1. G.R. No.

217026

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
LAWRENCE GAJO y BUENAFE and RICO GAJO y BUENAFE, Accused-Appellants

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On appeal is the October 13, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
1

No. 06071 which affirmed in toto the December 6, 2010 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial
2

Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77 in Criminal Case Nos. 9185, 9186, and 9187
finding Lawrence Gajo y Buenafe (Lawrence) and Rico Gajo yBuenafe (Rico) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (sale of dangerous drugs), and Section 11
(possession of dangerous drugs), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165), and
3

imposing upon them the penalty of life imprisonment and a ₱500,000.00 fine for illegal
sale of shabu; and, the indeterminate prison term of twelve (12) years and one (l) day. as
minimum, to fifteen (15) years and one (1) day, as maximum, as well as a ₱300,000.00 fine
for illegal possession of shabu.

Factual Antecedents

The information for illegal sale of shabu against Lawrence and Rico contained the following
accusatory allegations:

[In Criminal Case No. 9185]

That, on or about the 23rd day of March 2007, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, in conspiracy with one another, without having been authorized by law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver or give away to another 0.01 gram of
white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet,
which substance was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
commonly known as 'Shabu', a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of Php
200.00, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

On the other hand, the Information below respectively charged Lawrence and Rico for illegal
possession of shabu:

[In Criminal Case No. 9186 - against Lawrence]

That, on or about the 23rd day of March 2007 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of
Rizal, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and control 0.01
gram of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet and which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

[ln Criminal Case No. 9187 - against Rico]

That, on or about the 23rd day of March 2007 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of
Rizal, Philippines. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and control 0.02
gram and 0.02 gram, with a total weight of 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance
contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets and which were found positive
to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-
cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

When arraigned,Lawrence and Rico pleaded ''Not Guilty" to the charges against them.
7

During the trial, the parties stipulated on the intended testimony of Forensic Chemist P/I
8

Ruben M. Apostol, Jr. as regards the existence of Chemistry Report No. D-140-07. This 9

Report found that the submitted specimens with markings GMJ (0.01 gram), GMT-
I (0.02 gram), GMJ-2 (0.02 gram), and GMJ-3 (O.OI gram) were found positive for the
presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.

Version of the Prosecution

To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Officer 3 Geraldo Justo (PO3 Justo)
and PO1 Jimmy A. San Pedro (PO1 San Pedro) who narrated on the following facts:
10

Sometime in March 2007, die Intel Personnel Department of San Mateo (Rizal) Municipal
Police Station (Police Station) conducted a surveillance on Lawrence, a resident of Pag-asa
Compound. Ampid I,San Mateo, Rizal. A week before the actual operation, PO3 Justo
11

conducted further surveillance, and witnessed the physical description of their target person
and the appearance of the latter's house. 12

On March 23, 2007, at about 11:05 p.m., PO3 Justo, PO1 Sangahin, and PO1 San Pedro
were on duty at the Police Station. While thereat, they planned to conduct a buy-bust
13

operation against Lawrence based on the details given by a civilian informant. PO3 Justo
wrote his initials "GMJ" into two ₱100.00 bills, and the police agreed that if PO1 Justo, as
14

poseur buyer, successfully bought shabu during the buy-bust, he would remove his cap. 15

At about 11:20 p.m. of even date, PO3 Justo, PO1 Sangahin and PO1 San Pedro arrived at
their target area. P03 Justo immediately alighted from the vehicle and proceeded to the
house of Lawrence. He saw Lawrence standing near a lamp post and approached him. P03 16

Justo told Lawrence, "pakuha ng dos," handing him (Lawrence) ₱200.00. Lawrence took the
money, and replied, "sandali lang, asa bahay." And thereafter, he entered his house. After a
17

while, a man. who the police later on identified as Rico. came out of Lawrence's house and
18

handed PO3 Justo a small plastic sachet containing suspected shabu. Consequently, PO3
Justo removed his cap, the police's pre-arranged signal that PO3 Justo already
bought shabu. 19

When approached by POI Sai1 Pedro, P03 Justo told him that Lawrence received the
marked money and went inside his (Lawrence's) house. PO3 Justo thereafter held Rico's
20

am1 and informed him of his constitutional rights. He also directed Rico to bring out the
contents of his pocket Upon doing so, PO3 Justo saw from Rico's pocket two plastic sachets
suspected to contain shabu. Meanwhile POJ San Pedro and PO1 Sangahin entered the
21

house of Lawrence. There, PO 1 San Pedro recovered the marked money and one plastic
22

sachet of suspected shabufrom Lawrence.

23

In the Police Station, P03 Justo placed the markings GMJ, GMJ-1, and GMJ-2 on the three
sachets he recovered from Rico. He also marked and placed his initials, GMJ-3, on the 24

plastic sachet that PO1 San Pedro recovered from Lawrence. PO3 Justo mm-ked all the
25

seized items in the presence of PO1 San Pedro and PO1 Sangahin. According to PO1 San
Pedro, at the time of the marking, '"[the accused] was already inside the jail." 26

In addition, PO3 Justo testified that he marked the plastic sachet at the Police Station
because there was already a commotion at the place of the incident. However, PO 1 San27

Pedro denied that there was any commotion immediately after the buy-bust. 28

In the Police Station, PO1 San Pedro made an inventory of the recovered items. This
inventory was the same Initial Laboratory Report"' submitted to the Crime L'1lboratory. PO3
29

Justo and PO1 San Pedro confirmed that they brought the seized items to the Crime
Laboratory. However, based on the Request for Laboratory Examination, it was a ce1tain
30 31

PO2 Cruz w1hbmitted them to the Crime Laboratory Service of Tikling, Taytay, Rizal.
 Version of the Defense

For its part, the defense presented Lawrence and Rico, who denied the allegations against
them and narrated on these events:

On March 23, 2007, at around 11:00 p.m., Rico was inside his room at the house he had
been living with his family, including his brother, Lawrence, and their mother. Suddenly, he
32

heard noise from outside. Upon going out of his room, he saw five armed persons. Later, he
learned that these men were Police Officers Arellano, San Pedro, Justo, Benito and Moreno.
Thereafter, SPO1 Arellano poked a gun at and asked Rico his name. He also informed the
latter that they were looking for Bubot, a neighbor of Rico. In reply, Rico told SPO1 Arellano
that Bubot did not reside at their (Rico) house. After insisting that Bubot entered Rico's
house, PO1 San Pedro frisked Rico, and eventually, directed him to sit down. The police
then searched the house. 33

Meanwhile, Lawrence who was then sleeping, also heard noise and came out of his room.
He saw five men in civilian clothes inside their house. Eventually, he learned that these men
were policemen. Lawrence saw that the police were accusing Rico that he was Bubot. He
attempted to stop them from arresting Rico. In turn, the police frisked Lawrence and asked
him to sit beside Rico.
34

After searching Rico's house. the policemen boarded Lawrence and Rico to their (police)
vehicle and brought them to the Police Station. 35

Rico testified that SPO1 Arellano asked ₱20,000.00 from him but he replied that he did not
have any money. 36

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

According to the RTC. the act of Lawrence of accepting two ₱100.00 hills from PO3 Justo
and Rico's turning over one plastic sachet of shabu to PO3 Justo proved that there was
conspiracy between them to sell drugs. Moreover, PO1 San Pedro recovered one plastic
sachet of shahu from Lawrence while PO3 Justo recovered two more plastic sachets
of shabu from Rico. As such, the RTC decreed that Lawrence and Rico were guilty of illegal
possession of shabu as they failed to prove that they were legally authorized to possess or
use the same.

Consequently, the RTC ruled that Rico and Lawrence were guilty of violating Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165. It sentenced them to life imprisonment, and ordered them to pay a
₱500.000.00 fine. It also found them guilty of violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165,
imposing upon them the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and one day imprisonment, as
minimum, to 15 years and one day, as maximum, and ordering them to pay a ₱300,000.00
fine each.

On appeal, Rico and Lawrence argued that the procedure on the seizure and custody of
drugs was not complied with in the case. Thus, the prosecution failed to establish their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On October 13, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC Joint Decision. It ruled that the elements of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs had been established as the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt a) ti1e identities of Rico and Lawrence as the persons with whom the
poseur-buyer transacted for the purchase of shabu; b) the Crime Laboratory confirmed that
the seized items were shabu; and c) the consideration of the sale (₱200.00). Anent the
charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the CA held that Rico and Lawrence were
in possession and control of three sachets of shabu, two of which (0.02 gram each) were
obtained from Rico, and the other one (0.01 gram) \Vas obtained from Lawrence.

The CA likewise decreed that the chain of custody requirement had been sufficiently
complied with. It explained that the prosecution established the seizure and markings of the
illegal drugs; the transfer of the seized items by PO3 Justo to the custody of the requesting
authority and Investigating Officer, Anastacio Benzon; and the Rizal Provincial Crime
Laboratory received the request for laboratory examination signed by Inspector Benzon. It
noted nonetheless that it was a certain PO2 Cruz, not PO3 Justo, who personally delivered
the specimens. As regards the last link, it ruled that the same had been substantially
complied with after the marking of the specimens during the trial.

According to the CA, while there might be deficiency in compliance on the chain of custody
of the seized items, the integrity of the seized drugs had been preserved and the chain of its
custody had been continuous and unbroken.

Hence, this appeal.

Our Ruling

Lawrence and Rico contend that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt because of non-observance of the chain of custody requirement under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 in the case.

The Court agrees.

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended by R.A.10640, pertinently provides:

37

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs. x x x so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
dangerous drugs, x x x shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an
e1ected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof; Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provider, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous

drugs, x x x the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for
a qualitative and quantitative examination:

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results x x x shall be

issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That
when the volume of dangerous drugs, x x x does not allow the completion of
testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be
provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to
be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final
certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said
examination and certification;

In this case, Lawrence and Rico were indicted for illegal sale and possession of shabu. Thus,
it is necessary for the prosecution to establish with moral certainty the elements of these
offenses. Specifically, for the case of illegal sale of shabu, the prosecution must prove: 1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller as well as the object and consideration of the sale; and, 2)
the delivery and payment of the object sold. As regards illegal possession of shabu, it is
necessary to establish: 1) the possession of the accused of an identified prohibited drug; 2)
such possession was not legally authorized; and. 3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed it. 38

At the same time, to convict Lawrence and Rico, it is primordial that the corpus delicti or the
confiscated illegal drugs had been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This means that the
same illegal drugs possessed and sold by the accused must be the same ones offered in
court. As such, the required unbroken chain of custody under Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 above-quoted comes into play to ensure that no unnecessary doubt is created on the
identity of the seized illegal drugs.
39

More particularly, chain of custody refers to recorded authorized movements and custody of
confiscated dangerous drugs, or controlled substances. It involves testimony on every link in
the chain - from the confiscation of the illegal drugs to its receipt in the forensic laboratory up
to its presentation in court. It is necessary that every person who touched the seized item
describe how and from whom he or she received it; where and what happened to it while in
the witness' possession; its condition when received and at the time it was delivered to the
next link in the chain.
40

Generally, there are four links in said chain of custody: 1)the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug confiscated from the accused by the apprehending officer; 2)
the turnover of the seized drug by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; 3) the
turnover by the investigating officer of said item to the forensic chemist 'for examination; and,
4) the turnover and submission thereof from forensic chemist to the court. 41

As stated, the first link requires seizure and marking of the illegal drugs. To stress, marking
must be done immediately upon the seizure of the illegal drugs and in the presence of the
apprehended violator of law. Such prompt marking is important because the. Subsequent
handlers of the seized items will use the marking as reference, "The marking also sets apart
the seized item from other materials from the moment it was confiscated until its disposal
after the proceedings. In fine, marking is essential to preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the recovered dangerous drug. 42

In this case, however, the apprehending officer did not make a proper marking of the seized
shabu.

PO3 Justo confirmed that he marked the seized items upon arrival at the Police Station. He
attested that he did not immediately mark the three sachets of shabu from Rico and the one
sachet recovered by PO1 San Pedro from Lawrence as there was a1ready a commotion at
the place of incident. Nonetheless, PO1 San Pedro refuted such claim of PO3 Justo, to wit:

Q: Why did you mark that in the police station?

A: Because that is our usual procedure, sir, that we mar[k] the evidence we confiscated
already at the police station.

Q: So, that is the only reason Mr. witness, you don't have any knowledge that these pieces of
object evidence should be marked at the scene of the crime?

A: Formerly, sir, we used to mark the object evidence at the police station, because there
were times that commotion ensued whenever we are going to arrest and we were being
stoned. so to avoid harm to ourselves, we just marked them at the station. 43

Q: After you have allegedly recovered the said shabu, you immediately proceeded to the
police station and placed the markings?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: By the way, at that time[,] was there a commotion?

A: None, ma'am.

Q: There was no commotion[?]

A: None, ma'am. 44

Since there was no commotion that transpired after the seizure of shabu, there was nothing
that would prevent PO3 Justo from marking the shabu immediately after confiscation.

Moreover, PO3 Justo marked it without the presence of Lawrence and Rico. As testified by
PO3 Justo himself he marked the confiscated shabu in the presence of PO1 Sangahin and
PO1 San Pedro. And, PO1 San Pedro declared that "[the accused] was already inside the
45

jail" when PO3 Justo marked the recovered items.

46

Indeed, the failure to immediately mark the shabu after confiscation, and for marking it
without the presence of the accused constituted clear gaps in the chain of custody of the
seized illegal drugs.

In People v. Ismael, the Court stressed that the failure to mark the illegal drugs immediately
47

after confiscation from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution's evidence and warrants
the acquittal of the accused on reasonable doubt. Also, in Ismael, the Court ruled that the
requirement that the marking be done in the presence of the accused is not a mere
technicality as it assures the preservation of the identity and integrity of the illegal drugs. As
such, the non-compliance with this requirement is fatal to this case against Lawrence and
Rico.

In addition, the second link was not complied with here.

To reiterate, to establish an unbroken chain of custody, every person who touched the seized
illegal drug must describe how and from whom it was received; its condition upon receipt,
including its condition upon delivery to the next link in the chain.

Here, PO3 Justo supposedly turned over the confiscated shabu to Police Chief Inspector
Anastacio B. Benzon (PC/Insp. Benzon), the investigating officer. Nevertheless, the
prosecution did not present PC/Insp. Benzon to testify on the matter. Such non-presentation
undeniably constitutes another gap in the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drugs.

Similarly, the third link in the chain of custody was also infirm. This is because the Request
for Laboratory Examination indicated a certain PO2 Cruz as the person who delivered the
specimens to the crime laboratory for examination. Nevertheless, like in the case of PC/Insp.
Benzon. the prosecution did not present PO2 Cruz to testify on his receipt of the
seized shabu. Evidently, this non-presentation of a necessary witness constituted another
gap in the chain of custody.

Additionally, while the parties stipulated on the intended testimony of Forensic Chemist P/I
Ruben M. Apostol, Jr., the same was rendered futile by reason of the above-discussed gaps
in the chain of custody f the seized shabu. It could not thus be denied that the seized illegal
drugs were not properly handled from the time they were confiscated to their turnover in the
Police Station

SO ORDERED.
2. G.R. No. 218208

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
BRIAN VILLAHERMOSO, Accused-Appellant

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is an appeal filed by appellant Brian Villahermoso from the January 28, 2013
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR HC No. 01023, affirming the
1

November 14, 2008 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 17, in
2

Crim. Case No. CBU-78163.

The Factual Antecedents

Appellant was charged under the following Information:

That on or about the 12th day of October, 2006, at about 2:45 x x x P.M., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said [appellant] with
deliberate intent, and without authority of law, did then and there sell, deliver or give away to
a poseur buyer:

'Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, each containing white crystalline substance
weighing A-1=15.12 grams and A-2=12.13 grams or with a total weight of 27.30 grams'
locally known as "SHABU" containing Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 4

Version of the Prosecution

During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of the poseur-buyer PO2 Joseph
Villaester (PO2 Villaester).

The evidence of the prosecution as summarized by the CA is as follows:

The prosecution relays that on October 12, 2006, at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
PCI Fermin Armendarez III called a conference and formed a buy-bust team to counter the
selling of shabu by one Brian Villahermoso in Sitio Pailob, Urgeloo St., Barangay Sambag II,
Cebu City. The designated poseur-buyer was PO2 Villaester. The buy-bust was done with
prior coordination with the PDEA (Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency).

Upon dispatch at the scene, the civilian informant contacted Brian and went with the latter to
a small house where PO2 Villaester was waiting. The informant introduced PO2 Villaester as
an interested buyer of ₱32,000.00 worth of shabu. PO2 Villaester then exhibited a bundle of
money purporting to be ₱32,000.00 but was in truth just boodle money wrapped with a
genuine 1,000-peso bill bearing PO2 Villaester's signature. Brian handed to PO2 Villaester
two big sachets of shabu after seeing the money.

PO2 Villaester scratched his head as a signal for other team members, who were waiting at
a distance, that the buying and selling had been consummated. PO2 Villaester then
1âwphi1

introduced himself as a police officer, apprised Brian of the latter's violation as well as of his
constitutional rights, and effected the arrest through the assistance of the team.

Brian was handcuffed and was brought to the office of 7RCIDU together with the
seized shabu. The arrest was recorded in a police blotter. The two sachets of shabu were
then marked as "BV-01" and "BV- 02" by team member SPO 1 Noel Triste. The marked
sachets of shabu were then submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. SPO1 Noel
Triste also delivered the laboratory request signed by the Regional Chief of 7RCIDU, Police
Senior Superintendent (DSC) Jose Jorge Elizalde Corpuz. Chemistry Report No. D-1632-
2006 which was completed at 1400H (or 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon) on October 13, 2004
yielded that the two sachets submitted for examination were indeed positive for
Methamp[h]etamine Hydrochloride or shabu. 5

Version of the Appellant

Appellant claimed that the charge against him was fabricated; that he was in the area to
collect payment for two kilos of mango from a certain Litlit Canupil; that he met seven
unidentified persons, four of which asked him if he was Jam Juning; that they introduced
themselves as policemen; that they conducted a body search on him; and that they took his
money worth ₱900.00. 6

Appellant's neighbor, Alex Esconas, testified in court that he saw the appellant being held by
unidentified persons; that when he approached them, he was told not to intervene; and that
he saw the appellant board a brown automobile. 7

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On November 14, 2008, the RTC rendered Judgment finding the appellant guilty of the
charge against him, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court hereby finds [appellant] BRIAN
VILLAHERMOSO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged herein.
Accordingly, the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
₱500,000.00. 8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Appellant elevated the case to the CA.

On January 28, 2013, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the RTC Judgment.

Appellant moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its Resolution dated
9

October 29, 2014.

Hence, appellant filed the instant appeal.

On July 22, 2015, the Court required both parties to file their respective supplementary
briefs; however, they opted not to file the same. 10

Our Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. He puts in issue the alleged failure of the police to conduct prior surveillance and to
comply with the Chain of Custody Rule as the seized items were not properly marked,
inventoried, and photographed.

The Court is not persuaded.

Jurisprudence has consistently held that "prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the
validity of an entrapment operation x x x especially if the buy-bust team is accompanied to
the target area by their informant." Such is the situation in this case. PO2 Villaester, who
11

was designated as the poseur buyer, was assisted by the confidential informant, who
contacted the appellant to inform the latter that there was a prospective buyer of "shabu." 12

As to the Chain of Custody Rule, the Court, taking into consideration the difficulty of
complete compliance with the said rule, has considered substantial compliance sufficient "as
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending police officers." 13
In this case, although the marking of the evidence was done at the police station, the Court
quotes with approval the discussion of the CA on the matter.

In the instant case the policemen were justified in marking the sachets of shabu at their
office. [Appellant] was struggling and trying to get away from the police, as testified by
defense witness Alex Esconas. [Appellant] himself testified that he even elbowed one of the
arresting officers as he was resisting arrest. The priority of the arresting officers is to
apprehend the offender. They would have had difficulty, if not impossibility, in marking
the corpus delicti at that the scene of the crime considering that the [appellant] was quite out
of control.
14

Likewise, the absence of a physical inventory and the lack of a photograph of the seized
items are not sufficient justifications to acquit the appellant as the Court in several cases has
affirmed convictions despite the failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the
Chain of Custody Rule as long as the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti of the crime
are preserved.

In this case, it was established by the testimony of PO2 Villaester that the appellant was
apprehended pursuant to a legitimate buy-bust operation; that the appellant was apprised of
his constitutional rights; that he was brought to the office of 7RCIDU together with the
seized "shabu;" that the arrest was recorded in a police blotter; that the two sachets
of "shabu" were marked as "BV-01" and "BV-02" by SPO1 Noel Triste (SPO1 Triste) in the
police station; that the marked sachets were delivered on the same day by SPO 1 Triste to
the crime laboratory for examination; and that as per Chemistry Report No. D-1632-2006, the
two sachets submitted for examination were positive for "shabu." Considering the foregoing,
there is no reason for the Court to doubt the findings of the CA that the two sachets
of "shabu" seized from the appellant were the same sachets of "shabu" presented in
evidence before the RTC.

All told, the RTC and the CA correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and accordingly sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The January 28, 2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR HC No. 01023, which affirmed the November 14, 2008
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. CBU-
78163, finding appellant Brian Villahermoso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge
against him is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 3. G.R. No. 225500, September 11, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff­Appellee, v. JONAS GERONIMO Y PINLAC, Accused­
Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

PERLAS­BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Jonas Geronimo y Pinlac
(Geronimo) assailing the Decision2 dated December 18, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06405, which affirmed the Joint Decision 3 dated October 7, 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 127 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. C-83928 and C-83929, finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations 5 filed before the RTC accusing Geronimo of the
crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which
state:

Criminal Case No. C-83928

"That on or about the 12th day of April, 2010 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to 101 Crisanto L. Lorilla, a [bona
fide] member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, who posed as poseur buyer,
METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) and MEFENOREX, dangerous drugs, weighing
0.1076 gram, without the corresponding license or prescription therefore, knowing the same to be
such.

Contrary To Law."6

Criminal Case No. C-83929

"That on or about the 12th day of April, 2010 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control One
(1) self-sealing transparent plastic bag with marking EXH B 04-12-10 CLL containing dried
MARIJUANA leaves and fruiting tops weighing 4.1283 grams, which when subjected for laboratory
examination gave POSITIVE result to the tests for Marijuana, a dangerous drugs [sic], in gross
violation of the above-cited law.

Contrary To Law."7

The prosecution alleged that at around ten (10) o'clock in the morning of April 12, 2010, a tip was
received from a confidential informant that Geronimo was peddling illegal drugs in Caloocan City.
Acting on the said tip, Intelligence Agent 1 Joshua V. Arquero (IA1 Arquero) immediately organized
a buy-bust operation, which was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
Regional Office and the Philippine National Police (PNP). IA1 Arquero then instructed the informant
to order P500.00 worth of shabu from Geronimo.8 At around nine (9) o'clock in the evening, the
buy-bust team composed of IA1 Arquero, Intelligence Officer (IO) 1 Crisanto Lorilla (IO1 Lorilla), IO
2 Lorenzo Advincula (IO2 Advincula), 9 a certain IO1 Camayang, and one IO1 Mellion reached the
target area in Narra Street, Barangay 171, Caloocan City and conducted a quick surveillance
thereof. Moments later, Geronimo arrived, took out from his right pocket a transparent plastic
sachet containing a suspected shabu, and handed it over to the poseur-buyer, IO1 Lorilla, who, in
turn, paid him with the buy-bust money. 10Shortly after, IO1 Lorilla lit a cigarette to signal the rest of
the team that the transaction was completed, prompting IO2 Advincula to rush towards the scene to
arrest Geronimo. Subsequently, IO1 Lorilla and IO2 Advincula frisked Geronimo's pockets. IO1
Lorilla recovered the buy-bust money, while IO2 Advincula recovered the marijuana leaves wrapped
in a newspaper and gave them to the former. The team proceeded to the headquarters in Quezon
City, and the confiscated items were supposedly marked, photographed, and inventoried by IO1
Lorilla in the presence of Geronimo and Barangay Kagawad Jose Y. Ruiz.11 After conducting the
inventory, IO1 Lorilla secured the letter-request for laboratory examination from IO1 Jay son R.
Albao and delivered the specimens to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing. Consequently, the
specimens were received and examined by Forensic Chemist Jappeth M. Santiago, who later on
revealed that the substance found in the plastic sachet tested positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride and mefenorex, while the other wrapped specimen tested
positive for the presence of marijuana, all dangerous drugs.12

For his part, Geronimo interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up, maintaining that at the time
of the incident, he was drinking at the house of his friend Julian Faura, Jr. (Faura) when three (3)
unidentified armed men suddenly arrived and forced him to board a white Toyota Revo. There, he
noticed that his girlfriend Elaine Cabral (Cabral), whom he recently had an argument with, was
inside the vehicle as well. According to Geronimo, Cabral suddenly slapped him, while the other
men repeatedly hit him. Geronimo claimed that he was then brought to the PDEA office, where he
was forced to drink something and urinate in a small bottle. Subsequently, the police officers
allegedly brought out several plastic sachets, placed them on the table, and instructed Geronimo to
stand before it while they took pictures of the same. During trial, Geronimo pleaded not guilty to
the crimes charged and presented Faura as his witness.13

The RTC Ruling

In a Joint Decision14 dated October 7, 2013, the RTC found Geronimo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 and, accordingly, sentenced him as
follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. C-83928, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00; and (b) in Crim. Case No. C-83929, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and eight (8) months, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00. 15 It held that all the essential elements of the crimes
of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs were duly proven. On the other hand,
Geronimo's defenses of denial and frame-up failed to create reasonable doubt in view of his positive
identification as the culprit, as well as the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers in
the discharge of their duties.16

Moreover, the RTC declared that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs were shown
to have been preserved from the time of seizure to receipt by the forensic chemist up to
presentation in court. It added that the requisite marking of seized items immediately upon their
confiscation at the place of arrest is not absolute and can thus be done at the nearest police station
or office of the apprehending team, given that there is no exact definition of the phrase
"immediately upon confiscation in Philippine Jurisprudence.17

Aggrieved, Geronimo elevated his conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA). 18

The CA Ruling

In a Decision19 dated December 18, 2014, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC,20 finding
that all the necessary elements of the crimes charged have been adequately proven. Moreover,
Geronimo failed to prove that the evidence was tampered or meddled with, and that the police
officers improperly performed their duties; and on the contrary, it was shown that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs were preserved. 21

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Geronimo's conviction for illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, as respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and
11, Article II of RA 9165, should be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review
and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the
appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 22 "The appeal confers the appellate
court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law." 23

In this case, Geronimo was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165.
For the successful prosecution of unauthorized sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the
essential elements thereof are proven beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: (a) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment.24 On the other hand, in cases wherein an accused is charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements to warrant his conviction:
(a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such
possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
said drug.25
In both cases, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral
certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs,
the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to
account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure
up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.26

Relatedly, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the
procedure that police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their
integrity and evidentiary value.27 Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, among
others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the
items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same; and the seized drugs must be turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination. 28 In the case
of People v. Mendoza,29 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official
during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity
and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence
herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the
incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved
an unbroken chain of custody."30

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 31 In fact, the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the
passage of RA 1064032 - provide that the said inventory and photography may be conducted
at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of
warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA
9165 - under justifiable grounds -will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody
over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. 33 In other words, the failure of
the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and
its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid, provided
that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.34 In People v. Almorfe,35the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to
apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that
the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. 36 Also,
in People v. De Guzman,37 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance
must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist.38

In his Brief,39 Geronimo prayed for his acquittal in light of the police officers' non-compliance with
Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR and their failure to proffer a plausible explanation therefor. 40 In
particular, he claims that the inventory and certification was neither done in the presence of nor
signed by a representative from the DOJ and the media. 41

The appeal is meritorious.

An examination of the records reveals that although the requisite inventory and photography of the
seized items were conducted in the presence of Geronimo and an elected public official, the same
was not done in the presence of the representatives from the DOJ and the media. In an attempt to
justify such absence, IA1 Arquero testified that:

ATTY QUILAS:

Q: You said you are a team leader and you knew for a fact the requirements that in the subsequent
inventory, an elected official, a representative from the Media, a representative from the
Department of Justice, you know for a fact that they are required, is not that correct?

[IA1 ARQUERO]:

A: In Section 21 of RA 9165 that is a requirement and prior to that operation is a buy-bust

operation. So, in the buy-bust operation we don't need to comply with the requirements, we don't
need to call the Media Representative, an elected official and a Representative from the D.O.J.
unless there is a search warrant were taken briefly to go with the apprehending officers in entering
the house. In the buy-bust operation we don't do that, sir.

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)42
Based on the foregoing testimony, the justification given by IA1 Arquero was grossly insufficient
and without legal basis. It appears that he clearly misunderstood the law and its application in buy-
bust operations. The law mandates the apprehending team to follow the prescribed procedure under
Section 21 of RA 9165 mainly to ensure the proper chain of custody and avoid the possibility of
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. There is nothing in the law which exempts the
apprehending officers from securing the presence of an elected public official and a representative
from the DOJ or media, particularly in instances when they are not equipped with a search warrant
as claimed by IA1 Arquero. In fact, RA 9165 and its IRR explicitly provide that non-compliance with
the required procedure can only be allowed under exceptional circumstances, provided that
justifiable grounds are given and proven as a fact therefor by the apprehending officers, which IA1
Arquero likewise failed to show in this case.

Moreover, records reveal that the said inventory and photography of the seized items were not done
at the place of arrest but at the office of the apprehending officers in Barangay Pinyahan, Quezon
City. During IA1 Arquero's direct examination, he maintained that since the area of operation was
"so dark" and "risky," he decided to instruct the buy-bust team to conduct said processes at their
office, to wit:

PROS CANSINO:

Q: You said after effecting the arrest and apprising the accused of his violation and constitutional
rights and you proceeded to your office, why did you not conduct the required inventory,
photograph and marking at the place of operation?

[IA1 ARQUERO:]

A: Because the area is so dark and there are many people there may be the cohorts of the suspect
so being the team leader and the area may be risky, I ordered them to withdraw and conduct the
inventory and photography of the said item to the nearest station which is in our office at [Brgy.l
Pinyahan, Quezon City, sir. x x x x (Underscoring supplied)43

On the contrary, I02 Advincula earlier testified that the apprehending team went directly to their
office to conduct the inventory even if there was no threat to their security and safety at the place
of Geronimo's arrest:

[ATTY. QUILAS:]

Q: And despite of the fact that you were armed you just left the area after the arrest of the
suspect?

[IO2 ADVINCULA:] A: Yes, sir.

Q: And went ahead directly to your office and conduct inventory?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: There was not even a threat, serious threat on your team after the arrest of the suspect, is not
that right?

A: None, sir.

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)44

Clearly, there were inconsistencies in the statements of the members of the apprehending team as
to why the requisite inventory and photography were not done immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the dangerous drugs and at the place of Geronimo's arrest. While the law allows that
the same may be done at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team, the police
officers must nevertheless provide justifiable grounds therefor in order for the saving clause to
apply. Here, the apprehending officers failed to discharge that burden.

Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers,
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.45 It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of
substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored
as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. 46 As such, since the prosecution failed
to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by RA
10640, as well as its IRR, Geronimo's acquittal is perforce in order.
As a final note, it is fitting to mention that "the Court strongly supports the campaign of the
government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers
against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth.
But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of
Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals.
The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against
any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions. Those
who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty." 47

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 18, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06405 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
accused-appellant Jonas Geronimo y Pinlac isACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held
in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.
 4. G.R. No. 179757, September 13, 2017

LEONARDO P. CASONA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Too much reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties on the part
of the arresting officers in the prosecution of drug-related offenses is unwarranted if the records
show noncompliance with the affirmative safeguards prescribed to preserve the chain of custody of
the contraband. The presumption of regularity applies only when there is no showing of non-
compliance.

