PEOPLE v. ECHEGARAY GR NO. 117472 FEBRUARY 01, 1997
WADE 410 US 113 (1973)
FACTS: On June 25, 1996, Supreme court rendered a decision affirming the
conviction of Echegaray for raping his 10-year-old daughter, imposing R.A.
7659 or the Death Penalty Law which was already in effect at the time of the
commission of the crime in 1994. On July 9, 1996, Accused filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, saying he was falsely accused because of sinister
motives of the victim’s grandmother. On August 6, 1996, Echegaray
discharged his counsel Atty. Vitug but retained services of the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG). On August 23, 1996, SC received a Motion which
asked for the reversal of death sentence.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7659 is constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. The death penalty is not a cruel and unjust punishment. Jurisprudence
provides that punishments are cruel and unjust when they involve torture or
a lingering death. As long as our law provides for its imposition in certain
cases, the courts must impose it. RA 7659 meets all the requirements for the
reimposition of the death penalty. The defendant says that the death penalty
is unconstitutional for (1) having been enacted in the absence of compelling
reason therefor and (2) death penalty for rape is cruel and excessive. The
constitutional exercise of the limited power to re-impose the death penalty
entails: (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes;
(2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as
heinous in accordance with the definition of decription set in the death
penalty bill; (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly
motivated by “compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. The assailed law
provides “…the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for
being grievous, odious, and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity, and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency
and morality in a just civilized and ordered society.” The SC finds this a
sufficient definition of “heinous crimes”. SC does not agree that the gauge of
whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not is the attendance
of the circumstances of death on the part of the victim. The SC has no doubts
as to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as held in the case of People
v. Cristobal. Two types of crimes punished by death penalty: (1) those which
are punished by RP to death; (2) those with mandatory capital punishment
with the presence of certain qualifying circumstances.
ROE v.
Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to
obtain an abortion, sued on behalf of all woman similarly situated in an effort
to prevent the enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing all abortions
except those performed to save the life of the mother.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Statutes that make criminal all abortions except
when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother are
an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion
except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes
were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent defendant
Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged
that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a
legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by
the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel
to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of
herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes
were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy,
protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Issue. Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the
appellant to terminate her pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal
liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in the
personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or
its penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people by the Ninth
Amendment?
Held. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the
right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent
vintage, deriving from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half
of the 19th century. At common law abortion performed before quickening
(the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable
offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established
common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.
Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal
abortion laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social
concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken
seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the
abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to protect
pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the
situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first
trimester. The third reason is the State’s interest is in protecting the prenatal
life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the pregnant woman
cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion
decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s
attending physician, and may not be criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the
State may regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health
based upon the State’s interest in promoting the health of the mother.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even
proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the
mother’s life, based upon the State’s interest in the potential of the potential
life of the unborn child.
Discussion. The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all abortions
except in the case of a life saving procedure on behalf of the mother is
unconstitutional based upon the right to privacy. However, it does allow for
regulation and proscription of abortion when the statute is narrowly tailored
to uphold a compelling state interest, such as the health of the mother or the
viable fetus. The court declined to address the question of when life begins.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 497 US 261 (1990)
Brief Fact Summary. Nancy Cruzan was involved in a car accident, which left
her in a “persistent vegetative state.” After it became clear that Cruzan would
not improve, her parents requested that the hospital terminate the life-
support procedures the hospital was providing. The hospital and
subsequently the State court refused to comply.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A State may condition the exercise of a patient’s
right to terminate life-sustaining treatment on a showing of clear and
convincing evidence of the desire of the patient to exercise such a right.
Facts. Nancy Cruzan was involved in a car accident, which left her in a
“persistent vegetative state.” In order to feed her and to facilitate her
recovery, surgeons implanted into her a gastronomy feeding and hydration
tube. After it become apparent that Cruzan had virtually no chance for
recovery, Petitioners, Cruzan’s parents, asked hospital employees to
terminate the life support procedures. The State hospital employees refused
to honor this request without court approval. After trial, on appeal, the
Missouri Supreme Court refused to order termination of the life-support,
because clear and convincing evidence was not produced to show that Cruzan
herself would have chosen to refuse treatment.
Issue(s).
Did Cruzan have a right under the United States Constitution that would
require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment?
