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Realism, Detente, and Nuclear Weapons
Author(s): Steve Weber

Source: International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Winter, 1990), pp. 55-82
Published by: The MIT Press
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Realism,detente,and nuclearweapons
SteveWeber
Have nuclearweaponsfundamentally alteredtheconductof international

relations?It is not surprisingthatthe "nuclearrevolution"thesis,which
answers"yes" tothisquestion,continues toattract attentionduringperiods
ofimproving U.S.-Soviet relations.As in theearly1970s,thecontroversy
inthelate 1980shas posedthisquestionwithout fullyclarifyingthemeaning
of the term"nuclearrevolution"or its implications forthe behaviorof
states.'My goal in thisarticleis to proposeone way of formalizing what
has thusfarbeenambiguousbyforcing theconceptofa nuclearrevolution
to confrontfundamental premisesofstructural realisttheoryandthehistory
of U.S.-Soviet detente.
I arguethatwhilenuclearweaponsper se did notalterthestructure of
theinternational system,thewidespreaddeployment oftheseweaponsled
to nucleardeterrence, a system-wideconditionthatdoes constitute a par-
ticularkindof structural change.Nucleardeterrence has had visibleand
traceableconsequencesforthe behaviorof states.It has allowedthe su-
perpowersto acquirea new function-"jointcustodianship" of theinter-
nationalsystem-whichimplies a new organizing principleforthesystem.
Usingthisconceptof structural
change as a lens through which to analyze
I
U.S.-Sovietdetente, argue that the
during 1970s, decision makers inWash-
An earlyversionofthisarticle,preparedincollaborationwithCoitBlacker,was presented
at the1988annualmeeting oftheAmerican PoliticalScienceAssociation
inWashington, D.C.
I thankJackLevy,Alexander George,UriBar-Joseph, LynnEden,GeorgeBreslauer, Michael
Desch,Ted Hopf,StephenVan Evera,FeliciaWong,StephenKrasner,and twoanonymous
reviewers forhelpful
discussions,
comments, andcriticisms.
1. See, forexample,JohnLewis Gaddis,"The Long Peace: Elementsof Stability in the
Post-WarInternational System,"InternationalSecurity10 (Spring1986),pp. 99-142. For
alternative views,see therecentexchangebetweenMuellerand Jervis:JohnMueller,"The
EssentialIrrelevanceofNuclearWeapons:Stability inthePostwarWorld,"andRobertJervis,
"The PoliticalEffectsofNuclearWeapons:A Comment," International
Security3 (Fall 1988),
pp. 55-79and80-90,respectively.
InternationalOrganization44, 1, Winter1990
C 1990bytheWorldPeace Foundation Institute
andtheMassachusetts ofTechnology

56 International
Organization
ingtonandMoscowdevelopeddifferent andoftenincompatible understand-

ingsof the behavioralimplicationsof the structuralchange.Pushingthe
argument forwardtothe1990s,I thengenerate predictionsaboutthepotential
forlong-termdevelopments in U.S.-Soviet relations
whichgo beyondwhat
wouldbe consistentwiththestandardstructural realistargument.
One payoffofthisapproachis thatit focusesattention on theprocesses
by whichstatesbecome "socialized" to the structural constraintsof an
system.Whena systemundergoesstructural
international change,actors
withinthesystemmayadapttheirbehavioronlyslowly,and theymaydo
so by a numberof paths.A moredetailedunderstanding of theprocesses
bywhichstatesadaptor"learn"wouldbe a valuableaddition totheresearch
program theory.In thecase at hand,itwillallowmetopropose
ofstructural
fortheriseand demiseofdetentethathas interesting
an explanation impli-
of superpower
cationsforthepossibilities cooperation in the 1990s.
Detenteand SALT
Fromtheinitiation of theStrategicArmsLimitation Talks (SALT) in No-

vember1969to at least theVladivostoksummitmeetingaboutfiveyears
later,U.S. and Sovietleadersengagedin an unevenbut sometimesquite
ambitiouseffort to reshapesuperpower relationsacrosspolitical,military,
and economicspheres.Manyof theachievements of detentewerepatchy
andshort-lived, andtheirdeteriorationthroughout thelatterhalfofthe1970s
culminated in whatwas sometimes labeleda new cold warduringthefirst
Reaganpresidency.Nonetheless,in U.S.-Soviet relations,detenterepre-
sentsan unusualchapterwhosesignificance forinternationalrelationstheory
shouldnotbe dismissed.
Two characteristics thedetenteoftheearly1970sfromother
distinguish
postwarattempts tomoderate superpower First,theU.S. andSoviet
rivalry.
leadersshoweda willingness to concludeagreements thatlimitedsomeof
theirmostimportant military
systems,notablylong-range ballisticmissiles
and strategic defenses.Although thetwocountries had signeda numberof
armscontrolaccordsin previousyears,the 1972agreements werethefirst
to constraincentralstrategic weaponssystemsand to affect(forbetteror
forworse)fundamental elementsofthemilitary balance.The Anti-Ballistic
Missile(ABM) Treatywas aimedat forestalling competition in an entire
class of strategicsystems.Howeverincomplete and imperfect theymight
have been, the SALT agreements represented an unprecedented level of
cooperation oratleastcoordinated inU.S.-Sovietsecurity
restraint relations.
Second,the 1970sdetenteinvolvedefforts to delimittheU.S.-Soviet geo-
strategiccompetition through the development and implementation of an
inchoate"code of conduct."The Basic Principles ofRelationsAgreement
(BPA) of 1972standsas a formalexpressionof an unprecedented ifagain

Nuclearweapons 57
unevenattempt by leadersin Washington and Moscowto elaborateshared

normsto regulateand containtheirpoliticaland military rivalrythrough
effortsto exercisemutualrestraint, to negotiateand settledifferences by
peacefulmeans,and to preventthe development of situationscapable of
causinga dangerousexacerbation of theirdifferences. In lightof thecon-
tinuingconflictsofinterest in the relationship,it is surprising thatthetwo
superpowers agreedto extendtheir efforts at cooperation much beyondan
obviousshared interest in avoiding nuclear war. The BPA thereforerepre-
sentsan unusualtestament to theirwillingness to experiment witha fun-
damental modificationoftheirrelationship andtoextendnormsofreciprocity
and restraintbeyondthedictatesof self-interest and prudenceengendered
by nuclearweapons.
The factthattheseattempts ultimatelyfailedtotransform thesuperpower
relationshipseemsto undermine theargument thatdetentewas a product
of a "nuclearrevolution"thatcaused a basic changein the conductof
internationalrelations.But theachievements of detente,despitetheirsub-
sequentdecline,pose an equallytroubling challengeto thestandardrealist
argument thatthestructure of theinternational systemhas notundergone
change.If structureis a constant, whyhas thebehaviorofthesuperpowers
towardeach otherfluctuated so widelyoverthepasttwenty years?It is true
thattherangeoffluctuation has thusfarremainedwithintheboundariesof
whatis permitted byrealism;butthatresponse,becauseitis consistent with
so much,actuallyexplainsverylittle.2Neitherthenuclearrevolution ar-
gumentnortherealistargument can adequatelyexplainthepuzzle of de-
tente'sriseand decline.Unlesswe are willingeitherto dismissdetenteas
an historicalaberration or to accepta theoretical approachto U.S.-Soviet
relationsthatdoes notdifferentiate betweenthedetenteof theearly1970s
andthecold waroftheearly1980s,we needto pushthesearguments quite
a bitharder.
Approachesto explainingdetente
The richestexplanationsof the 1970sdetenteare foundin the analytic-

workof authorssuchas RaymondGarthoff,
historical HarryGelman,and
AdamUlam.3Each wouldagreethatdetentedevelopedon a foundation of
objectiveswhichwereoftenpoorlydefinedand notnecessarily sharedbe-
2. For an excellentdiscussionofthewiderangeofpostwarsuperpower relationships
con-
sistentwiththepredictions ofrealism,see DeborahLarson,The Originsof Containment:A
Psychological Explanation N.J.:Princeton
(Princeton, Press,1985),pp. 19-23.
University
3. See, for example, Raymond L. Garthoff,Detente and Confrontation:American-Soviet
RelationsfromNixon to Reagan (Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,1985); HarryGel-
man, The BrezhnevPolitburo and the Decline of Detente (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1984); and Adam B. Ulam, Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in WorldPolitics,
Press,1983).
1970-82(New York:OxfordUniversity

58 International
Organization
tweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionbutwhichforbothsideswent
beyondthesimpletaskofavoidingnuclearwar.Whiletheiraccountsoffer
valuableinsightson how theobjectivesof thetwo countriesdiffered and
whydetentein thiscase failedto producea lastingmodification of the
superpower relationship,theylacka solidtietointernational relationstheory
and do notaddresstheissue of thestructural impactof nuclearweapons.
Historicalexplanations leavethedistinct impression thata setofuniqueand
probablyirreproducible "causes" coalescedin the1970sto producea tem-
porarychangein thecharacterof superpower relations.If theintersection
ofobjectivesinthe1970sis seenonlyas a coincidence orhistorical
accident,
to generalizeaboutfuture
itis difficult fordetente.To do this,
possibilities
we needa theoretical approachthatwilladdressseveralbasicpuzzlesabout
detente:Fromwhichsourcesand underwhatcircumstances didthesuper-
powers'objectivesarise,and in whatsensemighttheyactuallyhave been
"shared"?If ambiguousobjectivesled to incompatible behaviorin specific
areas, did the experienceshatterthe objectives?Alternatively, if shared
objectivesdo persist,mighttheexperienceofthe1970sserveas a stepin a
socializationorlearning process,theresiduesofwhichcouldbe calledforth
in anotherattempt to realizesimilarobjectivesin the 1990s?
The logicalplace to startthesearchfora theorythatwilladdressthese
questionsis withrealismand,in particular, thestructuralor neorealistper-
spectiveassociatedwiththeworkofKennethWaltz.Numerouscriticshave
foundthatWaltz'stheory is sometimes misleadingormoreofteninadequate
forspecificpurposesininternational relations.ButthepostwarU.S.-Soviet
relationship oughtto be a relatively easy testforneorealism;the theory
shouldbe able to capturethedynamicof an intensely bipolarrelationship
betweentwogreatpowersthathavea highlevelofconflicting interests
and
a low level of interdependence. Can it do so in a way thatallows us to
extrapolate fromthedetenteexperienceofthe 1970s?
Structural realismstartswiththeaxiomsthattheinternational systemis
anarchicand thatstatesare compelledby theharshimperative of self-help
to providefortheirown securityand well-being. It suggeststhattheself-
help principlewill be strongest in a conflict-ridden, high-stakessecurity
relationshipbetweenpowerful states,suchas thatbetweentheUnitedStates
and the SovietUnion. Althoughanarchydoes not makecooperationim-
possible,any cooperationthatdoes emergeundertheseconditionsis ex-
pectedto be tenuous,unstable,and limitedto issues of peripheral impor-
tance.4Whileproponents ofstructural realismcan thusclaimthata limited
superpower detenteis notinconsistent withtherealistviewofworldpolitics,
4. I discuss this problemat lengthin ExplainingCooperation in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control
(Princeton, N.J.:Princeton UniversityPress,forthcoming).Fora moregeneraldiscussion, see
Robert0. Keohane,"Theoryof WorldPolitics:Structural Realismand Beyond,"in Ada
Finifter,ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington,D.C.: AmericanPo-
liticalScienceAssociation,1983),pp. 503-40.

