Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks

Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity
Author(s): Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder

Source: International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring, 1990), pp. 137-168
Published by: The MIT Press
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Chain gangsand passed bucks:
alliancepatternsin
predicting
multipolarity and
ThomasJ. Christensen
JackSnyder
KennethWaltz's rigorousrecastingof traditionalbalance-of-power theory

foundation
has providedtheintellectual formuchofthemostfruitful recent
workin thefieldsofinternationalpoliticsand nationalsecurity.1 But there
is a tensionbetweenWaltz'stheoryandthosewhoapplyitintheirpractical
researchagendas.Waltz'sis a theoryofinternational politics;it addresses
properties system,such as therecurrence
of theinternational of war and
the recurrent formationof balances of power.2Those who have applied
Waltz's ideas, however,have normally used themas a theoryof foreign
This article combines the work of two unpublishedpapers. The theoreticalsections are
derivedfromChristensen's"Chained Gangs and Passed Bucks: Waltz and Crisis Management
Beforethe Two World Wars," Columbia University,December 1987. The case studymaterial
is based on Snyder's "Offense, Defense and Deterrencein the TwentiethCentury," a paper
presentedat the Conferenceon the StrategicDefense Initiative,Universityof Michigan,No-
vember 1986. We are gratefulto Charles Glaser, Harold Jacobson, Robert Jervis,Stephen
Krasner,Helen Milner,David Reppy,CynthiaRoberts,Randall Schweller,StephenVan Evera,
Stephen Walt, Deborah Yarsike, WilliamZimmerman,and an anonymousreviewerforcom-
mentson various earlier drafts.We also thankthe Social Science Research Council and the
MacArthurFoundation for Christensen'sfinancialsupportand the Programin International
Peace and Security Studies at the Universityof Michigan for sponsoringSnyder's original
paper.
1. KennethWaltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1979).
2. We feel no need to take a position on the epistemologicaldebates surroundingWaltz's
theory,spurredin particularby JohnRuggieand RobertCox. We are satisfiedto accept Waltz's
scheme as what Cox termsa "problem-solvingtheory." For currentpurposes, we hope to
improveits problem-solving utilityratherthanto address its deeper epistemologicaladequacy.
See RobertKeohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics(New York: Columbia UniversityPress,
1986), especially pp. 208 and 214. See also David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-
StructureDebate?" InternationalOrganization43 (Summer 1989), pp. 441-74; and JohnS.
Dryzek, MargaretL. Clark, and GarryMcKenzie, "Subject and System in InternationalIn-
teraction,"InternationalOrganization43 (Summer 1989), pp. 475-504.
InternationalOrganization44, 2, Spring 1990

? 1990 by the World Peace Foundation and the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology
Organization
138 International
policyto makepredictions aboutor prescriptions forthestrategic choices

of states.3
Thisis a problem becausefora particular stateinparticularcircumstances,
anyforeign policyanditsoppositecan sometimes be deducedfromWaltz's
theory.In multipolarity, forexample,statesare saidtobe structurally prone
to eitherof two oppositeerrorsthatdestabilizethebalancingsystem.On
theone hand,theymaychainthemselves unconditionallyto recklessallies
whosesurvivalis seentobe indispensable tothemaintenance ofthebalance.
This,Waltzargues,was thepatternof behaviorthatled to WorldWar I.
On theotherhand,theymaypass thebuck,counting on thirdpartiesto bear
thecostsof stopping a risinghegemon.Thiswas thepattern thatpreceded
WorldWarII.4
For Waltz,as a systemictheorist, thisis not a crippling problem.He
deduceslogicallythatmultipolarity is structurallyproneto instabilities,and
thetwo majorcases of thiscenturyillustrate his theorysuitably.But for
thosewhowoulduse Waltzas a theorist offoreign policy,thereis a problem.
To explain,predict,or prescribealliance strategyin particularcircum-
stances,theyneed to specifywhichof the two oppositedangers-chain-
gangingor buck-passing-isto be expectedin thosecircumstances. An ex-
planationthatcan accountforanypolicyand itsoppositeis no explanation
at all. Likewise,a prescription thatwarnssimultaneously againstdoingtoo
much and doingtoo little
is ofless use than one that whichofthe
specifies
twoerrorspresentsthemorepressingdangerin particular circumstances.
Thisdoes notmeanthatWaltz'sinsights aboutchain-ganging and buck-
passingare ofno use in a theoryofforeign policy.Rather,itmeansthathis
ultraparsimonious theorymustbe cross-fertilized withothertheoriesbefore
it will makedeterminate predictions at theforeignpolicylevel. Users of
Waltz'stheoryalreadydo thisat variouslevelsofexplicitness, factoring in
military technology, geography, and powervariablesthatgo beyondthe
merecountingof greatpowerpoles. In particular, theycombineWaltz's
insights withthevariablesstressedinRobertJervis'sversionofthesecurity
dilemmatheory.S Theyalso factorinbiasesaffecting howpolicymakers and
3. See, forexample, StephenWalt, The OriginsofAlliance (Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity

Press, 1987); and BarryPosen, The Sources of MilitaryDoctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni-
versityPress, 1984). By "theoryofforeignpolicy" we mean a theorywhose dependentvariable
is the behavior of individualstates ratherthan the propertiesof systemsof states. It does not
referto a theorythatexplains all aspects of a state's foreignpolicy.
4. Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, pp. 67 and 165-69.
5. See RobertJervis,"Cooperation UndertheSecurityDilemma," WorldPolitics 30 (January
1978),pp. 167-214; StephenVan Evera, "Causes ofWar," Ph.D. diss., UniversityofCalifornia,
Berkeley, 1984; Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensiveand the Originsof the First
World War," in Stephen E. Miller, ed., MilitaryStrategyand the Originsof the First World
Alliancepatterns 139
soldiersperceivethebalance-of-power problemthatfacesthem.6By com-

plicatingthespecificationofthestate'spositionintheinternational
system-
and in somecases by introducing theroleofperception-determinate pre-
dictionscan be made.7
Thougha few scholarshave de factobeen workingthisway forsome
time,theirmethodwarrantsmoreexplicitspecification. Towardthisend,
we will attemptto explainthe oppositealliancechoicesof the European
greatpowersbeforeWorldWarsI and II, starting withWaltz'stheoryand
addinga minimalnumberof variablesfromsecuritydilemmatheoryand
fromperceptualtheoriesthatare necessaryto derivea theoretically deter-
minateand historically accurateaccount.In a nutshell,we arguethatgiven
Europe's multipolar checkerboard geography, the perception
of offensive
militaryadvantagesgaveriseto alliancechain-ganging before1914,whereas
theperception ofdefensive advantages gaverisetobuck-passingbefore1939.
Theseperceptions oftheinternationalconditions constraining
strategic
choice
were,however,misperceptions, rootedinpatterns ofcivil-military
relations
andtheengrained lessonsofformative experiences.In thefirst
twosections
ofthearticle,we reviewthetheoriesneededto underpin thisinterpretation
and showhowtheycan be combinedin a relatively parsimonious fashion.
In subsequentsections,we presentshortcase historiesdemonstrating the
historical oftheinterpretation
plausibility and offercomments on issuesfor
furtherresearch.
This exerciseshouldbe of practicalas well as theoreticaland historical
interest.
Arguably, theworldis againbecomingmoremultipolar. Japanhas
caughtup withtheSovietUnionin termsof grossnationalproduct.Both
theUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionare playinga less dominating global
War (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1985), pp. 58-107; Stephen Van Evera,

"Offense, Defense, and Strategy: When Is Offense Best?" paper presented at the annual
meetingoftheAmericanPoliticalScience Association,Chicago, 1987.For a workthatpreceded
the publicationof Waltz's and Jervis's theories but made many similarpoints, see George
Quester,Offenseand Defense in theInternationalSystem(New York: Wiley, 1977),especially
chap. 10 on alliance behavior in World War I.
6. In additionto the above-mentionedworks by Van Evera, see Posen, Sources of Military
Doctrine; and Jack Snyder, "Civil-MilitaryRelations and the Cult of the Offensive,1914 and
1984," in Miller,MilitaryStrategy,pp. 139-40. Levy pointsout thatdifficulties in measuring
offensiveand defensiveadvantage make such judgmentsproblematicfor social scientistsas
well as elusive for policymakers.See Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of
MilitaryTechnology," InternationalStudies Quarterly28 (June 1984), pp. 219-38.
7. By "determinatepredictions" we mean that if all other factors(such as checkerboard
geography)are held constant,thenknowingthepolarityofthesystemand theperceivedoffense-
defense balance will theoreticallysufficeto predictthe alliance behavior of states. Of course,
in thereal world,otherfactorshavingsome effecton alliance behaviormaynotbe held constant,
makingour predictionsprobabilisticratherthan strictly"determinate."
140 International
Organization
rolenow thantheywerewhenWaltzbeganto writeaboutthestability of

thebipolarbalance.As intheperiodsbeforeWorldWarsI andII, Germany
and Russia mayonce againbe contending formarketsand influence in an
increasingly
heterogeneous, independent, yetvulnerable beltofEasternEu-
ropeanstates.Willmultipolar makea reappearance?
alliancepatterns And
if so, whichpattern-chain-ganging or buck-passing? For whichproblem
shouldscholarsand policymakers begindevisingantidotes?
As the new configuration of poweremerges,we willneed to knownot
onlyaboutitspolaritybutalso aboutthekeysecurity dilemma andperceptual
variablesthatinteractwithpolarityin shapinginternational alignments.If
thepotentiallyunstableconditionof multipolarity reemerges, we willneed
to knowhow its effectscan be mitigated. Since thepolarityofthesystem
is generallynot subjectto consciousmanipulation by policymakers, our
attentionshouldbe especiallydirectedtowardthevariablesthatare some-
whatmoresubjecttoconsciouscontrol, variablessuchas theoffense-defense
balanceoftechnology and perceptions ofit.
Chain gangsand passed bucks
Waltz arguesthatthe structure of the international systemdetermines

whattypesof international behaviorwill be rewardedand punished(the
processofselection)and,as a result,whattypesofforeign policywillseem
prudent to actorsinthesystem(theprocessofsocialization). Thisstructure
comprisesa constantelement,anarchy,and a variableelement,polarity.
The fundamental, invariantstructural feature,internationalanarchy,gen-
erallyselectsand socializesstatesto formbalancingalignments in order
to survivein theface of threatsfromaggressivecompetitors. However,a
variablestructuralfeature,polarity,affectstheefficiency of thebalancing
process.
In multipolarity,
twoequalandoppositealliancedilemmas impedeefficient
balancing.8 The firstis the chaingangproblem.In multipolarity, the ap-
proximateequalityof alliancepartnersleads to a highdegreeof security
interdependence withinan alliance.Giventheanarchicsetting and thisrel-
ativeequality,each statefeelsitsownsecurity is integrally
intertwinedwith
thesecurity ofitsalliancepartners. As a result,anynationthatmarchesto
war inexorably dragsits alliancepartnerswithit. No statecan restraina
recklessallyby threatening to sit out the conflict,sincethedemiseof its
recklessallywoulddecisivelycrippleitsown security.9
8. For relatedargumentsthatuse the concepts of entrapmentand abandonment,see Glenn

