The MIT Press

Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory
Author(s): James W. Davis, Jr., Bernard I. Finel, Stacie E. Goddard, Stephen Van Evera,
Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann
Source: International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter, 1998-1999), pp. 179-206
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539342 .
Accessed: 16/06/2014 14:04
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Correspondence
Correspondence JamesWDavis,
I. Finel
~~Bernard
Jr.
Theory StacieE. Goddard
TakingOffenseat Offense-Defense
StephenVanEvera
CharlesL. Glaserand
ChaimKaufmann
TotheEditors(JamesW.Davis,Jr.writes):
In his article"Offense,Defense, and the Causes of War,"' Stephen Van Evera claims
that"offense-defense theory"is "important,"has "wide explanatoryrange.... wide real-
world applicability.... large prescriptiveutility.... [and] is quite satisfying"(p. 41).
Van Evera's conclusions are, however, unwarranted. First, his reformulationof
influentialargumentsmade prominentby RobertJervisstretchesthe meaning of key
concepts such that interestingavenues of empirical inquiryare closed offratherthan
opened. Second, the hypotheses-or "prime predictions"-Van Evera derives fromthe
theoryare themselvesproducts of faultydeductive logic. Furthermore,they are non-
testable, presumably nonscientificin Van Evera's understandingof the term.2Van
Evera's resultsare thus of littleuse to the social scientistwho is interestedin under-
standingthe myriad causes of war and conditionsfacilitativeof peace.
In his classic article,"Cooperation under the SecurityDilemma," Jervisargued that
the securitydilemma is more virulentand the internationalsystem less stable when
offenseenjoys an advantage over defense. By contrast,when defense is more potent,
status quo powers find it easier to adopt compatible securitypolicies, and the perni-
cious effectsof internationalanarchyare greatlydiminished.3Althoughthe operation-
JamesW Davis, Jr.,is AssistantProfessor Politicsat Ludzvig-Maximnilians-Universitat

ofInternational in
Munich,Germany. He is also a NATO ResearchFellow.
BernardI. Finel is AssociateDirectorof theNationalSecurityStudiesProgramand VisitingAssistant

ofNationalSecurityStudiesand International
Professor Affairsat GeorgetownUniversity'sEdmundA.
WalshSchoolofForeignService.He thanksDieter-Dettke,RobertHaffa,TimHoyt,Jeffrey Lord,Kristin
Lord,JamesLudes,GarySchaub,and BrentSterlingfortheircomments.
ofPoliticalScienceat ColumbiaUniversity.
StacieE. Goddardis a doctoralcandidatein theDepartment
Relationsin thePoliticalScienceDepartment
StephenVan EverateachesInternational at theMassachusetts
He is a member
InstituteofTechnology. oftheMIT SecurityStudiesProgram.
and DeputyDean in theIrvingB. HarrisGraduateSchoolofPublicPolicy

CharlesL. Glaseris Professor
Studiesat theUniversityofChicago.ChaimKaufmannis AssociateProfessor Relationsat
ofInternational
LehighUniversity.
1. Stephen Van Evera, "Offense,Defense, and the Causes of War," Initernational Security,Vol. 22,
No. 4 (Spring 1998),pp. 5-43. Subsequent citationsto thisarticleappear in parenthesesin the text.
2. See Stephen Van Evera, Guide to MethodsforStudentsof PoliticalScience(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
UniversityPress, 1997).
3. See RobertJervis,"Cooperation under the SecurityDilemma," WorldPolitics,Vol. 30, No. 2
(January1978), pp. 167-214.
Ititeriatioinal Secur)ity, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 179-206

? 1998 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.
179

International
Security23:3 | 180
alizationof theoffense-defense balancehas been thesubjectof considerabledebate,4

theconceptas originally employedby Jervisreferred to themodalitiesof battlefield
conquest:military tactics,strategy, technology, and the state'sgeography. The argu-
ment'sappealderivesfromitseleganceand parsimony, as wellas itsexplanatory range.
Throughvariationsin a rathersimple-basicallymaterial-relationship, we appearto
gainleverageovera wide rangeofbehavioraloutcomes.
In his reformulation of theoffense-defense balance,however,Van Everaadds "dip-
lomaticfactors" to themilitary and geographic factorsidentifiedbyJervis. In doingso,
Van Everasubsumesundertheoffense-defense balancemuchofwhatwe thoughtthe
balance helped explain.When "collectivesecuritysystems,defensivealliances,and
balancingbehaviorby neutralstates"(pp. 21-22) are all constitutive of theoffense-
defensebalance,we are no longerin a positionto ask whichmilitary and geographic
factorspromotebalancing, bandwagoning, oreffortsat collective howtheydo
security;
so; or how thebalancebetweenoffenseand defenseinteracts withthesediplomatic
variablesto producesuch outcomesas war,peace, or overallsystemstability. Van
Evera'sredefinition of the offense-defense balance is a step backward,a regressive
reformulation ofa heretofore usefulconcept.
A secondproblememergesbecauseVan Everafailsto keep thematerialor "objec-
tive"offense-defense balanceanalytically distinctfromthebalanceas itis perceivedby
theactors.Thatactorsmightnotapprehendthetrueor objectivestateof theoffense-
defensebalancewas alreadyrecognizedby Jervis.5 The manifest difficulties
thatdis-
crepanciesbetweentheobjectiveand perceptualbalanceraiseforattempts to use the
conceptin actualempiricalinvestigations were,however,onlylaterappreciated.6
Theindividualtheorist maycomedownon oneortheothersideoftheobjective/per-
ceptualdivide,or she maychooseto testwhichof thetwo variantsaccountsforout-
comesin a givencase.Logically ruledout,however, is thecombination ofbothin a given
hypothesis. Yet thisis preciselywhatVan Evera attemptsto do: "Warwill be more
commonin periodswhenconquestis easyor is believedeasy,less commonwhencon-
questis difficultor is believeddifficult"(p. 22).As formulated, thehypothesis is impre-
cise,internally incoherent, and as a resultcannotbe testedin anymeaningful fashion.
4. See, forexample, JackS. Levy,"The Offense/DefenseBalance of MilitaryTechnology:A Theo-

reticaland HistoricalAnalysis,"International StudiesQuarterly,Vol. 28, No. 2 (June1984), pp. 219-
238; ScottD. Sagan, "1914 Revisited:Allies, Offense,and Instability," International
Security,Vol. 11,
No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-175,esp. p. 161; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-DefenseTheoryand Its
Critics," SecuirityStudies,Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691; and Charles L. Glaser and
Chaim Kaufmann,"What Is the Offense-DefenseBalance and Can We Measure It?" International
Secutrity,Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82.
5. Jervis,"Cooperation under the SecurityDilemma," pp. 190-194.
6. See, forexample, the ratherad hoc justificationthatThomas Christensenand JackSnyderoffer
foradopting the perceptualbalance in theiramended Waltzian model of the balance of power in
Christensenand Snyder,"Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: PredictingAlliance Patternsin Multipo-
larity,"InternationalOrganization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990),p. 145. See also Snyder,"Perceptions
of the SecurityDilemma in 1914," in RobertJervis,Richard Ned Lebow, and JaniceStein, eds.,
Psychology an1dDetewrence(Baltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkins UniversityPress, 1985),pp. 153-179; and
RichardNed Lebow, BetweenPeaceand War(Baltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkins UniversityPress,1981),
chap. 7.

| 181
Correspondence
Iftwodimensions areat work-one objectiveand one perceptual-then logicallywe

have fourpossiblecombinations. Thatis, conquestcan be (1) easy and believedto be
easy; (2) easy but believedto be difficult; but believedto be easy; or (4)
(3) difficult
difficultand believedto be difficult.
At least two cases contemplated by the permutation of the two variantsof the
offense-defense balancecannotbe includedin thesamehypothesis, becausetheystand
in logicaloppositionto each other.Thuswe cannothave a hypothesis thatsimultane-
ouslypredictswar to be relatively frequent becausepeoplemistakenly believeoffense
to be dominantand rarebecausethedefenseis in factdominant.Similarly, we cannot
have a situationwherewar is predictedto be rarebecausethedefenseis believedto
be dominant, butwherein factoffense is dominantand thehypothesis simultaneously
predictswars to be morefrequent. And if perceptions always trackthe "objective"
offense-defense balance,thenparsimony woulddictatewe leaveperceptions outofour
theoryand thusrejectthetwoclassesofcases emerging fromtheprimeprediction that
are notruledoutby logic(i.e.,offense is dominantand believedto be dominant, and
defenseis dominantand believedto be dominant).Moreover,such cases would be
uninformative ifwe are interested in finding out how perceptions matter.
Third,Van Everaoverstatestheextentto whichhis theorystandsup to empirical
tests.He arguesthat"thestrength of a passed testdependson theuniquenessof the
predictions tested.Do othertheoriespredicttheoutcomeobserved,or is theprediction
unique to the testedtheory?The predictions here seem quite unique. Thereis no
obviouscompeting explanation fortheperiodicupsurgesand downsurges in European
expansionismand warfareoutlinedabove. Offense-defense theoryhas the fieldto
itself"(p. 35).
Everyhypothesis is,however, testedagainsta competing explanation,evenifmerely
a hypothetical counterfactual.7 Butgiventhateveryoutcomeis in somewayconsistent
withVanEvera'shypothesis, one cannotevenformulate a hypotheticalcounterfactual.8
Moreover, it is generally acceptedthatone is justified in ascribingsomeplausibility to
a theory's explanatory claimsonlyafterithas beentestedagainsta competing theory.9
Theoriesand hypotheses are "fortified" or "strengthened" to thedegreeto whichthey
pass teststhatare suggestedin lightof competingexplanations.10 Van Everais thus
7. See James D. Fearon, "Counterfactualsand Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," World

