doprinosu razvoju zemlјe,
zanimlјivi su rezultati istraživanja koje empirijski
dokazuje da su univerzalne banke od 1989.
do 2012. godine finansirale projekte rizičnijih i
ujedno znatno produktivnijih korporacija od onih
koje su finansirale komercijalne banke. Takođe,
postoje dokazi o većoj efikasnosti poslovanja
univerzalnih banaka i njihovom izraženom
uticaju na disperziju prihoda u SAD (Neuhann
i Saidi, 2013).
Prethodni argumenti još jednom ukazuju
na pozitivne strane univerzalnog bankarstva,
ukazivanjem na vezu između finansijskog
razvoja i privrednog rasta i razvoja. To što je neka
banka razvijena ili uklјučena u korporativne
tokove ili u investiranje u hartije od vrednosti,
ne znači unapred da je taj finansijski sistem loš
i sklon izbijanju finansijske krize. Finansijski
sistem, iako jedan od najvažnijih i najznačajnijih
sistema u državi, ipak predstavlјa samo (jedan)
segment razvoja ukupne privrede.
Treba imati u vidu specifičnosti malih
zemalјa, pošto određena pravila koja važe u
velikim državama ne važe za manje privrede.
Tako se ukazuje na činjenicu da je za male
privrede važno da zadrže manje tradicionalne
banke, pošto će se u njima pre i lakše ispostaviti
da su veće banke „prevelike da bi propale“ i
da su izražena pretnja finansijskoj stabilnosti
(Vallascas i Keasey, 2012).
Da li je jedan od motiva bankarskog
ulaganja u preduzeća povećanje privrednog
rasta? Nasuprot prethodnom razmatranju, ima
stavova da bi bilo naivno bankarskom razvoju
pripisivati bilo kakve zasluge za privredni
razvoj. Ako do toga i dođe, to je samo slučajna
posledica sebičnog ponašanja banaka. Ako se
ima u vidu rani razvoj američkog bankarskog
sistema, naročito kroz poslovanje J. P. Morgana
i Rokfelera, uviđa se ogroman uticaj koji banke
vrše na kompanije, kako direktno tako i preko
političkog lobiranja. Podatak o 126 direktorskih
pozicija u 89 kompanija koji su J. P. Morgan i
njegova banka imali, jasno ukazuje na veliku
moć koju uživa mala grupa lјudi. Savremenici
ovih događanja ukazuju na svemoć grupe
oligarha koji kroje i prekrajaju zakone i propise
po svojoj meri. Već je napomenuto da i čuveni
Glas-Stigalov zakon više nastaje kao posledica
privatnih previranja nego nužnog javnog
interesa. Kroz svoje političko-rodbinske veze,
Rokfeler lobira za ovaj zakon (iako će i njegova
banka trpeti posledice) s cilјem da uništi svog
konkurenta, o čemu je već bilo reči. Dakle, lični
motivi, osvetolјubivost, lјubomora, gramzivost,
pohlepa i nezasitost nekada su mnogo veći
pokretači reformi i zakona nego bilo koji
društveno opravdani faktori.
Da li su univerzalne banke u konfliktu
interesa s klijentima?
U konceptu univerzalnog bankarstva
konflikt interesa nastaje po definiciji jer je veoma
teško razgraničiti poslovanje banke u interesu
klijenta od interesa same banke. Poslujući sa
hartijama od vrednosti, s jedne, i depozitima,
s druge strane, univerzalne banke mogu da
dođu u sukob interesa. Hartije od vrednosti,
čiji su pokrovitelјi, banke prodaju svojim
klijentima (deponentima) i time mogu da se,
umesto na istoj, nađu na suprotnim pozicijama
u transakciji. Naime, kao pokrovitelјi emisije,
banke imaju interes da postignu što veću cenu
kako bi pobolјšale reputaciju i povećale profit
kao posrednici u emisiji hartija. S druge strane,
imaju deponente u čijem bi interesu trebalo
hartiju kupiti po što povolјnijoj ceni. Dakle,
univerzalne banke se nalaze u situaciji da biraju
između interesa dve grupe svojih klijenata (Ber
i saradnici, 2001). Često u tom procesu prevare
svoje komitente kojima prodaju hartije za
koje očekuju pad cene. Ova praksa je, sem u
bankarstvo 5 2013
Americi, evidentna bila sedamdesetih godina
u Nemačkoj i to u nekoliko oblika. Najnovijom
finansijskom regulativom sve veći značaj
pridaje se baš ovom pitanju. Opisani konflikt
interesa je jedan od glavnih uzroka finansijskih
70
 of capital investments. For instance, in the
period of strong industrial development in the
US (in early 20th century), prominent banking
concentration (i.e. low competition among
banks) actually facilitated growth instead of,
as might have been expected, slowing it down
for the sake of banking profits (Mitchener and
Wheelock, 2013). Thanks to their reputation
and the confidence of the public that they
enjoy, large banks are in the position to easily
introduce and boost trading in new instruments
(Schilbach, 2013). Universal banks enable the
creation and expansion of financial innovations,
initially for institutional clients, but these
financial instruments soon become popular
with other financial market participants as
well, thereby contributing to the progress of
the society overall. Worth mentioning are the
hedging instruments at the FX market, which
were originally a financial innovation targeted
at multinational companies, soon, however,
accepted by other market participants, too. The
operations conducted by the German banks in
late 19th and early 20th century were mostly
oriented towards commercial enterprises, with
which they established a rather close relationship
based on mutual trust. Consequently, the costs
of procuring information about the enterprises
are reduced, distrust is eliminated, and the road
paved for easier savings mobilization.
