CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
1.1.Introduction
Pragmatics is a branch of linguistics which has recently become
increasingly well known. One part of the pragmatics that will be discussed in this
paper is Implicature. The concept of implicature was first introduced by H. Grice
(1975) to solve the problem of language meaning that cannot be solved by
ordinary semantic theory. Implicature of language is used to calculate what is
suggested or what is meant by speakers as something different from what is
literally stated (Brown and Yule, 1983: 31 in Abdul Rani, 2006: 176).
Meanwhile, pre-presumption (presupposition) comes from the word to
pre-suppose, which in English means to suppose beforehand, in the sense that
before the speaker or writer says something he already has a previous guess about
the friend to talk or the matter being discussed. In addition to these definitions,
several other definitions of presuppositions include: Levinson (quoted by
Nababan, 1987: 48) provides a concept of presupposition that aligns its meaning
with presupposition as a kind of assumption or background knowledge that makes
an action, theory, or expression meaningful. George Yule (2006: 43) states that
presupposition is something assumed by speakers as an event before producing a
speech.
Furthermore, a branch of logic that deals with the study of the meaning
and sense (in Russian, znachenie and smysl) of concepts and propositions and of
their formal analogues—the interpretations of expressions (terms and formulas) of
different calculi (formal systems). The first and foremost task of logical semantics
is to define precisely the concepts of “meaning,” “sense,” and “interpretation,”
and, accordingly, the concepts of “truth,” “definability,” “expressibility,”
“consequence,” and “model” (including such general and primary concepts as
“set,” “object,” and “correspondence”).
Important semantic problems arise as a result of the difference between the
content and extension of concepts and between the meaning and truth value of
propositions. Properties such as equivalence and consequence that are related to

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the content of concepts and the signification of propositions are called intensional;
properties related to the extension of concepts and the truth value of judgments
are called extensional. Propositions and concepts that are intensionally equivalent
are also extensionally equivalent, although the opposite is generally false. For
example, the statements “The Volga flows into the Caspian Sea” and “2 × 2 = 4”
are equivalent extensionally but not intensionally. Any pair of propositions that
are equivalent in the ordinary sense of the term illustrate the preceding assertion
(see below the discussion of analytic and synthetic truth).
In logical semantics the fundamental relation between an expression and
its interpretation has, after detailed analysis, proved to be not a two-place but a
three-place relation. That is, the concept of an interpretation is “stratified” into an
extensional and an intensional level. Following the tradition established by G.
Frege, the author of the first fundamental studies on logical semantics, by the
Austrian logician R. Carnap, and by the contemporary American logician A.
Church, each proper noun (including, in the broad sense of the term, cardinal
numbers and any nouns with definite articles or demonstrative pronouns) is
contrasted with, on the one hand, its denotative object (denotation, or nominatum)
and, on the other, the sense, or concept expressed by the noun. The terms of this
“semantic triangle” are first defined for natural languages and only then, with
certain restrictions, are they transferred to formalized languages.

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 CHAPTER II
THEORY OF CONVERSATIONAL MAXIM (IMPLICATURE),
PRESUPPOSITION AND SEMATICS LOGICS
2.1. The Theory of Implicature
Further explained that Grice (in Suseno, 1993: 30 via Mulyana)
suggests that implicature is speech which implies something different from what
is actually said. Something "different" is the intention of the speaker that was
stated explicitly. In other words, implicatures are intentions, desires, or
expressions of a hidden heart. In his article entitled Logic and Conversation, it is
suggested that a speech can imply a proposition that is not part of the speech
concerned. The implied proposition is called implicature. Because implicature is
not a part of speech that implies it, the relationship between the two propositions
is not necessary consequence.
Etymologically, implicature is derived from the word implicatum and in
noun this word is almost the same as the word implication, which means purpose,
understanding, involvement (Echols,1984: 313 via Mulyana). Structurally,
implicature functions as a bridge / chain that connects "pronounced" with
"implied". According to PWJ Nababan (1987: 28) in Abdul Rani stated that
implicature is closely related to the convention of meaningfulness that occurs in
the communication process. The concept is then understood to explain the
difference between "pronounced" and "implied".

