Is There a ‘Self’ in Self Research?

or,

How Measuring the Self Caused It to Disappear

Scott Greer, Ph.D.

Department of Psychology
University of Prince Edward Island
550 University Avenue
Charlottetown, PEI
C1A 4P3

from: Greer, S. (2007). Is There a 'Self' in Self Research? Or, How Measuring the Self Caused

It to Disappear. Social Practice/Psychological Theorizing. On-line at

http://sppt-gulerce.boun.edu.tr.html.

Correspondence can also be addressed via e-mail to sgreer@upei.ca

 Abstract

This paper discusses the historical transformation of the concept of self in and through self research.

By looking at the rise of empirical self measurement and its effect on the use and understanding of

the self, a greater appreciation can be gained of the interconnections between theory and research

practice. This article focuses on the Pier-Harris Self Concept Scale for Children, which appeared

along with a number of other self measures in the late 1950s and 60s. With the rise of paper and

pencil tests in the late 1950s, writing on the self shifted from a theoretical to an increasingly

empirical discourse, where the primary concern was with the prediction of personality variables.

This transition entailed changes to the term, from self to self-acceptance, and then to self-concept

and self-esteem, as well as more subtle conceptual changes concerning what it meant to have a self.

This transition was less a function of best research practices, and more a function of disciplinary

changes to what counted as knowledge.

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 Is There a ‘Self’ in Self Research? 1

or,

How Measuring the Self Caused It to Disappear

Scott Greer, Ph.D.

University of Prince Edward Island

Introduction

The concept of a ‘self’ is an extremely well-known and traversed area within the personality

area and psychology in general, and it is also an integral (if theoretically implicit) part of many

psychological theories. This paper builds upon earlier research (e.g., Greer, 2003a, 2003b) that

suggests the self has undergone a series of fundamental transformations in terms of its

conceptualizations and the practices that inform them.. However, these changes are actually shifts

in disciplinary codification rather than scientific advances, and have their origins more in terms of

adaptations of practice to social context rather than as empirical facts.

After a “disappearing act”, as Gordon Allport (1943) called it, during the heyday of

behaviorism, the concept of self began to again permeate psychological discourse with the decline

of behaviorism, and the rise of more client-based practices that both appealed and applied to people’s

experience. Since the late 1950s and early 60s, self research has exploded in terms of the number

of theories about the self, as well as the number of measures and tests of self-related constructs.

Kitano (1989) reported that over 30,000 articles included the term "self" in the title--about 6,500 of

which specifically used "self-esteem," clearly the most intensively studied area in self research. This

3
finding was also confirmed by Mruk (2006), and Baumeister (1998) likened the attempt to keep up

with the self literature to “trying to drink from a fire hose” (p.680).

In earlier work (Greer, 1999, 2003a, 2003b), I found that despite prodigious empirical

research activity, there is no consensus as to what terms such as self, self-concept, self-esteem mean

or refer to, or how they should be defined within psychological research. To make matters worse,

the use of the terms are widely inconsistent: some use self-esteem and self-concept interchangeably–-

although there have been attempts to differentiate between them (Greenwald et al., 1988; Watkins

and Dhawan, 1989). Others simply use self, self-esteem, and/or self-concept and do not differentiate

among them, while others still may use self-concept to mean self-esteem.2 However, Byrne (1996)

cites construct validity studies which have argued that the lack of a "clear, concise, and universally

accepted definition of self-concept" stands as a major methodological weakness in the area.

One common assumption in psychological research is that multiple measures will (hopefully)

triangulate upon what the self actually ‘is.’ As Green (1992) has noted, however, to assume the self

(or IQ, emotion, etc.) is some non-physical thing ‘out there’ beyond our measures is to

metaphysicalize the entire notion–not exactly the move one would expect from an ‘empirical

psychological science.’ This criticism, and the problem of multiple operationalizations, clearly

applies beyond our critique of the self, and perhaps includes a majority of social and personality

research. In any event, self researchers do not appear to be charting the murky waters of the self with

the same map, nor moving towards one, and Wylie (1989) maintains (echoing Byrne) that the lack

of a consistent or clear conceptual definition represents a major problem in using the self literature

for further research. From looking at this general situation over twenty years ago, Demo (1985)

concluded that it appears the area of self research has focussed almost exclusively on the empirical

4
questions regarding the self, but neglected to work out the conceptual framework in which the

findings would be meaningful.

This situation since this time has changed very little, but it is essential in understanding the

difficulties within this field. The lack of any consistent conceptual definition or theoretical structure,

the confusing myriad of fleeting measures which are used, and the fact that basic distinctions

between self, self-concept, and self-esteem are not consistently maintained all point to a profound

theoretical and empirical confusion.3 Furthermore, over the past 20 years a growing number of

writers have questioned the validity of this frequented notion, calling our attention to the self’s

cultural and historical embeddedness, and leaving the nagging feeling that there is no actual ‘self’

behind our discourse about it (e.g., Gergen, 1973, 1985; also see Cushman, 1990). By focussing our

attention back to the conceptual and historical foundations of our current uses of self-related terms,

some of the reasons for such remarkable inconsistency may come to light. We will be looking at

evidence that suggests that one of the central reasons is that the self is a discursive object (as opposed

to a natural one), sensitive to social and historical context, and therefore there cannot be one ‘true

definition’ or ‘correct methodological practice.’

As such, I would suggest that this situation in self psychology is perhaps one of the strongest

arguments for a “historical psychology” (as outlined for example by Danziger, 2003a, Gergen, 1973,

and Peeters, 1997): one where psychological concepts are more authentically understood within local

parameters of social and historical context, including disciplinary and social practice. Here is an

example of how the study of history can make its own ‘research’ (traditionally defined)

contributions: an historical psychology can not only help make sense out of the self, but add in some

important ways to our understanding of the discipline itself. For instance, in adopting an ontology

5
of socio-historical (vs. natural) kinds, such historical transformations would be central to

Psychology, rather than something anomalous that needs to be corrected. It would indeed be ironic

the empirical investigative practices of psychology, which have traditionally been thought to be the

basis of its scientific status, should become one of the central arguments–indeed the very grist--for

an ‘historical psychology.’ Even further, I would argue that research such as this may prove

necessary to work out the historicity of psychological objects and measures together with, or even

before, the empirical work in the field—historical psychology as a “prolegomena” for empirical

psychology!4

Greer (2003a, 2003b) argued that the self, as a theoretical concept, had undergone a series

of transformations in the late 1950s and 60s, as found in the varied assortment of self-report based

constructs, including most significantly ‘self-concept’ and ‘self-esteem.’ This transformation was

accomplished through a tremendous resurgence of interest in the self that was realized through a new

generation of paper and pencil tests in post-war America. Most of these early tests dealt with the

notion of "self-acceptance," a progenitor to what is now referred to as self-concept or self-esteem