Banks are in the position to closely examine
the business of enterprises, to distinguish
between better and worse investments, and
use this information to attract capital in a much
simpler way. In England the financial system’s
structure was more securities-oriented, and
there was no such close relation with enterprises
as was the case in Germany. The dedication of
the German banks to the corporate sector to a
great extent explains the incomparably quicker
growth of industrial production in this country
prior to the First World War. The comparative
analysis with the US financial system also
corroborates higher dedication to industrial
development, at the same time pinpointing
some slight systemic problems in the German
bankarstvo 5 2013
financial sector. As opposed to the bank-centric
financial system in Germany, the US financial
system was somewhat more oriented towards
the securities market, predominantly shares
owned by retail clients (households). This is an
71
additional argument in favor of the fact that the
German financial system, through the reduction
of information asymmetry and increased
corporate control in enterprises, enabled a more
efficient allocation of funds. The developed US
securities market, on the other hand, promoted
a higher level of diversification as the basis for
mitigated investment risk (Levine, 1997).
In light of the current global crisis, the
research by Deutsche Bank indicates that the
biggest loss was suffered by highly specialized
banks, whether they engaged only in investment
or only in commercial banking, as opposed to
universal banks which faced slighter financial
problems. They are still consolidating, but the
suffered damage and losses are mostly the result
of bad business policy of their management
and their poor judgment (Schilbach, 2013).
Another research basically confirms the above
hypothesis, the only difference being that the
bad decisions of the management are ascribed to
the state ownership in bankrupt German banks
(Dietrich and Vollmer, 2012). As part of the
thesis on contributing to a country’s progress,
it might be interesting to mention the results
of a research empirically proving that, between
1989 and 2012, universal banks financed the
projects of riskier and, at the same time, more
productive corporations, compared to those
financed by commercial banks. Also, there has
been evidence of higher business efficiency of
universal banks and their prominent impact on
the dispersion of income in the US (Neuhann
and Saidi, 2013).
The above arguments reiterate the positive
aspects of universal banking, by indicating the
correlation between financial development and
economic growth and progress. A fact that a
bank is developed or involved in corporate
flows or securities-based investments, does not
necessarily mean that the concerned financial
system is bad overall, or prone to financial
crises. The financial system, though one of the
major and most significant systems in a country,
still represents just one segment of the entire
economy’s development.
The specificities of small countries have to
be taken into account, given that certain rules
that apply in large countries does not apply to
small economies. Thus, the fact is that for small
economies it is important to keep less traditional
problema poslednjih godina i to zahvalјujući
potpuno različitoj kulturi investiranja koje
imaju tradicionalne i investicione banke. Prve
su konzervativnije i imaju veću odbojnost
prema riziku, dok su ove druge okrenute
špekulativnim i rizičnijim transakcijama.
Oni koji smatraju da nema konflikta interesa
između banaka i investitora (deponenata)
najčešće se pozivaju na reputaciju univerzalnih
banaka. Loše savetovanje investitora brzo bi se
pročulo i to nije u interesu nijedne strane. Gubitak
reputacije je najveća kazna na finansijskom
tržištu. Osetlјivi i lako ranjivi, investitori bi na
informaciju o pogrešnom poslovnom savetu
povukli svoja sredstva i premestili ih na
bezbednije i pouzdanije mesto. Dakle, sukob
interesa u dugom roku je nemoguć.
Da li univerzalne banke podstiču moralni
hazard?