Politics,Vol. 43, No. 2 (January1991), pp. 169-195.
8. This has the effectof closing offa traditionalescape route for structuraltheorists(i.e., the
argumentthattheirtheoryexplains only tendenciesand not particularoutcomes,because tenden-
cies are demonstrableonly to the extentto which we can clearlyidentifyoutliers).
9. For an argument with roots in Popper, see Paul Feyerabend,"Problems of Empiricism,"in
Robert Colodny, ed., Beyondthe Edge of Certainty(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall,1965);
Feyerabend,"Reply to Criticism,"in RobertS. Cohen, ed., BostonStudiesin thePhilosophy ofScience,
Vol. 2 (New York:Humanities Press, 1965), pp. 223-261, esp. p. 227; and Imre Lakatos, "Method-
ology of ScientificResearch Programmes,"in Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticismand the
GrowthofKnowledge(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1970), p. 190. Even Thomas Kuhn
stressed his acceptance of this criterion,although under certain limited conditions. See Kuhn,
"Logic of Discovery or Psychologyof Research?" in ibid., pp. 1-23.
10. For discussions of hard or crucial testsin the social sciences,see Harry Eckstein,"Case Study
and Theoryin PoliticalScience," in Fred Greensteinand Nelson Polsby,eds., HandbookofPolitical

Security23:3 | 182
International
promoting an unorthodox understanding of hardtestswhenhe writes:"Alternative

explanationsfortheriseand fallofAmericanglobalactivismarehardtocomeup with,
leavingthe offense-defensetheory'sexplanationwithoutstrongcompetitors, so this
elementofthetestposed by theU.S. case is fairlystrong"(p. 40).
Of course,seriousalternativeexplanations in war propensity
forvariations abound.
For example,based on a studyof the Europeanstatessystemfrom1640 to 1990,
AndreasOsianderconcludedthatstability ofthecoherence
is a function oftheprincipal
(normative)assumptionsupon whichan international systemis founded.1"And al-
thoughhe does not dismissthe effectsof "size, structure, power,and geographic
positionofthevariousEuropeanstates,"Paul Schroeder arguesthatthechiefdifference
betweentherelativelywar-prone lateeighteenth and themorepeacefulConcert
century
of Europea generation laterwas the lack of consensusamongthe greatpowerson
legitimate ofconductand an equitablebalanceofpowerpriorto theNapo-
principles
leonicWars.12
Giventheexistenceof competitors, Van Evera'sdiscoverythathe has thefieldto
himselfsuggeststhathe is eitherlost,or is playingsomething moreakinto solitaire
thanto science.
W Davis,Jr.
-James
Munich,Germany
I. Finelwrites):
To theEditors(Bernard
Severalrecentarticleshaveprovidedtextured ofoffense-defense
considerations theory
and theimpactof the offense-defense balanceon statebehavior.1These workshave
tightenedtheconceptuallogicand added much-needed refinementsto theargument.
Four major problemswith offense-defense theoryremain,however.First,offense-
defensetheoryignoresinteractioneffects in warfare.Second,it makesill-considered
assumptionsaboutthelinksbetweencontrolofterritory, conquest,and victoryin war.
Third,thetheoryis stillneitherwell conceptualizednoroperationalized.Finally,the
approachlacksparsimony.
Science,Vol. 7, StrategiesofInqluiry(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1975), esp. pp. 118-120; and

Arend Lijphart,"Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," AmericanPoliticalScience
Reviezv,Vol. 65, No. 3 (September 1971), esp. pp. 692-693.
11. Andreas Osiander, The States Systemof Euirope,1640-1990: Peacemakingand the Conditionsof
InternationalStability(Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1994).
12. Paul W. Schroeder,The Transforination ofEluropeanPolitics,1763-1848(Oxford:Clarendon Press,
1994), quotation at p. 10. For a similar argument,see Henry A. Kissinger,A WorldRestored:
Metternich,Castlereagh, and theProblemnsofPeace,1812-1822 (New York:Grossetand Dunlap, 1964).
1. Most notably,Stephen Van Evera, "Offense,Defense, and the Causes of War," International
Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann,"What Is
Seclurity,
the Offense-DefenseBalance and Can We Measure It?" International Secuirity,
Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring
1998), pp. 44-82; and Sean M. Lynn-Jones,"Offense-DefenseTheory and Its Critics," Seclurity
Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691.
Stludies,

| 183
Correspondence
ofInteraction
TheImportance Effects
Theoffense-defense balanceis nota structural Ratheritcan be influenced

variable.2 by
immediatedecisionsaboutdeployments and employment Thisfactcreates
strategies.
forCharlesGlaserand ChaimKaufmannas theytryto use thetoolsofnet
difficulties
assessmentto operationalizeand potentially quantifythe offense-defense balance.3
Theirarticleis vague aboutthemeaningofnetassessment. AreGlaserand Kaufmann
referringto netassessmentas used by EliotCohen,AndrewKrepinevich, and Andrew
Marshall-thatis, broad-based,subjectiveanalysesof nonmilitary as well as military
factors?4Or are theyreferring to campaignanalysis-thatis, theuse ofmathematical
modelsto predictthe resultsof highlyspecifiedforce-on-force engagements?5 Cam-
paignanalysiswouldcertainly fittheirgoal,buttheproblemis thatcampaignanalysis
usuallyrelieson ForwardEdge of theBattleArea (FEBA) models.FEBA modelsare
usefulin explainingthe resultsof attrition warfare,but not necessarily of dynamic,
maneuver-based warfare.
To predicttheoutcomeof dynamic,maneuver-based warfare,it is possibleto use
complexwar games.Thesewar gamesrarelycreatereproducible and theyare
results,
extremely sensitiveto modificationin theinitialrules.However,war gamesusually
demonstrate thatdifferent and moreimportant,
strategies, the interaction effectsof
different makea big difference.
strategies, Ifwe takethewar-gameapproachseriously,
thenwe mustconcludethattheoffense-defense balanceis nota structural
variable,but
an outgrowth ofstrategicinteraction.6
The effectivenessofbattlesystems dependson employment doctrine,
strategies, and
trainingand tactics.Changesat thesethreedistinctlevelsof analysisare potentially
independently capableof alteringthecourseof a battle.7For example,theSchlieffen
Plan determined theinitialcourseofWorldWarI in theWestat thestrategic level.It
determined how theGermanswould mobilizetheirforces,theirconcentration points,
and theiroperationalgoals.In theend,theSchlieffen Plan'sflaws-overextension and
an uncoveredrightflank-doomedtheGermanattack.Doctrinerefers totheconceptual
2. Cf. Glaser and Kaufmann,"What Is the Offense-DefenseBalance?" p. 55.

3. Ibid., p. 76.
4. Andrew W. Marshall,ProblemsofEstimnatingMilitaryPozver(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996);
Eliot A. Cohen, "Net Assessment:An AmericanApproach," unpublished paper presentedas JCSS
(JaffeeCenter forStrategicStudies) Memo No. 29 (April 1990); and Cohen, "Toward BetterNet
Assessment,"International Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 50-89.
Security,
5. RobertP. Haffa,Jr.,RationialMethods,Prldent Choices:PlanningU.S. Forces(Washington,D.C.:
National Defense UniversityPress, 1988); Joshua M. Epstein, The Calculus of ConventionalWar:
Dyniamnic Analysis withoutLanchiester
Equationis(Washington,D.C.: Brookings Institution,1985);
Epstein,Coniventional ForceReductions:A Dynanic Assessmenit (Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInsti-
tution,1990); and Alain C. Enthovenand WayneK. Smith,How MaclhIs Enouggh? ShapingtheDefense
Progran,1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
6. As an empiricalexample, the German attackon France in 1940 did not succeed quicklybecause
of offensivedominance.Ratherthe German advance throughthe Ardennesto the EnglishChannel
coast was particularlyeffectivebecause the Franco-Britishforceswere pivoting into Belgium at
the time.Martinvan Creveld et al., Air Powerand ManeuverWarfare (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.:
Air UniversityPress, 1994), p. 41.
7. JohnJ.Mearsheimer,Conventionial Deterrence(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1983).