Nuclearweapons 59
thisclaimis fundamentally differentfromand muchweakerthana claim

thatrealismexplainsdetente.In fact,thereare elementsof the 1970sex-
periencewhichstretch theboundariesofwhatrealismpermits. The theory
allowsforlimited U.S.-Sovietcooperation onissuesofmarginal importance,
butit cannotcomfortably encompassthemoreconstraining provisionsof
SALT or theefforts at a broadpoliticalrapprochement envisionedby the
BPA.
The factthattheseattempts failedoverallhas beentakenas a vindication
of realism,sinceit can be arguedthatthe 1970sdetentewas just a short-
lived deviationfromthe norm.But thisis not a satisfying argument for
severalreasons:thefactthattheeffort was madeat all remainsa puzzle;
theSALT agreements (ifnottheBPA) didhavean effect onthesuperpowers'
behaviorand expectations;the demiseof detentedid notlead to thedis-
mantling ofall ofthecooperativearrangements ofthe 1970s;and less than
twenty yearslater,we seemto be witnessing ofsuperpower
a revitalization
collaborationin a varietyofareas. Cooperation mayproceedfurther thanit
didin the1970s,and itmaydeteriorate once again;in themeantime, itwill
probablyhavea meaningful impacton U.S. and Sovietbehaviorandon the
generalbehaviorofnationsin theinternational system.Realismoffers little
intermsofmorespecificpredictions. Butifthevicissitudes ofdetente'srise
and declineare themselvesimportant phenomenaand if each experience
leaves tracesthatcontinueto influence thetenorof superpower relations,
thenrealismas it standsis an insufficientlydiscriminating toolwithwhich
to viewthedetenteofthe1970s.Forthesamereasons,italso failsto suggest
forand implications
possibilities of theevolutionof U.S.-Soviet relations
duringthe 1990s.
Forpurposesofmyarguments here,realismdoes notneedtobe replaced,
butitdoes needto be extendedor supplemented in somefashion.I see two
ways to go aboutthistask.The firstis to arguethatdetenterepresents a
particularhistoricalmanifestation of a basic, sharedinterestin avoiding
nuclearwar. This lineof reasoning, whichhas been welldeveloped,leads
downthepathtoregimetheory andtheissueofsecurity regimes.Thesecond
is to arguethatnuclearweaponshave somehowbrought abouta changein
the structure of the internationalsystemand thatcertainimplications of
anarchyno longerlogicallyfollow.Realismhas notsystematically explored
thissecondoption.
Realism and thepreventionof nuclear war

The simplestexplanationfordetenteis thatthethreatof a nuclearAr-
mageddoncreatespowerfulsharedincentivesforthe superpowers to co-
operateinpreventingnuclearwar.Detentewas thereforesimplya resultof
But thethreatof nuclearwar is
of myopicself-interests.
the intersection
clearlynot a necessarycondition securitycooperationbetweengreat
for

Organization
60 International
powers,5and it is notevenclearthatnuclearweaponson balanceincrease

theincentives forsuchcooperation. In fact,itis entirely possiblethatnuclear
weaponsby themselves reducethe superpowers' incentives to cooperate.
The deployment of second-strike, retaliatory forces-an actionthata state
can takeon itsown-providesa largeandprobablyunprecedented measure
ofassurancethatsecurity orat leasttheterritorial integrityofthestateitself
willbe maintained. If nuclearweaponssupporttheprinciple of self-help in
thisway,thisleaves littleincentiveto cooperatewitha powerful and dis-
trustedadversary in orderto protectvitalsecurity interests.6
Followingthisline of reasoning, thedemandfora superpower security
regimeto deal withtheprevention ofnuclearwarmayinfactbe quitelow.
Theachievement ofroughstrategic parity intheearly1970swouldifanything
furtherreducethisdemand,rather thanfacilitate cooperation (as othershave
claimed7).The superpowers had successfully managedto preventtheout-
breakof war betweenthemselvesduringtheprecedingtwenty-five years
withoutsubstantial armscontrolagreements. Unilateralactionto maintain
strategic inan eraofparitymight
stability havebeenviewedas slightly more
expensivethanmutualrestraint, but it was also morereliableand would
offertheadditionaladvantagethatif,forwhatever reason,one superpower
failedto competeeffectively, theothermightstandto benefit militarily.
In lightofthelimitedincentives forcooperation on the one hand and the
broaderconflicting superpower interestsand the continuing promise ofself-
helpon theother,it is hardto account for SALT as a direct consequence
ofmyopicself-interests in avoidingnuclearwar.It wouldbe evenharderto
stretchthisargument to explainthemorefar-reaching effort to revisethe
basic politicaltermsofU.S.-Soviet relations, which was also an important
partof thedetenteexperience. The point here is not to engage in a sterile
debateaboutwhether detente was or was not a security regime or to con-
structsome kind of comparison between the levels of cooperation in the
5. The mostwidelystudiedexampleofa well-developed cooperativesecurity arrangement
betweengreatpowersin theprenuclear era is theConcertof Europeand its accompanying
systemofdiplomacy. CarstenHolbraad,TheConcertofEurope:A Study
See, in particular,
in German and BritishInternationalTheory,1815-1914 (London: Longman, 1970); Robert
Jervis,"From Balanceto Concert:A Studyof International SecurityCooperation,"World
in Nine-
Politics38 (October1985),pp. 58-79; and Paul GordonLauren,"CrisisPrevention
teenthCenturyDiplomacy," in AlexanderGeorge,ed., Managing US-Soviet Rivalry:Problems
ofCrisisPrevention (Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress,1983),pp. 31-64.
6. The stateof mutualassureddestruction does not,of course,absolutely guaranteethe
ofthesuperpowers'
integrity
territorial homelands. Statesremainfreeto choosewar,as dis-
cussedlaterinthisarticle.Theremayyetbe someincentive tocooperatetofurtherreducethe
thatnuclearwarwouldcomeaboutthrough
alreadysmallpossibility accidentorinadvertence.
However,themaintenance largeand survivable
of a sufficiently forcear-
nuclearretaliatory
guablyoffersa higherdegreeof assuranceagainstdirectattackthananypreponderance of
conventional weaponspreviously
defensive availableto a state.
7. For example,see CondoleezaRice, "SALT and theSearchfora SecurityRegime,"in
Alexander George,PhillipFarley,andAlexander Dallin,eds., US-SovietSecurityCooperation
(New York:OxfordUniversity Press,1988),pp. 293-306.

Nuclearweapons 61
Concertof Europeand in U.S.-Soviet detente;8 rather,it is to determine

whetherregimetheorycould be used to generate a usefulexplanation for
the development and deterioration of U.S.-Soviet detente. In thiscase,
regimetheory is reallyoflittlehelp.Ifa securityregimehadbeenestablished
undertheaegis of a hegemon, thenwe would have expectedto see coop-
erationdevelop earlier;itwould havebeen leastlikelyto evolveintheearly
1970s,whentheSovietUnionadvancedto a positionof roughparitywith
theUnitedStatesin strategic forces.If "sharedaversions"had been the
primary cause, we wouldhave expecteda detenteto arise earlierin the
decade, perhapsfollowing the Cuban missilecrisis.9And if diffusecom-
monalitiesof interest,culture,tradition, and languagehad been necessary
preconditionsforthedevelopment ofa security regime,we wouldnothave
expecteda detenteto ariseat all. The obstaclesto greatpowercooperation
underanarchyare ifanything compoundedin theU.S.-Soviet case by the
factthateachnationpointstotheotheras themajorthreat topeace,stability,
and thefurther development ofhumanwelfarearoundtheglobe.
Nuclear weapons and the structureof the

internationalsystem
Anotherwayto explaindetenteis to arguethatnuclearweaponschange
thestructureoftheinternational systemina waythatfundamentally recasts
theprospectsforsecurity cooperation. realismrejectsthisexpla-
Structural
nationon theoreticaland historicalgrounds.The logic is easy to follow.
Waltzdefinesthestructure ofa politicalsystembythreeessentialproperties:
the"ordering principle,"thefunctions offormally units,and
differentiated
of capabilitiesamongunits.10
the distribution The international systemis
orderedbytheprinciple ofanarchy.Thefunctions oftheunitsfollowdirectly
fromanarchy:statesareconsigned andeachstatemustperform
to self-help,
to thebestofitsabilitythefullrangeofactivitiesto safeguard itssecurity.
inthepostwarsystem
ofcapabilities
The distribution hasbeenheavilyskewed
8. In "FromBalanceto Concert,"Jervishimself Whilehe sees the
rejectsthecomparison.
Concertas exerting an autonomous impacton stateexpectationsandbehavior,he arguesthat
thepatterns ofbehaviorin U.S.-Sovietsecurity relationsevenduringdetentewereso closely
linkedto immediate conceptions thattheconceptofa regimeis superfluous
ofself-interest to
theirexplanation. It is clearthattheConcertincludedsomeelaborateformsofcooperation,
suchas jointactionagainstrevolutionary forces,whichdetentedidnot.On theotherhand,I
have discussedseveralfeaturesof U.S.-Soviet detentewhichnotonlygo beyondwhatthe
Concertaspiredto do in armscontrolandpoliticalissuesbutwhichalso appearto go beyond
thesimpleconstraints ofshort-term self-interest.
9. It is truethatU.S.-Sovietrelations underwent "thaw"inthewakeofthis
a considerable
crisisandthatthesigning oftheLimitedTestBanTreatyin 1963was probably a closelyrelated
concomitant of thatprocess.Nevertheless, thisdoes notexplainthemoveto a muchmore
wide-ranging andextensive detenteprocessintheearly1970s,whichinfactfolloweda period
ofrelativecalmand stability in U.S.-Sovietrelations.
10.Kenneth Waltz,Theory ofInternational Mass.:Addison-Wesley,
Politics(Reading, 1979),
p. 79.