Moralni hazard podrazumeva preuzimanje
prevelikog rizika i društveno neodgovorno
ponašanje učesnika na finansijskom tržištu
potkreplјeno ulјulјkavanjem u osećaj
bezbednosti da neko čuva leđa ako stvari
krenu po zlu. Univerzalno bankarstvo se
u stručnoj literaturi neizbežno povezuje sa
moralnim hazardom. To je posledica činjenice
da se rizična ulaganja investicionih banaka
finansiraju (delom) iz osiguranih depozita koje
garantuje država, a garancije pruža i centralna
banka kao kreditor u krajnjoj istanci. Značaj
činjenice da su gubici dobrim delom zaštićeni,
omogućava rasterećenje i konfor u investiranju,
što po pravilu rezultira ulaganjem u visoko
rizične projekte. I zaista, u viševekovnoj istoriji
bankarskog sistema postoji puno primera
pomoći države u kriznim situacijama. Veliki
broj radova ukazuje na transmisiju moralnog
hazarda iz oblasti bankarstva na realne
privredne sektore, najviše zahvalјujući činjenici
da se univerzalne banke nalaze u strukturi
vlasništva preduzeća (Boyd, 1999).
Protivnici prethodnog stava smatraju da
moralni hazard ne mora biti u direktnoj vezi
sa univerzalnim bankarstvom. Više smisla ima
vezivati ga za velike banke koje posluju pod
okrilјem da su „prevelike da bi propale“ (too-
big-to-fail) ili sa čisto komercijalnim bankama
koje izvorno posluju uz državno osigurane
depozite. Upravo na ovu činjenicu ukazano je
u američkom slučaju nakon Velike depresije
tridesetih godina prošlog veka. Tada je, naime,
država nametnula bankama obavezne rezerve,
što je, uz državno osiguranje depozita, zapravo
imalo suprotan efekat zamišlјenom - umesto
da se smanji moralni hazard banaka, one su
osetile da je finansijski sistem zaštićeniji i da
mogu da se upuste u rizičnije poslove nego do
tada (Mitchener i Richardson, 2013). I u ovom
primeru se pokazuje da regulacija, i kada je
dobro zamišlјena i motivisana, može da ima
neželјene efekte.
Neizvesna budućnost: regulativa i
preporuke
Novi zakon u SAD
Nakon brojnih parcijalnih mera za spasavanje
finansijskog sistema, predloga, saveta i pravilnika,
Sjedinjene Američke Države u julu 2010. godine,
delom na osnovu Vokerovih pravila (Paul Volcker,
američki ekonomista i bivši predsednik Fed-a, a
od 2009. godine u savetodavnom telu predsednika
Baraka Obame), koja se tiču bankarskog trgovanja,
donose zakon o finansijskoj reformi (Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act)
kojim se u potpunosti reguliše čitav finansijski
sistem. Pored banaka, osiguravajućih kuća i
penzionih fondova, zakon reguliše i rejting
agencije kao i druge segmente finansijskog
sistema. Najznačajnija promena u smeru
rigoroznije kontrole banaka je Vokerovo pravilo
o ograničavanju špekulativnih transakcija koje su
identifikovane kao glavni uzročnici finansijske
krize i potom recesije. Naime, komercijalne banke
mogu se baviti trgovinom hartija od vrednosti
u svoje ime, kao i ulaganjem u hedž fondove i
ostale privatne fondove samo do 3% sopstvenog
kapitala (proprietary trading, trgovina hartijama
od vrednosti koju banka obavlja u svoje ime i
za račun sticanja sopstvenog profita). Izvorno,
Voker je predložio niz strožih ograničenja, ali nisu
svi predlozi i pretočeni u zakon. Tako je pravilo
prvobitno sugerisalo potpunu zabranu ulaganja
komercijalnih banaka u investicione poslove u
svoje ime, ali se ipak, pod političkim pritiscima i
bankarstvo 5 2013
pritiscima raznih interesnih grupa - modifikovalo.
U pogledu odvajanja investicionog i
komercijalnog bankarstva, novi zakon se poredi
sa Glas-Stigalovim zakonom iz 1933. godine.
Dok je na snazi bio stari zakon, dešavale su
72
 banks, because in these economies it might more
easily turn out that major banks are “too-big-to-
fail”, and that they pose a considerable threat to
financial stability (Vallascas and Keasey, 2012).
Is facilitating economic growth one of the
motives for banks’ corporate investments? As
opposed to the above considerations, there are
some opinions stating that it would be naive
to ascribe any credits for economic growth to
the development of banking. Even if it does
happen, it is simply a random consequence
of the selfish behavior of banks. If we bear in
mind the early development of the US banking
system, especially through the businesses of J.
P. Morgan and Rockefeller, we become aware of
the enormous impact banks exert on companies,
both directly and indirectly by means of
political lobbying. The information about 126
managerial seats in 89 companies which J. P.