(a change, incidently, that has its own story). These early self measures (some of which will be

discussed later) were all based on a well-defined theory of self, and reported on responses to items

concerning self-perceptions. These measures were based on Likert scales and other questionnaire-

type methods that could sample large numbers of people. Later measures became increasingly

behaviorally-oriented, and used constructs such as self-concept and self-esteem. The most recent

breed of self constructs are multidimensional; rather than positing a single or holistic sense of self,

these measures are more closely tied to specific behaviors with specific behavioral domains (e.g.,

academic, social, athletic, etc.). Unlike the purely conceptual self, self-concept and self-esteem

6
could be defined as testable constructs, which offered a much better fit with the empirical

measurement mandate of late 20th century North American Psychology. As a result, self-concept and

self-esteem have, over time, all but replaced the self as a part of psychological research. Similarly,

the original theoretical context of the self had broader connections to agency and dialectical co-

constitutive social relationships; as discussed in Greer (2003b), these connections are now all but

gone in self research.

Greer (2003a, 2003b) also argued that self-concept and self-esteem are far from adequate

replacements for the concept of self: they either leave out or severely truncate and transform the

moral dimension of conduct, as well as other notions such as agency, reflexivity, intentionality,

consciousness, experience, and the nature of ‘the social.’ While I am not suggesting that there is

some ‘true’ version of these concepts that needs to be maintained, I am concerned that these

transformations are largely invisible, often masked by a rampant a-theoretical utilitarian concern with

test validation, furthering the disciplinary agenda of prediction and control, and a certain naivete

about the nature of language and psychological (vs. natural) kinds in psychological research. As

such, so-called objective investigative practices are the most transformative in the “life history of

a psychological concept” (borrowing Danziger’s metaphor), since the process of change is rendered

largely invisible by Psychology’s neo-positivism and its a-historical treatment of its subject matter.

In this paper, I want to add to previous research and provide further support for the

transformative process of measurement and measurement practices; to borrow from Freud this

time–we seek to make the invisible visible.. Due to space limitations, we can only look at the history

of a single measure of self, the Piers-Harris Self Concept Scale for Children, which was among the

myriad of self measures that seemed to inundate Psychology in the late 1950s and early 60s.

7
Although created over 40 years ago in 1964, the Piers-Harris measure is still the most widely used

measure of self for children, and third among all self measures, behind the Rosenberg Self-Esteem

Scale and the Tennessee Self Concept Scale (TSCS), respectively.5 Through examining this measure

and its history in detail, I hope to show how the measure itself evolved, reveal its conceptual

background, and explore how it defines its subject matter. More importantly, I want to reveal (á la

Heisenberg) how the practice of measurement itself is transformative, resulting not only in

significant alterations to its subject matter, but also, rather paradoxically, creating a sense of

historicity for these supposedly objective instruments.

Before considering the Piers-Harris measure and its historical context, I would like to very

briefly review some historiographic issues connected to this study.

Historiography and Other Methodological Considerations

As indicated above, rather than regarding the question “What is the self?” as a legitimate

question to be answered, I am taking the question itself as problematic. Variables in psychology are

defined to a large extent by how they are measured, and as has been repeatedly charged of

psychology, psychological method is usually the tail that wags the conceptual dog. Following this

logic, I am taking self measures themselves (i.e., their assumptions, definitions, historical

connections, psychometric format, etc.) to be the source of information about the meaning of the self,

rather than looking to the results these measures provide. In this way, the self-as-practiced (in the

context of psychological research) will be examined, focusing on the uses and practices in

representing the self as a psychological object.

To gain some sense of how the self is investigated in psychological research, I conducted a

8
survey using PsycINFO to identify the most popular self measures. Covering material up to October

2006, my findings confirmed trends reported by Byrne (1996), Greer (1999), and Wylie (1989): The

Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale, the Tennessee Self Concept Scale (TSCS), and the Piers-Harris Self

Concept Scale for Children remain (by far) the most widely used measures related to the self. To

give some sense of the scope and popularity of these measures: the Rosenberg scale registered the

most ‘hits’ on PsycINFO with 1164; TSCS had 864, and the Piers-Harris scale managed 689. With

the exception of Coopersmith’s (1959) Self-Esteem Inventory (562 hits), an early self measure whose

use has waned over time, other well-known self measures were still well behind this degree of

popularity; these included Marsh and Shavelson’s (1985) Self-Description Questionnaire (292),

Harter’s (1982) Self-Esteem Scale (168 hits), Body Esteem Scale (92), Pictorial Scale of Perceived

Competence (89), and Bracken’s (1992) Multidimensional Self-Concept Scale (34). The three most

popular measures that I have identified account for over 90% of the psychometric tools used to test

concepts involving the self. As noted, I will restrict my comments to an in-depth discussion of the

Piers-Harris measure, but include research on the other two measures from my doctoral dissertation

(cf. Greer, 1999).

In investigating the history of the self according to self measures and instruments, I am

following Danziger’s (1990;1997; 2003a; 2003b) lead, and attempting to situate concepts of self

within a set of disciplinary practices which play a formative role in the existence of the concept.

While attempting to answer Danziger’s call for a “historical psychology” and “biographies of

psychological objects,” the work of authors such as Cushman (1995), Foucault (1977; 1984), Gergen

(1973; 1985, 2001), and Rose (1988; 1996) are also related. Following these writers, the

historiography used here can be described as ‘genealogical,’ in following the Foucauldian, and,

9
before him, the Nietzschean (cf. 1887/1968) use of the term. This approach views the self as a set

of psychological concepts constructed through discourse and various forms of human activity, rather

than an a priori object outside of these practices that have been measured in a variety of ways.

Now, let us consider some examples of these new self technologies, focusing on the Piers-

Harris Self Concept Scale, and the ways in which they characterize–and, ironically, eliminate--the

concept of self.