62 International
Organization
in favorof theUnitedStatesand theSovietUnion.Takentogether, these

threeproperties definean anarchic, bipolarinternational
system whosestruc-
tureis unaffected by nuclearweapons.
The historical argument leadingto thisconclusionis straightforward. An-
archyas an organizing principlehas not been visiblyalteredby nuclear
weapons.Theinternational systemcontinues tolacka centralauthority, and
statesmustrelyprimarily on the maintenance of militarycapabilities(be
theynuclearor conventional) to safeguard theirsecurity.Norhavenuclear
weaponssignificantly alteredthedistribution of capabilitiesamongstates.
The nuclearpredominance of theUnitedStatesand theSovietUnionand
thefactthattheirmissilesare aimedat each otherbothreflect andreinforce
theunequaldistribution of powerthatcontinuesto definethestructure of
theinternational system.
Thetheoretical argument forrejectingstructural changeis somewhat more
subtle.It startswiththenotionthata unit-level phenomenon, an actiontaken
bystates,cannotbydefinition inducestructural change.Structure is a prop-
ertyof the systemas a whole,whichleads to the expectationthatwhat
statesdo willreflect ratherthanundermine thefundamental characteristics
ofthesystem.The development ofnuclearweaponswas a manifestation of
statebehaviorthatwas fullyconsistent withall threeproperties defining the
structure of theinternational system:anarchy,self-help, and bipolarity. If
nuclearweaponsdo not affectthe conditionof anarchy,theycannotun-
derminetheprincipleof self-help. This is because anarchy,to repeatthe
point,precludesfunctional differentiationamongunits;self-help is a nec-
essaryconsequence.As longas thefirsttwoproperties of thesystemare
notmodified, structural changecan onlyfollowfroma significant redistri-
butionof capabilities.Nuclearweaponshave notdone this.Waltzargues
thatevenmajorchangesin military technology do notchangethestructure
of theinternational systemunlessthenew weaponsare used to fight wars
thatchangethenumber ofgreatpowers. 1I1Nuclearweapons,then,reinforce
thebipolarity thatwouldhave prevailedin theirabsence,and althoughthe
existenceoftheseweaponsmakestheoutbreakofwarbetweenthesuper-
powersfarless likely,nuclearweaponsthemselves havenotfundamentally
modifiedthe functions of the UnitedStates,the Soviet Union,or other
states.12The structure ofthesystemis unchanged.
Modifyingthe structuralrealist argument

The realistargument one,butitstillleavesus
is an elegantandattractive
empty-handed in our searchforwaysto thinkaboutnuclearweaponsand
detente.Waltz and othersare correctwhentheyassertthattherewere
11. Ibid.,pp. 180-81.
12.On thispoint,see ibid.,pp. 176-83;andRobertGilpin,WarandChangeinWorld
Politics
(New York:Cambridge University Press,1981),pp. 213-19.

Nuclearweapons 63
previousrevolutions in thetechnology of warfareand thatdespitetheac-

companying vastincreasein thepotentialforstatesto damageeach other,
thesetechnological changesdidnotalterinternational anarchy.Andalthough
itis correctto saythatthedevelopment ofnuclearweaponswas a unit-level
actionwhichdid not per se representa structural change,I believeit is
possibleand necessaryto go beyondthisposition.
Whilenuclearweaponsare undeniably the resultof stateaction,their
subsequentwidespreaddeployment has led to a worldin whichnuclear
deterrence based on mutually assureddestruction (MAD) is an inescapable
factoflifeforthesuperpowers. Deterrence is a system-wide This
condition.
condition, in turn,has engendered a structural changein theinternational
system.It has done so in thefollowing way. MAD represents a qualitative
changenot onlyin the destructiveness of war but also in thepredictable
consequencesofwar.Warhas alwaysentailedconsiderable costsandrisks
andhas oftenresultedina loss ofabsolutecapabilities forthevictoras well
as thevanquished.But in thepre-MADworld,decisionmakerscouldand
oftendid makethecalculationthatlarge-scalemilitary operationsagainst
rivalswouldenhancetheirstate'srelativestanding. Iftheywerewrong,the
costs of defeatwereunlikelyto be extirpation. MAD affectsthesecalcu-
lationsina fundamental way.For thefirst timeinthehistory ofthemodern
statesystem, a greatpower'suse offorceagainstitsnuclear-armed adversary
wouldabsolutelyensurea redistribution of capabilitiesthatis unfavorable
to both.
In thecase oftheUnitedStatesand theSovietUnion,eithersuperpower
remainsfreeto choose to go to war withthe other,but doingso would
virtually guaranteethatit would not emergeas a greatpower.It is the
certainty ofdestruction intheeventofa U.S.-Soviet nuclearexchangethat
is essential.Neitherstatepossessesmeansto protectitspopulationor in-
dustrialbase fromcatastrophic losses.13 MAD deniesthepromiseor even
thepossibility ofrelativegains.A nuclearwar,whateveritsglobaleffects,
wouldpredictably resultinthedevastation ofbothsuperpowers andtheend
oftheirimmediate participationinwhatever might be leftoftheinternational
politicalsystem.
This is unprecedented. The superpower relationship is now deprivedof
thebasicprinciple defining an anarchic international system: theever-present
possibilityof recourseto force. A "cause" of this magnitude shouldhave
equallysignificant effects.MAD createshistorically if
unique not always
fullycompelling incentives forthesuperpowers place theirinterest
to inthe
13. The citiesand themanufacturing, energy,and communication

transportation, facilities
ofthetwostatesareequallyvulnerable. Moreover, no technological
thereis virtually prospect
deploy,a strategic
thateitherstatewillsoon develop,let alone successfully defensesystem
capableofproviding degreeofprotection
a meaningful againstnuclearattack.For a compre-
ofTechnology
hensivereview,see Office Assessment, U.S. Congress,BallisticMissileDefense
Technologies (Washington,D.C.: Government Office,1985).
Printing

64 International
Organization
maintenance of theinternational politicalsystemahead oftheircontinuing

struggleforrelativegains.These incentives are of a qualitativelydifferent
naturefromthosethatexistedin prenuclear systemsas wellas fromthose
thatwouldexistin a bipolar,nonnuclear system.
One consequenceof thishas been a significant degreeof differentiation
amongthefunctions ofstatesin thesystem,a condition whichis equallyat
odds withanarchy.14Undernucleardeterrence, statesare notalikein the
tasksthattheyface. The two mostpowerfulstateshave been essentially
compelledtotakeona newfunction-"jointcustodianship" ofthesystem-
whichgivesthemresponsibilities thatno otheractorsare in a positionto
perform. ThefactthattheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionhaveacquired
thisfunction is a resultofmorethanjust an unevendistribution ofcapabil-
ities.Thisdoes notmeanthattheinternational systemhas beentransformed
froman anarchyto a hierarchy, but it does suggestthatthisanalyticdi-
chotomyno longercapturestheessenceoftheorganizing principle behind
contemporary internationalpolitics.
Realisttheorydoes not,of course,denythepossibility thatthe United
Statesand theSovietUnionwillengagein some "management" of an an-
archicinternational system.Waltz,infact,devotesthefinalchapterofThe-
oryof International Politicsto thisissue, and historyprovidesotherex-
amplesofgreatpowerscooperating inlimitedwaysto manageinternational
systems.Jointcustodianship, however,is fundamentally differentfromsys-
temmanagement as portrayed in thecase of theConcertof Europeor in
Waltz'sdiscussion.
Systemmanagement undertheConcertfocusedon defusing revolutionary
forcesthatthreatened thestability ofthegovernments ofthegreatpowers.
This was primarily a "negative"task of avoidingsharedaversions.The
Concertdid not extendto "positive" tasks of management, presumably
because thestatesinvolvedfearedthepossibleconsequencesof an asym-
metricdistribution ofbenefits. The Concertdidnotattempt to regulatethe
militarycapabilitiesof statesor to slow the competition in transforming
nationalpowerintomilitary force.It also achievedrelatively littlein the
way of institutionalization.In contrast, jointcustodianship involvesmore
thancoordination to avoidsharedaversions;itincludeselements ofpositive
management thatwouldbe difficult to achieveifthemanagerswereoverly
concernedwiththerelativegainsthatmightresult.15 I have alreadynoted
thatdetenteinvolved jointstepsto regulateandlimitthesuperpowers' most
centralmilitary capabilities.The superpower relationship has also achieved
a relatively
highdegreeofinstitutionalization, ranging from theestablishment
14. In TheoryofInternational actorsin anarchic
Politics,p. 93, Waltznotesthatunit-level
systems cannotengageinspecialization: political
"The statesthataretheunitsofinternational
systemsare notformally bythefunctions
differentiated theyperform."
15.I returnto thisissuewhenI discusssomeofthe"positive"management tasksthatwere
performed underdetenteandadditional tasksthatmaybe partofa newdetentein the1990s.

Nuclearweapons 65
of formalbodiesassociatedwitharmscontrol(suchas theStandingCon-
sultativeCommission)to the development of less formalbut stillinstitu-
tionalizedforumsforthediscussionof regionalconflicts, nonproliferation,
and othersubjectsofjointinterest. Manyoftheseinstitutions survivedand
continuedto function (albeitat reducedlevels)duringthedarkestdays of
therelationship in theearly1980s.
Jointcustodianship also differssubstantiallyfromthetypeofmanagement
tasks thatWaltz believesthe moderngreatpowersare in a positionto
perform. 16 It is logicalto expectthatsuperpowers ina bipolarworldwilldo
moreto managethesystembecauseexternalities andproblems ofcollective
actionare reducedas the numberof greatpowersdecline.That-said,the
problemof relativegainsremainsunsolved.In a bipolarsystemwithout
nucleardeterrence, therewouldbe continuing or evenenhancedincentives
to pursuerelativegainsin thecompetition betweenthepoles. The factthat
thedistribution ofpoweris so severelyskewedinfavorofthesuperpowers
mayrelievetheirconcernsabouttherelativegainsmadebylesserstatesat
theirexpenseas theyperform management tasksand bearthecosts,butit
can hardlyrelievetheirworriesabout each other.This structural effect
shouldbe reinforced by thehostileideologicaltingein U.S.-Soviet com-
petition.
The continuing problemofrelativegainsmeansthatsystemmanagement
in a bipolarworldis essentially a typeof balancingbehaviorin whichthe
underlying harshcompetition betweenthesuperpowers is themostimportant
factorpromoting theperformance oftheirrespectivemanagement tasks.In
the absence of nucleardeterrence, accordingto Waltz,each superpower
wouldbe primarily responsibleformanagingeventsin its own sphereof
influence, creating a geographically based "divisionofmanagerial labor."'17
It followsthattheprospectsforsignificant jointsuperpower action,either
to managethesystemtogether ortoaid theothersuperpower initsprincipal
efforts,wouldbe minimal. History, however,goesagainstthislogic.To the
extentthatthe detenteof the 1970sincludedat least some elementsof
superpowercooperationin positivemanagement tasks and thatthe new
detenteofthelate 1980sseemsto be expanding further in thisdirection, a
revisedrealistframework-one in whichnucleardeterrence is viewedas a
changeinorganizing principle andjointcustodianship is recognized as a new
superpower function-maybe a morepowerfulmeansof conceptualizing
thestructure oftheinternational system.
In subsequentsectionsof thisarticle,I interpret the 1970sdetenteas a
consequenceofstructural changein theinternational systemand thenpush
theinterpretation forward to generatepredictions forU.S.-Soviet detente
in the 1990s.
16. See Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, chap. 9.
17. Ibid.,p. 209.