The Case

The petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on March 30, 2007 in C.A.-G.R. CR No.
29905,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision rendered on August 29, 2005 by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 214, in Mandaluyong City convicting him of a violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).2

Antecedents

The Office the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City charged the petitioner with illegal possession
of shabuin violation of Section 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, alleging in
the information as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about the 6th day of February 2004, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control two (2) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets each containing 0.03 and 0.02 grams of white crystalline substance,
which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as
'shabu' a dangerous drug, without corresponding license and prescription.

Contrary to law.3
The CA adopted the summary of the evidence of the State as presented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in the appellee's brief, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On February 6, 2004, at 7:20 in the morning, the drug enforcement unit of the Mandaluyong City
Police Station received a telephone call from a concerned citizen regarding an illegal drug activity in
Barangay Poblacion, particularly in Paraiso Street. On the basis of said information, PO2 Oliver
Yumul, the officer-in-charge of the said unit, called a meeting to conduct a surveillance operation in
the said area.

Immediately after coordinating with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), a team,
composed of PO1 Gomez, PO1 Alfaro, PO1 Saupi, PO1 Madlangbayan, POS Adriano and their team
leader, proceeded to the area.

Upon arrival thereat, PO1 Gomez and PO1 Alfaro stay (sic) inside the van while the rest of the group
namely: PO1 Madalangbayan (sic), POS Adriano, PO1 Saupi and their team leader went off While
walking in their civilian clothes, they saw two (2) male persons in the middle of Paraiso street
exchanging something. PO1 Madalangbayan (sic), who was only an arm's length away from the two
(2) suspects, saw one of them place a small plastic sachet in between his two (2) fingers and then
hand it to the other. The person to whom the plastic sachet was handed turned out to be the
appellant.

Immediately, the group approached appellant and his companion and introduced themselves as
police officers. At that instance, appellant's companion ran away. The other police officers chased
him but he escaped. Appellant, on the other hand, was prevented from fleeing by PO1
Madlangbayan who arrested him. Upon arrest, PO1 Madlangbayan noticed that appellant was
holding a plastic sachet in his hand. After discovering that it contained suspected shabu, he ordered
him to pull out the contents of his pocket. Consequently, PO1 Madlangbayan recovered another
plastic sachet from appellant containing white crystalline substance.

PO1 Madlangbayan informed appellant of his constitutional rights and brought him to the
Mandaluyong City Police Station for investigation. The plastic sachets recovered from appellant were
submitted to the SOCO for chemical analysis which, after examination, yielded positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu." 4 (Citations omitted)
On the other hand, the petitioner vigorously denied the accusation. He insisted during the trial that
he was on his way to the off-track betting station at around 7:20 pm on February 6, 2004 when he
encountered police operatives from the Anti-Illegal Drugs Unit along Paraiso Street in Mandaluyong
City who mentioned to him that they would be conducting a raid; that on his way back from the
betting station he again encountered the same police operatives but this time they arrested him for
allegedly selling shabu; that he resisted the arrest because he was surprised by their conduct, but
to no avail; and that they brought him with them to the hospital before taking him to their office,
where he was investigated and eventually detained.5

Ruling of the RTC

On August 29, 2005, the RTC declared the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge,
to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12)
YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.

Accused is credited in full of the preventive imprisonment he has served in confinement.

Let the physical evidence subject matter of this case be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
State and referred to the PDEA for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.6
Decision of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In sum, we find no cogent reason to alter the findings of the trial court, and no ground to question
its conclusions.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by the trial court, the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. MC-04-7897-D, finding
appellant Laonardo Casono (sic) y Perez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
Section 11, Article [II] of Republic Act 9165, the appeal is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.7
The CA accorded more weight to the testimonies of the police officers based on the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties and for lack of showing of any improper motive on
their part to falsely testify against the petitioner. Also, it observed that the arresting police officers
properly preserved the integrity of the dangerous drug.

Issue

The petitioner now seeks the reversal of the decision of the CA, and raises the sole issue of: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE.8
The petitioner submits that the testimony of PO1 Madlangbayan was not worthy of belief; that the
police officers had no probable cause to apprehend him because they had acted only on the basis of
information from an unnamed concerned citizen; and that the CA erred in finding that the chain of
custody was preserved by the arresting officers.

The OSG counters that the submissions of the petitioner involved purely questions of fact that were
beyond the ambit of the appeal of this nature; that the CA correctly found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged based on the testimony of PO1 Madlangbayan showing the
presence of all the elements of the offense; and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized articles were preserved.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

Every conviction for a crime should only be handed down after proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the guilt of the accused for the crime charged has been adduced. "Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind."9

Such degree of proof fell short herein; hence, the Court sees it fit to acquit the petitioner.

First of all, it is wrong for the OSG to vigorously insist that this appeal by petition for review
on certioraricould not be the occasion for the petitioner to argue in his favor that the CA erred in its
appreciation and evaluation of the facts. Such insistence, though generally true, is not controlling in
an appeal of a criminal conviction that opens the entire records of the trial to review. This can only
mean that the Court is not to be limited to reviewing questions of law. As a consequence, the Court,
in the course of its review, may also examine any error even if not assigned by the accused.

Secondly, the Court cannot ignore the very palpable permissiveness on the part of the RTC as the
trial court and of the CA as the intermediate appellate court in enforcing the statutory safeguards
put in place by no less than Congress in order to ensure the integrity of the evidence to be
presented against a violator of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Such
permissiveness was contrary to the letter and spirit of the law, and should be rebuffed by not letting
the unworthy conviction stand. This, because the State and its agents must be the first to comply
with the safeguards; there would be lawlessness among the enforcers of the law otherwise.

There is no question that the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was enacted to revise
the approaches in law enforcement involving drug-related offenses. The legislators then believed
that the predecessor enactment, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, did not include needed
safeguards against evidence tampering or substitution. Among the new approaches was the
incorporation of affirmative safeguards to deny wayward law enforcers apprehending violators any
opportunity for tampering with the confiscated evidence, and to ensure the preservation of the
integrity of the evidence from the moment of seizure until the ultimate disposal thereof upon order
of the trial court. This approach was a true recognition of the value as evidence of guilt of the seized
illegal substances themselves - which are no less the corpus delicti in the drug-related offenses of
illegal sale and illegal possession so essential to the conviction and incarceration of the offenders.

Inasmuch as the dangerous drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense charged, its
identity and integrity must be shown by the State to have been preserved. On top of the elements
for proving the offense of illegal possession, therefore, is that the substance possessed is the very
substance presented in court. The State must establish this element with the same exacting degree
of certitude as that required for ultimately handing down a criminal conviction. 10 To achieve this
degree of certitude, the Prosecution has to account for all the links in the chain of custody of the
dangerous drug, from the moment of seizure from the accused until it is presented in court as proof
of the corpus delicti. The process, though tedious, must be undergone, for the end is always
worthwhile - the preservation of the chain of custody that will prevent unnecessary doubts about
the identity of the evidence.

In particular, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 has incorporated affirmative
safeguards that the apprehending officers should faithfully comply with in their seizure and custody
of dangerous drugs, viz.: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof;

xxxx
Complementing this provision is Section 21(a) of Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;

xxxx
As the law stands, there can be no avoidance of the responsibility to comply on the part of the
arresting officers.

A careful review of the records reveals that the police operatives did not faithfully follow the
affirmative safeguards. For one, although the safeguards required a physical inventory and
photographing of the shabu immediately upon seizure and confiscation "in the presence of the
accused x x x, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof," there was no showing why no such inventory and
photographing of the shabu had been made by the arresting team. It is true that under the
guidelines they could have also made the inventory and photographing at the police station by
virtue of the confiscation having been in flagrante delicto. Yet, they also did not make any inventory
or take any photographs at the police station. And, secondly, it was not also established that any of
the police operatives had marked the seized shabu at the crime scene and in the presence of the
petitioner, a representative of the media, a representative of the DOJ, and any elected official, as
similarly required. In this regard, PO1 Madlangbayan identified the shabu in court through the
markings "LCP-1" and "LCP-2" (which were the initials of the petitioner), 11 but there was no
testimony by him or any other about the specific circumstances of the placing of such markings,
such as the time when and the place where the markings were actually made.

The lack of the inventory signed by the petitioner himself or by his representative as well as by the
representative of the media and the DOJ and/or the elected official as required by law could very
well be held to and/or the elected official as required by law could very well be held to mean that
no shabu had been seized from the petitioner on that occasion. Also, the lack of testimony by PO1
Madlangbayan on when and where he had placed the markings "LCP-1" and "LCP-2" on the sachets
of shabu sidelined the safeguards. Despite the blatant lapses in the compliance with the statutory
safeguards, the records do not contain any explanation offered by the State for the lapses. The non-
compliance with the affirmative safeguards thus rendered the evidence of the corpus delicti open to
doubt.

The CA observed in its assailed decision that the shabu had been properly preserved by the police
operatives, and further noted the fact that the plastic sachet containing the shabu had been
examined as to its contents which were later on presented in court. 12 However, the observations by
the CA did not abate the doubts surrounding the conviction of the petitioner. We should insist that
the members of the arresting and seizing team should have themselves rendered the explanation
for the lapses thus noted. No one else could have done so. In fact, neither the RTC nor the CA could
assume the responsibility of explaining the lapses, even by inference from the record, for their
doing so would slacken the safeguards and tolerate the non compliance by the arresting lawmen at
the time of the seizure. We should emphatically remember that the particular safeguard requiring
the presence of the media and DOJ representatives, or the presence of the elected official, being
designed to insulate the arrest of the violator and the seizure of the drug from suspicion, 13 could be
complied with only prior to or simultaneously with the arrest of the suspect and confiscation of the
contraband. Moreover, the requirement for marking of the shabu to be made at or nearest to the
time of the seizure would at least guarantee that the identity of the substance be preserved despite
its movement from one hand to the next in the chain of custody starting from the seizure until
disposal by order of the trial court.14

The significance of preserving the integrity of the chain of custody for the dangerous drugs
confiscated cannot ever be understated. The Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) dutifully promulgated a
formal rule to preserve the chain of custody in DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, and stated in
Section 1 (b) thereof:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition;
The Court has already recognized that strict adherence to the rule on chain of custody was almost
always impossible to do.15 Strict adherence is not always expected, therefore, as borne out by the
saving declaration in the last paragraph of Section 21 (a) of the IRR to the effect that the seizure
and custody of the dangerous substances should not be rendered void or invalid by the non-
compliance with the requirements under justifiable grounds for as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved by the apprehending officers. 16 But such saving
declaration did not come into play herein because, one, the seizing officers did not tender their
justification for the lapses committed;17and, two, there was really no showing by the State that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the shabuhad been properly preserved.

To stress, the obligation to tender the credible explanation for any non-compliance with the
affirmative safeguards imposed by Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 pertained to the State,18 and its agents, and to no other. If the State and its agents do not
discharge such obligation, then the evidence of guilt necessarily becomes suspect.

In light of the foregoing, the State did not establish the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
How can there be any moral certainty of his guilt as having illegally possessed the shabu presented
at the trial if there were lapses in the observance of the affirmative safeguards? In view of the
suspicion infecting the evidence of guilt, his defense of not having been the focus of the operation
by the police officers when he first encountered them that evening gains ground. As a result, his
version of being apprehended only on his return from the off-track betting station cannot be
discounted or dismissed as implausible. Therein lies the reasonable doubt of his guilt.

It is quite notable that the CA relied too much on the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties on the part of the arresting officers. Such reliance was premised on the failure of
the petitioner during the trial to impute any ill motive against them for arresting and incriminating
him. In our view, however, such reliance was legally unwarranted. To begin with, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duties should not even be relied upon because there was
concrete and undeniable evidence of lapses committed by the arresting officers in their compliance
with the affirmative safeguards. The presumption has been erected only for convenience, to excuse
the State from the duty to adduce proof that official duties have been regularly performed by its
agents, because of the physically impossible or time-consuming task of detailing all the steps
establishing the regular performance of official duties. Moreover, it would be unconstitutional to
place a higher value in the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties - a mere
tool of evidence - than in the more substantial presumption of innocence favoring the petitioner as
an accused - a right enshrined no less than in the Bill of Rights. Preferring the former would ignore
the experience in the streets that actually bears witness to so many illegal arrests and unreasonable
incriminations of the innocent. In People v. Andaya,19therefore, we have precisely warned against
judicially pronouncing guilty the person arrested by law enforcers just because he could not impute
any ill motives to them for arresting him, and have cautioned against presuming the regularity of
the arrest on that basis alone, stating:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x x We should remind ourselves that we cannot presume that the accused committed the crimes
they have been charged with. The State must fully establish that for us. If the imputation of ill
motive to the lawmen is the only means of impeaching them, then that would be the end of our
dutiful vigilance to protect our citizenry from false arrests and wrongful incriminations. We are
aware that there have been in the past many cases of false arrests and wrongful incriminations, and
that should heighten our resolve to strengthen the ramparts of judicial scrutiny.

Nor should we shirk from our responsibility of protecting the liberties of our citizenry just because
the lawmen are shielded by the presumption of the regularity of their performance of duty. The
presumed regularity is nothing but a purely evidentiary tool intended to avoid the impossible and
time-consuming task of establishing every detail of the performance by officials and functionaries of
the Government. Conversion by no means defeat the much stronger and much firmer presumption
of innocence in favor of every person whose life, property and liberty comes under the risk of
forfeiture on the strength of a false accusation of committing some crime.

The criminal accusation against a person must be substantiated by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court should steadfastly safeguard his right to be presumed innocent. Although his innocence
could be doubted, for his reputation in his community might not be lily-white or lustrous, he should
not fear a conviction for any crime, least of all one as grave as drug pushing, unless the evidence
against him was clear, competent and beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the presumption of
innocence in his favor would be rendered empty.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on March 30,
2007 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, in Mandaluyong City finding and
declaring petitioner Leonardo P. Casona guilty of a violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 as charged in the information; and ACQUITS him for failure of the State to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
 5. G.R. No. 207229, September 20, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIEGFRED CABELLON

CABAÑERO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The marking and identification of the seized dangerous drug is an essential part of the chain of
custody. Absent this step, a gap is created which casts a shadow of doubt on the identity and
integrity of the dangerous drug presented as evidence, creating reasonable doubt, which must be
resolved in favor of the accused.

This reviews the August 30, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CEB-CR HC No.
01081, affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Siegfred Cabellon y Cabañero (Cabellon) for
violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.

This Court restates the facts as found by the lower courts.

In an Information2 dated April 28, 2006, Cabellon was charged with violation of Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165:

That on or about the 13th day of April2006 at about 7:30 P.M. more or less, in Bulacao, City of
Talisay, Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
deliberate intent, did then and there sell and dispose One (1) heat sealed plastic packet of white
crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine (sic) hydrochloride locally known as "SHABU",
weighing 0.03 gram, a dangerous drugs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Upon arraignment Cabellon pleaded not guilty. 4 Trial on the merits ensued.

Evidence for the prosecution showed that on April 13, 2006, a buy bust operation was planned to
capture Cabellon in the act of selling drugs. At 7:30 p.m., PO2 Junar Rey Barangan (PO2 Barangan),
PO3 Rey Bucao (PO3 Bucao), and PO3 Reynato Abellar (PO3 Abellar) went to Sitio Jawod, Barangay
Bulacao, Talisay City to commence the buy-bust operation. The police officers had a poseur-buyer
with them.5

The asset poseur-buyer transacted with Cabellon in an alley, while the police officers observed them
from a distance. Once they saw the poseur-buyer scratch his head, their pre-approved signal, the
police officers descended upon Cabellon, who then ran away upon noticing the approaching
officers.6

Cabellon ran and hid inside a nearby house and the police officers followed him. The police officers
stumbled upon three (3) men sniffing shabu inside the house, one (1) of whom they apprehended
while the other two (2) managed to escape. The police officers caught up with Cabellon inside the
house, whom they thereafter frisked. They recovered the marked P100.00 and P50.00 bills from
him.7

After Cabellon's arrest, the poseur-buyer handed over the sachet of shabu he purchased from
Cabellon to PO3 Bucao.8

That same date, a sachet marked with "SCC 04/13/06" was turned over to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory for examination. The Request for Laboratory Examination was received by a
certain PO1 Domael.9

P/S Insp. Mutchit G. Salinas (P/S Insp. Salinas), a forensic chemist, confirmed executing Chemistry
Report No. D-698-2006. She testified that she had examined a heat-sealed plastic sachet of white
crystalline substance labelled with "SCC 04/13/06." The chemistry report bore the signatures of P/S
Insp. Salinas and P/Supt. Myrna P. Areola. The specimen weighed 0.03 grams and tested positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).10

Cabellon was the only defense witness and he denied selling shabu to the poseur-buyer. 11

He claimed that on April 13, 2006, at about 3:30p.m., he was buying barbecue when he saw his
aunt, Jane Cabellon, crying. He asked her why she was crying and he told her that she had a fight
with someone. He approached and slapped the lady his aunt had a fight with. The lady then warned
him that he would be arrested for what he had done to her. 12
Later that evening, at the barbecue station,13 he was arrested and bodily searched by some police
officers; however, nothing was recovered from him. He claimed that he was not informed by the
arresting officers of the offense he supposedly violated.14

Cabellon was then brought to the police station and was asked to call somebody. He was also asked
to pay for his release and for the settlement of the case filed against him. He was unable to pay or
give a gift and declined to make the phone call; hence, he was charged and a case was filed against
him.15

On October 27, 2008, the Regional Trial Court16 found that the prosecution was able to prove all the
elements for the illegal sale of shabu.17 Furthermore, PO3 Bucao and PO2 Barangan identified the
sachet sold by Cabellon to the poseur-buyer. The seized sachet's chain of custody from the time
Cabellon was arrested until it was presented as evidence to the court was accounted
for.18 The fallo of the trial court Decision read:
ACCORDINGLY, this court finds the accused GUILTY as charged and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of [P]500,000.00.

Exhibit "B" is forfeited in favor of the State for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.19
Cabellon filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals and raised several errors. He claimed that the
trial court erred in upholding the validity of his arrest despite the blatant violation of his right
against unreasonable searches and when it relied on the weakness of the defense evidence rather
than on the strength of the prosecution evidence. Additionally, he averred that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.20

On August 30, 2012, the Court of Appeals 21 dismissed the appeal and upheld the trial court decision.

The Court of Appeals held that the elements for the illegal sale of shabu were duly proven by the
prosecution.22

The Court of Appeals also downplayed the supposed necessity of presenting the poseur-buyer as a
witness in court since the testimonies of the members of the apprehending team had already
sufficiently established the illegal sale between Cabellon and the poseur-buyer. 23

The Court of Appeals likewise waived the stringent application of Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165, considering the circumstances obtaining in the case. The Court of Appeals emphasized that
the defense never questioned the integrity of the evidence during trial and only did so upon
appeal.24 The fallo of the Court of Appeals Decision read:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DENIED. The decision dated October 27, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Brunch 58, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-76737 convicting
Siegfred Cabellon y Cabañero for the crime of Sale of Dangerous Drugs penalized under Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.25
Cabellon filed a Notice of Appeal26 on October 4, 2012, which was noted and given due course by
the Court of Appeals in its April 29, 2013 Resolution.27

In its August 7, 2013 Resolution,28 this Court notified the parties that they may file their respective
supplemental briefs. Both parties manifested29 that they were dispensing with the filing of a
supplemental brief.

Cabellon alleges that the supposed illegal sale was never proven because the poseur-buyer was not
presented to attest to the alleged sale. Furthermore, the police officers were positioned at a
distance where they could not have seen the sale and could merely rely on the poseur-buyer's
signal. Cabellon insisted that the fact of the sale was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. 30

Cabellon also emphasizes that the police officers did not comply with the mandatory requirements
under Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165, requiring the apprehending team to
immediately physically inventory and photograph the seized drugs in the presence of the accused, a
representative from media or the Department of Justice, and any elected official. 31

Cabellon then points out that the prosecution was unable to show an unbroken chain of custody,
PO3 Bucao testified that the poseur-buyer handed him the sachet after Cabellon was arrested, but
he never testified as to whom he gave it next or who marked it. 32 Lastly, Cabellon asserts that he
was not informed either of his constitutional rights upon his arrest or the reason for his arrest or
detention.33

On the other hand, the prosecution claims that the poseur-buyer's failure to testify was not fatal to
the case since PO3 Bucao testified that he saw the sale. 34

The prosecution argues that there was substantial compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165 because the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item was properly preserved. The
prosecution maintains that the circumstances surrounding the arrest, where he was arrested in a
house with three (3) persons high on drugs, made it impossible to mark and inventory the sachet
on the spot.35 The prosecution also avers that the supposed violations of Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165 were only raised for the first time on appeal. 36

Finally, the prosecution denies that Cabellon was found guilty based on his weak defense and holds
that it has proven the evidentiary integrity of the seized sachet proving Cabellon's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It asserts that the prosecution witnesses have established Cabellon's guilt with
their straightforward and candid testimonies.37

The only issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellant Siegfred Cabellon's
guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the non-observance of the required procedure
under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

This Court grants the appeal and acquits Siegfred Cabellon y Cabañero.

In order to sustain a conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, these two (2) elements must
be established by the prosecution: "(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence."38

To prove that the illegal sale of shabu took place, the prosecution presented PO3 Bucao and PO2
Barangan, two (2) of the police officers who were part of the buy-bust operation team which
apprehended the accused.

Both PO3 Bucao39 and PO2 Barangan40 testified that they had seen the accused talk with the poseur-
buyer before the latter scratched his head, signalling that the transaction had taken place. The
marked money was recovered from the accused,41 while the poseur-buyer turned over the sachet
with shabu he had bought from the accused to PO3 Bucao. 42

While the prosecution may have proven that a transaction took place, it was not as convincing in its
presentation of the alleged corpus delicti as evidence.

People v. Jaafar43 underscored the importance of presenting the actual illicit drug or corpus
delictirecovered as evidence since its existence is essential to convict the accused. Thus:
In all prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug
itself. Its existence is essential to a judgment of conviction. Hence, the identity of the dangerous
drug must be clearly established.

Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable. To determine their composition and nature, they
must undergo scientific testing and analysis. Narcotic substances are also highly susceptible to
alteration, tampering, or contamination. It is imperative, therefore, that the drugs allegedly seized
from the accused are the very same objects tested in the laboratory and offered in court as
evidence. The chain of custody, as a method of authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts
involving the identity of seized drugs are removed.44 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides the manner by which law enforcement officers should
handle seized dangerous drugs:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 further provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person's from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items[.] (Emphasis supplied)
While it may be true that strict compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 may be
excused under justifiable grounds, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items must still
be preserved by the apprehending officer.

This Court is not convinced that the prosecution was able to prove the identity of the shabu
supposedly seized from the accused.

PO3 Bucao claimed that the poseur-buyer turned over to him the sachet purchased from the
accused and that he had custody of the sachet until he reached the police station. He then handed
the sachet to PO3 Abellar, who supposedly prepared the request for the chemical analysis of the
seized item. However, PO3 Bucao failed to identify who placed the markings on the sachet:
(Pros. Canta) Q: How many packs of shabu did your poseur[-]buyer handed it (sic) to you?

(PO3 Bucao) A: Only one.

Q: Who kept this pack of shabu from the place of the arrest to the police station?

A: Myself.

Q: What did you do with this pack of shabu that you get (sic) from the accused?

A: After we reach in (sic) our station I gave it to PO3 Abellar the one pack of shabu.

Q: What did PO3 Abellar do with this one pack of shabu?

A: He made a request to the PNP Crime Lab for chemical analysis.

....

Q: I am showing to you this one pack of white crystalline substance with labeling "SCC" the date
thereon, is that the evidence you are referring to?

A: Yes[,] sir.

Q: Who then made the marking "SCC" and the date?

A: I am not sure who made the marking.45

Even PO2 Barangan could not confirm who placed the markings on the sachet:
(PROS. CANTA) Q: I am showing to you this one pack of white crystalline substance marked as
Exhibit B, with markings SCC with a date, can you tell us if this is the same evidence that your (sic)
recovered from the accused?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why are you sure?

A: Because this is the one PO3 Bucao showed to me.

Q: And there are markings in this plastic pack containing this small plastic pack of shabu SCC and
the date 04/13/06, who made that marking if you know?

A: I do not know[,] sir.46

People v. Nandi47 expounded on the four (4) links that should be established by the prosecution to
constitute an unbroken chain of custody:
[F]irst, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 48
Undeniably, a noticeable gap exists in the chain of custody with the prosecution's failure to present
evidence that the seized sachet was actually marked by any of the three (3) apprehending officers.

The prosecution likewise did not present evidence that the seized sachet was inventoried and
photographed in the presence of the accused or his representative, a representative from the media
or the Department of Justice, and an elected public official. Neither did it provide an explanation as
to why the police officers did not follow the requirements provided under the law.

PO3 Bucao also testified that he turned over the unmarked seized sachet to PO3 Abellar, who then
prepared the request to the Philippine National Police for chemical analysis. 49 However, a careful
review of the Request for Laboratory Examination50 dated April 13, 2006 shows that not only did it
refer to a marked sachet, it was also signed by P/Superintendent Romeo Pagal Perigo, not PO3
Abellar, who supposedly prepared it.

The prosecution utterly failed to proffer evidence on who placed the markings on the sachet
Furthermore, it also failed to account for the seized sachet's transfer from PO3 Bucao to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination, creating another gap in the
chain of custody.

This blatant lack of compliance with the safeguards established in Republic Act No. 9165 is made
even more egregious by the fact that the seized sachet only contained 0.03 grams 51 of shabu, no
more than a grain of rice. The danger of tampering and planting of evidence was, thus, heightened,
which should have put the lower courts on guard and not have so easily relied on the presumption
of regularity accorded to police officers in the performance of their official acts. As this Court stated
in People v. Holgado:52
While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a ground for acquittal, this
circumstance underscores the need for more exacting compliance with Section 21. In Mallillin v.
People, this court said that "the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is
greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and
similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives." 53
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. CEB-CR HC No. 01081 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Siegfred
Cabellon y Cabañero is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for
any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City
for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this
Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this decision the action he has taken.

The Regional Trial Court is directed to turn over the seized sachet of methamphetamine
hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.
 6. September 20, 2017

G.R. No. 208095

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JEFFERSON DEL MUNDO y ABAC and MITOS LACSON-DEL MUNDO, Accused-
Appellants

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is an appeal from the 30 January 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
1

G.R. CR-HC No. 05114, which affirmed the 17 May 2011 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial
2

Court, Branch 39, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro (RTC), in Criminal Case Nos. CR-05-8045
and CR-05- 8046, convicting accused-appellant Jefferson Del Mundo y Abac (Jefferson) for
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs and accusedappellant Mitos Lacson-
Del Mundo (Mitos) for illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

THE FACTS

Jefferson and Mitos were similarly indicted for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs,
while Jefferson was additionally charged with illegal possession of drugs, both under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002" in
Criminal Case Nos. CR- 05-8045 and CR-05-8046. The accusatory portions of the said
Informations read:

Criminal Case No. CR-05-8045

That on or about the 10th of May 2005, at around 2:15 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less,
at Barangay Calero, City of Calapan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating[,] and mutually helping one
another, without any legal authority nor[ sic] corresponding license or prescription, did[,] then
and there[,] willfully, unlawfully[,] and feloniously sell, deliver, transport[,] or distribute to
a poseur-buyer methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, weighing
0.03 gram, more or less. 3

Criminal Case No. CR-05-8046

That on or about the 10th of May 2005, at around 2:15 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less,
at Barangay Calero, City of Calapan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed

accused, without any legal authority nor[ sic] corresponding license or prescription, did[,]
then and there[,] willfully, unlawfully[,] and feloniously have in his possession, custody[,] and
control four (4) pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, with a total
weight of 0.14 gram, more or less. 4

When arraigned, Jefferson pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges; Mitos similarly entered a
"Not Guilty" plea in Criminal Case No. CR-05- 8045. 5

After pre-trial, the two (2) cases were consolidated and thus tried jointly.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Senior Police Officer 2
Eduardo Espiritu (SP02 Espiritu), the leader of the buy-bust team; Police Inspector Rhea Fe
Dela Cruz-Alviar (PI Alviar), the forensic chemist; Police Officer 3 Mariel D. Rodil (P03 Rodil),
the poseur-buyer; and SPO1 Noel Buhay (SPO1 Buhay). Their combined testimonies tended
to establish the following:

Sometime in early May of 2005, the Calapan City Police Station Intelligence Team conducted
surveillance on the accused-appellants after receiving information that they were selling
dangerous drugs in Barangay Calero, Calapan City. 6

The surveillance confirmed that the accused-appellants were indeed engaged in the
business of selling dangerous drugs. Consequently, a buybust operation was planned with
P03 Rodil designated as the poseur-buyer; while SP02 Espiritu, SPO1 Buhay, and at least
two other unnamed police officers were tasked as backups. Two (2) ₱l00.00 bills, supplied
7

by Chief of Police P/Supt. Alexander Aceveda, were prepared as buy-bust money and were
marked with "MDR," P03 Rodil's initials. 8

On 10 May 2005, at around two o'clock in the afternoon, P03 Rodil, accompanied by a
confidential informant, proceeded to the house of the accused-appellants in Barangay
Calero, Calapan City. SP02 Espiritu and SPO1 Buhay strategically positioned themselves
near the target area, while the other backups were far from the house. 9

The informant knocked on the door of the accused-appellants. After a few moments, a
woman, later identified as Mitos, opened the door. The informant introduced P03 Rodil to
Mitos as a buyer of shabu. Mitos hesitated for a while as she doubted P03 Rodil's identity.
After the asset assured Mitos that P03 Rodil was a legitimate buyer, the latter handed to her
the marked bills. Upon receipt of the money, Mitos turned her head towards a man inside the
house, later identified as Jefferson, and said "Pahingi ng halagang dalawang piso."
Thereafter, Jefferson handed to P03 Rodil a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substances. At this point, P03 Rodil gave the pre-arranged signal to call SP02 Espiritu. P03
Rodil then immediately apprehended Mitos and seized the marked money in her
possession. 10

Meanwhile, upon getting the signal, SP02 Espiritu and SPO 1 Buhay immediately rushed to
the crime scene to arrest Jefferson, but the latter fought back and even tried to stab the head
of SPO 1 Buhay with a ball pen. Jefferson then ran inside the house but SP02 Espiritu and
SPOl Buhay gave chase and caught him inside the toilet where he was seen throwing
something into the toilet bowl. Using a broomstick, the police officers retrieved four (4) plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substances from the toilet bowl. After the sachets were
wiped clean, SP02 Espiritu turned these over to P03 Rodil. 11

After informing them of their constitutional rights, the accusedappellants were brought to the
Calapan City Police Station for booking and further investigation. At the police station, the
seized items were photographed, inventoried, and marked by P03 Rodil with her initials, in
12

the presence of the accused-appellants, Romeo Gargullo (Garguilo), a barangay kagawad,

and Nicanor Ocampo, Sr. (Ocampo, Sr.), the president of Kill Droga movement in the
area. The plastic sachet seized by P03 Rodil was marked with the initial "YEL" while the 4
13

plastic sachets recovered by SP02 Espiritu were marked with the initials MDRJ, MDR2,
MDR3, and MDR4. Letter-requests for laboratory examination were then prepared and
delivered to the crime laboratory, together with the seized items, by P03 Rodil. The accused-
appellants were also brought to the crime laboratory for mandatory drug testing. 14

On 10 May 2005, at about 4:55 p.m., the criminal laboratory received the letter-requests for
laboratory examination and the five (5) heat-sealed transparent sachets. After a qualitative
15

examination, the substances inside the subject sachets yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Urine samples from both Jefferson and Mitos
16

also yielded positive for the presence of shabu. 17

Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented accused-appellants Jefferson and Mitos as witnesses. Their

combined testimonies tended to establish their innocence, as follows:

On 10 May 2005, at about 2:15 p.m., Jefferson was inside the comfort room when he heard
banging sounds on the front door of their house. When he went out of the comfort room to
check who was banging on their door, he saw five (5) to six (6) police officers already inside
their house. He noticed that their door knob and wooden lock had been destroyed.
Thereafter, the police officers approached his wife Mitos and frisked her. They then
proceeded to search the house for about half an hour. Jefferson asked them what they were
searching for, but he was ignored and held. After the search, the police officers told them that
they found shabu inside their house. When Jefferson denied it, they punched and kicked
him, dragged him outside the house, and brought him to the police station. 18

The RTC Ruling

In its 17 May 2011 Joint Decision, the RTC found Jefferson guilty of the crimes of illegal sale
and illegal possession of prohibited drugs in Criminal Case Nos. CR-05-8045 to 8046; while
Mitos was found guilty of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs in Criminal Case No.
CR-05- 8045, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In CR-05-8045, this Court finds the accused JEFFERSON DEL MUNDO y ABAC and
MITOS LACSON-DEL MUNDO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal[s] of the
crime charged in the aforequoted Information and in default of any modifying circumstances
attendant, hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay
a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, with the accessories
provided by law and with credit for preventive imprisonment undergone, if any. The 0.03
gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) subject matter of this case is hereby
ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.

