Marine Technology, Vol. 33, No. 2, April 1996, pp.

81-91

Marine
Technology

RO/RO Passenger Ferry Safety: A Perspective from the

Canadian West Coast
P. Noble, 1 H. Martin, 2 P. S. Hatfield, 3 Ken Davies, 4 G. R o d d a n , 5 and G. S t e n s g a a r d 5

This paper discusses actions which the British Columbia Ferry Corporation has undertaken sub-
sequent to the catastrophic 1994 Estonia capsize accident in the Baltic Sea that resulted in the loss
of 912 lives. The corporation sets as its highest goal the provision of a "safe, efficient and effective
ferry system," and therefore the actions described form part of a continuum of safety improvement
which is central to the BCFC operating philosophy. Recommendations with respect to both rough
water, northern route vessels and to the southern route, more sheltered water fleet are outlined. In
addition, the improvement of safety on the northern routes vessels by the fitting of improved
supporting and closing devices on the bow visors, by improving the bow ramp securing arrange-
ments and by installation of inner weathertight doors is described in detail. Some recent model
testing undertaken to investigate the potential for "bow scooping," and which has provided valu-
able input to the International Maritime Organization's Panel of Experts in determining the limits of
application of proposed bow flooding criteria, is reviewed.

Background be heavily influenced by European operating conditions,

IN 1987, the roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ferry MV Herald of
Free Enterprise capsized in shallow water shortly after set-
ting sail from Belgium, bound for England. The resulting
death toll of 192 aroused international concern among ferry
operators and regulatory bodies alike, and led to changes in
both vessels and operating procedures. Unfortunately, de-
spite these efforts, another ferry disaster occurred on Septem-
ber 28th, 1994 when, with little warning, the MV Estonia
capsized and sank in the Baltic Sea. This time, with the wa-
ter cold and deep and many passengers in their bunks, the
sea claimed 912 lives.
With a throughput of over 21 million passenger trips per
year, the British Columbia Ferry Corporation (BCFC) is one
of the largest ferry operators in the world and its fleet of
RO/RO ferries is a major link in the British Columbia trans-
portation system. The fleet operates in cold, deep waters and
regularly navigates treacherous tidal passes. A major pro-
portion of BCFC's passenger volume is carried aboard large
vessels, with capacities of up to 2100 passengers per ship.
Clearly, the potential for a high loss of life exists should a
BCFC ferry undergo a rapid capsizing similar to those expe-
rienced in Europe.
In the aftermath of the Estonia loss, marine regulatory
bodies have once again reacted quickly to try to prevent a
recurrence of any such incident. This is a laudable response;
however, the new regulations emanating from this effort will
1 American Bureau of Shipping, Houston, Texas.
2 British Columbia Ferry Corporation, Vancouver, B. C., Canada.
3 Peter S. Hatfield Ltd., Vancouver, B. C., Canada.
4 Vancouver Shipyards, Vancouver, B. C., Canada.
5 British Columbia Research Institute, Ocean Engineering Centre,
Vancouver, B. C., Canada.
Presented at the October 28, 1995 meeting of the Pacific North-
west Section of THE SOCIETY OF NAVAL ARCHITECTS AND MARINE EN-
GINEERS.
practices and public opinion, which differ substantially from
those prevailing in British Columbia.
Both the Herald of Free Enterprise and the Estonia capsiz-
ings resulted from massive flooding of the vessels' main ve-
hicle decks via the bow door openings, which led to sudden
loss of stability. These European vessels were configured dif-
ferently from the typical BCFC open shelter deck RO/RO
vessels in that they had relatively low freeboard and their
car decks were essentially completely enclosed so that, once
water had entered the vehicle deck space, it could not readily
escape. On the other hand, most BCFC ferries are open shel-
ter-deck vessels with relatively high freeboard and with nu-
merous large freeing ports along each side of the main car
deck.
Round table forum
In light of the recent Estonia RO/RO ferry disaster in Eu-
rope and in order to continue to fulfill its mission of providing
safe, effective and dependable ferry transportation services in
the most efficient manner possible, the British Columbia
Ferry Corporation convened a "round table forum" compris-
ing members of the corporation's safety, engineering and op-
erations staffs, local shipbuilders, naval architects, maritime
consultants, regulatory agencies and marine researchers fa-
miliar with and experienced in the issues relating to RO/RO
ferry stability. The intent of holding this meeting was to
review the current approach to stability of ferries on the
West Coast of Canada, where two different types of RO/RO
ferries are in service.
Within the forum, extensive discussions took place cover-
ing a range of topics relating to the existing static approach
to stability determination, the need to examine cargo shift-
ing, and the general benefit of applying approaches which
recognize the "real world" of ferry operations in our local
waters.
Further topics under discussion included the loading of fer-