The Measurement of the Self in Social and Disciplinary Context:

The Piers-Harris Self Concept Scale

As Baumeister (1998) noted, the self literature is nothing if not vast. However, historically

within psychology there has been a distinction between theories of personality that addressed the

person holistically (e.g., Allport, Murray) and those that were more interested in specific personality

traits or constructs (e.g., Cattell and the “individual differences” approach). Early North American

psychology (i.e., before the 1930s) tended to view the person as a whole rather than as a set of

elements. Stern’s (1924) “personalistic psychology,” for example was based on an understanding

of the person as a “multiform dynamic unity,” while McDougall (1908) believed personality was a

confluence of instincts and sentiments. The unity of self, or “character” according to McDougall

(1908), is based on the capacity for “self-regard.” However, the general trend in self research since

the late 1950s has been away from the moral and mental philosophy-sounding ‘self,’ and more

towards the questionnaire-based ‘self- concept.’ As well, the past three decades have represented a

significant shift in discourse on the self: one away from the first-person perspective (i.e., holistic,

experiential) and a move towards a third-person multidimensional perspective, which is more

10
concretely tied to specific behaviors (e.g., Bracken, 1992; Markus and Nurius, 1986; Marsh and

Shavelson, 1985). An important part of this shift entailed changes in the terminology, from theories

of ‘self’ to empirical models of ‘self-concept’ and ‘self-esteem.’ Far from simply semantics, this

shift represents a conceptual evolution in how the self is understood.

As a parallel to the rejection of the self in self research, the ‘person-as-a-whole’ was rejected

in personality research, which was apparent as early as 1971, when Carlson (1971) wrote the critical

and provocative “Where is the person is personality research?” Although written over 35 years ago,

much of Carlson’s critique is still relevant today. For instance, personality research has yet to answer

the basic questions regarding the ‘person’ posed by the pioneers of the area, Allport and Murray.

Most researchers, however, consider these questions naive, and more appropriately framed and

answered by today’s more empirically-driven methodologies. Nevertheless, Carlson (1971) made

a cogent point when she wrote:

Personality psychology would seem to be paying an exorbitant price

in potential knowledge for the security afforded by preserving norms

of convenience and methodological orthodoxy. Must these important,

unanswered questions be left to literature and psychiatry? (p. 207).

The shift towards multidimensional models was not because they were simply ‘better’ than

the holistic types--indeed one could argue that they do not reflect the person’s experience of self as

well--but rather that they were better suited to the needs (and expectations) of the consumers of

psychological knowledge (e.g., prediction).

However, the form of knowledge was not the only aspect of psychological research shaped

by the American cultural milieu---the content areas became important too. As McAdams (1997)

11
points out, the self, authoritarianism, achievement motivation, anxiety, and field independence

became hot topics in the late 1950s and 60s, reflecting an overwhelming sense of the post-war,

middle-class American values of individualism and self-determination. The study of field

independence, for example, is indicative of this type of nationalism. The trait of “high field

independence” meant that a person could separate a figure (i.e., an ‘individual’) from a context or

background; those that were “field dependent” (clearly an undesirable trait) had difficulties in

de-contextualizing the embedded figure. In other words, ‘standing out from the crowd’ or an

emphasis on individuality is obviously the ‘best’ option here; lacking this quality might be

tantamount to a lack of individuality, freedom, or even (gulp!) a disposition toward socialism.

Furthermore, should it seem odd that this also serves as a rather accurate portrayal of personality

testing in psychology? ‘Good’ personality research was able to divorce the person from his or her

context and isolate specific factors within the individual; considering the ‘self’ and the ‘social’ as

inextricably woven together was not only impractical, in that it was untestable, it was downright

‘un- American!’ Similarly, ‘authoritarianism’ represented the evil Nazis who blindly followed orders

like automata, as opposed to the freedom-loving, liberal, democratic Americans (a myth which

Milgram, of course, laid to rest!). “Achievement motivation” and the middle-class preoccupation

with personal success through self-direction just as clearly reflects the American ‘character’ of the

time. In short, the “bounded, masterful self” (Cushman, 1990) was never more firmly etched in

American consciousness or psychological practice. Clearly, the American values regarding

individualism had significant implications for the way in which the self was framed and investigated

in psychology: the self was autonomous and inner directed, and not a product of social context or

a group mentality. As McAdams (1997) again acutely points out:

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 The polarities of individual and group, figure and ground, and self and context reflect

a cultural tension that, in America, is probably as old as de Tocqueville’s nineteenth

century appraisal of American life. Yet the tension seemed to grow stronger and

more salient after World War II, subtly influencing the questions asked and answers

sought by American personality psychologists (p. 17).

As has been previously documented (cf. Danziger, 1990), changing social conditions in North

America after World War II brought about new research practices and technologies. Newly

developed measures of psychological phenomena, set within an individual differences paradigm,

carved up the psychological interior of a population amidst a booming post-war economy. This

involved, among other things, the transformation of “psychological reality into a statistical reality”

(Danziger, 1990), and the proliferation of a scientific and technological discourse concerning human

conduct on an aggregate level. After World War II, this new statistical psychological reality emerged

when psychology was called upon to research a variety of “human factors” that were relevant to

North America’s growing industrial complex. Many of these human factors included personality

characteristics, or “traits,” which when studied in an empirical, individual differences format,

produced a large amount of aggregate data concerning a given population. This aggregate-focused

approach to personality factors proved extremely useful in America, as it allowed businesses and

government agencies to handle growing numbers of people with efficiency and ‘accuracy.’ It also

helped psychology find its niche in the post-war American economy, capitalizing on the transition

from war-time to peace-time production (Cushman, 1990).

On a corporate front, psychology offered a growing number of psychological tests (which had

the perception of being useful during the war) that could predict areas of achievement and identify

13
areas of weakness.6 The status of psychological ‘instruments’ as objective tools gained ascendency,

as these were the devices which would be used to measure and help manipulate the transformed

individuals. “Personality inventories”-- even the name has a commercial ring to it--became popular

tools, such as Gough’s (1957) California Psychological Inventory (CPI), Cattell’s (1957) Sixteen

Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF), Jackson’s (1967) Personality Research Form (PRF), and

(of course) the MMPI. At the same time, statistical analyses were developed (such as factor analysis)

to interpret responses and give a relative indication of a person's level of functioning (Kendler,

1987). Psychology’s pragmatic and practical approach to mental testing and measurement was

perfectly suited to the business-oriented, utilitarian Zeitgeist of American culture: psychological

testing could identify behaviors that are useful to society, and develop methods of testing to see who

excelled at these.

From this perspective, psychology can be seen as another ‘business’ in the fast-paced,

success-driven American marketplace. For psychology to survive, let alone succeed, it had to evolve

along with the demands of the targeted consumers of psychological knowledge. This meant that only

particular forms of knowledge (typically, in an empirical, aggregate format) were considered useful

or even ‘knowledge’ at all. The mental testing movement and the concomitant ‘individual

differences paradigm’ shows how the philosophies of pragmatism and positivism have worked

together to form the driving force behind psychological research for much of its history and into

present-day.