Did Missouri’s procedural requirement for clear and convincing evidence of
an incompetent person’s desire to terminate life support before it is
terminated violate the Constitution?
Held. No and No. The Missouri Supreme Court is affirmed.
Prior decisions support the principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing medical treatment
under the Due Process Clause. But incompetent persons do not enjoy the
same rights, because they cannot make voluntary and informed decisions.
The right to terminate life-sustaining treatment of an incompetent, if it is to
be exercised, must be done for such incompetent by a surrogate. Missouri’s
interest in the preservation of life is unquestionably a valid State
interest. The Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as a right
to refuse life-saving treatment. Missouri may legitimately safeguard these
personal decisions by imposing heightened evidentiary
requirements. Moreover, even when available, family members will not
always act in the best interests of a patient. The State is entitled to safeguard
against such abuses.
Discussion. This case is labeled a “right to life case.” Most of the attention,
however, is focused on burden of proof standards for showing a person’s
intent with regard to a life-threatening matter. This type of case, where a
person requests that her life be left to natural processes, must be
distinguished from cases that involve assisted suicide, whereby a doctor will
take an affirmative step to induce a person’s death.
BOLOS V. BOLOS 634 SCRA 429, [October 20, 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of
the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition
for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by respondent Danilo
and he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the
required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order
declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by
Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition
forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they
were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically
capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who
should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their
children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of
the RTC declaring the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate
court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case
as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14,
1980 before the Family Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner,
the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Such that petitions
filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No.
even if the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his
Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his
marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its
effectivity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is
applicable to the case at bench.
RULING:
No. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its
scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt.
The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule
sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to
subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under
the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions”
rather than to the word “marriages.”
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the
RTC decision which denied due course to respondent’s appeal and denying Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance
petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of
course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize
Aglipay v. Ruiz GR 45459 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public
Facts: money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
church. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious
would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the
in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps
by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take
Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of advantage of an event considered of international importance to give
what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the
of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a
Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription
Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”
postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though
the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without
sought to be prevented by the petitioner. pronouncement as to costs.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the
Constitution.
Held:
Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs.
Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates
man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the
purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored “the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government
that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy,” they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and
placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized
here as elsewhere.

Edwards v. Aguillard 482 US 578 (1987)
Synopsis of Rule of Law. While the Court is normally deferential to the state’s
articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such
purpose be sincere and not without a sham. It is clear that requiring schools
to teach creation science with evolution does not advance academic
freedom.
Facts. The Act forbids the teaching of evolution in public schools unless
accompanied by instruction in “creation science.” No school is required to
teach evolution or creation science. If either is taught however, the other
must be taught. The Appellees, Aguillard and other parents of children
attending Louisiana public schools, Louisiana teachers, and religious leaders
(Appellees) challenged the constitutionality of the Act. The District Court held
that the Act violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution either
because it prohibited the teaching of evolution or because it required the
teaching of creation science with the purpose of advancing a particular
religious doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue. Whether the Act violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution?
Held. Yes. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Lemon’s first prong
focuses on the purpose of that animated adoption of the Act. In this case, the
Appellants, Edwards and others (Appellants), have identified no clear secular
purpose for the Act. The goal of providing a more comprehensive science
curriculum is not furthered by either outlawing the teaching of evolution or
by requiring the teaching of creationism. While the Supreme Court is
normally deferential to the state’s articulation of a secular purpose, it is
required that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not without a
sham. It is clear that requiring schools to teach creation science with
evolution does not advance academic freedom. The Act does not grant
teachers the flexibility that they did not already possess to supplant the
present science curriculum with a presentation of theories besides evolution,
about the origin of life. Here, the purpose of the Act was to restructure the
science curriculum to conform to a particular religious viewpoint. Therefore,
the Act violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.
Discussion. Since this case took place in the context of a public school, the
Supreme Court was less tolerant of governmental sponsorship of religious
symbolism.
Baze v. Rees 553 US 35 (2008)
FACTS:
Two Kentucky inmates challenged the state's four-drug lethal injection
protocol. The lethal injection method calls for the administration of four
drugs: Valium, which relaxes the convict, Sodium Pentathol, which knocks the
convict unconscious, Pavulon, which stops his breathing, and potassium
chloride, which essentially puts the convict into cardiac arrest and ultimately
causes death. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the death penalty
system did not amount to unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of a four-drug lethal injection process to carry out
death sentences a violation of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and
unusual punishment.
