1.
Dartmouth College vs Woodward, 4 Wheaton
518
Statement of the Facts:
Dartmouth College was chartered before the
American Revolution.  After the Revolution, it
remained a privately funded institution.  The State
of New Hampshire, in 1816, attempted to change
Dartmouth College to a state university.  precedent in Fletcher v. Peck, which held that
Specifically, the legislature changed the college’s
corporate charter such that the control once vested
in the Trustees of the college was changed to the
State governor.  It did so by adding new appointees
to the Trustee board.  In order to regain authority
over the college, the Trustees sued Woodward, a
Trustee who sided with those appointed by the
State.
The suit alleged that the legislature’s action
violated the Trustees’ freedom to contract; and it
asked the court to compel Woodward to return the
college’s record, books, and seal; and to pay
damages.
Procedural History:
 The New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled
against the Trustees.
 The U.S. Supreme Court took the case on
a writ of error.
Issue and Holding:
Does the Constitution’s Contracts Clause apply to
private as well as public contracts?  Yes.
Judgment:
The decision of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court is reversed.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
A charter, such as the one granted by the British
Crown to Dartmouth College, is a contract.  Under
the Constitution, no State shall make any law
impairing the obligations of contracts.
Reasoning:
The Court noted first that giving respect to
contracts made in the U.S. is necessary to the
functioning of the Republic.  The Court went on to
find that Dartmouth College’s corporate charter
was a “contract” between parties – the British
Crown and the Trustees – with which the New
Hampshire legislature could not interfere.  Despite
the fact that the United States were no longer royal
colonies, that did not change the fact that there was
a valid contract, which is protected by the
Constitution’s Contracts Clause.  New Hampshire
commissioned the charter after the Revolution. 
But, that did not change the school into a public
institution.
Significance:
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward  finds
valid contracts (even if illegally obtained) cannot
be invalidated by a government entity.  The
decision was not popular in its day, but it is now
seen as an important early Supreme Court decision
that strengthened the Contracts Clause and limited
the government’s power to interfere with private
charters.
2. Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators
Association vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-
24693, 20 July 1967
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar
Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance
4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city
of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the
powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to
the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory
powers.
They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged
ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar
because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for
second class motels;  there was also the
requirement that the guests would fill up a form
specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection from city authorities.
They claimed this to be violative of due process for
being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and
required the maintenance of certain minimum
facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in
each room, a dining room or, restaurant and
laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of
due process on this for being arbitrary. It was also
unlawful for the owner to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18
in the hotel. The challenged ordinance also caused
the automatic cancellation of the license of the
hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional. Hence, this appeal by the city of
Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila
is violative of the due process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.”
However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion
of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual
foundation being laid in the present case, the lower
court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the
stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity
must prevail and the judgment against the
ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals,
particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover,
the increase in the licensed fees was intended to
discourage "establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the city
government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. In view
of the requirements of due process, equal
protection and other applicable constitutional
guaranties, however, the power must not be
unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of
due process. It has a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the
standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided.
 Due process is not a narrow or "technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances," decisions based on such
a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry
into fundamental principles of our society."
Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or
phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the
ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet
the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-
useful occupations are also incidental to the police
power and the right to exact a fee may be implied
from the power to license and regulate, but in
fixing amount of the license fees the municipal
corporations are allowed a much wider discretion
in this class of cases than in the former, and aside
from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general
rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg.
Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to
supplement the state’s police power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to
municipal corporations in determining the
amount," here the license fee of the operator of a
massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a
police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by
limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It
was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as
understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and
for the greater good of the peace and order of
society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium,
which means peace and order and happiness for
all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its
virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole
case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire
has to some extent given way to the assumption by
the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the
liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at
the most rights of property, the permissible scope
of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal
information, the maintenance of establishments,
and the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree
to all the generalities about not supplying criminal
laws with what they omit but there is no canon
against using common sense in construing laws as
saying what they obviously mean."
3. Buck vs Bell, 274 US 200
Statement of the Facts:
The State of Virginia had a statute that authorized
the forced sexual sterilization of certain mentally
ill people in certain mental institutions.  The
purpose of the law was to promote the “health of
the patient and the welfare of society.”  The
sterilization only took place after a hearing on the
propriety of such action.
Carrie Buck was a “feeble minded” woman who
was committed to a mental health facility.  Both
Buck’s mother and daughter were feeble minded. 
It was believed that the mental affliction was
hereditary.  Accordingly, the superintendent of the
mental health facility recommended sterilization of
Buck.
Buck challenged the Virginia statute, arguing that
it is a violation of due process and equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Procedural History:
 The Circuit Court of Amherst County
denied Buck relief.
 The Supreme Court of Appeal of Virginia
also denied Buck relief, upholding the
statute.
 The U.S. Supreme Court granted to hear
the case on writ of error.
Issue and Holding:
Did Virginia’s forced sterilization law deny Buck
her right to due process and equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment?  No.
Judgment:
The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal of
Virginia is affirmed.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
It is better to impose sterilization on those
“manifestly unfit from continuing their kind,” than
to wait for such people to commit crimes or “starve
for their imbecility.”
Reasoning:
In order for society not to be “swamped with
incompetence,” having the sterilization of some
mentally incompetent persons is permitted. 
Further, the sterilization process cannot occur until
after a long hearing process.  Justice Holmes,
writing for the majority, noted that “[t]hree
generations of imbeciles are enough.”
With regard to equal protection, there is no equal
protection problem by the statute focusing only on
people in certain mental institutions rather than the
public at large.  The “law does all that is needed
when it does all that it can,” as it assumes most
mentally deficient people are in the relevant
institutions.
Significance:
Buck v. Bell is significant because it legitimized
eugenic sterilization, and it sparked many states to
adopt their own involuntary sterilization statutes. 
In fact, Adolf Hitler cited Buck v. Bell as a model
for his forced sterilization law to prevent
“hereditarily diseased offspring.”  The Nazis even
used Buck v. Bell as a defense during the
Nuremburg trials following World War II.
Buck v. Bell has not been expressly overturned.  making it unconstitutional?
However, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) made forced sterilization so difficult that it
discouraged the practice.  By 1963, sterilization
laws were almost entirely out of use.
4. Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro, GR
No. 14078, 7 March 1919
FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in
favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the
Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their
liberty by the provincial officials of that province.
Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against
their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under
the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the
provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes
in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a
site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the
provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly
approved by the Secretary of the Interior as
required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917
reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon
sites selected by provincial governor. — With the
prior approval of the Department Head, the
provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when
such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up
their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands
to be selected by him an approved by the
provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this
section of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a
provincial official and a department head, therefore
HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred
authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the
provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of
legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what
it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion
as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the later no valid objection can be made.
Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to
an executive department or official. The
Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to
whom it has committed the execution of certain
acts, final on questions of fact. The growing
tendency in the decision is to give prominence to
the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the
Administrative Code, the Legislature merely
conferred upon the provincial governor, with the
approval of the provincial board and the
Department Head, discretionary authority as to the
execution of the law. This is necessary since the
provincial governor and the provincial board, as
the official representatives of the province, are
better qualified to judge “when such as course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order”.
As officials charged with the administration of the
province and the protection of its inhabitants, they
are better fitted to select sites which have the
conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a
backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial
official and a department head.

5. Terrace vs Thompson, 263 US 197
Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner-father sought
to have the federal district court decide which of
two conflicting child custody determinations is
valid, and the district court refused to exercise
jurisdiction. This appeal ensued.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The PKPA requires that
a state give full faith and credit to a sister state’s
child custody determination, provided it is
rendered in compliance with the provisions of the
PKPA. However, there is no implied federal cause
of action to determine which of two conflicting
state child custody determinations is valid.
Facts. The petitioner-father and respondent-mother
became divorced in California, and a California
court issued a child custody determination
awarding joint custody to the parents. When the
respondent decided to move to Louisiana, the
California court entered an order granting full
custody to the respondent pending the submission
of a report from the court investigator, after which
the court would make a more studied custody
determination. Shortly after the respondent and the
child moved to Louisiana, the respondent filed a
petition in Louisiana state court for enforcement of
the California custody decree.
The Louisiana court granted the petition and
awarded sole custody to the respondent. Two
months later, the California court, upon receiving
and reviewing the investigator’s report, entered an
order awarding sole custody to the petitioner. The
petitioner then brought this action in federal court
requesting a decree invalidating the Louisiana
order and upholding the California decree.
The district court granted the respondent’s motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter and personal
jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. The petitioner then initiated this
appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
Issue. Does the federal Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act (PKPA) furnish an implied cause
of action in federal court to determine which of
two conflicting state custody decisions is valid?
Held. No. The PKPA is an extension of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to custody determinations.
In other words, the PKPA requires that a state
court enforce a child custody determination of
another state if that determination is consistent
with the PKPA. In short, a determination is
consistent with the PKPA if the issuing state has
jurisdiction under local law and one of five
conditions, not relevant to the rule of this case, is
met.
The PKPA only imposes a federal duty on a state
court to give full faith and credit to a sister state’s
custody determination. However, there is no
implied federal cause of action to determine which
of two conflicting state custody decrees is valid.
Thus, the district court did not err in refusing to
exercise jurisdiction over this cause of action.
Discussion. The PKPA does not authorize a
federal cause of action but rather acts to impose a
federal duty on state courts to enforce their sister
states’ child custody determinations.
6. Nunez vs Averia, GR No. L-38415, 28 June
1974
Facts:
Petitioner is the protestant in Election Case No.
TM-470 of respondent court contesting the
November 8, 1971 election results in certain
precincts for the mayoralty of Tarnate, Cavite on
the ground of fraud, irregularities and corrupt
practices.
Vice-mayor Rodolfo de Leon who as the
incumbent mayor is now substituted in this action
as party... respondent.[3]
Respondent court has granted protestee's motion
for dismissal of the election protest on the ground
"that this court has lost its jurisdiction to decide
this case for the reason that the same has become
moot and academic," citing the
President's authority under General Order No. 3
and Article XVII, section 9 of the 1973
Constitution to remove from office all incumbent
government officials and employees, whether
elective or appointive.
Petitioner filed a timely appeal.
Court resolved to consider petitioner's petition for
review on certiorari as a special civil action and the
case submitted for decision for prompt disposition
thereof.
Issues:
Granted protestee's motion for dismissal of the
election protest on the ground "that this court has
lost its jurisdiction to decide this case for the
reason that the same has become moot and
academic," citing the
President's authority under General Order No. 3
and Article XVII, section 9 of the 1973
Constitution to remove from office all incumbent
government officials and employees, whether
elective or appointive.
Ruling:
Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly
elected to their respective positions and
consequently, have no right to hold the same,
perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and
emoluments, then certainly, they should not be
allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given
to them by said... constitutional provision,"
We are of the opinion... that they hold their
respective offices still under the term to which they
have been elected, although the same is now
indefinite."
To hold that the right of the herein private
respondents to the respective offices which... they
are now holding, may no longer be subject to
question would be tantamount to giving a stamp of
approval to what could have been an election
victory characterized by fraud, threats,
intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of
irregularities prohibited by the Election Code... to
preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot."...
respondent court's dismissal order of January 31,
1974 is hereby set aside and respondent court is
directed to immediately continue with the trial and
determination of the election protest before it on
the merits.
7. Bince vs COMELEC, GR No. 111624,-25, 9
March 1995
FACTS:
 Bince and Macu were Sangguniang Panlalawigan
candidates in Pangasinan during the 1992
elections. During the canvassing of the COCs for
the 10 municipalities of the 6th District, Micu
objected to the inclusion of the COC of San
Quintin, claiming that it contained false
statements.
Micu later secured a resolution from the
COMELEC directing the Provincial Board of
Canvassers the correct number of votes from the
municipality of San Quintin. Meanwhile, Micu
filed several petitions for correction of the
Statements of Votes (SOVs) for alleged errors in
other municipalities of the 6th district (Tayug and
San Miguel). Note that the errors were committed
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBCs).
However, after canvassing the COCs for the 10
municipalities, it turns out Bince garnered 27,370
votes against Micu’s 27,369 or a margin of 1 vote. 
Bince was not yet proclaimed at this time because
of the absence of authority from the
COMELEC.On June 29, the COMELEC en banc
promulgated a resolution directing the PBC to
continue with the provincial canvassand proclaim
the winning candidates.
On June 24, the PBC acted on Micu’s petitions for
correction of the SOVs for Tayug and San Miguel.
Bince appealed, claiming that the PBC
had no jurisdiction. Subsequently the PBC filed
a petition with the COMELEC seeking a definitive
uling as to who should be proclaimed. Apparently,
if the corrections for the SOVs of Tayug and
SM were to be included, Emiliano Micu would
gain plurality by 72votes. The COMELEC
resolved the PBC to proclaim the winning
candidate on the basis of the completed
and corrected Certificates of Canvass.