Snyder,"The SecurityDilemma in Alliance Politics," WorldPolitics 36 (July1984),pp. 461-95.
9. Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, pp. 167-70.
aptexampleofthisdilemmais WorldWarI:
Waltz'sentirely
If Austria-Hungary marched,Germany had to follow:thedissolution of
theAustro-Hungarian Empirewouldhave leftGermany alonein the
middleofEurope.If Francemarched,Russiahad to follow;a German
victoryoverFrancewouldbe a defeatforRussia.Andso it was all
aroundtheviciouscircle.Because thedefeator thedefection ofa ma-
jor allywouldhave shakenthebalance,each statewas constrained to
and theuse ofitsforcesto theaimsand fearsofits
adjustits strategy
partners.10
In short,as one memberof thechaingangstumblesofftheprecipice,the
othermustfollow.Hyperactive balancingbehaviorthreatens thestability
of
the systemby causingunrestrained warfarethatthreatens the survivalof
someofthegreatpowersthatformthesystem'spoles.
The second,and opposite,pathology ofmultipolarityis buck-passing. In
thefaceofa risingthreat,
balancingalignments failtoformina timely fashion
becausesomestatestryto ridefreeon otherstates'balancingefforts. They
maydo thisbecausetheywishtoavoidbearingunnecessary costsorbecause
theyexpecttheirrelativepositionto be strengthened bystanding alooffrom
the mutualbloodlettingof theotherpowers.Waltzillustrates withWorld
WarII:
FrenchForeignMinisterFlandintoldBritishPrimeMinisterBaldwin
occupationoftheRhinelandin 1936providedthe
thatHitler'smilitary
occasionforBritainto takethelead in opposingGermany. As theGer-
manthreatgrew,someBritishand Frenchleaderscouldhopethatif
theircountries remainedaloof,Russiaand Germany wouldbalance
to thefinish.Uncertainties
each otheroffor fight aboutwhothreatens
whom,aboutwhowillopposewhom,aboutwhowillgainor lose from
theactionsofotherstatesaccelerateas thenumberof statesin-
creases.II
BarryPosen,in thesame vein,showsthatthedefensivemilitary postures
adoptedby bothBritainand Francein thefaceofGermanexpansionwere
designedto pass thecostoffighting
Germany to otherallies.12As a result,
givingtheaggressora chance
thebalancingprocessoperatedinefficiently,
to overturn
thebalancebyeliminatingthesystem'sopposingpolesthrough
piecemeal aggression.
Waltzarguescogently thatneitherchain-ganging norbuck-passing dilem-
mascan ariseinbipolarity. Bipolarsuperpowers do notneedto chainthem-
selvesto small,recklessallies,sincethesuperpowers are notdependent on
alliesfortheirsurvival.Superpowers also do notpass thebuck,sincesmaller
alliescannotpossiblyconfront theopposingsuperpower alone.13
10. Ibid., p. 167.
11. Ibid., p. 165.
12. Posen, Sources of MilitaryDoctrine, pp. 232-33.
13. Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, chaps. 6-9.
142 International
Organization
Superficially, it mightappearthatWaltz'sargument aboutbipolarity suf-

fersfromas muchunderdetermination as his argument aboutmultipolarity
does. That is, Waltz appearsto associatebipolarity withtwo equal and
oppositestancestowardperipheral allies.On theonehand,sincethebalance
ofpowerinbipolarity hingeson thesuperpowers' internal efforts togenerate
powercapabilities,theloss of peripheral allies is largelyirrelevant. Thus,
chaingangsneednotoccur,and thesuperpower enjoystheluxuryofnon-
involvement in peripheral disputes.On the otherhand,each superpower
understands thatonlyit has the powerto resistencroachments on third
partiesbytheother.Consequently, thebuckcannotbe passedto others,so
superpowers in bipolaritytendto "overreact"to threatsin theperiphery,
Waltzsays.14
We believethatthetensioninthispartofWaltz'sargument is notdifficult
to resolve.Since superpowers have no strongincentive to intervene in the
periphery, the issue of buck-passing should be irrelevant. The structural
logicof limitedinvolvement shouldoverridetheoppositelogicleadingto
overreaction. Or putsomewhat less categorically,bipolarsuperpowers should
practicea policyof limited liabilityin intervening in defense of peripheral
allies.Thatis, theyshouldincurthecostsofintervention onlyinproportion
to thepowerassetsthatare at risk.In bipolarity, theseassetswillalways,
bydefinition, be ofmarginal importance, so superpower interventions inthe
periphery shouldbe limited.Waltz'spolicyprescriptions suggestthatthis
is his view.15
The behaviorof Cold War policymakers has sometimesviolatedthese
prescriptions, but we believethatthishad moreto do withperceptualor
domesticpoliticalfactorsthanwiththestructural properties of bipolarity.
The structural consequencesofbipolarity, unlikethoseofmultipolarity, do
lead to a determinate prediction aboutalliancestrategy, even thoughem-
piricallythebehaviorofthesuperpowers sometimes falsifiesthatprediction.
In short,bipolarity is an ameliorator ratherthana panacea. It does not
entirely ruleoutoverreactions and underreactions caused,forexample,by
domesticpoliticsorfaulty ideas,butbipolarity mitigates thestructural causes
of suchproblems.
In creating a theoryofinternational politics,Waltzis interested mainlyin
showingthata systemof two is morestablethana systemof many.He
therefore evincesno interest in predicting whichpathology ofmultipolarity
willappearin particular circumstances. For his purposes,thismaybe ac-
ceptable.Even on Waltz'sownterms,however,thefailureto specifywhen
chain-ganging andbuck-passing willoccuris atleastmildly troubling. Waltz's
14. Ibid., pp. 169 and 171-72.

15. Ibid., chap. 9. This certainlyis the view of Waltz's students.See Stephen Walt, "The
Case forFiniteContainment:AnalyzingU.S. GrandStrategy,"InternationalSecurity14 (Sum-
mer 1989), pp. 5-49; and Stephen Van Evera, "American StrategicInterests: Why Europe
Matters; Why the ThirdWorld Doesn't" (forthcoming).
argument hingeson thenotionthatthestructure ofthesystem-thatis, the

numberof poles-selects and socializesstatesto a particular formof be-
havior.But ifchain-ganging and buck-passing, two starkly oppositeforms
of behavior,are equallyselectedundermultipolar circumstances, how do
statesbecome socialized?Arguably,moreinformation aboutthe interna-
tionalsettingmustbe providedin orderforWaltz'scrucialprocessof so-
cializationto set stateson a determinate path.
This indeterminacy is even moretroublesome forWaltz'sstudents, who
attempt to adaptWaltz'sideas intoa theoryofforeign policy.For example,
if Posen is to arguethatthe structural requirements of multipolarity led
Franceto adopta military strategy designedto pass thebuck to Britain,
thenhe mustshowthatotherstrategies werenotequallyconsistent withthe
logicofmultipolarity. Posenunderstands thisbutleaves thesolutionto the
problemonlypartially expressed.
Why,Posenasks,did statesthatpassedthebuckin the1930schaingang
in the 1910s?In a singleparagraph, Posen explainsthisas a consequence
of thedifferent effectsofperceivedoffensive and defensiveadvantageson
security calculationsin multipolarity. Perceivedoffensive advantagebefore
1914meantthatwarwas considered cheap.Moreover,alliescrucialtomain-
tainingthebalanceof powerwereconsideredhighlyvulnerableto attack.
Thus,statesbalancedaggressively and unconditionally. By contrast, in the
1930s,perceiveddefensiveadvantageled to buck-passing. Accordingto
Posen, "Each statehad an interest in passingthecostsof itsown defense
to itsallies,because thesecosts [ofdefensive, attritionalwar]werehigh."
He adds that"therewas a widespreadbeliefin a defensiveadvantage,so
statesdid notbelievethattheirallies mightfold" and that"leavingone's
allya littlebitinthelurchwas notseento represent a highriskto theally's
survivalor one's own."16
Without spellingoutthetheoretical underpinning behindthesearguments,
Posen appearsto dispensewithevidencethatfalsifies his argument in an
unsatisfying, ad hoc manner.By spellingout the underlying logic more
explicitlyandbycombining balance-of-power theorywithsecurity dilemma
theory, we hopeto showthatPosen's insight can be usedto resolveWaltz's
indeterminacy as a theoristof foreignpolicy.Far frombeingan ad hoc
sleight-of-hand, thisis a parsimonious, productive theoreticalinnovation that
has generalapplicability forscholarsworking in therealisttradition.
Posen also notesthatit was perceptionsofoffensive advantages,driven
bythebiasesof"out-of-control militaryorganizations," whichshapedpolicy
through shapingperceptions of systemic incentives before1914.Thisintro-
duces stillmorevariables,but parsimony is stillnot utterly lost. Forces
withinthestateaffectalliancebehaviorand grandstrategy, buttheydo so
16. Posen, Sources of MilitaryDoctrine, p. 232. We are gratefulto Randall Schweller for
helpfulcommentson this point.
144 International
Organization
by affecting
perceptionsof theinternational
environment.
Thus,domestic
andperceptualforcescanbe cleanlypluggedintoparsimonious
international
systemtheories.The nextsectionlaysouta framework fordoingthis.
Polarity,the securitydilemma,and perception
To turnWaltz'sideasintoa theoryofforeign policythataccurately explains

alliancebehaviorbeforeWorldWarsI and II, two complications mustbe
introduced. First,thevariableelementsof international structure
mustbe
broadenedto includenotonlypolaritybutalso thesecuritydilemmavari-
ables: technology and geography.Second, perceptionof the strategicin-
centivesinherent in thesystemicstructure mustbe introduced as a poten-
tiallyautonomous factor.
Waltzapprovingly citesJervis'swritings on thesecurity dilemmaas sup-
portforthe notionthatstatesin international anarchyare condemnedto
behave competitively. Indeed,Waltz's and Jervis'stheoriesare cut from
thesamecloth,bothstressing dilemmasthatstemfromtherequirements of
self-helpin an anarchicalpoliticalorder.Both agree,moreover,thatthe
intensityofthesecurity dilemmais notconstantbutinsteadvarieswiththe
vulnerabilityof states.Waltzexploresthe stabilizing consequencesof bi-
polarity,whichare due in partto thesuperpowers' greaterself-sufficiency
and consequently lesser vulnerabilityto the vicissitudesof international
anarchy.17 Jervisexploresthe stabilizing consequencesof defensiveand
deterrent militarytechnologies, as wellas geographical that
configurations
makeconquestmoredifficult. Bothsee thesameproblem: leads
vulnerability
to self-help
strategies thatleave everyoneless secure.Bothconceiveofthe
internationalordersimilarly: as an anarchy.Andbothsee greaterinvulner-
abilityas the sourceof greaterstability in international anarchy.Thereis
no reasonthattheirtwo theoriescannotbe combinedin orderto explore
interactionsbetweentheirvariables.
These interactions includethe connectionbetweenoffensive advantage
and chain-ganging and, conversely, the connectionbetweendefensivead-
vantageand buck-passing. In multipolarity,thegreaterthevulnerability of
states(thatis, the morepropitiousthe technology or geography forthe
attacker),thegreateris thepropensity to alignunconditionally and to fight
all-outindefenseofan allyfromthefirst moment itis attacked.Thishappens
because the expectationof rapid,easy conquestleads statesto conclude
17. This is at least implicitin Waltz's argumentsabout interdependencein his Theoryof

InternationalPolitics,pp. 143-46,juxtaposed to his argumentsabout therelativeinvulnerability
of the bipolar superpowers,p. 172. Note also Waltz's remarksabout firmson p. 135: "More
than any other factor,relative size determinesthe survivalof firms.Firms that are large in
comparison to most others in their field findmany ways of takingcare of themselves-of
protectingthemselvesagainst otherlarge firms."
thatallies essentialto maintaining thebalanceof powerwillbe decisively

defeatedunless theyare givenimmediateand effective assistance.Con-
versely,theless thevulnerability of states,thegreateris thetendencyto
pass thebuck.This is due bothto theexpectation thatotherstates,even
singly,willbe able to stalematetheaggressor without assistanceandto the
expectation thattheprocessof fighting will be debilitatingeven fora vic-
toriousaggressor.Such an aggressorwillpose a reducedthreatto buck-
passingonlookerswhoremainat theirfull,pre-warstrength. Thus,Jervis's
variablesprovidethedeterminate predictions thatWaltz'stheoryneedsin
orderto becoinea theoryofforeign policy.18
On theoreticalgrounds alone,we couldbe entirely satisfiedwiththisminor
and parsimonious yet productiveaddendumto Waltz's theory.Unfortu-
nately,forempirical reasons,stillfurther adjustments areneededto explain
alliancedynamics beforeWorldWarsI andII. Thisis becausesoldiers'and
policymakers' perceptions ofoffensive anddefensive advantagesbeforethe
twowarswerealmostexactlywrong.Therefore, we needtoadda perceptual
dimension to explainwhytechnological circumstances ofdefensiveadvan-
tagewere seen as encouraging offensives in 1914,whereascircumstances
thatwereobjectively muchmorefavorableto theattackerin thelate 1930s
wereseen as discouraging offensives.
In principle,anynumberofperceptual biasesmightaffectperceptions of
the structure of internationalincentives.In fact,however,two mainhy-
pothesesenjoythegreatestplausibility. The firstis thatsoldiers'and poli-
cymakers'perceptions of international structural incentives, the
including
offense-defense balance,are shapedby theirformative experiences,espe-
ciallythelastmajorwar.Thus,sinceEuropeanwarsbefore1914had often
been shortand decisive,mostpeopleexpectedoffensives to succeed.But
aftertheexperienceof 1914-18,mostpeople expecteddefensivesto suc-
ceed.19The secondhypothesis is thatuncontrolled militariesfavoroffensive
strategies,and sinceciviliancontroloverthemilitary was muchgreaterin
the 1930sthanin the 1910s,themilitary-fueled "cult of theoffensive"no
longerdominatedstrategic perceptions.Instead,a civilian-based "cult of
the defensive,"aimedat finding strategicexcuses forbuck-passing, may
havehad an equal butoppositeimpact.20 It is notourmainpurposehereto
18. For related discussions, see Posen, Sources of MilitaryDoctrine, p. 232; Van Evera,
"The Cult of the Offensive,"pp. 96-101; Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914," in
KennethOye, ed., Cooperation UnderAnarchy(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress,
1986), especially pp. 83-84; and Walt, Originsof Alliance, especially pp. 24-25, fn31, and pp.
32 and 165-67.
19. For the theoryunderlyingthis hypothesis,see Robert Jervis,Perception and Misper-
ceptionin InternationalPolitics (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1976),especially
chap. 6.
20. See Posen, Sources of MilitaryDoctrine; Van Evera, "Causes of War"; Snyder,"Civil-
MilitaryRelations"; and Jack Snyder, "InternationalLeverage on Soviet Domestic Change,"
WorldPolitics 41 (October 1989),pp. 1-30. On thecultof thedefensive,see JohnMearsheimer,
Liddell Hart and the Weightof History(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress, 1988),pp. 107,
111-12, and 128; and Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and Strategy."
146 International
Organization
argueaboutthesourcesof suchmisperceptions. Rather,we are satisfiedto

