1. The Supreme court is a constitutional body.

It cannot be abolished nor may its membership or the

manner of its meetings be changed by mere legislation.

Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 Phil 297 F: Pet. Vargas filed a motion assailing the constitutionality of People's
Court Act w/c provides that any justice of the SC who held any office or position under the Phil Exec.
Commission or under the govt called Phil. Republic, may not sit and vote in any case brought to that
court under sec. 13 hereof in w/c the accused is a person who held any office or position under either
both the Phil. Exec. Commission and the Phil. Republic or any branch, instrumentality or agency
thereof. If on account of such disqualification, or bec. of any of the grounds of disqualification of
judges, in R 126, sec. 1 of the ROC, or on account of illness, absence of temporary disability, the
requisite number of justices necessary to constitute a quorom in any case is not present, the Pres.
may designate such no. of judges of the CFI, judges at large of CFI, cadastral judges, having none of
the disqualification set forth in the above law, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as justice of the
SC in order to form a quorom. HELD: (1) Congress does not have the power to add to the existing
grounds for disqualification of a justice of the SC. To disqualify any of these constitutional component
member of the court- especially as in this case, a majority of them-- in a treason case, is nothing short
of depriving the court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification
of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. It would seem evident that if Congress could disqualify
members of SC in taking part in the hearing and determination of certain "collaboration" cases, it
could extend the disqualification to other cases. (2) The designation provided (a CFI-judge to sit as a
SC justice if the SC does not have the required quorum) is repugnant to the constitutional
requirement that members be appointed by the Pres. w/ the consent of the CA. (This was under the
1935 Constitution w/c required confirmation from the Commission on Appointments.) It will result in
a situation wherein 6 members sitting will not be appointed and confirmed in accordance w/ the
Consti. (3) However brief or temporary may be the action or participation of a judge designated, there
is no escaping the fact that he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the SC and if
allowed to do so, his vote would count as much as any regular justice.

////////////////////

“The trouble with tweaking even if it ain’t broke is it precipitates sneezing

(like when you tweak your nose), which was what happened with the
introduction of the DBM’s zero-based budgeting system that triggered the
irritation of the SC’s nostrils. Having expounded the merits of the action of
the DBM, perhaps it would be to the enlightenment and interest of your
faithful layman readers to follow through your discussion by next beaming
your lights on the position of the SC on the matter, to enable us to reconcile
the apparent conflict between the Executive function of budgeting and the
clamour of Judicial fiscal independence.”

I am not in a position to speak for the Supreme Court. Golden touch Court
Administrator Midas Marquez adequately performs that function. But allow
me to provide my four centavos on the topic of judicial independence.

***
In the proper order of things, fiscal autonomy is but one safeguard to protect
judicial independence. The importance of this order is buttressed by the fact
that the seven-year-old “New” Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary sets out as its first canon the tenets of “independence,” holding and
hailing the same as a “pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental
guarantee of a fair trial.”

On the operational level, the canon on “independence” commands Judges to

perform or refrain from certain acts that would “objectively” compromise
their independence. On the operationalized level, that is, in reality, “judges
shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by,
the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear
to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer” (sec. 5, canon 1). Simply put,
“appearing to be” and “recognized for being” can very well be just as
important as “being independent.”

***

Indeed the Judiciary is — or, at least, it ought to be — the least politicized

branch of government. The courts should function independently from
considerations other than justice, fairness, and equity. If the last “bulwark of
democracy” is to authoritatively speak with finality then it must be sparing,
as it is deliberate in its speech. As such, in years past, those who don the
judicial robe are, themselves, judged by their decisions, as their written
word speak for themselves.

***

The bottomline is that the bottomline, i.e. “fiscal autonomy”, isn’t the end
all and be all of judicial independence. As adverted to in last week’s column,
if the problem is in the meager salaries, then the solution is through
institutionalized practice, i.e. through a law that is passed for that purpose. If
the conviction is that the welfare of our judges needs to be improved, then
the increase in their salaries should not be made to depend on the
availability of “savings” or the generosity of local government units’ grant
of allowances, for doing so would offend against judicial independence.

And yet, in the end, the proof of judicial independence is found in Court
decisions that are wise, just, and consistent with settled law and
jurisprudence. “Judicial independence” as a function of public perception is
itself a result of the Court’s reputation. The people’s faith, trust, and
confidence in the institution is an important condition for its continued
existence; decisions cannot be credible if the people no longer find credence
in them. The predictability and regularity of the Court’s decisions are part
and parcel of the rule of law, because when the Court cannot give the people
what they can expect — justice — then they lose something that they can
and ought to look forward to.