However on July 21, Bince was proclaimed
winner. Micu filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt
and to Annul Proclamation, and Amended Urgent
Petition for Contempt and Annul Proclamation,
alleging that the PBC defied the directive of the
COMELEC. The COMELEC held the officers who
proclaimed Bince in contempt, and directed the
PBC to proclaim the true winner.
The case later turned to the legality of the PBC’s
granting of the petition for the correction of the
Tayug and SM SO Vs. Micu claims that his
petitions for correction were valid under Section 6,
Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Eventually, Bince’s proclamation was affirmed,
but on Micu’s MR to the en banc, was set aside
and declared null and void.
Bince appealed to the SC in a special civil action
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
 WON the COMELEC committed Grave Abuse of
Discrection in nullifying Bince’s proclamation
 
RULING:
 NO. COMELEC acted within its jurisdiction.
COMELEC did not act with GAOD in annulling
the proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr.
and in directing the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the MBCs of
Tayug and San Miguel to make the necessary
corrections in the SOVs and COCs. Nullification
was justified as the basis was a mathematical error
committed by the MBCs in the computation of
votes.
The COMELEC cannot be faulted for
subsequently annulling the proclamation of
petitioner Bince on account of a mathematical
error in addition, committed by the MBCs.
 As to timeliness of Micu’s petitions for correction,
the petitions to correct manifest errors were filed
on time, that is, before the petitioner’s
proclamation on July 21, 1992. The petition of the
MBC of San Miguel was filed on June 4, 1992,
while that of the MBC of Tayug was filed on June
5, 1992. Still, Micu’s petition was filed with the
MBC of Tayug and San Miguel on June 10 and 11,
1992, respectively. It is definitely well within the
period required by Section 6, Rule 27 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Sec. 6 clearly
provides that the petition for correction may be
filed at any time before proclamation of a winner.
What if the petitions for correction were filed
out of time?
 No effect. Assuming for the sake of argument that
the petition was filed out of time, this incident
alone will not thwart the proper determination and
resolution of the instant case on substantial
grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would
put a stamp of validity on a palpably void
proclamation, with the inevitable result of
frustrating the people’s will cannot be
countenanced.
Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and
not on technicalities has been
consistently observed by the Court. Well-settled is
the doctrine that election contests involve public
interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers
should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an
obstacle to the determination of the true will of the
electorate in the choice of their elective officials.
And also settled is the rule that laws governing
election contests must be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people may not be defeated
by mere technical objections.
Was allowing the correction of mathematical
errors proper ? YES It does not involve the
opening of ballot boxes; neither does it involve the
examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The
correction sought by respondents is correction of
manifest mistakes in mathematical addition.
Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical act of
reflecting the true and correct votes received by the
candidates. In this case, the manifest errors only
sought proper and diligent addition of the votes in
Tayug and San Miguel. Consequently, by a margin
of 72 votes, Micu indisputably won.
Bince’s proclamation and assumption into public
office was therefore flawed from the beginning,
the same having been based in a faulty tabulation.

8. Crespo vs Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,
GR No. L-33237, 15 April 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner Gregorio Crespo was the elected
Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija in the
local elections of 1967. An Administrative
complaint was filed against him by private
respondent Pedro Wycoco for harassment, abuse of
authority and oppression.
Public respondent, Provincial Board of Nueva
Ecija heard the said administrative case without
notifying the petitioner or his counsel and, on the
basis of the evidence presented by private
respondent, passed a resolution preventively
suspending petitioner form his office as municipal
mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether the preventive suspension issued by the
Provincial Board is arbitrary and violated the
fundamental principle of due process.
RULING:
YES. Petitioner was denied due process by
respondent Provincial Board. Undoubtedly, the
order of preventive suspension was issued without
giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. In the
proceedings held on 15 February 1971, nothing
therein can be gathered that, in issuing the assailed
order, the written explanation submitted by
petitioner was taken into account. The assailed
order was issued mainly on the basis of the
evidence presented ex parte by respondent
Wycoco.
9. JMM Promotion and Managements vs CA,
GR No. 120095, 5 August 1996
Facts:
Petitioner JMM Promotions and Management Inc.
appealed to the respondent NLRC with regard to
the decision of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) on the
ground of failure to post the required appeal bond.
NLRC, in support of the decision, cited Article 223
of the Labor Code, as provided and amended:
Article 223 - In a case of judgment involving a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer may
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.
Rule VI, Section 6 of the New Rules of Procedure
of the NLRC as amended reads as follows:
Section 6 - Bond - In case the decision of the
Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer shall be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by
a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the Commission or the Supreme Court in an
amount equivalent to the award.
The Petitioner contended that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in applying
these rules to decisions rendered by POEA. It
insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the
case of licensed recruiters for overseas
employment because they are already required
under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA
Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000.00
but also a cash bond of P100,000.00 and a surety
bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner also claimed it has placed in escrow the
sum of P200,000.00 with PNB in compliance of
Section 17, Rule II, Book II to primarily answer
for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a
result of recruitment violations or money claims.
The office of the Solicitor General sustained the
appeal bond requirement but suggested that the
rules cited by NLRC are applicable only to
decisions of the Labor Arbiter and not of POEA.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner is still required to post
an appeal bond even after posting a cash and surety
bond of P150,000.00 and placing an escrow money
of P200,000.00 as required by POEA rules to
perfect the appeal from a decision of POEA to
NLRC?
Held:
Yes. POEA rules are clear. In addition to the cash
and surety bond, and the escrow money fund, there
should be also an amount equivalent to the
monetary award to perfect the appeal.
An appeal bond is intended to further insure
payment of the monetary award in favor of the
employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to
the NLRC.
In legal hermeneutics, caution should be taken that
every part thereof be given effect on the theory that
it was enacted as an integrated measure. and not as
a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res
magis valeat quam pereat. Under the petitioner's
interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section
6 of the POEA rule should be disregarded because
of the earlier bonds and escrow fund. The Court
ruled that it is not a redundancy, but rather a
complement between Section 6, Section 4 and
Section 17.
The rule is that a construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
coordinated and harmonious whole.
10. Republic vs Rosemoor Mining &
Development Corporation, GR No. 149927, 30
March 2004
Facts:
The four (4) petitioners after having been granted
permission to prospect for marble deposits in the
mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan,
succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high
quality and in commercial quantities in Mount
Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato
mountain range. The petitioners applied with the
Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences
Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding
license to exploit said marble deposits. License No.
33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of
the herein petitioners. Shortly after Respondent
Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed Minister of the
DENR, petitioners License No. 33 was cancelled
by him through his letter to ROSEMOOR
MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION dated September 6, 1986.