APRIL 1996 0025-3316/96/3302-0081500.47/0 MARINE TECHNOLOGY 81

ries, their operation in rough conditions, and the training of
passengers in evacuation drills.
The type of ferry most numerous in Canada is the open
deck design which has relatively high freeboard and nonwa-
tertight spaces above the main vehicle deck. A few closed
shelter-deck ships, generally of the type used in Europe
which rely on watertight closures at the end of the main
vehicle deck to provide reserve buoyancy, are in service in
Eastern Canada and on BCFC's North Coast routes. Figure 1
shows the arrangement of the Queen of the North, the largest
of the BC Ferries northern routes vessels.
The open deck ships can be further subdivided into two
classes;
• The smaller ferries, generally below 100 m in length,
which have truly open car decks, uncovered except amid-
ships below the bridge and passenger accommodation,
protected only by bulwarks at the ends of the ship. Figure
2 shows the arrangement of one of the BCFC interisland
open deck ferries.
• The larger multideck, open shelter-deck ferries which
can have up to three decks of vehicles running the whole
length of the ship, inside an enclosed, but nonwatertight,
superstructure. Figure 3 shows the arrangement of one of
the large major route nonwatertight superstructure fer-
ries.
Out of a total fleet of 41 vessels BCFC operates three fer-
ries which are of the closed shelter-deck type: the European-
built Queen of the North and Queen of Chilliwack, and the
BC-built Queen of Prince Rupert. The Queen of the North and
the Queen of Prince Rupert are operated on the North Coast
routes between Port Hardy, Prince Rupert and the Queen
Charlotte Islands where they are exposed to more severe
weather conditions than the vessels operating on the south-
ern routes. [See Fig. 14 (p. 90) for BCFC routes map.]
The mood of the round table forum was that it was prema-
ture to define any permanent conclusions, but there was gen-
eral consensus on a number of topics raised in the discus-
sions, as follows:
• Status quo--The general opinion seemed to be that the
status quo was not an option. Sufficient concern over the
application of static calculations to problems that are
clearly dynamic in nature necessitates improvement over
the status quo.
• Freeboard--Dramatic differences in residual stability be-
tween the higher freeboard "open" deck southern ships
and the lower freeboard "closed" deck northern ships, to-
gether with other experience, led to the general conclu-
sion that historic minimum freeboard levels may not give
sufficient reserve. It was felt that this area would require
further study.
• Intact and damage stability standards--The conclusions
of the group of experts were that merely raising existing
standards by requiring more metacentric height/righting
arm (GM/GZ) or more area under the righting lever curve
were not appropriate responses, since they fail to recog-
nize the dynamic nature of the type of accident of con-
cern, such as the Herald of Free Enterprise or Estonia
capsize incidents.
• Subdivision of RO/RO decks--Full bulkheads with wa-
tertight doors, vertically hinged doors or horizontally
hinged folding partial bulkheads were considered possi-
ble solutions for retrofitting to existing RO/RO vessels;
however, the group felt that other solutions such as more
freeboard may be a more efficient approach on new de-
signs. This area was identified as needing more study.
• Lashing of vehicles--It was recognized that on the south-