Organization
66 International
Structuraltheoryand U.S.-Soviet detente:a briefaccount
Structural theories,ofcourse,do notpredicttheprecisebehaviorofstates;

thebehaviorofunitswithina systemis almostalwaysunderdetermined by
structure. A majorchangein international structure of thetypeI am pro-
posinghereshould,nonetheless, have a substantialand demonstrable im-
pact. First,if nucleardeterrencehas indeedbroughtabout a changein
international structure, we wouldexpectmoreextensiveand long-lasting
cooperation between thesuperpowers. "Negative"cooperation shouldbroaden
in scope and becomemorehighlyinstitutionalized, allowingsomeof these
effortsto surviveperiodsofdeteriorating relations.Mostconvincingly, we
shouldsee cooperation extending beyondtherealmofsharedaversionsand
intoareas of positivebenefit,wherethe distribution of benefitsmay be
unequal.Second,we wouldexpecta structural changeto influence policy-
makers'perceptions ofstructuralconstraints and gradually lead to changes
in theirconceptionsof stateinterestand behavior.Whetherwe view the
linkbetweenstructure andbehavioras socialization, learning, orsomeother
processof development is a secondaryissue; theanalytictaskof crossing
levels of analysisis the same. The goal is to demonstrate thatstructural
factorssystematically influence conceptions of stateinterest.Thisrequires
a focuson domesticpoliticaland individual decision-making processesthat
togetherreflectsocializationor learningwithinstates.The moststriking
finding is howdifferent theseprocesseshavebeenin Washington and Mos-
cow.
By thelate 1960s,manypolicymakers inWashington perceiveda growing
need to respondto a relativedecline in U.S. powervis-a-visthe Soviet
Union.Theyalso believed thatnuclear deterrence had fundamentallyre-
shapedthedynamic ofpowertransition. WarbetweentheUnitedStatesand
the Soviet Union was unlikelybecause in contrastto past international
systems,neither greatpowercouldhopeto achievepredominance byforce
ofarms.Thisopenedup anotherpossibility: theUnitedStatescouldtryto
drawthe SovietUnionintocooperativeefforts to shareresponsibility
for
management oftheinternationalsystemin a mannerthatwouldcontribute
to thefurther achievementofU.S. goalsevenas Americanpowerdeclined
in relativeterms.As HenryKissingerexpressedelegantlythroughout his
memoirs, thisconceptionofdetentereflectedthefactthatnewopportunities
forand new constraints on thepursuitof stateinterests werefundamental
consequencesofnucleardeterrence. 18
A uniquefeatureoftheAmericanconceptionofdetentewas thepresup-
positionof a particular betweenjointcustodianship
relationship in thepo-
liticalsphereand superpower competition in themilitarysphere.American
decisionmakersbelievedthatpoliticalcooperation withtheSovietshad to
18. See HenryKissinger,WhiteHouse Years (Boston:Little,Brown,1979),especially
chap.5.

Nuclearweapons 67
be madecontingent uponsomerestraint of themilitary rivalry,preferably

byformal agreement. 19Thiswas notso mucha function ofmilitary necessity
(deterrencecouldbe maintained byunilateralaction)as itwas a consequence
of decisionmakers'individualbeliefsand uncertainties about the Soviet
Unionand theirunderstanding ofthedemandsofdomesticpolitics.Nixon
and Kissingerwere acutelysensitiveto the importance of achievingand
maintaining publicsupportfora revisedpolicytowardMoscow,and they
naturallyviewed agreements limiting strategicnuclearweaponsas high-
evidencethatdetentewouldserveAmericaninterests.
visibility Restraint
inmilitarycompetition wouldalso providereassurance thattheSovietUnion
sharedan understanding of whattheAmericanssaw as thebehavioralim-
plicationsofnucleardeterrence. Despitetheprogressive mellowing ofSoviet
rhetoricand a demonstrated willingnessto engagein limitedcooperation
withU.S. leaders,manyAmericanscontinued to harbordoubtsthatSoviet
leadershad givenup theambitionsof usingmilitary meansto replacethe
UnitedStatesas hegemonin somefutureinternational system.
Sovietleadersthrough muchof thepostwarperiodhad repeatedly pro-
claimedthatprogressive shiftsin the "correlation of forces"wouldcarry
socialismand the Soviet stateto eventualpredominance over the United
States.The notionthatthisprocessmustculminate in greatwarbetween
a
theimperialistandsocialistcampswas,however,repudiated byKhrushchev
at thetwentieth was
partycongressin 1956.By 1967,Brezhnev arguing that
thewidespreaddeployment ofnuclearweapons meant that "the struggle to
preventa newworldwarhas nowbecomeone of the most important con-
ditionsforaccomplishing the tasks of construction of socialism.''20 Pre-
venting warobviously did not imply thatthe Soviet Union was preparedto
accept continued second-class statusin international politics.The Soviet
leaders'perceptions of theirinterestsnow focusedon a less violentroute
to achieve(at a minimum) politicalequalitywiththeUnitedStates.21This
represented both a modification of goals and a moderation of tacticscon-
nectedto theconsequencesof nucleardeterrence. The Sovietconception
ofa detenterelationship, however,differed fromthatof theUnitedStates
in twoimportant ways.
First,theKremlinheldto a morepermissive understanding oftherange
ofcompetitive behaviorthatwouldbe consistent withdetente,particularly
withregardto the supportof nationalliberationmovements in the Third
World.GeorgeBreslauerhas arguedthatthisinconsistency in U.S. and
19. The usualcaveatsapplyto thistreatment of "Americandecisionmakers."Obviously,
thedecision-making eliteis nota rationalunitary actor,norare perceptions unan-
ofinterest
imouslyshared.Mydiscussionfocuseson mainstream beliefsandon thepointsofconsensus
thatweresharedamongthemajority oftopdecisionmakers.
20. See thetextofBrezhnev'sspeechinhonorofthefiftieth oftheRevolution:
anniversary
"FiftyYears of GreatVictoriesof Socialism:Reportby ComradeL. I. Brezhnev,General
Secretary oftheCPSU CentralCommittee," Pravda,4 November1967.
21. The caveatsdiscussedinfootnote 19 also applyhere.

Organization
68 International
Sovietviewsoftheboundary betweencollaborative andcompetitive aspects

ofdetente,whichmanifested itselfin controversies over"adventurism" in
Africaandelsewhere,was thefundamental causeofthedeclineofdetente.22
Froma structural perspective,itis notsurprising thatthetwosidesdidnot
immediately arriveat a sharedunderstanding of the rangeand limitsof
competition underdetente.We wouldexpectto see socializingpressures
working to bringtheirconceptions ofinterests in thisarea intoclosercon-
formity over time.In fact,the evidencesuggeststhatthisprocessbegan
during theshortperiodofdetente;some"rulesoftheroad" delimiting areas
and methodsofcompetition emergedandto a considerable degreesurvived
thedeclineofdetente.
Second,the Sovietconceptionof the relationship betweenpoliticalco-
operationand military competition was different fromthatof the United
States.The predominant Americanview was thattherestraint of military
competition was a prerequisiteforthedevelopment ofpoliticalcooperation.
For theKremlin,it was preciselythegrowthof Sovietmilitary powerthat
hadbrought aboutthewillingness oftheUnitedStatestoaccordsuperpower
statusto theSovietUnion.An expanding nucleararsenalwas thusviewed
bytheSovietsas thefundamental enablingcondition ofdetente,leavingthe
Americansno realchoicebutto accepttheascendancyof Sovietpower.23
FromtheKremlin'sperspective, however,the SovietUnionhad to be as
vigilant if
as ever, not more vigilant, inthemaintenance ofitsmilitary power
to guarantee that theUnited States would continue to accept itas a partner
in detente.The best way to bothensureagainsttheoutbreakof war and
thedevelopment
facilitate ofdetentewas thusto acquireadditionalmilitary
capabilities,both conventional and nuclear.
Thisdivergence of thetwo sides' conceptions ofnationalinterest in light
of perceivedstructural constraints is capturedin thehistoryof theABM
treatyand itsrelationship to detente.FromtheU.S. perspective, theABM
treatywas at least a cornerstone, ifnotthefundamental pillar,of thenew
detenterelationship. Clearly,thestrategic andmilitary rationalesforlimiting
ABM systemswereat thetimeseenas relatively compelling, butthesewere
"WhyDetenteFailed,"inGeorge,ManagingUS-SovietRivalry,
22. See GeorgeBreslauer,
pp.319-40.Othershaveoffered as moreaggressive,
ofSovietintentions
interpretations claiming
thatdetentewas seen in theKremlinfromthestartas a fundamentally policythat
offensive
would"lull" theWestintoa falsesenseofsecurity andpermit Moscowto takeadvantageof
theunilateral thatwouldresult.For an argument
restraint attributing detente"to
"offensive
domesticand partypoliticsin theKremlin,see Gelman,TheBrezhnevPolitburoand theDecline
of Detente.
drewdirectlinksbetweenthedevelopment
23. The Sovietleadership ofSoviet"defensive
might"and the emergenceof greater"realism"in U.S. foreign policyin scoresof major
speechesbetween1967andthemid-1970s. Forrepresentative
statements, ofBrezh-
see reports
nev'sspeechesentitled ofSocialism"and "For Strengthening
"FiftyYearsofGreatVictories
theSolidarityofCommunists: For a New UpswingintheAnti-Imperialist
Struggle," Pravda,
4 November1967and 8 June1969.This argument was also expressedin analytictermsby
Arbatovandothers;see GeorgiA. Arbatov,"An EventofWorldSignificance," USA,August
1972,pp. 3-12.

Nuclearweapons 69
notthe onlyreasonsforAmericaninterestin theagreement.24 Fromthe

startof the SALT negotiations in November1969,Sovietbehaviorin the
ABM talkswas viewedin Washington as an indicatorof the Kremlin's
willingness toeschewthegoalofmilitary superiority anditspreviously stated
ambition toascendto a positionofhegemony oversomefuture international
system.25 If theSovietleaderssignedan agreement aimedat long-term sta-
bilizationof the strategic armsrace, it wouldbe a convincing signalthat
theyhadcometo roughly thesameconclusionas theU.S. leadersregarding
thebehavioralimplications of nucleardeterrence. The ABM treaty,from
theAmericanperspective, was theessentiallinkbetweenformaland effec-
tiverestraint ofmilitary competition on theone handand thedevelopment
ofa moreconstructive andcooperativesuperpower politicalrelationshipon
theother.
For theSovietUnion,theABM treatywouldhave had a somewhatdif-
ferentsignificance.It seems,in retrospect, thatSovietleadersviewedde-
terrencebased on dominancein offensive capabilitiesas an objectivecon-
ditionofthestrategic military balanceas stoodaround1969andrecognized
it
thata nuclearwarcouldnotbe wonbyeithersideat thattime.26 The Soviets
also seem to have understoodand shared to some degree the American
concernsaboutarmsrace and crisis that
instabilities might be engendered
by ABM deployments. The Sovietsdid not,however,seem to have im-
mediately accepted the predominant Americanview thattheseconditions
wouldholdfortheindefinite future.Thereis evidenceto suggestthatat least
through muchofthe1970s,theleadership inMoscowcontinued to place its
bets on the possibility thatsome combination of offensive and defensive
capabilitieswouldenableone side or theotherto eventually"prevail" in
nuclearwar.IftheSovietshad notembracedtheAmericanlogicofnuclear
deterrence andthenotionofmutualvulnerability as a moreorlessexistential
realityofthenuclearage, thereis no reasonto suspectthattheKremlin's
long-term interestingainingmilitary superiority wouldhaveundergone any
fundamental change.27
24. By thelate 1960s,Americanstrategic werelargelyagreedthatABM systems
theorists
posedtheprimary threat a robustandstablenuclearbalanceinwhichneither
to achieving side
wouldbe compelledto escalatetherace in offensive systemsor to use nuclearweaponsfirst
ina crisis.Fora concisediscussionofthelogicofthesearguments evolution,
andtheirhistorical
see P. EdwardHaley, David M. Keithly,and JackMerritt, eds., NuclearStrategy, Arms
Control, and theFuture(Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress,1985).
25. See the discussion by Gerard Smithin Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I (New York:
Doubleday,1980),pp. 93-94and 107-8.
26. See David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
Garthoff,
Press,1983).See also Raymond
University andSALT," inJiri
"The SovietMilitary
Valenta and WilliamPotter,eds., Soviet Decisionmakingfor National Security(London: Allen
& Unwin,1984),p. 152.
27. For examples,see ColonelI. Sidelnikov,"PeacefulCoexistenceandtheSecurityofthe
Peoples,"KrasnayaZvezda,14August1973.See also HenryTrofimenko, Changing Attitudes
TowardDeterrence, ACIS Working and
Paperno. 25 (Los Angeles:CenterforInternational
StrategicStudies,1980).Trofimenko's aboutSovietviews
paperis notableforwhatitsuggests