CA Ruling:
Cancellation of respondents’ license without notice
and hearing was tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law. It added that
under the clause in the Constitution dealing with
the non-impairment of obligations and contracts,
respondents license must be respected by the State.
Petitioners Argument:
The license was validly declared a nullity and
consequently withdrawn or terminated. In the said
issued letter, respondents were informed by then
Minister Maceda that their license had illegally
been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD
463; and that there was no more public interest
served by the continued existence or renewal of the
license. The latter reason, they added, was
confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84.
According to this law, public interest would be
served by reverting the parcel of land that was
excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former
status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato
national park.
*Section 69. Maximum Area of Quarry License
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14
hereof, a quarry license shall cover an area of not
more than one hundred (100) hectares in any one
province and not more than one thousand (1,000)
hectares in the entire Philippines.
The license in question, QLP No. 33, is dated
August 3, 1982, and it was issued in the name of
Rosemoor Mining Development Corporation. The
terms of the license allowed the corporation to
extract and dispose of marbleized limestone from a
330.3062-hectare land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
The license is, however, subject to the terms and
conditions of PD 463, the governing law at the
time it was granted;
Issue:
Whether or not Proclamation no. 84 violated the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
Held: NO.
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements
are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein.
They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause.
Proclamation No. 84 cannot be stigmatized as a
violation of the non-impairment clause. As pointed
out earlier, respondents license is not a contract to
which the protection accorded by the non-
impairment clause may extend. Even if the license
were, it is settled that provisions of existing laws
and a reservation of police power are deemed read
into it, because it concerns a subject impressed
with public welfare. As it is, the non-impairment
clause must yield to the police power of the state.
In line with the foregoing jurisprudence,
respondents license may be revoked or rescinded
by executive action when the national interest so
requires, because it is not a contract, property or a
property right protected by the due process clause
of the Constitution.
11. Chavez vs Romulo, GR No. 157036, 9 June
2004
FACTS:
The instance is about the prohibition on the
carrying of pieces outside of abode in order to
discourage the lifting offense rates. Petitioner
inquires the prohibition as a misdemeanor of his
right to belongings.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the annulment of license to transport
pieces is unconstitutional
2. Whether the right to transport pieces is a vested
belongings right
HELD:
Petitioner can non happen consolation to the
above-quoted Constitutional proviso. In measuring
a due procedure claim ; the first and first
consideration must be whether life. autonomy or
belongings involvement exists. The majority of
law is that a licence authorising a individual to
bask a certain privilege is neither a belongings nor
belongings right. In Tan V. The Director of
Forestry. we ruled that “a licence is simply a
license or privilege to make what otherwise would
be improper. and is non a contract between the
authorization allowing it and the individual to
whom it is granted ; neither is it belongings or a
belongings right. nor does it make a vested right. ”
In a more emphasized dictum. we held in Oposa
vs. Factoran. Jr. that: “Needless to state. all
licences may therefore be revoked or rescinded by
executive action.
It is non a contract. belongings or a belongings
right protected by the due procedure clause of the
Constitution. ”xxx In our legal power. the PNP
Chief is granted wide discretion in the issue of
PTCFOR. This is apparent from the tenor of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P. D. No.
1866 which province that “the Chief of
Constabulary may. in meritable instances as
determined by him and under such conditions as he
may enforce. authorise lawful holders of pieces to
transport them outside of abode. ”
Following the American philosophy. it is so logical
to state that a PTCFOR does non represent a
belongings right protected under our Constitution.
Consequently. a PTCFOR. merely like ordinary
licences in other regulated Fieldss. may be revoked
any clip. It does non confabulate an absolute right.
but merely a personal privilege to be exercised
under bing limitations. and such as may
thenceforth be moderately imposed.
A licensee takes his licence topic to such
conditions as the Legislature sees fit to enforce.
and one of the statutory conditions of this licence
is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their
pleasance. Such a licence is non a contract. and a
annulment of it does non strip the suspect of any
belongings. unsusceptibility. or privilege within
the significance of these words in the Declaration
of Rights. The US Supreme Court. in Doyle vs.
Continental Ins. Co. held: “The correlate power to
revoke or remember a permission is a necessary
effect of the chief power. A mere licence by the
State is ever revokable. ”
12. Libanan vs Sandiganbayan, GR No. 112386,
14 June 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor
of Eastern Samar and was a former member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior to the 1992
elections.
He was charged in conspiring to other members to
prevent and exclude Docena (Respondent), a
qualified replacement of a deceased member, from
exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member
of the said body.
In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued a
resolution suspending their respective public
position and office for ninety (90) days.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging three grounds: [1] Order of Suspension if
executed shall affront the petitioner’s right for due
process; [2] the suspension would assault his
covenant to the people of Samar as their vice-
governor; and [3] the reasons sought to be
prevented by the suspension no longer exist.
Petitioner contends that the order of suspension,
being predicated on his acts supposedly committed
while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan,
can no longer attach to him now that he is the duly
elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern
Samar.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by
the SANDIGANBAYAN is valid?
HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that the term "office" used in
the law could apply to any office which the officer
charged might currently be holding and not
necessarily the particular office under which he
was charged.
The suspension order cannot amount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Public office is "a public agency or trust," and it is
not the property envisioned by the Constitutional
provision which petitioner invokes.
Hence, SC dismissed the petition.
SANDIGANBAYAN’s decision is affirmed.
13. Kwong Sing vs City of Manila, GR No.
15972, October 1920
Facts:
Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other
Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same
interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary
injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the
validity of enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city
of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the
receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly
signed showing the kind and number of articles
delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments. The permanent injunction was
denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is
that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation;
putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It
unjustly discriminates between persons in similar
circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary
infringement of property rights. They also contest
that the enforcement of the legislation is an act
beyond the scope of their police power. In view of
the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme
Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance
no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power
(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is
a class legislation that infringes property rights.

Held:
Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such
purposes are permissible under the police power.
The police power of the City of Manila to enact
Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444,
paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code,
as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the
municipal board of the city of Manila, with the
approval of the mayor of the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license
fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary
and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of
the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of
Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between
laundrymen and their patrons and to protect
customers of laundries who are not able to
decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded.
(Considering that in the year 1920s, people of
Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe
English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the
court held that the ordinance invades no
fundamental right, and impairs no personal
privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an
attempt is not made to violate personal property
rights.
The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor
unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all
public laundries without distinction, whether they
belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any
other nationality. All, without exception, and each
every one of them without distinction, must
comply with the ordinance.
The obvious objection for the implementation of
the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the
Administrative Code. Although, an additional
burden will be imposed on the business and
occupation affected by the ordinance such as that
of the appellant by learning even a few words in
Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in
order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the
same burdens are cast upon the them.