notethateitheroftheabove hypotheses is parsimonious and can easilybe
joined withthe Jervis-Waltz international systemtheoryto improvethe
accuracyofitspredictions.
The elementof misperception is notas foreign to Waltz'stheoryas one
mightfirstimagine.Indeed,Waltzclaimsthatthebasic problemof multi-
polarityis "miscalculation by some or all of the greatpowers."21 In the
simplerworldofbipolarity, a superpower's responsibilitiesand vulnerabil-
itiesareeasiertogauge,andegregious strategicmiscalculationsaretherefore
less likely.Ofcourse,Waltzis referring heretorandomerrorsofperception
andcalculation thatareinherent inthestructural complexity anduncertainty
ofmultipolar conditions; he is notreferring to systematic perceptual biases
due to cognitive or organizational quirks.
But in explaining thedifferences betweenthetwomultipolar outcomes,
Waltzgoes muchfurther. For example,he writesthat"the keennessof
competition betweenthetwocamps" led to thechaingangeffectin World
War I. The "perceptionof a commonthreatbroughtRussia and France
together,"he adds. "If competing blocs are seen to be closelybalanced,
and ifcompetition turnson important matters, thento let one's side down
risksone's owndestruction."22 Waltz'suse oftheterm"perception"here
mayhavebeenaccidental,butwe thinknot.In purelystructural terms,the
fateofAustro-Hungarian powerin 1914was notmore"important" forthe
Europeanmilitary balance thanwas the fateof Czechoslovakpowerin
1938.23Therewas no structural reasonforthecompetition overitto be less
"keen." Consequently, itis entirely appropriate forWaltztouse perceptual
language,ratherthanstructural language,in discussingFrance'sand Rus-
sia's senseofa commonthreat.
It is ourpurposeto makeexplicitthemilitary andperceptual factorsthat
made competition morekeen,alliancestighter, and East Europeancrises
seemingly moreimportant in 1914thanin 1938.Bydoingthis,we canaccount
forthedifferences in multipolar alliancebalancingbehaviorbeforeWorld
Wars I and II and thusrescueWaltz's theoryfromits predictive indeter-
minacy.Ourproposedtheoretical framework is summarized inFigure1 and
discussedin detailbelow.
21. Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, p. 172.

22. Ibid., pp. 165-67.
23. For a detailed descriptionof Czechoslovakia's crucial role in the European balance, see
WilliamsonMurray,The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939 (Princeton,
N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1984).
dilemma
The security
Perceived defensive Perceived offensive

advantage (arisingfrom advantage (arisingfrom
civilian controlor militaryautonomyor
defensivelessons offensivelessons
of history) of history)
a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(Z) Buck-passing Chain-ganging
Neither Neither
buck-passing buck-passing
o nor nor
chain-ganging chain-ganging
FIGURE 1. Polarity,the securitydilemma,and resultingalliance

strategies
AlliancestrategiesbeforeWorld Wars I and II
alliance patterns
Proposed explanationfor the differing
The two worldwars starklyillustrate theconsequencesof differing as-

sessmentsof therelativestrength of theoffensive
and thedefensive.The
strategicsituationin thesetwo cases was, in mostrespects,quitesimilar:
Germanythreatened to overturn thebalanceamongthesamefourleading
Europeanpowersby establishing its hegemony overEasternEurope.But
because the prevailing perceptionof the relativestrength of offenseand
defensediffered in the two cases, thestrategic behaviorof thepowersin
1938-39was theoppositeoftheirbehaviorin 1914.
In 1914,the continental statesadheredto essentially unconditionalalli-
ances,committing themselves to immediate offensives
infullstrengthto aid
theirallywithlittleregardto thecircumstances givingriseto thehostilities.
In 1938-39,in contrast, thepowerstriedto pass thebuck,luringothersto
bear the burdenof stoppingtheriseof Germanhegemony.Stalinsaid in
1939thattheSovietUnionwouldnotpullothers'chestnuts outofthefire,
butthatis preciselywhatRussiahad done in August1914through itspre-
Organization
148 International
mature,ill-fated offensiveintoEast Prussia,an offensive designedto draw

GermanfireawayfromFranceduringthebattleoftheMarne.24
The aggressors'strategieswere also opposite.The originators of the
Schlieffen Plansoughtto overturn thebalanceina singleboldstroke, whereas
Hitlersoughtto overturn it through thepiecemealconquestofisolatedtar-
gets.Finally,thecauses of the two warswereessentially opposite.World
a
WarI was largelytheresultof spiralprocess in which alliance dynamics
magnified theconsequences of local disputes,turningthem into globalissues.
in
WorldWarII, contrast, has often been considered a deterrence failurein
whichbuck-passing diplomacyby the statusquo powersencouragedex-
pansionist powersto riskpiecemealaggression.25
Behindthesedifferences in strategicbehaviorwerediffering assumptions
abouttheefficacy ofstrategic offenseand defense.In 1914,quickvictories
thatwoulddecisivelyoverturn themilitary balanceweregenerally thought
to be quitefeasible.To upholdthe balanceand to have an effecton the
outcomeof thefighting, policymakers believedthattheyhad to conclude
binding alliancesinadvanceandthrowtheirfullweightintothebattleat the
outset.26In thelate 1930s,incontrast, policymakers andstrategists whohad
livedthrough thetrenchwarfarestalematesof 1914-18believedthatcon-
quest was difficult and slow. Consequently, theythought thattheycould
safelystandasideat theoutsetofa conflict, waitingto intervene onlyifand
whentheinitialbelligerents showedsignsofhavingexhaustedthemselves.
We contendthatgiventheconstant factorsofthemultipolar checkerboard
configuration ofpowerandGermany's aggressive aims,varying perceptions
of the offense-defense balance constitute a sufficientexplanationforthe
differing alliancepatterns:chain-ganging beforeWorldWar I and buck-
passingbeforeWorldWarII. As we go through theevidencein supportof
thisinterpretation, readersmaywantto keep in mindthefollowing alter-
nativeexplanations and ourreasonsforrejecting them.
24. Stalin'sstatementof 10March1939,citedin AdamUlam,Expansionand Coexistence,

2d ed. (New York:Praeger,1974),p. 263.
25. Thisdistinctionworksonlyas a roughfirstcut.Thereweredeterrence aspectsto
failure
the 1914diplomacy.Conversely, even firm,earlydeterrent threatsmightnothave deterred
Hitler'saggression. alongtheselines,see SeanM. Lynn-Jones,
Fora recentcorrective "Detente
and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations,1911-1914,"InternationalSecurity11(Fall 1986),
pp. 121-50.Recentcorrectives,however, do notnegatethemainpoint.Evenfollowers ofFritz
FischeracceptthatGermany didnotwanta worldwarbutthatit stumbled intoitas a result
ofmisguided attemptsto ensureGermansecurity. For a subtlediscussionofthesepointsand
a commentaryon Fritz Fischer's German Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton,
1967)andrelatedworks,see JackS. Levy,"The Role ofCrisisManagement intheOutbreak
ofWorldWarI," paperpresented oftheInternational
attheannualmeeting StudiesAssociation,
London,1989,especiallypp. 15-16.
26. ThisargumentaboutWorldWarI, setin a theoretical is madebyQuester
perspective,
inOffense andDefense,byJervis in "Cooperation Dilemma,"andbyVan
UndertheSecurity
Everain "The CultoftheOffensive."
alliance patterns
Alternativeexplanationsfor the differing
Franco-Soviet ideological differences.It is occasionally argued that a
balancingalliancefailedto formin the 1930sowingto thedeep ideological
distrustbetweenFranceand the SovietUnion.This ignoresthefactthat
republicanFranceand autocraticRussia managedto forma tightalliance
beforeWorldWarI, despitetheirdeep ideologicaldifferences.27
The creation of independentstates in Eastern Europe. It is sometimes

statesinEasternEurope,especially
arguedthatthecreationofindependent
Poland,hinderedFranco-Sovietsecurity
cooperation by depriving theSo-
vietUnionofa commonfrontier withGermany.ButafterSeptember1939,
Stalindidhavea commonfrontierwithHitler,and he stillpassedthebuck.
The lesson that tightalliances cause wars. It mightbe argued thattight

allianceswereshunnedowingto theapparentlessonof 1914thattightal-
liancescause wars.Even thoughtoday'sscholarsmayarguethatitwas the
offensive of1914thatcausedthetight
strategies alliances,interwar
observers
may not have understoodthisunderlying cause.28Thus, theymay have
passed the buck not because perceiveddefensiveadvantagesmade it at-
tractivebut,rather,because theywantedto avoidwhattheythought were
We have uncoveredlittleevidencein favorof
recklessalliancestrategies.
butitwas nota majorfocusofourresearch.
thisinterpretation,
Cost minimization. It mightbe arguedthatstatespassed thebuckin the

1930ssimply becausetheexperience of1914-18hadradically increasedtheir
perceptions This
ofthecostoffighting. explanation overlapswithourown,
sinceone of thereasons thatwar was seen as too costlyto fightwas the
expectationthat defense dominance would create a slow-moving war of
It differs
appallingattrition. fromour argument, however,in thatwe see
policymakers makingessentiallystrategic decisionsdrivenby thesecurity
oftheirstatesandnotbyanabsolutehorror
interests atinordinatebloodshed.
Stalinpassed the buck even thoughbloodshedobviouslydid not trouble
him.Moreover,as we arguebelow,FranceandBritainpassedthebuckless
thanthecost-minimization explanationwouldlead us to expect.
Germany's greater relativepower. It mightbe argued that France and

Britainadopteddefensive
buck-passing inthe1930sbecausethey
strategies
wereweakerrelativeto Germanyat thattimethantheyhad been in 1914.
But defensivebuck-passing
is thepreferred of weak or declining
strategy
powersonlywhendefenseis perceivedtohavetheadvantageandthusoffers
27. Waltz makes thispoint. See Theoryof InternationalPolitics, p. 125.

p. 97. We aregrateful
28. Van Evera,"The CultoftheOffensive," toRandallSchweller
for
raisingthisissue.
150 International
Organization
compensation forweakness.Whenoffenseis perceivedto havetheadvan-

tage,weakpowerscompensate through
surpriseattack,anddeclining
powers
compensatethrough preventiveaggression.Logically,Germany'sgreater
powershouldhave madeno difference,independent of assessmentsof of-
fensiveand defensiveadvantage.
Case study: WorldWar I