Along with personality traits and self-esteem, the 'normal' and 'abnormal' dimensions of

behavior became not only moral and functional terms, but also (due to psychology’s naturalization

and ‘scientization’ of the mind) 'objective' designations. From the self’s initial revival in clinical

14
practice, there has been a connection between self measures and clinical diagnosis. In fact, Fitts

(1965), the creator of the Tennessee Self Concept Scale, suggested that the TSCS could be used as

a general diagnostic tool for psychological disorders. By correlating patterns of responses with

response styles of a particular disorder, self-measures could not only detect ‘normal’ versus

‘abnormal’ in terms of our self-concept, but also indicate what disorder might be present(!).

North American personality psychology’s “individual differences” paradigm thus had a

tremendously transformative effect, not only on self research, but on the very basic structure and

understanding of the person. It is within this context that today’s most popular self measures were

created, including the Piers-Harris Self Concept Scale for Children in 1964. It is interesting and

important to note that all three of the most popular self measures were created between 1964 (Piers-

Harris and TSCS) and 1965 (Rosenberg). And while the multidimensional self-concept is

supposedly ‘superior’ and the dominant trend since the early 80s, the Piers-Harris and Rosenberg

scales posit a unitary self-concept; the TSCS does actually assume the self-concept is

multidimensional, but, psychometrically, the measure has never been able to reliably demonstrate

this. This leads one to wonder just what does account for the success/popularity of these three

measures?

Theory, Assumptions, and Overview of the

Piers-Harris Children’s Self-Concept Scale

In their original 1964 article, Ellen Piers and Dale Harris (1964) proposed a "wide range

self-concept instrument" that would be a standardized general self- concept test for children over an

extensive age range (8-18 years), and a measure for helping determine the correlates of the

15
self-concept. Twenty years later, Piers and Harris published a revised self-concept scale, although

the differences between the initial and revised measure are minimal. As described by Piers and

Harris (1984), "Despite the addition of some supplementary measures (principally the cluster scales)

and the accumulation of an impressive body of research, the basic format and content of the scale

have remained the same" (p. 43)

As the title of their article ( "Age and other correlates of self-concept in children") suggests,

Piers and Harris (1964) began their investigation of the self-concept in a psycho-educational context.

The original study was conducted on school children in Grades 3, 6, and 10, and the authors hoped

that they would be able to chart the development of the self-concept through these formative years.

They point to Carl Rogers' theory of self, with its emphasis on personal adjustment as a function of

(the development of) self-concept and self-acceptance, as the progenitor of this area of research.

Piers and Harris saw their own research as broadening this perspective to include data on the

development of the self-concept and its correlates (such as intelligence).

Regarding the definition of their terms, Piers and Harris (1964) define the self-concept

slightly differently (and less precisely) than they do in Piers and Harris (1984). In the 1964 article,

Piers and Harris eschew the question of whether or not the self-concept gathered through self-report

accurately reflects an underlying self. Likewise, they report that their study did not investigate the

controversial topic (at the time) of self vs. ideal self discrepancies (which Rogers had done).

However, in the revised scale, Piers and Harris (1984) state that their definition of self-concept:

focuses on children's conscious self-perceptions, rather than attempting to infer how

they feel about themselves from their behaviors or the attributions of others. Thus,

this definition is consistent with what Wylie (1974) refers to as a phenomenological

16
 view of "self-concept" and, ...is interchangeable with the terms self-esteem and

self-regard. (p. 1)

Piers and Harris (1984) discuss, in some detail, their assumptions regarding the self-concept

of children. First, (as stated above) they view the self-concept “phenomenologically”; that is, they

find “self-report”--while scientifically perhaps not as accurate as behavioural observation--to be the

most "direct expression of the individual's experience of himself or herself." Second, the

self-concept has global and specific components. In this regard they are part way between

‘unidimensional’ models of self-concept (e.g., Rosenberg) and ‘multidimensional’ models (e.g.,

Bracken, 1992; Marsh and Shavelson, 1985): they are interested in the person's overall view of self,

but are also trying to assess the various aspects in which people compartmentalize their experience.

Hence, some of the items may be broad (e.g., “I'm a nice person”), while others may be more specific

(e.g., “I'm good at math”). Piers and Harris clearly agree with (but do not acknowledge) William

James' observation that what we tend to value has a greater impact on our self-concept than that

which we find unimportant. Piers and Harris repeat their third assumption in numerous places: that

is, the self-concept is assumed to be "relatively stable," and, while shaped by experience, it does not

change easily or quickly. They note that some self-concepts may be more pliable than others, and

some may be more subject to change during certain "critical periods" (i.e., as described by Erikson,

1950). Fourth, the self-concept contains both an evaluative and a descriptive component. The

evaluative aspect usually involves a comparison of the person to someone else, such as a peer. The

descriptive component (which still seems ‘evaluative’) is more often a comparison of past feelings

or behaviour with the present, or a within-person comparison as opposed to a between-person

comparison. Fifth, the self-concept is believed to be experienced and expressed in accord with the

17
development of the child. In other words, as the child develops, changes in self-concept mean that

his or her way of experiencing the world is altered; moral and ethical development would be obvious

examples here. Finally, the self-concept is thought to play an important role in organizing and

motivating behaviour. In conjunction with the stability assumption, Piers and Harris assume that

part of the functioning of the self-concept entails the maintenance of an overall “self-image” (which

of course begs the question of how this is different from “self-concept”). As a result, they argue, we

are motivated to 'correct' deviations from a 'normal' perception of ourselves, and our ability to plan

illustrates the organizational features of the self-concept.

Looking at the structure of the measure itself, it consists of 80 "yes" or "no" questions (as

opposed to the Likert scale favoured by many). A sample of some of the items include: "I get into

a lot of fights; I have good ideas; I am strong; I am nervous; I am unpopular; I am lucky." These six

items were drawn from the measure’s six ‘post hoc’ cluster scales, offered in Piers and Harris

(1984); these scales are (in their order above): behaviour, intellectual and school abilities, physical

appearance and attributes, anxiety, popularity, and happiness and satisfaction.

Unlike some of the early self-concept measures that focussed on adults, the Piers-Harris scale

measures the self-concepts of children and adolescents. Today, most self-concept measures focus

on children and/or adolescents (e.g., the Piers- Harris and Harter’s Pictorial Scale of Perceived

Competence and Social Acceptance for Young Children [Harter and Pike, 1984]), while some

consist of various versions that cover the entire life span, such as Harter’s Self Perception Profiles

(e.g., Harter, 1985; Neeman & Harter, 1986) and the Self Description Questionnaires I-III (e.g.,

Marsh, 1992a-c). However, the single highest concentration of self-concept measures, and

self-concept measurement, is clearly on the school age years (Byrne, 1996; Wylie, 1989). Although

18
the early history of self research can be traced to clinical interests, the applicability and practicality

of self-concept measurement to school and educational settings became clear by the early 1960s.