Yet, even if private rights of person or property are
subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to
individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance,
this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold
the power of the legislative body. The very
foundation of the police power is the control of
private interests for the public welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is
affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary
injunction is denied, with costs against the
appellants.
14. Yu Eng Cong vs Trinidad, 271 US 500
Facts: 
The petitioner, Yu Cong Eng, was charged by
information in the court of first instance of Manila,
with a violation of Act 2972, which provides that
(Section 1) it shall be unlawful for any person,
company, or partnership or corporation engaged in
commerce, industry or any other activity for the
purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in
accordance with existing law, to keep its account
books in any language other than English, Spanish
or any local dialect. He was arrested, his books
were seized, and the trial was about to proceed,
when he and the other petitioner, Co Liam, on their
own behalf, and on behalf of all the other Chinese
merchants in the Philippines, filed the petition
against the fiscal, or prosecuting attorney of
Manila, and the collector of internal revenue
engaged in the prosecution, and against the judge
presiding. 
Issue: 
Whether or Not Act 2972 is unconstitutional. 
Held: 
Yes. The Philippine government may make every
reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keep
proper records of their business transactions in
English or Spanish or Filipino dialect by which an
adequate measure of what is due from them in
meeting the cost of government can be had. But we
are clearly of opinion that it is not within the police
power of the Philippine Legislature, because it
would be oppressive and arbitrary, to prohibit all
Chinese merchants from maintaining a set of books
in the Chinese language, and in the Chinese
characters, and thus prevent them from keeping
advised of the status of their business and directing
its conduct.
15. Deloso vs Sandiganbayan, GR No. 86889-93,
15 May 1989
FACTS:
The petitioner was the duly elected mayor of
Botolan, Zambales in the local elections of
November 1971. While he occupied the position of
mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a letter of
complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing Deloso
of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-
Graft Law (RA 3019) in relation to the award of
licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal
waters of Botolan, Zambales during the period
1976 to 1978 and the issuance of five (5) tractors
of the municipality to certain individuals allegedly
without any agreement as to the payment of
rentals. Petitioner was then suspended pendente
lite pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 3019.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner’s suspension is
unreasonable and violates the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. The order of suspension does not have a
definite period so that the petitioner may be
suspended for the rest of his term unless his case is
terminated sooner.
As extended suspension is a distinct possibility
considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the
petitioner’s plea for earlier dates of trial of his
cases on the ground that there are other cases set
earlier which have a right to expect priority. Under
these circumstances the preventive suspension
which initially may be justified becomes
unreasonable thus raising a due process question.
16. GSIS vs Montesclaros, GR No. 146494, 14
July 2004
FACTS:
Nicolas Montesclaros, a 72-year-old widower
married Milagros Orbiso, who was then 43 years
old, on 10 July 1983. Nicolas filed with the GSIS
an application for retirement benefits under the
Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977.
In his retirement application, he designated his
wife as his sole beneficiary. GSIS approved
Nicolas’application for retirement effective 17
February 1984, granting a lump sum payment of
annuity for the first five years and a monthly
annuity after.
Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with
the GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under
PD 1146 but was denied the claim because, under
section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no
right to survivorship pension if the surviving
spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner
within three years before the pensioner qualified
for the pension.
Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than
one year from his date of retirement on 17
February 1984. Milagros filed with the trial court a
special civil action for declaratory relief
questioning the validity of Sec. 18 of PD 1146.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring
Milagros eligible for survivorship pension and
ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits
including interest. Citing Articles 115and 117 of
the Family Code, the trial court held that
retirement benefits, which the pensioner has earned
for services rendered and for which the pensioner
has contributed through monthly salary deductions,
are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement benefits
are property the pensioner acquired through labor,
such benefits are conjugal property. The trial court
held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146
is deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the
Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has
retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or impair
vested rights.
The trial court held that Section 18 of PD 1146
was repealed by the Family Code, a later law.
GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, this
appeal.
In a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros
informed the Court that she has accepted
GSIS’ decision disqualifying her from receiving
survivorship pension and that she is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. However, the Court
will still resolve the issue despite the manifestation
of Milagros because social justice and public
interest demand the resolution of the
constitutionality of the proviso.
ISSUE:
Whether the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is
constitutional.
HELD:
NO. The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is
unconstitutional. Under Section 18 of PD 1146, it
prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving
survivorship pension if such dependent spouse
married the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. The Court
holds that such proviso is discriminatory and
denies equal protection of the law.
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution, which provides that [n]o person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly
denying a dependent spouses claim for
survivorship pension if the dependent spouse
contracted marriage to the pensioner within the
three-year prohibited period.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the
surviving spouse without giving the surviving
spouse an opportunity to be heard.
The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146,
which is to assure comprehensive and integrated
social security and insurance benefits to
government employees and their dependents in the
event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement
of the government employees.
A statute based on reasonable classification
does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the
equal protection of the law. The requirements for a
valid and reasonable classification are:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the
same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate
one class differently from another class provided
there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these
requirements. The proviso discriminates against
the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to
the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the
proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the
pensioner more than three years before the
pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still
not receive survivorship pension if the marriage
took place within three years before the pensioner
qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition
is vague. There is no reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose
intended. The law itself does not provide any
reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the
purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed
marriages,  then we do not see why the proviso
reckons the three-year prohibition from the date
the pensioner qualified for pension and not from
the date the pensioner died. The classification does
not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the
classification lumps all those marriages contracted
within three years before the pensioner qualified
for pension as having been contracted primarily for
financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and
arbitrary.
This is probably the reason Congress deleted the
proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA
8291), otherwise known as the Government
Service Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the
old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the
implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving
spouse who married the member immediately
before the members death is still qualified to
receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS
proves that the surviving spouse contracted the
marriage solely to receive the benefit.
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that
marriages contracted within three years before
retirement or death of a member are sham
marriages contracted to avail of survivorship
benefits. The present GSIS law does not
automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of
the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a
GSIS member within three years before the
members retirement or death. The law
acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage mainly to receive
survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The
law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification
that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving
spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress
enacted the social legislation.
Wherefore, the proviso in Section 18 of
Presidential Decree No. 1146 is void for being
violative of the constitutional guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the law.
17. JAVIER VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
 petitioner and the private respondent were
candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa in the May 1984 elections
 the eve of the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head when
several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the
latter's men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Paci􀀾cador, are now facing
trial for these murders.
 case was still being considered by this
Court when on February 11, 1986, the
petitioner was gunned down in cold blood
and in broad daylight.