Germany:a strategyfor decisive victory.The mainspringdrivingevery-
one's strategic
calculations in 1914was theSchlieffen Plan,Germany's strat-
egyfora rapidknockoutblow againstFranceand a subsequentcampaign
againstRussia.Whether Germanwaraimswereexpansionism, self-defense,
or "extendeddeterrence" ofRussianpressureon Austria,theGermanGen-
eral Staffarguedthatstrategic circumstances dictatedthatany European
warwouldhave to be fought in thisway.29
To say thatthisstrategy was predicatedon an erroneousbeliefin "of-
fensiveadvantage"wouldbe too simple.Schlieffen and his collaborators
understood thatincreasing firepower enhancedthetacticaladvantageofthe
entrenched defender andthatrailroadmobility wouldhelpa country defend
itsownterritory. However,healso arguedthattrenches couldbe outflanked,
thatrailroadswouldallowa centrally positionedattackerto beat its oppo-
nentspiecemeal,and thatthe slownessof Russianmobilization createda
"windowof opportunity" forimplementing sucha strategy. In thissense,
Schlieffensaw an offensive advantageforGermany, whichhe generalized
through themaximthat"ifone is too weakto attackthewhole,one should
attacka section.''30
Germanstrategy was shapedevenmorestrongly byfearoftheoffensive
opportunitiesopento Germany'sopponents.Schlieffen's mentor, theelder
Moltke,hadconcludedthatGermany could"extenddeterrence" to Austria
by mounting a limitedattackon Russia in theEast and maintaining a po-
sitionaldefenseagainstFrancein theWest.If Francebalkedat attacking
stoutGermandefensesintheSaar,thewarmight be keptlocalizedtoEastern
Europe.Schlieffen, however,believedthatFrancewouldrather easilyover-
runthosedefensesifGermanyturnedthebulkofits armyeastward.Con-
sequently,Francewouldhave to be disarmedbeforeGermanycould turn
itsattentionto Russia.
29. For a discussionoftheGermanstrategyof 1914inan alliancecontext,

see ScottSagan,
and Instability,"
"1914 Revisited:Allies,Offense, InternationalSecurity11 (Fall 1986),pp.
151-76.See also thedialoguebetweenScottSaganandJackSnyderin "Correspondence: The
OriginsofOffense andtheConsequencesofCounterforce," Security11(Winter
International
1986),pp. 187-98.On Germanstrategymoregenerally, see Gerhard TheSchlieffen
Ritter, Plan
(New York: Praeger, 1958); and Jack Snyder,Ideology of the Offensive:MilitaryDecision-
makingand theDisastersof 1914(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity
Press, 1984),chaps. 4
and5.
30. Schlieffen,cited in Snyder,Ideology of the Offensive,p. 113.
In short,becauseSchlieffen andhissuccessorsgreatly
exaggerated
France's
offensive powerand somewhatexaggerated theirown,Germany adopteda
warplanensuring thata limitedwarin EasternEuropewouldimmediately
escalate to a decisiveshowdowninvolvingall of Europe's greatpowers.
Moreover,the Schlieffen Plan increasedGermany'sstrategicdependency
on Austriaby weakeningGermanforcesfacingRussiaearlyin a war.This
meantthatGermany hadtorunriskstokeepAustria'sstrategicpowerintact,
making theoutbreak ofan East Europeanwarall themorelikely.In general,
perceptions ofoffensive advantagesandtheadoptionofoffensive strategies
led to unconditionalalliancesand aggressivebalancingbehavior.31
France: offensiveadvantages and supportfor Russia. When the defender

enjoysa netstrategic advantage,even a materially inferiorpowermayfeel
secure.In theyearsbeforeWorldWarI, however,Frenchauthorities ex-
aggeratedthe advantagesof the attackerand thusconcludedthata tight
alliancewithRussia was neededto offsetthethreatposed by Germany's
largerpopulation, army,and materialbase.
Afterthe 1911Moroccancrisis,in whichRussia had offered onlytepid
supportof Francein its confrontation withGermany, theFrenchresolved
to tightentheiralliancewithRussiaat all costs.32SinceactiveRussianhelp
was seenas essentialinparrying thedangerfroma Germanoffensive, France
concludedthatthedangerof beingentrappedin a Russo-Germandispute
overtheBalkanswas less worrisome thanthedangerof beingabandoned
by Russia in somenew Franco-German Indeed,some Frenchof-
crisis.33
ficialsconcludedthatitwouldbe desirablefora warto ariseovera Balkan
issue, since thatwould ensureRussia's activeparticipation. Francewas
willingto balanceaggressively in orderto precludeRussianpassivity.
Poincare,theFrenchPresident electedinthenationalist upsurgeafterthe
Moroccancrisis,was consequently morewillingthanhis predecessorsto
support Russianefforts toformanallianceofthesmallBalkanpowersagainst
Austria.As itturned out,theBalkanstatesthemselves weremoreinterested
in liberatingEuropeanTurkey.To deterSerbiafromexcessiveterritorial
aggrandizement as a consequenceofthevictoryoverTurkey,Austriamo-
bilizedpartofitsarmy.As a result,throughout November1912,Russiaand
Franceconfronted decisionsaboutwhatmilitary
difficult measuresto take
in responseto Austria'spartialmobilization and whatto do ifAustriaat-
tackedSerbia.Thoughit wouldbe an exaggeration to say thattheFrench
31. For additionalanalysis,see Van Evera, "The Cultof the Offensive,"especiallypp.

96-101.
32. For a perceptiveanalysis,see A. J. P. Taylor,The Strugglefor Masteryin Europe
(London:OxfordUniversity Press,1971),pp. 468and486.
33. For an analysisof theentrapment-abandonment in 1914and in general,see
trade-off
Snyder,"The Security Dilemmain AlliancePolitics."
Organization
152 International
activelysoughtwaron thisoccasion,theyseemto havebeenmorekeenfor

theRussiansto takemilitary measuresthantheRussianswerethemselves.34
The Russiansdid takesomeprecautionary steps,delayingthedischarge
of a year'scohortof drafteesand mobilizing a lightsecurityforceon the
Austro-Hungarian For
frontier.35 themost part,however,theRussiansdid
notthinkthatthe situationwas especiallydangerousand soughtto avoid
provoking a needlessescalation.TheybelievedthatGermany was restraining
Austriaand thatAustria'spartialmobilization had madea fullmobilization
againstRussiamorecomplicated ratherthaneasier.36Russiancautionwas
also based on an emergency reviewof Russia's materialpreparedness for
war,whichconcludedthatstockswereso low thatRussiacouldnotfight.37
According to A. J.P. Taylor,theRussiansneededto finda scapegoatfor
theirowntimidity and "triedagainand againto makePoincaresay thathe
would not supportthemif theywentto war forthe sake of Serbia,but
Poincarerefusedto be caught,' theRussianambassadorthat"if
'38 telling
Russiagoestowar,Francewillalso."39Evenmoreamazingwasan interview
in whichFrenchDefenseMinisterAlexandreMillerandtook to task the
Russianmilitary attachein Paris forhis government's weak responseto
Austrian militarymeasures.Atissuewas "thehegemony ofAustriathrough-
outtheentireBalkanpeninsula,"Millerandtoldhim.IfRussiafailsto pick
34. Keiger puts thisin perspective,arguingthatPoincare was notbellicose. See JohnKeiger,

France and the Originsof the First WorldWar (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).
35. For what is by farthe clearestaccount of thismisunderstoodepisode, see V. I. Bovykin,
Iz istoriivozniknoveniiapervoi mirovoivoiny: OtnosheniiaRossii i Frantsii v 1912-1914 gg.
(From the historyof the originsof the FirstWorld War: Relations betweenRussia and France
in 1912-1914)(Moscow: Moskovskii Universitet,1961),pp. 151-53. See also E. C. Helmreich,
The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1938), p.
216; Louis Garros, "En marge de l'alliance franco-russe, 1902-1914" (A footnoteto the
Franco-Russian alliance, 1902-1914),Revue historiquede l'arme'e,June1950,p. 33; FrankM.
Laney, "The MilitaryImplementationof the Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1914," Ph.D.
diss., Universityof Virginia,1954, p. 390; and Samuel Williamson,"MilitaryDimensions of
Habsburg-RomanovRelationsDuringtheEra oftheBalkan Wars," in Bela Kiralyand Dimitrije
Djordjevic, eds., East CentralEuropean Society and the Balkan Wars (Boulder, Colo.: Social
Science Monographs, 1986), pp. 317-37.
36. See Laney, "The MilitaryImplementationof the Franco-Russian Alliance," p. 402;
dispatch by General Marquis de Laguiche, the French militaryattache in St. Petersburg,file
7N1478 (6/19December 1912,27 November/4December 1912,and 30 November/13December
1912) at the Frenchmilitaryarchive,Chateau de Vincennes; I. V. Bestuzhev, "Bor'ba v Rossii
po voprosam vneshneipolitikinakanune pervoi mirovoivoiny, 1910-1914 gg." (The struggle
in Russia on questions of foreignpolicy on the eve of the First World War, 1910-1914),
Istoricheskiezapiski, vol. 75, 1965,pp. 63 ff.;Garros, "En margede l'alliance franco-russe,"
p. 36; Documents diplomatiquesfrangais(DDF), series 3, vol.V, no. 52, p. 65; and "Podgotovka
pervoi mirovoivoiny" (Preparationsforthe First World War), Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal,
no. 3, 1939, pp. 132-33.
37. See Bovykin,Iz istoriivozniknoveniia pervoimirovoivoiny,p. 136;and A. A. Manikovskii,
Boevoe snabzhenierusskoiarmii,1914-1918gg. (Militarysupplyin theRussian army,1914-1918)
(Moscow: Voennyi RedaktsionnyiSovet, 1923).
38. This is Taylor's apt characterizationof the situationin Strugglefor Masteryin Europe,
p. 494.
39. Poincare, cited by Taylor in ibid., p. 492.
up thechallenge,he said, "it is notour fault:we are ready."40Similarly,

theRussianambassadorreported thatFrenchgeneralssawgreatadvantages
infighting
a warinwhichAustria'sstrength wouldbe dissipatedina Balkan
41
campaign.
In short,farfrombuck-passing in the crisesof 1912and 1914,France
seemsto have been at least as eagerto standup forRussianinterests as
werethe Russiansthemselves.This contrastssharplywiththeextremely
tepidsupportthatFranceoffered Russia in the 1909showdownoverBos-
nia-Herzegovina.42 The changein Frenchcalculations was primarily due to
theirbeliefafterthe 1911Moroccancrisisthatwar betweenFranceand
Germanywas close to inevitable.Thus,abandonment by Russiabecamea
greaterriskthanentrapment in Russia's quarrels.
Another factorpromoting thetightening ofthealliancewas theriseofthe
doctrineofoffensived outrance,whichwas accompanied bythepresumption
thata decisivevictory or defeatwouldbe achievedwithgreatspeedon the
Franco-German front.43Forthisreason,theFrenchfeltmoredependent on
rapidaid fromRussiaat theearliestpossiblemoment, andtheypressedfor
a premature Russianoffensive againstEast Prussiaand offered to pay for
therailroadsneededto supportthismaneuver. GreaterFrenchfaithintheir
ownoffensive prospectsmayalso haveincreasedtheattractiveness offight-
ingGermany, especiallyundercircumstances in whichAustria'sforceswould
be divertedto theBalkans.44 In thisway,thebeliefin offensive advantage
promoted aggressivebalancingbehavior.
Russia: shortwar expectationsand a commitment to France. Thegrowing

beliefthattheclashoftheFrenchand Germanoffensives wouldlead to an
extremely rapiddecisionin the West also led to a tightening of Russia's
commitment to France.Thisis an especiallyinteresting
case becauseithelps
torefutean alternative
explanation forbalancingandbuck-passing choices-
namely,thatstatesseekbalancingallianceswhentheybelievethattheyare
thenexttargeton theaggressor'slist,buttheytryto pass thebuckwhen
theybelievethatotherswillbe attackedfirst.
As lateas 1910,theRussianGeneralStaffbelievedthatGermany would
citedin A. A. Ignat'ev,Piatdesiatletv stroiu(Fiftyyearsofservice),vol. 1