Morgan and his bank occupied, clearly indicates
the huge power concentrated in the hands of a
few. The contemporaries of these events try to
draw attention to the almightiness of a group
of oligarchs, tailoring the laws and regulations
to suit themselves. It was already mentioned
that even the famous Glass-Steagall Act was
more a result of the private turmoil than of
the necessary public interest. By means of his
political and family ties, Rockefeller lobbied
in favor of this law (although his bank was to
suffer the consequences, too) with the intention
of destroying his competitor, as was already
explained. In other words, personal motives,
revengefulness, jealousy, cupidity, greed, and
insatiability were once much bigger drivers of
reforms and laws than any socially justified
factors.
Are universal banks in a conflict of interests
with the clients?
Within the universal banking concept, a
conflict of interests by definition occurs because
it is very difficult to make a distinction between
the operations conducted by a bank in its client’s
interest and the bank’s own interests. Dealing
with securities, on the one hand, and deposits,
bankarstvo 5 2013
on the other, universal banks may face a conflict
of interests. Securities, underwritten by banks
themselves, are later sold by them to their clients
(depositors), which may put them, instead of on
the same, on the opposing sides of a transaction.
73
Namely, as underwriters, banks have it in their
interest to achieve the highest possible price in
order to improve the reputation and increase the
profit as intermediaries in the securities issue. On
the other hand, banks have depositors in whose
interest it would be to purchase securities at
the most favorable price. Thus, universal banks
get into the position where they have to choose
between the interests of two groups of their
clients (Ber et al., 2001). Often in this process
they trick their clients by selling securities
whose price is expected to fall. Apart from the
US, this practice was evident in Germany in the
1970s, when it took several forms. The latest
financial regulations address this very issue as
increasingly important. The described conflict
of interests has been one of the major causes of
financial problems in recent years, owing to the
utterly different investment culture practiced by
traditional and investment banks. The former
are more conservative and have higher risk
aversion, whereas the latter are oriented towards
speculative and riskier transactions.
Those who believe that there is no conflict
of interests between banks and investors
(depositors) most often refer to the reputation
of universal banks. The rumors of a bad piece
of advice offered to an investor would spread
all too quickly, and that is certainly not in the
interest of either parties. Loss of reputation is a
death sentence in the financial market. Sensitive
and vulnerable, investors would, at the mention
of poor business advice, withdraw their funds
and transfer them into a safer and more reliable
place. Therefore, a conflict of interests, in the
long run, is practically impossible.
Do universal banks instigate moral hazard?
Moral hazard implies that financial market
participants have undertaken excessive risk,
and that they have been acting in a socially
irresponsible way, lulling themselves into a false
sense of security by believing that someone is
there to watch their back if things go wrong.
Universal banking is in literature inevitably
associated with moral hazard. This is due to
the fact that risky investments of investment
banks are (partially) financed by insured
deposits guaranteed by the state, although the
guarantees are also provided by the central
bank as the lender of last resort. The importance
se parcijalne, ali ne i globalne turbulencije
na finansijskom tržištu. Krajem osamdesetih
godina kriza na berzanskom tržištu nije pogodila
komercijalne banke, kao što bankarska kriza
početkom devedesetih nije pogodila tržište
hartija od vrednosti. To govori u prilog tezi da
razdvajanje dva vida bankarskog poslovanja
donosi diversifikaciju na globalnom finansijskom
tržištu i umanjuje rizik finansijske krize. Razlog
više za razdvajanje leži i u činjenici da su u
poslednjoj krizi integrisane banke inficirale jedna
drugu i prenele zarazu u svetske okvire.
Nije zgoreg osvrnuti se i na političke uticaje
i pritiske pri uvođenju bilo kakvih novina
i zakona od strane regulatornih vlasti na
finansijskom tržištu. U univerzalnom bankarstvu
to poprima ozbilјnije implikacije jer su u ovom
slučaju udruženi interesi skoro svih učesnika:
komercijalnih i investicionih banaka, penzionih
fondova, osiguravajućih društava, investicionih
fondova. Razdvojeni interesi i institucije ipak
nemaju tako veliku pregovaračku snagu, a
imaju manje finansijskih mogućnosti i motiva
za lobiranjem i političkim pritiscima.
Međutim, najnoviji zakon u SAD nailazi
na brojne kritike. Smatra se da će američke
banke biti u inferiornijem položaju u odnosu
na konkurentske inostrane banke koje nemaju
takvu vrstu ograničenja, što može da dovede
do nelojalne konkurencije. Nil i Vajt ukazuju
na oprez pri analizi aktuelne regulacije u SAD
i ukazuju na moguće posledice koje se sada ne
mogu sagledati. Moguće je, prema njihovim
rečima, da neke nove finansijske inovacije
zaobiđu stroži regulatorni okvir i iniciraju neku
novu krizu, krizu čija se obeležja sada ne mogu
zamisliti (Neal i White, 2012).