 The nation, already indignant over the
obvious manipulation of the presidential
elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted
by the killing, which 􀁎aunted a scornful
disregard for the law by the assailants who
apparently believed they were above the
law. This ruthless murder was
 possibly one of the factors that
strengthened the cause of the Opposition
in the February revolution that toppled the
Marcos regime and installed the present
government under President Corazon C.
Aquino.
 The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa
and the disappearance of the o􀀻ce in
dispute between the petitioner and the
private respondent — both of whom have
gone their separate ways — could be a
convenient justi􀀾cation for dismissing
this case. BuT there are larger issues
involved.
 on July 23, 1984, the Second Division
promulgated the decision now subject of
this petition which inter alia proclaimed
Arturo F. Paci􀀾cador the elected
assemblyman of the province of Antique.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
 Owing to what he claimed were attempts
to railroad the private respondent's
proclamation, the petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to question the
canvass of the election returns
 came to SC, arguing that the proclamation
was void because made only by a division
and not by the Commission on Elections
en banc as required by the Constitution
 charged that the elections were marred by
"massive terrorism, intimidation, duress,
vote-buying, fraud, tampering and
falsi􀀾cation of election returns under
duress, threat and intimidation, snatching
of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed
men of respondent Pacificador."
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
 that only contests need to be heard and
decided en banc and all other cases can
be — in fact, should be — filed with and
decided only by any of the three
divisions.
 obstinately insisted on participating in
the case, even if he was asked to inhibit
himself on the ground that he was a
former law partner of the respondent
but he denied he was biased.
 OBJECTED to the transfer of the case
to another division

ISSUE/S:
I. Was the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections
authorized to promulgate its
decision of July 23, 1984,
proclaiming the private respondent
the winner in the election? - NO!
II. WN there was a violation of due
process – YES!
RULING:
I.
- applicable provisions are found in Article XII-
C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973
Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on
Elections the power to:
"(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and quali􀀾cations of all
member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective
provincial and city officials."
Section 3 provides:
"The Commission on Elections may sit en banc
or in three divisions. All election cases may be
heard and decided by divisions except contests
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa,
which shall be heard and decided en banc.
Unless otherwise provided by law, all election
cases shall be decided within ninety days from
the date of their submission for decision."
- in making the Commission on Elections
the sole judge of all contests involving
the election, returns and quali􀀾cations
of the members of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial and
city o􀀻cials, the Constitution intended
to give it full authority to hear and
decide these cases from beginning to
end and on all matters related thereto,
including those arising before the
proclamation of the winners.
- word "contests" should not be given a
restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it
should receive the widest possible scope
conformably to the rule that the words
used in the Constitution should be
interpreted liberally. As employed in
the 1973 Constitution, the term should
be understood as referring to any
matter involving the title or claim of
title to an elective office, made before or
after proclamation of the winner,
whether or not the contestant is
claiming the office in dispute. –
- Needless to stress, the term should be
given a consistent meaning and
understood in the same sense under
both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of
Article XII-C of the Constitution
- As correctly observed by the petitioner,
the purpose of Section 3 in requiring
that cases involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa be heard and
decided by the Commission en banc was
to insure the most careful consideration
of such cases.
- Obviously, that objective could not be
achieved if the Commission could act en
banc only after the proclamation had
been made, for it might then be too late
already.
- in conferring the initial power to decide
the preproclamation question upon the
division, the Constitution did not intend
to prevent the Commission en banc
from exercising the power directly, on
the theory that the greater power
embraces the lesser. It could if it wanted
to but then it could also allow the
division to act for it. That argument
would militate against the purpose of
the provision, which precisely limited
all questions affecting the election
contest, as distinguished from election
cases in general, to the jurisdiction of
the Commission en banc as sole judge
thereof.
- "Sole judge" excluded not only all other
tribunals but also and even the division
of the Commission. A decision made on
the contest by less than the Commission
en banc would not meet the exacting
standard of care and deliberation
ordained by the Constitution.
II. DUE PROCESS ISSUE
- Given the general attitude of the
Commission on Elections toward the
party in power at the time, and the
particular relationship between
Commissioner Opinion and MP
Pacificador, one could not be at least
apprehensive, if not certain, that the
decision of the body would be adverse
to the petitioner.
- This Court has repeatedly and
consistently demanded "the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge" as the
indispensable imperative of due
process.
- To bolster that requirement, we have
held that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just. 16
- The litigants are entitled to no less than
that. They should be sure that when
their rights are violated they can go to a
judge who shall give them justice. They
must trust the judge, otherwise they will
not go to him at all. They must believe
18. TABUENA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
in his sense of fairness, otherwise they
will not seek his judgment. Without
such confidence, there would be no
point in invoking his action for the
justice they expect.
- Due process is intended to insure that
confidence by requiring compliance
with what Justice Frankfurter calls the
rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls
for equal justice.
- There cannot be equal justice where a
suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting
only to be formalized after the litigants
shall have undergone the charade of a
formal hearing.
- Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays
in which the parties are supposed to
make the motions and reach the
PETITIONER’S DEFENSE
denouement according to a prepared
- that they acted in good faith.
script. There is no writer to foreordain
the ending.
- The judge will reach his conclusions
only after all the evidence is in and all
the arguments are filed, on the basis of
the established facts and the pertinent
law.
- The relationship of the judge with one
of the parties may color the facts and
distort the law to the prejudice of a just
decision.
- Where this is probable or even only
possible, due process demands that the
judge inhibit himself, if only out of a
sense of delicadeza.
- For like Caesar's wife, he must be above
suspicion. Commissioner Opinion,
being a lawyer, should have recognized
his duty and abided by this well-known
rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to
do so, he divested the Second Division of
the necessary vote for the questioned
decision, assuming it could act, and
rendered the proceeding null and void.

 Tabuena and Peralta were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of having
malversed the total amount of P55 Million
of the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) funds during their
incumbency as General Manager and
Acting Finance Services Manager,
respectively, of MIAA
 In obedience to President Marcos' verbal
instruction and memorandum, Tabuena,
with the help of Dabao and Peralta, caused
the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds
by means of three (3) withdrawals.
PROSECUTION’S POSITION:
- there were no outstanding obligations in
favor of PNCC at the time of the
disbursement of the P55 Million
 - Tabuena claimed that he was merely
complying with the MARCOS
Memorandum which ordered him to
forward immediately to the O􀀿ce of the
President P55 Million in cash as partial
payment of MIAA's obligations to PNCC,
and that he (Tabuena) was of the belief
that MIAA indeed had liabilities to PNCC.