B. Types of Implicatures
Grice (1975) in Abdul Rani (2006: 171) states that there are two kinds of
implicatures, namely (1) conventional implicature (conventional implicature), and
(2) implicature conversation (conversation implicature). The following is an
explanation of the two kinds of implicatures :

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1. Conventional Implicature
Conventional implicature, that is, implicature, is determined by "the conventional
meaning of the words used". The point is general understanding, all people
generally already know about the meaning or understanding of certain things.
Example:
(1). Lestari is Solo's daughter, so she is flexible.
The general implicature that can be taken between Princess Solo are flexible in the
example above, that so far, the city of Solo has always been named as a cultural
city full of subtleties and the flexibility of its daughters. The implicature that
arises is that Solo women are generally known for their flexible appearance.

Conventional implicature is contemporary. That is, the meaning or understanding

of something is more durable. A lexeme, which is contained in a form of
utterance, can be identified by its meaning "which is durable" and is generally
known.
2. Implicature in conversation
This type of implicature is generated because of the demands of a
particular context of conversation. Implicatures of this conversation have more
varied meanings and meanings. The reason, understanding of things "intended: is
very dependent on the context of the conversation. So, if conventional implicature
has a long-lasting meaning, then this conversational implicature only has a
temporary meaning that is meaning only when there is a conversation /
conversation occurs in that context. In a dialogue (conversation), it often happens
that a speaker does not express his intent directly. The thing that is to be said is
actually 'hidden', pronounced indirectly, or uttered completely different from the
intent of his words.

Example:
(2) Mother: Ani, your sister hasn't eaten.
Ani: Yes, ma'am. What is side dish?

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 In the example above, the conversation between Mother and Ani contained
implicature which meant 'command to feed'. In the utterance, there is no form of
command sentence at all. The only utterance my mother made was a notification
that 'sister hasn't eaten'. However, because Ani can understand the implicatures
conveyed by her mother, she answers and readiness to carry out her mother's
orders. Grice explains that conversational implicatures cite the principle of
cooperation or mutual agreement, namely the agreement that the things discussed
by participants must be interrelated. Grice also stated that the principle of
cooperation referred to as follows: Give your contribution to the conversation as
needed according to the purpose or direction of exchange of your conversation
seen in it. With this general principle, in speaking, speakers are advised to convey
their utterances in accordance with the context of the occurrence of speech events,
speech objectives, and speech turns that exist.
The principle of this collaboration is supported by a set of assumptions
called conversation principles (maxims of conversation) which include: (1) the
principle of quantity, providing information as requested (2) the principle of
quality, stating only what we think is right or sufficient proof of its truth (3) the
principle of relations, contributing relevant information and (4) principles of
methods, avoiding unclear disclosures, avoiding intimidation, expressing briefly,
expressing in an orderly manner. The first three relate to 'what is said', and the
fourth to 'how to say'.
However, the principle of collaboration is denied by Leech (1985: 17)
via Abdul Rani (2006) who said that, in pragmatics, language communication is a
combination of illocutionary goals and social goals. Thus, in communication that,
in addition to conveying the mandate and acting speech, the needs and duties of
speakers are to keep the conversation going smoothly, not stalled, not in vain, and
the social relations between listeners' speakers are not disturbed. For this reason,
according to Leech, the principle of collaboration between Grice must be
complementary (not just added) with the principle of courtesy so that the principle
of cooperation is saved from the difficulty of explaining between meaning and
power.

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 Example:
(3) Mother (I) : "Someone broke this pot"
Child (A): "Not me!"
From the example above, the Child (A) gives an answer that is as if it is not gay
(violation of the principle of relationship): A reacts as if he must save himself
from an evil deed even though in the sentence of the Mother (I) there are no words
accused A of committing the act. In such situations, the answer in the form of
denial A can actually be predicted and non-compliance (violation of the principle
of relationship) can be explained as follows.
We suppose I did not know who did the action, but he suspected A.
Because I wanted to be polite, I did not say the accusation directly. Instead, he
makes a statement that is less informative, but true, that is replacing your
terminology with 'there is something'. A captures intent I and statement I is
interpreted by A as an indirect accusation. As a result, when A heard the
statement, A responded as an accused person, namely A denied an act that had not
been openly accused. Thus, the violation of the maximal relationship in answer A
is caused by implicature in the utterance I, an indirect implicature motivated by
manners. So, the goal of answer A is this implicature, not the expression I actually
pronounced.