2. In CR-05-8046, this Court finds the accused JEFFERSON DEL MUNDO y

ABAC GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime charged in the
aforequoted information and in default of any modifying circumstances attendant, hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from TWELVE
(12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as MINIMUM to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as
MAXIMUM and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00. The 0.14 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) subject matter of this case is hereby ordered
confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law. 19

The RTC observed that the defense offered by the accused-appellants merely revolved
around denial and an insinuation of "frame-up" and "planting of evidence" committed by the
police officers. However, the RTC did not give any credence to such defense, stating that
mere denial could not prevail over the positive and steadfast testimonies and sworn affidavits
of the police officers.

Aggrieved, the accused-appellants appealed before the CA. 20

The CA Ruling

In its assailed Decision, dated 30 January 2013, the CA affirmed the 17 May 2011 RTC
21

Joint Decision. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Br. 39, in Crim. Case Nos. CR-05-8045 and CR-05-8046 is
AFFIRMED. 22

The appellate court ratiocinated that the trial court correctly convicted the accused-
appellants as the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the essential elements of both
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Also, the CA was convinced that the
prosecution had properly established the unbroken chain of custody resulting in the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.

THE ISSUE

WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
 THE COURT'S RULING

The appeal is meritorious.

As a general rule, the trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
entitled to great weight, and will not be disturbed on appeal. This rule, however, does not
23

apply where facts of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misapplied in a case under appeal. The Court opines that the trial and appellate court
24

misapprehended material facts in this case.

Chain of Custody Rule in Illegal

Sale and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs

In prosecuting both illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, conviction cannot
be sustained if doubt persists on the identity of said drugs. The identity of the dangerous
drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of
possession or sale are present, the fact that the dangerous drug illegally possessed and sold
is the same drug offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same
degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. 25

Because it is indispensable that the substance confiscated from the accused be the very
same substance offered in court, the Court has adopted the chain of custody rule, a method
of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be.
26

The chain of custody is established by testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would be able to describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link
in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same. 27

As a general rule, the prosecution must endeavour to establish four links in the chain of
custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover
by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from
the forensic chemist to the court.28

Non-Observance of the Procedural

Requirements under Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165

At the outset, the Court notes that the buy-bust team failed to observe the proper procedure
in taking custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Section 21, Article II ofR.A. No. 9165
provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. -

xxxx

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. (emphasis supplied)

While the prosecution was able to present the inventory of the confiscated items, which was
apparently prepared by P03 Rodil, and attested to by Ocampo, Sr., of Kill Droga, the Court
opines that the same could not be given any credence. Readily apparent from the said
inventory is the fact that it is undated. Hence, the requirement that the inventory must be
made immediately after seizure was not satisfied.

Further, none of the persons required to sign the inventory, as enumerated under the law,
were made to sign the same. The Court notes that while the prosecution witnesses testified
that the seized items were physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the
accusedappellants and Garguilo, they were not made to sign the inventory. Instead, a certain
Ocampo, Sr. was made to sign the inventory. It must be noted that Ocampo, Sr. is not among
those persons required by the law to witness and sign the inventory as he did not represent
the accused-appellants, the media, or the Department of Justice. Neither was he an elected
public official.

P03 Rodil further testified that photographs were taken of the accused-appellants and of the
items confiscated from them. Not one of the alleged photographs, however, was presented in
court as part of the evidence for the prosecution and no explanation was offered to explain
why.

In the recent case of People v. Jaafar, the prosecution and the buybust team committed
29

lapses similar in this case. In that case, the buy-bust team conducted a physical inventory of
the seized sachets of shabu. However, it was not shown that the physical inventory was
done in the presence of the accused, his representative, representatives from the media and
the Department of Justice, or an elected public official. Neither was any photograph of the
alleged inventory presented by the prosecution. In ruling for the acquittal of the accused, the
Court ratiocinated as follows:

The prosecution established during trial and on appeal that the buybust operation had been
carefully planned by narrating the events with intricate detail. However, at the same time, the
prosecution relied heavily on the exception to the chain of custody rule. Worse, the
prosecution did not even offer any explanation on why they failed to comply with what was
mandated under the law. Indeed, if the police authorities had carefully planned the buy-bust
operation, then there was no reason for them to neglect such important requirements. They
cannot feign ignorance of the exacting standards under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Police officers are presumed and are required to know the laws they are charged with
executing.

This Court cannot merely gloss over the glaring procedural lapses committed by the police
officers, especially when what had been allegedly seized from accused-appellant was only
0.0604 grams of shabu. Recent cases have highlighted the need to ensure the integrity of
seized drugs in the chain of custody when only a miniscule amount of drugs had been
allegedly seized from the accused.

In People v. Holgado, this Court held that "[ c]ourts must employ heightened scrutiny,
consistent with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases
involving minuscule amounts of drugs ... [as] they can be readily planted and tampered."

Non-observance of the mandatory requirements under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165
casts doubt on the integrity of the shabu supposedly seized from accused-appellant. This
creates reasonable doubt in the conviction of accused-appellant for violation of Article II,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. (citations omitted)
30

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the failure to faithfully observe the procedural
requirements under Section 21 would not necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused,
provided the chain of custody remains unbroken. Indeed, the prosecution's failure to show
31

that the police officers did the required physical inventory and to present any photograph of
the evidence confiscated pursuant to the said guidelines is not fatal and does not
automatically render accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. Nonetheless, it is well to stress that such liberality could only be applied for
32
justifiable grounds and only when the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are
33

properly preserved. 34

In this case, no explanation was offered by the prosecution for failing to comply with the
requirements in Section 21. There is no justifiable ground for its failure to require the
accused-appellants and the elected public official to sign the inventory if they were indeed
present during the physical inventory. The absence of Gargullo and the accused-appellants'
signatures on the inventory raises the suspicion that the physical inventory was made
without their presence, in violation of the requirements under the law.

More importantly, the Court opines that the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drugs
seized have been compromised. The prosecution failed to sufficiently establish an unbroken
chain of custody.

The accused-appellants must be

acquitted in Criminal Case No. CR-
05-8045 (Illegal Sale of Drugs); the
corpus delicti of the offense was not
presented.

Accused-appellants insist that the charge of illegal sale of drugs must fail for the
prosecution's failure to preserve the integrity and credibility of the evidence against them.
They point out that the plastic sachet marked with the initials "YEL" which they allegedly
gave to P02 Rodil was never presented in court during trial.

In criminal prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove the
following essential elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is
35

material, therefore, is proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti.
36

After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution indeed failed to
establish an unbroken chain of custody of the sachet marked with the initials "YEL." The
prosecution failed to establish the fourth link in the chain of custody because the corpus
delicti in Criminal Case No. CR-05-8045 was not presented and offered in court in evidence.

In her testimony, PI Alviar admitted that their criminal laboratory office received from P03
Rodil the subject five (5) plastic sachets, including the one marked "YEL," together with
requests for their examination.

With respect to the sachet marked as "YEL," PI Alviar testified that after performing
qualitative examination on its contents, she found out that the same yielded positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. The said finding was written in
Chemistry Report No. D-027-05 which the prosecution presented during PI Alviar's
37

testimony. Interestingly, PI Alviar failed to produce before the court the specimen subjected
to examination. Instead, she undertook to present the same on the next scheduled hearing
and the prosecution reserved its right to recall her for the purpose of identifying the sachet
marked as "YEL":

PROSECUTOR JOY A:

Q. Where is this specimen subject of this chemistry report now, Miss Witness?

A. It is in our office.

Q. Can you bring the specimen on the next scheduled date of hearing?

A. Yes, ma[a]m.

PROSECUTOR JOYA:

We are through with the witness, Your Honor, but we will be recalling this witness to identify
the subject of Chemistry Report No. D-027-05. Perhaps before the cross-examination. 38
The presentation of evidence for the prosecution was completed and yet they failed to
present the sachet marked "YEL."

Although the prosecution's Formal Offer of Exhibits listed an Exhibit "F-1," purportedly
39

referring to the confiscated five (5) sachets of shabu, the records do not show that the plastic
sachet with the markings "YEL" was ever presented and identified in court by any of the
prosecution witnesses. The parties merely stipulated that P03 Rodil would be able to identify
the specimen subject of this case which remained in the custody of the criminal laboratory. 40

The prosecution's failure to present the sachet marked as "YEL" is crucial to their cause
because it constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, absent the said corpus delicti,
the Court is unable to sustain the accused-appellants' conviction for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. Jefferson and Mitos must therefore be acquitted of the charges against them in
Criminal Case No. CR-05-8045.

Accused-Appellant Jefferson must be

acquitted in Criminal Case No. CR-
05-8046 (Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs); Unbroken Chain
of Custody was not established.

To ensure conviction in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must
be established: (1) the accused was in possession of the dangerous drugs; (2) such
possession was not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of the dangerous drugs. 41

As in illegal sale, the dangerous drug illegally possessed by and confiscated from the
accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, the chain of custody rule takes
42

primary importance to ascertain that the integrity and identity of the seized item are
preserved with moral certainty. 43

In this case, the prosecution left serious gaps in the chain of custody of the sachets of shabu.

In his testimony, SP02 Espiritu recalled having custody of the four (4) sachets of shabu from
the time he retrieved the same from the toilet bowl until they arrived at the police station. He
narrated that:

PROSECUTOR JOYA:

Q. What did you do with the thing thrown to the toilet bowl? A. Since that toilet bowl was still
dirty and full of human feces, I got a broom stick and took those sachets with it.

Q. What did you do with the 4 plastic sachets you took from the toilet bowl?

A. I place it near the bowl because they were still filled with some human feces.

xxx

Q. What did you do with the shabu after cleaning it?

A. They were already in my custody.

xxx

Q. From the place where the incident happened in Calero up to your station who has custody
of the 4 confiscated items?

A. In my custody. (emphases supplied]

44

SPOI Buhay corroborated SP02 Espiritu's account. 45

However, P03 Rodil's testimony contradicts the version of SP02 Espiritu and SPOI Buhay.
According to P03 Rodil, SP02 Espiritu gave her the four sachets after their retrieval, thus:

PROSECUTOR JOY A:

Q. What happened in the comfort room of the house, Madam Witness, if you know?

A. According to what they said, when they caught up with him at the comfort room, Jefferson
was about to flush four more plastic sachets but they were able to confiscate the same,
ma'am.

Q. And what did SP02 Espiritu do with those four sachets which accused was about to flush?

A. After retrieving those four sachets of shabu, they gave it to me together with the sachet
that I was able to buy, ma'am.

Q. And what did you do to the four sachet[s] of shabu which were confiscated from the
possession of Jefferson del Mundo?

A. After that we already arrested them and brought them to the Calapan City Police Station
and the four plastic sachets that [were] confiscated together with the one plastic sachet that I
bought were all marked, ma'am. 46

Evidently, there is confusion and uncertainty regarding the person who had custody of the
sachets when they were brought to the police station. Worse, no attempt to reconcile this
1âwphi1

inconsistency was made by the prosecution. As a consequence, the identity and integrity of
the items marked at the police station were placed in serious doubt.

Aside from the confusion, another matter that militates the cause of the prosecution is the
doubt on the number of confiscated sachets which actually contained a white crystalline
substance.

SP02 Espiritu testified that he recovered four (4) plastic sachets, each containing a white
crystalline substance, which Jefferson had thrown into the toilet bowl. That the plastic
sachets contain white crystalline substances was supported by the Chemistry Report No. D-
026-05, which summarized the specimens received and examined by the forensic chemist,
47

as follows:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

A - Four (4) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing white crystalline
substance with the following markings and recorded net weights:

A-1 (MDR-1)= 0.04 gram A-3 (MDR-3)= 0.03 gram

A-2 (MDR-2)= 0.04 gram A-4 (MDR-4)~ 0.03 gram

xxxx

These sachets were presented in court and identified by PI Alviar as the same ones that
tested positive for shabu.

On the other hand, SPO 1 Buhay testified that only one (1) out of several sachets retrieved
from the toilet bowl contained a white crystalline substance. He even surmised that the
substances from the other sachets may have been dissolved after being wet, thus:

PROSECUTOR JOYA:

Q. What shabu are you referring to that Jefferson threw at the toilet bowl?

A. Those who were left over shabu that he threw to the toilet, madam.
Q. How many sachets of shabu did Jefferson del Mundo throw at the toilet bowl?

A. SP02 Espiritu was able to take one sachet of shabu together with some empty plastic
containers and maybe because the substance became wet and it dissolved,
madam. (emphasis supplied)
48

Again, the prosecution did not attempt to clarify or rectify this discrepancy, a fatal mistake.
This inconsistency could not be considered minor because it is crucial to establishing a
reliable chain of custody of the drug specimens.

Indeed, SPOl Buhay's testimony that only one of the four sachets contained a white
crystalline substance casts reasonable doubt on the integrity and identity of the contents of
the remaining sachets, if not on all of them. Thus, there is uncertainty on whether the four (4)
plastic sachets presented in court and identified by PI Alviar were the same ones confiscated
from Jefferson.

Reasonable doubt thus exists, as the quantum of proof required for the conviction of
Jefferson for illegal possession of dangerous drugs was not met. His acquittal is, therefore, in
order.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated 30 January 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 05114 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Jefferson Del
Mundo y Abac and Mitos Lacson-Del Mundo are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. CR-05- 8045.
Further, accused-appellant Jefferson Del Mundo y Abac is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. CR-05-
8046. They are ORDERED immediately RELEASED from detention, unless they are
detained for any other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.
7. G.R. No. 207992 August 11, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROBERTO HOLGADO Y DELA CRUZ AND ANTONIO MISAREZ Y ZARAGA, Accused-
appellants.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Law enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to ensure integrity in the chain of
custody of seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. This is especially true when only
a miniscule amount of dangerous drugs is alleged to have been taken from the accused.

This resolves an appeal from a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs or for violation
of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.

Accused-appellants Roberto Holgado y Dela Cruz (Holgado) and Antonio Misarez y Zaraga
(Misarez) were charged in an information dated January 19, 2007, as follows:

On or about January 17, 2007, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping
and aiding with (sic) one another, and not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous
drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1
Philip Aure, one (1) piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing five (5)
centigrams (0.05 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found to (sic) positive to
the test for methylamphetamine hyrdrocloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the
said law.

Contrary to law. 1

Holgado and Misarez were also charged with possession of dangerous drugs, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, but subsequently acquitted.

As alleged by the prosecution, inDecember 2006, the Pasig City Police received reports of
illegal drug activities of Holgado along C. Raymundo Street, Pasig City. After surveillance
2

operations, a search warrant was issued against Holgado. Acting on the search warrant, the
Pasig City Chief of Police instructed his officers to, if possible, first conduct a buy-bust
operation before actuallyenforcing the search warrant. 3

In the evening of January 17, 2007, police operatives went to No. 17, C. Raymundo Street
for the buy-bust operation. PO1 Philip Aure, acting as poseur-buyer and accompanied by the
police informant, approached Holgado who was then part of a drinking session with two (2)
companions. Holgado asked the informant if he was buying drugs while at the same time
offering him a drink. The informant accepted the drink and introduced PO1 Aure as a drug
user. PO1 Aure thenhanded Holgado two (2) marked one hundred peso bills. Holgado asked
PO1 Aure and the informant to wait as the drugs were with his "kumpare" who was then in
the restroom. 4

Holgado called Misarez. After some time, co-accused Antonio Misarez stepped out of the
restroomand asked who was buying drugs. PO1 Aure and the informant answered, "Kami."
Misarez then handed a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance to PO1 Aure.
PO1 Aure examined the sachet’s contents and took out his cellphone. This was the pre-
arranged signal to the other police operatives that the sale of drugs had been consummated. 5

The police operatives then approached PO1 Aure. When PO1 Aure saw his companions
approaching, he seized Misarez’s hand, but the latter was able to escape and lock himself
inside the house. Holgado, too, was able to flee into the house and join Misarez. The police
operatives managed to break open the wooden door with a crowbar. By then, however,
Holgado and Misarez had managed to leave the house through a passageway in the ceiling
leading to an adjoining house. PO3 Rolando Abuyme and PO2 Arnulfo Dancel managed to
get inside the adjoining house where they apprehended Holgado and Misarez. 6

The search warrant was then enforced "in coordination with a barangay official and in the
presence of some media people." The search allegedly yielded several drugs and drug
7

paraphernalia. These items (i.e., other than the plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
8

substance supposedly sold to PO1 Aure) were the subject of three (3) other cases. These
other cases have since been dismissed. 9

As noted in the Regional Trial Court’s August 17, 2009 decision, PO3 Abuyme prepared an
inventory of the seized items. Specifically with respect to the plastic sachet which was the
10

basis of the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, PO1 Aure supposedly marked the
plastic sachet handed to him by Misarez with "RH-PA" at the site of the buy-bust operation.
11

Following their arrest, Holgado and Misarez were charged with violating Sections 5 (sale of
dangerous drugs), 11 (possession of dangerous drugs), and 12 (possession of drug
12 13

paraphernalia) of Republic Act No. 9165. The case for violating Section 5 was docketed as
14

Criminal Case No. 15338-D. The cases for violating Section 11 were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 15339-D and 15341-D. The case for violating Section 12 was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 15340-D. The charge for violating Section 5 was in view of the plastic
sachet containing a white crystalline substance supposedly sold by Holgado to PO1 Aure.
The charges for violations of Sections 11 and 12 were in view of the items supposedly seized
in enforcing the search warrant.

During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses PO1 Aure and the apprehending officers
PO2 Roberto Castulo and PO3 Abuyme. The defense presented as its witnesses accused-
appellants Holgado and Misarez, as well as their neighbor, Carlos Marquing, and Holgado’s
wife, Maribel Villareal. 15

In their testimonies, accused-appellants claimed that no buy-bust operation was conducted.

Instead, the police operatives allegedly barged into Holgado’s house and arrested accused-
appellants who were then merely having a few drinks. While Holgado and Misarez were
handcuffed, the police operatives conducted a supposed search of Holgado’s house. They
were then taken to the police station. Defense witnesses Marquing and Villareal corroborated
accused-appellants’ claims. 16

After trial, the Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch 154 found Holgado and Misarez guilty
of illegal saleof dangerous drugs (i.e., violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165). They
were acquitted of the charges pertaining to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 as the drugs
supposedly seized were not introduced in evidence. Holgado, the sole accused in Criminal
Case No. 15340-D, was also acquitted of the charges relating to Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 9165 asthe paraphernalia to which PO2 Castulo testified to in court were different from
those indicated in the inventory supposedly made when the search warrant was enforced. 17

Holgado and Misarez were sentencedto suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
penalty of ₱1million. The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered –

In Crim. Case No. 15338-D finding both the accused Roberto Holgado and Antonio Misarez
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165 (sale of
dangerous drug), and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment. Each of them is also ordered to pay a fine of One Million Pesos
(₱1,000,000.00). In Crim. Cases Nos. 15339-D and 15341-D for violation of Section 11 of
R.A. 9165 (possession of dangerous drug) against accused Roberto Holgado and Antonio
Misarez, they are hereby found NOT GUILTY of the said offense for lack of evidence.

In Crim. Case No. 15340-D for violation of Section 12 of R.A. 9165 (possession of drug
paraphernalia) against Roberto Holgado, judgment is hereby rendered finding the said
accused NOT GUILTY of the said offense charged against him on the ground of reasonable
doubt.

The dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia allegedly obtained from the persons of the
accused and subject of the Informations are hereby ordered delivered forthwith to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.

Considering the penalty imposed by the Court on the accused ROBERTO HOLGADO and
ANTONIO MISAREZ for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165 (sale of dangerous drug), their
immediate commitment to the National Bilibid Prisons is hereby ordered.

SO ORDERED. (Underscoring in the original)

18

In the decision dated February 18, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial
19

Court’s decision convicting Holgado and Misarez.

On March 4, 2013, Holgado and Misarez filed their notice of appeal. 20

In the resolution dated September 11, 2013, this court noted the records forwarded by the
Court of Appeals and informed the parties that they may file their supplemental briefs. 21

On November 6, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion,
on behalf ofthe People of the Philippines, noting that it would no longer file a supplemental
brief.
22

On December 27, 2013, Holgado and Misarez filed their joint supplemental brief where they
23

assailed the supposed lack of compliance with the requirements set by the chain of custody
of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia as provided by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

For resolution is the issue of whether Holgado’s and Misarez’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 was established. Subsumed in the
resolution of this issue is the question of whether the prosecution was able to establish
compliance with the requisites of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

The elements that must be established to sustain convictions for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs are settled. In People v. Morales, this court stated:
24

In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
25

On corpus delicti, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No.
10640, provides for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered
drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. Specifically with respect to custody before the filing of a
criminal case, Section 21, as amended, provides: SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition
ofConfiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/orLaboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and havecustody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending teamhaving initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
 representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:Provided,
That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources ofdangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well
as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be
submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative
examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done
by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of
the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does
not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of
dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however,
That a final certification shall be issued immediately uponcompletion of the said
examination and certification[.] (Emphasis supplied)

As this court declared in People v. Morales, "failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 implie[s] a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution toestablish
the identity of the corpus delicti." It "produce[s] doubts as tothe origins ofthe [seized
26

paraphernalia]."27

The significance of ensuring the integrity of drugs and drug paraphernalia in prosecutions
under Republic Act No. 9165 is discussed in People v. Belocura: 28

Worse, the Prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug that constituted
the corpus delicti itself. The omission naturally raises grave doubt about any search being
actually conducted and warrants the suspicion that the prohibited drugs were planted
evidence.

In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account
for the custody of the incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation
until the moment it is offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence. It is
not enough that the evidence offered has probative value on the issues, for the evidence
must also be sufficiently connectedto and tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not
relevant merely because it is available but that it has an actual connection with the
transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This is the reason why authentication and
laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence are important. (Emphasis supplied)
29

In Malilin v. People, this court explained that the exactitude required by Section 21 goes into
30

the very nature of narcotics as the subject of prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165:

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake withrespect to an exhibit is greatest when
the exhibit issmall and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar
in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham vs. Statepositively
acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroin—was
handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the
condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession—was
excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized
could have been indeed heroin or it could havebeen sugar or baking powder. It ruled that
unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit
at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in
the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory’s
findings is inadmissible. A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not
readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their
composition and nature.The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at
least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could
have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases—by accident
or otherwise—in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was
submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more
stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be
applied,a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged
with another or been contaminated or tampered with. (Emphasis supplied)
31

Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore,
ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or
drugparaphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized;
second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the
substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the
relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in
possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities
for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner.

By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-compliance with Section 21 indicates a

failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that
this non-compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal. As this court stated in People v.
Lorenzo: 32

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained
if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug.The identity of the prohibited drug
must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of
possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in
the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established
with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. (Emphasis
33

supplied)

The prosecution’s sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of seized drugs and
drug paraphernaliawill not secure a conviction. Not even the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties will suffice. In fact, whatever presumption there is as to the
regularity of the manner by which officers took and maintained custody of the seized items is
"negated." Republic Act No. 9165 requires compliance with Section 21.
34

Even the doing of acts which ostensibly approximate compliance but do not actuallycomply
with the requirements of Section 21 does not suffice. In People v. Magat, for instance, this
35

court had occasion to emphasize the inadequacy of merely marking the items supposedly
seized: "Marking of the seized drugs alone by the law enforcers is not enough to comply with
the clear and unequivocal procedures prescribed in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165." 36

The exactitude which the state requires in handling seized narcotics and drug paraphernalia
is bolstered by the amendments made to Section 21 by Republic Act No. 10640. Section
21(1), as amended, now includes the following proviso, thereby making it even more
stringent than as originally worded:

Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures:

In People v. Nandi, this court explained that four (4) links "should be established in the chain
37

of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officerto the investigating officer; third, the turnover
by the investigating officer ofthe illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from
the forensic chemist to the court."38

In Nandi, where the prosecution failed to show how the seized items were handled following
the actual seizure and, thereafter, turned over for examination, this court held thatthe
accused must be acquitted:
After a closer look, the Court finds that the linkages in the chain of custody of the subject
item were not clearly established. As can be gleaned from his forequoted testimony, PO1
1âwphi1

Collado failed to provide informative details on how the subject shabu was handled
immediately after the seizure. He just claimed that the item was handed to him by the
accused in the course of the transaction and, thereafter, hehanded it to the investigator.

There is no evidence either on how the item was stored, preserved, labeled, and recorded.
PO1 Collado could not even providethe court with the name of the investigator. He admitted
that he was not present when it was delivered to the crime laboratory. It was Forensic
Chemist Bernardino M. Banac, Jr. who identified the person who delivered the specimen to
the crime laboratory. Hedisclosed that he received the specimen from one PO1 Cuadra, who
was not even a member of the buybust team. Per their record, PO1 Cuadra delivered the
letter-request with the attached seized item to the CPD Crime Laboratory Office where a
certain PO2 Semacio recorded it and turned it over to the Chemistry Section.

In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the considered view that chain of custody of the illicit
drug seized was compromised. Hence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duties cannot be applied in this case.

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and
the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute
authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance
thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers
deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is
irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted,
the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty.

With the chain of custody in serious question, the Court cannot gloss over the argument of
the accused regarding the weight of the seized drug. The standard procedure is that after the
confiscation of the dangerous substance, it is brought to the crime laboratory for a series of
tests. The result thereof becomes oneof the bases of the charge to be filed. (Citations
39

omitted)

In this case, the defense points out that all that the prosecution claimed, with respect to the
handling of the sachetsupposedly handed by Misarez to PO1 Aure, was that PO1 Aure
supposedly marked it "RH-PA" at the scene of the buy-bust operation. 40

While the buy-bust operation team allegedly conducted an inventory of the seized items, it is
unclear if this inventory was limited to those seized pursuant to the enforcement of the
search warrant (i.e., after the conduct of the buy-bust operation) or was inclusive of whatever
items seized during the buy-bust operation. In any case, this inventory was discredited as
Holgado was acquitted by the Regional Trial Court of the charge of illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia because the inventory was found to be unreliable visa-vis the testimony of
PO2 Castulo. The paraphernaliato which PO2 Castulo testified to in court were different from
those indicated in the inventory supposedly made when the search warrant was enforced.

There have been claims to the effect that the search warrant was enforced "in coordination
with a barangay official and in the presence of some media people." However, this
41

"barangay official" and these "media people" have neither been identified nor presented as
witnesses. In any case, even if it were to be granted that these individuals took part in the
events that transpired in the evening of January 17, 2007, their participation was alleged to
have been only with respect to the enforcement of the search warrant. It did not extend to
the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized items arising from the buy-
bust operation, as required by Section 21. For that matter, it was not even shown that
photographs of the sachet marked as "RH-PA" were taken. Per his own testimony, PO1 Aure
himself doubtedif any photograph was taken. 42

The defense also points out that "PO1 Aure . . . failed to disclose who, in particular, held the
sachet of shabu from the crime scene (after it was marked) up to the police station, and
finally to the crime laboratory for the requisite chemical examination." It added that "nothing
43
on (sic) the records showed who, in particular, submitted/brought the specimen to the crime
laboratory for examination." 44

In People v. Gatlabayan and People v. Sitco, this court considered as fatal to the
45 46

prosecution’s case the lack of evidence on the identity of the person who submitted the
specimen for examination to the PNP Crime Laboratory and/or the forensic chemist. In Sitco,
this court characterized the lack of evidence on this matter as "glaring gaps or missing links
in the chain of custody of evidence, raising doubt asto the identity of the seized items and
necessarily their evidentiary value." This court also underscored that "[t]his broken chain of
47

custody is especially significant given that what are involved are fungible items that may
beeasily altered or tampered with." 48

In sum, the integrity of three (3) ofthe four (4) links enumerated in People v. Nandi (i.e.,
49

seizure and marking, turnover by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer, and
turnover by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist) has been cast in doubt. As in
Nandi, this doubt must be resolved in favor of accused-appellants.

It is true that Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a proviso to the effect that
"noncompliance of (sic) these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items."
However, the prosecution has not shown that when the buy-bust operation was allegedly
conducted on January 17, 2007 and the sachet was supposedly seized and marked, there
were "justifiable grounds" for dispensing with compliance with Section 21. Rather, it merely
insisted on its self-serving assertion that the integrity of the seized sachet has nevertheless
been, supposedly, preserved. The omission became more glaring considering that the
prosecution asserted that the events of January 17, 2007 entailed a carefully planned
operation, engendered by reports of drug-related activities along C. Raymundo Street. This
planning even led to the application for and issuance of a search warrant.

Apart from the officers’ glaring non-compliance with Section 21, two (2) circumstances are
worth underscoringin this case. First, the shabu supposedly seized amounted to five (5)
centigrams (0.05 gram). This quantity is so miniscule it amounts to only about 2.5% of the
weight of a five-centavo coin (1.9 grams) or a one-centavo coin (2.0 grams). Second,
Holgado and Misarez were acquitted by the Regional Trial Court of all other charges (i.e., for
possession of dangerous drugs and for possession of drug paraphernalia).

While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a ground for acquittal, this
circumstance underscores the need for more exacting compliance with Section 21. In Malilin
v. People, this court said that "the likelihood of tampering, loss ormistake with respect to an
50

exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics
fungible innature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives."
51

Moreover, the Regional Trial Court’s observations which led to accused-appellants’ acquittal
for violations of Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165 should have warned the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals that something was amiss.

The events of January 17, 2007 should be taken and appreciated as a whole even as they
gave rise to four (4) distinct criminal cases which were separately docketed. The reasons for
acquitting accused-appellants for the charges of violating Sections 11 and 12 (i.e., the
prosecution’s complete failure to introduce in evidence the drugs seized and the testifying
police operative’s own failure to properly account for the paraphernalia he himself took part
in seizing) seriously cast doubt, not only on accused-appellants’ own guilt, but more so on
52

the soundness and reliability of the measures taken and procedures followed by the police
operatives. These circumstances cast a heavy shadow on the integrity of the operation and
the police operatives themselves.

Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving violations
of Republic Act No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly uncomplicatedand
1âwphi1

barefaced narrative must be scrupulously considered. Courts must employ heightened

scrutiny, consistent with the requirement ofproof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating
cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs. These can be readily planted and tampered.
Also, doubt normally follows in cases where an accused has been discharged from other
simultaneous offenses due to mishandling of evidence. Had the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals been so judicious in this case, a speedier resolution would have been
handed to Holgado and Misarez whose guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not established.

It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act No.
9165 involving small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of prosecutions
involving the proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with cases involving small fry who have
been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a bane to our society, small
retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of drug cartels. Both law
enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the more effective and efficient strategy is to
focus resources more on the source and true leadership of these nefarious organizations.
Otherwise, all these executive and judicial resources expended to attempt to convict an
accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful custodial arrangements will hardly make a
dent in the overall picture. Itmight in fact be distracting our law enforcers from their more
challenging task: to uproot the causes of this drug menace. We stand ready to assess cases
involving greater amounts of drugs and the leadership of these cartels.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated February 18, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals inCA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04635 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants
Roberto Holgado y Dela Cruz and Antonio Misarez y Zaraga are hereby ACQUITTEDfor
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
directed to report to this court within five (5) days from receipt of this decision the action he
has taken. Copies shall also be furnished to the Director General of Philippine National
Police and the Director General of Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency for their
information.

The Regional Trial Court is directed to tum over the seized sachet of methamphetamine
hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
8. G.R. No. 201845 March 6, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDGARDO ADRID y FLORES, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated February 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03775, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Br:mch 35 in Manila, in Criminal Case No. 06-247286, finding accused-appeIlant Edgardo
Adrid y Flores (Adrid) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

In two separate lnformations2 filed on October 11, 2006, Adrid was charged with violation of
Sees. 5 and 11, Art. II of RA 9165, allegedly committed as follows:

Crim. Case No. 06-247286

That on or about October 8, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
without being authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver, or give away to another any dangerous
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell to SPO1 ARISTEDES
MARINDA, who acted as poseur-buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of
white crystalline substance marked by the police as "DAID-1" with net weight of ZERO
POINT ZERO EIGHT SIX (0.086) gram, commonly known as "SHABU", which substance,
after a qualitative examination, gave positive results for methylamphetamine hydrochloride,
which is a dangerous drug.

Crim. Case No. 06-247287

That on or about October 8, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
without being authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control white
crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked by
the police as "DAID-2" with net weight of ZERO POINT ZERO SIX SIX (0.066) gram, known
as "SHABU" containing Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

At the instance of the prosecution, these cases were consolidated with Crim. Case No. 06-
247288 against Romeo Pacaul y Lagbo (Pacaul), who was arrested together with Adrid
during the same buy-bust incident. When arraigned, Adrid pleaded not guilty. 3

During the pre-trial, the parties agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemical
Officer Police Senior Inspector Maritess Mariano (PS/Insp. Mariano) and stipulated on the
tenor of her testimony to the following effect: she was a Forensic Chemical Officer of the
Western Police District Crime Laboratory, and on duty on October 9, 2009; on that day, she
received a memorandum-request from the District Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operations Task
Group (DAID-SOTG); said memorandum came with three plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance; her examination of the substance presented yielded a positive result
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. 4

Trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution’s account of the events, pieced together from the testimony of Senior Police
Officer 1 Aristedes Marinda (SPO1 Marinda) 5 and documentary and object evidence, is as
follows:

At around 10 o’clock in the evening of October 8 2006, a male informant arrived at the
Manila Police District (MPD) Anti-Illegal Drugs Unit (DAID) to report that one "Jon Jon" is
pushing illegal drugs at Chesa, Tondo, Manila. 6 Acting on this tip, the DAID Chief
immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation and named a certain SPO1
Macasling as team leader. Designated as poseur-buyer was SPO1 Marinda, while Police
Officer 1 Jaycee John Galutera and Police Officer 2 Arnold Delos Santos (PO2 Delos
Santos) were to serve as back-up officers. Following the usual instructions, the buy-bust
group was given two PhP 100 bills bearing the initials "DAID," to serve as marked money. 7

Thereafter, or at about 10:30 p.m., the operatives proceeded to the target area. Once there,
the informant approached and then had a brief conversation with a person, later identified as
"Jon Jon," standing at the entry of an alley. The informant then called SPO1 Marinda, who,
after being introduced to "Jon Jon," expressed his desire to purchase shabu as test buy to
determine the quality of the goods.8

During the course of the negotiations, Pacaul arrived and asked Adrid in the vernacular, "Tol,
pakuha ng pang-gamit lang may bisita lang ako." (Bro, can you give me some, I have a
visitor.) SPO1 Marinda then saw Adrid hand over to Pacaul one plastic sachet containing
suspected shabu. Pacaul then left the scene, and PO2 Delos Santos immediately followed
him.9

The negotiations continued, and SPO1 Marinda told the accused that he is buying "dos,"
meaning, that he was buying the value of PhP 200. The accused replied, "Sigue ho, meron
naman ho ako ng halagang hinahanap ninyo." 10 (Okay sir, I have the amount you are looking
for). He then handed to SPO1 Marinda a sealed plastic sachet, with a white substance in the
appearance of "vetsin."11 SPO1 Marinda received the filled sachet with his left hand, and
handed Adrid the PhP 200 marked money using his right hand. This sachet was later marked
as "DAID-1." SPO1 Marinda then immediately grabbed Adrid’s arm, introduced himself as a
police officer, and arrested the latter.12 Found in Adrid’s possession when frisked was another
sachet of suspected shabu, later marked as "DAID-2." Some persons who tried to intervene
in the entrapment episode were likewise arrested.

From the target area, Adrid and two other individuals were brought to MPD DAID. There, the
police officers learned that the real name of "Jon Jon" is Edgardo Adrid, the same accused in
the case here. In his testimony during the trial, SPO1 Marinda claimed that he turned over
the plastic sachets recovered from Adrid, together with the marked money, to the investigator
at DAID, a certain SPO1 Pama who, in his (SPO1 Marinda’s) presence, marked the
recovered sachets as "DAID-1"13 and "DAID-2." The sachet recovered from Pacaul was
marked as "DAID-3."

SPO1 Marinda’s direct narrative ended with the statement that these three sachets were
submitted for laboratory examination to the DAID Forensic Chemistry Division. He, however,
admitted having no participation in the submission of the specimen for examination. The
examination later yielded positive results for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. 14

During cross-examination, SPO1 Marinda testified that prior to the buy-bust operation, his
group coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). He was not sure,
however, if the pre-operation report is present in the records of the case, albeit he admitted
not indicating the fact of coordination in his Affidavit of Apprehension. 15

Version of the Defense

The evidence for the defense, meanwhile, consisted of the lone testimony of accused Adrid
himself. His narration of what purportedly transpired during the period material is as follows:

On October 6, 2006, at about 7:30 in the evening, after having supper, several men suddenly
entered his house on Magsaysay St., Tondo, Manila, introduced themselves as police
officers and without so much of an explanation apprehended and handcuffed him. 16 When he
asked them, "ano po ang kasalanan ko, bakit ninyo ako hinuhuli sir?" (What did I do sir, why
are you arresting me?), the intruders simply gave a dismissive reply, "sumama ka na lang sa
amin."17 (Just come with us.)

At the MPD DAID, he was mauled and forced to admit something regarding the sale of
drugs.18 The police, according to Adrid, was actually after a certain "Jon Jon" who was into
selling drugs, but who have given the police officers a slip. For its failure to nab "Jon Jon,"
the police turned to Adrid to admit to some wrongdoings. 19 And albeit he has no actual
knowledge of "Jon Jon’s" full name, he is aware of his being a well-known drug lord in their
area and knows where "Jon Jon" lives, as he, "Jon Jon" has in fact been to his (Adrid’s)
house three times to have a PlayStation game. 20

The Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the Manila RTC rendered on October 22, 2008 a Joint Decision, 21 finding the
accused Adrid guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 06-247286 (sale of illegal
drugs). The trial court, however, acquitted Adrid in Crim. Case No. 06-247287 and Pacaul in
Crim. Case No. 06-247288 (both for illegal possession of drugs), for insufficiency of evidence
to sustain a conviction. The fallo of the RTC Decision, in its pertinent part, reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 06-247286 finding the accused Edgardo Adrid y Flores
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Article II of
RA [9165] (Sale of Dangerous Drug), he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment; to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand(₱500,000) Pesos; and
cost of suit;

Let a commitment order be issued for the transfer of his custody to the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City, pursuant to SC OCA Circulars Nos. 4-92-A and 26-
2000;

2. With respect to Criminal Case No. 06-247287, finding the evidence insufficient to
establish the guilt of accused Edgardo Adrid y Flores beyond reasonable doubt, he is
hereby

ACQUITTED of the offense charged therein;

3. With respect to Criminal Case No. 06-247288, finding the evidence insufficient to
establish the guilt of accused Romeo Pacaul y Lagbo beyond reasonable doubt, he
is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged.

xxxx

The plastic sachet with shabu (Exh. "C"), as well as Exhs. "D" and "E", which were also
positive for shabu, are hereby confiscated in favor of the Government. x x x

SO ORDERED.

The trial court based its judgment of conviction on the charge of illegal sale on the combined
application of the following factors: (1) SPO1 Marinda‘s inculpatory testimony which was
given in a positive, categorical, and straightforward manner and thus worthy of belief; (2) the
absence of credible evidence of bad faith or other improper motive on the part of the police
officers; and (3) the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. 22

As to the identity of the dangerous drugs seized and presented in court in evidence, the RTC
stated the following observations: Thus, as testified to by SPO1 Marinda, from the place of
arrest and recovery, he was in custody of the dangerous drug involved in this case (Exh.
"C"). Upon arrival at the police station, he promptly turned it over to the duty investigator,
SPO1 Pama who placed markings thereon of the capital letters "DAID", in his presence.
Thereafter, it was brought to the MPD Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis of its contents
which gave positive result for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, or "shabu", a dangerous
drug. The specimen itself was produced in Court and was positively identified by SPO1
Marinda as the same plastic sachet with white crystalline substance which accused handed
to him in exchange for the two One Hundred Peso bills buy-bust money (Exhs. "G" and "G-
1").23

On December 3, 2008, Adrid filed a Notice of Appeal, 24 pursuant to which the RTC forwarded
the records to the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

On February 24, 2011, the CA rendered its assailed affirmatory Decision, disposing as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), National Capital Region, Branch 35, Manila in Criminal Case No. 06-247286 is
AFFIRMED.

Just like the RTC, the CA gave credence to the testimony of SPO1 Marinda to prove a
consummated sale of a prohibited drug involving Adrid, 25 noting in this regard that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated prohibited drug had been properly
preserved, thus satisfying the rule on chain of custody. 26

On the conduct of the buy-bust operation, the CA rejected Adrid’s protestation about the lack
of prior surveillance before the buy-bust operation was set in motion. As the appellate court
stressed, a prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment
operation,27 which is presumed to have been conducted regularly, absent proof of ill motive
on the part of the apprehending police officers. 28

Hence, this appeal.

On July 30, 2012, this Court, by Resolution, required the parties to submit supplemental
briefs if they so desired. The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, manifested
having already exhaustively addressed the issues and arguments involving the case, and
expressed its willingness to submit the case on the basis of available records. Similarly,
appellant Adrid manifested that he is adopting all the defenses and arguments that he raised
in his Appellant’s Brief before the CA, capsulated in the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE

PROSECUTION’S VERSION DESPITE THE PATENT IRREGULARITIES IN THE
CONDUCT OF THE BUY-BUST OPERATION.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF
THE DRUG SPECIMEN ALLEGEDLY CONFISCATED.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.29

In fine, the issues raised by appellant revolve around the conduct of the buy-bust operation,
and the subsequent handling and examination of the seized substance inside the sachet.
Appellant insists that the incredibility of the manner of the conduct of the supposed buy-bust
operation supports his claim that there was no such operation and that he was, in fact, a
victim of a frame-up.30 Even assuming that the buy-bust operation was actually conducted,
appellant argues, he deserves to be acquitted for the prosecution’s failure to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. Appellant must be acquitted but not because of his defense of
1âwphi1

frame-up or the perceived flaw in the conduct of the buy-bust which, as alleged, was carried
out without prior surveillance and in coordination with the PDEA.

The Court has long held that the absence of a prior surveillance is neither a necessary
requirement for the validity of a drug-related entrapment or buy-bust operation nor
detrimental to the People’s case. The immediate conduct of the buy-bust routine is within the
discretion of the police officers, especially, as in this case, when they are accompanied by
the informant in the conduct of the operation. We categorically ruled in People v. Lacbanes: 31

x x x In People v. Ganguso, it has been held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for
the validity of an entrapment operation, especially when the buy-bust team members were
accompanied to the scene by their informant. In the instant case, the arresting officers were
led to the scene by the poseur-buyer. Granting that there was no surveillance conducted
before the buy-bust operation, this Court held in People v. Tranca, that there is no rigid or
textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of good police work.
The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for
prior surveillance. (citations omitted)

Of the same tenor is the holding in People v. Dela Rosa, 32 We underscored the leeway given
to the police officers in conducting buy-bust operations:

That no test buy was conducted before the arrest is of no moment for there is no rigid or
textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. For the same reason, the absence of
evidence of a prior surveillance does not affect the regularity of a buy-bust operation,
especially when, like in this case, the buy-bust team members were accompanied to the
scene by their informant. The Court will not pretend to establish on a priori basis what
detailed acts police authorities might credibly undertake and carry out in their entrapment
operations. The selection of appropriate and effective means of entrapping drug traffickers is
best left to the discretion of police authorities.

Whether or not the buy-bust team coordinated PDEA is, under the premises, of little moment,
for coordination with PDEA, while perhaps ideal, is not an indispensable element of a proper
buy-bust operation. The Court, in People v. Roa, has explained the rationale and practicality
of this sound proposition in the following wise:

In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before
police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 86 of
Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of
Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters," the
provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA’s participation a condition sine qua non for
every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest
sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of the Court, which police authorities may
rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA.
A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA. 33

Neither can appellant’s defense of alibi or frame-up save the day for him. Frame-up, denial,
or alibi, more particularly when based on the accused’s testimony alone, as here, is an
inherently weak form of defense. As the prosecution aptly observed and as jurisprudence
itself teaches, the defense of denial or frame-up has been viewed with disfavor for it can
easily be concocted and is a common defense plot in most prosecutions for violations of anti-
drug laws. Bare denial of an accused cannot prevail over the positive assertions of
apprehending police operatives, absent ill motives on the part of the latter to impute such a
serious crime as possession or selling of prohibited drugs. 34
The foregoing notwithstanding, appellant is still entitled to an acquittal considering that
certain critical circumstances that had been overlooked below, which, if properly appreciated,
engender moral uncertainty as to his guilt. Nothing less than evidence of criminal culpability
beyond reasonable doubt can overturn the presumption of innocence. In this regard, the
onus of proving the guilt of the accused lies with the prosecution which must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, the
following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. 35 As it were, the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the offense of
possession or sale of prohibited drugs. Withal, it is essential in the prosecution of drug cases
that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. This means
that on top of the elements of possession or illegal sale, the fact that the substance illegally
sold or possessed is, in the first instance, the very substance adduced in court must likewise
be established with the same exacting degree of certitude as that required sustaining a
conviction. The chain of custody requirement, as stressed in People v. Cervantes, 36 and other
cases, performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts respecting the
identity of the evidence are minimized if not altogether removed. People v. Cervantes
describes the mechanics of the custodial chain requirement, thusly:

As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission
of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe
how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition it was delivered
to the next link in the chain.37

xxx

The Court has to be sure stressed the need for the strict adherence to the custodial chain
process and explained the reason behind the rules on the proper procedure in handling of
specimen illegal drugs. People v. Obmiranis 38readily comes to mind:

The Court certainly cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the possibility of substitution,
alteration or contamination—whether intentional or unintentional—of narcotic substances at
any of the links in the chain of custody thereof especially because practically such possibility
is great where the item of real evidence is small and is similar in form to other substances to
which people are familiar in their daily lives. x x x

Reasonable safeguards are provided for in our drugs laws to protect the identity and integrity
of narcotic substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from drug offenders.
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 materially requires the apprehending team having initial custody
and control of the drugs to, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The same
requirements are also found in Section 2 of its implementing rules as well as in Section 2 of
the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the same case, We stressed why evidence of an unbroken chain of custody of the seized
illegal drugs is necessary:

Be that as it may, although testimony about a perfect chain does not always have to be the
standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody
indeed becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is a narcotic
substance. A unique characteristic of narcotic substances such as shabu is that they are not
distinctive and are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to
determine their composition and nature. And because they cannot be readily and properly
distinguished visually from other substances of the same physical and/or chemical nature,
they are susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination, substitution and exchange—
whether the alteration, tampering, contamination, substitution and exchange be inadvertent
or otherwise not. It is by reason of this distinctive quality that the condition of the exhibit at
the time of testing and trial is critical. Hence, in authenticating narcotic specimens, a
standard more stringent than that applied to objects which are readily identifiable must be
applied—a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged
with another or contaminated or tampered with.39

Appellant contends that the police officers failed to follow the proper procedure laid down in
Sec. 21 of RA 9165, in relation to the chain of custody rule. He argues:

The prosecution failed to supply all the links in the chain of custody rule. SPO2 Marinda
testified that he supposedly turned-over the confiscated plastic sachets to the investigator
SPO1 Pama. However, the latter was never presented to testify on this matter. The
prosecution also failed to testify on what happened to the subject specimens after these
were turned-over to Pama and who delivered these to the forensic chemist. Thus, there is an
unexplained gap in the chain of custody of the dangerous drug, from the time the same were
supposedly seized by SPO2 Marinda from accused-appellant, until these were turned-over to
the crime laboratory.

It also appears that the prosecution’s evidence failed to reveal the identity of the person who
had the custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending its
presentation in court. This unexplained link also created doubt as to the integrity of the
evidence. This should have been considered as a serious source of doubt favorable to the
accused-appellant.40

Appellant’s contention is very much well-taken. The Court particularly notes that of the
individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical possession of the sachets of
shabu allegedly seized from appellant, only SPO1 Marinda testified for the specific purpose
of identifying the evidence. But his testimony failed to sufficiently demonstrate an unbroken
chain, for he himself admits that at the police station he transferred the possession of the
specimen to an investigator at the MPD DAID, one SPO1 Pama to be precise. The following
is the extent of SPO1 Marinda’s testimony regarding his knowledge of the whereabouts of
the specimen:

Q You said you received the plastic container containing the supposed shabu from John
John, what happened to that plastic sachet?

A I turned that over to out investigator at DAID.

Q So you were the one who brought that from the scene of the incident to your office?

A Yes, sir.

Q And after you turned over the stuff to the investigator, what happened to that, if any?

A It was marked by our investigator DAID-1. COURT:

Q Who marked the evidence?

A Our investigator, Your Honor.

Q Who is he?

A SPO1 Pama, Your Honor. FISCAL:

Q And how did you know that it was marked with DAID-1?

A We were present when it was marked, sir.

xxxx
Q And after you turned over the plastic sachet and alias Jon-Jon to the investigator, what
happened next?

A The evidence were submitted to the laboratory for examination, sir. 41

And after this turnover of the specimen, SPO1 Marinda no longer had personal knowledge of
the whereabouts of the shabu-containing sachet. In plain language, the custodial link ended
with SPO1 Marinda when he testified that the specimen was submitted for laboratory
examination, he was veritably assuming the occurrence of an event; he was not testifying on
the fact of submission out of personal knowledge, because he took no part in the transfer of
the specimen from the police station to the laboratory. This testimony of SPO1 Marinda
alone, while perhaps perceived by the courts below as straightforward and clear, is
incomplete to satisfy the rule on chain of custody.

It baffles this Court no end why the prosecution opted not to present the investigator,
identified as SPO1 Pama, to whom SPO1 Marinda allegedly handed over the confiscated
sachets for recording and marking. If SPO1 Pama indeed received the sachets containing
the illegal drugs and then turned them over to the laboratory for testing, his testimony is vital
in establishing the whereabouts of the seized illegal drugs and how they were handled from
the time SPO1 Marinda turned them over to him, until he actually delivered them to the
laboratory. He could have accounted for the whereabouts of the illegal drugs from the time
he possessed them.

The indispensability of SPO1 Pama testimony cannot be over-emphasized. He could have

provided the link between the testimony of SPO1 Marinda and the tenor of the testimony of
PS/Insp. Mariano, which the prosecution and appellant have already stipulated on. As the
evidence on record stands, there is a considerable amount of time, a gaping hiatus as it
were, in which the whereabouts of the illegal drugs were unaccounted for. This constitutes a
clear but unexplained break in the chain of custody. Then too no one testified on how the
specimen was handled and cared following the analysis. And of course no one was
presented to prove that the specimen turned over for analysis, if that be the case, and
eventually presented in court as exhibits were the same substance SPO1 Pama received
from SPO1 Marinda. There are so many unanswered questions regarding the possibility of
evidence tampering and the identity of evidence. These questions should be answered
satisfactorily to determine whether the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
substance have been compromised in any way. Else, the prosecution cannot plausibly
maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 42Thus, the
trial court should not have easily accorded the drugs presented in court much credibility.

Not lost on the Court is the prosecution’s admission that the "Forensic Chemical Officer has
no personal knowledge as to where or from whom the specimen she examined originally
came from x x x; that several hands got hold of the said specimen before the presentation of
the same in court."43 This admission puts into serious question whether it was in fact the
same SPO1 Pama who turned over the specimen for laboratory testing, or some other police
officer or person took possession of the specimen before it was brought to the laboratory.

The prosecution’s own misgivings created a reasonable doubt on the integrity of the drugs
presented in court, and necessarily strongly argue against a finding of guilt. As the Court
stated in Malillin v. People, "When moral certainty as to culpability hands in the balance,
acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right." 44

Apropos too is what the Court said in People v. Almorfe:

The presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the offenses, calls for the
necessity of proving beyond doubt that they are the same seized objects. This function is
performed by the "chain of custody" requirement as defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous
Drugs

Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which requirement is necessary to erase all doubts
as to the identity of the seized drugs by establishing its movement from the accused, to the
police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.

xxxx
It bears recalling that while the parties stipulated on the existence of the sachets, they did
not stipulate with respect to their "source."

People v. Sanchez teaches that the testimony of the forensic chemist which is stipulated
upon merely covers the handling of the specimen at the forensic laboratory and the result of
the examination, but not the manner the specimen was handled before it came to the
possession of the forensic chemist and after it left his possession. 1âwphi1

While a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible to achieve, an unbroken chain
becomes indispensable and essential in the prosecution of drug cases owing to its
susceptibility to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange.
Hence, every link must be accounted for.

In fine, the prosecution failed to account for every link of the chain starting from its turn over
by Janet to the investigator, and from the latter to the chemist.

As for the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty relied upon by the
courts a quo, the same cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 45(citations omitted)

In People v. Librea,46 the Court acquitted the accused for the reason that the circumstances
of how the person who delivered the specimen for laboratory testing came into possession of
the specimen remained unexplained.

The CA, thus, gravely erred in ruling that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated prohibited drug were properly preserved. 47 On the contrary, the prosecution failed
to provide each and every link in the chain of custody. This runs contrary to the rule that the
corpus delicti should be identified with unwavering exactitude. 48

It is worthy to note, as a final consideration, that the trial court acquitted appellant in Criminal
Case No. 06-247287, for illegal possession of drugs, on this ground: the subject shabu was
not identified in court. What the trial court failed to appreciate, however, is that while SPO1
Marinda identified a sachet of shabu in court, his testimony failed to establish that it was the
same one submitted for laboratory testing. The trial court, in the case for illegal sale, should
not have so easily trusted the alleged integrity of the shabu identified in court, when the
evidence of the prosecution itself casts a doubt on the integrity of the specimen presented
and identified in court.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accused-appellant Edgardo Adrid y Flores

is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violating Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 on account of
reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the
immediate release of accused-appellant, unless he is being lawfully held for any other cause.
Accordingly, the CA Decision dated February 24, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03775 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 9. G.R. No. 219955, February 05, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GLENN DE GUZMAN Y DELOS

REYES, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this appeal is the January 29, 2015 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 05930 which affirmed the October 10, 2012 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 75, Olongapo City, finding Glenn De Guzman y Delos Reyes (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Antecedent Facts

Appellant was charged with the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, as well as the use of
dangerous drugs under Sections 5, 11 and 15, Article II of RA 9165 in three Informations 3 dated
November 16, 2009 which read:

Criminal Case No. 627-2009

That on or about the twelfth [sic] (12th) day of November, 2009, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly deliver to PO1 Lawrence Reyes Php100.00 (SN-S528347) worth
of marijuana fruiting tops, which is a dangerous drug[,] in one (1) plastic sachet weighing Two
Grams and Fifty Thousandths of a gram (2.050 gm.)

Criminal Case No. 628-2009

That on or about the twelfth (12th) day of November, 2009, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his effective possession and control, four (4) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing marijuana fruiting tops weighing 8.645 gms. and one (1) pc.
of ziplock containing small bricks of marijuana fruiting tops weighing 32.825 grams said accused not
having the corresponding license or prescription to possess said dangerous drugs.

Criminal Case No. 629-2009

That on or about the twelfth (12th) day of November, 2009, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully
authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, was found to be positive tor use
of THC metabolites, a dangerous drug after a confirmatory test.
During his arraignment on December 10, 2009, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 4 Trial
thereafter ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

On November 12, 2009, at around 11:45 p.m., the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Unit of Olongapo City,
in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), conducted an entrapment
operation against appellant along Balic-balic Street, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City. Prior surveillance had
confirmed numerous reports that appellant was indiscriminately selling marijuana within the
neighborhood.5

During the pre-operation briefing, P/Insp. Julius Javier designated PO1 Lawrence Reyes (PO1 Reyes)
as poseur buyer, SPO1 Allan Delos Reyes (SPO1 Delos Reyes) as case investigator and back-up,
PO2 David Domingo as spotter, and three other policemen as perimeter security. 6

At the target area, appellant approached PO1 Reyes and asked if he wanted to buy marijuana. PO1
Reyes accepted the offer and handed the P100.00 marked money to appellant who, in turn, gave
him a sachet of marijuana fruiting tops. Once the exchange was completed, PO1 Reyes grabbed
appellant's right hand which served as the pre-arranged signal that the transaction had been
consummated.7

SPO1 Delos Reyes rushed to the scene and assisted PO1 Reyes in conducting a body search on
appellant. They introduced themselves as police officers, informed appellant of his constitutional
rights and placed him under arrest. After the body search, SPO1 Delos Reyes recovered the P100.00
marked money, four sachets of marijuana and one plastic pack containing a small brick of
marijuana fruiting tops.8

The entrapment team immediately brought appellant to the police station after his relatives created
a commotion and tried to interfere in appellant's arrest.9

At the police station, PO1 Reyes marked the sachet that was the subject of the buy-bust operation
with his initials "LR" and turned it over to SPO1 Delos Reyes who also put his initials "ADR" thereon.
SPO1 Delos Reyes separately marked the other four sachets and the plastic pack that he had
confiscated from appellant during the body search with his initials "ADR." 10

SPO1 Delos Reyes then prepared the Inventory Receipt, the Letter Request for Laboratory
Examination, and the Request for Drug Test.11 Photographs of the confiscated items were also
taken. Notably, only two barangay officials were present during the conduct of a physical inventory
of the seized items there were no representatives from both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the media.12

Later, SPO1 Delos Reyes personally turned over the seized items to the Regional Crime Laboratory
in Olongapo City.13 On November 13, 2009, Forensic Chemist Arlyn Dascil (Forensic Chemist Dascil)
conducted a qualitative examination on the subject specimens to determine the presence of
dangerous drugs. Based on Chemistry Report No. D-074-2009-OCCLO, 14 the seized items tested
positive for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug.

Version of the Defense

Appellant raised the defenses of denial and frame-up and insisted that the evidence against him was
planted. He narrated that, while on his way home from a party, some armed men alighted from a
van and asked for the whereabouts of a certain "Bunso." After failing to provide an answer, he was
frisked and brought to the police station where he was incarcerated and forced to point to the drugs
on the table as pictures were taken.15

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision dated October 10, 2012, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. It held that:
x x x In this case, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of
the marked money successfully consummated the buy bust transaction. This was further
corroborated by the presentation of the marked money in evidence. Moreover, the failure of the
accused to successfully impute false motive to the policemen who arrested him strengthens the
presumption that they were in the regular discharge of duties when they entrapped the accused and
later charged him with drug pushing x x x.16
The RTC also held that "the integrity and the evidentiary value of the drug involved were
safeguarded,"17as the seized items were "immediately marked for proper identification by the
seizing officers and turned over to SPO1 Delos Reyes who, in turn, prepared the receipt of evidence
in the presence of the accused, members of the police and barangay representatives."18

Nevertheless, the RTC acquitted appellant of the charge of use of dangerous drugs under Section
15Article II of RA 9165, considering that Section 15 is inapplicable where "the person tested is also
found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug," 19 as in this case.

Accordingly, the RTC sentenced appellant to sutler the penalties of: a) life imprisonment and a fine
of P500,000.00 for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 in Criminal Case No. 627-09; and b)
imprisonment from twelve (12) yeas and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
and a fine of P300,000.00 for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 in Criminal Case No. 628-
09.20

Appellant thereafter appealed the RTC Decision before the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated January 29, 2015 the CA affirmed the assailed RTC Decision in toto. It upheld
the RTC's findings that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish all the elements of both the
illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs.21

The CA noted that appellant was positively identified by PO1 Reyes, the poseur-buyer, as the person
who sold to him a sachet of marijuana that was presented in court for P100.00 during the
entrapment operation.22 It emphasized that "[i]n cases of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the accused of the marked money
consummate the transaction."23

In addition, the CA ruled that all the elements of illegal possession of marijuana were present in the
case, considering that: first, four sachets of marijuana and one plastic pack containing a small brick
of marijuana fn1iting tops were found in appellant's possession after a lawful search on his person;
and second, appellant failed to adduce evidence showing his legal authority to possess the
contrabands recovered from him.24

Finally, the CA held that "the prosecution [had] adequately shown the unbroken possession and
subsequent transfers of the confiscated items through the following links in the chain of custody:" 25
(1) PO1 Reyes marked the plastic sachet that was subject of the buy-bust with
"LR"and turned it over to case investigator SPO1 Delos Reyes who marked it
with his own initials "ADR." On the other hand, the four other sachets and plastic
pack searched from the person of the accused were separately marked by SPO1
Delos Reyes with his initials "ADR";

(2) A request for laboratory examination of the seized items was then prepared by
SPO1 Delos Reyes;

(3) The request and the marked items were personally delivered by SPO1 Delos
Reyes to the Regional Crime Laboratory;

(4) Chemistry Report No. D-074-2009-OCCLO confirmed that the specimens

contained marijuana; and

(5) The marked items were offered in evidence as Exhibits "I", "I-I" and "I-2". 26
Aggrieved, appellant filed the present appeal.

The Issue

Appellant raises the sole issue of whether the chain of custody over the seized items had remained
unbroken despite the arresting officers: failure to strictly comply with the requirements under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, i.e., the failure to mark the seized items at the crime scene, and
the absence of the representatives from both the DOJ and the media during the conduct of the
physical inventory and taking of photographs of said items.

