Pahad D. Cadalay Block D.

Hon. Judge Rene Morallo Dala Cruz

Statutory Construction
16 November 2019

CHAPTER IX
Conflicting Statutes

It may happen that in a statute, conflicting clauses and provisions may arise. If such

situation may occur, the statute must be construed as a whole. It is a principle of legal

hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute or a set of rules, care should be taken that every part

thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a

hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. The rule is that a

construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently

inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and

harmonious whole (JMM Promotion and Management Inc., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 109835

November 22, 1993).

I. Basic Guidelines
It is well accepted that statutes relating to the same subject should not be read in

isolation. Such statute should be considered in pari materia. Moreover, statutes dealing with the

same subject matter should be considered together to achieve a harmonious result, resolving

conflicts to give effect to legislative intent. An accepted principle of statutory construction is

that, when it is not clear which of two statutes applies, the more specific statute prevails over the
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more general. Also when statutes provide different procedure on the same subject matter, the

general must give way to the specific.

II. Statute in Pari Materia

Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because enactments of the

legislature on the same subject are supposed to form a part of one uniform system; later statutes

are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the

legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the subject and to have

enacted its new act with reference thereto (Agpalo, 2016).

Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an

expressed national policy, thus on the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a

provision it has in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, it is held that in

the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision was enacted in

accord with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should be

construed together. Provisions in an act which are omitted in another act relating to the same

subject matter will be applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not inconsistent with its

purpose. Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be compared with the new

provisions; and if possible by reasonable construction, both are to be construed that effect is

given to every provision of each. Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent conflict, are so

far as reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other (Tan Co vs. Civil Register

of Manila, GR No. 13496, February 23, 2004).

III. Effect should be given to the Entire Statute

One of the well-established rules of statutory construction enjoins that endeavor should

be made to harmonize the provisions of a law or of two laws so that each shall be effective. In
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order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent.

The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act (U. S. v. Palacios, 33

Phil., 208.). Merely because a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an

earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law

may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 634.).

The Supreme Court applied this principle in the case of Paras vs COMELEC, G.R No.

123169, 4 November 1996. The Supreme Court speaking through justice Francisco declared that:

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. In the case at bar,
Paragraph (b) of Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period
when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, i.e. during the second year of
his term of office. SK elections cannot be considered a regular election as this would render
inutile the recall provision of the LGC.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in
the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute
or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or
nugatory.

IV. Interpretare et Concordare Legibus Est Optimus

It is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed not only to be

consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to

form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. This principle is consistent with the maxim,

interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must

be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.

In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only
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when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply

(Dreamwork Construction Inc., vs. Cleofe, G.R. NO. 184861 : June 30, 2009).

The Supreme Court applied this principle by declaring that:

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are
susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase
"previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible
of alternative interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or
may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion
to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public
prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the
case.

This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the
situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or
during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the
office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal
action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil
Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.

V. General and Special Statute

A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any

subject or place naturally belonging to such class, while a special act is one which relates to

particular persons or things of a class (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 265.).

A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless

the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia specialibus non derogant. And this is true

although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute

(Manila Railroad Company v. Rafferty, 40 Phil., 224.).

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VI. When Harmonization is no longer Possible

Agpalo (2019), each provision of the statute is inserted for a definite reason. The one who

drafted the law may have a good reason for inserting provision, which the reader may not see or

appreciate. The court therefore has the duty to reconcile or harmonize so far as practicable the

various parts and provisions of a statute including the conflicting provisions thereof, so as to

make them consistent, harmonious and sensible. It is only through this that the statute will be

given effect as a whole.

In cases where two statutes of different dates and of contrary tenor are of equal

theoretical application to a particular case, the rule is that the statute of later date shall prevail

because the statute of later date is presumed to be the latest expression of legislative will on the

subject.

In one case the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Tuason declared that by a fair

and reasonable construction, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, may be said

to apply to disqualifications under section 8 of that Act, and section 211 of the Revised

Administrative Code to disqualifications or disabilities not embraced in the Code of Civil

Procedure.

At any rate, in the event harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in

two laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, considered in its

entirety, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature.

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CHAPTER XI

Constitutional Construction and Interpretation

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a

nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it

emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes

the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their

respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is

founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other

laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all

public authority administered (Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS G.R. No. 122156 February 3,

1997).

I. Basic Guidelines

In construing and interpreting the constitution the court is guided by the following

principles of statutory construction. First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used

in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are

employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, the Supreme Court,

speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared that

“We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not
of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed
in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails”.
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Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be

interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framer. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional

construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held

that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be

accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A

doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and

circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason

which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose

sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words

consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive

Secretary, G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991). Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The

Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. It is a well-established rule in constitutional

construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be

considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought

into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections

bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the

whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by

any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together (Civil Liberties Union v.

Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991).

II. Suprema Lex

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of

the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive

branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any
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force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of

the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract (Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS G.R.

No. 122156 February 3, 1997). Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that “when the courts

declare a law to be inconsistent with the constitution, the former shall be void and latter shall

govern”. Thus as a rule, do not interpret a statute independently from the constitution construe it

in harmony with the latter. If the statute is susceptible to two constructions, one is constitutional

and the other is unconstitutional, the former shall be adopted.