According to Levinson (1983) via Abdul Rani (2006: 173), there are four types of
benefits of the concept of implicature, namely:
1. Can provide explanations of meanings or facts of language that are not
reached by linguistic theories.
2. Can provide a firm explanation of the external differences of what the
language user means.
3. Can give a simple semantic description of the relationship clause
associated with the same conjunction.
4. Can describe various facts that outwardly appear unrelated, even opposite
(like metaphors).
From the information, it is clear that the sentences that we outwardly see

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 are not related, but for people who understand the use of the language can
capture the message conveyed by the speaker, such as:

Husband: " Cuplis is crying for his mother's expression!"

Wife: "I'm frying."
The two sentences above are conventionally structurally unrelated. However, for
listeners who are familiar with such situations, they will understand what the
second sentence means. The wife did not answer the husband's utterance that
Cuplis (his child) was crying because it was alleged by the husband to be thirsty
and asked to drink his mother's milk, but only stated that he was frying. And,
obviously this sentences was found in pragmatics.

Cuplis (his son) cried because it was alleged by the husband that his son is thirsty
and asked to drink his mother's milk, but only stated that she was frying. And,
clearly the sentence can only be explained by pragmatic rules only.

The existence of implicatures in a conversation (discourse of dialogue) is needed,

among others:
1. Give functional explanations for linguistic facts that are not covered by
structural linguistic theories.

2. Bridging the communication process between speakers.

3. Give a clear and explicit explanation of how the possibility of language

users can capture messages, even though things that are spoken outwardly
are different from what is intended.

4. Can simplify the semantic description of the difference between

interclausal relationships, even though the clauses are related to the same
words and structures.

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 5. Can explain various kinds of linguistic facts and symptoms that are
outwardly unrelated (Levision in PWJ Nababan, 1987: 28).

The term implicature is anonymous with the word explosive. According to

Grice (Brown & Yule, 1986: 31 in Abdul Rani (2006), the term implicature is
interpreted as "what speakers can imply, or mean, as distinct from what a speaker
literally says". Similarly, Pratt states (1981; 1977 via Abdul Rani) "What is the
meaning of the utterance in that context?" From his understanding, it is known
that implicatures are indirect meanings or implicit meanings caused by what is
said (explosive). In communicating means expressing something indirectly.
Example:
(5) (Context : Very cold air. A husband who tells his wife who is beside him).
Husband: "Very cold!"
Transcript of husband's utterances that are not accompanied by a clear context can
be interpreted in various ways, including:
(5a) a request to his wife to return a sweater, jacket or blanket, or a warm drink
to warm his body
(5b) a request to his wife to close the window so that the wind does not enter
the room so that the air inside the room warms up.
(5c) notice to his wife indirectly that his health is being disturbed.
(5d) a request to his wife for him to be treated with his body.

The meaning of the four is the meaning of implicature. The general

meaning is explicit (literal), which is commonly called explosive, the example
above is "information that the situation (at that time) was very cold". From here, it
can be clearly seen the difference in the meaning of implicature and eclectic.
From the explanation above, it turns out that implicature can be divided into
several types based on the explosive form. The following is a further
explanation:
1. Implicature in the form of the meaning implied by an expression (between
the line), is a simple implicature.

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 2. Implicature in the form of a highlighted meaning from beyond the line,
which is a continuation of the first implicature.
3. Implicature which is the opposite of explosive. Eventhough it is the
opposite, it generally does not cause logical conflict.

C. Implicature’s characteristics
Gunarwan (in Rustono, 1999: 89) emphasizes the existence of three things that
need to be considered related to implicature, namely:
1. Implicature is not part of speech,
2. Implicature is not a logical result of speech,
3. A speech allows to have more than one implicature, and that depends on
the context.

D. Implicature’s Examples
1. A: Bambang arrived
B: a. The cigarette is hidden
b. I will go first
c. The room is cleaned
Implicature : a. Maybe Bambang was a smoker, but he never bought cigarettes.
Smoking if someone gives, and never gives a friend, etc.
b. Maybe not happy with Bambang
c. Maybe Bambang is a cleaner. He will get angry seeing something
dirty.