The Court's Ruling

"For prosecutions involving dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug itself constitutes as the corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond
reasonable doubt."27 Like the other elements of the offense/s charged the identity of the dangerous
drug must be established with moral certainty. Such proof requires "an unwavering exactitude that
the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that seized
from him."28

Thus, in prosecutions for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material "is the proof that the
transaction or sale or [sic] had actually taken place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of [the] corpus delicti."29 Similarly, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, aside from the
elements of the offense, "the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond
[reasonable] doubt."30

Note, however, that the presentation of evidence establishing the elements of the offenses of illegal
sale and possession of dangerous drugs alone is insufficient to secure or sustain a conviction under
RA 9165. In People v. Denoman,31 the Court explained:
A successful prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs requires more than the perfunctory
presentation of evidence establishing each element of the crime: the identities of the buyer and
seller, the transaction or sale of the illegal drug and the existence of the corpus delicti. In securing
or sustaining a conviction under RA No. 9165, the intrinsic worth of these pieces of evidence,
especially the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti, must definitely be shown to have been
preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug's unique characteristic that
renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution
either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and
integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented
in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant;
otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under RA No. 9165
fails.32(Emphasis supplied)
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the procedural safeguards that the apprehending team
should observe in the handling of seized illegal drugs in order to preserve their identity and integrity
as evidence. "As indicated by their mandatory terms, strict compliance with the prescribed
procedure is essential and the prosecution must show compliance in every case." 33

The procedure under Section 21, par. 1 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, 34 is as follows:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, x x x so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, x x x shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with em. elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures and custody over said items.
In this case, the records show that the buy-bust team had failed to strictly comply with the
prescribed procedure under Section 21 , par. 1. Although the seized items were marked at the
police station, there is nothing on record to show that the marking had been done in the presence of
appellant or his representatives.35 Clearly, this constitutes a major lapse that, when left
unexplained, is fatal to the prosecution's case.

To be sure, non-compliance with the prescribed procedures under Section 21, par. 1, does not, as it
should not, automatically result in an accused's acquittal. The last sentence of Section 21(1), Article
II of RA 9165, as amended, provides a saving mechanism, viz.:
Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said
items.
However, this saving mechanism operates only "under justifiable grounds, and as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team."36 Thus, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to: a) recognize and explain the lapse or
lapses committed by the apprehending team; and b) demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized had been preserved, despite the failure to follow the procedural
safeguards under RA 9165.37

Unfortunately, the prosecution failed not only to recognize and explain the procedural lapses
committed by the buy-bust team, but also to adduce evidence establishing the chain of custody of
the seized items that would demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of said items had
been preserved.

In Derilo v. People,38 the Court laid down the guidelines in order to show an unbroken chain of
custody of seized dangerous drugs, viz.:
To show an unbroken link in the chain of custody, the prosecution's evidence must include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it is
offered in court as evidence, such that every person who handled the evidence would acknowledge
how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain. The same witness would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have its possession. It is from the testimony of every witness who bandied the
evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in
court is one and the same as that seized from the accused. 39 (Emphasis in the original)
In simpler terms, the following links must be established in order to ensure that the identity and
integrity of the seized items had not been compromised: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the il1egal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second,
the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third,
the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.40

a) The first and second links

The first crucial link in the chain of custody pertains to the time the marijuana was seized from
appellant up to its delivery at the police station.

Although the records show that PO1 Reyes turned over the sachet of marijuana that was the subject
of the sale to SPO1 Delos Reyes at the police station,41 and SPO1 Delos Reyes himself was the one
who confiscated the four sachets of marijuana and one plastic pack containing a brick of marijuana
after conducting a lawful search on appellant,42 their testimonies are glaringly silent on details
regarding the handling and disposition of the seized items after appellant's arrest They both failed
to disclose the identity of the person/s who had custody and possession of the confiscated items
after their seizure, or that they themselves had retained custody of the same from the place of
arrest until they reached the police station.43

b) The third link

The prosecution's evidence relating to the third link in the chain of custody, i.e.,
the turnover of
the seized items from the investigating officer to the forensic chemist, also has
loopholes. The pertinent portion of SPO1 Delos Reyes' direct testimony is quoted
below:
[FISCAL M. F. BAÑARES]

Q: Mr. Witness, was the PNP Crime Laboratory able to examine the evidence
recovered from [appellant]?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Who turned over the sachets of marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination?

A: I myself ma'am, and the other CAIDSOT members.

Q: What evidence do you have to prove that you were the one who turned over the
marijuana with the PNP Crime Laboratory?

A: I signed the delivery receipt.

Q: Are you referring to the stamp receipt that you brought the specimen to the
crime laboratory for examination?

A: Yes, sir [sic].44

The said request for laboratory examination, as well as the specimens, were supposedly received by
a cettain "PO1 Menor."45 However, SPO1 Delos Reyes did not testify in this regard; neither did "PO1
Menor." Clearly, the prosecution failed to disclose the identily of the person who had custody of the
seized items after its turnover by SPO1 Delos Reyes; the identity of the person who turned over the
items to Forensic Chemist Dascil, and the identity of the person who had custody thereof afler they
were examined by the forensic chemist and before they were presented in court.

c) The fourth link

The fourth link in the chain of custody, i.e. the turnover of the seized items from the forensic
chemist to the court, presents an unusual twist in the prosecution's evidence in this case.
Notably, the forensic chemist did not testify in court. Instead, the prosecution and the defense
stipulated on her testimony as follows:

1. That Arlyn Dascil is a Forensic Chemist assigned at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Olongapo
City;

2. That she examined the specimen subject matter of [the] case;

3. That based on her examination, the specimen suqject of [the] case was tbund positive for
marijuana as shown by Chemistry Report No. D-074-2009, marked as Exhibit "H";
4. That upon the request of the City Prosecutor's Office, the Evidence Custodian of
[the] PNP Crime Laboratory turned over the specimen subject matter of [the]
case to the Prosecutor's Office.46 (Emphasis supplied)

It appears, based on the prosecution's evidence no less, that for reasons unknown, the PNP Crime
Laboratory agreed to turn over custody of the seized items to an unnamed receiving person at the
City Prosecutor's Office before they were submitted as evidence to the trial court. It should be
emphasized that the City Prosecutor's Office is not, nor has it ever been, a part of the chain of
custody of seized dangerous drugs. It has absolutely no business in taking custody of dangerous
drugs before they are brought before the court.

Given the flagrant procedural lapses committed by the police in handling the seized marijuana and
the serious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, the lower courts clearly misapplied the
presumption of regularity in the perfonnance of official duties in the prosecution's favor. After all, it
is settled that a presumption of regularity cannot arise where the questioned official acts
are patentlyirregular,47 as in this case.

All told, the totality of these circumstances leads the Court to inevitably conclude that the identity of
the corpus delicti was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The failure of the prosecution to
establish an unbroken chain of custody over the seized marijuana is fatal to its cause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the January 29, 2015
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 05930. Appellant Glenn De Guzman y Delos
Reyes is hereby ACQUITIED of the charges of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His
immediate RELEASEfrom detention is hereby ordered unless he is being held for another lawful
cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City
for immediate implementation, who is then also directed to report to this Courtag, the action he has
taken within five days from his receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
10.  G.R. No. 163217 April 18, 2006

CELESTINO MARTURILLAS, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

Well-rooted is the principle that factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by
the appellate court, are generally binding on the Supreme Court. In convicting the accused in
the present case, the Court not merely relied on this doctrine, but also meticulously reviewed
the evidence on record. It has come to the inevitable conclusion that petitioner is indeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside
the November 28, 2003 Decision2 and the March 10, 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 25401. The CA affirmed, with modifications as to the award
of damages, the Decision4 of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. The
RTC had found Celestino Marturillas guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 42091-98. The
assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, subject to the modification thus indicated, the judgment appealed from must
be, as it hereby is, AFFIRMED. With the costs of this instance to be assessed against the
accused-appellant."5

The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. 6

Petitioner was charged with homicide in an Information 7 dated November 5, 1998, worded as
follows:

"[T]hat on or about November 4 1998, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a gun, and
with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot one Artemio Pantinople, thereby
inflicting fatal wound upon the latter which caused his death." 8

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the People’s version of the facts:

"4. The prosecution presented Lito Santos, Ernita Pantinople, PO2 Mariano Operario, Alicia
Pantinople and Dr. Danilo Ledesma as its witnesses from whose testimonies, the following
facts were established.

"Lito Santos, a forty-three-year old farmer and resident of Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan
District, Davao City, testified that about 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 4, 1998,
he saw his neighbor and ‘kumpare’ Artemio Pantinople arrive on board a jeepney from
Bunawan, Davao City. Artemio was carrying a truck battery, some corn bran and rice. They
talked for a while concerning their livelihood afterwhich, Artemio proceeded to connect the
battery to the fluorescent lamps in his store. Artemio’s store was located about five (5)
meters away from Lito’s house.

"After installing the battery to the fluorescent lamps, Artemio sat for a while on a bench
located in front of his store. Then, Cecilia Santos, Lito’s wife, called him and Artemio for
supper. Artemio obliged. Lito, opting to eat later, served Artemio and Cecilia the food. After
eating, Artemio returned to the bench and sat on it again together with his tree (3) children,
namely: Janice, Saysay and Pitpit.

"Lito was eating supper in their kitchen when he heard a gunshot. From a distance of about
ten (10) meters, he also noticed smoke and fire coming from the muzzle of a big gun.
Moments later, he saw Artemio clasping his chest and staggering backwards to the direction
of his (Lito’s) kitchen. Artemio shouted to him, ‘Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan,’
meaning ‘Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain.’ However, Lito did not approach Artemio
right after the shooting incident because Cecilia warned him that he might also be shot.

"Lito did not see the person who shot Artemio because his attention was then focused on
Artemio.

"Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from her house towards the
direction where Artemio was sprawled on the ground. Ernita was hysterical, jumping and
shouting, ‘Kapitan, bakit mo binaril and aking asawa.’ She also repeatedly cried for help.

"Lito then went out of their house and approached Artemio who was lying dead near a
banana trunk more than five (5) meters from his house. Some of their neighbors, namely:
Antenero, Loloy Libre and Lapis answered Ernita’s call for help and approached them.

"When the shooting incident happened about 7:30 in the evening of November 4, 1998,
Lito’s house was illumined by a lamp. Their kitchen has no walls. It is an open-type kitchen
giving him an unobstructed view of Artemio who was about five (5) meters away from where
he was positioned at that time. Although there was a gemilina tree growing in the space in
between his house and the store of Artemio, the same did not block his view of Artemio.
Likewise, the coconut trees and young banana plants growing at the scene of the crime did
not affect his view.

"At the same instance, Ernita was also in their kitchen preparing milk for her baby. Her baby
was then lying on the floor of their kitchen. When she was about to put the bottle into the
baby’s mouth, she suddenly heard the sound of a gunburst followed by a shout, ‘Help me
Pre, I was shot by the captain.’ She immediately pushed open the window of their kitchen
and saw appellant wearing a black jacket and camouflage pants running towards the
direction of the back portion of Lito’s house. From there, appellant crossed the street and
disappeared.

"Ernita saw appellant carrying with him a long firearm which looked like an M-14 rifle. Ernita
also sensed that appellant had some companions with him because she heard the crackling
sound of the dried leaves around the place. Ernita had a clear view of appellant at that time
because their place was well-illumined by the full moon that night and by the two (2)
fluorescent lamps in their store which were switched on at the time of the incident.

"Ernita immediately went out of their house and ran towards Artemio. Artemio tried to speak
to her but he could not do so because his mouth was full of blood. Upon seeing the pitiful
sight of her husband, Ernita shouted several times, ‘Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay and akong
bana.’ She also repeatedly called her neighbors for help but only Lito Santos, Eufemio
Antenero, Norman Libre and some residents of Poblacion Gatungan responded to her calls
and approached them. She noted that no member of the CFO and CAFGU came to help
them. Also, no barangay tanod came to offer them to help.

"While waiting for the police, Ernita did not allow Artemio’s body to be touched by anybody.
After more than two (2) hours, the police arrived, together with a photographer by the name
of Fe Mendez of Bunawan District, Davao City who took pictures of the crime scene.

"PO2 Mariano Operario, Investigation Officer of the Investigation Section of the Bunawan
Police Station, Philippine National Police, Davao City, testified that about 9:05 in the evening
of November 4, 1998, he received a report of an alleged shooting incident at Barangay
Gatungan, Bunawan District in Davao City. Together with SPO1 Rodel C. Estrellan and a
member of the mobile police patrol on board their mobile car, PO2 Operario proceeded
immediately to the crime scene. They reached the crime scene about 10:00 o’clock in the
evening of the same date. They found the lifeless body of Artemio sprawled on the ground.
Ernita and Lito then approached PO2 Operario and informed him that appellant was the one
responsible for the shooting.

"PO2 Operario stayed at the crime scene for about one (1) hour and waited for the funeral
vehicle to pick up the body of Artemio. When the funeral hearse arrived, PO2 Operario told
the crew to load Artemio’s body into the vehicle. Thereafter, he then boarded again their
mobile car together with Lito Santos.

"Armed with the information that appellant was the one responsible for the shooting of
Artemio, PO2 Operario proceeded to the house of appellant and informed him that he was a
suspect in the killing of Artemio. He then invited appellant to go with him to the police station
and also to bring along with him his M-14 rifle. Appellant did not say anything. He just got his
M-14 rifle and went with the police to the police station where he was detained the whole
night of November 4, 1998. Appellant did not also give any statement to anybody about the
incident. The following day, appellant was transferred by the police to Tibungco Police
Station where he was detained.

"Alicia Pantinople, the 44-year old sister of Artemio, testified that on the night of November 4,
1998, she was at home watching television. She heard a gunshot but did not mind it because
she was already used to hearing the sound of guns fired indiscriminately in their place.

"After a few minutes, Junjun, a child and resident of Sitio Centro, Barangay Gatungan,
Bunawan District, Davao City came knocking at their door. Junjun informed them that: ‘Yoyo,
Uncle Titing was shot,’ referring to Artemio.

"Upon hearing the report, Alicia looked for some money thinking that it might be needed for
Artemio’s hospitalization because she expected Artemio to be still alive. Artemio’s two (2)
children, namely: Jonel and Genesis who were staying with her hurriedly left. She then ran to
the place where her brother was shot and found Artemio’s dead body on the ground
surrounded by his four (4) children.

"At the Bunawan Police Station, Alicia was informed by the police that appellant was at
Tibungco Police Station. She sent her male cousin to proceed to Tibungco Police Station to
find out if appellant was indeed in the said place. However, her cousin immediately returned
and informed her that appellant was not in Tibungco Police Station. She then went around
the Bunawan Police Station and noticed a locked door. When she peeped through the hole
of the said door, she saw appellant reclining on a bench about two and a half (2 ½) meters
away from the door. Appellant’s left leg was on top of the bench while his right leg was on the
ground. Appellant was wearing a brown shirt, black jacket and a pair of camouflage pants.
He was also wearing brown shoes but he had no socks on his feet.

"At the police station, Alicia confronted appellant: ‘Nong Listing I know that you can
recognize my voice. It is me. Why did you kill my brother? What has he done wrong to you?’

"Appellant did not answer her. Nevertheless, she was sure that appellant was awake
because he was tapping the floor with his right foot.

"Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal officer of the Davao City Health Department, conducted
an autopsy on Artemio’s cadaver about 9:30 in the morning of November 5, 1998 at the
Rivera Funeral Homes located at Licanan, Lasang. His findings are summarized in his
Necropsy Report No. 76:

‘POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

‘Pallor, marked generalized.

‘Body in rigor mortis.

 ‘Wound, gunshot, ENTRANCE, 0.9 x 0.8 cm. Ovaloid located at the anterior
chestwall, rightside, 1.0 cm; from the anterior median line, at the level of the third
(3rd) intercoastal space and 131.0 cms. above the right heel, directed backwards,
upwards, medially crossing the midline from the right to left, involving the soft tissues,
perforating the body of the sternum, into the pericardial cavity, perforating the heart
into the left thoracic cavity, perforating the heart into the left thoracic cavity,
perforating the upper lobe of the left lung, forming an irregular EXIT, 1.5 x 1.1 cms. at
the posterior chest wall left side, 13.0 cms. from the posterior median line and 139.0
cms. above the left heel.

‘Hemopericadium, 300 ml.

‘Hemothorax, left, 1,000 ml.

‘Stomach, filled with partially digested food particles.

‘Other visceral organs, pale.

‘CAUSE OF DEATH: Gunshot wound of the chest.

Signed by: DANILO P. LEDESMA

Medico-Legal Officer IV’

"During the trial, Dr. Ledesma explained that Artemio died of a gunshot wound, 0.9 x 0.8
centimeters in size located about one (1) inch away from the centerline of Artemio’s Adam’s
apple down to his navel and about 1:00 o’clock from his right nipple.

"The trajectory of the bullet passing through Artemio’s body indicates that his assailant was
in a lower position than Artemio when the gun was fired. Dr. Ledesma also found the wound
of Artemio negative of powder burns indicating that the assailant was at a distance of more
than twenty-four (24) inches when he fired his gun at Artemio. He did not also find any bullet
slug inside the body of Artemio indicating that the bullet went through Artemio’s body.
Artemio’s heart and lungs were lacerated and his stomach contained partially digested food
particles indicating that he had just eaten his meal when he was shot.

"In the certificate of death of Artemio, Dr. Ledesma indicated that the cause of his death was
a gunshot wound on the chest.

"5. After the defense presented its evidence, the case was submitted for decision." 9

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, petitioner presented the following statement of facts:

"9. This is a criminal case for Homicide originally lodged before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 10 of Davao City against herein Petitioner Celestino Marturillas, former Barangay
Captain of Gatungan, Bunawan District[,] Davao City and docketed as Criminal Case No.
42,091-98. The criminal charge against Petitioner was the result of a shooting incident in
Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City which resulted in the slaying of Artemio
Pantinople while the latter was on his way home in the evening of November 4, 1998.

"10. On that same evening at around 8:30 p.m. herein Petitioner former Barangay Captain
Celestino Marturillas was roused from his sleep at his house in Barangay Gatungan,
Bunawan District, Davao City by his wife since Kagawads Jimmy Balugo and Norman Libre
(Barangay Kagawads of Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City) wanted to see him. Dazed
after just having risen from bed, Petitioner was rubbing his eyes when he met the two
Kagawads inside his house. He was informed that a resident of his barangay, Artemio
Pantinople, had just been shot. Petitioner at once ordered his Kagawads to assemble the
members of the SCAA (Special Civilian Armed [Auxiliary]) so that they could be escorted to
the crime scene some 250 meters away. As soon as the SCAA’s were contacted, they
(Petitioner, Kagawads Libre and Balugo including Wiliam Gabas, Eddie Loyahan and Junior
Marturillas - the last three being SCAA members) then proceeded to the crime scene to
determine what assistance they could render.
"11. While approaching the store owned by the Pantinople’s and not very far from where the
deceased lay sprawled, Petitioner was met by Ernita Pantinople (wife of the deceased-
Artemio Pantinople) who was very mad and belligerent. She immediately accused Petitioner
of having shot her husband instead of Lito Santos who was his enemy. Petitioner was taken
aback by the instant accusation against him. He explained that he just came from his house
where he was roused by his Kagawads from his sleep. Not being able to talk sense with
Ernita Pantinople, Petitioner and his companions backed off to avoid a heated confrontation.
Petitioner instead decided to go back to his house along with his companions.

"12. Upon reaching his house, Petitioner instructed Kagawad Jimmy Balugo to contact the
Bunawan Police Station and inform them what transpired. Not knowing the radio frequency
of the local police, Kagawad Balugo instead radioed officials of nearby Barangay San Isidro
requesting them to contact the Bunawan PNP for police assistance since someone was shot
in their locality.

"13. Moments later, PO2 Mariano Operario and another police officer arrived at the house of
Petitioner and when confronted by the latter, he was informed by PO2 Operario that he was
the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio Pantinople. Upon their invitation, Petitioner
immediately went with the said police officers for questioning at the Bunawan Police Station.
He also took with him his government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14
ammunition which Petitioner turned over for safe keeping with the Bunawan PNP. The police
blotter showed that Petitioner surrendered his M-14 rifle with live ammunition to SPO1
Estrellan and PO3 Sendrijas of the Bunawan PNP at around 10:45 p.m. of November 4,
1998.

"14. When the shooting incident was first recorded in the Daily Record of Events of the
Bunawan PNP it was indicated therein that deceased may have been shot by unidentified
armed men viz:

‘Entry No. Date Time Incident/Events

2289 110498 2105H SHOOTING INCIDENT-

‘One Dominador Lopez 43 years old, married, farmer and a resident of Puro[k] 5, Barangay
Gatungan, Davao City appeared at this Precinct and reported that shortly before this writing,
one ARTEMIO PANTINOPLE, former barangay kagawad of Barangay Gatungan was
allegedly shot to death by an unidentified armed men at the aforementioned Barangay. x x x.’

"15. The extract from the police blotter prepared by SPO2 Dario B. Undo dated November 9,
1998 already had a little modification indicating therein that deceased was shot by an
unidentified armed man and the following entry was made.

‘2105H: Shooting Incident: One Dominador Lopez, 43 years old, married, farmer and a
resident of Purok 5, Barangay Gatungan Bunawan District, Davao City appeared at this
Police Precinct and reported that prior to these writing, one Artemio Pantinople, former
Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Gatungan was allegedly shot to death by unidentified
armed man at the aforementioned barangay. x x x.’

"16. On November 5, 1998 at around 7:15 a.m. PO2 Mariano Operario indorsed with the
Bunawan PNP an empty shell fired from a carbine rifle which was recovered by the said
police officer from the crime scene in the night of the incident. Owing to his pre-occupation in
organizing and preparing the affidavits of the Complainant and her witnesses the previous
evening, he was only able to indorse the same the following morning. At the same time,
P/Chief Insp. Julito M. Diray, Station Commander of the Bunawan PNP made a written
request addressed to the District Commander of the PNP Crime Laboratory requesting that a
paraffin test be conducted on Petitioner and that a ballistics examination be made on the M-
14 rifle which he surrendered to Bunawan PNP.

"17. At around 9:30 a.m. of November 5, 1998, Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma, M.D., Medico-Legal
Officer for Davao City conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of deceased and made the
following Post-Mortem Findings contained in Necropsy Report No. 76 dated November 6,
1998, viz:
‘Pallor, marked, generalized

‘Body in rigor mortis

‘Wound, gunshot, ENTRANCE, 0.9-0.8 cm. ovaloid located at the anterior chest wall, right
side, .0 cm. from the anterior median line, at the level of the third (3rd) intercostal space and
131.0 cms. above the right neck, directed backwards, upwards, medially, crossing the
midline from the right to left, involving the soft tissues, perforating the body of the sternum
into the pericardial cavity, perforating the heart into the left thoracic cavity, perforating the
upper lobe of the left lung forming an irregular EXIT, 1.5x1.1 cms. at the posterior chest wall,
left side, 13.0 cms. from the posterior median line and 139.0 cms. above the left neck.

‘Hemopericadium, 300 ml.

‘Hemothorax, left 1,000 ml.

‘Stomach filled with partially digested food particles.

‘Other visceral organs, pale

‘CAUSE OF DEATH: Gunshot wound of the chest.’

"18. After the fatal shooting of deceased, Celestino Marturillas was subjected to paraffin
testing by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Davao City at 10:30 a.m. November 5, 1998. The
next day, November 6, 1998, the PNP Crime Laboratory released Physical Sciences Report
No. C-074-98 regarding the paraffin test results which found Petitioner NEGATIVE for
gunpowder nitrates based on the following findings of the PNP Crime Laboratory:

‘FINDINGS:

‘Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave NEGATIVE

result to the test for the presence of gunpowder nitrates. x x x

‘CONCLUSION:

‘Both hands of Celestino Marturillas do not contain gunpowder nitrates[.]’

"19. After preparing all the affidavits of Ernita Pantinople and her witnesses PO2 Mariano R.
Operario Jr., the police officer as[s]igned to investigate the shooting of the deceased,
prepared and transmitted, on November 5, 1998, a Complaint to the City Prosecution Office
recommending that Petitioner be indicted for Murder, attaching therewith the Sworn Affidavits
of Ernita O. Pantinople (Complainant), Lito D. Santos (witness) and the Sworn Joint Affidavit
of SPO1 Rodel Estrellan and PO2 Mariano R. Operario Jr. of the PNP.

"20. The following is the Affidavit-Complaint of Ernita Pantinople as well as the supporting
affidavits of her witnesses all of which are quoted in full hereunder:

‘Ernita Pantinople’s Affidavit-Complaint dated November 5, 1998:

‘That last November 4, 1998 at about 7:30 in the evening, I was attending and caring my
baby boy at that time to let him sleep and that moment I heard first one gun shot burst after
then somebody shouting seeking for help in Visayan words ‘tabangi ko Pre gipusil ko ni
Kapitan’ I estimated a distance to more or less ten (10) meters away from my house;

‘That I immediately peep at the windows, wherein I very saw a person of Brgy. Capt.
Celestino Marturillas of Brgy. Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City, wearing black jacket
and camouflage pants carrying his M-14 rifle running to the direction to the left side portion of
the house of Lito Santos who was my neighbor respectively;

‘That I hurriedly go down from my house and proceeded to the victims body, wherein when I
came nearer I got surprised for the victim was my beloved husband;
‘That I was always shouting in visayan words ‘kapitan nganong imo mang gipatay and akong
bana’;

‘That I let my husband body still at that placed until the police officers will arrived and
investigate the incident;

‘That I know personally Brgy. Capt. Celestino Marturillas for he is my nearby neighbor at that
placed;

‘That I am executing this affidavit to apprise the authorities concern of the truthfulness of the
foregoing and my desire to file necessary charges against Celestino Marturillas.’

‘Witness-Affidavit of Lito Santos dated November 5, 1998 reads:

‘I, LITO D. SANTOS, 43 yrs. old, married, farmer, a resident of Purok 5, Brgy. Gatungan,
Bunawan District, Davao City after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law do
hereby depose and say:

‘That last November 4, 1998 at about 7:30 in the evening I was taking my dinner at the
kitchen of my house and after finished eating I stood up then got a glass of water and at that
time I heard one gun shot burst estimated to more or less ten (10) meters from my
possession then followed somebody shouting seeking for help in Visayan words ‘tabangi ko
pre gipusil ko ni Kapitan’;

‘That I really saw the victim moving backward to more or less five (5) meters away from
where he was shot then and there the victim slumped at the grassy area;

‘That I immediately go out from my house and proceeded to the victims body, wherein, when
I came nearer I found and identified the victim one Artemio Pantinople who was my nearby
neighbor sprawled on his own blood at the grassy area;

‘That no other person named by the victim other than Brgy. Capt. Celestino Marturillas of
Brgy. Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City;

‘That I am executing this affidavit to apprised the authorities concern of the true facts and
circumstances that surrounds the incident.’

"21. Based on the Affidavits executed by Ernita Pantinople and Lito Santos, then 2nd Asst.
City Prosecutor Raul B. Bendigo issued a Resolution on November 5, 1998 finding sufficient
evidence to indict Appellant for the crime of Homicide and not Murder as alleged in Private
Complainant’s Affidavit Complaint. The Information states:

‘Above-mentioned Accused, armed with a gun, and with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shot one Artemio Pantinople, thereby inflicting fatal wound upon the latter which
caused his death.

‘CONTRARY TO LAW.’

xxxxxxxxx

"23. The theory of the Defense was anchored on the testimony of the following individuals:

‘23.1 Jimmy Balugo, was one of the Barangay Kagawads who went to the house of
Petitioner after receiving a radio message from Brgy. Kagawad Glenda Lascuña that a
shooting incident took place in their barangay. He also testified that together with Kagawad
Norberto Libre, he proceeded to the house of Petitioner to inform him of the shooting incident
involving a certain Artemio ‘Titing’ Pantinople. After informing Petitioner about what
happened, the latter instructed him and Norberto Libre to gather the SCAA’s and to
accompany them to the crime scene. He also narrated to the court that Petitioner and their
group were not able to render any assistance at the crime scene since the widow and the
relatives of deceased were already belligerent. As a result of which, the group of Petitioner
including himself, went back to the former’s house where he asked Petitioner if it would be
alright to contact the police and request for assistance. He claimed that he was able to
contact the Bunawan PNP with the help of the Barangay Police of Barangay San Isidro.

‘23.2) Norberto Libre testified that in the evening of November 4, 1998, he heard a gunburst
which resembled a firecracker and after a few minutes Barangay Kagawad Jimmy Balugo
went to his house and informed him that their neighbor Titing Pantinople was shot. Kagawad
Balugo requested him to accompany the former to go to the house of then Barangay Captain
Celestino Marturillas; that he and Kagawad Balugo proceeded to the house of Petitioner and
shouted to awaken the latter; that Barangay Captain Marturillas went out rubbing his eyes
awakened from his sleep and was informed of the killing of Artemio Pantinople; that
Petitioner immediately instructed them to fetch the SCAA and thereafter their group went to
the crime scene.

‘23.3) Ronito Bedero testified that he was in his house on the night Artemio Pantinop[l]e was
shot. The material point raised by this witness in his testimony was the fact that he saw an
unidentified armed man flee from the crime scene who later joined two other armed men
near a nangka tree not far from where deceased was shot. All three later fled on foot towards
the direction of the Purok Center in Barangay Gatungan. This witness noticed that one of the
three men was armed with a rifle but could not make out their identities since the area where
the three men converged was a very dark place. After the three men disappeared, he saw
from the opposite direction Petitioner, Barangay Kagawad Jimmy Balugo and three (3) SCAA
members going to the scene of the crime but they did not reach the crime scene. A little later,
he saw the group of Petitioner return to where they came from.

‘23.4) Police C/Insp. Noemi Austero, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
testified that she conducted a paraffin test on both hands of Petitioner on November 5, 1999
at around 10:30 a.m. She also testified that Petitioner tested NEGATIVE for gunpowder
nitrates indicating that he never fired a weapon at any time between 7:30 p.m. of November
4, 1999 until the next day, November 5, 1999. She also testified that as a matter of
procedure at the PNP Crime Laboratory, they do not conduct paraffin testing on a crime
suspect seventy two (72) hours after an alleged shooting incident. She also testified that
based on her experience she is not aware of any chemical that could extract gunpowder
nitrates from the hands of a person who had just fired his weapon.

‘23.5) Dominador Lapiz testified that he lived on the land of the victim, Artemio Pantinople for
ten (10) years. He was one of the first persons who went to the crime scene where he
personally saw the body of deceased lying at a very dark portion some distance from the
victim’s house and that those with him at that time even had to light the place with a lamp so
that they could clearly see the deceased. He also testified that there were many coconut and
other trees and bananas in the crime scene. He also testified that the house of Lito Santos
was only about four (4) meters from the crime scene, while the house of victim-Artemio
Pantinople was about FIFTY (50) meters away. He testified that there was no lighted
fluorescent at the store of deceased at the time of the shooting. He was also the one who
informed Kagawad Glenda Lascuna about the shooting of Artemio Pantinople. His testimony
also revealed that when the responding policemen arrived, Lito Santos immediately
approached the policemen, volunteered himself as a witness and even declared that he
would testify that it was Petitioner who shot Artemio Pantinople.

‘On cross-examination, this witness declared that the crime scene was very dark and one
cannot see the body of the victim without light. On cross-examination, this witness also
testified that Lito Santos approached the service vehicle of the responding policemen and
volunteered to be a witness that Petitioner was the assailant of the victim, Artemio
Pantinople. This witness further testified that immediately after he went to the crime scene,
the widow of the victim and the children were merely shouting and crying and it was only
after the policemen arrived that the widow uttered in a loud voice, ‘Kapitan nganong gipatay
mo and akong bana?’