Organization
70 International
According to thislogic,theSovietswouldhavehadlittlereasontoengage
in anythingmorethanextremely limitedcooperativeefforts to managethe
armsraceandwouldhavefavoredmoreextensiverestraints onlywhensuch
agreements offeredasymmetric benefitstoMoscow.Sovietleadersmayhave
made the assessmentaround1969thatan agreement to constrainABM
systemswouldallowthemto intensify thecontinuing strategicmilitarycom-
petitionwiththe UnitedStatesin areas in whichthe SovietUnionhad a
comparative advantage.This,in turn,wouldreinforce thetrendin thebal-
anceofmilitary powerthathadledtodetenteandwouldguarantee continued
Americanwillingness to view the Soviet Union as a moreor less equal
superpower.
Continuing theraceinABM systems might havehadprecisely theopposite
effect.The Sovietexperiencewithstrategic defensehad been largelydis-
appointing.In the 1950sand 1960s,Moscow had investedsignificant re-
sourcesin developingvariousmeansof defending the countryor limiting
damagein theeventof nuclearattack,butthetechnological advantageof
offenseoverdefensein nuclearsystemsremainedconvincing (and thein-
troductionof the multipleindependently targetedreentry vehicle[MIRV]
would soon make it even moreso). By the late 1960s,the Sovietswere
beginningto scale back on deployment oftheGaloshABM systemaround
Moscow,and theywerewillingto talkseriouslyabouta completeban on
ABMs thatwouldhave requiredthemto dismantle it.28
WhiletheAmericanshad also been dissappointed withtheperformance
oftheirvariousprototype defensesystems, theKremlin hada healthy respect
forU.S. technological prowess.The AmericanABM programs and partic-
ularlyNixon'ssafeguard systemposed no immediate threatto theSoviets'
assureddestruction buttherewas also no guaranteethatAmer-
capability,
icaneffortsmightnotin timeproducea technological breakthrough. If this
wereto happen,theSovietUnioncouldbe thrownback intoa positionof
nuclearinferiority,
strategic a positionfromwhichtheleadership hadworked
so hardto escape sincetheend of WorldWar 11.29 The essentialpointis
(itsostensiblefocus).
of theproblemratherthanforwhatit has to say aboutU.S. attitudes
For a detailed analysis, see JeremyR. Azrael, The Soviet CivilianLeadership and theMilitary
HighCommand,1976-1986(SantaMonica,Calif.:RandCorporation,1987),p. 13.
was haltedat sixty-four
28. In 1970,theGaloshdeployment arrayedinfourcom-
launchers
plexes. See JohnPrados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligenceand Soviet StrategicForces
University
N.J.:Princeton
(Princeton, Press,1986),pp. 155-56and 169.Thiswas a significant
hadestimated
fromwhatU.S. intelligence
reduction planneddeployment.
as theoriginally See
Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University oftheSovietleadership's
Press,1986),pp.87-90.Fora discussion interest
in a completeban on ABM deployments, see Smith,Doubletalk,pp. 116-25.
29. Sovietconcernson thisscorehavebeenandcontinue tobe a standard ofmilitary
feature
writers'commentaries. Duringthe early1980s,Chiefof theGeneralStaffMarshalNikolai
Ogarkovwrotethatthestrategic militarybalanceduring theearly1960swas an unacceptable
conditionwithextremely disadvantageousconsequences forSovietinterests.
Ogarkovbelieved
thatas lateas 1963,theUnitedStateswas capableoflaunching a disarming first
strikeagainst

Nuclearweapons 71
thatfromthe Sovietperspective, competition in ABM systemscould un-

derminethe statusof the SovietUnionas a military equal to the United
Statesin strategicsystems,theveryconditionthatSovietleaderssaw as
backingtheirclaimto equal statusas a superpower in worldpolitics.
By agreeingto limitthedeployment of ABM systems,theSovietswere
certainly forcedto amenda strong, traditionalcommitment to defense.That
thiswas a painful,difficult, and controversial decisionis evidentin Soviet
military and politicalwritings of the late 1960s.30But as a self-contained
agreement notto deploycurrent-generation defenses,theABM treatymade
good sense. It did notstop Sovietefforts to improveair defenseand civil
defense,nordid it deeplyconstrainresearchand development of second-
generation ballisticmissiledefensetechnology. Most important, theABM
treatychanneledthearmsrace intooffensive systems, an area inwhichthe
Sovietscould continueto buildtheresourcesof powerthattheybelieved
had led to detentein thefirstplace.
FromMoscow's perspective, theABM treatydid notreflect a broadpo-
liticalbargainor anylargercommitment to moderatethepursuitof usable
military force.It was seen as a usefulagreement preciselybecause it pre-
servedand mightenhancetheSoviets'overallabilityto competemilitarily
withthe UnitedStates,thusreinforcing the foundations of detente.The
basic politicalbargainof detentefortheSovietsseemsto have been con-
tainedin theBPA and notin someunspokencorollaryoftheABM treaty.
WhatAmericanleaderstook to be moreor less innocuousrhetoric, the
Sovietsapparently regardedquiteseriouslyas an explicitendorsement of
Moscow's positionas an equal superpower.An agreement that"in the
nuclearage thereis no alternative to conducting [U.S.-Soviet]relationson
thebasisofpeacefulcoexistence"signaledWashington's reluctant accession
to granting the SovietUnionfullsuperpower status as a politicalequal of
It
theUnitedStates.31 seemed to recognize the validity of Foreign Minister
theSovietUnion.He arguedthatescapingfrommilitary hadbeena criticalachieve-

inferiority
mentand shouldremainan unassailablepriority of theKremlin'spolicyto ensurethatthe
condition ofessentialequalitywas maintained. See "VictoryandthePresentDay," Izvestia,
9 May 1983;and "Providea ReliableDefenseforPeace," Pravda,23 September 1983.
30. For evidenceof theflurry of debate,see "Soviet HintsShifton a MissilePact," The
New YorkTimes,17 February1967;"SovietABM ShiftDenied," Washington Post, 18 Feb-
ruary1967;and "Commentsby MarshalR. Malinovsky," Pravda,23 February1967.For a
generaldiscussion,see RaymondL. Garthoff, "MutualDeterrence andStrategic ArmsLimi-
tationin SovietPolicy,"International Security3 (Summer1978),pp. 112-45.
31. For thetextof theBPA, see Coit Blackerand GloriaDuffy, Arms
eds., International
Control:Issues and Agreements (Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress, 1985).Soviet
leadersarguedexplicitlythattheBPA was themostimportant achievement ofthedetenteera;
theyseldomreferred to theABM treatyin suchterms.See, forexample,"On theFiftieth
Anniversary oftheUnionof SovietSocialistRepublics:Reportby ComradeL. I. Brezhnev,
GeneralSecretary oftheCPSU CentralCommittee," Pravda,22 December1972;and"On the
Pathof OctoberTowardNew VictoriesfortheCause of Communism and Peace: Reportby
ComradeA. A. Gromyko at theCeremonialSessionDevotedtotheFifty-Seventh Anniversary
oftheGreatOctoberSocialistRevolution," Pravda,7 November1974.Academician Arbatov

Organization
72 International
AndreiGromyko'spronouncement at thetwenty-fourth partycongressin

1971thatin the future,therewouldbe "no questionof any significance
whichcan be decidedwithouttheSovietUnionor in oppositionto her.''32
In accordancewiththeirunderstanding ofthenewpoliticalrelationship, the
Sovietsweredetermined to employtheirgrowing powerand acknowledged
statusto presstheirinterests aroundtheglobe.Moscow'sconfidence inthe
recognizedlegitimacy ofitsrightto do so was probablybolstered byWash-
ington'saccessiontothe1973Agreement on thePrevention ofNuclearWar,
anotherseemingly innocuouspoliticaldocument withvagueandambiguous
assertionsaboutsharedsuperpower responsibilityformanaging volatilepo-
liticalsituations.33
I have arguedthusfarthatU.S. and Sovietleadersin the early1970s
reactedto a structural changein international politicsin different ways.
Although leaderson bothsidesperceivedthedevelopment ofnewstructural
constraints arisingfromnucleardeterrence, theyhad different conceptions
of theirinterests in lightof theseconstraints. Bothsides favoreda treaty
limiting strategicdefensive systems, butbecausetheirperceptions ofinterest
weredivergent, theyfavoredthetreatyfordifferent reasons.As a result,
theirvisionsofthekindoffuturestrategic environment to whichthetreaty
wouldcontribute werequitedifferent and,in fact,incompatible.
ThattheABM treatywas an exampleof international cooperationof a
sortis undeniable.It was not,however,cooperation as we usuallythinkof
it,becauseitwas notbased on sharedinterests or compatible visionsofthe
long-term goalsto be achievedthrough agreement. Instead,itwas based on
complementary interests, whichrepresented a convergenceof short-term
goals.Cooperation basedon sharedinterests canbe relatively stable,atleast
untilperceivedinterests undergosignificant change.Butcooperation based
on complementary intereststendsto be a wastingassetfromthebeginning.
Anagreement basedon complementary interests ofthepeculiar
is an artifact
environmental conditionsor particular historicalcircumstances thatbring
divergent conceptionsof interestintotemporary convergence, and these
made essentiallythe same argument in a numberof pieces; see, forexample,"On So-

viet-AmericanRelations,"Kommunist, no. 3, February1973,pp. 1-4. In contrast,
American
leadersplacedprimary emphasison theSALT processand on theconcreteachievements of
theABM treaty as thecornerstone ofthedetenterelationship.The BPA, at leastwhenitwas
signed,was notthought document.
significant
of as a particularly See Kissinger'sdiscussion
oftheBPA in WhiteHouse Years,pp. 1131-32,1150-51,1250,and 1253.See also Garthoff's
discussion in Detente and Confrontation,pp. 290-98.
32. Quotedin RobertLegvold,"The Conceptof Powerand Securityin SovietHistory,"
Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s, part 1, Adelphi Paper no. 151 (London: International
ofStrategic
Institute Studies,1979),p. 6.
33. For thetextoftheagreement, see U.S. ArmsControlandDisarmament
Agency,Arms
Controland DisarmamentAgreements:Textsand HistoriesofNegotiations(Washington,D.C.:
Office,1980),pp. 159-60.
Printing
Government

