29/03/2020

Commentaries
Jul 05 2010

Fighting limited wars: A major challenge for the military

Gen V.P. Malik (retd)

In January 2000, when I spoke about the concept of limited conventional wars under the nuclear threshold at an international seminar in New Delhi, there was
considerable uproar in the media and the strategic community, particularly in Pakistan.

In January 2000, when I spoke about the concept of limited conventional wars under the nuclear threshold at an international seminar in New Delhi, there was
considerable uproar in the media and the strategic community, particularly in Pakistan. My articulation was pronounced as highly provocative. What the Pakistani
media did not state or realise was that the idea of a limited war came from their country. It was the Pakistan Army which had initiated Kargil war and surprised us.
But its military leaders then had failed to think it through and thus created strategic imbalance for themselves at Kargil, and in future.
 
The limited conventional wars concept was prepared after going through the full conflict spectrum scenarios to find an answer to the Pakistani challenge below the
nuclear threshold, other than launching a covert or a proxy war. I am happy to see that this concept and its realisation have been progressed and continuously refined
since then.

There are two strategic conditions which can spark off and then escalate a military conflict between India and its neighbors. First, the border disputes where a serious
skirmish can lead to a conventional military conflict, and second, intense proxy war that may lead to a conventional war. When a conventional war does break out in
such conditions between two nuclear nations, it is expected to be fought under a nuclear overhang. Some people call that a sub-conventional war or a limited
conventional war. The Chinese call it ‘local border wars’. Such a conflict could also spread out in time, in what could possibly be termed as a war in ‘slow motion’. It
will have to be conducted within the framework of carefully calibrated political goals and military moves that permit adequate control over escalation and
disengagement.

The limited wars concept is far removed from the classical ‘no holds barred’ attitude. It is typically characterised by severe limitations and constraints imposed by the
political leadership on the employment of the military. It would imply limited political and military objectives, limited in duration, in geography, and in the actual use
of force levels.

Important political and military objectives, the time available to the armed forces to execute their missions and achieve politico-military goals, would be crucial for
their planning and conduct of operations. There would have to be complete understanding between the political and military leadership over this. We can also expect
restricting political terms of reference, as were given during the Kargil war.

In a ‘reactive’ situation like the Kargil war, the war duration can be prolonged. However, the duration available will be much less if we decide to take the initiative.

There is also a linkage between deterrence and limited conventional war escalation. Capability to wage a successful conventional and nuclear war is a necessary
deterrent. A war may well remain limited because of a credible deterrence or ‘escalation dominance’ (which means that one side has overwhelming military
superiority at every level of violence). The other side will then be deterred from using conventional or nuclear war due to the ability of the first to wage a war with
much greater chances of success. It means that more room is available for manoeuvre in diplomacy and in conflict. A limited conventional war does not mean limited
capabilities but refers to their use. 

In such a war scenario, politico-diplomatic factors will play an important role. Careful and calibrated orchestration of military operations, diplomacy, and domestic
political environment is essential for its successful outcome. Continuous control of the escalatory ladder requires much closer political oversight and politico-civil-
military interaction. It is, therefore, essential to keep the military leadership within the security and strategic decision-making loop and having a direct politico-
military interface. During a conflict situation, all participants must remain in constant touch with the political leadership, as was done during the Kargil war.

Important challenges in the limited wars concept are: The political definition of the goals and its translation into military objectives would be difficult, sometimes
uncertain and indirect. Yet, it is critical to the attainment of the political goals. The key military concepts pertaining to the desired end result such as victory, decision,
and success, are fundamentally transformed to reflect a much heavier political emphasis and attributes.

The successful outcome of such a war hinges on the ability to react rapidly to an evolving crisis, which often erupts by surprise. This would be a major challenge for
the military. For the military is expected to react quickly to the changing circumstances in order to localize/ freeze/ reverse the situation on the ground, and to arrest
its deterioration, enhance deterrence, and diminish incentives for escalation.