‘23.6) Celestino Marturillas, former Barangay Captain of Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan

District, Davao City testified that he learned of Pantinople’s killing two hours later through
information personally relayed to him by Kagawads Jimmy Balugo and Norberto Libre. He
intimated to the Court that he did try to extend some assistance to the family of the deceased
but was prevented from so doing since the wife of deceased herself and her relatives were
already hostile with him when he was about to approach the crime scene. He also testified
that he voluntarily went with the police officers who arrested him at his residence on the
same evening after the victim was shot. He also turned over to police custody the M-14 rifle
issued to him and voluntarily submitted himself to paraffin testing a few hours after he was
taken in for questioning by the Bunawan PNP. Petitioner, during the trial consistently
maintained that he is innocent of the charge against him.’" 10

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC that the guilt of petitioner had been established
beyond reasonable doubt. According to the appellate court, he was positively identified as
the one running away from the crime scene immediately after the gunshot. This fact, together
with the declaration of the victim himself that he had been shot by the captain, clearly
established the latter’s complicity in the crime.

No ill motive could be ascribed by the CA to the prosecution witnesses. Thus, their positive,
credible and unequivocal testimonies were accepted as sufficient to establish the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.

On the other hand, the CA also rejected his defenses of denial and alibi. It held that they
were necessarily suspect, especially when established by friends or relatives, and should
thus be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. At any rate, his alibi and denial cannot prevail over
the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses found to be more credible.

The appellate court upheld petitioner’s conviction, as well as the award of damages. In
addition, it awarded actual damages representing unearned income.

Hence, this Petition.11

The Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the Court’s consideration:

"I

The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave credence to the claim of the
solicitor general that the prosecution’s witnesses positively identified petitioner as the alleged
triggerman

"II

The Court of Appeals was in serious error when it affirmed the trial court’s blunder in literally
passing the blame on petitioner for the lapses in the investigation conducted by the police
thereby shifting on him the burden of proving his innocence

"III

The Court of Appeals committed a serious and palpable error when it failed to consider that
the deceased was cut off by death before he could convey a complete or sensible
communication to whoever heard such declaration assuming there was any

"IV

Petit[i]oner’s alibi assumed significance considering that evidence and testimonies of the
prosecution’s witnesses arrayed against petitioner failed to prove that he was responsible for
the commission of the crime."12

In sum, petitioner raises two main issues: 1) whether the prosecution’s evidence is credible;
and 2) whether it is sufficient to convict him of homicide. Under the first main issue, he
questions the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses; the alleged
inconsistencies between their Affidavits and court testimonies; and the plausibility of the
allegation that the victim had uttered, "Tabangi ko p’re, gipusil ko ni kapitan" ("Help me p’re, I
was shot by the captain"), which was considered by the two lower courts either as his dying
declaration or as part of res gestae.
Under the second main issue, petitioner contends that the burden of proof was erroneously
shifted to him; that there should have been no finding of guilt because of the negative results
of the paraffin test; and that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the type of gun
used in the commission of the crime.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is unmeritorious.

First Main Issue:

Credibility of the Prosecution Evidence

According to petitioner, the charge of homicide should be dismissed, because the inherent
weakness of the prosecution’s case against him was revealed by the evidence presented.
He submits that any doubt as to who really perpetrated the crime should be resolved in his
favor.

We do not agree. This Court has judiciously reviewed the findings and records of this case
and finds no reversible error in the CA’s ruling affirming petitioner’s conviction for homicide.

Basic is the rule that this Court accords great weight and a high degree of respect to factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, as in the present case. 13 Here,
the RTC was unequivocally upheld by the CA, which was clothed with the power to review
whether the trial court’s conclusions were in accord with the facts and the relevant
laws.14 Indeed, the findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal, unless it has
overlooked or misinterpreted some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance.15 Although there are recognized exceptions 16 to the conclusiveness of the findings
of fact of the trial and the appellate courts, petitioner has not convinced this Court of the
existence of any.

Having laid that basic premise, the Court disposes seriatim the arguments proffered by
petitioner under the first main issue.

Positive Identification

Petitioner contends that it was inconceivable for Prosecution Witness Ernita Pantinople -- the
victim’s wife -- to have identified him as the assassin. According to him, her house was "a
good fifty (50) meters away from the crime scene,"17 which was "enveloped in pitch
darkness."18 Because of the alleged improbability, he insists that her testimony materially
contradicted her Affidavit. The Affidavit supposedly proved that she had not recognized her
husband from where she was standing during the shooting. If she had failed to identify the
victim, petitioner asks, "how was it possible for her to conclude that it was [p]etitioner whom
she claims she saw fleeing from the scene?" 19

All these doubts raised by petitioner are sufficiently addressed by the clear, direct and
convincing testimony of the witness. She positively identified him as the one "running away"
immediately after the sound of a gunshot. Certain that she had seen him, she even
described what he was wearing, the firearm he was carrying, and the direction towards which
he was running. She also clarified that she had heard the statement, "Help me p’re, I was
shot by the captain," uttered after the shooting incident. Accepting her testimony, the CA
ruled thus:

"Ernita’s testimony that she saw [petitioner] at the crime scene is credible because the spot
where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from her house. Undoubtedly, Ernita is
familiar with [petitioner], who is her neighbor, and a long-time barangay captain of Barangay
Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City when the incident took place. Ernita was also able
to see his face while he was running away from the crime scene. The identification of a
person can be established through familiarity with one’s physical features. Once a person
has gained familiarity with one another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from
a considerable distance. Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural
communities generally know each other both by face and name, and can be expected to
know each other’s distinct and particular features and characteristics." 20
This holding confirms the findings of fact of the RTC. Settled is the rule that on questions of
the credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are
given the highest degree of respect.21 It was the trial court that had the opportunity to observe
the manner in which the witnesses had testified; as well as their furtive glances, calmness,
sighs, and scant or full realization of their oaths. 22 It had the better opportunity to observe
them firsthand; and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling
examination.23

Petitioner doubts whether Ernita could have accurately identified him at the scene of the
crime, considering that it was dark at that time; that there were trees obstructing her view;
and that her house was fifty (50) meters away from where the crime was committed.

These assertions are easily belied by the findings of the courts below, as borne by the
records. Ernita testified on the crime scene conditions that had enabled her to make a
positive identification of petitioner. Her testimony was even corroborated by other
prosecution witnesses, who bolstered the truth and veracity of those declarations.
Consequently, the CA ruled as follows:

"x x x Ernita’s recognition of the assailant was made possible by the lighted two fluorescent
lamps in their store and by the full moon. x x x. In corroboration, Lito testified that the place
where the shooting occurred was bright.

"The trees and plants growing in between Ernita’s house and the place where Artemio was
shot to death did not impede her view of the assailant. To be sure, the prosecution presented
photographs of the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinities. These photographs gave
a clear picture of the place where Artemio was shot. Admittedly, there are some trees and
plants growing in between the place where the house of Ernita was located and the spot
where Artemio was shot. Notably, however, there is only one gemilina tree, some coconut
trees and young banana plants growing in the place where Artemio was shot. The trees and
banana plants have slender trunks which could not have posed an obstacle to Ernita’s view
of the crime scene from the kitchen window of her house especially so that she was in an
elevated position."24

This Court has consistently held that -- given the proper conditions -- the illumination
produced by a kerosene lamp, a flashlight, a wick lamp, moonlight, or starlight is considered
sufficient to allow the identification of persons.25 In this case, the full moon and the light
coming from two fluorescent lamps of a nearby store were sufficient to illumine the place
where petitioner was; and to enable the eyewitness to identify him as the person who was
present at the crime scene. Settled is the rule that when conditions of visibility are favorable
and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the
malefactor should normally be accepted. 26

But even where the circumstances were less favorable, the familiarity of Ernita with the face
of petitioner considerably reduced any error in her identification of him. 27 Since the
circumstances in this case were reasonably sufficient for the identification of persons, this
fact of her familiarity with him erases any doubt that she could have erred in identifying him.
Those related to the victim of a crime have a natural tendency to remember the faces of
those involved in it. These relatives, more than anybody else, would be concerned with
seeking justice for the victim and bringing the malefactor before the law. 28

Neither was there any indication that Ernita was impelled by ill motives in positively
identifying petitioner. The CA was correct in observing that it would be "unnatural for a
relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody else other than the
real culprit. For her to do so is to let the guilty go free." 29 Where there is nothing to indicate
that witnesses were actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, their positive
declarations made under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence. 30

Inconsistency Between Affidavit and Testimony

Petitioner contends that the testimony of Ernita materially contradicted her Affidavit.
According to him, she said in her testimony that she had immediately recognized her
husband as the victim of the shooting; but in her Affidavit she stated that it was only when
she had approached the body that she came to know that he was the victim.
We find no inconsistency. Although Ernita stated in her testimony that she had recognized
the victim as her husband through his voice, it cannot necessarily be inferred that she did not
see him. Although she recognized him as the victim, she was still hoping that it was not really
he. Thus, the statement in her Affidavit that she was surprised to see that her husband was
the victim of the shooting.

To be sure, ex parte affidavits are usually incomplete, as these are frequently prepared by
administering officers and cast in their language and understanding of what affiants have
said.31 Almost always, the latter would simply sign the documents after being read to them.
Basic is the rule that, taken ex parte, affidavits are considered incomplete and often
inaccurate. They are products sometimes of partial suggestions and at other times of want of
suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which witnesses may be unable to recall the
connected circumstances necessary for accurate recollection. 32

Nevertheless, the alleged inconsistency is inconsequential to the ascertainment of the

presence of petitioner at the crime scene. Ruled the CA:

"x x x. They referred only to that point wherein Ernita x x x ascertained the identity of Artemio
as the victim. They did not relate to Ernita’s identification of [petitioner] as the person running
away from the crime scene immediately after she heard a gunshot." 33

Statements Uttered Contemporaneous with the Crime

Ernita positively testified that immediately after the shooting, she had heard her husband say,
"Help me p’re, I was shot by the captain." This statement was corroborated by another
witness, Lito Santos, who testified on the events immediately preceding and subsequent to
the shooting.

It should be clear that Santos never testified that petitioner was the one who had actually
shot the victim. Still, the testimony of this witness is valuable, because it validates the
statements made by Ernita. He confirms that after hearing the gunshot, he saw the victim
and heard the latter cry out those same words.

Petitioner insinuates that it was incredible for Santos to have seen the victim, but not the
assailant. The CA dismissed this argument thus:

"x x x. The natural reaction of a person who hears a loud or startling command is to turn
towards the speaker. Moreover, witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicits
different reactions from witnesses, for which no clear-cut standard of behavior can be
prescribed. Lito’s reaction is not unnatural. He was more concerned about Artemio’s
condition than the need to ascertain the identity of Artemio’s assailant." 34

It was to be expected that, after seeing the victim stagger and hearing the cry for help,
Santos would shift his attention to the person who had uttered the plea quoted earlier. A shift
in his focus of attention would sufficiently explain why Santos was not able to see the
assailant. Petitioner then accuses this witness of harboring "a deep-seated grudge," 35 which
would explain why the latter allegedly fabricated a serious accusation.

This contention obviously has no basis. No serious accusation against petitioner was ever
made by Santos. What the latter did was merely to recount what he heard the victim utter
immediately after the shooting. Santos never pointed to petitioner as the perpetrator of the
crime. The statements of the former corroborated those of Ernita and therefore simply added
credence to the prosecution’s version of the facts. If it were true that he had an ulterior
motive, it would have been very easy for him to say that he had seen petitioner shoot the
victim.

The two witnesses unequivocally declared and corroborated each other on the fact that the
plea, "Help me p’re, I was shot by the captain," had been uttered by the victim. Nevertheless,
petitioner contends that it was highly probable that the deceased died instantly and was
consequently unable to shout for help. We do not discount this possibility, which petitioner
himself admits to be a probability. In the face of the positive declaration of two witnesses that
the words were actually uttered, we need not concern ourselves with speculations,
probabilities or possibilities. Said the CA:
"x x x. Thus, as between the positive and categorical declarations of the prosecution
witnesses and the mere opinion of the medical doctor, the former must necessarily prevail.

"Moreover, it must be stressed that the post-mortem examination of the cadaver of Artemio
was conducted by Dr. Ledesma only about 9:30 in the morning of November 5, 1998 or the
day following the fatal shooting of Artemio. Evidently, several hours had elapsed prior to the
examination. Thus, Dr. Ledesma could not have determined Artemio’s physical condition a
few seconds after the man was shot."36

Dying Declaration

Having established that the victim indeed uttered those words, the question to be resolved is
whether they can be considered as part of the dying declaration of the victim.

Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, provides:

"The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of impending death, may
be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause
and surrounding circumstances of such death."

Generally, witnesses can testify only to those facts derived from their own perception. A
recognized exception, though, is a report in open court of a dying person’s declaration made
under the consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case. 37

Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of death, are entitled
to the highest degree of credence and respect.38 Persons aware of an impending death have
been known to be genuinely truthful in their words and extremely scrupulous in their
accusations.39 The dying declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who
knows of one’s impending death will make a careless and false accusation. 40 Hence, not
infrequently, pronouncements of guilt have been allowed to rest solely on the dying
declaration of the deceased victim.41

To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances

surrounding the declarant’s death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an impending
death; 3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper
influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is the subject
of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that
person been called upon to testify.42

The statement of the deceased certainly concerned the cause and circumstances
surrounding his death. He pointed to the person who had shot him. As established by the
prosecution, petitioner was the only person referred to as kapitan in their place. 43 It was also
established that the declarant, at the time he had given the dying declaration, was under a
consciousness of his impending death.

True, he made no express statement showing that he was conscious of his impending death.
The law, however, does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the
inevitability of death.44 The perception may be established from surrounding circumstances,
such as the nature of the declarant’s injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that
there was a consciousness of impending death. 45 Even if the declarant did not make an
explicit statement of that realization, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact
that death occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the
declaration was made by the victim with full consciousness of being in a dying condition. 46

Also, the statement was made freely and voluntarily, without coercion or suggestion, and was
offered as evidence in a criminal case for homicide. In this case, the declarant was the victim
who, at the time he uttered the dying declaration, was competent as a witness.

As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the victim was complete, as it was "a full
expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning. It [was] complete and
[was] not merely fragmentary."47 Testified to by his wife and neighbor, his dying declaration
was not only admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, but was also a
weighty and telling piece of evidence.
Res Gestae

The fact that the victim’s statement constituted a dying declaration does not preclude it from
being admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of both are present. 48

Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

"Part of the res gestae. -- Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part
of the res gestae."

Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators
to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. 49 These statements are a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any
opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. 50 An important consideration is
whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance
calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford
an opportunity for deliberation.51

A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule, when the following requisites concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is
a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.52

All these requisites are present in this case. The principal act, the shooting, was a startling
occurrence. Immediately after, while he was still under the exciting influence of the startling
occurrence, the victim made the declaration without any prior opportunity to contrive a story
implicating petitioner. Also, the declaration concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the
latter’s statement was correctly appreciated as part of the res gestae.

Aside from the victim’s statement, which is part of the res gestae, that of Ernita -- "Kapitan,
ngano nimo gipatay ang akong bana?" ("Captain, why did you shoot my husband?") -- may
be considered to be in the same category. Her statement was about the same startling
occurrence; it was uttered spontaneously, right after the shooting, while she had no
opportunity to concoct a story against petitioner; and it related to the circumstances of the
shooting.

Second Main Issue:

Sufficiency of Evidence

Having established the evidence for the prosecution, we now address the argument of
petitioner that the appellate court had effectively shifted the burden of proof to him. He
asserts that the prosecution should never rely on the weakness of the defense, but on the
strength of its evidence, implying that there was no sufficient evidence to convict him.

We disagree. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain
the conviction of petitioner. The dying declaration made by the victim immediately prior to his
death constitutes evidence of the highest order as to the cause of his death and of the
identity of the assailant.53 This damning evidence, coupled with the proven facts presented by
the prosecution, leads to the logical conclusion that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged.

The following circumstances proven by the prosecution produce a conviction beyond

reasonable doubt:

First. Santos testified that he had heard a gunshot; and seen smoke coming from the
muzzle of a gun, as well as the victim staggering backwards while shouting, "Help
me p’re, I was shot by the captain." This statement was duly established, and the
testimony of Santos confirmed the events that had occurred. It should be
understandable that "p’re" referred to Santos, considering that he and the victim were
 conversing just before the shooting took place. It was also established that the two
called each other "p’re," because Santos was the godfather of the victim’s child. 54

Second. Ernita testified that she had heard a gunshot and her husband’s utterance,
"Help me p’re, I was shot by the captain," then saw petitioner in a black jacket and
camouflage pants running away from the crime scene while carrying a firearm.

Third. Ernita’s statement, "Captain, why did you shoot my husband?" was
established as part of the res gestae.

Fourth. The version of the events given by petitioner is simply implausible. As the
incumbent barangay captain, it should have been his responsibility to go immediately
to the crime scene and investigate the shooting. Instead, he avers that when he went
to the situs of the crime, the wife of the victim was already shouting and accusing him
of being the assailant, so he just left. This reaction was very unlikely of an innocent
barangay captain, who would simply want to investigate a crime. Often have we ruled
that the first impulse of innocent persons when accused of wrongdoing is to express
their innocence at the first opportune time. 55

Fifth. The prosecution was able to establish motive on the part of petitioner. The
victim’s wife positively testified that prior to the shooting, her husband was trying to
close a real estate transaction which petitioner tried to block. This showed
petitioner’s antagonism towards the victim.56

These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was petitioner who shot
and killed the victim. This Court has consistently held that, where an eyewitness saw the
accused with a gun seconds after the gunshot and the victim’s fall, the reasonable
conclusion is that the accused had killed the victim. 57 Further establishing petitioner’s guilt
was the definitive statement of the victim that he had been shot by the barangay captain.

Clearly, petitioner’s guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. To be sure, conviction in
a criminal case does not require a degree of proof that, excluding the possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty.58 Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof that
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.59

That some pieces of the above-mentioned evidence are circumstantial does not diminish the
fact that they are of a nature that would lead the mind intuitively, or by a conscious process
of reasoning, toward the conviction of petitioner. 60 Circumstantial, vis-à-vis direct, evidence is
not necessarily weaker.61 Moreover, the circumstantial evidence described above satisfies
the requirements of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

"SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. -- Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt."62

Paraffin Test

Petitioner takes issue with the negative results of the paraffin test done on him. While they
were negative, that fact alone did not ipso facto prove that he was innocent. Time and time
again, this Court has held that a negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof that a
person has not fired a gun.63 In other words, it is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for
nitrates, as when culprits wear gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or are bathed in
perspiration.64 Besides, the prosecution was able to establish the events during the shooting,
including the presence of petitioner at the scene of the crime. Hence, all other matters, such
as the negative paraffin test result, are of lesser probative value.

Corpus Delicti
Petitioner then argues that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the type of gun used
in the shooting. Suffice it to say that this contention hardly dents the latter’s case. As
correctly found by the appellate court, the prosecution was able to give sufficient proof of the
corpus delicti -- the fact that a crime had actually been committed. Ruled this Court in
another case:

"[Corpus delicti] is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by the
testimony of eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily refer to the
body of the person murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide with the use of
unlicensed firearms, to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom, or x x x to
the seized contraband cigarettes." 65

To undermine the case of the prosecution against him, petitioner depends heavily on its
failure to present the gun used in the shooting and on the negative paraffin test result. These
pieces of evidence alone, according to him, should exculpate him from the crime. His
reliance on them is definitely misplaced, however. In a similar case, this Court has ruled as
follows:

"Petitioner likewise harps on the prosecution’s failure to present the records from the
Firearms and Explosives Department of the Philippine National Police at Camp Crame of the
.45 caliber Remington pistol owned by petitioner for comparison with the specimen found at
the crime scene with the hope that it would exculpate him from the trouble he is in.
Unfortunately for petitioner, we have previously held that ‘the choice of what evidence to
present, or who should testify as a witness is within the discretionary power of the prosecutor
and definitely not of the courts to dictate.’

"Anent the failure of the investigators to conduct a paraffin test on petitioner, this Court has
time and again held that such failure is not fatal to the case of the prosecution as scientific
experts agree that the paraffin test is extremely unreliable and it is not conclusive as to an
accused’s complicity in the crime committed." 66

Finally, as regards petitioner’s alibi, we need not belabor the point. It was easily, and
correctly, dismissed by the CA thus:

"[Petitioner’s] alibi is utterly untenable. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that it was
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. Here, the locus criminis was only several meters away from [petitioner’s] home.
In any event, this defense cannot be given credence in the face of the credible and positive
identification made by Ernita."67

Third Issue:

Damages

An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review. It then becomes
1avvphil.net

the duty of this Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether or not included
in the assignment of error.68 The CA upheld the RTC in the latter’s award of damages, with
the modification that unearned income be added.

We uphold the award of P50,000 indemnity ex delicto 69 to the heirs of the victim. When death
occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to this amount as
indemnity for the death, without need of any evidence or proof of damages. 70 As to actual
damages, we note that the prosecution was able to establish sufficiently only P22,200 for
funeral and burial costs. The rest of the expenses, although presented, were not duly
receipted. We cannot simply accept them as credible evidence. This Court has already ruled,
though, that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than
P25,000, the award of P25,000 for temperate damages is justified, in lieu of the actual
damages of a lesser amount.71 In effect, the award granted by the lower court is upheld.

As to the award of moral damages, the P500,000 given by the RTC and upheld by the CA
should be reduced to P50,000, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. 72 We also affirm the
award of loss of earning capacity73 in the amount of P312,000; attorney’s fees of P20,000;
and payment of the costs.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
AFFIRMED, subject to the modification in the award of damages set forth here. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
11. G.R. No. 123137 October 17, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL, MACARIO ASTELLERO, and JANUARIO DOSDOS, accused-
appellants.

QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal is the decision dated May 17, 1995, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 10, in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-30350 for murder and CBU-33664 for illegal
possession of firearms, finding appellants Albert Abriol, Macario Astellero, and Januario
Dosdos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 on Illegal Possession of Firearms. Its decretal portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

In Criminal Case No. CBU-30350 for Murder, the Court finds accused Albert Abriol,
Macario Astellero and Januario Dosdos, GUILTY of murder beyond reasonable doubt
and each is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
provided by law; to indemnify the heirs of deceased Alejandro Flores the sum of
P50,000.00; actual damages of P30,000.00, representing a reasonable amount for
the embalming, vigil, wake, and burial expenses; P30,000.00 for attorney's fees; and
to pay the costs.

For insufficiency of evidence, accused Gaudioso Navales is hereby ACQUITTED

with costs de officio.

In Criminal Case No. CBU-33664 for Illegal Possession of Firearms, accused Albert
Abriol, Macario Astellero and Januario Dosdos, are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months and
to pay the costs.

The .38 caliber revolver, SN P08445 and the two .45 caliber pistols with SN PGO
13506 and SN 52469, are hereby confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government and accordingly, the Clerk of Court of this Branch is directed to turn over
the said firearms to the Chief of Police, Cebu City, or to the Firearms and Explosives
Office (FEO) of the PNP Region 7, upon proper receipt.

The Cebu City Chief of Police is directed to release immediately upon receipt hereof,
the person of Gaudioso Navales, unless there be any other valid reason for his
continued detention.

SO ORDERED.1

This judgment was the culmination of proceedings beginning with the Amended Information
dated September 6, 1993, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-30350, wherein appellants
PO2 Albert Abriol of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Macario Astellero, Januario
Dosdos, and PNP P/Chief Inspector Gaudioso Navales were charged with murder allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of June, 1993, at about 11:50 P.M., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
armed with handguns, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent, with
intent to kill, did then and there shot one Alejandro Flores alias Alex with the said
handguns, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him
the following physical injuries:

CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO SHOCK AND HEMORRHAGE

SECONDARY TO MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS TO THE TRUNK AND
THE HEAD
 as a consequence of which the said Alejandro Flores alias Alex died later.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

At the time of the incident, appellant Abriol, a policeman previously detailed as a jailguard at
the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center (BBRC) in Cebu City, was himself a detention
prisoner in BBRC. He was charged with murder, a non-bailable offense, in Criminal Case No.
CBU-28843 before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 14.3

Appellant Astellero was a former prisoner at BBRC, who had served time for grave
threats.4 The warden then, Chief Inspector Navales,5 employed him as his personal driver
and general factotum.6 Navales was found guilty of grave misconduct in Administrative Case
No. 01-93 for allowing Abriol and Dosdos out of BBRC on the day of the murder and was
summarily dismissed from the police force.

Dosdos had been convicted by the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 10, of highway robbery in
Criminal Case No. CBU-18152 but Navales failed to act on the mittimus ordering Dosdos'
transfer to the national penitentiary, and he remained in BBRC.7 Abriol and Dosdos enjoyed
special privileges at BBRC as the warden's errand boys8 or "trustees."

The victim, Alejandro Flores alias "Alex," was a former policeman. He was dismissed from
the PNP in August 1992 after testing positive for prohibited drugs. 9

Abriol, Astellero, and Dosdos were also indicted for illegal possession of firearms in Criminal
Case No. CBU-33664. The charge sheet reads:

That on or about the 5th day of June 1993 at about 11:48 P.M. in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with
deliberate intent, did then and there keep under their control and possession the
following:

1. one (1) .38 cal. revolver (Armscor) with SN P08445 with six empty shells;

2. one (1) .45 cal. pistol (Colt) with SN P6013506 with 9 live ammunitions (sic);

3. one (1) .45 cal. Pistol (Colt) with SN 52469 with five live ammunition.

without first obtaining a permit or license therefor from competent authority.

CONTRARY TO LAW.10

When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges. Since the indictments
arose from the same incident, the cases were jointly tried.

The facts of the case are as follows:

At around 11:50 P.M., June 5, 1993, Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., a radio news reporter then aboard
his jeep, had just reached the ABS-CBN compound in P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, when
he heard a couple of gunshots. He looked around and saw a man running unsteadily
towards the intersection of P. del Rosario Street and Jones Avenue (Osmeña Boulevard).
The man was shouting "Tabang, tabang!" ("Help! Help!"). Sta. Cruz, Jr., saw a red "Jiffy"
make a U-turn near the gate of the city central school that nearly ran over the man shouting
for help. The man turned back and staggered towards the direction of Bacalso Avenue and
Urgello Private Road, but after a few meters on wobbly legs, he stopped and collapsed.

Meanwhile, the "Jiffy" followed. It stopped beside the fallen figure and a tall, thin man
alighted. The man fired several shots at the prostrate figure. He boarded the "Jiffy" which
sped away towards Leon Kilat Street. Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., moved his jeep and focused its
headlights on the victim.
In the meantime, PO3 Alexander Rustela was at a vulcanizing shop near the intersection of
Bacalso Avenue and Leon Kilat Street, when he heard gunshots coming from the north. He
ran towards where the gunshots came and saw people scampering. All of a sudden, the
"Jiffy" with three persons on board sped past him and made an abrupt left turn at Leon Kilat
Street. Rustela immediately radioed for assistance. Minutes later, patrol car No. 201 with
PO2 Herbert Ramos on board arrived. Rustela boarded the car and they followed the "Jiffy,"
while broadcasting an alarm to police headquarters and other mobile patrol cars.

On nearby Colon Street, SPO1 Eleazar Abrigana and PO2 Romeo Abellana were cruising
aboard patrol car No. 208, when they heard a radio message that the suspects in the
shooting incident were aboard a "Jiffy." As they turned left at Leon Kilat Street, they saw the
"Jiffy" heading towards Carbon Market. They pursued the "Jiffy" which stopped in front of the
Don Bosco Building near BBRC, when police car No. 205, with PO Eugenio Badrinas and
PO2 Gerald Cue aboard, blocked the "Jiffy's" path. Cue fired a warning shot and three
persons alighted. The driver was appellant Astellero, whom Cue had recognized and seen
before at the BBRC. Abrigana and Cue approached the trio who stood a meter away from
the "Jiffy." SPO1 Abrigana frisked Abriol and seized from his waist a .38 caliber revolver with
serial number PO8485 with six (6) empty shells in its cylinder. 11 Under Abriol's seat, the
police also found a .45 caliber pistol bearing serial number PGO 13506 with nine (9) live
rounds in its magazine and another .45 caliber pistol with serial number 52469 loaded with
five (5) unfired bullets.12

While the patrol cars were chasing the "Jiffy," another police team proceeded to the crime
scene in response to the alarm. This team from Police Station No. 3 in San Nicolas, Cebu
City rushed the victim to the Cebu City Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead on
arrival. Meanwhile, PO3 Celso Seville, Jr., a homicide investigator of Police Station No. 3
found four (4) .45 caliber shells some four (4) feet away from the victim's body, and two (2)
deformed slugs where the victim had lain, and submitted them to the Region 7 PNP Crime
Laboratory for ballistics testing. 13

Dr. Ladislao Diola, Jr., Chief of the PNP Region 7 Crime Laboratory autopsied the victim's
body. He found that the cause of the victim's death was "cardiorespiratory arrest due to
shock and hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds to the trunk and head.'' 14 Dr.
Diola recovered a .38 caliber slug from the corpse, which he later submitted for ballistics
examination.

SPO4 Lemuel Caser, ballistician of the PNP Crime Laboratory, reported the following:

1. Fired cartridge cases marked "JA-1" to "JA-3" possesses similar individual

characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .45 with SN:
PGO13506;

2. Fired cartridge cases marked "JA-4" and "E-69-6" possesses similar individual
characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .45 pistol with
SN: 52469;

3. Fired bullet metal jacket marked "JA-5" possesses similar individual characteristics
markings with test bullets fired from cal .45 pistol with SN: PGO13506;

4. Fired cartridge cases marked "E-45-1 " to "E-45-6" possesses similar individual
characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .38 Rev. SN:
P8445;

5. Fired bullets marked as "JA-6" and "LD" possesses similar individual characteristic
markings with the test bullets fired from cal .38 Rev. SN: P8445. 15

The following day, appellants underwent a paraffin test. The hands of appellants were found
positive for gunpowder residues. A chemistry test on the firearms showed that the three
handguns were also positive. Inspector Myrna Areola, Chief of the Chemistry Section of the
PNP Region 7 Crime Laboratory, stated in her testimony that the firearms had been
fired,16 and that appellants had fired the guns within a period of seventy-two (72) hours prior
to the examination.
The widow and relatives of the victim testified on the possible motive behind the killing. They
claimed the victim, a confessed drug user, may have been "rubbed out" on the orders of
Navales for failure to remit P31,000 as proceeds from pushing prohibited drugs. After failing
to deliver the drug money to Navales, for whom he was repeatedly pushing drugs, the victim
went into hiding, but later returned to Cebu City because he missed his family. 17

Appellants deny the accusations. Abriol averred that he and Dosdos were among the several
"trustees" at BBRC assigned to work in the kitchen. Appellant Astellero, who was the
warden's driver, was also in charge of marketing for the prisoners' food. On the day of the
incident, Astellero realized that there was no money for the next day's marketing so he asked
Abriol to accompany him to the house of Navales, but since he was not in, they returned to
BBRC and saw Navales an hour later. After they received the money from Navales' niece on
their way back to BBRC, Dosdos heard gunshots. Abriol ordered Astellero, who was driving,
to turn back. Then Abriol claimed he saw a tall, slim man alight from a "Jiffy" and shoot at a
prone figure on the ground. Seconds later, the gunman returned to the "Jiffy," which sped off.
Abriol said he ordered Astellero to chase that "Jiffy" but it had too much of a headstart and
they lost sight of it. Abriol ordered Astellero to proceed to BBRC. At Colon Street, they heard
gunshots behind them and the blaring siren of a police car. They explained that since they
were detention prisoners, they had to evade meeting the police. They heard more gun shots.
Upon reaching BBRC, the gates were closed, so they drove to the old airport. On their way
back to BBRC several police cars blocked them and arrested them. SPO4 Eleazar Abrigana
frisked him and took the .38 service revolver from his waist.18

Abriol also testified that he surrendered his service firearm to the BBRC Administrative
Officer when he was served a warrant of arrest for murder in Criminal Case No. CBU-28843.
However, the handgun was defective and it was returned to him for repair by Armscor, and
upon repair he handed it over to the BBRC armory. The armorer returned it to him since
there was no place to keep it. He said that although he was a detention prisoner, he had yet
to be discharged from the service. He was assigned guard and escort duties by the
warden.19 Abriol said that on the day of the incident he was, as a BBRC jailguard, authorized
to carry his service firearm.20 He presented a Memorandum Receipt21 authorizing him to carry
the government-issued .38 revolver.22

On the witness stand, Astellero and Dosdos narrated a similar version of the incident as did
Abriol. Both vehemently denied having any knowledge of the two .45 caliber pistols found by
PO3 Cue in the "Jiffy."23

The defense also presented Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, medico-legal officer of the Cebu City PNP
Command, to testify on the caliber of the firearms which might have caused the gunshot
wounds of the victim. Relying on the Necropsy Report prepared by Dr. Diola, Dr. Cerna
declared that wound nos. 1 and 2, which each measured 0.6 cm. by 0.6 cm., may have been
caused by a .38 caliber firearm. As to wound nos. 3 and 4, which each measured 0.5 cm. by
0.5 cm., it was possible that a .38 handgun was used, or one with a smaller bore. Dr. Cerna
opined that a .45 pistol could not have inflicted all the foregoing wounds, as the entry points
were too small for a .45 caliber bullet. With respect to the grazing wounds found on the
victim's body, Dr. Cerna testified that it was impossible to determine the caliber of the firearm
used.24

The trial court found appellants' version of the incident neither convincing and credible and,
as earlier stated, it believed the prosecution's version. Petitioners' were convicted of the
offenses charged.