82 APRIL 1996
ern BC ferry route the lashing of vehicles to secure them
against ship motions in rough weather was unnecessary
as, if the weather gets really severe, the ferry sailings are
suspended. However, some concern was expressed that,
in the event of an accident (a grounding or side collision)
which caused a large heel to develop, shifting of vehicle
cargo was a real possibility and it was felt that this effect
should at least be investigated as part of a complete sta-
bility analysis.
• Sealing~securing of bow~stern doors--The Herald of Free
Enterprise and the Estonia capsizes both occurred when
large quantities of water entered the vessel on the car
deck through the bow doors. One capsize resulted from
human error when the doors were not closed prior to the
vessel sailing and the other appears to be the conse-
quence of structural failure of the outer bow visor, fol-
lowed by partial failure of the sealing/securing system of
the inner ramp, thus allowing the ingress of water. Ways
of securing the bow doors that are fast, effective, rela-
tively straightforward and which can be checked easily
were seen as appropriate.
• Lifesaving systems--The consensus appeared to be that,
in the event of a capsize of a large ferry with a high
passenger count, the existing lifesaving systems would
be of little use. The existing systems assume that some
time will be available to muster the passengers, help
them don life jackets, and deploy evacuation systems and
rafts. Recent accidents have shown that in a capsize there
is little time available to effect evacuation. It was there-
fore felt that the best approach was to minimize the like-
lihood of capsize through other means. One possibility
discussed was to have occasional drills involving passen-
gers in order to build safety awareness in the traveling
public. This area was identified as needing further inves-
tigation.
• Accident response--Some time was given to discussion of
external support should a major marine accident occur. It
was noted that on the southern routes there would nor-
mally be another ferry within 20 minutes sailing time of
any casualty and that some steps have already been
taken to accommodate the transfer of passengers from
one ferry to another at sea.
• Human factors--It was recognized that human factors
are of critical importance in ferry safety, and that train-
ing of both crew and passengers is vital. It was further
recognized that good design can play a large part in the
human factors area. For example, ready access, freshly
painted, well lighted, and clean spaces with clearly
worded directions and signage, can create positive incen-
tives to carry out the required tasks effectively.
RO/RO passenger ferry stability and safety
working group
Following from a suggestion made at the conclusion of the
round table forum, a Working Group on Stability and Safety
was established, including representatives of BC Ferries, the
Canadian Coast Guard and local shipbuilders, naval archi-
tects and marine consultants.
At an early meeting of the Working Group a set of objec-
tives for the Group's work was discussed. The three main
objectives for the Working Group were:
(1) To review the current (November 1994) proposed Eu-
ropean approaches to RO/RO vessel stability and to investi-
gate the effects of those proposed rule changes on those BCFC
ships which are of the low-freeboard, closed shelter-deck type
(Queen of the North, Queen of Prince Rupert, and Queen of
Chilliwack).
MARINE TECHNOLOGY
 BOATDKCI~