Mobilising and sustaining domestic and international political support for such military operations in the present age of transparency and openness would depend on
the ability of the military to operate in a manner that conforms to political legitimacy, i.e. minimum civilian and military casualties and collateral damage.

Militarily, the greatest challenge could be in the political reluctance to commit a pro-active engagement and insistence to retain the authority for approving not just
key military moves, but also many operational decisions pertaining to deployment and employment of military assets.

Political requirements and military targeting would need heavy reliance on accurate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance before and during the battles.
Surgical strikes would be a common option. Airpower, precision guided weapons, standoff armaments, and information would be the weapons of choice.
Employment of ground forces across the borders could be discouraged, or delayed, due to fear of casualties and difficulty in disengagement at will.

Information operations become important due to the growing transparency of the battlefield to the public. The political requirements of the military operations, in
order to achieve and retain the moral high ground and deny that to the adversary, would need a comprehensive and sophisticated media, public affairs and information
campaign. This would have to be fully integrated and synchronised with the planning and execution of the military operations.
Counter-intervention and defensive measures cannot be overlooked. Lucrative targets would have to be defended and denied through dispersal and other means,
taking into account the symmetrical as well as asymmetrical capabilities of the adversary.

At the operational level, the military implications on the ground are effective and continuous surveillance, integrated capabilities, rapid concentration and launch,
surprise, multiple choices/thrust lines, short, sharp intense actions, maximum use of Special Forces, force multipliers, and a pro-active deployment.

In a meeting of the National Security Advisory Board with the Prime Minister on the day Op Prakaram was called off, I had recommended ‘strategic relocation’ of
ground forces and the need to prepare joint contingency plans which can be implemented at a short notice or during the course of mobilisation. The logic is that the
sooner an intervening force can arrive to influence the course of a military event; the lesser is the chance of the conflict devolving into a firepower intensive, wasteful
slugging match. Rapid mobilisation and contact out-paces enemy, and has the same asset as surprise. For a limited conventional war environment, therefore, it is
necessary to carry out strategic relocation and tasking of combat formations, particularly those which take a long time to be moved and deployed. We need not wait
for mobilisation of the entire theatre or border to be completed. This important aspect and its military application on the ground have led to what is now
euphemistically called the ‘cold start’ doctrine.

1/21
29/03/2020
In a post-Kargil war India Today Conclave, Ashley Tellis had stated “Limited war should be viewed not as a product of the proclivities of the state, but rather as a
predicament resulting from a specific set of structural circumstances.” No one in their right senses would want to have a war. Least of all democracies like India, and
people like me who have studied, participated, and had to conduct a war. But the armed forces of the nation must be prepared for all possible conflict contingencies.

The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff

Commentaries
Defence and Security
Domestic Politics and Governance
India
Indian Defence
Internal Security
Political Economy
Political Reform and Governance
Strategic Studies
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Tweet
Share
Share 0

Leave a Reply
Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Comment

Name *

Email *

Website

Captcha *
87 − 79 =

Post Comment
PREVIOUS

Punjab government funding Jamaat-ud Dawa

NEXT

Japan's Upper House Elections: Crucial test for new Japanese PM

Publication

Previous
Next

More Commentaries:

PM’s India shutdown is an unprecedented gamble

2/21
29/03/2020

India-Pakistan dynamics after Balakot: A different deterrence equation?

How women can change the world

Why China’s growing military might in Tibet should worry India

Fate of plural, democratic India

See More

PRINT PAGE
Get Mail updates

3/21
29/03/2020

4/21
29/03/2020

5/21
29/03/2020
d-

6/21
29/03/2020

7/21
29/03/2020

8/21
29/03/2020

9/21
29/03/2020

10/21
29/03/2020

11/21
29/03/2020

12/21
29/03/2020

13/21
29/03/2020

14/21
29/03/2020

15/21
29/03/2020

16/21
29/03/2020

17/21
29/03/2020

18/21
29/03/2020

19/21
29/03/2020

20/21
29/03/2020

21/21