Hence, this appeal, with appellants assigning the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE

CRIMES OF MURDER AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS DESPITE THE
FLIMSY AND UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.

II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

At issue is whether the prosecution's evidence, which is mainly circumstantial, suffices to

convict appellants for murder and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, beyond
reasonable doubt.

A. Criminal Case No. CBU-30350

On their conviction for murder, appellants argue that the prosecution's circumstantial
evidence against them is weak, ambiguous, and inconclusive. Specifically, appellants
contend that they should be acquitted because:

First, eyewitness Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., did not personally identify them as the culprits. At no
point in his testimony did eyewitness Sta. Cruz, Jr., positively identify any of the appellants or
appellant Abriol as the gunman. Sta. Cruz, Jr. only gave a general description of the
assailants, despite attempts to make him give a categorical identification. He admitted he
found out the name of Abriol from television and news reports and could not identify Abriol as
the one whom he saw shot the victim. The transcript of his testimony is revealing.

Q: Then after the Jiffy stopped in front of the fallen victim, what happened next?

A: I saw that there was a man who disembarked from the Jiffy. He was a tall,
thin fellow who disembarked from the Jiffy and at the same time, he shot the fallen
victim.

Q: How many times did he shoot the victim?

A: I cannot count attorney but I saw him shooting the victim.

Q: In your affidavit, you said that the person who disembarked from the Jiffy,
whose name you know later on as PO2 Albert Abriol, PNP, shot the victim in the
different parts of his body. If Albert Abriol is now in the courtroom, will you please
point to him?

A: I will know him attorney because of the TV shows and newspapers.

COURT: (TO WITNESS)

Q: You are referring to the name of that man who disembarked from the Jiffy
and fired several shots at the fallen victim?

A: Yes, I know his name Your Honor on (sic) the news cast.

COURT: (TO WITNESS)

Q: Alright, forget the news. The man you saw when he alighted from the Jiffy
and poured (sic) several bullets on the fallen man, look around if he is in the
courtroom?

A: I cannot identify Your Honor.

COURT:

Q: You cannot?

A: But [because] what I saw is a man who is tall and thin because it was dark.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How many persons fired a shot at the fallen man?

 A: I only saw that man Your Honor who alighted from the Jiffy.

Q: Did you see his physical features?

A: Only (t)his, I can only tell his height, he was tall and his body build is thin. Tall
and thin. (Emphasis supplied)25

Since the sole eyewitness could not identify the gunman and his companions, the
prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence from which the trial court could draw its
findings and conclusion of culpability. 26Circumstantial evidence may be relied upon, as in this
case, when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting felons free.

Second, appellants assert that the paraffin tests are judicially recognized as unreliable and
inconclusive. A paraffin test could establish the presence or absence of nitrates on the hand.
However, it cannot establish that the source of the nitrates was the discharge of firearms.
Nitrates are also found in substances other than gunpowder. A person who tests positive
may have handled one or more substances with the same positive reaction for nitrates such
as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, and leguminous plants.
Hence, the presence of nitrates should only be taken as an indication of a possibility that a
person has fired a gun.27 However, it must be borne in mind that appellants were not
convicted on the sole basis of the paraffin test.

Third, appellants claim that the autopsy report of prosecution witness Dr. Ladislao Diola
revealed serious ambiguities.28 Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, using the same autopsy report, said that
the gunshot wounds measuring 0.6 x 0.6 centimeters could not have been caused by a .45
caliber pistol because an entrance wound of that size was too small for a .45 caliber
bullet.29 Dr. Cerna claimed that a wound inflicted by a .45 pistol would have an entry point of
anywhere from 1.1 to 1.3 centimeters. He declared that it was with more reason that an
entrance wound measuring .5 x .5 centimeters could not be caused by a caliber .45
bullet.30 Since no firearm smaller than a .38 caliber pistol was seized from appellants, they
claim the observation of Dr. Cerna only shows that they could not have shot the victim.

We note, however, that during cross-examination, Dr. Diola carefully explained that a
firearm's caliber is not the only basis for determining the cause of the gunshot wound. He
said:

ATTY. REMOTIQUE:

Q: So, normally the size of .5 cm x .5 cm which is the point of entry of gunshot

wound No. 3 this may have been caused by a firearm of lesser caliber than caliber .
38?

A: Not necessarily. There is a very small difference in the size and this does not
preclude that gunshot wound No. 3 may have also been caused by the same firearm
which caused gunshot wounds Nos. 1 and 2. There are factors which often affect the
size of the wounds at the time of the examination, perhaps a recission (sic) of the
skin in the area where gunshot Wound No. 3 was inflicted so that gunshot wound
becomes smaller.

Q: Did you not say that normally the point of entry of the gunshot wounds vary
with the caliber of the firearm which caused it, so that the point of entry caused by
one firearm of a particular caliber may be bigger than the point of entry of a gunshot
wound caused by another firearm of lesser caliber?

A: I told you of other factors that often affect the size of the entry of the bullet
although the caliber is one basis of the size of the wounds.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Will you explain further on that because my understanding is that .5 cm

wound must perforce be caused by a firearm of lesser caliber than that which caused
the .6 cm wound?
 A: As I said there are ranges in the size of the wounds. The variance in the size
of the wound when it is minimal does not exclude the possibility that a wound with a .
5 cm size and .6 cm size could have been caused by the same caliber. (Emphasis
supplied).31

The Office of the Solicitor General points out that Dr. Diola's testimony is supported by Dr.
Pedro P. Solis, a medical expert, in his book entitled Legal Medicine. The factors which could
make the wound of entrance bigger than the caliber include: (1) shooting in contact or near
fire; (2) deformity of the bullet which entered; (3) a bullet which might have entered the skin
sidewise; and (4) an acute angular approach of the bullet. However, where the wound of
entrance is smaller than the firearm's caliber, the same may be attributed to the
fragmentation of the bullet before entering the skin or to a contraction of the elastic tissues of
the skin (stress supplied).32 Dr. Diola testified that a .45 caliber pistol could have caused the
grazing wounds on the victim's head and extremities. 33 Dr. Cerna corroborated Dr. Diola's
findings in this regard.34 Such expert opinions disprove appellants' theory that the .45 caliber
handguns confiscated from them could not have been used in killing the victim.

Fourth, appellants allege that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel Caser, the prosecution's
ballistics expert, clearly shows that: (1) He is ignorant about such ballistics instruments such
as the micrometer, goniometer, and pressure barrel.35 (2) He is not conversant with "the
required references concerning ballistics," particularly books on the subject by foreign
authorities.36 (3) He could not "scientifically determine the caliber of a bullet." 37 Since
P/Inspector Caser lacked adequate training and expertise in ballistics, they claim that his
opinion that the test bullets and cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges recovered from
the scene of the crime was not reliable. Appellants also assail Caser's failure to take the
necessary photographs to support his findings.

An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject
matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which
he proposes to express an opinion."38 There is no definite standard of determining the degree
of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is
sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular, first-
hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of authorities or standards
upon which his opinion is based.39 The question of whether a witness is properly qualified to
give an expert opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial court. 40

In giving credence to Caser's expert testimony, the trial court explained:

The defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics ballistics and identifying
firearms. Much stress is given to the absence of photographs of his examination.
Nonetheless, the Court is satisfied (with) Caser's examination, findings and
conclusions with the use of a microscope. Caser's conclusion based on his
examination deserves credit. He found the impressions on the primer of the fired
cartridges that were test-fired to have the same characteristics with those recovered
at the scene of the crime. Whenever a triggerman pumps a bullet (into) the body of
his victim, he releases a chunk of concrete evidence that binds him inseparably to his
act. Every gun barrel deeply imprints on every bullet its characteristic marking
peculiar to that gun and that gun alone. These marking might be microscopic but
they are terribly vocal in announcing their origin. And they are as infallible for
purposes of identification, as the print left by the human finger. 41

We agree with the trial court that P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a
licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command and Laboratory Center in Fort
Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, and in the National Bureau of
Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-seven (27)
murder and homicide cases all over the country.42 An expert witness need not present
comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support his
findings.43 Examination under a comparison microscope showing that the test bullet and the
evidence bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient. 44 Moreover, the ballistician
conclusively found similar characteristic markings in the evidence, test cartridges and slugs.

Fifth, appellants aver that the prosecution failed to show any plausible motive for appellants
to kill the victim. The prosecution tried to prove that their co-accused Navales instigated them
to kill the victim because Navales had a grudge against him. However, as Navales was
acquitted, appellants insist that Navales' acquittal should redound to their benefit since no
motive was imputed on their part.

Motive is not an essential element of a crime, 45 particularly of murder.46 It becomes relevant

only where there is no positive evidence of an accused's direct participation in the
commission of a crime.47 Stated otherwise, proof of motive becomes essential to a conviction
only where the evidence of an accused's participation in an offense is circumstantial. 48 A
careful perusal of the State's evidence reveals that the prosecution had established sufficient
motive why appellants killed the victim, independent of any grudge which Navales may have
had against the latter. At the time of the incident, appellants Abriol and Dosdos were both
BBRC detention prisoners during Navales' term as warden. Abriol and Dosdos were treated
as highly favored "trustees" of Navales and were never locked up. Abriol and Dosdos were
even allowed to go out of BBRC to do the marketing for the prison's kitchen. Appellant
Astellero, a former detention prisoner, was also a recipient of Navales' favors. Navales hired
Astellero as his personal driver after the latter served his sentence. Navales and the victim, a
former BBRC jailguard, were associates in dealing with prohibited drugs, until they had a
falling out allegedly after the victim failed to remit to Navales proceeds from the sale of illegal
drugs amounting to P31,000. Appellants apparently killed the victim to return the "special
favors" Navales had showered them. Lack of a motive does not necessarily preclude
conviction. Persons have been killed or assaulted for no reason at all, and friendship or even
relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a crime. 49

Sixth, in the present case, appellants contend that the PNP cannot be presumed to have
done their work since it committed errors and blunders in transferring possession and
custody of the physical evidence. They allege there was a possibility that the evidence was
tainted, planted, or manufactured. Besides, appellants point out that the presumption of
regularity cannot prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.

The record shows that the police officers did not issue acknowledgment receipts in some
instances. However, minor lapses do not mean that the State had failed to show an
unbroken chain of custody of the subject firearms and ammunition, nor that said firearms and
ammunition were tampered. The slugs and spent shells recovered from the scene of the
crime and the victim's corpse were plainly identified in open court by the PNP investigators.
The ballistician testified that the bullets and cartridges recovered from the crime scene had
been fired from the subject handguns. Under these circumstances, we must respect the
presumption of the regularity in the performance of duties.

Seventh, appellants insist that the prosecution failed to show that the red "Jiffy" used by
them and seized by the police officers was the same vehicle used by the gunmen who killed
Alejandro Flores. Appellants point out that PO3 Rustela, who was aboard police car No. 201,
testified that they lost sight of the red "Jiffy" while chasing it along Leon Kilat Street.
Appellants argue that the "Jiffy" which was chased by patrol car No. 208 until it was cornered
near BBRC by the other pursuing patrol cars was not the same vehicle originally sighted and
tailed by patrol car No. 201.

In rejecting this theory, the trial court stated that:

. . . PO3 Rustela who was nearby, immediately ran to the scene of the crime and met
the red jiffy with three persons on board, that speedily passed by him proceeding
towards Leon Kilat Street. Car 208 readily picked up the trail and pursued the red jiffy
from Leon Kilat, then making abrupt turns on downtown streets until other patrol cars
joined the chase and captured them in Lahug, near the BBRC. The identity of the red
jiffy was never interrupted. Members of the Mobile Patrol Cars identified in court
without batting an eyelash, the red jiffy which was the object of the shooting alarm.
There was no interruption, no let-up in the chase, right after Alejandro Flores was
shot and there was no other red jiffy that the crews of the (pursuing) patrol cars
noticed.

The Court rejects their claim of innocence, for their very acts belied the same.

Astellero could have stopped the jeep upon noticing that patrol cars were already
running after them with sirens, blinkers and warning shots fired. From Leon Kilat
Street to Lahug airport, there were several police stations that they could have
sought shelter and police assistance. Guilt has many ways of surfacing. Instead of
 stopping, Abriol ordered Astellero to accelerate their speed. Their obvious purpose
was to elude the patrol cars. Flight is indicative of guilt. 50

But, in this case, is the totality of the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court
sufficient to support a conviction?

Circumstantial evidence is that which indirectly proves a fact in issue. For circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every
other possible, rational hypothesis, except that of guilt. 51 An accused can be convicted on the
basis of circumstantial evidence where all the circumstances constitute an unbroken chain
leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the culprit.52

In our assessment, the prosecution's evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of events

leading to the inevitable conclusion of guilt on the part of appellants. First, the fatal shooting
of Alejandro Flores occurred at around 11:50 P.M. of June 5, 1993 in front of the ABS-CBN
compound in Cebu City. The gunman, who was tall and thin, alighted from a red "Jiffy,"
pumped several bullets into the prone victim, and got back aboard the "Jiffy" which then sped
towards Leon Kilat Street. Second, eyewitness Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr.'s description of the
gunman as "tall and thin" perfectly matches the physique of appellant Abriol. Third, PO3
Alexander Rustela, who was close to the crime scene, heard the gunshots and ran towards
the place where the sound of gunshots emanated. A red "Jiffy" with three persons aboard
whizzed by him and abruptly turned at Leon Kilat Street. After Sta. Cruz, Jr. informed him
that the gunmen were aboard a red "Jiffy," Rustela boarded patrol car No. 201, radioed an
alarm, and commenced a pursuit of the fleeing vehicle. Police car no. 208 received the
alarm, and on turning into Leon Kilat Street, encountered the speeding red "Jiffy." They
immediately chased the "Jiffy" but failed to catch it. Police cars Nos. 208 and 205 cornered
the vehicle in front of the Don Bosco building near BBRC. PO2 Gerald Cue, on patrol car no.
205 fired a warning shot at the vehicle and directed all those aboard to disembark. Three
men got out, with their hands raised. SPO1 Abrigana, on patrol car no. 208 and PO2 Cue
approached the trio. Abrigana frisked the man who was seated in the front passenger seat,
who turned out to be appellant Abriol, and recovered from his waist a .38 caliber revolver
with six empty shells. Cue searched the red "Jiffy" and found two loaded .45 caliber pistols
under the front seat where Abriol had sat. Other police officers immediately went to the crime
scene where they found the victim barely alive. PO3 Seville retrieved four .45 caliber slugs
and two deformed slugs at the spot where the victim was shot. The autopsy of the victim's
remains showed that he died of cardio respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage
secondary to gunshot wounds. A deformed metal jacket of a .38 caliber slug was recovered
from the corpse. Ballistics tests showed that the bullets and cartridges had identical
individual characteristics with those of the test bullets and cartridges. Paraffin tests
conducted on each of the appellants, one day after the incident, revealed that all were
positive for gunpowder residues. The subject firearms were also chemically examined and
found positive for gunpowder residue. Before the shooting incident, appellants were seen at
Navales' house until around 7:30 P.M., when they left aboard Navales' red "Jiffy" with
Astellero driving, Abriol in the front passenger seat, and Dosdos in the back
seat.53 Appellants' seating arrangements were exactly the same, several hours later, after
they were pursued and cornered by police cars near BBRC. Appellants admitted that they
dropped by the Navales residence at around 7:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M.

These unbroken chain of events prove not only appellants' identities but also their
participation and collective responsibility in the murder of Alejandro Flores. They reveal a
unity of purpose and concerted action evidencing their conspiracy to kill him. Against this
matrix of facts and circumstances, appellants' bare denials cannot stand. Their story of
chasing a red "Jiffy" is merely a disingenuous diversion of no evidentiary value for the
defense.

Finally, the information for murder alleged treachery and evident premeditation. We note,
though, that the trial court did not state which circumstance qualified the killing into murder.

A review of the record would reveal that there was no evident premeditation. There is evident
premeditation when the following are shown: (a) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (b) an act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and (c) a lapse of time between the determination to commit the crime and
the execution thereof sufficient to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.54 Evident premeditation indicates deliberate planning and preparation. Nowhere in the
record is it shown when and how appellants planned and prepared to kill the victim.

Concerning treachery, however, it was shown that: (1) the means of execution employed
gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. 55 These twin requisites were adequately
proved.

Appellants had superiority in numbers and weapons. The victim was without any means to
defend himself as no weapon was found or even intimated to be in his possession. The
victim was running away from the "Jiffy" prior to the killing. That he was warned or
threatened earlier is of no moment. Even when the victim is warned of danger to his person,
if the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to
retaliate, treachery can still be appreciated. 56 The victim was lying prostrate on the ground
when he was deliberately and mercilessly riddled with bullets. The weapons used, the
number of assailants, the swift and planned manner of the attack, and the multiple number of
wounds inflicted upon the victim all demonstrate a determined assault with intent to kill the
victim. No doubt there was treachery.

B. Criminal Case No. CBU-33664

On their conviction for illegal possession of firearms, appellants contend that the handguns
and ammunition allegedly taken from them by the police officers were illegally seized. They
assert that the police had no warrant to effect a search and seizure, such that these illegally
seized firearms were inadmissible as evidence, and it was error for the trial court to admit
them.

There are eight (8) instances where a warrantless search and seizure is valid. They are: (1)
consented searches;57(2) as an incident to a lawful arrest;58 (3) searches of vessels and
aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws;59 (4) searches of moving
vehicles;60 (5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the
prohibited articles are in "plain view;"61 (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire,
sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations. 62

In this case, the warrantless search and seizure of the subject handguns and ammunition is
valid for two reasons. It was a search incidental to a lawful arrest. It was made after a fatal
shooting, and pursuit of a fast-moving vehicle seeking to elude pursuing police officers, and
a more than reasonable belief on the part of the police officers that the fleeing suspects
aboard said vehicle had just engaged in criminal activity. The urgent need of the police to
take immediate action in the light of the foregoing exigencies clearly satisfies the
requirements for warrantless arrests under the Rules of Court. 63 Moreover, when caught
in flagrante delicto with firearms and ammunition which they were not authorized to carry,
appellants were actually violating P.D. No. 1866, another ground for valid arrest under the
Rules.64

Appellants further contend that the trial court erred in convicting appellants Astellero and
Dosdos of illegal possession of firearms. They point out that the .38 caliber revolver was
recovered from appellant Abriol, who as a policeman was authorized to carry and possess
said firearm, as evidenced by his Memorandum Receipt (MR), which had "not been recalled,
cancelled or revoked until the time of the trial of these cases." Appellants claim that the two .
45 caliber pistols could have been left in the vehicle by PNP personnel assigned at BBRC,
considering that the red "Jiffy" was generally used as a service vehicle by BBRC personnel.
They also argue that the prosecution failed to prove appellants' ownership, control, and
possession of the .45 caliber pistols, considering that appellants were six meters away from
the "Jiffy" when said handguns were allegedly found.

To sustain a conviction for violation of P.D. No. 1866, the prosecution must prove two
elements of the offense: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; (2) the fact that the accused
who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess it.65 These the prosecution did. It presented a .38 caliber revolver with serial number
PO8445, a .45 caliber pistol with serial number PGO 13506 Para Ordinance, and a .45
caliber pistol with serial number 52469. The .38 caliber handgun was recovered from
appellant Abriol, while the two .45 caliber automatics were found and seized from under the
front passenger seat of appellants' vehicle. SPO4 Aquilles Famoso of the Cebu City PNP
Metropolitan District Command's Firearms and Explosive Unit testified that appellants were
not listed as licensed firearm owners in Cebu City.66 The prosecution also presented a
certification from P/Senior Inspector Edwin Roque of the Firearms and Explosives Division of
PNP Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City that appellant Abriol is not licensed to hold
any firearm; that the .45 caliber pistols were unlicensed; and that a certification from the PNP
Firearms and Explosives Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm,
proves beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. 67

Abriol insists that he had a valid MR authorizing him to carry the .38 revolver. We agree with
the observation of the trial court that:

The claim of Abriol that .38 caliber was issued to him, as evidenced by the
corresponding receipt (MR), is of no moment. While an MR is an authority of Abriol to
possess the government firearm that was issued to him, when he was charged and
detained at BBRC for an earlier case of murder, other than the case at bar, he was
already then at that moment a detained prisoner and therefore, (un)authorized to
carry a firearm. A military man or a member of the PNP who commits a crime, is
immediately disarmed upon his arrest and stripped of all the rights and privileges that
go with the function of his office, and this includes, in the case of Abriol, his MR.
Thus, when he shot Alejandro Flores with his .38 caliber revolver, this firearm was
already unauthorized and its use and possession illegal. 68

Even if Abriol's MR was valid, said authorization was limited only to the .38 caliber revolver
and not the two .45 caliber automatic pistols found under the front passenger seat of the
"Jiffy." Appellants were still in the unlawful possession of the .45 caliber pistols. Under P.D.
No. 1866, possession is not limited to actual possession. 69 In this case, appellants had
control over the pistols. They were all liable since conspiracy was established and the act of
one is the act of all.70

Appellants claim that they were six meters away from the "Jiffy" when it was searched and
the two .45 caliber pistols were seized. They suggest that the policemen who searched the
vehicle could have planted said firearms. The trial court found that they were in fact only one
meter away from the vehicle. Findings of fact of the trial court, when supported by the
evidence on record, are binding and conclusive upon appellate courts. 71

All told, on the charge of illegal possession of firearms, no reversible error was committed by
the trial court when it found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

The Office of the Solicitor General recommends that although appellants were charged with
and convicted of two separate offenses of murder and violation of P.D. No. 1866, R.A. No.
8294, which amended said decree, should be applied to appellants retroactively,
citing People v. Molina, 292 SCRA 742, 779 (1998) interpreting R.A. No. 8294.

We agree. We ruled in Molina that with the passage of R.A. No. 8294 on June 6, 1997, the
use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is not a separate crime, but merely a
special aggravating circumstance. This was recently reiterated in People v. Castillo, G.R.
Nos. 131592-93, February 15, 2000. 72 Appellants are thus guilty only of murder with the
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. The imposition of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua cannot however be modified since the murder took place
before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.

A final word on the damages. In addition to the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, the
trial court awarded P30,000 in actual damages, "representing a reasonable amount for the
embalming, vigil, wake and burial expenses," and P30,000 as attorney's fees. To be entitled
to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof, and on the best evidence obtainable by
the injured party.73 No such evidence was offered. The award of actual damages must,
therefore, be deleted. However, temperate damages may be awarded since the family of the
victim has demonstrably spent for the wake, funeral and burial arrangements. The amount of
P20,000 should suffice as temperate damages. In addition, we find an award of exemplary
damages in order, pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 74 The killing was attended by
the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. Moreover, the public
good demands that detained prisoners should not abuse their status as "trustees." Had the
police been unsuccessful in their pursuit of appellants, the latter would have used the BBRC
as shelter and as an alibi that they could not have committed the crime since they were then
in detention. Thus, we find an award of P10,000 as exemplary damages in order.
Accordingly, the award of attorney's fees is sustained. 75

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10, in
Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-30350 and CBU-33664 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellants Albert
Abriol, Macario Astellero, and Januario Dosdos are hereby found GUILTY of murder,
qualified by treachery, with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearms and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided for by law. Appellants Abriol, Astellero, and Dosdos are also
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Alejandro Flores the sum of P50,000 as
death indemnity, P20,000 as temperate damages, P10,000 as exemplary damages, and
P30,000 as attorney's fees, as well as the costs.

SO ORDERED.
12. G.R. No. 130963 November 27, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIANO PASCUA, JR. @ "PEDRO" & JOHN DOES, accused,
MARIANO PASCUA, JR. @ "PEDRO", accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch
32, dated April 28, 1997, in Criminal Case No. 993, finding accused-appellant Mariano
Pascua, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties inherent thereto, to indemnify
the heirs of the victim the amount of P120,000.00 as and for actual and moral damages, and
to pay the costs without subsidiary imprisonment case of insolvency. 1

In an Information dated November 27, 1992, accused-appellant Mariano Pascua, Jr. alias
"Pedro", together with four John Does, was charged of Murder, committed as follows:

"That on or about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of November 14, 1992 in Barangay
Doña Imelda, Municipality of Diffun, Province of Quirino, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill,
armed with firearms of unknown calibers and taking advantage of their superior
strength and with the aid of armed men and with treachery after conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously shoot ERNESTO QUIMING, a Barangay Captain of the said place,
hitting the latter on the different parts of his body that caused his instantaneous
death.

CONTRARY TO LAW."2

Evidence for the prosecution shows that on November 14, 1992, at about 6:00 in the
evening, prosecution witness Sanita Quiming (Sanita), wife of the victim, Ernesto Quiming
(Ernesto), was gathering dry clothes in the yard of their house at Doña Imelda, Diffun,
Quirino when a man arrived looking for the house of the barangay captain. She answered
"none sir" because she saw that the man was holding a gun with his two hands. Then the
man inquired about Ernesto and she replied that he was attending a prayer meeting at
Barangay Malayod together with their three children but they will soon be back. Suddenly the
man pointed his gun at her and pushed her inside the house. She was told to keep quiet and
was threatened that her children will be killed if she talked.

Upon entering the house, Sanita was surprised to see three other armed men pointing their
guns at her two children. One of them, whose face was covered with a bonnet, spoke and
Sanita was startled when she heard the voice because it sounded familiar. For a moment,
Sanita surreptitiously stared at the man with the bonnet and she became apprehensive when
she recognized him to be herein accused-appellant because of the eyes, eyelids, nose,
mouth, and beard which were not covered. She knows accused-appellant well because they
have been neighbors ever since he was a child. Sanita also knows accused-appellant as the
person who threw a hand grenade at Ernesto during a barangay meeting. However, she
pretended not to recognize accused-appellant.

The man who approached Sanita in the yard told her that they want to get the .38 caliber gun
of Ernesto. When she told him that she did not know anything about it, herein accused-
appellant got angry, insisted that Ernesto had a gun and forced her to bring it out. At this
point, two of the Quiming children, Aileen and Elizabeth, arrived from the prayer meeting.
The two were almost near the fence of the house when they heard somebody whistle from
behind. When they looked back, a man poked a gun at them and ordered them to go inside
the house and keep quiet. Aileen recognized accused-appellant though he was wearing a
bonnet since his face was not totally covered. She has known accused-appellant from
childhood and the latter's house is only 300 meters away from them. Not long after, her
brother Jonathan followed and was likewise forced into the house by one of the armed men.
Knowing that her husband Ernesto would not be far behind, Sanita stood up and peeped
through the jalousy of the window. They were still being heavily guarded by the four men
inside the house. It was then that she saw Ernesto walking towards the house, around ten
meters away from where she was standing. A man coming from the waiting shed located
along the road going to their house followed Ernesto and suddenly shot him on the right arm.
Ernesto fell to the ground facing downward. Upon seeing this, accused-appellant and his
three companions immediately ran outside. One of them shot Ernesto a second time.
Accused-appellant fired the third shot that hit Ernesto on the head. Ernesto's shoulder shook
and then his body turned limp. Sanita was so stunned that she kept jumping helplessly. The
five malefactors hurriedly ran away. Thereafter, Sanita and her children rushed to Ernesto
but he was no longer moving. They brought him to the Quirino Provincial Hospital where he
was declared dead on arrival.

A few hours after the incident, several barangay officials and members of the PNP went to
the house of Sanita to investigate. When asked if she knew the identity of the assailants, she
said "nobody had killed my husband except the one who threw a hand grenade at my
husband." It was on November 26, 1992 that she gave her sworn statement 3 to the police
and disclosed the name and identity of accused-appellant as one of the assailants.
According to Sanita, she was afraid that accused-appellant might escape and hide if she
immediately revealed his name before a formal investigation could be conducted. On
November 27, 1992, Aileen and Elizabeth executed their joint affidavit. 4

According to Sanita, during a meeting of barangay officials on August 30, 1992, Ernesto, a
barangay captain, and accused-appellant, a barangay councilman, had a misunderstanding
and the latter threw a hand grenade at the former. When the hand grenade did not explode,
accused-appellant tried to shoot Ernesto twice inside the latter's yard but failed. Sanita was
present when the first shooting incident happened.

Three days after the death of Ernesto, accused-appellant and his family left their house at
Doña Imelda, Diffun and moved to Ricarte Norte, Diffun. Sanita testified that she spent
P20,000.00 for the burial of Ernesto.

Prosecution witness Leslie Chambers-Maalat, a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime

Laboratory Service in Camp Crame, Quezon City, testified that as per her Chemistry Report
No. C436-92 dated May 20, 1992, 5 the paraffin casts taken from both hands of accused-
appellant gave positive result to the tests for gunpowder nitrates because a blue reaction
was produced. She concluded that accused-appellant fired a gun. She said that matches,
cigarettes and fertilizers can also test positive for nitrate and produce a blue reaction just like
gun powder nitrate. However, she explained that matches and cigarettes produce positive
result for nitrate only which is different from gunpowder nitrate. Also, the blue reaction
produced from nitrate contained in the former does not have dots and tails whereas the blue
reaction produced by gunpowder nitrate has dots and tails.

The autopsy examination conducted by Dra. Mary Jean Baguioen, Medical Officer III at the
Quirino Provincial Hospital, showed the following postmortem findings as contained in
Autopsy Report No. 92-06-35-99:6

"Intrathoracic Findings:

= Penetrating wound, middle lobe, right lung.

= Base of the heart.

= Inferior lobe of left lung.

Intracranial Findings:

= Gunshot wound entry — right parietal bone.

= Orbital bone fractured, left.

= Bullet lodged at orbital area, inferior.

 CAUSE OF DEATH:

Intrathoracic hemorrhage secondary to Gunshot Wound."

