Descartes: Meditation Five

1. In this Meditation Descartes offers a second proof of the existence of God, known as the
Ontological Argument. Descartes needed the first proof (the Trademark Argument) to:
a. eliminate the possibility of systematic deception (say by the evil genius), and
b. establish that our judgments based on clear and distinct ideas are true.
Descartes believes that the second proof is weaker than the first proof of God’s existence.
The second proof cannot be used to eliminate the possibility of systematic deception, and
hence cannot establish that the judgments based on clear and distinct understanding are true.
But the first proof guarantees that the second proof is valid and sound.

The Ontological Argument

2. The Ontological Argument has a fairly long history, dating back to St. Anselm (1033-1109),
who devised the first known version of the argument, which attempt to prove the existence of
God solely from our concept of God, without relying upon any evidence from experience.
Descartes’s version is simpler and more elegant, and the gist of his argument is that the very
essence of God entails the existence of God. Here is how Descartes’s version of the
argument runs:
(1) I have a clear and distinct idea of a perfect being, i.e., of God.
(2) Perfection necessarily includes existence.
(3) Therefore, a perfect being, i.e., God, exists.
This argument is supported by analogy with the following argument we can make about the
clear and distinct idea of a triangle:
(1*) I have a clear and distinct idea of a triangle.
(2*) A triangle necessarily includes three angles adding up to 180 degrees.
(3*) Therefore, a triangle has three angles adding up to 180 degrees.
It follows that, just as a triangle necessarily has three angles adding up to 180 degrees, so
God necessarily has existence in reality.

3. A relevant similarity between the idea of God and the idea of a triangle: Both are clear and
distinct ideas, and hence guaranteed to be true by Descartes’s first proof of God’s existence
(i.e., the Trademark Argument in Meditation Three).

4. A relevant difference between the idea of God and the idea of a triangle: our idea of God is
that of a necessary being (= a being that necessarily exists in reality), whereas the second is
an idea of a contingent being (= a thing that may or may not exist in reality).

5. Perhaps the most difficult step to defend in the Ontological Argument is (2). Why must
perfection include existence, or in other words, why must existence be a perfection? One
answer is that Descartes accepted a worldview1 in which degrees of perfection correspond to

1
That is, “The Great Chain of Being”. See the notes on Meditation Four.

1
 degrees of reality. For instance, greater wisdom has a fuller existence than less wisdom.
Since God is perfect in all positive attributes, God also has the fullest existence.
But since this is not a worldview most of us accept, here’s another way of making Step
(2) plausible. Consider a being that only has good, positive attributes, like Santa Claus. An
actually existing Santa would be better than a merely imaginary Santa, right? Next we
consider God, who has all the good, positive attributes in the highest degree possible. Here
we ought to say, just as we did with Santa, that an actually existing God would be better than
a merely imaginary God. But now it follows that a merely imaginary God does not have all
the good, positive attributes in the highest degree possible, because a merely imaginary God
is worse than an actually existing God. Hence, existence is a perfection, at least for beings
who only have good, positive attributes. (I add this qualification because we would think
that an actually existing evil genius is worse than an imaginary one.)

A Problem with the Ontological Argument

6. Later, when we move on to Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, we will discuss
the Ontological Argument in greater detail. But here’s one recurrent worry about the
Ontological Argument: that it defines God into existence. For instance, the 19th century
German philosopher Schopenhauer suspected that the argument surreptitiously introduces
what is to be proved, i.e., the existence of God, among its premises or presuppositions, i.e., in
what counts as a perfection. He compared the argument to a conjuring trick where the rabbit
is secretly put into a hat before it is pulled out of it; so the argument seems to beg the
question against the atheist. If Schopenhauer’s worry is justified, it should be possible to
define other things into existence by using something like the Ontological Argument. Shall
we try?

7. First we will define a clearly non-existent being into existence, using an argument analogous
to the Ontological Argument. Let’s define Schmanta as “Santa Clause who necessarily
exists”. You now have an idea of Schmanta, and you want to deny that Schmanta exists in
reality. But Schmanta by definition is a necessary being (= a being who necessarily exists),
so Schmanta does exist in reality!

8. Next we will define a clearly contingent being (= a being who may or may not exist) into
necessary existence. Let’s define schlion as “a lion whose essence necessarily involves
existence”, and prove the necessary existence of schlions using the definition. You now have
an idea of schlion, and you want to deny that a schlion exists in reality. But a schlion is a
lion that necessarily exists! Therefore, schlions exist as necessary beings.

9. The two conclusions above (that Schmanta and schlions necessarily exist) are absurd: the
first conclusion because we know Santa does not exist, and the second conclusion because
we know all lions are contingent beings. Does this mean that the Ontological Argument is
also absurd in the same way? I leave it up to you to ponder, until our next discussion of this
argument.