Fig. 1 BCFC northern routes enclosed watertight superstructure ferry

APRIL 1996 MARINE TECHNOLOGY 83

 =o I • e [] ~ i

STARBOARDOUTBOARD PROFIIA

I I I ol [
I i ! I

=I

BOATDECK

L~ ~ ; ~ i ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ F~q ! I ~ I
LEGEND tLD~E~ H~L~

[--1
- L ,:L .-- --

LOWERHULL

Fig. 2 BCFC interisland open deck ferry

64 A P R I L 1996 MARINE TECHNOLOGY

 f

I ~ ] t ~ ] ] F OODDDDDDDOaD
II ......
'k J- .L oE;~oaao~ao~
~_~7 j OD[]DO00 ODD
~I~ ~ ~1 ,, , JBooooooo~ooo
~'~ .~i ' ~ = l~r~OOOOOOuoO000
,° , ~ ~ ~'~._~/

.%-

1._ I_ .J .J j

~" r- F-

Fig. 3 BCFC southern routes enclosed nonwatertight superstructure ferry

APRIL 1996 MARINE TECHNOLOGY 85

 urgent as submissions to the International Maritime Orga-
NOTE: MATINGFACETO BE nization (IMO) will be made, early in 1995, for discussion and
ALIGNEDWiTHVISOR adoption at the May 1995 Marine Safety Committee MSC
PIVOTR/~)IUS.
meeting.
20 mm PLAE
(3) To investigate reasonable accident scenarios and thus
mm PLATE recommend logical criteria for the intact and damaged sta-
3 ~ ^mm DOUBLERPL bility of "open" shelter-deck ferries, and recommend the ap-
(NEW)
WELD TO BE GROUND 150 x 20
propriate safety equipment, training, operating limits, etc.
SMOOTHON FACE (NEW) that should be in place for open shelter-deck RO/RO ferries.
2O
Working Group recommendations
T-r---- As a result of its studies, the BCFC RO/RO Passenger
Ferry Stability and Safety Working Group prepared two
memoranda, one on closed shelter-deck vessels and one on
150
open shelter-deck ferries. Within each memorandum specific
recommendations were given for action under a number of
topics. The following paragraphs give a summary of these
400 recommendations.
Recommendations for closed shelter-deck RO/RO ferries
(northern routes vessels)
Weather conditions and existing operational criteria A re-
view of existing operational procedures in regard to weather
conditions shall be performed.
--Through model tests or full-scale data collection, or both,
. ~ ~ ~ EXISTING
compile information which will allow review of the current
BREAS'i3-tOOK operating guidelines for wind and wave conditions.
30 mm STRUCTURE
(NEW) --All agencies concerned with weather data collection to
be contacted to correlate historic data.
Fig. 4 B O W visor supporting device pins--BCFC Queen of the North
--Wind and wave measuring instrumentation to be inves-
tigated for type and positioning for real-time feedback.
(2) To establish that open deck and open shelter-deck BC Subdivision--A review of existing subdivision of the Queen
ferries should be treated differently from typical closed deck of Prince Rupert and the Queen of the North should be per-
European or Eastern Canadian ferries, because of freeboard, formed, together with the degree of compliance of each vessel
operational conditions, etc. The Working Group will attempt with current stability standards.
to ensure that the current (November 1994) Norwegian po- --Perform a study of the potential to upgrade the one-com-
sition of having appropriate regional regulations and criteria partment standard Queen of the North to a two-compartment
is adopted, rather than a general overall uniform standard standard.
that would apply equally to the North Atlantic, the Baltic, Stability--A full review of the modifications required on the
the Strait of Georgia or Howe Sound. This part of the work is Queen of Prince Rupert and the Queen of the North should be

EXISTING

X B~E~S'rHOOK 5

-- -"T /
24o ,, s
BKTS (FIT BOTH
(NO/)
mm• ~
\

-%.
>~,
\ ,,..
I
1200x20 1 /I
I mx.3um I /
,--.;.....~"~) ~

~, L - - ~ - - J
%I
I

I
I 6oo (NEW9
,-----_o

I
la
-.., n

I /
el / / "

DOUBLER PL (NEW) ~ ~ ~ I | -'1~" 7s AI ~ I ~V

?/
BREAS11-IOOK--I %1,
STRUCTURE i'-
(P~) I
Fig. 5 B o w structure in way of supporting device (visor partial bulkhead--looking forward), Queen of the
North

86 APRIL 1996 MARINE TECHNOLOGY

performed, as soon as the new or modified IMO requirements
are known. I

?W
I
Bow visors--Complete the work on modifying the bow vi- t i

sor structure and securing systems on the two North Coast

ferries.
--Retain the weathertight closure of the bow loading
o o
ramps which, although not required when separate inner J (:3
bow doors are fitted, will provide for additional safety by
providing a third barrier to the ingress of water onto the
vehicle deck through the bow openings. ....< /