Nuclearweapons 73
conditionsare likelyto be ephemeral.34Because thereis no consensusto

supportthe sequelae of cooperationover the longterm,cooperationwill
breakdownwhentheuniqueconditions thatbrought thetwosides'interests
intotemporary convergence have passed. Thisis, I believe,theessenceof
theprocessthatunderlay thedeclineofdetentein themid-1970s. If so, the
factthatthedeclineoccurreddoes notinvalidatetheargument thatsuper-
powercooperation duringtheseyearsreflected a changein thestructure of
theinternationalsystem.
Cooperation diminished becausethetwosidesmaintained differentvisions
of thefutureenvironment and detente'scontribution to it. Yet bothsides
seem to have believedthatthiswas not the case; expectationsin both
Washington and Moscowreflected confidencethatthesuperpowers werein
factoperating witha sharedunderstanding of whatnucleardeterrence im-
plied fortheirrelationship.But Sovietand Americanconceptionsof the
behavioralimplicationsofthisstructuralchangewereinfactquitedifferent.
Whenvisionsand expectationswere dramatically contradicted, the rela-
tionshippredictably tooka sharpturntowardconfrontation as bothsides
soughtto repudiatecooperation, blamingeach otherfordealinginbadfaith.
In signingtheSALT I accords,U.S. leadersmadecleartheirexpectation
thattheInterim Agreement on Offensive Systemswouldsoon be replaced
bya comprehensive treatylimiting offensive
strategic weapons.Atthevery
least,theSovietswereexpectedto showsomerestraint in thedeployment
of counterforce-capable systems,thisbeingthe necessaryconcomitant of
an agreement tolimitABMs.35Theseexpectations werefullyconsistent with
theAmericanperception oftheconsequencesof nucleardeterrence. Arms
racestability
required ofdamagelimitation
restraint capabilities,whichmeant
restraintofbothABM and counterforce systems.Stabilization ofthearms
race,again,wasa prerequisiteforthefurtherdevelopment ofpoliticaldetente
and a moreconstructive long-termU.S.-Soviet relationship.
34. Thispointsto twointerestingquestionsforfurther research:Underwhatcircumstances
wouldan agreement basedon complementary interestsactuallycontributetothedeterioration
oftheparticular
conditions thatmadeitpossibleinthefirstplace?Is itpossiblethatanagreement
based on complementary interests
can transform eithertheenvironment or theparties'con-
ceptionsoftheirinterestsso thattheirinterestsbecomeshared?
35. Theseexpectations weremadeexplicitinstatements byGerardSmith,HenryKissinger,
andothersduring theSALT I negotiations,immediately following theMay 1972summit, and
forsometimethereafter. Forexample,incomments ata Moscowpressconference immediately
precedingthesigning ofSALT I, Smithclaimedthatthenegotiating recordofthetreatyimplied
"a commitment [on thepartoftheSovietUnion]notto buildanymoreoftheseICBMs that
haveconcerned us [and]a recognitionthatthedeterrent forcesofbothsidesare notgoingto
be challenged."See WhiteHouse PressRelease,26 May 1972,in U.S. ArmsControland
Disarmament Agency,Documentson Disarmament, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing May1974),p. 212.Kissinger,
Office, alsoalluding totheissueofcounterforce weapons,
wrotelaterthatSALT I and its aftermath "gave us the opportunity to determine whether
detentewas a tacticor a newturnin Sovietpolicy."See Kissinger, WhiteHouse Years,pp.
1244-45.

74 International
Organization
The Sovietinterest intheABM treaty was fundamentally different,as was

theSovietvisionofthefuture strategic environment towhichtheagreement
wouldcontribute. SALT I effectively eliminated theAmericanABM threat
butdidnotprevent theKremlin frompursuing damagelimitation capabilities.
Whilethe Soviet Union maintained an activeresearchand development
programin strategic defense,themoreimportant partof thestrategy was
to developand deploya newgeneration of counterforce-capable intercon-
tinentalballisticmissiles(ICBMs) withgreaterthrow-weight, significantly
improved accuracy,and multiple warheads.Deployments ofSS-18and SS-
19 missilesbeganinlate 1974;anditwas duringthisperiodthattheSoviets
musthave madecriticaldecisionsto moveforward witha newgeneration
of counterforce systemsto be deployedin the 1980s,theSS-24 and SS-25.
Thisbehavior,whichwas extremely provocative to theAmericans, was in
factentirely consistent withtheKremlin'sunderstanding oftherelationship
betweenpoliticaldetenteandmilitary competitiveness. Thestrategic buildup
was themostreliablemeansto ensurethattheUnitedStateswouldcontinue
torespectSovietclaimstofullsuperpower status.The continuing reluctance
of theUnitedStatesto fulfill itspartof theperceived"bargain"no doubt
reinforced Sovietdetermination to add newmilitary capabilities, bothcon-
ventionaland nuclear.36
It is notsurprising thatdecisionmakerson bothsidesweresoon asking
themselveswheretheyhad gone wrong.Life underdetentematchedno
one's expectations:the Soviets did not obtainpoliticalequalityand the
"right"to aid nationalliberation movements in theThirdWorld,nordid
the UnitedStatesobtainSoviet restraint in deployment of counterforce-
capableoffensive systems.
The UnitedStatesseemsto have been thefirstto reactto thesedisap-
pointedexpectations. The logicalresponseforU.S. leaderswas to reverse
theirattempts at restraintand to begina new military buildupbothto test
Sovietintentions at SALT and to forestall further gainsby Moscowin the
ThirdWorld.Thisreasoning ledtolargeincreasesintheU.S. defensebudget
during theFordadministration andagainduring thelatteryearsoftheCarter
administration.37 TheearlierU.S. strategic doctrine ofrelianceon "strategic
sufficiency" andtheimpliedacceptanceofMAD subsequently shifted to an
explicitcommitment to developa "countervailing" strategythatwouldin-
cludediscriminate counterforceattacksagainstSovietmilitary assets.38The
36. Thefirstandmostpoignant demonstration ofthefactthatU.S. decisionmakershadnot
acceded to the idea of fullpoliticalequalityforthe SovietUnioncame in the diplomacy
surrounding theYom KippurWarof 1973,notlongaftertheSALT I treatycameintoforce.
Kissinger'spolicyof exclusionary diplomacy was a greatsuccessin further
reducingSoviet
influenceintheMiddleEast.Moscowcomplained buttonoavailthatAmerican
bitterly behavior
in thiscase was inconsistent
withtheunderstandings ofdetente.
37. See U.S. ArmsControland DisarmamentAgency,WorldMilitaryExpendituresand Arms
Transfers
(Washington,
D.C.: Government
Printing
Office,1985),p. 85.
38. The countervailingstrategyis describedin Reportof SecretaryofDefense Harold Brown
to theCongresson theFY1981 Budget,FY1982 AuthorizationRequest and FY1981-85 Defense

Nuclearweapons 75
UnitedStates also steppedup its involvement in ThirdWorldconflicts,

providing "covert"aid to irregularforcesfightingSoviet-supported regimes
in Africaand Asia.
The learningprocessthatwas takingplace in Washington withregardto
U.S. interestshad its corollaryin Moscow,buttheSovietswerelearning
somewhat differentlessons.Moscow,too,reviseditsperceptions ofinterest
but in a radicallydifferent direction.The Sovietswere surprisedby the
vehemenceof theU.S. responseto theirmilitary buildup;theexpectation
inMoscowhadbeenthatthiswouldmaketheUnitedStatesa morecompliant
ratherthana less compliant politicalpartner.39
By 1977,theSovietleadership
seemedtohaverealizedtheextentofthismiscalculation: themilitarybuildup
had actuallyservedto re-ignite Americanaspirations to superiority.
Brezh-
nev, movingto repairthe damagein the now famous"Tula speech" of
January1977,explicitly declaredthattheSovietUnionwas notaspiringto
militarysuperiorityandwouldbe contentwithparity.A seriesofhigh-level
statements conveying muchthesamemessagefollowedin lateryears.40
By the late 1970s,it seems thatthe Soviet leadershiphad revisedits
perception ofinterestsin lightofthestructural constraintsofdeterrence to
morenearlymatchtheAmericanconception of the early The
1970s. United
States,however,had movedon to its own revisedconceptionof interest,
whichwas ironicallysimilarto thatof the Kremlinin thefirstpartof the
decade.Formanyanalystsbrought intoofficeduring thefirst
Reaganadmin-
Programs (Washington,D.C.: GovernmentPrintingOffice, 1980), pp. 65-70. It is true that

targeting doctrinehas notvariedover theyearsto theextentthatdeclaratorypolicyhas. Nuclear
targetingplans have always includedcounterforceoptions. This does not, however,vitiatethe
importanceof a radical change in declaratorypolicy. If nothingelse, the shiftin U.S. strategic
thoughthad an impact on research and developmentprioritiesas well as procurementand
basingdecisionsfornuclearforces.See Scott Sagan, MovingTargets(Princeton,N.J.: Princeton
UniversityPress, 1989), pp. 10-58.
39. This themepervaded Soviet rhetoricduringthe periodfrom1976to 1978. For examples,
see "Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's Speech at the PlenarySession of the CPSU CentralCommittee
on 25 October 1976," Pravda, 26 October 1976; "In a Friendly Atmosphere," Pravda, 1
December 1976; and G. A. Arbatov, "Big Lie of Detente's Opponents," Pravda, 5 February
1977.
40. For the text of the Tula speech, see "OutstandingExploit of the Defenders of Tula:
CeremonialMeetingDedicated to thePresentationoftheGold Star Medal to theCity," Pravda,
19 January1977. Lawrence Caldwell has pointedout to me thatSovietologistsremaindivided
over whetherthe Tula speech and the subsequent "line" representeddisinformation on Brezh-
nev's part,a disingenuouseffortto "cool" the Americansdown throughcalmingrhetoric,or
a serious reappraisalof the relationshipbetweenmilitarycompetitivenessand politicaldetente.
Much evidence supportsthe latterposition. For additionalstatementsechoing the Tula line,
see "The Report of the CPSU CentralCommitteeto the Twenty-SixthCongress of the Com-
munistPartyof the Soviet Union and the Party's ImmediateTasks in the Fields of Domestic
and Foreign Policy: Delivered by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretaryof the CPSU
CentralCommittee,on 23 February1981," Pravda, 24 February 1981; and "A MightyFactor
in the Peace and Securityof Peoples: Marshal D. F. Ustinov, Member of the Politburoof the
CPSU CentralCommitteeand USSR Ministerof Defense," Pravda, 23 February1983. Events
since thattime and particularlysince the appointmentof Mikhail Gorbachev as General Sec-
retaryprovide additionalevidence of Soviet learningon this score.