2. Father : Your clothes have not been ironed

Mother : Mother is feeding brother, sir
Implicature: Mother refused to iron your clothes because she was feeding him
food.
3. (Context: 10 o'clock in the evening. A boarding house rebukes a boarding child

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who is still sitting in front with his friends)
Mrs. Kos: "It's ten o'clock, Ma'am!"
Implicature: a. The boarding house asked his boarding house friends to go home
soon.
b. Kos's mother intended to tell her that the visiting hour had passed
its limit.

4. Yesterday I met the Ucok who was hard-nosed. No wonder, it turns out he's a
Batak person. During this time, Batak people have always been seen as hard-
nosed people, the implicature which is that the Batak people are hard-hearted.

5. Deni like a Negro, so he is black

So far, we know that Negroes are identical to blacks, so the implicature is black
Negroes.

6. Don't be like Linling, who counts, you're not Chinese.

So far, we know that Lingling's name is identical to Chinese names. Chinese are
also synonymous with stingy or calculating with money. The implicature that
arises is calculating / stingy Chinese.

7. He is Padang, he likes spicy food.

During this time, Padang people always like to eat spicy, the implicature that
arises is that Padang people like spicy food.

2.2. Theory of Presuppositions

Pre-presumption (presupposition) comes from the word to pre-suppose,
which in English means to suppose beforehand, in the sense that before the
speaker or writer says something he already has a previous guess about the friend
to talk or the matter being discussed. In addition to these definitions, several other
definitions of presuppositions include: Levinson (quoted by Nababan, 1987: 48)
provides a concept of presupposition that aligns its meaning with presupposition

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as a kind of assumption or background knowledge that makes an action, theory, or
expression meaningful. George Yule (2006: 43) states that presupposition is
something assumed by speakers as an event before producing a speech. Those
who have presuppositions are speakers not sentences. Louise Cummings (1999:
42) states that presuppositions are assumptions or inferences that are implicit in
certain linguistic expressions. Nababan (1987: 46), provides an understanding of
presuppositions as a basis or basic conclusions about the context and situation of
language (using language) which makes language forms (sentences or
expressions) have meaning for listeners or recipients of the language and vice
versa, helping the speaker determine the forms language that can be used to
express the intended meaning or message. From a number of presuppositions
definitions above, it can be concluded that presuppositions are the conclusions or
initial assumptions of speakers before making a speech that what will be delivered
is also understood by the speech partner. To clarify this, consider the following
example:
(1) a: "I bought Mr. Udin's book yesterday"
b: "Get 30 percent discount right?

The example of the conversation above shows that before speaking (1A) there was
a presumption that B knew what he meant, namely there was a book written by
Mr. Pranowo.

Errors make presuppositions of effects in human speech. In other words,

the right presuppositions can enhance the communicative value of a speech
expressed. The more precise presuppositions are hypothesized, the higher the
communicative value of a utterance is expressed. According to Chaika (1982: 76),
in some cases, discourse can be sought through presuppositions. It refers to
meanings that are not explicitly stated.
Example:
(2a) "My father came from Surabaya".
(3a) "The drink is finished".

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From example (2a) presuppositions are: (1) I have a father; (2) Father is in
Surabaya. In example (3a) the presumption is please drink it. Therefore, the
presupposition function is to help reduce the barriers of people's responses to the
interpretation of a speech.

Pre-perceived Characteristics
The basic presupposition is the nature of permanence under denial (Yule,
2006: 45). This has the intention that the presupposition (presupposition) of a
statement will remain steady (still true) even though the sentence is made a
negative sentence or negated. For example, consider the following sentences:
(4) a: "Budi Guitar is new".
b: "Guitar Budi is not new".
The sentence (b) is the negative form of sentence. 4a). The presumption in
sentence (4a) is that Budi has a guitar. In sentence (b), it turns out that the
presumption does not change even though sentence (b) contains denial of sentence
(4a), which has the same presumption that Budi has a guitar.

Wijana (citedif, 2009: 64) states that a sentence is stated to presupposure another
sentence if the untruth of the second sentence (the sentence being proxied) results
in the first sentence (the prepositional sentence) cannot be said to be true or false.
To clarify the statement note the following example.
(5) a. "The wife of an official is very beautiful."
b. "The official has a wife".