i
--Through continuous training, make all relevant crew I
members familiar with the operation and maintenance of the
bow visor systems• }1
--Take extra precautions to ensure that the bow visors are Ot
F.P. (R'R~FERENCEPOINT)
effectively closed and secured before the vessel proceeds to
sea.
Inner bow doors--Complete the work on fitting inner bow
doors on the two North Coast ferries.
--Through thorough training, make all relevant crew
members familiar with the operation and maintenance of the
150 60 165 170 175 180
FRAME SPACING - 600 MM FWD OF 155
inner bow doors. 650 MM AFT OF 155
--Take extra precautions to ensure that the inner bow
LLOYD'S RULES
doors are effectively closed and secured before the vessel pro-
ceeds to sea.
Loading--A review of procedures for checking of drafts and
trim by ship's officers prior to sailing shall be performed. --J ~ } CCG REGULATIONS
~ 8 . 7 2 4
--Accurate records of draft and trim shall be kept in the
Fig. 7 Collision bulkhead and ramp configuration--Queen of the North
logbooks for all sailings.
--Investigations shall be made into means of establishing
actual total vehicle weights and distribution of weights on --Model tests and actual observations shall be conducted
board. to review operating guidelines for wind and wave conditions.
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for open shelter-deck RO/RO ferries --All agencies concerned with weather data collection
(southern routes vessels) shall be contacted to correlate historic data.
---Wind and wave measuring devices shall be investigated
Weather conditions and existing operational criteria--A re- for type and positioning for real-time feedback.
view of existing operational procedures in regard to weather Freeboard considerations: intact and damaged--In con-
conditions shall be performed. junction with the model tests and observations advocated
above, criteria shall be established that will minimize the
possibility of a significant quantity of water encroaching onto
the car deck when encountering waves during operational
• 6" x 25# WF
conditions.
- - D a t a shall be collected with accurate recordings of water
(EXISTING)

5 x 3 x 3 / 8 " F (NEW)
1" DH 36 PL. ' 9 mm PL. (NEW)
(NEW) S

5/8" PL. (NEW)- ~

8 x 3/4" TOP PL. (NEW) I~ hz
3"¢, TAPERED '
PIN, 7 I/2" LONG 6" x 25# WF
3
GRADE D (NEW)
-
(EXISTING)
5/8" PL BKT (NEW)
s II o

1 1/4" PL
="==~. 6" x 25# WF
~ ¢ (NEW) 5', " • (REFERENCE POINT)

FLG (NEW)
~/#~CaR OEcK(70.) t,l,l ,
6 x 1 1/4" F.B.
7' LONG, CONTINU01 120 122 124- 126 128 1 0 1 8 113 4, 31 326 140 142 144
(NEW)
~ 5"6°~"-'~ }
.-,,~.~ LLOYD'SRULES
5 x 3 x 3/8"r 8 x ~- x 7 / 1 6 " F &
(NEW) (EXISTING)
26" FRAME SPACING . I_ 24" FRAME SPACING
10 mm PL. (NEW)--~ -I
Fig. 6 Bow visor supporting device pins--Queen of Prince Rupert Fig. 8 Collision bulkhead and ramp configuration--Queen of Prince Rupert

APRIL 1996 MARINE TECHNOLOGY 87

 =, :C rs i , ~ZFS J, - - F o r new ships investigations shall be made into alterna-
tive means of removing water on deck.
LADDER UP - - - - . . . ~ Loading considerations A review of procedures for check-
ing of drafts and trim by ship's officers prior to sailing shall
be performed.
---Accurate recording of drafts and trim shall be entered
into logbooks for all sailings.
NEw H=NGEPOST--< ~ ~ - ~ --Investigate means of establishing total vehicle weights
and onboard distribution of vehicle weights.

Investigation of stability performance of N o r t h

123 #25 12 131 I.~'~ " ) Coast ferries versus proposed Nordic standards
Initial investigations have been undertaken to establish
the effects of applying the proposed Nordic water-on-deck
standards for both the Queen of the North and the Queen of
Prince R upert, and to ascertain the level of RO/RO deck sub-
division likely to be required to meet the anticipated IMO
regulations. Further action will be taken once the outcome of
~jr" ~-NCW ooon ~cEss the November 1995 SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) meeting is
IN EXISTING SLOPING BHO
known.