40. Millerand,
(Moscow:Khudozhestvennaia Literatura,1959),p. 506.
41. Unpublishedarchivaldocuments, citedin Bovykin, Iz istoriivozniknoveniia
pervoimi-
rovoi voiny,pp. 137 and 146 ff.
42. DDF, series2, vol. XII, nos. 51,55, 74, 86, 87,90, 100,113,and266.
43. For example,in March1910,Lt. ColonelPelle,theFrenchattachdin Berlin,wroteto
GeneralJeanJulesBrun,theMinister ofWar,that"bothontheGerman sideandontheFrench,
thebulkoftheactiveforcesofbothcountries are plannedfordeployment in first-line
armies
[nearthefrontiers].The victoryor defeatofthesearmiesofthefirst linewillveryprobably
decidetheoutcomeofthecampaign"bythetwentieth or thirtieth
dayaftermobilization.See
DDF, series2, vol. XII, no. 453,p. 691.
44. Forsomepertinent comments onthismatter, see Taylor,Struggle
forMastery inEurope,
p. 486.
154 International
Organization
directits mainoffensive towardRussia if war brokeout over a Balkan

dispute.45 Despite seeingthemselvesas the mostimmediately threatened
power,defense-minded Russianstaff officers
resistedcommitting themselves
to a tighterFrenchalliance.Thoughtheythought Germany was morelikely
to attackeastward,theythought thatGermanymightsendthebulkof its
forcesagainstFranceifwararoseoversomebilateralFranco-German dis-
pute.In thatevent,theybelievedthatitwouldbe unnecessary and ruinous
to agreeto a hastyRussianoffensive intoEast Prussia.The Russianattache
in Berlintoldhis FrenchcolleaguethatRussia's offensive could succeed
onlyafterits mobilization was completedand thuswouldhave to lag two
weeksbehindthatofFrance.Notingthat"Napoleon'sprinciple was to act
withall his forcesunited,"theRussianinsistedthat"we shouldnot risk
compromising thissuccessbytaking theoffensive prematurely." TheFrench
attacherebutted that"in thecase of two alliedarmies,suchas ours,the
trueapplicationoftheprinciple wouldconsistnotinwaiting forthecomplete
concentration ofRussianforces,butratherinactingtogether at themoment
whenthe Frenchand Russianarmiescould producesimultaneously the
maximum effect.'
'46
SoontheRussiansbegantoacceptthelogicofthisargument. Eventhough
theRussianscame to believethatGermanywouldalmostcertainly attack
firstintheWest,thisdidnotreducetheirdependency ontheFrenchalliance.
On thecontrary, theynowdesireda tighter allianceon Frenchtermsbecause
theyfearedthatFrancewouldbe defeatedwithout it. Afterabout1911,the
Russiansincreasingly acceptedtheviewthatthecollisionof theoffensive
tdoutrance and the simultaneous Germanoffensive wouldlead to a rapid
decision,one wayor theother.Russianplanning documents nowbeganto
expressfearsofan immediate routoftheFrench,leadingtoa separatepeace
thatwouldgiveGermany a freehandin theEast.47As one military official
argued,Russiashouldmountan earlyoffensive "to preventGermany from
finishingwithFranceor weakeningherin orderto have thepossibility of
redeploying forcesagainstus.' '48
In fact,inAugust1914,RussiadidinvadeEast Prussiahastily, notwaiting
forthefullmobilization oftheRussianarmyor evenofthesupplytrainsof
theattacking units.One resultwas thattheGermanstransferred twoarmy
corpsto East Prussiafromthesecondechelonoftheoffensive in theWest,
45. See DDF, series 2, vol. XII, no. 399, p. 611; and Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive,
chaps. 6 and 7.
46. Conversationbetween Colonel Mikhelsson and Lt. Colonel Pelle, reportedby Pelle to
General Brun in March 1910 and cited in DDF, series 2, vol. XII, no. 453, p. 695, and no. 467,
p. 717.
47. See ValentinAlekseevich Emets, "O roli russkoi armiiv pervyiperiod mirovoivoiny,
1914-1918gg." (On therole oftheRussian armyin thefirstperiodoftheWorldWar, 1914-1918),
Istoricheskiezapiski, vol. 77, 1965, p. 64.
48. General N. A. Kliuev, chiefof staffof the Warsaw militarydistrict,cited by Emets in
ibid., p. 64.
perhapsmarginally easingFrance'sburdenat thebattleoftheMarne.An-

otherresultwas theencirclement and destructionofa Russianarmyofone
hundredthousandmenat thebattleofTannenberg.
Thisdisasterhas oftenbeenexplainedbytheassertionthatRussianstrat-
egywas heldinthrallbyFrenchfinancial hegemony. RecentSovietarchival
scholarshipshows,however,thatchangesin Russian strategy were not
the
extractedas thepriceforrailroadloans.Rather, headlong rush to Tan-
nenbergwas caused by Russian fearsthat theclash of offensivestrategies
wouldlead to a rapiddecisionin theWest,forcing Russiato act hastilyin
orderto have anychanceofinfluencing theoutcome.49
In short,Germany'sdecisionto attackFrancefirstcould have allowed
Russiato pass thebuck,waitingon developments in theWestbeforecom-
mitting forcesto thefray.Indeed,someRussiansadvocateda strategy of
standingaside in orderto exploitGermanweaknessaftera slow,
initially
bloody,Pyrrhic victoryoverFrance.Instead,Russiachose to balanceag-
gressivelyand unconditionally out of the fearthatthe Germanoffensive
mightbe quick,relatively bloodless,anddecisivefortheEuropeanbalance
ofpower.
Britain: defensive advantages. Though some British strategistsshared

Russia'sfearsofa lightning Frenchdefeat,BritainhadtheEnglishChannel,
theBritishfleet,and theresourcesof theBritishEmpireto buffer it from
theconsequencesofa shiftinthecontinental balance.Moresothan
military
Russia, Britaincould affordto waiton developments, seekingaccommo-
dationwithGermanyand Austriaup to theveryend and limiting Britain's
initialliability forceofsomefourdivisions.S?
to an expeditionary Moreover,
it was notunreasonable fortheBritishto believethatFrenchand Russian
powerwouldsuffice to containGermanexpansionism. itmade
Consequently,
senseforBritainto limititsinvolvement campaignin order
intheattritional
to emergefromthewaras thestrongest, leastdamagedpower.
Duringthisperiod,as in thelate 1930s,Britishpolicymakers soughtto
contribute "the smallestamountofmoneyand thesmallestnumberofmen
withwhichwe mayhope,someday,to winthewar," through a blockade
oftheGermaneconomyandfreeriding on Frenchcasualties.5'
LloydGeorge,
forexample,anticipatedin February1912thatthe Germanoffensive in
Francewouldbogdownina stalemate andthatmodestBritish effortswould
49. Valentin Alekseevich Emets, Ocherki vneshneipolitikirossii v period pervoi mirovoi

voiny: Vzaimootnosheniiarossii s soiuznikamipo voprosam vedeniia voiny(Sketches of the
foreignpolicyof Russia duringtheFirstWorldWar: Relationsof Russiawithits allies on
questionsoftheconductofthewar)(Moscow:Nauka,1977),pp. 47-52.
50. MichaelHoward,TheContinental Commitment (London:TempleSmith,1972).
of theviewsof Walter
51. Thisis Field MarshalWilliamRobertson'sapt characterization
Runciman and ReginaldMcKenna,citedbyDavid FrenchinBritishStrategy and WarAims,
1914-1916(London:Allen& Unwin,1986),p. 247.
Organization
156 International
sufficeto maintainFrenchmorale.52 Meanwhile, as DavidFrenchhasnoted,

Britain'sownfinancial andexpandedmilitary
strength forceswouldbe hus-
banded"so thatBritainwouldhavethestrongest armyofall thebelligerents
whenthetimecame to makepeace."53This approachchangeddecisively
onlyin 1916,whenFrenchresourcesand moralecamenearexhaustion and
whenitseemedlikelythatRussiawouldbe knockedoutofthewarifBritain
continuedits strategy oflimitedliability.54
Thus,in 1914,Britainwas theoutlier,thecountrywiththemostinvul-
nerabledefensive positionandthecountry withthemostlimited, conditional
commitment to itsallies.WhileBritain didnot entirely
pass thebuck, itdid
take advantageof its protectedposition to pass costs and risksto France
and Russiauntiltheircollapseseemedimminent.
For each ofthemajorpowersbefore1914,therewas a close connection
betweentheperception ofoffensiveadvantageandtheadoptionofa strategy
of aggressive,unconditional balancing.Franceand Russia tightened their
alliancewhenFrenchstrategy became more offensive and when theexpec-
tationof a rapidand decisivevictory, one wayor theother,becamemore
prevalent.Fearinga collapseof thewesternfront,Russia acceptedmajor
tobailFranceout,despitethetemptation
self-sacrifices bytheSchlieffen
offered
Planto ridefreeon Frenchefforts. Britain,in contrast,exploiteditsspecial
defensiveadvantagesto limitits liabilityuntilthe strategicsituationwas
in theopeningengagements.
clarified
Case study: WorldWar II

Germany:Hitler's strategyof piecemeal expansion. Hitler's strategyin
thelate 1930swas theoppositeof Schlieffen'searlierstrategy.Insteadof
tryingto overturntheEuropeanbalanceofpowerinone boldstroke,Hitler
soughtto accomplishthisin a seriesof lightning
campaignsagainstdiplo-
maticallyisolatedvictims.Especiallyimportant in this strategywas the
captureof Czechoslovakia'sthirty-fourdivisionsand its heavyindustrial
complex,theSkoda works.Throughthispiecemealaggression, Hitlerhad
by 1941achievedan industrialand rawmaterialsbase thatwouldallowhim
toprosecute theSovietUnion,despitetheBritish
a longwaragainst blockade.55
A sufficient fortheGermanadoptionofthispiecemealstrategy
explanation
ofexpansionis thebuck-passing diplomacyoftheotherpowers.Perhapsif
Hitlerhadbeentightlyencircledbya Franco-Sovietalliance,he wouldhave
52. French, ibid., p. 3; forrelatedevidence, see also pp. xii, 106, 118, and 245-46.
53. This is French's characterizationof Lord Kitchener'sviews, cited in ibid., pp. 200-201.
54. French, ibid., pp. xii, 119, and 201.
55. See Murray,Change in the European Balance of Power. On the tailoringof German
militarycapabilityfor short campaigns and diplomaticintimidation,see Posen, Sources of
MilitaryDoctrine, especially p. 200.
soughta Schlieffen-type solution.But thebuck-passing

strategic ofhis op-
ponentsmeantthattheeasier,piecemealroutewas available,so Hitlertook
it. Whatwas important in thiscase was notso muchGermanperceptions
oftherelativeadvantagesofoffense anddefensebut,rather,theperceptions
ofGermany'sopponentson thatdimension. Hitlerhimself
was usuallyop-
timisticaboutoffensiveschemes,thougheven he expectedGeneralHeinz
Guderian'sblitzthrough theArdennesin May 1940to yieldonlya limited
victoryandnottheuttercollapseofFrance.ManyGermangenerals,steeped
in thelessonsofWorldWarI, wereevenmorepessimistic aboutthepros-
pectsforarmoredblitzkrieg But because thosesame les-
breakthroughs.56
sonsled Germany'sopponentsto adoptstrategies ofpassivebuck-passing,
theGermansneverhad to face thehardquestionof whetheroffensewas
easy enoughto defeatall of Europe in a singlecampaign,the task that
Schlieffenhad confronted. Instead,Hitlerhad onlyto considerwhether
offensewas feasibleenoughto lay low one enemyat a time.
The Soviet Union: Stalin's strategyof entrapmentand buck-passing.Two

keyassumptions shapedStalin'salliancediplomacy.Thefirst was thatFrance
and Britaincould holdoutfora longtimeagainstGermanattacks,in part
owingto theadvantagesof thedefender, even iftheSovietUnionoffered
themno assistance.Even if Germanydid defeatFrance,a victorywon
through a grueling campaignwouldbe pyrrhic,
attritional leavingthefree-
ridingSovietUnionin a strengthened positionvis-a-vistheotherpowers.
Khrushchev laterreportedthatStalinhad beennotonlydismayedbutalso
trulysurprised bythecollapseofFrancein 1940."Couldn'ttheyputup any
resistanceat all?" complainedthe stunneddictatorto his Politburocol-
leagues.57
Stalin'sdismayand surprisewere due in partto his overrating of the
strengthof Franceand Britain.In his March1939speechwarning thathe
wouldnotpullothers'chestnuts outofthefireforthem,Stalinarguedthat
"thenon-aggressive, democratic statesareunquestionably stronger ... both
economically and militarily"
thanGermany and couldtherefore resistGer-
manyon theirown.58In part,however,Stalin'sreactionswerealso due to
hisoverrating oftherelativestrength ofthedefense.GeneralD. G. Pavlov,
whomone historian labels"Stalin'sGuderian,"returned
ironically fromthe
SpanishCivilWarand convincedStalinthatmassed-armor blitzkriegoffen-
56. See JohnMearsheimer,ConventionalDeterrence(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress,