The sentence (b) is the presupposition (presupposition) of the sentence (5a). The
sentence can be declared true or false if the official has a wife. However, if it is
contrary to the reality (the official does not have a wife), the sentence cannot be
determined.

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Types of Presuppositions
Presuppositions (presuppositions) have been associated with the use of a large
number of words, phrases, and structures (Yule, 2006: 46). Furthermore Gorge
Yule classifies presuppositions into 6 types of presuppositions, namely existential
presuppositions, factive presuppositions, non-factional presuppositions, lexical
presuppositions, structural presuppositions, and counterfactual presuppositions.

1. Existential Presuppositions
Existential presuppositions are previews that show the existence / existence /
identity of the referent which is expressed in definite words.
a. The person is walking
b. There are people walking

2. Factive Presuppositions
Factive presuppositions are presuppositions where information presumed to
follow a verb can be considered a reality.
(a) a. He did not realize that he was sick
b. She is sick
(b)c. We regret telling him
d. We told him

3. Lexical presuppositions
Lexical presuppositions are understood as a form of presupposition in which the
meanings expressed conventionally are interpreted with the presumption that
another meaning (which is not stated) is understood.
(a) a. He stopped smoking
b. He used to smoke
(b) a. They began to complain
b. Previously they did not complain

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4. Non-factional presuppositions
Non-factive presuppositions are presuppositions that are assumed to be incorrect.
(a ) a. I imagine that I am rich
b. I am not rich
(b ) a. I imagine being in Hawaii
b. I am not in Hawaii

5. Structural Presuppositions
Structural presuppositions refer to the structure of certain sentences that have been
analyzed as a regular and conventional presupposition that the structure part has
assumed to be true. This can be seen in the question sentence, conventionally
interpreted with question words (when and where) as well as known problems.
(a) a. Where did you buy the bicycle?
b. You buy a bicycle
(b) a. When did he leave?
b. He goes

6. Counterfactual presuppositions
Counterfactual presuppositions mean that what is prejudiced is not only incorrect,
but also the opposite (opposite) of right or contrary to reality.
(a) a. If only

2.3. Theory of Semantics Logics

a branch of logic that deals with the study of the meaning and sense (in
Russian, znachenie and smysl) of concepts and propositions and of their formal
analogues—the interpretations of expressions (terms and formulas) of different
calculi (formal systems). The first and foremost task of logical semantics is to
define precisely the concepts of “meaning,” “sense,” and “interpretation,” and,
accordingly, the concepts of “truth,” “definability,” “expressibility,”
“consequence,” and “model” (including such general and primary concepts as
“set,” “object,” and “correspondence”).

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 Important semantic problems arise as a result of the difference between the
content and extension of concepts and between the meaning and truth value of
propositions. Properties such as equivalence and consequence that are related to
the content of concepts and the signification of propositions are called intensional;
properties related to the extension of concepts and the truth value of judgments
are called extensional. Propositions and concepts that are intensionally equivalent
are also extensionally equivalent, although the opposite is generally false. For
example, the statements “The Volga flows into the Caspian Sea” and “2 × 2 = 4”
are equivalent extensionally but not intensionally. Any pair of propositions that
are equivalent in the ordinary sense of the term illustrate the preceding assertion
(see below the discussion of analytic and synthetic truth).
In logical semantics the fundamental relation between an expression and
its interpretation has, after detailed analysis, proved to be not a two-place but a
three-place relation. That is, the concept of an interpretation is “stratified” into an
extensional and an intensional level. Following the tradition established by G.
Frege, the author of the first fundamental studies on logical semantics, by the
Austrian logician R. Carnap, and by the contemporary American logician A.
Church, each proper noun (including, in the broad sense of the term, cardinal
numbers and any nouns with definite articles or demonstrative pronouns) is
contrasted with, on the one hand, its denotative object (denotation, or nominatum)
and, on the other, the sense, or concept expressed by the noun. The terms of this
“semantic triangle” are first defined for natural languages and only then, with
certain restrictions, are they transferred to formalized languages.
The relations between noun, denotation, and concept are generally not
univocal. Thus, nouns that are homonyms have several different concepts; on the
other hand, different nouns that are synonyms may correspond to one and the
same concept. The nominative relation between a noun and its denotation is also
not univocal (Frege’s example was that of the nouns “morning star” and “evening
star,” which have the same common denotation, the planet Venus, but different
concepts). The concept however completely defines the denotation, that is, of