76 International
Organization
istration,
vigorousmilitary competitionwas thought to be thebestrouteto
The Sovietsmighthave had it rightall
an acceptablepoliticalrelationship.
along:itdidmakesensetodiscussandmakeplansforfighting and"winning"
a nuclearwarin a moreconcretefashionthanAmericanstrategic doctrine
had done in the past decade. Reagan's strategicmodernization program,
withitsemphasison theimprovement ofcommandandcontrolfacilities and
therapiddeployment ofa newgeneration ofcounterforce-capableweapons,
was aimedat providing the UnitedStateswitha flexiblelimitednuclear
optioncapabilityto fightand prevailin a protractedwar of attrition.
The
StrategicDefenseInitiative(SDI), launchedon 23 March 1983,was fully
consistent withthisnew perspective on U.S. interests.If theABM treaty
lay at the centerof the old Americanconceptionof detente,its essential
repudiation meanttheend of a perceivedconjunction betweenmilitary re-
straintand thepoliticalaspectof superpower relations.Henceforth,U.S.
attempts to engagetheSovietUnionin politicalcooperation wouldreston
a foundation ofmilitarycompetitivenessand,ifpossible,outright strategic
superiority.
The U.S. leadership's"flirtation"withthisalternativeconceptionofin-
tereststurnsoutto havebeenremarkably brief.By 1985,thetwosideswere
once againengagedin seriousarmscontrolnegotiations, whichproduced
the Intermediate NuclearForces (INF) Treatyin 1987and considerable
progresstowarda Strategic ArmsReductionTalks(START) agreement that
wouldincludesignificant reductions in the numberof strategic
warheads.
SDI remained,butit was largelytransformed intoa programdesignedto
enhanceratherthantranscend thecondition ofmutualdeterrence.41
Whathappenedin theinterim? It seemsthatthe"power" ofa structural
constraintexerteditselfon otherwise reluctantAmericandecisionmakers,
who werethenforcedto revisetheirconceptionsofnationalinterest once
again.The Americansratherquicklyranup againsttheboundariesof uni-
lateralactionand soon recognizedthattheyhad littlechoicebutto engage
theSovietUnioninsomesortofcollaborative relationship
beyondthesimple
dictatesof avoidingnuclearwar.42The SovietUnion,forreasonspossibly
41. Therewere,ofcourse,individuals withinandoutsidetheadministrationwhocontinued
tobelievethatSDI couldandshouldfocusondeveloping systemsthatwerecapableofcomplete
area defenseandwouldfulfill President visionofrendering
Reagan'soriginal nuclearweapons
"impotent andobsolete."By 1986,however,theywerea distinct minority.Funding priorities
withintheresearchprogram had also beenprogressivelyreorientedawayfrom"visionary"
high-technology conceptsand towardmoremundanetechnologies thatcouldbe deployedin
theneartermforhardsitedefenseor limited ofcitiesagainstaccidentalattack.By
protection
theendofthedecade,fewAmericans or SovietsbelievedthatSDI wouldin theforeseeable
future pose a seriouschallengeto theconditionofmutualvulnerabilityanddeterrence.
42. PublicpressureintheUnitedStatesandinEurope-symbolized mostpoignantly bythe
growth of the"nuclearfreeze"movement in theUnitedStates-obviouslyplayeda consid-
erableroleinbringing an otherwisereluctantAmerican administration
backto thebargaining
tablewiththeSoviets.But thisdoes notweakenthepowerof a structural argument, since
structuralconstraintscan affectstatebehaviorbya varietyofmeans.Terminology aside,we
shouldexpectstructural variablesto expressthemselves in somefashionthrough domestic

Nuclearweapons 77
relatedto thetortuousprocessofleadershipsuccession,had notreactedto

theshiftin AmericanbehaviorduringtheearlyReaganyearswithanyfun-
damentalrevisionofitsconceptionofnationalinterest. The resultwas that
by themid-1980s, thetwo sides' perceptions of structural
constraintsand
theirunderstandings in lightofthoseconstraints
of nationalinterest began
to convergein a waythattheyhad notduringthe 1970s.This setthestage
fordevelopment ofa "newdetente,"whichhasthepotential togofarbeyond
thedetenteofthe 1970sin scope and character.
Conclusion
The centraltheoretical innovation of thisarticleis the argument thatthe

conditionofnucleardeterrence constitutesa structuralchangein theinter-
nationalpoliticalsystem.Thisstructuralchangehascreateda neworganizing
principlethatfollowsfromjoint custodianship, a function whichwas ac-
quiredby the UnitedStates and Soviet Union and whichfundamentally
themfromotherstates.If the international
differentiates systempermits
functional ofthissort,thenitwillno longeroperateprecisely
differentiation
as an anarchy.Thisdoes notimplythatthesystemhas becomehierarchic.
It does suggestthatwe shouldexpectto see behaviorand international
outcomesinconsistent withor unpredicted bytheoriesthattakeanarchyas
a starting
point.
The evidencethatstructural changehas takenplace is relatively compel-
ling,sincethesystemis, infact,demonstrating outcomesandprocessesthat
areinconsistent withtheold notionofstructure. The 1970sdetenteincluded
elementsofsuperpower cooperation thatarebarely(ifat all) allowedbythe
conceptofan anarchicbipolarsystemandarebetterexplainedbythenotion
of structuralchange.Tracingthe development of statedecisionmakers'
perceptionsof structuralchangesupportstheargument. It seemsthatU.S.
and Sovietleadersperceivedsimilarstructural constraints arisingfromnu-
cleardeterrence butthattheirunderstandings oftheprecisebehavioralim-
plicationsdevelopedin differentways.This led to a detentebornof com-
plementary and notsharedinterests. As thediscrepancy betweenthetwo
views of the futureenvironment became clear, cooperationdeteriorated
rapidly.But the equallyrapidreturnto and expansionof thecooperative
relationshipin the mid-1980ssuggestthatsuperpower detenterepresents
something morethanjust a short-term coincidenceofmyopicself-interests
in avoidingnuclearwar.
Jointcustodianship meansthatthesuperpowers takeonmanagement tasks
thatwouldnotbe performed ina bipolarsystemwithout nucleardeterrence.
politics and decision makers' individualperceptionsof interest.For an excellent theoretical
discussion of this issue, see Peter Gourevitch,"The Second Image Reversed," International
Organization32 (Autumn 1978), pp. 881-912.

Organization
78 International
Clearly,theincentivesformaintaining somelevel of stability in a nuclear

worldare muchenhanced,butthisis notsufficient to explainthechange.
Whatis centralis theremovalof important disincentives forcooperation
and, specifically,the problemof relativegains. In a nonnuclearbipolar
system,twolargeandpowerful statesmight nothaveto worrygreatly about
gainsand losses relativeto smallerstates,buttheywouldcertainly haveto
thinkaboutgainsrelativeto each other.43 Each "pole" might act as a man-
agerwithinitsown sphere,buttherewouldbe littleroomformanagement
tasksto be carriedoutjointlyby thetwo poles. The conditionof nuclear
deterrence leads tojointcustodianship andto cooperation thatgoes beyond
"negative"tasks,primarily becausetheproblemofrelativegainsbetween
the superpowers is markedly reduced.Jointcustodianship followsspecifi-
callyfromnucleardeterrence; it is notsimplya reflection of a highlycon-
centrated bipolardistributionof power.The factthatthisnew superpower
function different
is qualitatively fromthefunctions ofall otherstatesmust
represent a changein thestructure oftheinternational system.
A provocative wayto builda prospective testforthisargument wouldbe
togenerate andcomparepredictions aboutU.S.-Sovietrelations inthe1990s
basedon thetwocompeting conceptsofstructure. Thetraditional structural
argument would offera sternreminder about impediments and limitsto
superpower cooperation: the1990sdetentewillbe short-lived andtenuous,
as itwas inthe1970s;formal institutions supporting cooperation willbe rare
and,in anycase, weak;andcooperation willbe closelytiedto myopicself-
interestsand confined to the "negative"tasksof avoidingstrongly shared
aversions.Whenthedistribution ofrelativegainsis atissue,thesuperpowers
can be expectedto continueto go it alone.
In contrast,ifI am correctin thecharacterization of structural change,
theprospectsforU.S.-Soviet cooperation willbe considerably greater than
thetraditional modelallows.We wouldexpecttheexperienceof
structural
the1970sto havecontributed to bothsides' learning abouttheimplications
of structuralchange,and superpower cooperationin the 1990swouldin-
creasingly reflectsharedratherthancomplementary interests.Agreements
wouldthusbe morestableand long-lasting, and at least some efforts at
"negative"cooperation wouldextendsignificantly further than inthe 1970s.
An obviousexamplewouldbe new and expandedjointefforts to further
reducethe alreadyminisculeprobability of nuclear war. One possibility
wouldbe the development of the recentlyestablishedcrisismanagement
centersalong the lines of the originalNunn-Warner proposal,withjoint
staffing-that is,withAmericans working intheSovietcenterandviceversa.
We shouldalso see a significant increasein thenumber, scope,and vigor
ofinstitutions thatsupportsuperpower cooperation.Formaldiscussionsfo-
43. Theproblem alliesis reducedto theextentthatpoweris highly
ofrelativegainsvis-a-vis
in thepolesandtherisksofexitfromone sphereto theotherare small.
concentrated

Nuclearweapons 79
cused on regionalissues, includingthoseregarding the MiddleEast and

othercontentious areas, shouldcontinueto be a regularoccurrenceat the
level of theassistantsecretary or higher.Summitsof thetop leadersmay
becomefrequent.Consultation and exchangevisitsbetweenhigh-ranking
U.S. and Sovietmilitary officials,whichbeganin 1988withDefenseSec-
retaryCarlucciand DefenseMinisterYazov and withJointChiefsof Staff
ChairmanCroweand Chiefof theGeneralStaffAkhromeyev, shouldalso
becomea regularfeatureofthesuperpower relationship.We wouldexpect
theseinstitutions to surviveand to function, ifsomewhatless prominently,
duringperiodsofdifficult relations.
The mostcompelling evidenceforstructural changewouldbe theexpan-
sionof superpower cooperationin areas of positivebenefit, wherethepo-
tentialforrelativegainswillremainsignificant but presumably wouldbe
discountedby bothsides. Armscontrolthatgoes beyondmeasuresaimed
primarily at avoidingnuclearwaris an obviousrealmforsuchefforts. We
wouldexpectto see significant jointconventional armscontrolin Europe,
including asymmetric reductions and substantial restructuring of forcesto
reduceoffensive capabilities.Strategicarmscontrolmightextendbeyond
theapproximate 50 percentreduction in warheadsnowon theagendaand
wouldagainentailextensiveand expensiverestructuring ofbothsides' ar-
senals.44A treatybanningantisatellite systemsand severelyconstraining
further expansionof offensive military capabilitiesaboardsatellitescould
be signed,despiteconsiderable asymmetries ofinterest,capability, andvul-
nerability in thisarea. Such achievements would be inconsistent witha
traditional understanding of thelimitsto cooperation underanarchy,since
theincentivesappearto be small.The achievements wouldthusbe better
accountedforas theproductsofa structural change.
A potentially important realmfor"positive"cooperation lies in thecol-
laborativemanagement of ThirdWorldconflicts.In an anarchicbipolar
system,leadersin Washington and Moscow mightcooperatewhensuch
conflictsinvolvea palpableriskofescalationto superpower involvement or
nuclearwar. Limitedcooperation or mutualrestraint in theMiddleEast or
the PersianGulfis fullycompatiblewiththisargument. But themodified
conceptof structure predictsthatjointactionwillextendbeyondareas in
whichthe vitalshort-term interestsand aversionsof the superpowers co-
incide.Jointcustodianship suggestsa greaterpotentialforpositivecoop-
erationthatwouldprobablystartwithjointefforts aimedat long-term sta-
bilizationofdangerousregions.In theMiddleEast, we mightexpectto see
greaterU.S.-Soviet cooperation thatis notcoincident withperceivedshort-
termrisksof a largewarerupting in theregion.Cooperationmightextend
to suchdifficultissuesas reconstituting a viablegovernment inLebanonand
44. See Michael M. May, George F. Bing, and JohnD. Steinbrunner,StrategicArms Re-
ductions(Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,1988), especially pp. 18-25.