Indeed, Piers and Harris (1964) indicate that their interest in testing children and the use of the self

in educational psychology was a departure from the populations targeted by other self-concept

measures at the time (which served largely diagnostic purposes):

While parent-child interaction and other early experiences are assumed to be

important in the development of the self-concept, investigations into these variables

and the measurement of the self-concept, have, with a few notable exceptions...been

restricted to populations of college age or older. (p. 91)

While psycho-educational research on child development has been around since the late 19th

century, the notion that the self-concept was quantifiable only became popular since the late 1950s.

Unlike the clinical environment at the time, the psycho-educational setting brought with it less

concern with addressing the self-concept in an explicitly experiential manner, and more focus on the

structure of the self- concept and the factors involved in predicting behaviour. Piers and Harris

(1964; 1984) are quite clear on this point, as noted earlier, when they describe the purpose of their

measure as providing “correlates of self-concept.”

Unlike some self-measures, the Piers/Harris measure is not ‘a-theoretical’ (as the

assumptions listed earlier attest), but is informed by theories of self from clinical and developmental

psychology. However, it is curious that Pier and Harris (1964; 1984) do not comment at all about

an underlying self, or make any connections between their measure and a theory of self. Their

description of the measure focuses on the characteristics of the self-concept in terms of its

relationship to development and behaviour. Their assumptions do not make clear what the

19
relationship between self and self-concept is, or how there could be a self-concept without a self.

Piers and Harris (1984) do note that their use of self-concept is equivalent to self-esteem or

self-regard, a point not made in the 1964 article, and one which was more or less denied by their

statement at the time that ideal-self ratings (i.e., reflecting esteem) were problematic (in interpreting)

and therefore not collected. It would appear that this change of attitude was brought about first by

the acceptance of self-esteem inventories during the intervening 20 years, and also by the fact that

numerous other researchers who used the original Piers-Harris scale often referred to it as a measure

of "self-esteem" (e.g., Wylie, 1974). So, while there was an initial conceptual distinction between

self-concept and self-esteem, this did not carry over into the practice of self measurement. The

‘measured self,’ and the nature of what psychological subject matter could be tested and reported by

questionnaire methods, placed limits on the distinctions that could be drawn empirically. The only

actual empirical content about the self (or that which can be revealed by the decided method) appears

to be about esteem. And, as stated earlier, nearly all measures of self- concept today are actually

about esteem--i.e., the evaluative attitudes a person holds of his or her perceived self, where a

“perceived self” would be the self-concept (Greer, 1999).

Interestingly, Piers and Harris (1984) advocate their measure in terms that are more utilitarian

than scientific-- in what turns out to be a significant trend. They write:

The Piers-Harris is an efficient, cost-effective research instrument and screening

device for use in applied settings. It is easy to administer and score, and can be used

by trained technicians and paraprofessionals under the supervision of a qualified

professional. ...the scale should prove useful in a variety of settings where a quick,

routine assessment of a child's reported self-concept is important. (p. 2)

20
More specifically, Piers and Harris (1984) single out some of the settings in which the Piers-Harris

may be used: first, as a screening device to identify children with special needs or those in need of

some further psychological or psycho-educational evaluation. Second, the Piers-Harris can be used

as an assessment tool in a variety of clinical and counselling situations. They note that this measure

may be particularly useful here since it focuses on the child's experience directly, and it may point

to areas of conflict within the child's life. And third, the measure represents a "quantitative, self-

report measure of children's self-concepts" (p. 3). Thus, it is a scientific instrument for

understanding the nature of the self-concept and how it is related to other components of a child's

behaviour and personality.

There is a similar ‘usefulness’ argument present in the Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale and the

TSCS, all stressing the measure’s utility, convenience, and efficiency. While this is understandable

and desirable, to a certain extent, it appears that making this type of utilitarian case carries more

weight than its psychometric properties, including factor analyses of the test and its construct

validity. While the Piers-Harris scale has had a stronger psychometric record than either the

Rosenberg scale or the TSCS, that is not really saying very much. Even the most sympathetic writers

(e.g., Byrne, 1996) note that the actual structure of the self-concept purported in the Piers-Harris

measure is in doubt, and that the other popular self measures (the Rosenberg and the TSCS) have

an even more dubious psychometric profile. Again, one wonders what then is the reason that these

measures are so widely used? Does the usability and efficient instrumentality of a measure account

more for its popularity than any objective or scientific criteria?

21
Historical and Theoretical Context of the Piers-Harris Scale

In terms of the historical and theoretical context of the Piers-Harris, we can glean some

important insights from their own 1964 article. Piers and Harris refer to Carl Rogers' "self-theory"

in their first sentence: "According to Rogers' self-theory, adjustment is in part a function of the

self-concept and self-acceptance" (p. 91). The primacy of place accorded to Rogers is clearly

important, since Piers and Harris’ unitary view of the self-concept shares a number of basic features

with Rogers' view, and Rogers’ ideas had become widely known with his Client-Centered Therapy

(1951).

Rogers' (1951) defined the self as "an organized, fluid, but consistent conceptual pattern of

perceptions of characteristics and relationships of the 'I' or 'me,' together with values attached to these

concepts" (p.498). Like many others, Rogers unfortunately used the terms self and self-concept

interchangeably, but the basic notion behind his theory was that the self-concept is a collection of

conscious representations that are organized to produce a sense of identity and "congruence."

Threats to one's self-concept can create disorganization and "incongruence," which therapy of course

attempts to attenuate. Rogers also believed that the self has an innate tendency towards

self-maintenance and self-improvement (the “actualizing tendency”). His view, while certainly not

popular in experimental psychology, began gaining support among clinicians during the 1960s.

While the utility of the notion of a self was becoming apparent to a growing number of

clinicians, the recognized and accepted types of methods for psychological research were still heavily

influenced by positivism and neo- positivism. A blatantly abstract, experiential, and non-observable

concept such as ‘self’ would not fit within psychology’s scientific discourse. Thus, a compromise

was sought, whereby this concept would be accepted as valid and legitimate methodologically, but

22
yet retain its utility to the aims of psychological practice. As a result, new methods for measuring

the self evolved, such as Victor Raimy’s (1943; 1948) “check-list” for describing the self-concept.

Raimy’s study was one of the early attempts to understand the self empirically in a clinical context.