- Peralta for his part shared the same belief
and so he heeded the request of Tabuena,
his superior, for him (Peralta) to help in
the release of P55 Million.
SANDIGANBAYAN’S:
- The Sandiganbayan made the 􀁁nding that
Tabuena had already converted and
misappropriated the P55 Million when he
delivered the same to Mrs. Gimenez and
not to the PNCC.
- rejected their claim of good faith which
ultimately led to their conviction
ISSUE/S:
I. WN THERE WAS A VIOLATION
OF DP BY RESPONDENT AND
PETITIONERS BE ACQUITTED OF
MALVERSATION – YES!
RULING:
- This Court has acknowledged the right of
a trial judge to question witnesses with a
view to satisfying his mind upon any
material point which presents itself during
the trial of a case over which he presides.
- But not only should his examination be
limited to asking "clarificatory" questions,
45 the right should be sparingly and
judiciously used; for the rule is that the
court should stay out of it as much as
possible, neither interfering nor
intervening in the conduct of the trial.
- Here, these limitations were not observed.
- The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge"
requirement of due process was certainly
denied Tabuena and Peralta when the
court, with its overzealousness, assumed
the dual role of magistrate and advocate.
- In this connection, the observation made
in the Dissenting Opinion to the effect that
the majority of this Court was "unduly
disturbed" with the number of court
questions alone, is quite inaccurate.
- A substantial portion of the TSN was
incorporated in the majority opinion not to
focus on "numbers" alone, but more
importantly to show that the court
questions were in the interest of the
prosecution and which thus depart from
that common standard of fairness and
impartiality.
- The majority believes that the interference
by the Sandiganbayan Justices was just
too excessive that it cannot be justi􀁁ed
under the norm applied to a jury trial, or
even under the standard employed in a
non-jury trial where the judge is
admittedly given more leeway in
propounding questions to clarify points
and to elicit additional relevant evidence.
- Let it, therefore, be emphasized anew that:
"A trial judge should not participate in the
examination of witnesses as to create the
impression that he is allied with the
prosecution.
- He [the judge] may properly intervene in a
trial of a case to promote expedition, and
prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to
clear up some obscurity, but he should
bear in mind that his undue interference,
impatience, or participation in the
examination of witnesses, or a severe
attitude on his part toward witnesses,
especially those who are excited or
terri􀁁ed by the unusual circumstances of a
trial, may tend to prevent the proper
presentation of the cause, or the
ascertainment of the truth in respect
thereto."
- Time and again this Court has declared
that due process requires no less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Bolstering this requirement, we have
added that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be
impartial, to give added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just. The
parties are entitled to no less than this, as a
minimum guaranty of due process."

19. SINGSON VS. NRLC
FACTS:
 petitioner Singson was employed by
private respondent Philippine Airlines,
Inc. (hereinafter PAL) as Traffic
Representative Passenger, Handling
Division. His duty consisted of checking
in passengers and baggage for a particular
flight.
 On June 7, 1991, petitioner was assigned
to serve the check-in counter of Japan Air
Lines (hereinafter JAL) for Flight 742.
 Among the passengers checked in by him
was Ms. Lolita Kondo who was bound for
Narita, Japan.
 After checking in, Ms. Kondo lodged a
complaint alleging that petitioner required
her to pay US $200.00 for alleged excess
baggage without issuing any receipt.
 A confrontation took place where
petitioner was asked by the security o􀁃cer
to empty his pockets. The dollars paid by
Ms. Kondo were not found in his
possession.
 However, when the lower panel of the
check-in counter he was manning was
searched, the sum of two hundred sixty
􀀿ve dollars (US $265) was found therein.
 Petitioner was administratively charged
and investigated by a committee formed
by private respondent PAL.
MS. KONDO’S:
- she was with three (3) Japanese friends
when she checked in on June 7, 1991, for
their 􀁄ight to Narita, Japan.
- While in line, a man approached her and
told her that she had excess baggage. She
denied the allegation since the pieces of
baggage did not only belong to her but
also to her Japanese companions.
- The man did not believe that the Japanese
were her companions and he charged that
she just approached them at the airport.
- To settle the matter, he told her to give
him two hundred dollars (US $200) and he
apologized for their argument
- Ms. Kondo identi􀀿ed the employee who
checked her in as the petitioner.
PETITIONER’S:
- admitted that he was the one who checked
in Ms. Kondo and her Japanese
companions
- He then heard an altercation involving a
woman passenger with excess hand-
carried baggage who was being charged
for it; she was insisting she had paid for it
in the counter but could not produce a
receipt. The passenger turned out to be
Ms. Kondo and she was accusing Cocoy
Gabriel as the one who charged her for
excess baggage.
- Mr. Gabriel at that time was assigned at
the THAI Airways counter, hence, it was
impossible that a passenger for a JAL
􀁄ight would pay him US $200.
- Petitioner was talking to the JAL's
representative when two PAL employees
and Ms. Kondo approached them. He was
told of Ms. Kondo's claim that she paid
the excess baggage fee to him. Petitioner
was surprised at the accusation since Ms.
Kondo had no excess baggage when she
checked in.
- Petitioner assails the Resolution of the
public respondent NLRC on account of
Commissioner Raul T. Aquino's
participation in reviewing and reversing
on appeal his own decision as labor
arbiter.
INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE:
- Petitioner is guilty
PAL:
- Adopted the recommendation and
dismissed petitioner
NLRC:
- Labor Arbiter Raul T . Aquino found the
evidence adduced by private espondent
PAL in terminating petitioner's
employment insu􀁃cient AND declared
petitioner's dismissal illegal and ordered
his reinstatement with backwages.
- BUT upon appeal by respondent PAL, it
was reversed by the 2ND DIVISION
ISSUE/S:
I. WN THERE WAS A VIOLATION
OF DP – YES!
RULING:
- In the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, we laid down the
requisites of procedural due process in
administrative proceedings, to wit:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the
right to present one's case and submit evidence
in support thereof;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented;
(3) the decision must have something to
support itself;
(4) the evidence must be substantial;
(5) the decision must be based on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected;
(6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges
must act on its own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) the Board or body should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in
such manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered. In addition,
administrative due process includes:
(a) the right to notice be it actual or
constructive, of the institution of the
proceedings that may affect a person's legal
right;
(b) reasonable opportunity to appear and
defend his rights and to introduce witnesses
and relevant evidence in his favor;
(c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him
reasonable assurance of honesty and
impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction;
and
(d) a 􀀿nding or decision by that tribunal
supported by substantial evidence presented at
the hearing or at least ascertained in the
records or disclosed to the parties.