RULING:
In a 7-2 decision with four concurrences and a dissent, the Court held that
Kentucky's lethal injection scheme did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
Noting that the inmates had conceded the "humane nature" of the procedure
when performed correctly, the divided Court inmates had failed to prove that
incorrect administration of the drugs would amount to cruel and unusual
punishment. However, the Court also suggested that a state may violate the
ban on cruel and unusual punishment if it continues to use a method without
sufficient justification in the face of superior alternative procedures. Chief
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. announced the judgment and issued an opinion
joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito. Justice John Paul
Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion supporting the judgment but for
the first time stated his opposition to the death penalty.
Roper v. Simmons 543 US 551 (2005)
Brief Fact Summary. Respondent committed murder when he was age 17. He
was tried and sentenced to death after he turned 18.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. “The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid
imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18
when their crimes were committed.”
Facts. Respondent Simmons conspired to burglarize and murder a person
with two friends. Only one fully participated. They entered the victim’s home,
kidnapped her, bound her with duct tape and electrical cord, and threw her
into a river. Respondent was 17 at the time. He subsequently bragged out the
killing. He was taken into custody and confessed. He was put on trial as an
adult, convicted, and sentenced to death.
Issue. “[W]hether it is permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States to execute a juvenile
offender who was older than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a
capital crime.”
Held. No. The Supreme Court of the United States first established the
applicability of the Eight Amendment, as well a precedent of the application
of the death penalty to minors. Traditionally, minors did not face capital
punishment. It noted that a “consensus” of the country is against the
application of the death penalty to juveniles.
The Supreme Court noted the gravity of capital punishment and its
application. “Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who
commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme
culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.'” The Supreme
Court further noted that juveniles are different, in that: they lack maturity
and understanding of responsibility; are “more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”; and that
“that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an
adult.” Having recognized the fact that a juvenile is not “the worst” offender,
“the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser
force than to adults.”
Concurrence. The concurring justices applauded the Supreme Court’s
application of “[t]he evolving standards of decency that have driven our
construction of this critically important part of the Bill of Rights foreclose any
such reading of the Amendment.”
Discussion. “The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too
marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the
death penalty despite insufficient culpability.
Atkins v. Virginia 536 US 304
Brief Fact Summary. Atkins contention was that the execution of a mentally
retarded criminal is a cruel and unusual punishment which contravenes the
Eighth Amendment. He made this contention when he was sentenced to
death for committing murder. Atkins (D) had an IQ 0f 59 at the time of his
conviction.
Facts. Atkins Daryl (D) was sentenced to death for shooting a patron of an
automated teller machine and for robbery, after he was found guilty of
abduction, capital murder and armed robbery. A verdict of “mildly mentally
retarded” pertaining to the health of Atkins (D), was given by a forensic
psychologist. This verdict of the psychologist was based on the interview he
had with Atkins (D) and with others who knew him, review of school and court
records of other crimes and a standard intelligence test which showed that
Atkins (D) had a full scale IQ of 59. Atkins (D) however appealed against the
ruling of the trial court on the ground that sentencing a mentally retarded
criminal to death was a cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.
Issue. Under the Eighth Amendment, is the capital punishment of a mentally
retarded convict cruel and unusual?
Held. (Stevens, J.) Yes. Under the Eighth Amendment, the capital punishment
of a mentally retarded convict is cruel and unusual. Mentally retarded
persons should be tried and punished when they commit crimes once they
meet the law’s requirement. Mentally retarded persons do not act with the
level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct because of their disabilities in the areas of reasoning, control of
impulses and judgment. Hence, the enactment of the federal government
which exempts the mentally retarded from execution has provided a strong
evidence in which the society view the mentally retarded offenders as less
culpable than the average criminal. The mentally retarded person’s
disposition often portrays that they lack remorse for their crimes and they
are also poor witnesses because they are not capable of assisting their
counsel. Reversed and remanded.
Ford v. Wainwright 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
Brief Fact Summary. Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. Defendant’s attorneys sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that
Defendant was not competent to understand the nature of the death penalty
and the reasons why it was imposed on him.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Eight Amendment prohibits the execution of an
insane person.