23:3 | 184
Security
International
basis fora tacticalbattlesystem. The blitzkrieg doctrinewas a complexmeldingof

armor,airpower,and disruptivepenetrating advances.The development of theblitz-
kriegconceptallowed forthe exploitation of theemergingtechnologies of the pre-
WorldWarII period,thusleadingto a discontinuous increasein militaryeffectiveness.
Trainingand tacticsrefersto how forcesactuallyfight.Are subordinate commanders
trainedtotaketheinitiative orwaitfororders?Do unitsengageorbypassenemystrong
points?Do forceslaunchpreparatory artillerybarrages,ordo theyseektomaintainthe
elementof surprise?The adoptionof infiltration tactics,forexample,jumpstarted the
Germanoffensive ofMarch1918on thewesternfront. all threelevelscan
Significantly,
varyindependently of thecurrent forcesin being.Not onlyare therealmostalways
severalplausibletacticalbattlesystems and usage doctrines at anyleveloftechnology,
butthesebattlesystems and doctrines generatea systemofstrategic interaction.
Warfare is fundamentally a "rock,paper,scissors"game.Choicesare onlydominant
vis-a-visotherstates'choices.Historically,lightmissileinfantry dominatedheavyin-
fantry,while heavyinfantry armedwithpikesor spearswas invulnerable to heavy
cavalry.But heavyshockcavalryalwaysdominatedlightinfantry, whichlackedthe
abilityto resistcharges.If theopponentwas fieldinga heavycavalryforce,thebest
defensivecountermeasure was a heavyinfantry force.Butiftheopponentwas armed
withheavyinfantry, thebestcountermeasure The optimalchoice
was lightinfantry.8
dependson theopponent'sdecisions.
Combinedarmswarfare is theresponseto thisfact,buttheeffectiveness ofa specific
balanceof forcesin a combinedarmssystemis also subjectto strategicinteraction.
Furthermore, theeffectiveness ofanyweaponssystemand anycombinedarmssystem
dependson how theforcesare beingused. Are theforcesbeingused as raidersor as
holdersof territory? Are theybeingused offensively or defensively?9The dynamics
hereare harderto illustrate,butconsiderthissimpleexample:a strategic plan geared
towarddefeatingan enemyarmywill workonlyiftheopponentis willingto stand
and fight.Iftheopponentchoosesto use a Fabianstrategy ofavoidingconflict instead,
theplan maycometo naught.
Conquest,and Victory:UnpackingtheAssumptions
Territory,
This lastpointaboutthesuccessof war plansraisesa secondproblemwithboththe

Van Evera and the Glaser and Kaufmannarticles.Botharticlesassume thatwhen
is easier,thereis a greater
seizingterritory propensity Thelogicis flawed.
touse force.10
JohnMearsheimer has arguedconvincingly thattheexpectedrapidityofvictory is the
crucialdeterminant The problemis thatseizingterritory
in decisionsto use force.11 is
8. ArcherJones,The Art of War in the WesternWorld(New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1987),

p. 494.
9. For an extended examinationof warfarein the West that focuses on differentstrategiesand
interactioneffects,see ibid., passim.
10. Glaser and Kaufmann,"What Is the Offense-DefenseBalance?" p. 47.
11. Mearsheimer,Conventional p. 64.
Deterrenice,

| 185
Correspondence
notsynonymous withvictory.Indeed,seizingand holdingterritory is neither necessary

norsufficient to win a war.
Warsare won undertwo conditions. First,it is possibleto win a war by effectively
eradicating theabilityoftheotherside to resist.WiththeexceptionofWorldWarII in
Europe,however,no war in modernhistoryhas ended as a resultof the absolute
destruction and occupationofa country's territory. The secondway to wina waris by
eitherinflicting highercoststhantheotherside can acceptor threatening crediblyto
do so. In manycases,thiscosttoleranceis notan objectivemeasure,butrathera setof
socialconstructions.12
It is possibleto inflict
thesecostswithoutoccupyingterritory. Indeed,formuchof
recordedhistory, the normwas forthe losingside to concedethe issue of the war
following defeatin a majorbattle,evenwhenthisdid not,in anysignificant and lasting
way,underminethelosingside's abilityto wage war.In addition,historically, many
warshavebeenwon usingraidingstrategies in whichcontrolofterritory is notsought.
In ancientGreece,raidingwas thedominantstrategy. Alexander'sdefeatofPersiawas
not theresultof his abilityto controlterritory. Even in theAmericanCivil War,the
devastating impactof WilliamTecumsehSherman'smarchto thesea had nothingto
do withhis abilityto controlterritory.13
To theextentthatitis notnecessaryto controlterritory to wina war,offense-defense
theorybeginsto breakdown.Ifdefeating enemyarmiesand inflicting costsare major
a fundamentally
priorities, defense-dominant world,givena low enoughforce-to-space
ratio,can lead to veryrapidvictories. In 1866PrussiadefeatedAustriaby winninga
relativelyindecisivevictoryat K6niggratz-theAustrianswere able to withdrawin
good orderand linkup withreinforcements fromItaly14-therebycausinga political
crisisin Vienna.In 1870thePrussianswon a setofdecisivevictories againstFranceby
usingturningmaneuversto wage an offensive strategy usingthe tacticaldefensive.
These two veryrapid and low-costvictoriesoccurredin an era of extremedefense
dominancein termsof tacticalmilitary factors. The explanationis thatsuccessin war
and theabilityto seize and hold territoryare notcoterminous.
TheImnplication TheProblemofPost Hoc Justifications

ofComplexity:
Althoughone mightarguethattheoffense-defense balanceis worthexaminingon its

own terms,offense-defense
theoryis ofteninvokedas a conciseway to expandthe
richness
ofsystemicmodelsofinternational
relations, and evenforeign
conflict, policy
15
Thus muchof the value of offense-defense
theoryderivesfromits contributionto
and parsimonious
buildingrich,powerful, explanatoryand predictive
theories.
12. JohnKeegan, A Historyof Warfare (New York:AlfredA. Knopf,1993), pp. 23-60.

13. Jones,The Artof Warin the WesternWorld,p. 417.
14. Ibid., p. 397.
15. See, for instance,Thomas J. Christensenand JackSnyder,"Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks:
PredictingAlliance Patternsin Multipolarity,"InternationalOrganization,Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring
1990), pp. 137-168.

International
Security23:3 | 186
In his article,Van Everacitesmilitary factors,geography, socialand politicalorder,

and diplomaticfactorsas causes of offenseand defensedominance.16 Althoughhe
attempts to aggregatetheseintoa singleoffense-defense measure,thesevariablesare
vague,toodisparateto aggregate, and extremely dependenton subjective assessments.
Theyproducea wide varietyof conflicting theoretical
predictions, mostof whichcan
be resolvedonlyby empiricalanalysis.
It is difficult
to avoid analyticalbias in thisprocess.Forinstance, Van Everaargues
that"popularity ofregimesprobablyaided offense beforeroughly1800and has aided
defensesincethen.The reversalstemsfromtheappearanceof cheap,mass-produced
weaponsusefulforguerrillawarfare-assaultriflesand machineguns,lightmortars,
and mines.The weaponsofearlytimes(swordand shield,pikeand harquebus,heavy
slow-firing muskets,etc.)werepoorlyadaptedforguerrillaresistance." 17 Therewere,
however,many guerrillacampaignsbefore1800.18Longbowsand crossbowswere
adequateguerrillaweapons.19 In thiscase, it is difficult
to see how thecodingcan be
done a priori.IfVanEveraused thefactthatguerrillacampaignsweremorecommon
and successful after1800as a basisforthejudgment, thenhe mayhaveconflated causes
and outcomes.In any case, theargumentis underspecified because thebasic coding
criteria are notexplicit.
This lack of explicitcriteriacreatesambiguitiesin Van Evera'sarticle.Van Evera
suggeststhatmilitary factorsfavoring mass infantry enhancetheoffense, but he also
stressesthelimitations on offensive actionimposedby thelogisticaldemandsoflarge
forces.20 Cavalryforces, becausetheyare expensiveand hencelimitedin number, are
arguedto favorthe defensedespitetheirgreatermobility, but tacticallyanalogous
armoredforces(althoughwithevenlargerlogistical requirements thancavalry)aresaid
to favorthe offense.Mass infantry in the NapoleonicEra favorsthe offense.Mass
infantry duringWorldWarI favorsthedefense.According toVanEvera,thisdistinction
is theresultof "lethalsmallarms,barbedwire,and trenches."21 However,Borodino
and Waterloo-Napoleon'stwo majorsetbacksand the two mostprominent battles
wherehe foughta steadyfoein a frontal assault-demonstrate thedefensivepowerof
mass infantry evenin theearly1800s.Anotherexampleofthiscodingproblemcan be
foundbycomparing theVanEveraand Glaserand Kaufmann articles.
WhereasGlaser
and Kaufmannarguethat"themostwidelyagreedproposition is thatimprovements
in mobility favoroffense,"22Van Everaarguesthatchariots, cavalry, and railroads-all
16. Van Evera, "Offense,Defense, and the Causes of War,"pp. 16-22.