- It is selfevident from the ruling case law that
the o􀁃cer who reviews a case on appeal
should not be the same person whose decision
is the subject of review. Thus, we have ruled
that "the reviewing officer must perforce be
other than the officer whose decision is under
review."
- Petitioner was denied due process when
Commissioner Aquino participated, as
presiding commissioner of the Second
Division of the NLRC, in reviewing private
respondent PAL's appeal. He was reviewing
his own decision as a former labor arbiter.
- The composition of the Division guarantees
equal representation and impartiality among its
members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a
review of three (3) commissioners who are
impartial right from the start of the process of
review. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be
considered impartial since he was the arbiter
who decided the case under review. He should
have inhibited himself from any participation
in this case.
- The right of petitioner to an impartial review
of his appeal starts from the time he 􀀿led his
appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial
tribunal in the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration.
- Moreover, his right is to an impartial review
of three commissioners. The denial of
petitioner's right to an impartial review of his
appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his
right to due process.
20. PPL VS. HERIDA
FACTS:
 Julio Herida and Nonito Jamila, Jr., were
charged by the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City with murder. They respectively
pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
 MAY 14, 1995 the residents of Purok 4-B,
Luzon Avenue, Barangay Culiat, Quezon
City celebrated their 􀁃esta. The affair had
been unremarkable until about 6:30 P.M.
when several gunshots shattered the early
evening calm
 Prosecution witness Tomas Baniquid was
preparing his family's evening meal when
he heard the shots
  Tomas peeped from his window and saw
three armed men ganging up on a person –
which was Herlito Delara, already prostate
on the ground.
 Tomas recognized the three attackers as
Edmund Tracilla, Edmund's brother-in-
law who was known only as "Rene," and
appellant Julio Herida.
 Delara was brought to a hospital, but
eventually died as a result of the wounds
he sustained.
APPELLANT’S:
- At the time of the incident, Nonito and he
were having a conversation when the latter
suddenly pulled him inside the house
- Nonito allegedly told him that Delara was
standing outside with a gun pointed at
him.
- Appellant never saw the victim approach
or fire his pistol.
- he had no quarrel with Delara at the time
of the incident. He admitted, however, that
Delara was angry at him because of a
previous misunderstanding.
- Delara had previously hired appellant to
do carpentry work on the former's house.
Appellant, however, did not complete the
task as he had another contract and
recommended another carpenter who
botched the job.
(IN RELATION TO DUE PROCESS)
- Appellant contends that over seventy
percent (70%) of the testimonies of the
prosecution's material witnesses were
elicited by the judge, while the cross-
examination of the defense witnesses was
to a large extent conducted by the judge
himself.
- He submits that under these
circumstances, his right to a fair and
impartial trial was violated.
ISSUE/S:
I. WN THE RTC JUDGE
EXXHIBITED BIAS OR
PREJUDICE AGAINST THE
APPELLANT – NO!
RULING:
- The transcripts of the proceedings show
that the trial court did intensively question
the witnesses.
- For instance, of the 182 questions asked of
prosecution eyewitness Tomas Baniquid,
79 or roughly 43% of the total came from
the judge.
- However, we note that the judge also
intensively questioned witnesses of the
defense.
- When appellant took the stand, 63
questions were added, with 27 or
approximately 43% asked by the judge.
- The intensive questioning of the
witnesses, however, was necessary.
- The sworn a􀁉davits of the material
witnesses were adopted as their direct
testimonies, subject to cross examination.
- Since a􀁉davits are generally taken ex
parte and are often incomplete or even
inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries
by the investigating o􀁉cer, 24 the trial
court had to ask many questions to clarify
important matters.
- The judge's behavior under this
circumstance cannot be considered biased
or prejudiced.
- Judges are, after all, not mere referees in a
boxing bout, whose only task is to watch
and decide the results.
- Judges have as much interest as counsel in
the orderly and expeditious presentation of
evidence and have the duty to ask
questions that would elicit the facts on the
issues involved, clarify ambiguous
remarks by witnesses, and address the
points that are overlooked by counsel.
24. SAMARTINO VS. RAON
FACTS:
- Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and
Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving
sister and spouse, respectively, of the late
Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo
- Summons was served on Roberto
Samartino, brother of petitioner. 2 At the
time of service of summons at petitioner's
 house, he was not at home as he was then
confined at the National Bureau of
Investigation Treatment and
Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC) where
he was undergoing treatment and
rehabilitation for drug dependency.
RESPONDENT’S:
- instituted against petitioner Regalado P.
Samartino a complaint for ejectment
- They alleged that during the lifetime of
Filomena Bernardo, she leased her share
in the property to petitioner for a period of
Five years counted from 1986;
- that the said lease expired and was not
extended thereafter;
- and that petitioner refused to vacate the
property despite demands therefor.
PETITIONER’S:
- liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared
before the trial court with a certi􀀼cation
that petitioner will be unable to comply
with the directive to answer the complaint
within the reglementary period, inasmuch
as it will take six months for him to
complete the rehabilitation program and
before he can be recommended for
discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee
- petitioner submitted an a􀁅davit of merit,
alleging in 􀀼ne that the parcel of land
from which he was being evicted had been
sold to him by Filomena Bernardo-
Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale
-  What made matters worse was that the
RTC:
- still declared petitioner in default
- writ of demolition was issued
commanding the sheriff to remove the
building and improvements made by
petitioner on the subject premises and to
deliver the possession thereof to
respondents.
ISSUE/S:
I. WN THE LOWER COURT LACKS
JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED
PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS – YES!
RULING:
 in the return of summons, it is shown that
petitioner's brother, on whom substituted
service of summons was effected, was a
person of suitable age and discretion
residing at petitioner's residence.
 There being no valid substituted service of
summons, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
 It should be emphasized that the service
of summons is not only required to give
the court jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, but also to afford the
latter an opportunity to be heard on the
claim made against him. Thus,
compliance with the rules regarding the
service of summons is as much an issue
of due process as of jurisdiction.
 The essence of due process is to be found
in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in
support of his defense.
 It is elementary that before a person can
be deprived of his property, he should first
be informed of the claim against him and
the theory on which such claim is
premised
 By reason of the ineffective service of
summons, petitioner was not duly apprised
of the action against him.
 Consequently, he was prevented from
answering the claims against him. He was
not given a chance to be heard on his
defenses.
trial court had actual knowledge that
petitioner was then indisposed and unable
to 􀀼le his answer to the complaint, as he
was then confined at the NBI-TRC.
 The trial court's failure to give petitioner a
reasonable opportunity to file his answer
violated his right to due process. Perforce,
the judgment rendered against petitioner is
nugatory and without effect.