Napori u Evropskoj uniji
U Evropskoj uniji kriza je donela prelazak
iz labavije u sveobuhvatniju, precizniju i čvršću
institucionalnu regulaciju. Naime, prethodna
regulacija sprovođena je u okviru Odbora
supervizora evopskog bankarstva (Committee of
European Banking Supervisors), osnovanog 2004.
godine, i imala je za cilj efikasniju primenu
direktiva u oblasti bankarstva. Od 2011. godine
nadležnosti pomenutog odbora preuzima Uprava
za evropsko bankarstvo (European Banking
Authority, EBA), koja, pored izrade regulatornih
rešenja i promovisanja harmonizacije različitih
nacionalnih zakonodavstava u oblasti
bankarstva, ima i moć da zabrani finansijske
aktivnosti koje prete da ugroze finansijsku
stabilnost u EU. Sredinom oktobra 2013. godine
doneta je odluka o osnivanju Jedinstvenog
mehanizma za superviziju (Single Supervisory
Mechanism) do kraja 2014. godine, koji se u
zvaničnim krugovima EU tumači kao prvi korak
ka evropskoj bankarskoj uniji. Pod krovom
Evropske centralne banke i EBA, Jedinstveni
mehanizam za superviziju treba da se izgradi
kao unifikovani sistem supervizije banaka
evrozone (članstvo nije obavezno za zemlje EU
izvan evrozone). Time se finansijska supervizija
poverava centralnoj banci, što je velika promena
u konceptu i praksi finansijske regulacije EU.
Sistemski važne banke (utvrđeni su kriterijumi
za razvrstavanje banaka) nadgledaće neposredno
ECB a ostale, manje banke, nacionalne centralne
banke. Planira se formiranje interventnog fonda
za spasavanje velikih i sistemski važnih banaka,
ukoliko su u budućnosti javi potreba za ovim
vidom intervencije. Nedostatak ove inicijative
je što druge finansijske institucije, osim banaka,
neće biti pokrivene novih mehanizmom.
Nova regulativa u Velikoj Britaniji
U septembru 2011. nastaje predlog reforme
bankarskog sektora Velike Britanije (Vickers
Report). Najvažnija promena tiče se pojma
ograđivanja ili izdvajanja (ring fence, odvajanje -
ne i fizičko - dela imovine ili poslova kompanije
ili banke u posebnu celinu koja posluje pod
zajedničkim krovom i istim imenom sa ostalim
sektorima matične kuće), koji najavlјuje
potpuno novu eru u poslovanju britanskih
banaka. Naime, tradicionalni bankarski poslovi
sa stanovništvom i malim preduzećima biće
potpuno izdvojeni iz osnovne bankarske
delatnosti, bilo da je reč o komercijalnoj ili
investicionoj banci. Finansijska podvojenost
podrazumeva da odvojene celine ne mogu
međusobno jedna drugoj pozajmlјivati sredstva
ako ne ispune propisane kapitalne zahteve,
ali mogu i dalјe koristiti prednosti ekonomije
obima u pogledu infrastrukture. Namera je da
bankarstvo 5 2013
se izvorni bankarski poslovi sa stanovništvom
i malim preduzećima udalјe od „kazino“
investicionog poslovanja i korporativnog
sektora. Time bi se smanjio ukupan sistemski
rizik finansijskog tržišta i povećala stabilnost
74
 of the fact that losses are largely protected
relieves investors of the burden, enabling them
comfortable investing, which as a rule results in
investments in high-risk projects. And indeed, in
the several centuries’ long history of the banking
system there have been numerous examples
of government bail-outs in the times of crisis.
A large number of papers elaborate on the
transmission of moral hazard from banking into
the real economy, primarily thanks to the fact
that universal banks are part of the companies’
ownership structure (Boyd, 1999).
The opponents of the above opinion believe
that moral hazard does not necessarily have
to be directly linked to universal banking. It
makes much more sense to associate it with
large banks operating under the stamp of being
“too-big-to-fail”, or with purely commercial
banks conducting traditional operations with
state-insured deposits. This was the very fact
pinpointed in the US case following the 1930s
Great Depression. At that time, namely, the state
imposed required reserves on banks, which,
alongside deposits insured by the state, actually
backfired - instead of reducing the moral hazard
of banks, it made banks feel that the financial
system was better protected, allowing them to
enter even riskier operations than until that
point (Mitchener and Richardson, 2013). This
serves as another example of how regulation,
even when well-outlined and properly
motivated, can still have undesired effects.