17. Ibid., p. 20.
18. Keegan, A Historyof Warfare, pp. 5-11; Jones,The Art of Warin the Western]
World,pp. 55-65;
and Donald Kagan, "AthenianStrategyin thePeloponnesian War,"in WilliamsonMurray,MacGre-
gor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein,eds., The Makiingof Strategy:Rulers,States,anidWar (Cambridge:
Cambridge UniversityPress, 1994), p. 44.
19. BernardBrodie and Fawn Brodie,FromCrossbozv to H-Bomb(Bloomington:Indiana University
Press, 1973), pp. 35-39. Crossbows are extremelyeasy to use, and longbows were widely available
huntingweapons in areas where huntingsupplemented local food production.
20. Van Evera, "Offense,Defense, and the Causes of War,"pp. 16, 17.
21. Ibid., p. 17.

| 187
Correspondence
systemsthatenhancemobility-helpthedefense.23 The othervariablescitedby Van

Everaand Glaserand Kaufmann-theimpactofgeography, socialand politicalorder,
and diplomaticfactors-areevenless susceptibleto clearcoding.
A largerproblemis Van Evera'sbeliefthatthesevariablescan be aggregated. This
is troublingfroma methodological perspective.Van Everadoes notpresentany con-
ceptualexplanationforhow he actuallymeasurestheoffense-defense balancein each
area.Instead,he presentsa laundrylistof thingsto look for.Nor does he explainthe
relativeweightshe uses in aggregating hisoffense-defensevariables.Thisleads to such
confusing passagesas, "Sometimestechnology overrodedoctrine, as in 1914-18and in
1945-91(whenthesuperpowers' militariesembracedoffensive doctrines butcouldnot
findoffensive countersto thenuclearrevolution). Sometimesdoctrineshapedtechnol-
ogy,as in 1939-45,whenblitzkrieg doctrinefashionedarmortechnology intoan offen-
siveinstrument."24Without a setofcontingent generalizationsabouttheconditions that
definethe"sometimes," thetheoryassumeswhatit oughtto demonstrate.
Offense-defensetheoryrepresents whatGiovanniSartoricalled"conceptmisforma-
tion."25Sartoriargued,"Thelowerthediscriminating powerofa conceptualcontainer,
themorethefactsare misgathered, i.e.,thegreaterthemisinformation."26 Bydefining
thebalanceas beinga function ofa vast,unrelated grabbag ofconditions and variables,
Van Evera and Glaserand Kaufmannhave createda situationwherethe empirical
referents become merelya menu of itemsto choose fromto justifya preexisting
assessment ofwhattheoffense-defense balanceis at a givenpointintime.Thisproblem
is exacerbatedbecausemostobservers begintheirresearchwithsignificant knowledge
and preconceptions aboutwhattheoffense-defense balancewas duringtheparticular
periodtheystudy.Familiarity withthecases almostcertainly leads to bias in interpre-
tations.Glaserand Kaufmanncompoundthisproblemwiththeirmethodological ap-
proach.Theyassumethatifyou throwtherightvariablestogether and do some net
assessment, the offense-defense balance will emerge.This sortof naked empiricism
does notadvancethecause of theorybuilding.
A ParsimoniousAddition?
It mightbe possiblefora historically
knowledgeableand methodologically
sophisti-
cated scholar to develop a comprehensive model of the causes of the offense-
defensebalance.The extraordinarily
complexresultingmodelwouldnot,however, be
parsimonious.
A fullyspecifiedmodelofthesourcesofoffenseand defensedominancewouldtake
intoaccountthe interactionof different
possiblebattlesystems
and different
usage
options.Thisprocesswould createa broadtypological
theory.Thenby examiningthe
cost of the competingsystem,we mightbe able to derivea crude offense-defense
23. Van Evera, "Offense,Defense, and the Causes of War," pp. 16-17.
24. Ibid., p. 18.
25. Giovanni Sartori,"Concept Misformationin Comparative Politics,"AmericanPoliticalScience
Review,Vol. 64, No. 4 (December 1970), pp. 1033-1053.
26. Ibid., p. 1039.

International
Security23:3 | 188
balancefora giventypological space. Thisresultwould thenneed to be validatedby

somesortofempiricalanalysisacrosscases.Giventhattheprocessofoperationalizing
thebalanceis unwieldy, involvingcomplicated andbudgetary
theorizing and campaign
analysis,itis reasonabletoquestionwhether theoffense-defense
balanceadds sufficient
richnessand explanatory powerto justifytheverysignificant
loss in parsimony.
Conclusion
Offense-defense theoryis methodolog.ically flawedand conceptuallymuddled.Al-

thoughVan Everaand Glaserand Kaufmannpush offense-defense theoryforward, it
is timeto ask whetheroffense-defense theoryin factmoves the fieldforward,or
whether itrepresents insteadthesecurity studies'versionoftheemperor's newclothes.
Defendersof offense-defense theorywill likelymakeseveralresponses.First,they
will correctlyargue thatI fail to addressthe perceptualvariantof offense-defense
theory.However,iftheoffense-defense balanceis notan objectiveor structural condi-
tion,but insteadresidespurelyin therealmof perceptions, thenit oughtto be inte-
gratedintoa cognitive-processes framework ratherthanheldapartas a specialsortof
(mis)perception.
Second,defenders ofoffense-defense theorywillclaimthatI overstate thedifficulty
ofoperationalizing thebalanceor thatI overemphasize thecomplexinteraction effects
of tacticalbattlesystems, doctrines,and usage decisions.If thatis thecase, however,
thenI would simplyask themto demonstrate the operationalizationprocessin a
systematic, reproducible manner.Untilthattime,I willremaina skeptic.
Third,offense-defense willarguethatI overstatetheproblemwithrelying
theorists
on seizingterritoryas a measureofoffensive success.Theymayclaimthatsubstituting
"victory"for"conquest"or "seizingterritory" is a simplechangethatdoes notharm
thetheoreticalconstruct. I wouldargue,however, thatonceonebreaksthelinkbetween
ease ofseizingterritory and victory, one is leftwiththefactthatnoneoftheempirical
indicatorsoperatesin a consistent fashion.Thisis nota semanticdistinction. Rather, all
the"causes" of theoffense-defense balanceare derivedfromtheease ofseizingterri-
tory.Once thatlinkis broken,theentirelogicoftheargument is questionable.
Finally,and linkedto thepreviouspoint,offense-defense theorists will claimthat
evenifmyarguments aboutinteraction and mobilewarfarearevalid,thetheoryis still
usefulbecause it explainsthe conditionsunderwhichbreakthroughs occur.These
breakthroughs, offense-defense theorists mightargue,are a prerequisite forany kind
of military victory,and theyrequirethe sortof frontal, attrition assaultstherelative
costsofwhichoffense-defense theoryclaimsto measure.The problemwiththisargu-
mentis threefold. First,althoughthecostsofbreakthrough maybe relatively higheror
lower,breakingthrough on a narrowfront maynotraisethecostssignificantly forthe
campaignas a whole.Second,thissortof breakthrough impliesa situationof high
force-to-space ratiosand a continuousfront. Empirically,thisis nota commoncondi-
tion.Third,breakthroughs do not necessarilyrequireattrition and frontalassaults.
Frontscan be brokenby infiltration tacticsand can usually be outflankedby a
sufficientlyimaginative foe.

| 189
Correspondence
So whatcan be done?Can offense-defense theorybe saved?Theshortansweris,no.