Bow visors and inner bow doors on North

Fig. 9 Inner bow door arrangement--Queen of Prince Rupert
encroaching onto the car deck. This should include estimates
of prevailing wave heights, wind speed, ship speed and load
condition.
Stability considerations--Investigate for each vessel the
amount of water on deck required to produce instability, both
in the intact and damaged conditions.
--Investigate the heel angle at which a shift in unsecured
vehicles is induced in both wet and dry deck conditions.
Bow and stern door considerations--An inventory of door
construction and details shall be conducted for all vessels.
---Standards for spray-tight door design, strength, latching
and sealing shall be established by using the data collected in
the task above.
--Door strength, latching adequacy and sealing arrange-
ments shall be checked against proposed standards and up-
graded and maintained where necessary.
Freeing port considerations---Model tests shall be per-
formed to establish the effectiveness of existing freeing ports.
--Investigation shall be made into designs of a freeing port
that will be effective and reliable in all anticipated ship mo-
tions and heel angles.
coast ferries
As a precautionary measure, following the Estonia loss, the
bow visor of the operating vessel Queen of the North was
welded shut, following which BCFC instigated extensive en-
gineering design and calculations to improve the capability
of the supporting and closing devices on the bow visors of
both the Queen of the North and the Queen of Prince Rupert.
The new devices and corresponding adjacent structure mod-
ification reflected the J a n u a r y 1995 International Associa-
tion of Classification Societies (IACS) Unified Requirements,
as developed by the IACS Ad Hoc Group on RO/RO Safety, for
bow visor forces and requirements for material specifications
and structure and to the full approval of Lloyd's Register of
Shipping--the classification society for both vessels.
The closing device design and installation were similar on
both vessels while being tailored to the respective predicted
forces for each ship. The supporting devices differed substan-
tially between the ships, however, due to the available space,
the differences between the existing structure of the visors
and the lowered vehicle deck and, of course, the predicted
forces between ships. Figures 4-6 show the details of the
supporting device pins and associated structure on the Queen
of the North and the Queen of Prince Rupert.

/-- NONw ~ E . ' n c . , ~ r Ro-~o OtCx m ¢ O S ~ t

I f NON WF=,A'TH~GHT BOW DOORS
I Y /- RmDuALmow
I! / .roD.=
/- R =oE= II /
~ ~ I__1 / I WAVE HEIGHT

Z . . . . . . . . .

(Combine~l=iMl<age,tMm,pit~ & b,ow

\ ws'4t DTOfile)

STA~C WATERLINE
Fig. 10 Single-ended ferry model setup

88 APRIL 1996 MARINE TECHNOLOGY

 arrangement of the new inner bow doors on the Queen of
Run 76 Relative Wave Ht vs Time
Prince Rupert. The bow ramp closing and locking arrange-
4.5 ments and equipment were also reviewed for each vessel and
3.5} improvements carried out to existing fittings and to access
A 2.5
E 1st areas to ensure effective closing and sealing of the ramps.
-~ 0.st_ . . . . ~L In compliance with the IACS Unified Requirements, re-
-05~ " - ' ' -'
mote control of the bow visor, bow ramp and inner bow doors
-2.5 t was provided with open/closed indication of every closing and
-3.5
-4.5 I Relative Wave Hr. locking device and separate indicator lamps and audible
(a) alarms on the navigation bridge. Closed-circuit television
surveillance was also provided on the bridge, giving views of
Fig. 11 Relative wave height model test data the inner doors and also of the space between the inner doors
and the bow ramp. Drainage of the space between the ramp
and the inner doors was provided along with an audible
alarm for water level in that space should it exceed 1 m (3.28
Run 76 D e p t h o f W a t e r - o n - D e c k (m) f r o m u l t r a s o n i c ft) in depth.
waveprobe