Uncertain future: regulations and
recommendations
New law in the USA
After many partial measures for the financial
system’s rescuing, proposals, suggestions
and rulebooks, in July 2010 the United States
of America, somewhat based on the so-
called Volcker Rule (Paul Volcker, American
economist and former Chairman of the Fed, and
since 2009 Chairman of the Economic Recovery
Advisory Board under President Barack
Obama), referring to banking operations,
bankarstvo 5 2013
adopted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, completely
regulating the entire financial system. In
addition to banks, insurance companies and
pension funds, the law also regulates rating
75
agencies, and other segments of the financial
system. The most noteworthy change towards
a more rigorous control of banks is the Volcker
Rule concerning the limitation of speculative
transactions, which were identified as the main
cause of the financial crisis and the subsequent
recession. Commercial banks can engage in
securities trading on their own behalf, and by
investing into hedge funds and other private
funds up to 3% of their equity (the so-called
proprietary trading, i.e. securities trading that
a bank conducts in its own name and for the
purpose of acquiring its own profit). Originally,
Volcker suggested a series of stricter limitations,
but not all of his proposals were actually
converted into the law. Thus, his rule initially
suggested a complete prohibition of commercial
banks engaging in investment operations in
their own name, but, under political pressure
and the pressure of various other stakeholders,
it was eventually modified.
In terms of the division between investment
and commercial banks, the new law has been
compared with the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act.
While the old law was in force, turbulences
did occur in the financial market, but only at
the regional, and not at the global level. In late
1980s, the crisis at the stock exchange market did
not hit commercial banks, just like the banking
crisis in early 1990s did not hit the securities
market. This speaks in favor of the thesis that
the separation of these two modes of banking
brings diversification at the global financial
market and reduces the risk of a financial crisis.
Additional reason for such separation lies in
the fact that during the latest financial crisis
integrated banks infected each other, spreading
the contagion on the global scale.
It would not be amiss to briefly comment
on political influences and pressures when any
innovations and laws are getting introduced by
the financial market’s regulatory authorities.
In universal banking this has more serious
implications, due to the joined interests of
almost all stakeholders: commercial and
investment banks, pension funds, insurance
companies, investment funds. Separate interests
and institutions do not possess such a huge
negotiating power, at the same time having
lesser financial possibilities and fewer motives
for lobbying and exerting political pressures.
čitavog finansijskog sistema. Na ovaj način
će investiciono poslovanje biti vidlјivije i
transparentnije, tako da će regulatorima i
ostalim učesnicima na tržištu biti lakše da
utvrde i reše probleme ovog sektora bez
uzurpiranja odvojene celine. Ova reforma
će po svemu sudeći biti uklјučena u buduće
regulatorne akte s obzirom na činjenicu da ima
potpunu podršku britanske vlade. Efekti će biti
nadgledani do kraja 2015. godine, a potpuna
primena kod banaka do kraja 2019. godine.
Kao svaka reforma i ova nailazi na niz
kritika i sugestija. Zanimlјiv je stav gospodina
Pola Vokera koji u intervju za londonski The
Telegraph iznosi sumnju u fukcionalnost ovog
sistema. Naziva ga „brodom za lepo vreme“ jer
smatra da ovaj sistem neće funkcionisati ako
stvari krenu nizbrdo i da njime ne mogu da se
zaštite poreski obveznici u potpunosti. Uslovi
fukcionisanja izdvojenih britanskih banaka nisu
sasvim jasni i precizni jer postoji prirodna težnja
da u kritičnim situacijama izdvojene celine
hrle svojoj matici (Volcker, 2013). Smatra se,
takođe, da postoji veliki manipulativni prostor
koji se bankama ostavlјa u procesu razdvajanja,
zatim se postavlјa pitanje adekvatnosti i nivoa
kapitala koji se zahteva, i koji bi izdvojeni
sektor morao da ostvari. Ne treba zanemariti
ni velike fiksne troškove potrebne za instalaciju
nove informacione platforme u izdvojenom
delu. Takođe, vrlo je teško ostvariti opisano
izdvajanje bankarskih poslova jer postoje
zajednički poslovi trgovine derivatima ili
svopovima sa veoma dugim rokom dospeća
koje nije lako ni jednostrano odvojiti, tako da
će biti potrebno organizovati ekipe stručnjaka
koji mogu takve rizike proceniti ili pomoći oko
upravlјanja i zaštite od njih. Ne treba zanemariti
ni povećane troškove radne snage koji bi se
pojavili odvajanjem delova banaka.
U EU glavi još jedan regulatorni tok odvija
se u skladu sa preporukama formulisanim
u tzv. Bazelskim standardama. Bankarskom
poslovanju se nameću stroži zahtevi za
kapitalom, likvidnošću i leveridžom putem
Bazel III standarda čija je implementacija u toku.