Offense-defensetheoryhas too manycriticaland fatalflaws.Ifwe cannot"uninvent"
offense-defense thenwe mustbe verycautiousabouthow we use it.Thereis
theory,
an unfortunatetendencyin thefieldto believethatoffense-defensetheoryis a cheap
and easy way to add predictive
powerto an explanatory model.In reality,
theissues
raisedby offense-defensetheoryare extremely complexand difficultto parse effec-
tively.The theorycreatesmoreconceptualholesthanit fills,and shouldcomewitha
strongwarninglabel attached.
-BernardI. Finel
Washington, D.C.
To the Editors (Stacie E. Goddard writes):
StephenVan Evera'sand CharlesGlaserand ChaimKaufmann's recentcontributions

toInternational
Securityarewelcomeexpansionsofoffense-defense theory.1Botharticles
recognizethatalthoughhypothesespresentedin this literature are intuitivelyand
empiricallyplausible,offense-defense
theory hassufferedfroma lackofmethodological
areoftentautological;
rigor:definitions thevariablesofoffense and defensedominance
are continuouslyconflatedwithotherfactorssignificant relationsthe-
to international
ory;and at timeshypotheses seem to be nothingmorethan"folktheorems" derived
fromthepopularcase of WorldWar1.2 Unfortunately, whilebotharticlesattemptto
addressand overcomethesecritiques,neither resolvesthemethodological
satisfactorily
problems mentioned above. Mostnotably, theseauthorsdo notdistinguishtheoffense-
defensebalancefromfactorssuch as thebalanceof powerand military skill.This in
turnleaves them vulnerableto tautologicalpropositions, overdetermination, and
difficulties
withempiricalmeasurement and testing.
1. See Stephen Van Evera, "Offense,Defense, and the Causes of War,"International Security,Vol.
22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43; and Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann,"What Is the
Offense-DefenseBalance and Can We Measure It?" International Security,Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring
1998), pp. 44-82. Offense-defensetheoryholds that under conditionsof offensedominance, war
is more likely between states. The seminal work on offense-defensetheory is Robert Jervis,
"Cooperation under the SecurityDilemma," WorldPolitics,Vol. 30, No. 2 (January1978), pp. 167-
214. Other works include Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War,Vol. 1: The StructureofPowerand the
JackSnyder,The Ideologyofthe
Rootsof War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, forthcoming);
Offensive:MilitaryDecisionMakingand theDisastersof1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress,
1984); Stephen M. Walt,Revolutionand War(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1996); Quincy
Wright,A Study of War,2d rev. ed. (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 792-808;
George H. Quester, Offenseand Defensein theInternational System(New York: Wiley,1977); and
Sean M. Lynn-Jones,"Offense-DefenseTheory and Its Critics," SecurityStudies,Vol. 4, No. 4
(Summer 1995), pp. 660-691.
2. Importantcriticismsof the program can be found in JackS. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive
Balance of MilitaryTechnology:A Theoreticaland HistoricalAnalysis,"International StudiesQuar-
terly,Vol. 28, No. 2 (June1984), pp. 219-238; JohnJ.Mearsheimer,Conventional Deterrence(Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1983); JonathanShimshoni,"Technology,MilitaryAdvantage, and
World War I: A Case forMilitaryEntrepreneurship," International
Security,Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter
1990/91),pp. 187-215; and Colin S. Gray, WeaponsDon't Make War: Policy,Strategy, and Military
Technology (Lawrence: UniversityPress of Kansas, 1993).

Security23:3 | 190
International
I beginbyexamining VanEvera'sarticle,arguingthathisconceptualizationofoffense
dominanceas the "ease of conquest"confusesthe offense-defense balancewiththe
probabilityof successin war. This conceptualproblemhas seriousramifications for
theexplanatory hypothesesand empiricalevidencehe bringsto bear in his theory. I
thenturnto Glaserand Kaufmann,notingthatwhile the authorsare cognizantof
previousmethodological critiques,the theoristscannotavoid conflation withother
variablesin theirframework. theirbroaddefinition
Specifically, oftheoffense-defense
balance,combinedwiththeirassumptionof "optimaldoctrine," to dis-
is insufficient
tinguishoffense dominancefromeitherpoweror doctrine. Followingthesecritiques, I
concludeby offering definitions
and suggestions forempiricaltestingthatmighthelp
avoid thesemethodological problemsin futureresearch.
of War
The Ease ofConquestand theProbability
In "Offense, Defense,and theCauses ofWar,"Van Everaarguesthat"war is farmore

likelywhenconquestis easy,and thatshiftsin theoffense-defense balancehavea large
effect on theriskof war."3He offers tenexplanatoryhypotheses, includingthetemp-
tationto strikefirstand increasedincentivesforexpansionism, thatfurther linkhis
definition withoutbreaksof war.Aftertestingtheseexplanatory propositions against
threeperiodsin history(Europe since 1789,ancientChina duringthe Springand
Autumnand WarringStatesperiods,and the UnitedStatessince 1789),Van Evera
concludesthat"offense-defense theoryhas theattributesofa good theory," explaining
largeamountsof international historywitha singlevariable.4
Althoughmanyofthetheoretical and empiricalpropositions arecompelling, serious
methodological flawsdetractfromVanEvera'sargument. First,hisdefinitionofoffense
dominance-"conquestis easy"-conflatesoffensedominancewitha host of other
variables,mostnotablywiththebalanceofpower.Simplyput,VanEverahas defined
offensedominancein termsof war outcomes,confusing theoffense-defense balance
withtheprobability thatan attackingstatewillprevailin theeventofwar.5To say that
an attackingstate has a high probability of defeatingits opponentsays nothing,
however,abouttherelativeefficacy and defensiveoperationsperse. One
of offensive
can easilyimaginea scenarioin whichdefensivestrategies have an advantage,yetthe
attackingstateprevailsbecause of superiorlogisticalsupport,deepereconomicre-
sources,oran overwhelming advantagein thenumberofforces.Forexample,conquest
certainlyappeared"easy" fortheNorthat theclose of theAmericanCivilWar.This
was nota function of thestrength versusdefensivestrategies,
of offensive but of the
greatersocial,economic,and logisticalsupportofthepopulation.6 In short,in orderto
3. Van Evera, "Offense,Defense, and the Causes of War,"p. 5.

4. Ibid., p. 41.
5. Also making this critiqueare Glaser and Kaufmann,"What Is the Offense-DefenseBalance?"
p. 70; however,I argue thattheytoo are vulnerable to these criticisms.
6. See Michael Howard, "The ForgottenDimensions of Strategy,"The Catusesof Warsand Other
Essays(Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1983), pp. 101-115;and Theodore Ropp, War
in theModernWorld(New York:Collier Books, 1971), pp. 175-194.

| 191
Correspondence
distinguish theoffense-defense balancefromthebalanceofpower,VanEveraneedsto

casthis definitionin relativeterms(i.e.,thevalue of attacking comparedto thevalue
ofdefending), ratherthanfocuson theabsolutevalue ofattacking fora state.
Theseconceptualproblemsarecompoundedin VanEvera'sexplanatory hypotheses.
Forinstance, he assertsthat"whenconquestis easy,aggression is morealluring:itcosts
less to attemptand succeedsmoreoften."7 Therefore "resourcesare morecumulative
whenconquestis easy.... As a result,gainsare moreadditive."8It maybe thecase
thatconquestsareself-reinforcing; however, thishypothesis cannotlogicallybe derived
froman assessment ofoffensiveand defensive strategies.Althoughtheoffense-defense
balancecan tellus therelativecostsofattacking versusdefending, itmeasuresneither
theabsoluteprobability ofsuccessnortheabsolutevalue ofconquest.
Furthermore, Van Evera's causal explanationscome close to tautologies:it often
seemshe is arguingthatwhen conquestis easy or perceivedto be easy,stateswill
attempt toconquer.Indeed,myriadvariables-including statebehavior-aresubsumed
in his conceptualization.Accordingto Van Evera,"Militarytechnology and doctrine,
geography, nationalsocialstructure,and diplomaticarrangements defen-
(specifically,
sive alliancesand balancingbehaviorby offshore powers)all matter"in determining
the offense-defense balance.9One is leftwonderingwhat factorscould be excluded
fromthis definition to show the causal autonomyof the offense-defense balance.
Moreover, aftersubsumingall ofthesebehavioralvariablesintohis conceptualization,
he usestheoffense-defense balancetoexplainbehavioramongstates.Forinstance, after
theCrimeanWar"thepowerofdefenders felldramatically becausedefense-enhancing
diplomacylargelybrokedown."10In theend,VanEverais usingthebehaviorofstates
(eschewing defensivealliancesin favorofoffensivediplomacy)to explainthebehavior
ofstates(offensive diplomacyuntil1871).11
Finally, thesemethodological flawsare strikingly
evidentin his empiricalaccounts.
Mostimportant, Van Everamakesno attemptto avoid conflating theoffense-defense
balancewiththe balance of power or militaryforces.For example,he arguesthat
"during1792-1815the offensewas fairlystrongmilitarily, as a resultof France's
adoptionof themass army(enabledby thepopularity of theFrenchgovernment)."'12
Althoughit is certainly plausiblethatNapoleonicdoctrineand tacticsrelatedto mass
armiesfavoredtheoffense, thesize of thearmyitselfis indeterminate of theoffense-
defensebalance. Arguably, Napoleon'smass armywould have been moreeffective
defending Frenchsoil,ratherthansearchingout offensive campaignsacrossEurope.'3
7. Van Evera, "Offense,Defense, and the Causes of War,"p. 7.