Organization
80 International
pushingforward rapprochement.
an Israeli-Palestinian We wouldalso ex-
pectto see cooperativemanagement of regionalconflictsextending to less
vitalareas,wherelow-levelhostilities do notthreaten thecentralinterests
ofthesuperpowers or carrysubstantial riskofescalation.This,too,would
represent strongevidenceofa structural change.
Whathave we seen recentlyto differentiate betweenthesetwo sets of
predictions? At a generallevel,thesharpdeterioration in U.S.-Soviet re-
lationsofthelate 1970sand early1980sturnsoutto have beenremarkably
brief,giventhedepthof hostility generatedduringthedeclineof detente.
Many of the institutions thatdevelopedaroundsuperpowercooperation
duringtheearly1970s(notably,nucleararmscontrolon theSALT model)
survivedthemaelstrom in a conditionresembling suspendedanimation and
were ratherquicklyrejuvenatedas relationsimprovedduringthe second
Reaganterm.Cooperationaimedat sharedaversionsis indeedexpanding
intonewandmoredifficult realms,includingjointeffortstocombatterrorism
and the spreadof ballisticmissiles,whichmayinvolvesharingsensitive
intelligencedata.45Strategicarmscontrolhas notyetyieldedcooperative
agreements thatexpandinfundamental waysbeyondthemodelofthe1970s,
butthepotential forsuchagreements seemsripe.46
The mostinteresting developments to datelie injointsuperpower action
in ThirdWorldconflicts. The Reaganadministration beganto seriouslyex-
plorethepossibilities forU.S.-Soviet cooperationon regionalconflicts as
earlyas September1984,whenthePresidentcalledfora regularseriesof
meetings at theministerialandexpertlevel.TheAmerican approachtothese
discussionsmanifests substantiallearningfromthe miscuesof the 1970s
detente:effortsto definegeneralguidelines havebeeneschewedin favorof
specificattempts to grapplewiththeparticulars ofeach individual conflict,
andtheentireconceptoflinkagetoothersuperpower issueshasbeenalmost
entirelydropped.47
ofStateJamesBaker'sproposals,see "US MayTell Soviets:
45. For a reportofSecretary
Let's ShareSecrets,"TheNew YorkTimes,21 April1989,p. 8.
46. The 1987INF agreement verification
was notableforitsintrusive procedures thatgo far
beyondanything envisionedbytheoriginalSALT model.Still,thesuperpowers havenotyet
agreement
concludeda substantial forcesorarrived
onstrategic acceptableformula
ata mutually
forthinking aboutmodernstrategicdefensivesystems.Yet mutualdeterrence is as robustat
presentas ithas everbeen,and theprobabilityofnuclearwarremainsinfinitesimally low. If
a "grandcompromise" offensive
on strategic and defensivesystemswerenegotiated in the
nearfuture, evidenceofcooperation
further
thiswouldconstitute beyondtheboundsofshared
aversion.
47. DiscussingtheAmerican positionon negotiations Undersecretary
in regionalconflicts,
MichaelH. Armacostsaid that"our approachhas beento work
of StateforPoliticalAffairs
on all theissuesacrosstheboard,makeprogress wherever we can,andconcludeagreements
whenin theirownterms,theymeetUS goalsandinterests." Thiscomesclose to an explicit
repudiation oflinkage.See his addressbeforetheGeneralFederation ofWomen'sClubs,22
June1988,reportedin Bureauof PublicAffairs, U.S. Department of State,Current
Policy
1089: Regional Issues and US-Soviet Relations (Washington,D.C.: GovernmentPrintingOf-
fice,July1988).

Nuclearweapons 81
A traditional structural
argument mightexplainmanyof theseefforts as
simplyrepresenting moreefficient tacticsof negativecooperation,but at
least somejointactionhas been aimedat areas of secondaryor even pe-
ripheralimportance wheresharedaversionsare an extremely weak incen-
tive.In Waltz'sworld,thereis no compelling reasonforthe superpowers
to cooperatein brokering a "solution"of sortsforthesituation in Angola
andNamibia;albeitlocallyviolent,thisconflict is unlikelytoriskescalation.
Detailsare sketchy,butit seemsthatleadersin Washington and Moscow
devotedconsiderableenergyto a quiet,cooperativeeffort to developa
framework forresolvingthisconflict. A prominent Reaganadministration
officialcharacterized theagreement as theproductof "an intensedialogue
withtheSoviets-involving discussionsatthesummit, ministerialandexpert
levels,aimedat seekingwaysto promotea politicalsettlement.' '48 It is also
notablethatcooperation amongthesuperpowers insomeoftheseareasgoes

beyondsimplypullingoutandwashingtheirhandsofunnecessary burdens;
thereseemto be substantive andsometimes expensiveefforts to solvebasic
problemsthatled to instability in the firstplace.49In the worldof joint
custodianship, theincentives of each superpower to engagein cooperation
ofthistypearegreater thantheoffsetting temptation toexacerbatesituations
thatmightexactrelativecostsfromtheothersuperpower.
Finally,
theworldofjointcustodianship wouldallowforgreater U.S.-Soviet
cooperation aimedat managing globalproblemsthatare oftenthought ofas
fallingat theperiphery of the superpowers' concerns vis-a-viseach other.
Waltzis notably pessimisticaboutthepossibility oftwogreatpowerssharing
responsibility forthe "fourp's": poverty,population,pollution,and pro-
liferation.He arguesthatifsuchproblemsare to be effectively managed,it
is theUnitedStateswhichmustlead andbearthelion'sshareofthecosts.50
The modified structuralargument foreseesbroaderpossibilities forsuper-
48. Ibid. The textofthepactas signedby SouthAfrica,Cuba, and Angolais reprinted in
TheNew YorkTimes,14 December1988,p. A14. WhiletheUnitedStatesactedas primary
broker intheAngolacase,ithasbeenwidelyreported thatMoscowplacedconsiderablepressure
on itsreluctantCubanalliesto agreeto moderate of
theirdemands,andthisled to withdrawal
foreign forces.See thereportof Elaine Sciolino'sinterviewwithSecretaryof StateGeorge
Shultz,TheNew YorkTimes,18December1988,section1, p. 22.
49. This is obviouslynottrueof all cases, butthefactthatit is trueof someis further
evidenceinfavorofmyalternative conceptofstructure. The Soviets,whomustbe particularly
reluctantto investresourcesin ThirdWorldareasofmarginal havenonetheless
significance,
takenstepstowardsolving problems ratherthanjustpullingoutinareaswheretherehasseemed
to be somepossibilityforsuccess.For an exampleofhowthisappliesinthecase ofEthiopia,
see "The Road DownhillfromMakale," TheEconomist,18 March1989,p. 35. For a similar
exampleinthecase ofSouthAfrica,see "Soviets,inShift, PressforAccordinSouthAfrica,"
The New YorkTimes, 16 March 1989, p. Al.
50. In Theory Politics,pp. 209-10,Waltzrefers
ofInternational oftheSoviet
tothe"inability
Union,whateverits inclinations,
to contributemuchto themanagement of thenonmilitary
affairsof theworld."We couldadd severalotherglobalissuesof pressingimportance that
might be thesubjectofmoreextensivesuperpower-ledcooperationinthenearfuture,
although
theydo notstartwiththeletter"p."

82 International
Organization
powercooperation ininternational to attacktheseandsimilarissues.

efforts
Soviet"new thinking" and,to a lesserbutstillsignificant
degree,changes
in SovietbehaviorunderGorbachevare at least consistent withmyargu-
ment,as areincreasingindicationsoftheU.S. leadership'sinterest
inbuild-
inga detenterelationshipthatwillgo beyondtheexperienceof the 1970s.
The eventsofthe 1990smayyetprovidemoreconvincing evidenceofthis
structural
change.


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Realism, Detente, and Nuclear Weapons

Author(s): Steve Weber

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.216 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 07:58:20 AM

Have nuclearweaponsfundamentally alteredtheconductof international

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ingtonandMoscowdevelopeddifferent andoftenincompatible understand-

Fromtheinitiation of theStrategicArmsLimitation Talks (SALT) in No-

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unevenattempt by leadersin Washington and Moscowto elaborateshared

The richestexplanationsof the 1970sdetenteare foundin the analytic-

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thisclaimis fundamentally differentfromand muchweakerthana claim

Realism and thepreventionof nuclear war

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powers,5and it is notevenclearthatnuclearweaponson balanceincrease

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Concertof Europeand in U.S.-Soviet detente;8 rather,it is to determine

Nuclear weapons and the structureof the

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in favorof theUnitedStatesand theSovietUnion.Takentogether, these

Modifyingthe structuralrealist argument

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previousrevolutions in thetechnology of warfareand thatdespitetheac-

13. The citiesand themanufacturing, energy,and communication

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maintenance of theinternational politicalsystemahead oftheircontinuing

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This content downloaded from 194.29.185.216 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 07:58:20 AM

Structuraltheoryand U.S.-Soviet detente:a briefaccount

Structural theories,ofcourse,do notpredicttheprecisebehaviorofstates;

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be madecontingent uponsomerestraint of themilitary rivalry,preferably

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Sovietviewsoftheboundary betweencollaborative andcompetitive aspects

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notthe onlyreasonsforAmericaninterestin theagreement.24 Fromthe

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thatfromthe Sovietperspective, competition in ABM systemscould un-

theSovietUnion.He arguedthatescapingfrommilitary hadbeena criticalachieve-

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AndreiGromyko'spronouncement at thetwenty-fourth partycongressin

made essentiallythe same argument in a numberof pieces; see, forexample,"On So-

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conditionsare likelyto be ephemeral.34Because thereis no consensusto

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The Sovietinterest intheABM treaty was fundamentally different,as was

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UnitedStates also steppedup its involvement in ThirdWorldconflicts,

Programs (Washington,D.C.: GovernmentPrintingOffice, 1980), pp. 65-70. It is true that

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relatedto thetortuousprocessofleadershipsuccession,had notreactedto

The centraltheoretical innovation of thisarticleis the argument thatthe

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Clearly,theincentivesformaintaining somelevel of stability in a nuclear

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cused on regionalissues, includingthoseregarding the MiddleEast and

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notablethatcooperation amongthesuperpowers insomeoftheseareasgoes

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