Dra. Baguioen explained that the victim suffered a penetrating wound on the right breast
caused by a gun shot. The right lung was fatally damaged. There was also a penetrating
wound at the base of the heart caused by a gunshot. These wounds sustained by the victim
were the most fatal. Another gunshot wound entry was found on the right parietal bone which
is located on the right side of the head. When they opened the skull of the victim, they
recovered a slug inside. The orbital bone located just below the lower left eyelid was also
fractured and she discovered a bullet lodged in this area. Finally, she testified that the victim
suffered severe bleeding inside the chest which caused his death.

The defense relied mainly on denial and alibi.

Accused-appellant testified that in the afternoon of November 14, 1992, he went to Barangay
Sta. Cruz, Benito Soliven, Isabela with his wife and two children to attend the wedding of the
daughter of his cousin, Ernesto Aquino. He drove his tricycle from the town proper of Diffun
to Barangay Sta. Cruz. It was almost dusk when they reached the place. On their way to the
house of his cousin, he saw Barangay Captain Sabino Carlos and invited the latter to the
pre-nuptial party that night. Accused-appellant parked his tricycle at the house of Kagawad
Abraham Martin. There he saw Barangay Secretary Francisco Viernes and several others in
a drinking session. The group invited accused-appellant for a drink to which he obliged.
Shortly thereafter, they all proceeded to the house of Ernesto Aquino where the pre-nuptial
party was being held. The group of accused-appellant drank at the party until 9:00 p.m. They
had to stop when trouble erupted from a group of guests who were also drinking. Accused-
appellant decided to go upstairs and sleep.

The next day, November 15, 1992, the wedding ceremony was held which ended at around
12 o'clock in the afternoon. Thereafter, accused-appellant and his family left for Diffun town.
They passed by Santiago City to have the tricycle painted with the names of their children.
Since it was raining and the road going to their house was not passable because it was
muddy and slippery, they proceeded to Ricarte Norte and spent the night at the house of
accused-appellant's uncle, Fred Antonino. That night, accused-appellant was informed by his
uncle about the killing of Barangay Captain Ernesto Quiming.

The following day, November 16, 1992, accused-appellant left in the morning to ply his
tricycle from Ricarte to Diffun. He was at the parking area in Diffun when two policemen
approached him and invited him to the police station for questioning. At the police
headquarters, the Station Commander asked him if he already knew what happened to
Ernesto and he answered that his Uncle Fred told him about it the night before. Accused-
appellant was informed that he is a suspect in the killing because he was the person last
known to have a grudge against the victim. He was then brought to the Crime Laboratory
Service in Cauayan, Isabela to undergo paraffin test. That night, accused-appellant slept at
Ricarte Norte and only his wife and children went home. Since then, accused-appellant has
never returned to Doña Imelda, Diffun.

Accused-appellant admitted that during a barangay meeting sometime in August 1992, he

had a misunderstanding with Barangay Captain Ernesto Quiming because the latter wanted
to remove him as barangay councilman. He felt embarrassed and humiliated before the
barangay officials and so he went home. But he went back to settle the matter with Ernesto.
And it was at this time when accused-appellant threw a hand grenade to the victim. He
alleged that it was Ernesto who shot him first and he only fired back. He stated that the
matter was settled in October 1992 when he asked for forgiveness from Ernesto in the
presence of the barangay officials. Since then, he did not have any misunderstanding with
Ernesto anymore.

Defense witnesses Abraham Martin, Ernesto Aquino, Sabino Carlos and Francisco Viernes
corroborated the alibi that accused-appellant attended a wedding party at Barangay Sta.
Cruz, Benito Soliven, Isabela on that fateful day of November 14, 1992. They testified upon
request of the father of the accused-appellant.
In this appeal, accused-appellant insists that he was not positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime.

Again, the basic issues in the case at bar deal with the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. It is an established rule that when the issue concerns credibility of witnesses,
appellate courts generally will not overturn the findings of the trial courts. The latter courts
are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses
through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, demeanor and
behavior in court. In the case at bar, we find no basis to depart from the rule. 7

I. Accused-appellant assails the conclusion of the trial court that he committed the crime
because he tested positive for gunpowder nitrate. He claims that the testimony of forensic
chemist Leslie Chambers-Maalat shows that other substances like fertilizers, matches and
cigarettes likewise produce positive results for nitrate, to wit:

"Q: How many casts were given to you for examination, Mrs. Witness?

A: Two paraffin casts, sir.

Q: This (sic) paraffin casts were given to you for laboratory examination, is it
not?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And before you proceeded to the laboratory examination, did you conduct
also a physical examination on this case?

A: No, sir.

Q: In other words, you did not try to find out the presence of gun power nitrate
through physical examination, you did not do that?

A: No, sir.

Q: Is it not a fact that aside from gun powder nitrate, there are other particles
which also gave (sic) positive nitrates like for instance fertilizers?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: or matches?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: and also cigarettes?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Is there a different characteristic on blue reaction coming from fertilizers and

gun powders?

A: Yes, sir. A nitrate/gun powder nitrate produced blue reaction with dot with tail;
while in the other source like fertilizers, matches and cigarettes, it only reacts blue
reaction but without dots or tail.

Q: Did you indicate the appearance of blue reaction with tails in your findings?

A: No, sir."

In an attempt to discredit the accuracy of the paraffin test conducted on him, accused-
appellant testified that while waiting for his paraffin test, he smoked a cigarette which he
lighted with a match. We are not convinced.
Accused-appellant failed to recite the complete testimony of the forensic chemist relevant to
the issue. Such selective quotation is unethical and will not exculpate accused-appellant. We
quote the relevant testimony of the forensic chemist to avoid its distortion, viz.:

"Q: How many casts were given to you for examination, Mrs. Witness?

A: Two paraffin casts, sir.

Q: This (sic) paraffin casts were given to you for laboratory examination, is it
not?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And before you proceeded to the laboratory examination, did you conduct
also a physical examination on this case?

A: No, sir.

Q: In other words, you did not try to find out the presence of gun power nitrate
through physical examination, you did not do that?

A: No, sir.

Q: Because what you resulted to was the chemical test/diphenylamine test?

A. Yes, sir.

Q: And you only concluded that the casts contains (sic) gun powder nitrate?

A: No, sir.

Q: And you concluded, madam Witness, that because of the presence of gun
powder nitrate that produces blue reaction, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, you concluded madam Witness that the casts contains (sic) gun
powder nitrate just because of the blue reaction?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Is it not a fact that aside from gun powder nitrate, there are other particles
which also gave (sic) positive nitrates like for instance fertilizers?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: or matches?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: and also cigarettes?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when a person who have (sic) been contacted with this (sic) particles is
examined, is it not a fact that a blue reaction will also take place?

A: They would only give positive result for nitrate but not gun powder nitrate, sir.

Q: But it remains, Madam Witness, that a gun powder nitrate create blue
reaction, is it not?
 A: Yes, sir.

Q: In the same manner like fertilizers, matches and cigarettes?

A: There is blue reaction but different characteristic, sir.

Q: Is there a different characteristic on blue reaction coming from fertilizers and

gun powders?

A: Yes, sir. A nitrate/gun powder nitrate produced blue reaction with dot with tail;
while in the other source like fertilizers, matches and cigarettes, it only reacts blue
reaction but without dots or tail.

Q: Did you indicate the appearance of blue reaction with tails in your findings?

A: No, sir."8 (italics are the omitted portions)

The ability to determine whether an individual has fired a firearm is of great significance in
the investigation of both homicides and suicides. Thus, over the years a number of tests
have been developed in an attempt to fill this need. The first of such tests was the "paraffin
test" also known as the "Dermal Nitrate" or "diphenylamine test." In this test, the hands were
coated with a layer of paraffin. After cooling, the casts were removed and treated with an
acid solution of diphenylamine, a reagent used to detect nitrates and nitrites that originate
from gunpowder and may be deposited on the skin after firing a weapon. A positive test was
indicated by the presence of blue flecks in the paraffin. Although this test may give positive
results on the hands of individuals who fired weapons, it also gives positive results on the
hands of individuals who have not fired weapons because of the widespread distribution of
nitrates and nitrites in our environment. 9 Thus, nitrates can also be found in many other
materials, including cigarette smoke, urine, fertilizers, and other kinds of chemicals such as
oxidizing agents.10

To be sure, negative gunshot residue results do not conclusively mean that a subject did not
fire a gun, and positive gunshot residue results do not prove someone fired a gun either.
Thus, this test for residue on skin has been challenged in the courts and fell into disfavor and
disuse because of the ambiguity in conclusions whether an individual fired a weapon or not. 11

In our jurisprudence, we have consistently held that paraffin tests are inconclusive, to wit:

". . . Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has . . . proved
extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can deliberately establish is the
presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from
this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a
firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances
which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives,
fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans
and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposit on his
hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of
tobacco."12

Be that as it may, the result of the paraffin test conducted on accused-appellant in the case
at bar still proves that he tested positive for gunpowder nitrates. The allegation of accused-
appellant that he smoked while waiting for his test is of no consequence. According to
witness Dr. Chambers-Maalat, the blue reaction produced by nitrate coming from cigarettes
and matches has a different characteristic from the blue reaction produced in gun powder
nitrate, in that the former does not have dots and tails which are present in the latter. It bears
to stress too that the fact that accused-appellant fired a gun is corroborated by the
convincing, straightforward and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

II. Accused-appellant contends that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime because on that fateful day he went to Sta. Cruz, Benito Soliven, Isabela
to attend the wedding of his cousin's daughter. This was corroborated by the defense
witnesses who were all barangay officials of Barangay Sta. Cruz.
There is no controversy that accused-appellant went to attend a wedding on November 14,
1992 at Barangay Sta. Cruz, Benito Soliven, Isabela. What is unclear and remains suspect,
however, is his allegation that before going to Barangay Sta. Cruz, he came from the house
of his employer, Board Member Natividad, in Diffun where he has allegedly been staying
even before November 14, 1992. The other defense witnesses testified merely on the fact of
his presence at the wedding, but none was presented to prove that accused-appellant came
from Diffun town. Accused-appellant could have easily presented Board Member Natividad to
corroborate his testimony but he never did. If it were true that accused-appellant was already
working for Board Member Natividad at that time, it is perplexing why he did not return to his
employer's house after the wedding and instead stayed with his uncle at Ricarte Norte,
Diffun on the pretext that he was going to ply his tricycle to earn a living. Also, accused-
appellant allegedly bought his tricycle on October 29, 1992 but it is highly dubious that he
started to use it for hire only on November 16, 1992 — the day he was invited to the police
headquarters for questioning.

The stubborn truth is that accused-appellant came from Doña Imelda, Diffun before going to
Barangay Sta. Cruz. We are not convinced that it was physically impossible for him to be in
Doña Imelda at the time of the incident considering that it is only around four hours drive
going to Barangay Sta. Cruz. The trite defenses of alibi and denial proffered by accused-
appellant cannot prevail over the positive and categorical statements of the prosecution
witnesses. For this defense to prosper, it must preclude any doubt on the physical
impossibility of the accused-appellant to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.13

III. Accused-appellant avers that it was impossible for Sanita and Aileen Quiming to have
recognized him since according to them the assailant was wearing a bonnet. Moreover,
when the police arrived at the scene of the crime, Sanita failed to identify the assailant and it
was only several days thereafter, or on November 26, 1992, when she executed a sworn
statement before the police that she named the accused-appellant. We are not persuaded.

First, prosecution witnesses Sanita and Aileen Quiming positively identified accused-
appellant as the one who fired the third and last shot and killed the victim Ernesto. Although
accused-appellant was wearing a bonnet, his face was not totally covered because his eyes,
nose, mouth and beard were exposed. Sanita and Aileen were also able to recognize
accused-appellant through his voice and gestures. Identification by the sound of the voice of
the person identified is sufficient and acceptable means of identification where it is
established that the witness and the accused had known each other personally and closely
for a number of years.14 It is not disputed that the prosecution witnesses and accused-
appellant have been longtime neighbors ever since the latter was a child. Besides, the house
was illuminated by a kerosene lamp.

Second, when the police and barangay officials arrived at their house on that fateful day,
Sanita told them that "nobody killed my husband except the one who threw a hand grenade
to my husband." When accused-appellant testified in court, he openly admitted that he threw
a hand grenade at the victim during a meeting of barangay officials sometime in August
1992. It is patently obvious that Sanita was referring to none other than accused-appellant
when she made that statement.

Third, during her cross examination, Sanita aptly explained that she intentionally withheld the
name of the real culprit because she feared that accused-appellant might escape and hide.
Delay or vacillation in making an accusation does not impair the credibility of the witness if
such delay is satisfactorily explained.15 Her apprehension was not absolutely baseless.
Indeed, three days after the November 14 incident, accused-appellant left his house and
moved his family to Ricarte Norte. On that day, November 16, 1992, accused-appellant was
invited to the police headquarters and was informed by the Station Commander of Diffun that
he was a suspect in the killing of Ernesto Quiming. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that,
without satisfactory explanation, flight is a clear and positive evidence of guilt. 16

It bears to stress that of the five malefactors, it was only herein accused-appellant who was
wearing a bonnet. This is hardly surprising. Accused-appellant is a barangay councilor and
everybody in the barangay knows him. He had to make sure that he will not be exposed and
that it will be difficult to recognize him. And true enough, in trying to impugn the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses, the defense made capital of the fact that the face of the assailant
was covered with a bonnet. We accord greater weight however to the straightforward
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that it was accused-appellant who shot the victim
on the head. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Sanita and Aileen Quiming were
clear, direct and categorical. Their recollection of the gruesome event remained steadfast
and unperturbed even under the grueling cross examination by the defense.

In addition, accused-appellant has failed to impute any bad motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses in pointing to him as the culprit. In contrast, it is accused-appellant
who has a clear motive to want to kill the victim. It appears that during a meeting of barangay
officials sometime in August 1992, the victim and accused-appellant had a misunderstanding
because the former wanted to remove the latter from his position as barangay councilor.
Accused-appellant told the victim that if he is no longer deserving of the position, he will just
go home. However, upon reaching home, accused-appellant felt embarrassed and
humiliated. According to him, he decided to go back to settle the matter with the
victim.17 Accused-appellant did try to settle it by throwing a hand grenade at the victim. When
it did not explode, he tried to shoot the victim but failed. Accused appellant had every reason
to want to get even. Motive is proved by the acts or statements of the accused before or
immediately after the commission of the offense, i.e., by deeds or words that may express
the motive or from which his reason for committing the offense may be inferred. 18 He
attempts to remove this cloud of suspicion by testifying that he had already asked for
forgiveness from the victim. His statement is, at the least, self-serving and hence has no
probative value specially when it is not corroborated by other witnesses.

IV. The information charged that the killing was attended by treachery with the aid of armed
men and with abuse of superior strength. The trial court considered the last two
circumstances to have been absorbed in treachery, and imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, there being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances.

Treachery clearly attended the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended part might make. 19 The treacherous
manner in which accused-appellant and his cohorts perpetrated the crime was shown by the
sudden, deliberate and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting victim. It has been clearly
established that Ernesto was walking towards his house when one of the malefactors
suddenly appeared from behind and shot him on the arm. When Ernesto fell to the ground,
accused-appellant came out of the house where he and his companions were hiding, and
shot the victim on the head.

Considering the number of armed assailants against the lone unarmed victim, there was also
abuse of superior strength.20 In a long line of cases, we have held that abuse of superior
strength and aid of armed men, when present with treachery, are absorbed in the
latter.21 There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The trial court ordered accused-appellant to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of
P120,000.00 as and for actual and moral damages. This is erroneous. Prosecution witness
Sanita testified that she spent P20,000.00 for the wake of her husband, but there were no
receipts presented to support the same. It is axiomatic that a party seeking the award of
actual damages must produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify
such award.22Since no receipts of expenses were presented, actual damages should be
disallowed.23

On the other hand, the heirs of the victim are entitled to receive moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00. This award is mandatory and does not require proof other than the
death of the victim.24 Under prevailing jurisprudence, civil indemnity should be awarded in the
amount of P50,000.00.25

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 32,
in Criminal Case No. 993 finding accused-appellant MARIANO PASCUA, JR. @ PEDRO,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is
hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Ernesto Quiming the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.
13. G.R. No. 129933 February 26, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
FEDERICO BALTAZAR y PIMENTEL alias "TODONG", accused-appellant.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Accused-appellant Federico Baltazar y Pimentel alias "Todong" interposes the present

appeal, seeking the reversal of the June 28, 1997 Decision 1 of the Regional trial Court of
Roxas City, Brach 162, in Criminal Case No. C-4658, which found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

The Information against him alleges as follows:

"That on or about November 16, 1994 at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening in sition
Hanalon, brgy. Malagab-i, Cuartero, Capiz, Philippines and within thenjurisdiction oif
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a firearm of unknown
caliber, with intent to kill and means of treachery, the accused having employed
means. Methods and form in the execution of the felony which insures its
commission without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party
might take did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one REYNALDO GARDOSE hitting the latter on the head causing death
thereafter."3

On March 22, 1995, appellant assisted by counsel de parte was duly arraigned and, after his
plea of not guilty to the charge or murder, the court a quo proceeded to trial.

The facts as narrated by the witnesses of the prosecution 45 are concisely summarized in the
Brief for the Appelle, submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:

"At around 9:30 o'clock in the evening of November 16, 1994, witness Rodney
Hallegado and the deceased Reynaldo Gardose went to the ricefield of Lilia
Hallegado in Brgy. Malagab-I, Cuartero, capiz to bring rice seedlings. On their was
home, the two agreed to have a drink at rodney's house. Reynaldo told Rodney that
he would first drop by his house to ask for his wife's permission. Rodney then agreed
to wait for him to at the day care center some twent (20) meters away from
Reynado's house(pp. 3-7, TSN, July 13, 1995).

While Reynaldo was talking with his wife, perla Gardose, and asking for the later's
permission, somebody from outside their house called him. Perla got a lamp and
opened the door to see who was calling her husband. She saw two persons outside.
She easily identified one of them as appellant Federico Baltazar, a resident of the
same barangay and whom she knew since childhood. She, however, failed to
recognize the other person who was standing in the dark. She asked appellant what
his purpose was, and the latter told her that he and Reynaldo then went down the
house and walked with the two other men through the feeder road. Perla watched
them walk away until she heard their baby cry. She went inddie the house and
breast-fed the baby until she almost fell asleep. A few minutes later, she heard a
gunshot. She got so afraid, so she just laid down back with her baby. That evening,
her husband did not return home (pp. 4-10, TSN, October 16, 1995).

Meanwhile, Rodney, who was waiting inside the day care center, saw appellant,
accompanied by another man, arrived at Reynaldo's house and called Reynaldo. He
later saw Reynaldo come out of the house and walk with appellant through the
feeder road. Reynaldo was ahead of appellant. Suddenly, he saw appellant drew a
firearm from his waist and shot Reynaldo when the latter was about to turn to his
right. The latter fell down. Fearing that appellant might see him, Rodney hid at the
back of the day care center and went home through the forested area (pp. 7-11,
TSN, July 13, 1995).
 The following morning, Perla woke up feeling that something wrong had happened.
She went to the feeder road nat, there, saw her husband lying face down already
lifeless. She hurriedly went home, told her children that their father was already
dead. On that same morning, she, accompanied by Rodney Hallegado, went to the
poblacion and reported the incident to the police (pp. 11-13, TSN, October 16,
1995). 1âwphi1.nêt

Reynaldo Gardose sustained gunshot wounds and died of massive hemmorrhave (p.
39, TSN, July 15, 1995)."5

On the other hand, accused-appellant interposed denial and alibi as his defense. According
to him and his wife, Luzviminda Baltazar, they were together in the ricefield in the afternoon
of November 16, 1994. From the ricefield they went home and had supper at 6:00 o'clock in
the evening. Accused-appellant stayed in the house until the following morning when at
around 8:00 o'clock, a policeman and a CAFGU member arrived at their house and invited
him to the poblacion for questioning. The third witness for the defense, Captain Angela
Baldevieso, a forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Services, testified that she
received a request on November 21, 1994 from the officer-in-charge of the Cuartero Police
Station to determine the presence of gunpowder nitrates on the cast taken from the hands of
the accused-appellant. She explained that the hands of the accused-appellant were applied
with melted parafinn wax which when dry, is used to determine the presence or absence of
gunpowder nitrates. The test she conducted on November 21, 1994 yielded a negative result
on the presence of gunpowder nitrates on the paraffin cast taken from the hands of accused-
appellant.

On January 28, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision, the decretal portion of which
reads:

"WHEREFORE, This Court finds the accused, FEDERICO BALTAZAR Y

PIMENETEL, a.k.a. 'TODONG', GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
Murder for shooting to death with treachery, Reynaldo Gardose, on the night of
November 16, 1994, defined and penalized under Article 248 paragraph (I) of the
Revised Penal Code, without mitigating nor other aggravating circumstances, and
sentences him to suffer impirsonment of Twenty Five (25) Years of reclusion
perpetua.

He is ordered to pay the heirs of Reynaldo Gardose civil damages in the sums of
P540,000.00 unrealized earnings, P15,000.00 funeral expenses, as actual or
compensatory damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as death
indemnity and costs of the suit."6

Expectedly, appellant filed a notice of appeal with the court a quo, which then forwarded the
records of the case to us. In his appeal brief, appellant makes the following assignment of
errors:

I THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS, SUBSTANTIAL AND

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPREHENSION OF FACTS IN GIVING FULL
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESS. THE
HONORABLE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF IMPROPER MOTIVE
ON THE PART OF SAID WITNESS.

II THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS, SUBSTANTIAL

AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THE
ALLEGED EYEWITNESS WAS AMPLY CORROBORATED BY THE TESTIMONY
OF THE WIFE OF THE VICTIM WHEN THERE ARE MATERIAL DISCREPANCIES
IN THE SUBSTANCE OR THEIR TESTIMONIES.

III THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESULTS
OF THE PARAFFIN TEST ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE OWING TO THE FACTORS
ATTESTING ITS ACCURACY ALBEIT THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THESE
FACTORS IN THE CASE AT BENCH (sic). THE NEGATIVE RESULTS OF THE
PARAFFIN TEST SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPRECIATED AS AN AID TO SHOW THE
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED.7
Basically, accused-appellant's first and second assigned erros refer to the trial judge's
assessment of the prosecution's witnesses, particularly that of eyewitness Rodney
Hallegado. According to accused-appellant, the actuations of Rodney Hallegado during and
after the shooting were contrary to human experience; that he was impelled by improper
motive to testify falsely against accused-appellat; and that the trial court failed to note the
material discrepancies between the testimonies of Rodney and that of the wife of the victim,
Perla Gardose, which totally destroyed their credibilty as witnesses.

The trail court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of eyewitness Rodney Hallegado,
observing in detail his demeanor, conduct and attitude on the witness stand, as follows:

"This Court observed his demeanor at the stand, the spontaneity of his answers, and
his candor, and finds no reason to doubt the truth of his eyewitness account of the
crime. There is nothing conflicting about his testimony that may affect his credibility.
In fact his testimony was corroborated by Perla Gardose, the victim's wife,
particularly that portion when the accused fetched his victim with an unidentified
person that night of November 16, 1994, a few minutes before he shot him. He
relived before the Court the horror of seeing his co-worker and relative shot to death
by accused, as well as his helplessness to prevent the crime. The Court finds in him
the quality of an unbiased witness who came forward to simply tell what he actually
saw that fatefull night of November 16, 1994.

This Court believes that he was in a position and had the opportunity to identify the
accused as the assailant. There are circumstances and compelling reasons to
support this stand. He was just five (5) meters away from where the crime was
committed. The accused and this witness are both for a long time. Not only that, they
are related to each other. They had no grudge against each other for this witness to
impute so grave a crime against the accused."8

As often stressed by this Court on the point of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will
not disturb the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses, in the absence of proof
that some fact or circumtance of substance has been overlooked, or its significance
misinterpreted which, if properly appreciated would affect the disposition of the case. 9 Having
heard the witnesses and observed their deportment on the stand, the trial judge is in a better
position to resolve such question.10 We have examined the records and find no reason to
depart from this well-settled rule.

Accused-appellant's argument that eyewitness Rodney Hallegado's actuations during and

after the shooting were contrary to human experience on account of, among others, "his
indifference and helpessness to prevent the crime to be committed on his co-worker despited
a showing that he saw the victim ahead of the alleged assailant," and that, "he did not even
bother to find out whether his companion and friend was still alive and could still be given
medical attendance but instead allowed the whole night to pass without informing the victim's
wife or the authorities" fails to persuade. It is well-settled that different people react differently
to a given situation or type of situation, and there is no standard form of human behavioral
response where one is confronted with a strange or startling or frighful
experience.11 Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience which elicits different reactions
from the witnesses and for which no clear-cut standard form of behavior can be drawn. 12 On
the witness stand, Rodney Hallegado explained that the attacl was so sudden that he did not
get the chance to warn Gardose before the accused drew and tired his firearm. 13 He also
testified that when he heard the shot he hid because of fear that accused-appellant might
see him and shoot him also.14 He added further that from the scen of the crime he went home
passing through the forested area to avoid detection. 15 He then narrated to this uncle what he
saw but the latter advised him to wait until morning to report the incident. 16 Verily, Rodney
adequately explained his conduct during and after the shooting as one borne out of fear for
his own life. It is not incredible, contrary to human experience and unrealistic for an
eyewitness to a crime, especially if he is alone and unarmed, to hide and not come out in the
open to either prevent the crime or assist the victim when to do so would put his own life in
peril.

Next, accused-appellant's argument that "there is reason to suspect that the witness wanted
the accused ousted from the land latter tilled because the former also appear (sic) interested
in working the land himself"17 must be rejected since the alleged ill-motive on the part of
eyewitness Rodney Hallegado to falsely testify against accused-appellant surmises that a
brewing agrarian dispute involving the accused-appellant and one Lilia Hallegado prompted
Rodney to testify falsely against the former and to impute so grave a crime as murder. It
must be emphasized that the Court adheres to the established rule that in the absence of
any evidence to show that the witness was actuated by any improper motive, his
identification of the accused as the assailant should be given full faith and credit. 18 The
presence of personal motives on the part of a witness to testify in favor of the victim and
against the accused should be supported by satisfactory proof in order that his testimony
may be considered biased.19 The records are barren of any satisfactory proof to show such
bias on the part of Rodney. This Court cannot reverse a judgment of conviction based on
accused-appellant's suspicion that Rodney was interested in workign the land himself to the
exclusion of accused-appellant.

Third, the inconsistencies referred to by accused-appellant in the testimonies of Rodney and

Perla refer to minor and insignificant details which do not destroy their credibility. Accused-
appellant points to the conflicting versions in the testimonies of Rodney and Perla as to the
incidents, which transpired the morning after the killing. He points out that Rodney testified
that early in the morning after the killing. He points out that Rodney testified that early in the
morning after the tragic incident, Rodney called for the victim's wife before thay went
together to the spot where the victim lay lifeless. The wife, however, said that she discovered
the death of her husband allk by herself when she focused her sight on the feeder road
where she saw her husband. These inconsistencies refer to minor details and collateral
matters which do not affect the substance, veracity or weight of their declaration as to what
happened on the night of the killing. As the trial court aptly pointed out, Rodney's testimony
was corroborated by Perla Gardose, "particularly that portion when the accused fetched his
victim with an unidentified person that night of November 16, 1994, a few minutes before he
shot him." If at all, the discrepancies poited out by accused-appellant serve to add credence
and veracity to the candid and spontaneous testimonies of Rodney Hallegado and Perla
Gardose.

As regards the third assigned error, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in
failing to appreciate in accused-appellant's favor the negative result of the paraffin test which
bolsters his defense of denial and alibi. Again, we are not persuaded. While accused-
appellant tested negative for gunpowder nitrates, forensic chemist Angela Baldeviesco
testified that a paraffon test in not conclusive owing to several factors including wind
direction, using a glove , firing at a hard object, using a long barrel gun or a low caliber gun
and profuse perspiration.20Indeed, the Court has held that, "the negative findings of the
paraffin test do not conclusively show that a person did not discharge a firearm at the time
the crime was committed for the absence of nitrates is possible if a person discharged a
firearm with gloves on, or if he throroughly washed his hands thereafter. 21 We agree with the
trial court that with the inconclusive result of paraffin tests, that is, tha an accused amy or
may not have fired a gun, the positive identification of an eyewitness that accused-appellant
shot the victim prevails and cannot be overcome by the negative result of a paraffin test.

In fine, accused-appellant's alibi cannot stand in view of the positive identification made by
eyewitness Rodney Hallegado. Settled is the rule that alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the assailant by an eyewitness.22 For alibi to prevail, it must be established by
positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission, and not merely that he was
somewhere else.23 In this case, there was no physical impossibility because accused-
appellant's house was only about one (1) kilometer away from the scene of the crime.

The Court is convinced that accused-appellant was correctly convicted of the crime of
murder. We agree with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a circumstance qualifying
the killing. There is treachery "when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without rick tp himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make."24 The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without
warning and in a swift, deliberate and unexpexted manner, affording the hapless, unarmed
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. 25 Here, the victim was called late at
night by the accused-appellant and his companion to come out of his house. The victim
walked out side with the two, unaware, unarmed and in non-position to defend himself when
the accused-appellant shot him. Clearly, treachery qualified the killing to murder.
Pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, 26 the penalty for the crime
of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance,27 the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. However, the trial court
incorrectly fixed the duration of said penalty at twenty-five (25) years.We have held that,
notwithstanding the provision of Republic Act No.7659 specifying the duration of reclusion
perpetua from 20 years and 1day to 40 years, reclusion perpetua remains as an indivisble
penalty without minimum,medium and maximum periods even after the operation of the law
on December 31,1997.28 Republic Act No.7659 simply restated existing jurisprudence when it
fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua at twenty years and one day to forty years but it did
not intend, through such statement of its duration, to alter its original nature and classification
as an indivisible penalty.29 Hence, accused-appellant should serve the indivisible penalty
of reclusion perpatua.

As to the civil liability imposed by the trial court,some modifications are in order.The award
for actual damages in the amount of P15,000.00 should be deleted in the absence of
competent proof and the best evidence obtainable on the actual amount of loss
suffered.30 Only expenses supported by receipts and which appear to have been actually
expended in connection with the death of the victim should be allowed for actual damages. 31

Similarly erroneous is the award for loss of earning capacity in the amount of P540,000.00.
Loss of earning capacity should be computed as follows:

"2/3 x [80 - age of victim at the time of death] x [reasonable portion of the annual net
income which would have been received as support by heirs]" 32

As testified to by the widow, Perla Gardose, the victim had been 36 years old at the time of
his death and earning an average of P100 daily or P3,000 monthly. 33 From this monthly
income must be deducted the reasonable amount of P1,000 representing the living and other
necessary expenses of the deceased.34 Hence, the lost earnings of the deceased should be
computed as follows:

= 2/3 x [80-36] x [P24,000]

= 2/3 x [44] x [P24,000]

= 2 [P1,056,000]
3

= P2,112,000
3

= P704,000

Being consistent with current jurisprudence, the award of P50,000.00 as death indemnity is
affirmed.35 Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is reasonable considering the grief
and sorrow36 suffered by the widow at the sudden loss of her husband. Moral damages,
which include mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded feelings, amy be recovered in
criminal offenses resulting in the victim's death. 37

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court vonvicting accused-appellant Francisco

Baltazar y Pimentel of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) accused-appellant shall serve the indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua, or imprisonment from twenty years and one day to forty years, in accordance with
the provisions of Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code; (2) the award of P15,000.00 as
actual damages is DELETED; (3) the award of loss of earning capacity is increased to
P704,000.00. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.