His notion of self was based on the writings of Kurt Lewin and Gestalt psychology, as can be seen

from his definition of the self-concept as: "a learned perceptual system which functions as an object

in the perceptual field" (1948, p. 154). To tap what he referred to as the “self-concept,” Raimy

developed a check-list where the person rated self-referential statements. These were then classified

by judges into one of three categories: approval of self, disapproval of self, or ambivalence toward

self. A six month follow-up reclassification was conducted to check for reliability.

On one hand, Raimy's study was groundbreaking in that it represents one of the first measures

to draw upon phenomenological theory as a conceptual basis for the self (Crowne and Stephens,

1961). On the other, it is also significant in that its operationalization of the “self-concept” into

self-referential statements (behavior) helped allow for, and could be seen as a signal of, the eventual

revival of self and personality testing.

Further efforts to understand the self along these lines soon followed with the development

of the Q-sort by William Stephenson (1953), which was quickly picked up and elaborated by Rogers

and Dymond (1954). In addition, as if quenching a long drought, there was a 'flash flood' of

self-rating methods in the early and mid 1950s, most using an adjective check-list or self-rating

scale--e.g., Index of Adjustment and Values (Bills, 1951), Adjective Check-list (Gough, 1955)7 ,

Interpersonal Check List (LaForge and Suczek, 1955), Self- Rating Inventory (Brownfain, 1952),

Attitudes toward Self and Others Questionnaire (Phillips, 1951), and Berger Self-Acceptance Scale

(Berger, 1952).

23
 Again, this research activity reflected the general clinical finding that in order to understand

personality and behavior change, one had to address the experience of the person. However, the

‘experiential’ and ‘phenomenological’ was now constructed, for the purposes of research practices,

in an ‘objective,’ linear, ordinal, and serial fashion--or as a data set that was suitable to aggregate

statistics. The call for empirical research which provided this type of data became a clear trend in

personality research (and psychological research in general). For instance, in 1945 the journal

Character and Personality issued a policy statement (cf. Zener, 1945) stipulating that it would be

giving greater weight to “empirical papers” rather than theoretical or historical ones, and changed

its name to the Journal of Personality - - perhaps reflecting a concern for more ‘objective’ and

‘scientific’ research (McAdams, 1997).

Piers and Harris (1964) also drew on the work of Lecky (1945) and Snygg and Combs

(1949), both of whom bear fundamental similarities to Rogers regarding the self. According to

Lecky (1945), the "self-concept" is the "nucleus" of the personality, where "personality" is defined

as "an organization of values that are consistent with one another" (p. 160). Personality, for Lecky,

was largely understood in terms of personal agency and experience, and is considered to be dynamic,

undergoing constant assimilation and rejection of material. The self- concept, however, is considered

to be more stable, with its main purpose being "self-consistency" (the title of Lecky's theory). Lecky

proposed that the self-concept strives to maintain a consistent and unitary view of the personality and

of itself. Any threat to this balance results in anxiety. In this view, the self-concept determines what

we believe or do not believe about our self, all of which is a function of how easily an idea or

behaviors can be assimilated.

Snygg and Combs (1949) extend Lecky's view into "field theory," which was a concept

24
initially borrowed from physics, but later became popular through the writings of Kurt Lewin and

other phenomenological and Gestalt-inclined psychologists in the 1940s and '50s. Snygg and Combs

(1949) thus referred to the personality and the self-concept as part of the individual's "phenomenal

field," where the personality was differentiated into various parts and the self-concept functioned as

the nucleus. While highly differentiated, the self- concept is not a mechanistic

information-processing hierarchy (as with contemporary cognitive theorists), but a dynamic

self-organizing whole. The self-concept refers to, according to Snygg and Combs (1949), "those

parts of the phenomenal field which the individual has differentiated as definite and fairly stable

characteristics of himself" (p. 112). The essential features which all of these views share is that the

self is a relatively stable but dynamic "nucleus" of the personality.

More precisely, for all of these writers, the self is not regarded so much a structural

component of the person, as a ‘process’ that is fluid and is in constant flux with the world around

it, yet is stable and maintains an identity over time. This psychological ‘force’ is individual, but its

existence is also co-constituted by the social and relational dimension of human conduct. It is

important to remember the historicity of the self- - the self in this context is not an information-

processing rational-decision maker that assumes only one point of view; the ‘perceptual field’ or ‘life

space’ of the person may consist of many different perspectives. The act of ‘empathy,’ for example,

allows us to see and understand alternative perspectives; to be able to discover some new

meaning--often a person enters our lives--which changes everything, and we begin to know the world

all over again.

The importance of the self as a diagnostic tool in clinical and educational contexts was

immediately apparent, and the transformation of this experiential and holistic view of the self would

25
soon give psychology yet another way to 'take our temperature.' The fact that this concept was and

is of such great utility was well-understood by Perkins (1958):

...the self-concept phenomenon can serve education in two ways: a) as a

psychological construct which enables teachers, counsellors, parents, and

others to achieve with training deeper understandings and insights into the

behaviors and development of children, and b) as a vital and important aspect

of learning and development which the school...seeks to promote and foster

in every child. (p.221)

Working at the Institute for Child Study at the University of Maryland, Perkins marks one

of the early studies in what would become an extremely popular trend: the use of the self from a

psycho-educational/assessment perspective. Piers and Harris (1964) are clearly following this

tradition, as they acknowledge the importance of Perkins' study (along with Sears, 1941 and

Coopersmith, 1959), and they appear to incorporate the above two points made by Perkins into the

rationale for their own study: 1) "to develop and standardize a general self-concept instrument...over

a wide age range," and 2) "to determine correlates of self-concept in children" (Piers & Harris, 1964,

p. 91). It seems clear that a primary aim here was to further the goals set out by Perkins by creating

a scientifically valid measure of this construct.

Like Perkins, Piers and Harris were more interested in creating a children's self-concept scale

rather than an adult's, which had been the focus of most early self measures (e.g., Rogers and

Dymond's, 1954, self-ideal self comparisons). For this purpose, Piers and Harris turned to research

by Jersild (1952), who collected children's, adolescents', and young adult's observations of what they

liked and disliked about themselves. In fact, Piers and Harris derived the initial items for their 1964

26
scale from Jersild’s (1952) study, In Search of Self, making it the most directly relevant and

influential work for understanding the Piers-Harris self-concept scale.

Jersild’s In Search of Self was primarily concerned with how psychology can aid and further

the goals of our education system; specifically, he wanted to address a "need of staggering

magnitude:" the need to help children and adolescents "acquire realistic attitudes of self-acceptance.”