11
0,S
061 i . J ~ ~,Af~
v 0.44
0.2 : i/ / /
-0,2 , o', co
Time (sec)
Fig. 12 Water-on-deck measurements
As the Queen of Prince Rupert was already in refit for the
winter months, work proceeded on that ship during the early
months of 1995, followed by work on the Queen of the North
during her spring refit in April and May 1995.
At the time of providing improved supporting and closing
devices for the bow visors for these vessels, engineering de-
sign was carried out for the fitting of bow doors at a location
aft of the bow ramps but within the limitations required by
classification society rules for the extension of the collision
bulkhead above the vehicle deck "in ships fitted with a long
enclosed superstructure forward." Figures 7 and 8 show the
bow visor/ramp design arrangements for the Queen of the
North and the Queen of Prince Rupert, respectively, and in-
dicate clearly that the inner ramps of both vessels are not far
enough aft to be considered as extensions of the collision
bulkhead.
Forward-opening inner doors along with hydraulic open-
ing, closing and locking cylinders, levers and pins, piping,
controls and indicators were fitted to each of the ships while
work on the bow visor was underway. Figure 9 shows the
Water-on-deck model testing
I I During the development of proposed new rules for passen-
~ , ~ ' ger RO/RO ships the IMO's Panel of Experts (POE) suggested
, /l
that all ferries fitted with bow doors should be designed to
- - meet the SOLAS 90 stability requirements when one cubic
meter of water per square meter of deck area ( - 3 5 ft 3 per 10
ft 2) is scooped onto the deck through the bow door opening.
This proposed rule is an attempt to develop a regulation
which would require vessels to retain sufficient stability even
if extreme incidents similar to the Herald of Free Enterprise
and the Estonia accidents were to occur.
The British Columbia Ferry Corporation and the Canadian
Coast Guard, while conceding that this approach may well be
valid for European-style RO/RO passenger ferries operating
in rough water, felt that it may be too onerous for typical
Canadian West Coast ferries which operate on relatively
sheltered waters and which are fitted with nonweathertight
bow doors at the forward and after ends of their nonwater-
tight superstructures.
Over 30 years of operating experience has not given any
indication that bow scooping is a potential hazard for Cana-
dian West Coast ferries; however, in order to provide some
scientific data to the POE it was decided to undertake a
model experimental program to investigate the potential for
bow scooping on a typical Canadian West Coast ferry.
Model tests were undertaken at BCRI Ocean Engineering
Centre in Vancouver using existing ferry models suitably
modified with decks and partial superstructures fitted. A 1:30
scale model of a 5950 mt displacement single-ended ferry and
a 1:40 scale model of a 3900 mt displacement double-ended
ferry were used. Figure 10 shows the fore-end arrangement
of the single-ended test model.

2.5

2
I
1.5
-" I

1
I 'I I
0.5
i I
0 .I J I
135 I 11- 25 35
-0.5

-1
F
-1,5

-2

FB/Sig. Wave Pit.