1983), chap. 4.
57. Nikita Khrushchev,KhrushchevRemembers,vol. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p.
134; see also p. 129. Accordingto Deutscher, "the major premise of Stalin's policy and his
major blunder" were that "he expected Britainand France to hold theirgroundfor a long
time." See Isaac Deutscher, Stalin (New York: OxfordUniversityPress, 1949), p. 441.
58. Stalin,citedin JohnErickson,The Soviet High Command(New York: St. Martin'sPress,
1962), p. 513.
Organization
158 International
siveswereinfeasible.59Consequently, Stalinoverratednotonlythedefensive
strengthof Francebutalso thatof Poland.60
Thesecondassumption behindStalin'sdiplomacy wasthatGermany might
getembroiled withtheWestfirstiftheSovietUnionadopteda stancethat
was militarilystrongbutdiplomaticallynonprovocative. Thisviewwas often
of
expressedin termsoftheLeninisttheory interimperialist contradictions,
whichwouldarisefromtheunevengrowth ofthecapitalistpowersand the
consequentneed to fight fora redivisionofthecolonialspoils.As earlyas
1925,Stalinheldtheviewthatifwarcomes "we shallhaveto takeaction,
butwe shallbe thelastto do so in orderto throwthedecisiveweightinto
thescales."'61
Proceedingfromthetwo assumptions of defensiveadvantageand inter-
imperialist Stalinmaneuvered
contradictions, to embroilGermany withthe
Westand to pass to Francethecosts of checkingGermanrevisionism. In
this,Stalinwas greatlyaidedbythefactthatFrancehad a commonborder
withGermanyand alliancecommitments to Czechoslovakiaand Poland,
whereasthe Soviet Uniondid not. At the timeof the Munichcrisis,for
example,Sovietdiplomacy triedto lureFranceto honortheCzech alliance
by promising to helpCzechoslovakiaifFrancedid too. Those who debate
whetherStalin'ssupportfor"collectivesecurity"was sincerein thisin-
stancemissthepoint.If Francehad agreedto theseconditions, a German
attackon Czechoslovakia wouldhavetriggered a majorengagementofFrench
andGermanforcesattheSiegfried line.Meanwhile, evenifRumaniaallowed
theSovietsto sendsometroopsintoSlovakiaacrossRumania'slimitedrail
connections, neutralPolandwouldhaveprevented GermanandSovietforces
frombecomingfullyengaged.In short,Stalinwas pursuinga strategy of
limitedliabilityin 1938as a meansto lure Franceand Germanyintoan
campaignthatwoulddebilitate
attritional bothofthem.62
Of course,if GermanyconqueredPoland,Stalinwouldlose his buffer,
59. See JohnErickson, The Road to Stalingrad,vol. 1 (New York: Harper & Row, 1975),
pp. 8 and 26; and Erickson, Soviet High Command, p. 537.
60. See Deutscher,Stalin, p. 437. This generalpredispositionto underestimatethefeasibility
of blitzkriegmay even have lasted past May 1940 and contributedto the false hope thatHitler
would not attackin June 1941. PolitburomemberAndreiZhdanov believed in 1940 that "Ger-
manyis incapable of fighting on two fronts,"and even afterthe fall of France, he considered
thatGermanywas too "bogged down" by the war with England to attack the Soviet Union.
Foreign MinisterVyacheslav Molotov said in June 1941 that "only a fool would attack us."
See Gavriel Ra'anan, InternationalPolicy Formationin the USSR (Hamden, Conn.: Archon,
1983),p. 18. On some new revelationsalong the same lines, see Y. Perechenev,"Ten Volumes
About the War," Moscow News, no. 38, 20 September 1987, p. 10, citingK. M. Simonov,
"Zametki k biografiiG. K. Zhukova" (Notes for the biographyof G. K. Zhukov), Voenno-
istoricheskiizhurnal,no. 9, 1987,pp. 49-51. We are gratefulto CindyRobertsforthiscitation.
61. Stalin, cited in Louis Fischer, Stalin's Road fromPeace to War (New York: Harper &
Row, 1969), p. 304.
62. For insightful analyses of the situation,see TelfordTaylor, Munich (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1979), pp. 452-56; and Barry Posen, "Competing Images of the Soviet Union,"
WorldPolitics 39 (July1987), pp. 579-604.
makinga buck-passing strategy andmoredifficult

riskier to arrange.France
andBritainmadeStalin'staskeasier,however,byguaranteeing theirsupport
forPolandafterHitleroccupiedCzechoslovakia.Thisgreatly increasedthe
likelihoodthatHitler'snexttargetafterPolandwouldbe Franceratherthan
theSovietUnion.
Thus,by theend of 1939,theSovietUnionwas in a positionstrikingly
analogoustothatofRussiaattheendof1913.Inthelongrun,a Russo-German
war was likelyto occur,but it wouldalmostcertainly be precededby a
Franco-German campaign. In both instances,Russia had an incentiveto
delaythe confrontation fortwo or threeyears,whenits military strength
relativeto Germany'swould peak. Moreover, in bothinstances, the current
militarybalancefavoredGermanyoverFranceonlyslightly.
Despitethesesimilarcircumstances, imperialRussiachose a strategy of
aggressive whereas
balancing, Stalinchose buck-passing. This was notdue
to theideologicalantipathy betweenSovietRussia and bourgeoisFrance,
whichwas onlya littlegreaterthanthatbetweenreactionary Russia and
bourgeoisFrance.Rather,theavailableevidencesuggeststhatit was due
faithin thepowerofthedefense.63
to Stalin'sstronger If Stalinhad under-
stoodthatGermanycould conquerFrancein a month,he probablywould
have actedjust as Russia had in August1914,mounting a simultaneous
offensiveregardlessoftheinsufficiently preparedconditionofhisforces.
in 1938-39
France: defensiveadvantagesand buck-passing.Frenchstrategy
was powerfully bythedesiretopass thecostsofFrance'sdefense
influenced
to Britainandbytheperception, basedon Frenchexperiences inWorldWar
I, thatoffensewas muchmoredifficult thandefense.However,theFrench
inclination to pass thebuckwas notall-consuming. In 1939,Francemight
havegambledon offering Hitlera freehandintheEast,passingall thecosts
ofFrenchdefenseto Polandand theSovietUnion.Instead,Franceagreed
tojoin in a guaranteeofPoland,thereby passingonlysomeofthecostsof
FrenchdefensetoBritain.Likewise,Frenchconfidence intheholding power
ofthedefensewas notabsolute.Ifithadbeen,Francecouldhaveextended
the Maginotline to the EnglishChanneland remainedindifferent to the
alliancepossibilitieswithBritain,Poland,and theLow Countries.
In fact,Frenchstrategywas morecomplex.The Frenchbelievedthatthey
wouldlose iftheyfought a longwaraloneagainstGermany, buttheywould
wina defensivewarfought withtheassistanceofa fullymobilizedBritain.
Frenchstrategy, includingbothitsbalancingandbuck-passing aspects,was
aimedat achievingthisend."'
This perspectiveexplainsthe mostpuzzlingaspectof Frenchstrategic
behavior:France'srefusalto fight on extremely favorabletermsin Septem-
57 and59-62above.
63. For thisevidence,see footnotes
64. In SourcesofMilitary strategy
Doctrine,chap.4, PosendescribestheFrenchmilitary
as drivenbythedesireto pass thecostsoffighting to theBritish.
Organization
160 International
ber 1938and its agreement on extremely

to fight unfavorable termsa year
later.At thetimeoftheMunichcrisis,theFrenchpotentially had strategic
masteryin Europe.To overcomeCzechoslovakia'sthirty-four crackdivi-
sionsandformidable frontier Hitlerplannedtouse-and would
fortifications,
have had to use-the bulkof his armyand airforce.This wouldhave left
Francewitha seven-to-one advantageintheWest.Atthistime,theSiegfried
line(or Westwall)was only 5 percentcomplete,withrecently pouredcon-
cretethathad notyet set.
By September1939,the Siegfriedline consistedof 11,283bunkers,in
contrastto the517 ofa yearbefore.The Germanarmyavailableforaction
in theWestduringthePolishcampaignhad thirty-five divisions,sevenof
whichwerefirstline,as opposedto onlyeightdivisionsin totalin 1938.In
lightof thedeficiencies of theFrencharmyin offensive operations, these
forcebalancessuggestthateven an all-outassaulton theSiegfried linein
September1939wouldnothave saved Poland.The weak probesactually
carriedoutbytheFrenchwereprobablytheonlyoffensives thatwerepos-
sibleunderthecircumstances.65
The Frenchseemto havemadeno gain,therefore, fromdeclaring waras
a resultofHitler'sinvasionofPoland.Theysucceededonlyinensuring that
they,and notRussia,wouldbe Hitler'snexttarget.Thus,it is ironicthat
somehistorians havebrandedForeignMinister GeorgesBonneta traitor for
allegedlyofferingHitlera freehandintheEast.66Underthecircumstances,
luringHitlereastwardwouldseemto havebeena vastlysuperiorcourseto
guaranteeing Poland.
The paradoxicalreversalinFrenchbehaviorbetweenSeptember 1938and
September1939was due to thechangeinBritain'sattitude. In 1938,Britain
offerednohelpina wartosave Czechoslovakia.By 1939,however,Britain's
guarantee to Polandand itsdecisionto increasethesize oftheBritisharmy
gavetheFrenchreasontoexpectthatiftheyjoinedintheBritish guarantee,
Britainwould be preparedto deploya significant expeditionaryforcein
Franceabout six monthsafterthe outbreakof war. Duringthisinterval,
Francewouldbe protected bythetimeneededto occupyPolandandbythe
winter.Thus,Britishaid plusdefensiveadvantagewouldsuffice to protect
FrancefromGermanyat a tolerablepricein Frenchlives. In thissense,
France'sguarantee to Polandwas partofa buck-passing strategypredicated
on theexpectation ofdefensiveadvantage.
Frenchperceptions ofa qualifieddefensiveadvantageplayedan important
roleat severalstagesof decisionmaking.Often,however,assessmentsof
defensiveadvantageseemto have beenless a cause ofbuck-passing diplo-
macythana manipulated ofit. For example,duringtheMu-
rationalization
65. Murray,Change in the European Balance of Power, p. 348.

of theevidenceon this,see Anthony
66. For a reviewof thecomplexities Adamthwaite,
France and the Coming of the Second WorldWar, 1936-1939 (London: FrankCass, 1977),pp.
269-79.
nichcrisis,whenFrenchChiefof StaffMauriceGamelinbriefedFrench
politiciansaboutthescenarioofFranceattacking theWestwall, heportrayed
a bloodycampaignwithno possibility of rapidresults-inshort,"a mod-
ernizedSomme."67 However,whenGamelinbriefedBritishPrimeMinister
NevilleChamberlain in September 1938,he arguedthata jointFranco-British
offensive wouldsurelybe successful, owingto theincompletion ofGerman
fortifications
as well as theirlack of trained reservists and raw materials.
AlexanderCadogan,a Britishparticipant, astutelyobservedthatwhatthe
Frenchreallyhad in mindwas a "squib offensive (to bringus in) and then
retirement on MaginotLine to wait(6 months) forourKitchener armies."68
It also smacksofa manipulated doublestandardthatin Gamelin'sconver-
sationswithFrenchpoliticians, he depictedtheWestwallas a toughnutto
crackwhilepredicting a Germanwalkoverof the elaborateCzech fortifi-
cationsystem.69
IftheFrenchselectively overrated Germandefenses,theydidnotgreatly
overratePoland's abilityto defenditself.Gamelinunderstood thatPoland
wouldbe destroyed, withor withouta Franco-British declaration of war.
He argued,however,thatit wouldbuy France six months,whichit did,
duringwhichBritishforceswouldstartto arrive.70
Likewise,theFrenchdidnotgreatly overrate theirabilityto defendthem-
selvesbehindtheMaginotline,even ifthelinewereextendedto thesea.
PrimeMinisterDaladierbelievedthat"France could notmakewar alone
againstGermany,"echoingthe views of the FrenchChiefsof Staffthat
"Francecannotlongwithstand effectivesthreetimesas numerous. "71 Rather
thancompletetheMaginotline,whichmight encourageBritainto ridefree
on Frenchdefense,Frenchleadersthought it betterto leave theinvasion
routesthrough Belgiumopen,thusluringBritainintoa jointdefenseofthe
Low Countries.72 Butonce Britainwas entrapped, theFrenchseemto have
been overconfident in theefficacyoftheirdefenses.
This selectiveand partialoverrating of theefficacy of defensestrongly
impliesthatthe desireforbuck-passing was drivingthe estimatesof the
relativestrengthof offenseand defense,ratherthanthereverse.Alleged
offensive advantages,suchas theease withwhichtheGermanscouldbomb
Paris,werealso invokedwhenevertheyservedtojustifytakingno action
withoutBritishassistance.This raisesthequestionof whetherthefearof
thehighcostsoffighting might havebeentheultimate forceshapingFrench
strategy andnotperceptions ofdefensive advantageperse. Thissimplication
fails,however,to explainthePolishguarantee.If Francehad been single-
67. Gamelin,citedin ibid.,p. 232.
68. Cadogan,citedin ibid.,p. 232. Kitchener
had organizedtheexpansionof theBritish
armyfordeployment in Francein WorldWarI.
69. Gamelin,citedin ibid.,pp. 232-34.
70. Gamelin'sopinionof23 August1939,citedin ibid.,p. 340. See also ibid.,p. 311.
71. Daladier,citedin ibid.,pp. 226and230.
72. Posen, Sources of MilitaryDoctrine, chap. 4.
162 International
Organization
mindedlybenton minimizing combatcasualties,the best strategy would