His study was decidedly qualitative in nature, and was designed to reflect the subjects’ experience

(without imposing any theoretical structure). He collected data from 3,000 students, ranging from

fourth grade through college, and asked them to write about their attitudes towards themselves (i.e.,

self-acceptance). Respondents wrote two short essays that answered the questions: "What I like

about myself" and "What I dislike about myself." With a panel of raters, he then took these and

slotted the responses into categories that he derived from the data, while still maintaining certain

"logical and psychological distinctions" as to what constituted 'healthy' vs. 'unhealthy' self-attitudes

(e.g., "moral conformity" vs. "inner strength"). Jersild commented that, next to the home

environment, the school is the most important venue in the psychological growth of children.

Accordingly, he believed that teachers had an obligation to foster psychological

development--particularly "self-acceptance"--in their students.

Jersild's (1952) study resulted in two tables, one for what students liked and one for what they

disliked about themselves. Each table had 18 content categories of the self-concept, representing

how many essays mentioned something in that category. These included some interesting and, now,

quite dated terminology: physical characteristics and appearance, clothing and grooming, health and

physical soundness, "just me, myself," and (a kind of catch-all) personality, character, inner

resources, and emotional tendencies. The original Piers and Harris study used these categories as

27
the basis for their initial pool of 164 items, and it is fascinating to compare Jersild’s categories with

Piers and Harris’ (presented above). Eventually this was reduced by over half to the 80 true/false

item test currently used. As noted earlier, these questions are all attempting to ascertain the child's

level of 'self-esteem' (according to contemporary linguistic practice), called "self-acceptance" by

Jersild, and "self-concept" by Piers and Harris. The important point is that the evolution of self

research (and the terms used within it) was as much (if not more) dictated by the type of data

required for the psychological market than by any findings from these early studies. In other words,

the new social and practical demands for self measurement not only led researchers away from

‘qualitative’ approaches such as Jersild’s, but toward a re-definition of what ‘self’ means.

Unlike Piers and Harris and others, Jersild (1952) was quite clear in explaining what he

meant by "self" and related terms, and we can trace the theories and traditions influencing his writing

fairly well. He offers several definitions of self, most of which are drawn from others including

James, Sullivan, Mead, Lecky, and Horney. Based upon these writers, his own view of the self is

as follows:

The self is a composite of thoughts and feelings which constitute a person's

awareness of his individual existence, his conception of who and what he is.

...The self includes, among other things, a system of ideas, attitudes, values,

and commitments. (p. 9)

Conceptually, his view appears to be heavily influenced by the sociological theory of

Mead--who was a tremendous influence on Sullivan's work as well. Jersild cited and agreed with

Mead's thesis that the self is social in origin, and it would be impossible for a self to develop outside

of social interaction. Jersild (1952) found Mead's concept of "reflected appraisals" (although he

28
incorrectly credits this concept to Sullivan) to be central to understanding the impact of relationships

on one's own self-appraisals. In effect, our sense of self develops based on what "significant" people

(i.e., parents and teachers) say and feel about us.

Jersild seemed to rely most heavily on Sullivan and Horney when discussing "the self and

its functions." Horney and Sullivan (especially) fit well with the Meadian view adopted by Jersild,

since all three emphasize similar points: most importantly, the role of the environment in the

development of the self, the plasticity of the self, and the need for acceptance and approval for

healthy development. Jersild (1952) believed that Sullivan's concept of "interpersonal relations" was

"at the heart of anything that could be done at school to promote healthy self-development or to

correct unwholesome tendencies..." (p. 12).

Jersild’s study was qualitative in nature and retained a theory of self which was central to the

investigation and interpretation of the self-reports. The Piers-Harris scale, by contrast, is quantitative

and eschews positing a self, although the assumptions underpinning the measure clearly reveal an

implicit understanding of self. Later measures have taken this a-theoretical path even further,

isolating specific self-report items that correlate to performance and various behavioral domains.

Conclusion

As described earlier, the notion of a self has undergone a profound transformation within

psychology: from the theoretical, speculative concept of ‘self’ to the self-report focused ‘self-

acceptance’ and ‘self-concept,’ and finally settling into the more behavior-oriented ‘self-esteem.’

Following World War II, self-report behavior, as found through paper and pencil tests, became an

objective and acceptable--not to mention primary--source of psychological knowledge. As

29
psychological research became increasingly applied, it frequently dealt with large numbers of people,

and the utility of questionnaire-type data (i.e, aggregate data) precipitated the rise and acceptance of

questionnaires as a psychological method. The entire notion that psychological tests could render

mental attitudes, beliefs, or desires in objective terms became, as it is now, an accepted practice.

However, it was only after the arrival of newly minted criteria for scientific objectivity in ‘construct

validity’ (cf. Cronbach and Meehl, 1955) during the mid 1950s that these practices flourished.

The concept of a self has traditionally represented the person as a whole, and, as such,

was deemed an ‘unscientific’ term by the new generation of methodologically self-conscious

psychologists. his situation changed when Carl Rogers and other holistic- and

phenomenologically-oriented (often clinical) psychologists found it to be a useful therapeutic

construct. Once tests were constructed which could describe the self (as self-concept) in a

manner that would be consistent with other forms of disciplinary practice, other tests which

purported to measure the qualities and dimensions of this new self-concept construct were

devised. The assortment of early self measures for children in educational settings, noted above,

is an example. This transformation of the self from an experiential, philosophical term to an

empirical, experimental construct allowed the self to be researched and marketed by psychology,

which is clearly a large part of the reason why, by the mid 1960s, a number of self-concept tests

had been conceived and were in regular use.

The Piers-Harris Self Concept Scale and, in fact, all three of today’s most popular self

measures were based on a humanistic or holistic notion of self--one which resisted fragmentation

and quantification, and which defined the self more as a process than as a structure or system

with components. Rosenberg, Piers and Harris, and Fitts all credit the writings of Carl Rogers

30
and Abraham Maslow as sources for their understanding of the self. Despite their ties to this

view of the person, the concept of self found in the humanistic and holistic psychologies of

Rogers and Maslow, and earlier Kurt Goldstein, is obviously lost in the current practices of self

measurement. Indeed, such notions are quite at odds with empirical measurement altogether. It

strikes one as rather odd that Piers and Harris (1984) and Roid and Fitts (1988) have each argued

in their revised testing manuals that their measures support a multidimensional view of the

self-concept.