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course, if such exists; for example the noun “Pegasus” has a sense but lacks a
denotation.
Unlike natural languages, formalized languages are, as a rule, constructed
such that every noun has exactly one sense. On the other hand, in most formalized
languages synonymy is retained, synonyms being connected, by definition,
through relations of equality (equivalence, identity). The elimination of synonymy
is in a number of cases theoretically impossible since there is no algorithm for
determining identity between arbitrary expressions (“words”) in a sufficiently
broad class of formalized languages.
The foundations for a systematic construction of contemporary logical semantics
were set forth in the works of A. Tarski, who was chiefly drawn to the analysis of
the notions “truth,” “realizability,” “definability,” and “denotation” and to the
possibilities of their exact definition. It was found that all these notions are
defined for formalized languages by means of richer languages that serve as
metalanguages for formalized languages (“object” languages). To define the
corresponding notions for nonformalized languages it is first necessary to
formalize them, after which they obey the same scheme. A metalanguage, in turn,
may be formalized, but the semantic notions (“truth,” etc.) of a formalized
metalanguage must be defined by means of yet another metalanguage. Mixing
language and metalanguage at any level inevitably leads to semantic paradoxes.
Following the American logician W. V. O. Quine, logicians distinguish the
properties of linguistic expressions that can be characterized in terms of arbitrary
interpretations (models) of a given language and that are invariant from one
interpretation to another and linguistic properties that can be defined in terms of
any one interpretation. The first range of questions relates to the theory of sense
while the second to the theory of reference (theory of denotation).
The notions of “sense,” “synonymy,” “intelligibility,” and “semantic
consequence” are dealt with in a theory of sense. This field of logical semantics is
still at a very elementary stage in its development. The theory of reference, which
is based on concepts of “truth,” “denotation,” and “nomination,” has already
proved quite productive. One of the results of the theory of reference was Tarski’s

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theorem that the truth predicate of any non-contradictory language system cannot
be determined using its own resources. The meaning of Tarski’s theorem, which
establishes specific limitations on the expressible means of formal languages, is in
many ways similar to the role in mathematics of Gödel’s famous theorem in
metamathematics that states that sufficiently rich calculi of mathematical logic are
in principle deductively incomplete. The very structure of the demonstrations of
these two remarkable clauses reveal profound analogies. They yield together an
extremely powerful tool for metamathematical demonstrations, for example, of
non-contradiction, completeness, and incompleteness.
Following the tradition starting from Leibniz, propositions of a language
that are true in all models of the language (“in all possible worlds”) are called
analytically true; accordingly, propositions not true in any model are called
analytically false. Analytically true propositions are in contrast to synthetically (or
factually) true propositions whose truth is said to depend on the properties of the
“given universe.” In other words, synthetically true propositions are neither
analytically true nor analytically false. They are satisfied in some but not in all
models of a given language. For complete languages the concept of analytic truth,
which is a semantic concept, can be described in purely syntactic terms, as
through demonstrability. For incomplete languages, on the other hand, which are
precisely the languages that are of greatest interest to science, no such reduction
of logical semantics to syntax can be directly carried out.
Leibniz’ idea of the distinction between “possible worlds” and the “actual
universe” as a foundation for logical semantics has been developed by the Dutch
logician E. Beth, the English logician A. N. Prior, the Finnish logician J. Hintikka,
and particularly by the American logician S. A. Kripke, who introduced the
concept of a model structure. Such a model structure is the universe of the set of
all models in classical propositional logic (“all possible universes”), a concrete
model from this set (“actual universe”), and a reflexive binary relation on the set
of models that relates the general validity (identical truth) of an arbitrary
proposition in one model with the possibility of this proposition in other models.
Depending on additional properties of such a relation (whether it is both

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symmetrical and transitive, or simply one or the other), different systems of modal
logic correspond to a model of the “actual universe.” Contemporary work in
logical semantics also draws on ideas and concepts of many-valued logic,
axiomatic set theory, and abstract algebra.
The ideas, methods, and results of logical semantics have been utilized in
various spheres of applied linguistics and in semiotics (automatic decoding,
machine translation, automatic abstracting), in the construction of a semantic
information theory, in problems arising in heuristic programming, in investigating
problems of pattern recognition, and other questions dealt with in cybernetics.