8. Ibid., p. 8.
9. Ibid., p. 6.
10. Ibid., p. 28.
11. Van Evera avoided this tautologyin "The Cult of the Offensiveand the Origins of the First
WorldWar,"InternatioitalSecurity,Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. In thisarticle,alliances
are a clearlydistinguisheddependent variable. The independentvariable is perceptionof offense
dominance,and thus Van Evera does not incorporatestates' behavior into his explanation.
12. Van Evera, "Offense,Defense, and the Causes of War," p. 26.
13. For an example of this argument,see Jean Jaures,L'arin&enouvelle(Paris: Editions Sociales,
1977).

International
Security23:3 | 192
ThatFrancecoulddeploya massarmytellsus a lotaboutthepowerofthecentralized

state,butverylittleabouttheoffense-defensebalance.
In sum,whileVan Everaarguesthatoffense-defense theoryoffers bothuniqueand
plausiblepredictions,methodological flawswithhis approachunderminethisclaim.
Bysubsumingpower,military skill,diplomacy,
doctrine,socialstructure,
and domestic
politicalstructure
intohis conceptualization
oftheoffense-defense balance,VanEvera
cannotarguethattheoffense-defense balancehas moreexplanatory powerthananyof
thesevariablestakenseparately.Needless to say,a much narrowerdefinition and
systematic hypothesesarenecessarybeforetheseclaimsto progresscan be empirically
tested.
Power,Skill,and Strategy:
TheOffense-Defense
Balanceand theOptimality
Assumption
In "WhatIs theOffense-Defense Balanceand Can We MeasureIt?"Glaserand Kauf-
mannare particularly concernedwithpreviousmethodological critiquesof offense-
defensetheory. Theynotethatcriticshave questionedtheutilityof thetheoryon the
groundsthat"thefoundations ofthetheoryareunderdeveloped" and that"thetheory
containsinherent flaws,themostseriousof whichis thattheoffense-defense balance
cannotbe measuredbecausetheoutcomesof war are so uncertain." 14 In responseto
thesecriticisms,Glaserand Kaufmann statethattheoffense-defense balanceshouldbe
definedrelatively:"theratioof thecostof theforcesthattheattackerrequiresto take
territoryto thecostof thedefender's 15 Theyarguethatthisdefinition,
forces." com-
binedwithsix keyassumptions, allows offense-defensetheoriststo avoid conflation
withothervariables.Moreover, thetheoristscontendthattheoffense-defense balance
can be measuredby using the analyticaltoolboxof militarynet assessment,thus
allowingempiricaltestsof thetheory.
Clearly,distinguishing theoffense-defense balancefromotherfactors is a crucialtask
forGlaserand Kaufmann.Theystatethatthey"envisionoffense-defense theoryas a
partialtheoryofmilitary capabilities.... A morecompletetheorywould includetwo
additionalvariables:(1) power,measuredin termsofrelativeresources;and (2) what
we term'military skill,'thatis, a country'sabilityto effectively
employmilitary tech-
nology."'16Indeed,Glaserand Kaufmanndo notclaimthattheoffense-defense balance
is theonlyorevenprimary determinant ofmilitary outcomes, butrather"eachofthese
threevariableshas thepotentialto overwhelm theothersin certaincircumstances."17
AlthoughGlaserand Kaufmannrealizethatdistinguishing theoffense-defense bal-
ancefrompowerand skillis important, theyfailto do so adequatelyin theirmethodo-
logicalframework. First,theiradoptionofa broaddefinition ofthebalancesubsumes
competing suchas forcesize and evennationalism.
factors, Althoughtheseare critical
factorsin determining theoutcomeofa war,theyaremorelikelyreflective ofthepower

15. Ibid., p. 46.
16. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
17. Ibid., p. 49.

| 193
Correspondence
of a centralized
state,and theabilityof thestateto effectively mobilizeresourcesand
forces,thantheyare of therelativeefficacy of offensiveand defensivestrategies.As I
argueabove,it is plausiblethatan attacking statewithpopularsupportand a mass
armywilldefeata country lackingtheseattributes. This,however,does nottellus the
relativevalue ofoffensiveand defensivestrategies foreitheroftheactorsinvolved.
Glaserand Kaufmannfacesimilarmethodological problemswhentrying to distin-
guishthe offense-defense balance frommilitary skill.Theyargue that"the offense-
defensebalanceshouldbe assessedassumingoptimality-that is,countries
choosethe
best possiblestrategiesand forceposturesforattackand defense.Offense-defense
theoryrequiresthisassumption becauseitfocuseson theeffects oftheconstraintsand
opportunities presentedby the international environment."18 The problemwiththis
assumption is thatitinvariablyleads to a posthoc,ergopropterhocfallacy-wecan only
ascertaintheoptimalstrategy afterobserving whichstrategies succeededduringa war.
By measuringthebalancein termsof successfulstrategies, we can neitherdetermine
thebalanceex antenorsatisfactorily separatethebalancefrompowerand skill.
Forinstance, considertheoffense-defense balanceduringWorldWarI. Mostwould
concurthatthebalanceheavilyfavoredthedefense,bothbeforeand duringthewar,
althoughthisbalance was misperceivedby statesmenand militaryleaders alike.19
thisdefensiveadvantageis epitomizedby the1916Battleon theSomme,an
Militarily,
attacklaunchedby theBritishon July1, 1916,and lastingthroughNovemberof that
sameyear.Overthisfive-month span,and at a costofapproximately 500,000casualties
(thelargestnumbereverof Britishcasualtiesin battle),theBritishwereable to move
thefront onlysevenmiles.Two yearslater,however,on March21, 1918,theGermans
achieveda massivebreakthrough on thesameterrain, usingthesametypeofweapons
availableto the Britishin 1916.Afterbreakingthroughthejunctureof Frenchand
Britishtroops,theGermansemployeda creepingbarrageand infiltration tacticsto gain
moregroundon thefirst dayofattack(approximately 140squaremiles)thantheBritish
had in 140 days.The Germanstrategy in WorldWarI would therefore be considered
byGlaserand Kaufmannto be theoptimaldoctrine. In fact,usingthesecriteriawould
meanthatWorldWarI was "objectively" offensedominant.20
18. Ibid., p. 46.

19. Advancing the hypothesisthatdefense was dominantbeforeand duringWorld War I are Van
Evera, "Offense,Defense, and the Causes of War"; Glaser and Kaufmann,"What Is the Offense-
Defense Balance?"; Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensiveand theOriginsof the FirstWorldWar";
and Snyder,Ideologyof the Offensive.For a dissenting argument,see Shimshoni, "Technology,
MilitaryAdvantage, and World War I." For a more limited critique,see Scott D. Sagan, "1914
Revisited:Allies, Offense,and Instability," Security,
International Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-
176.
20. Shimshoni, "Technology,Military Advantage, and World War I." Historians and political
scientistsalike have noted that had the SchlieffenPlan succeeded-and this is not a ridiculous
counterfactual-we would call World War I objectivelyoffensedominant.See Sagan, "1914 Revis-
ited." For otherexamples of thisdebate,see L.C.F. Turner,"The Significanceof theSchlieffenPlan,"
in Paul M. Kennedy,ed., The WarPlans oftheGreatPowers,1880-1914 (Boston: Allen and Unwin,
1979), pp. 203-204; and Martin Van Crevald, SupplyingWar: LogisticsfromWallensteinto Patton
(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1977), p. 116. I thankWarnerR. Schillingand Daniel H.
Nexon forhelpfuldiscussions on this topic.