Early self research, such as Jersild’s and Raimy’s, retained a theoretical context in which

the returns from their measure of self-concept might be understood. However, each succeeding

generation of self measures presented self-related constructs in an increasingly decontextualized

light, with little or no reference to the self. Emphasis on the prediction of behavior in specific

areas led to further compartmentalization of self constructs, leading to the current

multidimensional perspective. Questions in early self measures usually centered around how the

person rated him or herself concerning the various roles he or she played. In later measures, such

as the Piers-Harris, items were geared towards investigating aspects of children’s self-concepts,

in particular various aspects of childhood development and socialization: school, friends, sports,

etc. Thus, the notion of a multidimensional self can be seen as stemming from an interaction

between the needs of the consumers of psychological knowledge and the disciplinary parameters

and practices within psychology.

The language of the self literature continues to be confusing, inconsistent, and

contradictory; however, self-esteem has emerged as the variable that seems to carry the greatest

practical utility--child development, socialization, personality, work and family stress, and a

31
myriad of clinical applications all point to ‘esteem’ as a crucial variable. Esteem was, of course,

the construct that caught psychologists’ attention in the first place (viz. ‘self-acceptance’), not

only for its (perceived) ability to predict behavior, but it can be effectively correlated to specific

behavioral domains.

We should take note, however, that the historicity of esteem reveals it to be far from the

only important aspect of selfhood. During the Middle Ages, for instance (cf. Baumeister, 1987),

defining oneself was not simply a matter of esteeming oneself with respect to your behavior and

performance, but was a function of much larger social and cultural factors (such as lineage, class,

trade, etc.). Esteem has the role it does in psychological testing not because it best captures what

having a self or sense of self means, but it expresses what we consider, in our current context, to

be the most socially relevant information about individual selves.

Yet, there is a problem here, in what may be the self’s ‘final act’: while the empirical

approach to esteem appears to depict esteem at the level of the individual, this is clearly not the

case. The almost exclusive reliance on aggregate data and the use of inferential statistics places

the emphasis unmistakably on the overall characteristics of the group; the individual and the

qualities of the individual person’s esteem is not represented as psychological knowledge, but

lost in a sea of group data. As noted above, the most recent trend in the self literature has been

toward a multidimensional, multifaceted, and hierarchical self-concept (e.g., the

Marsh/Shavelson [1985] model, Bracken's [1992] "Multidimensional Self-Concept Scale," and

Markus and Nurius' [1986] "possible selves", not to mention Fitts’ and Piers and Harris’ claims

above). Based on cognitive, cognitive-behavioral, and information-processing theories, the

multidimensional self is understood as a 'multi-part' self-concept, rejecting most considerations

32
of a global conception of self or self-concept. When placed in the context of the reciprocally

influential revolutions in computer and cognitive science, the context for the self-concept’s new

look is clear. With the influx of computers, more ‘advanced’ statistical analyses and other

technologies, multidimensional constructs have become more prevalent, and most current models

of the self-concept reflect these new practices (e.g., factor analysis). Again, the historicity of the

self is marked by the objectified, third-person discourse of prediction and control.

One has to wonder, however, if it is possible to be too practical. While prediction is an

important part of science, prioritizing it above all else has transformed the data to such an extent

that theories of self are now contradictory and confusing. Here, we have a clear example of

Wittgenstein’s indictment: an overriding concern with utility and prediction has led us to the

ironic state of affairs of “experimental methods and conceptual confusion.” Perhaps more

attention should be paid to method as something more inclusive than simply empirical

techniques.

One of the other arguments of this paper has been that the utility of a measure is as

important, if not more important, to its success than its validity. We have seen how social context

affects research interests and methods, including the criteria by which we evaluate research (i.e.,

criteria of objectivity). We have also seen how investigative practices are not neutral with

respect to their subject matter, but are often transformative---and the heart of this transformative

process is practicality. Psychological testing is largely an applied science, not the basic science it

often appears to be, and the object of testing must be a usable, ready-to-hand object.

For instance, we say that revisions or ‘improvements’ to the Piers-Harris scale entailed

modifications of their technical dressing--added scales, revised statistics, computer scoring to

33
make them more ‘user-friendly’, and so on--not changes to the items themselves. This is true for

other measures as well, as found in Greer (1999). Again, this leaves one wondering if the

validity (or other such theoretical concerns) of the concept these measures portray is really the

issue; perhaps the tests in actual practice–its usability-- is really where it stands or falls.

Academic psychologists may be concerned with the abstract, psychometric issues, but one is left

with the feeling that a test’s reputation is determined by more practical, ‘everyday’ concerns.

In conclusion then, the current state of self measures is more a function of the type of

research and knowledge-generating practices being employed, and the purposes to which they are

geared, than any objective truth about individual psychological reality. We must continue to look

at these investigative practices, and the products they produce, more in terms of their place in the

larger social context, and their historicity, than as the 'best' or most objective way of conducting

research.

34
 Endnotes

1. The title is a my homage to, and paraphrase of, Rae Carlson’s 1971 classic, “Where’s the
Person in Personality Research?”

2. Traditionally, the "self" refers to the acting agent or "knower," the "self-concept" represents
the object of the self's knowledge (experienced as a compilation of perceptions), and "self-
esteem" refers to the evaluative dimension of that knowledge.

3. In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein dismissed experimental psychology, and

remarked that psychology has “experimental methods and conceptual confusion” (II, sect. xiv).

4. Obviously, the case for an historical psychology as a prolegomena to empirical psychology

will have to wait for another paper.

5. The choice of the Piers-Harris measure for analysis was based primarily on the point that
neither the Rosenberg nor the TSCS are strong psychometrically. I wanted to avoid the potential
confusion of a “weak construct” with the other kinds of weaknesses I address.

6. See Samelson (1977) and Reed (1987) for compelling indictments of Psychology’s failure to
develop a useful mental testing program for the U.S. Army.

7. This was to be part of the basis for the California Psychological Inventory (Gough, 1957).

35
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 Biographical Sketch

Dr. Scott Greer is currently Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Psychology at
the University of Prince Edward Island in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada. He is
currently the coordinator for the biennial Julian Jaynes Conference on Consciousness held at
UPEI. He is also the former Chair of the Canadian Psychological Association’s section on
Historical and Philosophical Psychology, and past Editor of the section’s journal, the History and
Philosophy of Psychology Bulletin.

Dr. Greer received his B.A. from the University of Memphis, and his M.A. and Ph.D. (in 1999)
from York University in Toronto. Current interests include, more generally, historical
psychology and a genealogical analyses of psychological content and practice, but also involve
the work of Julian Jaynes and the historical and philosophical foundations of his theory of
consciousness, and the intellectual relationship and theoretical connections between Friedrich
Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud, and their views on the origins of “bad conscience” and morality.

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