Fig. 13 Summary of bow scooping model tests

APRIL 1996 MARINE TECHNOLOGY 89

 #

~ r

^.
 Figure 11 shows a typical data trace for the relative wave
height probe fitted at the bow of the model, while Fig. 12
shows the output of a sonic probe fitted above the vehicle
deck to give an estimate of the quantity of water on deck.
Results of the tests on the two models and associated analyt-
ical investigations indicate clearly a relationship between
the occurrence of water-on-deck and the ratio of initial free-
board to significant wave height of the operating environ-
ment. In general, only a few wave-top splashes and no sig-
nificant water on deck were observed when the bow freeboard
was more than two times the significant wave height. Figure
13 shows a plot of the data from both sets of model tests.
Based on the test results it can be stated that in the 90%
probable wave conditions (the IMO proposed standard oper-
ating environment) expected in the Strait of Georgia, there is
no likelihood of bow scooping events on any of the vessels in
the BCFC fleet, even in the lowest-freeboard, trimmed by the
head, condition.
However, the experimental and analytical programs did
show that if the vessel were to be sailed at full speed (16
knots), with the bow doors open, directly into the most ex-
treme annual seas found in the Strait [about 2 m (6.5 ft)
significant wave height], bow scooping is possible in the
longer, 8-sec-period waves.
Based on the available wave data, these conditions appear
to occur less than 1% of the time or only 3-4 days per year.
The possibility of such a bow scooping event is made more
remote since BCFC normally restricts sailing in periods of
high wind (over 39 knots).
A further area of experimental study was the investigation
of freeing port size on the accumulation of water on deck
during bow scooping incidents. Freeing port area to ship
length ratios of 0.3, 0.15 and 0.075 were tested, but little
variation was observed in the bow scooping events over the
range of wave parameters tested. When all the freeing ports
were closed off, however, it was observed that water accumu-
lated on deck much faster, which caused a dangerous bow
scooping event to occur at a lower wave height than for the
configurations with open freeing ports.
Current position--October 1995
Following the Estonia disaster, the Society of Naval Archi-
tects and Marine Engineers established an Ad Hoc Commit-
tee on RO/RO Passenger Ferry Survivability. The BCFC
have chosen to be active participants in this Committee and
hosted one of the Committee meetings in early January 1995.
This Committee prepared a series of position papers which
have been used by both the U.S. Coast Guard and the Cana-
dian Coast Guard in submissions to the IMO in London.
One of the key pieces of research undertaken by the
SNAME Ad Hoc Committee was the development of a math-
ematical model which can be used to estimate the accumu-
lation of water on deck of a damaged RO/RO passenger ship.
APRIL 1996
This work was reported by Bruce Hutchison, chairman of the
SNAME Committee, in a paper at a workshop on Numerical
and Physical Simulation of Ship Capsize in Heavy Seas,
sponsored by the University of Strathclyde in Scotland. The
mathematical theory presented leads to a simple curvilinear
relationship between the accumulated depth of water on
deck, freeboard and significant wave height. The research
also addressed briefly the outflow processes through freeing
ports.
The BC Ferry Corporation has also supported the activities
of the Canadian Coast Guard member of the IMO Panel of
Experts (POE). Most recently (London, October 12, 1995) the
Stability Sub-Group of the Intersessional Working Group on
R O / R O F e r r y S a f e t y m e t a n d p r e p a r e d a r e p o r t w h i c h will b e
submitted to the full SOLAS meeting at the end of November
1995. The report reflected a wide range of opinion on how to
treat the stability issues on RO/RO passenger ships and it
will be extremely difficult to reach consensus at the Novem-
ber meeting.
There appear to be at least three current points of view
among the delegates:
1. A concept of using water on deck as a "stability pen-
alty"---generally supported by the northern Europeans.
2. A concept that the main problems are with people and
not equipment and that no amount of extra watertight
bulkheads etc. can make up for human error--a view
generally held by the southern Europeans and the Jap-
anese.
3. A concept put forward by the Russian Federation to up-
grade the survival criteria of SOLAS 90 instead of im-
posing the water-on-deck penalty.
Time will tell which view, if any, will prevail.
The good news from the Intersessional meeting was that
the Canadian delegate did succeed in having two major mod-
ifications made to the POE proposals, both resulting from
Canadian-sponsored research.
Proposed regulation II-I/8-1, dealing with water on deck
from a side damage, was revised to reflect the knowledge
gained about the benefit of flapped freeing ports based on
research carried out at IMD in Newfoundland. Proposed reg-
ulation II-I/8-2, dealing with water on deck from bow scoop-
ing, now incorporates a clause which will not require such
water on deck to be taken into account if the freeboard to
significant wave height ratio is greater than 2.0. This is a
direct result of the work undertaken at the BCRI Ocean En-
gineering Centre described earlier herein.
Acknowledgment
The authors wish to recognize the leading role taken by the
British Columbia Ferry Corporation in the research, design,
planning and engineering described in this paper. The Cor-
poration is truly living up to its goal of providing a safe ferry
system.
MARINE TECHNOLOGY 91