International
Security
23:3 | 194
Althoughthisconclusionmayseembizarre,I have troubleseeinghow Glaserand

Kaufmann wouldrefute it.A possibleresponsemightbe thatwhilemyexamplefocuses
on tactics,theyclaimto measuretheoffense-defense balanceat thestrategic level of
conflict.
This argumentis problematic fortwo reasons,however.First,as Glaserand
Kaufmannnote,"a changethatshiftsthebalancein a givendirection at one levelwill
usuallyalso shiftit in thesame directionat all higherlevels."21Therefore "a change
thatmakestacticaloffenseharderwill usuallyalso makeoperationaloffenseharder,
whichin turnmakesstrategic offense moredifficult."22
Indeed,tacticalinnovations at
theSommein 1918made offense easierat theoperationaland strategic levelsforthe
Germans,and latertheAllies.23 Furthermore, even ifdistinguishingtacticalfromstra-
tegicshiftsin the offense-defense balanceis theoretically
possible,Glaserand Kauf-
mannprovideinsufficient guidanceon how thiscould be accomplished. In fact,their
own netassessmenttechniques relyon bothtacticaland strategiccalculations to meas-
ure theoffense-defense balance.24
In sum, Glaserand Kaufmann'sassumptionof "optimality" neithercontrolsfor
militaryskillnorallowsforex anteassessmentoftheoffense-defense balance.Indeed,
theoptimality assumptionmeansthatone would inherently code periodsin termsof
skill,measuringthe offense-defense balancein termsof themostsuccessfulstrategy
employed.In further research,thisdilemmacouldbe addressedbyassumingsymmet-
ricaldoctrine.Obviously, whetherdoctrineis sufficientlysymmetrical is ultimately an
empiricalquestion.This assumption, however,would allow theorists to comparethe
ofoffensive
efficacy and defensivestrategies whilecontrollingforskilland doctrine.
Conclusion
Althoughoffense-defense theoryis riddledwithmethodological problems,the hy-

pothesesputforth bythesetheorists arebothempiricallyplausibleand policyrelevant.
The Van Everaand Glaserand Kaufmannarticlesdeserveattention for
and scrutiny
thesereasons.Criticalrevisionofthetheoryis clearlyin order;to thisend,I offertwo
suggestions.
of theoffense-defense
First,a definition balancethatavoids subsumingpowerand
doctrineneedsto be constructed. Thebalancecannotbe represented as theprobability
and should not incorporate
of takingterritory, the absolutevalue of an attack.An
exampleofsucha definition is one thatdescribesoffensedominanceas a situationin
whichitcostsless in termsoflivesand territoryto attacka statethanitdoes to defend
againstit.Analogously, defensedominancewould implythatattacking costsmorein
termsof lives and territory thandefendingagainstan attack.The offense-defense
balanceis representedas thecostdifferencebetweenthetwo.Notonlyis thisparticular
definitiona comparisonof therelativeefficacy it says nothingabout
of thestrategies,
theultimateoutcomeofa war,and thusavoids incorporating powerintotheconcept.

22. Ibid.
23. Ropp, Warin theModernWorld,p. 267.

| 195
Correspondence
Moreover,thisconceptualization allows thattheoffense-defense

balancemightvary
fromstateto state,giventhatit is framedin termsofa subjectiveutilityfunction.
Second,empiricaltestsof the offense-defense balancemustbe farmorerigorous.
Codingperiodsas offense ordefensedominant bylookingat theoutcomesofwardoes
nottellus abouttheefficacyofstrategiesand couldeasilybe representativeofbalance-
of-powerfactors.To avoid this,one mightconsidercases where statesfaced the
possibility witheach otheroveran extendedperiodof time.Findingtime
of conflict
periodsin whichthe offense-defense balancevaried,whilepowerand doctrinewas
relatively
constant,wouldbe difficult;however,thiswouldallowthevariablesofpower
and doctrineto be controlled.
-Stacie E. Goddard
New York,N.Y.
StephenVan EveraReplies:
JamesDavis, BernardFinel,and StacieGoddardraise a numberof questionsabout

offense-defense theory.HereI focuson threethatseemmostimportant, address
briefly
fiveothers,and lettherestpass withoutcomment, exceptto expressa generaldissent
fromtheirarguments.
canwe characterize
First, specificmilitary orforceposturesas defensive
technologies
or offensive? Or is everything dependenton thecontextofcombat?
BernardFineltakesthelatterview,arguingthat"theoffense-defense balanceis ...
an outgrowth ofstrategicinteraction."1 He muchoverstates a good point.As he notes,
thecapacityofa military forcecan dependon theforcesand strategies ofitsopponent.
Some forcesare betterat attackthandefenseagainstsome opponents,whilebeing
betterat defensethanattackagainstothers.Butmanyforcesare inherently optimized
foroffense or defense,in a way thatappliesacrossopponents.
A securenucleardeterrent is fundamentally Itmakesitsowneressentially
defensive.
unconquerable. At thesame time,it cannotconquerotherstatesthatpossessa secure
deterrent. Thesefactsapplyregardlessoftheopponent'sstrategy. The defensivechar-
acterofthenuclearrevolution, whichstemsfromtheserealities, is thedefining feature
ofmoderninternational relations.It is thesinglemostimportant aspectofpost-World
WarII and post-ColdWarinternational affairs.
Becausenucleardeterrents aredefensive, forcesdesignedto counterthemareessen-
tiallyoffensive. These forcesincludeoffensive strategic
nuclearcounterforce systems
(e.g.,accurateintercontinental ballisticmissilesand strategicantisubmarine warfare
systems)and area ballisticmissiledefenses.
Modernguerrillawar has defendedmanycountriesand conquerednone. It is a
fundamentally defensiveformofwarfare. Stateswouldpose littlethreattoone another
ifall reliedon citizenguerrilladefenses.
The accuraterepeatingrifles,machineguns,barbedwire,railroads,and entrench-
mentsof the westernfrontin WorldWar I were fundamentally defensive,as the
1. Bernard I. Finel, "Taking Offense at Offense-DefenseTheory,"InternationalSecurity,Vol. 23,

No. 3 (Winter1998/99),p. 183.

International
Security23:3 | 196
repeatedfailedoffensives of 1914-17demonstrated. Theywereeventuallyovercome:

firstby theGermaninfiltration tacticsin 1918,and laterby Germanblitzkrieg concepts
ofarmoredwar.Butforthreeyearstheygave dominanceto thedefense.
Manyotherdevelopments in military history canbe characterized thesameway.The
weaponryand tacticsof thelate MiddleAges in Europeadvantagedthedefense;the
gunpowderrevolution thenovercametheseweaponsand tactics, restoringtheoffense;
innovationsin fortificationby Vauban and othersrestoredthe defensein the late
seventeenth century;and Napoleonicwarfare bypopularmassarmythenstrengthened
theoffense. In thetwentieth century, Germanarmoredblitzkrieg tacticsalso bolstered
theoffense. Theeffectsofthesemodesofwarfare variedonlymodestly withthenature
oftheiropposition. Theyhad an inherent propensity to ease thedefenseor theoffense.
In sum, technologyand forceposturedo, on importantoccasions,have innate
defensiveor offensive propertiesand implications.2 Nuclearweapons are the most
important recentexample,buttheyare onlyone amongmany.
Second,does offense-defense theorylack parsimony?Does it committhe sin of
explainingby complexifying?
Finelclaimsthatit does. Its independent variable-theease of conquest-includes
factorsdrawn fromthe military, diplomatic,geographic,and social spheres.These
factorsare,says Finel,a "vast,unrelatedgrabbag of conditionsand variables."The
use ofsuchan unwieldyvariableleads to a "verysignificant loss in parsimony."3
Finelhas thingsbackward.Offense-defense theoryis elegant.It is parsimonious. It
ordersand thereby simplifiesa previously disorderedmelangeofphenomena.
To judgeFinel'scharge,we first mustask:Whatis parsimony? Whatprovidesit,and
whatdetractsfromit?
A theoryis notshownto lackparsimony simplyby demonstrating thatitsconcepts
includea diverserange of lesser-included concepts,because this is trueof every
concept.All conceptsare aggregations oflesserconcepts.Forexample,nationalpower
is a conceptthataggregatesnationalmilitary power,economicpower,and thepower
to marshalallies.Butthinking aboutstrategy wouldbe morecomplicated, notsimpler,
ifwe droppednationalpowerfromourlexiconand discussedonlyitscomponent parts.
Military power,a maincomponent ofnationalpower,is an aggregate ofairpower, naval
power,and groundpower,as well as of materialresources,skill,and willpower.
Discussionwouldbe farharderifwe had to addressthesecomponents separatelyeach
time militaryquestionswere at issue. Airpower,a componentof militarypower,
aggregatesthequalityand quantityof aircraft, thequalityand quantityof air force
personnel, and thequalityofairdoctrine. The qualityofaircraft in turnis an aggrega-
2. A good survey of the historyof the interactionof militarytechnology,geography,and the

offense-defense balance is Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann,"What Is the Offense-Defense
Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security,Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82 at
61-66.
3. Finel, "Taking Offense at Offense-DefenseTheory," pp. 187, 188. Stacie Goddard likewise
complains that"myriad variables" are subsumed in my definitionof the offense-defense balance.
"One is leftwondering what factorscould be excluded fromthis definition."Goddard, "Taking
Offenseat Offense-DefenseTheory,"International Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter1998/99),p. 191.
Security,
Arguing in the same vein are Glaser and Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-DefenseBalance?"
pp. 60, 68-70.