havebeento offerno guarantee to Poland,hopingthatHitler'sultimateaim
was theUkraineand notFrance.Thismighthave beenrisky,jeopardizing
Britain'scontinental commitment ifHitlerwereto strikeFrancefirst,butit
was notan unreasonablegamble,sinceFrance'sown estimateswerethat
Hitler'smaingoalslay in theEast.73
Insteadofgambling on passingthewholecostsofthewarto theSoviets,
Francetookwhatitthought was thesaferbutmorecostlycourseofpassing
part thecostsoffighting Britain.It was becauseFranceoverrated
of to the
chancesof a successfuldefensewithBritain'shelpthatthispolicylooked
superior.Thoughperceptions of defensiveadvantageweremanipulated in
the serviceof a buck-passing diplomacy,therewas also at bottoma real
perception thatFranceand Britaintogether could stalemateGermany,as
theyhad in 1914-18,aidedby theinherent advantagesofthedefender.74
Arguably,thisleftFrance withthe worstof all possiblestrategies.If
Francehadhad morefaithintheholdingpowerofthedefense,theMaginot
linemight havebeenextendedtotheChannelandthePolishguarantee would
have been shunned,even at the loss of Britishsupport.That is, France
wouldhave triedto pass thebuckentirely to Russia,ratherthanpartially
to Britain,whilepreparing to fightsuccessfullyon itsownifthatplanmis-
fired.If, on theotherhand,Francehad had moreconfidence in offensive
operations, supporting Czechoslovakiain 1938mighthave lookedmoreat-
tractive.As it was, theBritishexpeditionary forceamountedto onlyfour
divisionsby May 1940,a measureof theillusorysuccess of Frenchbuck-
passing.75
Britain:a strategyof limitedliability.Like France, Britaindid not count

onriding scot-free defensive
oninherent advantagesandthebalancing efforts
ofotherpowers.Nonetheless, Britaindidcountheavilyon suchadvantages
a minimum
to allow it to contribute thebalanceof poweras
to upholding
wellas theluxuryofwaitinguntilthelastminuteto see whatthatminimum
wouldbe. In short,Britainpursueda strategyoflimitedliability,
based on
the defensiveadvantageprovidedby the EnglishChanneland on theex-
pectationthata new Europeanwar wouldbe a slow-moving rerunof the
last one. Chamberlain,bothbeforeand afterSeptember1939,thought that
Frenchdefenseswereso strong thatHitlermightnotevenattackthem,that
Germanywouldbe worndownby a longblockade,and thatHitler'sonly
73. Adamthwaite,France and the Coming of the Second WorldWar, pp. 252 and 274.
74. For additional see EleanorM. Gates,End of
evidencein supportofthisinterpretation,
the Affair:The Collapse of the Anglo-FrenchAlliance, 1939-40 (Berkeley: Universityof Cal-
ifornia
Press,1981),pp. 57-58.
75. Brian Bond, BritishMilitaryPolicy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon,
1980),p. 336.
offensive optionwouldbe to tryto grabRumania'soil to helphimendure

theSitzkrieg.76
The Munichcrisisis easilyexplainablein theseterms.The specterof a
defensive landwar,coupledwiththefearofa costlyairwar,gave
attritional
Britaina strongincentive to makesurethatwarwas absolutely unavoidable
beforedecidingto fight. At the same time,confidence in theMaginot line
and the extra cushion provided by Britain'soff-shoreposition gave the
BritishtheluxuryofwaitinguntiltheevidenceofHitler'sintentions was all
in. As CadoganremarkedaftertheMunichcrisis,"I knowthatit is said
thatMitteleuropa willturnroundandrendus. Butmanythingsmayhappen
beforethat."77
The puzzlingPolishguaranteealso seemsmoresensiblewhenviewedin
thelightof a strategy anchoredon France'sapparently
oflimitedliability,
formidable defensivemilitary power.Like theFrench,theBritishChiefsof
Staffhad fewillusionsthattheycould takeany actionto preventthede-
struction of Poland. Onlythe Sovietscould stop Hitlerin the East, they
believed,and thenonlyifGermanyattackedtheSovietUnion,whichwas
devoidofoffensive power.78 Theydidbelieve,however,thatPolandmight
take monthsto conquer,exactingattrition on Germanforcesand buying
timeforpreparing a defenseoftheLow Countries.79 Ofcourse,Polishefforts
might haveachievedthisresultwithout a Franco-Britishguarantee. Never-
theless,as BrianBondindicates,"Halifaxand Chamberlain fearedthatthe
Poleswereaboutto do a dealwithGermany whichwoulddemolishthehope
ofa secondfrontin theeast."80
Anotherimportant aim of the guaranteewas its effecton France.The
Britishtendedto ratethe Maginotlineand, moregenerally, France'sde-
fensiveposturequitehighly.81 The secretaryof stateforwar,Leslie Hore-
Belisha,even arguedthatBritainshouldannounceirrevocably thatno ex-
peditionary forcewouldgo to thecontinent underanycircumstances, for
thenFrancewouldextendtheMaginotlineto thesea andgiveup thegame
letters
76. Chamberlain's tofamily citedinMauriceCowling,TheImpactofHitler
members,
(London: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1975),pp. 355-57. See also Bond, BritishMilitaryPower,
p. 253; and N. H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy,vol. 1, RearmamentPolicy (London: Her Majesty's
Office,1976),pp. 637-38.Bondand Gibbsalso note,however,thatthenotionsof
Stationery
advantageheldby Chamberlain
defensive werenotuniversally
and Leslie Hore-Belisha held
withinBritishofficial to RandallSchwellerforhelpon thispoint.
circles.We are grateful
77. David Dilks, ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945 (London: Cassell,
1971),p. 119.
79. Simon Newman, March 1939: The British Guarantee to Poland (Oxford: Clarendon,
1976), pp. 155-56.
80. Bond, BritishMilitaryPolicy, p. 306.
81. See, forexample,theviewsof Sir JohnSimon,ChancelloroftheExchequer,citedin
Murray,Change in the European Balance of Power, p. 274; and the views of the Chiefs of
Franceand theComing
Staff,citedin Newman,March1939,p. 139.See also Adamthwaite,
of the Second WorldWar, p. 51.
Organization
164 International
ofluringBritainto helpdefendtheinvasioncorridor acrossBelgium.82 This

wouldmakebothBritainandFrancemoresecure-and atFrance'sexpense.
The moretypicalview,however,was thatitwouldharmBritishsecurity
ifFrancemounteda defenseon theFrenchborders.Instead,Britainhadto
induceFranceto mounta forward defenseoftheLow Countries to prevent
Germanyfromusingthemas a base for air attacks on Britain.83To make
sure thatFrancewas willing and able to mount such a forward defense,
Britainconsidered it worthwhile to agree to a limited Britishcommitment
to thecontinent.
Beyondthis,afterthecollapseofCzechoslovakpower,therewas evena
fearthatFrancepropermight foldunderGermanpressure.TheBritish Chiefs
ofStaff, forexample,worriedthat"Francemight giveup theunequalstrug-
gle unlesssupportedwiththeassurancethatwe shouldassistthemto the
utmost.'84 Nonetheless,Britainstillheld to the assumptionof defensive
advantage,whichimpliedthata smallBritishforcewitha primarily moral
impactwouldprobablysufficeto stiffen Frenchresistance.Defensivead-
vantagewouldpermit Britaintheluxury oflimiting itsinitial
liability,
awaiting
further developments to see whether a greatercontribution was needed.
RobertVansittart capturedtheessenceof Britishthinking:
We are proceeding on twoassumptions bothofwhichI am surewillbe
thatFrancecan holdouton twoor perhapsthreefrontiers
first
falsified:
[German,Italian,and Spanish]withno expeditionary forcefrom
us.... Secondlywe are assumingthatthewar,ifit comes,willbe a
longone and we musttherefore lay greatstresson conserving our[fi-
nancial]stayingpower.85
ThoughVansittart offered thischaracterization in early1938,it stillcap-
turesBritain'sbasic thinking even afterthePolishguarantee.The strategy
was stillone of limitedliability based on theexploitation of defensivead-
vantageandthebalancingefforts ofothers.AfterApril1939,however,there
was a mildupwardadjustment intheestimateoftheminimal Britishliability
neededto ensurethatthose balancing would
forces operate successfully. In
thisway,Britainhoped to strike an optimaltrade-offbetween the benefits
ofridingfreeandthebenefits ofbalancingaggressively, guaranteeing British
securityat a minimalcost. If in retrospectthe trade-offappears less than
optimalto some,that is because the of
expectation defensive advantage was
82. Adamthwaite,France and the Coming of the Second WorldWar, p. 71.

83. See Murray,Change in the European Balance of Power, pp. 276-77; Dilks, Diaries of
Sir Alexander Cadogan, p. 139; and Bond, BritishMilitaryPolicy, p. 297.
84. BritishChiefs of Staff,cited in Adamthwaite,France and the Coming of the Second
World War, p. 253. See also Dilks, Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, p. 166. In Change in
theEuropeanBalance ofPower,p. 71, Murrayargues,mostlyby inference, thattheBritish
changeon thecontinentalcommitment thirty-
in 1939was due to theloss ofCzechoslovakia's
fourdivisionsfromtheEuropeanmilitary Policy,p. 296,Bond
equation.In BritishMilitary
attachein Paristookthisview.
notesthatBritain'smilitary
85. Vansittart,cited in Murray,Change in the European Balance of Power, p. 69.
too sanguineandnotbecauseBritishdeductions fromthatassumption were

faulty.
Finally,theair powerelementin Britishliability calculationsmeritsad-
ditionalattentionbecause it is especiallyrelevantto the choice between
strategicdeterrenceand strategic defense.One of thereasonsthatCham-
berlainappeasedHitlerat Munichwas hisexaggerated estimateofGerman
strategicbombingcapabilitiesand his fearthatBritain'sown retaliatory
capabilitywouldnotdeterattackson Britishcities.AftertheMunichcrisis,
Chamberlain pushedfora reorientation of Britishair powerexpenditures
frombombersto fighters. Believingtheseefforts to be successful,he con-
cludedbymid-1939 thata Germanairattackon Britainwouldprobablyfail.
This allowedhimto guaranteePolandwithless fearoftheimmediate cas-
ualtiesthatthismightproduce.86 By analogy,ballisticmissiledefenses,if
theywerebelievedto be highlyeffective, mightencouragefuturepolicy-
makersto be moreassertivein theirbalancingbehavior.
Chain-gangingand buck-passingin World Wars I and 11

To sumup thefindings fromthetwoworldwars,ineverycase perceptions
of offensive advantagewere associatedwithchain-ganging-that is, with
unconditional balancingbehavior.Conversely,perceptions ofdefensive ad-
vantagewereassociatedwithbuck-passing-that is,withstrategies
oflimited
liability.Givena choice,statespreferred to pass thecosts ofbalancingto
otherstatesor to awaitdevelopments beforemakingirrevocablecommit-
ments.But whenoffensive advantageswere believedto make statesex-
tremely vulnerable andwarsshort,buck-passing weredeemedtoo
strategies
risky.
This hypothesis is moresuccessfulthansomeobviouscompetitors. For
example,it is nottruethatstatesbalancewhentheybelievetheyare an
aggressor'snexttargetbutpass thebuckwhentheybelievetheyarefarther
statesare seen as vulnerablebutwillingand
downon thelist. If first-line
able to balanceifassisted,second-linestatestendto acceptthebuck.
Likewise,it is nottruethatbuck-passing has been drivenstrictly by a
cravendesireto minimize thecostsoffighting,regardlessof strategiccon-
sequences.TheFrenchdecisiontojoininguaranteeing Polandwasa strategic
attempt to ensuretheresourcesneededto stalemateGermanyin a costly
attritionalcampaign.IftheFrenchhadbeenconcerned onlywithminimizing
casualties,butata greater risk,theywouldhaveshunned
strategic theBritish
guarantee to PolandandtriedinsteadtoembroilHitlerandStalin.Similarly,
views,see WilliamR. Rock,NevilleChamberlain

on Chamberlain's
86. For information
(New York:Twayne,1969),p. 180;Cowling,Impactof Hitler,p. 395; and Ian Colvin,The
Chamberlain Cabinet(London:Gollancz,1971),p. 174.For backgroundon airpowerpolicy
and perceptions,see Posen, Sources of MilitaryDoctrine, chap. 5; and Murray,Change in the
European Balance of Power, pp. 208 and 251-53.
166 International
Organization
Stalin'sbuck-passing was aimednotat savingthelivesof Sovietsoldiers