As the constitution is the fundamental law to which all laws are subservient, a statute

should not be interpreted independently of the Constitution. The statute should be construed in

harmony with, and not in violation of the fundamental law. The legislature, in enacting a statute,

is presumed to have adhered to the constitutional limitations. Courts should accordingly presume

that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law one which

operates no further than maybe necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.

The Supreme Court applied this principle in the case of Ifurung vs. Carpio Morales, G.R

No. 232131, April 24, 2018. The Court speaking through Justice Martires declared that:

In our review of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, we note that in case of death,
resignation, removal, or permanent disability of the Ombudsman, the new Ombudsman
shall be appointed for a full term. Undoubtedly, Sec. 8(3), R.A. No. 6770 is consistent
with Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution in so far as it provides that the
Ombudsman and the deputies shall serve for a term of seven years. Every statute is
presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible
and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the
specific purpose of the law.
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III. Constitution Must be Construed in its Entirety

The principle Ut Magis Valeat Quam Pereat mandates that the constitution should be

interpreted as a whole, such that any conflicting provisions are to be harmonized as to fully give

effect to all. In the case of Decastro vs. JBC the Supreme Court was called to interpret the two

constitutional provisions which are seemingly in conflict. Section 15 of article VII provides that

“two months immediately before presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President

or acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive

positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public

safety”. Section 4(1) of article VIII provides that “The Supreme Court shall be composed of a

Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of

three, five, seven Members. Any cavancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence

thereof”. In this case the Supreme Court ruled that section 15 of article VII does not apply as

well to all other appointments in the judiciary. The court added that there is no question that one

of the reasons underlying the adoption of the section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate

midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing President. It is axiomatic in statutory

construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the process of

ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the enactment must

necessarily shed considerable light on the law of the statute i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment

should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek

to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it ( De Castro vs JBC, G.R No. 191032, March 17,

2010).

IV. Framer’s Intent

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It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be so

construed as to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. This intention is to be

sought in the constitution itself, and the apparent meaning of the words is to be taken as

expressing it, except in cases where that assumption would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or

contradiction (La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc., vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, January

27, 2004)

V. Mandatory Character of Constitutional Provisions

A mandatory provision of the constitution declares or imposes a duty or requirements that

must be followed. The Supreme Court speaking through Justice Bellosillo in the case of Manila

Prince Hotel vs. GSIS (G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997) held that section 10, second

paragraph, Article XII of the 1987 constitution, is a mandatory, positive command whci is

complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its

enforcement.

He further declared that as against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have

been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes

of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory

enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of

a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to

enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution

are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of

self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate

of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has

always been, that —

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In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-

self-executing .Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should

be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine

when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of

the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the

needed implementing statute.

VI. Self-Executing Provisions, Exceptions

The provisions of the constitution may be classified into self-executing and non-self-

executing provisions. The former refer to provisions which may be enforced without the need of

a statute, example of which is section 1 of Article III which states that “no person shall be

deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied

the equal protection of the laws” this provision is itself enforceable. Non-self-executing

provisions on the other hand refer to those provisions which in order to be enforced, it needs the

passage of a law, example of which is section 26 of Article II which provides that “the state

shall guarantee equal access for public service and prohibits political dynasties as may be

defined by law”. By simply reading this constitutional provision, it is clear that it can only be

enforced through the passage of a law that defines political dynasties.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their

provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who

merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the

governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A

provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987

Constitution is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
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becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which

supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-

executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right

conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be

determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating

that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

VII. Prohibitory Provisions given Literal and Strict Interpretation

In the case of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 83896, February

22, 1991) with respect to the construction of Section 13 Article VII of the 1987 constitution, the

Supreme Court speaking through Chief Justice Fernan declared that since the evident purpose of

the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-

President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple

offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition

must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is

prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of

the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the

language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive

and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be

given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution

itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3,

par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2)

and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and

Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

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Work Cited Page

Books

Diaz, Noli C. “Statutory Construction” 2016.

https://www.scribd.com/document/366606855/Statutory-Construction-Judge-Nilo-C-
Diaz-Fifth-Edition-2016
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Sayen, Mercy A. “Agpalo-Statutory Construction”. 2019

https://www.academia.edu/7643483/statutory_construction_agpalo

Suarez, Rolando A. “Statutory Construction”. Rex Bookstore, Manila, Philippines, 2014.

https://www.scribd.com/document/421816081/Statutory-Construction-by-Rolando-
Suarez

Cases

JMM Promotion and Management Inc., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993

Tan Co vs. Civil Register of Manila, GR No. 13496, February 23, 2004

Dreamwork Construction Inc., vs. Cleofe, G.R. NO. 184861 : June 30, 2009

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

De Castro vs JBC, G.R No. 191032, March 17, 2010).

La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc., vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, January 27, 2004

Ifurung vs. Carpio Morales, G.R No. 232131, April 24, 2018

UNIVERSITY OF NUEVA CACERES

College of Law
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CHAPTERS IX AND XI

CONFLICTING STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND

INTERPRETATION

(Term Paper)

Pahad D. Cadalay Block D

Statutory Construction

Hon. Judge Rene Morallo Dala Cruz

16 November 2019