2.3.1. Logic and Truth

Logic can help interpret a sentence. Logic starts from observing the principle of
validity of argument and inference. In connection with this, Saeed (1997: 8)
explains the relationship between logic and truth with Aristotle's theory, mode
tollen, namely the validity of arguments with 3 stages,
Example:
If he is angry with me, he doesn't want to talk to me.
He doesn't want to talk to me.
He is angry with me.

If the sentences a and b are the premise, then the sentence c which is the
conclusion must be
correct.

Truth (truth).
The truth of a statement supported by facts is called empirical truth. There is a
truth formula put forward by Tarski, quoted by Wahab (1995), namely:

S is true if and only if P

S is a sentence, and P is a condition that guarantees that the sentence is correct.

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The sentence used as an example in this formula is: "Snow is white" A series of
words that make up the phrase "Snow is white" is stated correctly if and only if
the snow is white.
In the semantics to state that a sentence is true or false, the term truth value is
used. Furthermore, to reveal the facts and facts that are used to find out the
sentence is correct or incorrectly used the term truth condition.

Types of Truth
According to Andrew Bernardin (2005), there are four types of truth, namely a)
personal truth, b) social truth, human truth, and d) universal truth.
1. Personal truth: truth that is only believed by someone personally, does not
apply to everyone. Even if there is one or two people who have the same
perspective on something, it is only by chance.
Example:
Mathematics is a difficult subject.
That statement may be true for certain people
Indivisually, but for others it is the opposite.

2. Social truth: truth that is believed by certain groups, and does not apply to other
groups.
Example:
A man is not good doing the house work.
A woman who is smoking a bad woman.
For particular people, thirteen is not a good number.

3. Human truth: human truth.

Example:
We are the best creature in the world.
Death makes someone sad.

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4. Universal Truth: universally valid truths, not relative to humans. Natural
science includes universal truth.
Example:
Water flows from the higher position to the lower one.
The moon orbits around the sun.

Different from Andrew Bernadin (1995), Saeed (1997) divides the type of truth
(from the linguistic side) into 3 types of pairs, namely: a priori truth and a truth
and contingent truth, necessary truth, analytic and syntactic truth.
1.A priori Truth and Posteriori Truth
a. A priori truth: truths originating from meanings that do not need to be found
proof of the truth. Truths that were known before without without experience.
Example:
A horse has four legs.
Cubes have six sides.
All bachelors are unmarried.

b. A posteriori: only the truth can be known based on the reality and experience of
the person who stated it or someone else's statement.
Example:
Dinosaurs existed millions years ago.
Water is H2O.

2. Necessary Truth and Contingent Truth

a. Necessary truth is a truth that does not need to be debated.
Example
in Mathematics the addition of 2 + 2 = 4 cannot be questioned again and will
not change.

b. The contingent truth can be called into question the truth depends on the facts.
Example:

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 Tiger is extict in Java. But if it turns out that someone found a tiger in Java, the
information conveyed in the sentence above is not true / false.

3. Analytic and Syntactic Truth

a. Analytic is a statement whose truth comes from the relationship of meaning in a
sentence without regard to relations with reality in the world.
Example:
Bachelors are unmarried. This is an analytic example because the concept of
"being unmarried" is already contained in the definition of the word "a bachelor"
itself.

b. Syntactic truth is a statement whose truth is in accordance with the reality, in

accordance with the facts in the world.
Example:
The sun is approximately 93 million miles from the earth.

The concept of the distance between the sun (sun) and earth (earth) is not only
determined by the terms sun and earth but also by how many distances between
them.

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 CHAPTER III
CONCLUSIONS

3.1. Conclusion
From the explanations, it can be concluded that:
1. implicature is used to describe the utterances or sentences to be produced by
speakers actually. Implicature is contained the implicit meaning which has
two or more meanings.
2. Presupposition is the the utterances, sentences, or assumtions that to be
produced by two speakers or more which has the meaning based on the
context or particular situation.
3. Semantics logics task is to define precisely the concepts of “meaning,”
“sense,” and “interpretation,” and, accordingly, the concepts of “truth,”
“definability,” “expressibility,” “consequence,” and “model” (including such
general and primary concepts as “set,” “object,” and “correspondence”).

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