Povećanje zahteva za kapitalom i regulacija
njegove adekvatnosti, kao i ostala ograničenja,
uvedena su u cilјu smanjenja moralnog hazarda
menadžera velikih banaka.
Umesto predloženog skoro potpunog
podvajanja komercijalnog i investicionog
bankarstva, postoje predlozi da se uvede stroga
supervizija investicionih banaka, jer bi svaka
podela mogla da donese više štete nego koristi
finansijskom sistemu. Bazelski standardi su
zapravo alternativa podvajanju jer svojim strogim
kriterijumima i zahtevima za kapitalom, koji raste
u skladu sa preuzetim rizikom u aktivi banke,
predstavlјaju regulaciju upravo investicione
(kritične) grane bankarskog poslovanja, ali bez
potrebe za formalnim razdvajanjem.
U poređenju sa uvođenjem Glas-Stigalevog
zakona 1933. godine, kada je iznos kapitala
kod investicionih banaka drastično opao,
a ekonomski rast ipak nastavlјen, efekti
najnovijeg regulatornog procesa biće vidlјivi
tek posle izvesnog vremena. Da li će uticati
na smanjenje transakcija na tržištu kapitala,
poskupeti kapital, povećati ili smanjiti
finansijsku stabilnost i ekonomski rast - ostaje
da se vidi u budućnosti. Potrebno je izvesno
vreme kako bi se predložene mere i izglasani
zakoni implementirali i još više vremena
kako bi se efektuirali i pokazali svoje dobre i
loše strane. Već sada ima oštrih kritičara ove
regulative i smatra se da će ona dovesti samo
do oseke kapitala i manje raspoloživog novca za
investiranje preduzeća (Allen i saradnici, 2013).
Teško je odrediti pravu istinu i jednog
krivca za poslednju finansijsku krizu i pored
dramatičnih ekonomskih posledica. Bio je to
splet okolnosti i dešavanja koji su u interakciji
doveli do razornih događaja. Za početak će
stradati univerzalne banke, delimično i zbog toga
što javnost želi da se nešto radikalno promeni,
da izgleda kako se problemi rešavaju u korenu.
Pri tome, previđa da su u krizi uvek lјudi, a ne
sistemi, glavni krivci. Budućnost će pokazati da
li će teški okovi u nogama finansijskog sistema
moći da preduprede izbijanje narednih kriza i
da li će stati na put sebičnoj i gramzivoj strani
lјudske prirode ili su zakoni i regulativa i ovom
bankarstvo 5 2013
prilikom pokucali na pogrešna vrata.
76
 Nevertheless, the latest law in the US has
been met with a lot of criticism. It is generally
believed that the US banks will be inferior to
their competitive foreign banks, operating under
no such limitations, which might lead to unfair
competition. Neal and White (2012) call for a
cautious analysis of the current US regulations,
highlighting potential consequences that cannot
be seen at the moment. According to them, it is
possible for some latest financial innovations to
find a loophole even in this stricter regulatory
framework, initiating some new crisis, whose
characteristics are beyond our imagination for
now (Neal and White, 2012).
Efforts in the European Union
In the European Union the crisis has brought
a shift from a more relaxed into a comprehensive,
precise and stricter institutional regulation.
Namely, the regulations used to be under the
jurisdiction of the Committee of European
Banking Supervisors, established in 2004, and
were aimed at a more efficient implementation
of EU directives in the field of banking. In 2011
the jurisdictions of the concerned Committee
were taken over by the European Banking
Authority (EBA), which, in addition to preparing
regulatory solutions and promoting the
harmonization of various national legislations
in the field of banking, also has the power to
ban financial activities threatening to jeopardize
financial stability in the EU. In mid-October
2013 a decision was passed on the establishment
of the Single Supervisory Mechanism by the
end of 2014, which has in the official EU circles
been interpreted as the first step towards the
European Banking Union. Under the auspices
of the European Central Bank and the EBA, the
Single Supervisory Mechanism should be built
as a unified supervisory system for the Euro
zone banks (membership is not mandatory for
bankarstvo 5 2013
77
the non-Euro zone EU countries). Thereby is
financial supervision entrusted to the central
bank, which is a huge change in the concept
and practice of the EU financial regulation.
Systemically important banks (according to the
defined criteria for banks classification) will be
directly supervised by the ECB, and the other,
smaller banks will be supervised by the national
central banks. It has been planned to form an
intervention fund for the saving of large and
systemically important banks, if a need arises
in the future for this kind of intervention. A
drawback of this initiative, however, is that
financial institutions other than banks will not
be covered by the new mechanism.