per se but,rather,at conserving Sovietpoweruntilthedecisivemoment
whentheotherpowerswouldbe exhaustedby thefirstroundoffighting.
Finally,the evidencecitedabove belies the commonly expressedview
thatappeasersin BritainandFrancedidnotcalculatestrategically at all but
weresimplyreactingto publicopinionor inchoateemotion."Chamberlain
was notprimarily, ifat all, motivatedby strategic factors,"statesa recent
historian;87likewise,"muddlenotmachination" is said to havebeenat the
bottomof Frenchpolicy.88 Domesticpoliticalpressuresand othersources
ofperceptual bias undoubtedly influenced strategiccalculations.Butthisis
notthesameas sayingthatno calculationsweremade.
This was thecase in 1914as well as in 1938-39.89 In 1914,themilitary
hadbeenhighly successful inpropagating whatGeneralJosephJoffre himself
latercalleda "cult oftheoffensive," whichservedmilitary organizational
interests.Conversely,in 1938,thereexisteda civilian"cult of thedefen-
sive," headed by B. H. Liddell Hart and otherswho soughtto use any
strategicrationalization to avoid a Britishcommitment to fighting
a large
land war on the Europeancontinent. Criticsof LiddellHarthave clearly
establishedthatthestrategy of limitedliability
came firstforhimand that
onlylaterdidhe develophisideasofdefensive advantageinarmored warfare
in orderto explainhow Francecould stalemateGermany withoutthehelp
ofa largeBritishexpeditionary force.90
The pointis thatstrategic calculations wereinfactmade,ifonlyto sella
policyas plausible,givena certainview of the offense-defense balance.
Indeed,policytendedto dovetailwiththelogicofthosearguments. Though
thesearguments mayhave sometimesbeen ex post factorationalizations
ratherthanrootcauses, assessmentsofoffensive and defensiveadvantage
weredirectly tiedto grandstrategic choices.
These choices had effectson the stability of the system.Strategiesof
aggressive balancing,basedon perceptions ofoffensive advantage,andpas-
sivebuck-passing, based on perceptions ofdefensiveadvantage,wereboth
destabilizing.Theseinstabilitiesweretriggered bythefactthattheunderlying
strategicassumptions wereincorrect. Thus,theEuropeanconfrontation of
July1914escalatedbecause oftheexpectation thatstateswerevulnerable
toconquest,butitwas prolonged bythefactthattheywerenot.Conversely,
Hitler'sopponentsfailedto appreciatethatblitzkrieg operationsagainst
87. Bond, BritishMilitaryPolicy, p. 282.

88. Adamthwaite,France and the Coming of the Second WorldWar, p. 320.
89. Fora discussionoftheeventsin 1914,see Snyder,IdeologyoftheOffensive.Forsimilar
pointsabout1938-39,see Posen,SourcesofMilitary Doctrine.In "Causes ofWar,"VanEvera
offersa generaltheoryofthistype.
90. See BrianBondand MartinAlexander,"LiddellHartand De Gaulle:The Doctrineof
LimitedLiabilityand MobileDefense,"in PeterParet,ed., MakersofModernStrategy, 2d
ed. (Princeton,
N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1986),p. 612;andMearsheimer,LiddellHart
and the Weightof History,pp. 107, 111-12, and 128.
isolatedtargetswouldallowGermanyto seize theassetsneededto mount

a seriousbidforEuropeanhegemony. By 1941,forexample,40 percentof
Germansteelproduction camefromoutsidetheReich's 1937borders.9'
However,perceptions ofdefensiveadvantageneednotalwaysleadtothis
result,even whentheaggressoroccupiesthecenterof thealliancecheck-
erboard.In thelate 1880s,Germany was dissuadedfromattackinganyone
because each of its opponentslookedindividually
impregnable.
However,
in the late 1930s,perceptionsof defensiveadvantagewere destabilizing
because the statusquo statessaw strongerdefensiveadvantagesthandid
the aggressors.In checkerboard conditions,therefore,
the aggressorwas
notdissuadedfromattackingisolatedopponents,whereasthe statusquo
statesweredissuadedfromaidingtheirallies by attackingtheaggressor's
rear.
Conclusionsand issues forresearch
Contemporary balance-of-power theoryhas becometoo parsimonious to

yielddeterminate predictions inmultipolarity.
aboutstatealliancestrategies
Waltz'stheorypredictsonlythatmultipolarity predisposesstatesto either
of twooppositeerrors,whichwe call chain-ganging and buck-passing.To
predictwhichofthesetwopolicieswillprevail,itis necessaryto complicate
Waltz's theoryby addinga variablefromJervis'stheoryof the security
dilemma:thevariableof whetheroffenseor defenseis perceivedto have
theadvantage.At leastunderthecheckerboard geographical conditionsin
EuropebeforeWorldWars I and II, perceivedoffensive advantagebred
unconditional alliances,whereasperceiveddefensiveadvantagebredfree
ridingon thebalancingefforts ofothers.
The marriage thatwe proposebetweenWaltz'stheoryand Jervis'ssug-
gestsa numberofissuesforfurther researchas wellas a numberofappli-
cationsto current policyanalysis.One questionofconsiderable theoretical
andpolicyinterest inmultipolar
is thesourceofstability periodsthatlacked
majorwars.Forexample,thediplomacy ofBismarck'seramanagedtoavoid
thepitfallsof bothchain-ganging and buck-passing, despiteits multipolar
setting.Above,we briefly suggestedthatthismayhave been theresultof
theincreasing perception inthe1880sthateach oftheEuropeanpowerswas
individuallytoo welldefendedto conquer.ButBismarck'slimitedaimsand
diplomatic skillsmayalso have beenfactors.In anyevent,giventhelike-
lihoodthattheworldwillbecomeincreasingly itwouldbe useful
multipolar,
to ask whatroletheoffense-defense balancehas playedin cases in which
multipolarityhas been managedsuccessfully.
The interaction of polarityand the offense-defensebalance mightalso

Organization
168 International
yieldinterestingintepretations ofregionalconflict dynamics outsideEurope.

The June1967Arab-IsraeliWar mightbe interpreted as multipolar chain-
gangingstemming fromperceptionsof offensive advantage,whereasthe
subsequentwar of attrition can be seen as Syrianbuck-passing stemming
fromperceptions of a defensivestalemate.92 Such regionalmultipolar pro-
cesses are likelyto becomea moreand moreimportant featureofinterna-
tionalpoliticsas the superpowers increasingly withdraw fromtheirover-
extendedpositionsin theThirdWorldand evenin EasternEurope.
Analytically moredifficult are multipolar settingsthatlack thefamiliar
checkerboard geography whichmakesone's neighbor an enemyand makes
theenemy'sneighbor one's friend.Checkerboard balancinghypotheses be-
comedecreasingly helpfulwhensea and airpowersupplantlandpoweras
thedominant factorin themilitary equation.Insofaras themultipolarity of
thetwenty-first century is likelyto featuretheriseofJapanas a majorsea
andairpower,heuristic historical cases ofnoncheckerboard alliancepolitics
shouldfocuson multipolar navalcompetition in theEasternMediterranean
(thenineteenth-century's "Easternquestion")or in East Asia.93
Nuclearweaponswillalso have to be factoredin to any assessmentof
multipolar balancingin thefuture, bothbecause theirglobalreachunder-
minestraditional checkerboard balancinglogicand becausethenuclearde-
terrentstalemate is likelyto benefit thedefender ofthestatusquo.94Insofar
as nuclearweaponsare likelyto makeeach pole individually invulnerable
to conquest,a nuclear-armed multipolaritymay resemble the stable1880s
morethanit willthechain-ganging 1910sor buck-passing 1930s. It cannot
be excluded,however,thatstateswithsmall,vulnerablenucleararsenals
willhaveto formallianceswithlargernuclearpowersor witheach otherto
mounta credibledeterrent. In thatcase, thedynamics ofchain-ganging and
buck-passing maystillapplyin future nuclearshowdowns.
We makeno claimto be able to foretell thebalancingdynamicsof the
comingdecades. We do claim,however,thatrealistscholarswillhave to
prepareforthisanalyticchallengebydeveloping a theory thatcombinesthe
insightsof Waltz'sbalance-of-power theoryand Jervis'ssecurity dilemma
theory.Thisis themostparsimonious international systemtheorythathas
anyhope ofexplaining and prescribing greatpoweralliancestrategies.
thispossibility.
92. We thankStephenWaltforsuggesting ofAlliancesapplies
Walt'sOrigins
theory
a variantofbalance-of-power to MiddleEasterncase studies.
93. For background,see C. J. Bartlett,Great Britainand Sea Power, 1815-1853 (Oxford:
Clarendon,1963).
as appliedtothepresent
94. Forthisargument bipolarsetting, TheMeaning
see RobertJervis,
oftheNuclearRevolution Press,1989).
(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity

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Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity

Author(s): Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder

KennethWaltz's rigorousrecastingof traditionalbalance-of-power theory

InternationalOrganization44, 2, Spring 1990

policyto makepredictions aboutor prescriptions forthestrategic choices

3. See, forexample, StephenWalt, The OriginsofAlliance (Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity

soldiersperceivethebalance-of-power problemthatfacesthem.6By com-

War (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1985), pp. 58-107; Stephen Van Evera,

rolenow thantheywerewhenWaltzbeganto writeaboutthestability of

Chain gangsand passed bucks

Waltz arguesthatthe structure of the international systemdetermines

8. For relatedargumentsthatuse the concepts of entrapmentand abandonment,see Glenn

Superficially, it mightappearthatWaltz'sargument aboutbipolarity suf-

14. Ibid., pp. 169 and 171-72.

argument hingeson thenotionthatthestructure ofthesystem-thatis, the

Polarity,the securitydilemma,and perception

To turnWaltz'sideasintoa theoryofforeign policythataccurately explains

17. This is at least implicitin Waltz's argumentsabout interdependencein his Theoryof

thatallies essentialto maintaining thebalanceof powerwillbe decisively

argueaboutthesourcesof suchmisperceptions. Rather,we are satisfiedto

21. Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, p. 172.

Perceived defensive Perceived offensive

FIGURE 1. Polarity,the securitydilemma,and resultingalliance

AlliancestrategiesbeforeWorld Wars I and II

The two worldwars starklyillustrate theconsequencesof differing as-

mature,ill-fated offensiveintoEast Prussia,an offensive designedto draw

24. Stalin'sstatementof 10March1939,citedin AdamUlam,Expansionand Coexistence,

The creation of independentstates in Eastern Europe. It is sometimes

The lesson that tightalliances cause wars. It mightbe argued thattight

Cost minimization. It mightbe arguedthatstatespassed thebuckin the

Germany's greater relativepower. It mightbe argued that France and

27. Waltz makes thispoint. See Theoryof InternationalPolitics, p. 125.

compensation forweakness.Whenoffenseis perceivedto havetheadvan-

Case study: WorldWar I

29. For a discussionoftheGermanstrategyof 1914inan alliancecontext,

France: offensiveadvantages and supportfor Russia. When the defender

31. For additionalanalysis,see Van Evera, "The Cultof the Offensive,"especiallypp.

activelysoughtwaron thisoccasion,theyseemto havebeenmorekeenfor

34. Keiger puts thisin perspective,arguingthatPoincare was notbellicose. See JohnKeiger,

up thechallenge,he said, "it is notour fault:we are ready."40Similarly,

Russia: shortwar expectationsand a commitment to France. Thegrowing

citedin A. A. Ignat'ev,Piatdesiatletv stroiu(Fiftyyearsofservice),vol. 1

directits mainoffensive towardRussia if war brokeout over a Balkan

perhapsmarginally easingFrance'sburdenat thebattleoftheMarne.An-

Britain: defensive advantages. Though some British strategistsshared

49. Valentin Alekseevich Emets, Ocherki vneshneipolitikirossii v period pervoi mirovoi

sufficeto maintainFrenchmorale.52 Meanwhile, as DavidFrenchhasnoted,

Case study: WorldWar II

soughta Schlieffen-type solution.But thebuck-passing

The Soviet Union: Stalin's strategyof entrapmentand buck-passing.Two

56. See JohnMearsheimer,ConventionalDeterrence(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress,

makinga buck-passing strategy andmoredifficult

ber 1938and its agreement on extremely

65. Murray,Change in the European Balance of Power, p. 348.

mindedlybenton minimizing combatcasualties,the best strategy would

Britain:a strategyof limitedliability.Like France, Britaindid not count

offensive optionwouldbe to tryto grabRumania'soil to helphimendure

ofluringBritainto helpdefendtheinvasioncorridor acrossBelgium.82 This

82. Adamthwaite,France and the Coming of the Second WorldWar, p. 71.

too sanguineandnotbecauseBritishdeductions fromthatassumption were

Chain-gangingand buck-passingin World Wars I and 11

views,see WilliamR. Rock,NevilleChamberlain

Stalin'sbuck-passing was aimednotat savingthelivesof Sovietsoldiers