Facts. Alvin Ford (Defendant) was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. While in prison, Defendant’s behavior began to change, and he started
experiencing numerous suicidal delusions related to the Ku Klux Klan.
Defendant also believed that a large group of his friends and family was being
held hostage inside the prison. After examination, a psychiatrist concluded
that Defendant suffered from severe paranoid schizophrenia. Shortly
afterward, a second doctor met with Defendant and concluded that
Defendant did not understand why he was being executed or recognize the
relationship between his death sentence and the homicide of which he had
been convicted. Following the procedures set forth under Florida law for
determination of competency of a condemned inmate in Fla. Stat. § 922.07
(1985), the governor of Florida empanelled three psychiatrists to evaluate
whether Defendant had the mental capacity to understand the nature of the
death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed on him. After interviewing
Defendant at a single meeting, all three psychiatrists produced different
diagnoses, but all agreed that Defendant understood the nature and effects
of the death penalty. Pursuant to the statute, the governor made the final
decision, based upon the psychiatrists’ conclusions, and signed a death
warrant for Defendant’s execution. Defendant’s attorneys subsequently
brought an action in federal court seeking a writ of habeas corpus.
Issue. Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of an insane
prisoner.
Held. Yes. The case is remanded. The Eight Amendment prohibits the
execution of an insane person.
Discussion. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment,” which includes execution of a
prisoner who is incompetent. Whether a particular punishment comports
with the amendment is evaluated by considering both traditional and
contemporary societal values and justifications. At common law, the practice
of executing a prisoner who lost his sanity was extensively condemned and
considered cruel and inhuman. A number of potential reasons supported this
widespread condemnation of the procedure, including that execution of an
insane person is simply an affront to humanity and that it does not provide
an example to others and has therefore no deterrence value, along with
various religious explanations. Today, many of these justifications are still
compelling. The retributive purpose of the death penalty is not served when
a person does not understand why he is being put to death, and the natural
unease and repugnance toward the practice is felt throughout the country.
Because this restriction arises from the Constitution, condemned prisoners
have a right to fair and independent fact-finding procedures to determine
present insanity. Here, the Florida procedures under § 922.07 are inadequate
and flawed, because they do not comport with due process requirements.
The procedures do not allow the prisoner to submit his own material to be
considered in the final decision and thus do not provide an opportunity to be
heard. There is also no chance to confront the state-appointed psychiatrists’
or challenge their opinions, which is an important element of a truth-seeking
process. Lastly, the insufficiently neutral executive branch has complete
power over the ultimate decision. Though this Court will not set forth an
exhaustive list of necessary procedures, each state must develop appropriate
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon executions of potentially
mentally ill inmates.
Victoria Segovia, et. al. vs CCC G.R. No. 211010, March 17, 2017 It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would
FACTS:
be violated. In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional
This is a petition for the issuance of Writs of Kalikasan and continuing right to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations
mandamus to compel the implementation of the following environmental that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public
laws and executive issuances - Republic Act No. (RA) 9729 (Climate Change respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a
Act), and RA 8749 (Clean Air Act); Executive Order No. 774 (BO 774); AO 254, violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
s. 2009 (AO 254); and Administrative Order No. 171, s. 2007 (AO 171).
Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.
In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the
Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely
foregoing laws and executive issuances resulted in the continued degradation
ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and the official can only
of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioners'
be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. At its
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology,14 and may even be
core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a
tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, and air"
ministerial act, but a discretionary act - the manner of implementation of the
by the government without due process of law.15
Road Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners' preferred specific course of action
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assert that (i.e. the bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling
petitioners are not entitled to a writ of kalikasan because they failed to show and Filipino-made transport vehicles) to implement the Road Sharing
that the public respondents are guilty of an unlawful act or omission; state Principle finds no textual basis in law or executive issuances for it to be
the environmental law/s violated; show environmental damage of such considered an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the necessary
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants of two or conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the
more cities; and prove that non- implementation of Road Sharing Principle implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control
will cause environmental damage. the exercise of discretion of the executive as to how the principle enunciated
in an executive issuance relating to the environment is best implemented.
ISSUE: Hence, the continuing mandamus cannot issue.
Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should be
issued.
RULING:
NO.
For a writ of Kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:
1. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology;
2. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and
3. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.