New regulations in Great Britain
In September 2011 appeared the draft reform
of the banking sector of Great Britain (the so-
called Vickers Report). The most substantial
change was expressed by the term ring-fencing
(to ring-fence, to separate - not physically - a
section of assets or operations of a company or
bank, into an isolated whole, functioning under
the same roof and under the same name as other
segments of the parent company), announcing a
completely new banking era for the UK banks.
Namely, traditional banking operations with
retail clients and SMEs were to be completely
separated from the basic banking activities,
regardless of the fact whether it was the case of
a commercial or an investment bank. Financial
separation implies that the separated sections
cannot lend funds one to another if they fail to
meet the prescribed capital requirements, but
they can still use the benefit of the economy of
scale in terms of infrastructure. The intention
was for traditional banking operations in the
retail and SMEs segments to be kept away
from “casino” investment operations and
the corporate sector. This would mitigate the
overall systemic risk of the financial market
and increase the stability of the entire financial
system. Moreover, thereby would investment
banking become more visible and transparent,
making it easier for regulators and other market
participants to detect and solve this sector’s
problems without usurping the separate
sections. In all likelihood, this reform will be
integrated into the future regulatory by-laws,
given the fact that it enjoys the full support
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fall-universal-bank, 03/07/2013.
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78
 of the UK Government. The effects are to be
monitored by the end of 2015, and the full
implementation in banks is expected by the
end of 2019.
Just like every other reform, this one, too,
has been met with a series of objections and
remarks. Particularly interesting is the position
of Paul Volcker, who, in his interview for
London’s The Telegraph, expressed his doubts in
the functionality of this system. He said that it
would only work in “fair weather” conditions,
but not when the weather was foul, adding
that it would not be able to fully protect the
tax payers. The conditions of ring-fenced UK
banks’ functioning are not completely clear and
precise, because there is a natural inclination
of isolated units in critical situations to flock
back to their parent (Volcker, 2013). Moreover,
it is believed that there is a huge space for
manipulation left to banks in the ring-fencing
process, which is accompanied by the issue
of capital adequacy and required level of
capital that the ring-fenced divisions must
achieve. What should not be neglected either
are the enormous fixed costs of installing new
IT platforms in the ring-fenced divisions.
Furthermore, it would be rather difficult to
actually achieve the intended separation of
banking operations, due to some common
operations of trading with extremely long
maturity derivatives or swaps, which would
hardly be easy to separate just like that. Instead,
this would require the organization of special
teams of experts, competent for assessing or
managing these risks, and providing protection
against them. What also has to be taken into
account are the higher costs of labour force,
generated by the ring-fencing of certain banks’
divisions.
In the EU another regulatory flow has been
implemented in line with the recommendations
formulated by the so-called Basle standards.
The Basle III standards, currently being
implemented, have imposed higher capital,
liquidity and leverage requirements to banks.
The increased capital requirements and
bankarstvo 5 2013
regulation of capital adequacy, along with other
restrictions, have been introduced in order to
curb the moral hazard of large banks’ managers.
Instead of the proposed, nearly complete
79
division of commercial and investment
banking, there have been some proposals for the
introduction of a strict supervision of investment
banks, because any division could bring more
damage than benefits to the financial system.
The Basle standards are actually an alternative
to this separation, given that their rigid criteria
and capital requirements, increasing in line
with the bank’s risk weighted assets, regulate
the investment (critical) banking segments,
eliminating the need for formal division.
In comparison with the implementation of
the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, when the amount of
investment banks’ capital drastically declined,
despite the continued economic growth, the
effects of the latest regulatory process will
only be visible after a certain period of time.
Whether it will cause a decline in capital market
transactions, whether capital will become more
expensive, whether financial stability and
economic growth will go up or down - it remains
to be seen in the future. Some time is required
for the proposed measures and adopted laws
to be implemented, and even more time for
them to become effective and demonstrate
their advantages and disadvantages. Even
now, however, there are some harsh critics of
these regulations, believing that they would
only cause an outflow of capital, leaving less
available money for companies’ investment
activities (Allen et al., 2013).
It is difficult to fathom the true state of
affairs, and point a finger at a single culprit
for the recent financial crisis, even with such
dramatic economic consequences. It was an
unfortunate turn of events and developments
whose interaction led to some devastating
consequences. For a start, universal banks will
go under, partly because the public wants to see
some radical changes, making it believe that the
problems are being solved by addressing their
root causes. All the while, we overlook that in
a crisis, people, not systems, are always to be
blamed. The future will show whether these
heavy chains bounding the financial system
will be able to prevent some other potential
crises from happening, and whether they will
put a stop to the selfish and greedy side of the
human nature, or whether laws and regulations
are, once again, barking up the wrong tree.