| 197
Correspondence
tionof the speed, range,payload,maneuverability, stealthycharacteristics,

avionics,
and durability of theaircraft.At everylevel,we findthatconceptsare composedof
moreconceptsfromthelevelbelow.
My ruleofthumbis tojudgenew conceptsbyaskingiftheyare theoretically useful.
In politicalsciencethisstandardusuallyrequiresthatconceptssomehowcorrespond
to phenomenain thereal world.Theymustfittheway thingswork,or theway we
think.A conceptthatfailsto do thisis artificial and onlycluttersdiscussion.But a
conceptthatcombinesotherconceptswhilealso capturing discussion.
realitysimplifies
Whenconsidering nationalsecurityproblems,leadersoftenaskifotherscanconquer
themor iftheycan conquerothers.Thesequestionslie at thecoreof manypast and
presentforeignand securitypolicydebates.And in askingif conquestis possible,
leadersaggregatethesame military, diplomatic,
geographic,and social factorsthatI
aggregateto capturethe ease of conquest.Leaders aggregatebecause theymust;
becausethesefactors togetherdecideiftheycan conquerorbe conquered.Aggregation
is not easy and cannotbe precise,but leadersdo it because otherwisetheycannot
understand theirnationalsecuritysituation.
As Bismarckplannedhis warsofGerman
unification,he recurrentlyaskedifGermanywas in a positionto wage aggressivewar
successfully. To answer,he had to weighmilitary,diplomatic,and geographicconsid-
erationsin some combination. Later,Germanswho warnedof Germaninsecurity
weighedthesesame factorstogether. Americansdid the same when assessingtheir
nationalsecurity duringtheCold War.FormerPresident HerbertHooveropposedthe
U.S. troopdeployment to Europein 1951becausehe thoughtconquestwas difficult:
"This Hemispherecan be defendedfromCommunistarmiescome what will. ...
Communist armiescan no moregetto Washington thanany allied armiescan getto
Moscow."4 Hoover had to aggregate military,geographic, and diplomatic factorsto
reachthisconclusion. theauthorsofNSC-68fearedin 1950thattheUnited
Oppositely,
Statesfaceda grave threatto its security,in large partbecause theybelievedthat
conquestwas easy.They reachedthisconclusionby aggregating both military
and
diplomaticfactors.5
The conceptof ease of conquest,then,corresponds to theway policymakers think.
It capturestheway theyorganizetheworld.Ifit did not,it wouldbe a complicating
distraction.But it does. And in so doing,it simplifiesour discussionof security
problemsand policies.
Offense-defensetheoryachievesothersimplicities as well.It arguesthata number
of important war causes-expansionism,fierceresistanceto others'expansion,first-
strikeadvantages,windowsofopportunity and vulnerability,
faitsaccomplis,negotia-
tionfailures,secrecy,arms races,and "chain gaining"in alliances-thatwere once
4. Quoted in Hugh Ross, ed., The Cold War:Containment and Its Critics(Chicago: Rand McNally,
1963), p. 17.
5. See NSC-68, excerptedin Thomas H. Etzold and JohnLewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: Docu-
mentson AmericanPolicyand Strategy,1945-1950 (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1978),
pp. 414, 416 (suggestingthat nuclear weapons are offensive),and pp. 427, 430 (suggesting that
states tend to bandwagon with threats).Also relevantis p. 396, suggestingthatthe Soviet empire
was vulnerable to Westernoffensiveaction,foressentiallysocial reasons.

International
Security23:3 | 198
viewedas independent stemfroma singlecause.Thissimplifies theproblemofpower

and war.We see thata numberof disparatedangersare fedby a singletaproot.
In short,offense-defensetheoryexplainsa wide rangeofphenomenawitha parsi-
moniousframework. Far fromcomplexifying, it streamlinesour understanding of the
war problem.
Third,is offense-defense
theory testable?JamesDavis complainsthatmyformulation
ofoffense-defense theoryis too impreciseand incoherent to be tested.6 he
Specifically,
notesthatI considertwovariantsofoffense-defense theory-anobjectivevariantand
a perceptualvariant-butI inferand testonlyone set of predictions fromthesetwo
variants.Instead,he argues,eachvariantmusthave itsown distinct setofpredictions.
Davis makesa good point,buthis conclusionis overdrawn. He showsthatI failedto
explainmyself,but does not show thatoffense-defense theoryis untestableor is
otherwiseflawed.
Letme clarifytheconfusion thatDavis rightly identifies.
Offense-defense theoryhas
an objectiveand a perceptualvariant.The objectivevariantframestheeffects of the
actualoffense-defense balance.The perceptualvariantframesthe effects of the per-
ceived offense-defensebalance.Boththeobjectiveand theperceivedoffense-defense
balancesare indicatorsoftheother:theobjectiveoffense-defense balanceinfluences-
and thusindicates-theperceivedoffense-defense balance;and theperceivedoffense-
defensebalance is influenced by-and thusindicates-theobjectiveoffense-defense
balance.Therefore boththe objectiveand the perceptualvariantsof offense-defense
theorymakepredictions aboutthecorrelates ofboththeobjectiveand theperceptual
offense-defensebalances.I conflated thesetwosetsofpredictions in myarticle,
offering
a singleunifiedforecast abouthow thingswouldappeariftheoffense weredominant
orifitwerebelieveddominant. I did thisbecauseitworksin thisinstance: bothvariants
ofthetheorymakeparallelpredictions aboutbothobjectiveand perceivedreality. We
neednotdistinguish theseforecasts becausetheyareessentially thesame.Twovariants
ofa theoryusuallyproducetwodivergent setsofpredictions, butnotin thiscase.
Whatdo we concludewhen theobjectiveand perceivedoffense-defense balances
differ,as in 1914,whenthe objectivebalancefavoredthedefenseand theperceived
balance favoredthe offense?Bothvariantsof the theorymake stronger predictions
aboutthecorrelates of theperceivedbalancethantheobjectivebalance,so teststhat
lookto theperceivedbalanceare stronger. Forexample,in the1914case bothvariants
predictthatperceptions ofoffense dominanceshouldcorrelate withwar,evenifobjec-
tiverealitiesfavorthedefense.The perceptualvariantpredictsthissimplybecauseit
deals onlywiththe perceptions, and puts the objectivebalanceaside. The objective
variantpredictsthisbecause the impactof the objectivebalance is translatedinto
outcomesthroughits effecton the perceivedbalance,as follows:objectiveoffense-
defensebalance--->perceivedoffense-defense balance--->outcomes.The hypothesis
on the right(perceivedoffense-defense balance---> outcomes)should operateeven
when the hypothesison the left(objectiveoffense-defense balance ---> perceived
6. JamesW. Davis, Jr.,"Taking Offenseat Offense-DefenseTheory,"International

Security,
Vol. 23,
No. 3 (Winter1998/99),pp. 179-182 at 180.

I 199
Correspondence
offense-defense balance) does not. Hence even the objective variant forecastsa more
certaincorrelationbetween perceptionsof offensedominance and war than between
objectiveoffensedominance and war.
I saved my readers this detail because I feared thattheireyes mightglaze over. But
I should have explained it,and Davis is rightto complain thatmy failureto explain is
confusing.He is wrong to claim, however, that offense-defensetheoryis somehow
flawed or untestable.I failed to explicate my logic, but I thinkthatlogic is sound.
I close with remarkson five othercriticismsmade by Davis, Finel, and Goddard.
Finel argues thatseizing territory does not confervictoryin war.7He seems to think
I believe otherwise,but I agree with him. My view is that the seizing of territory
requiresvictory(not the otherway around). Clearly,withouta victoryof some kind it
is impossible to seize and hold anotherstate's territory.
Finel quarrels with my coding of the historyof militarytechnologyand strategy.He
doubts thatguerrillawar grew easier with the developmentof mass-producedmodem
small arms after1800, and that accurate repeating rifles,machine guns, and barbed
wire made frontalassaults more difficultin the late nineteenthand early twentieth
centuries.8In so arguing,he takes on many historiansin addition to myself.I concur,
however,thatsuch questions are not open-and-shut,and we need a detailed study of
the historyof the offense-defense balance in warfareto help resolve such disputes.
Stacie Goddard argues that I failed to distinguishthe offense-defense balance from
the balance of power.9 I certainlymeant to distinguish them, and believe I did. In
footnote1, I suggest thatthe offense-defense balance could be measured by looking at
the probabilitythat a determinedaggressor could conquer a targetstate with compa-
rable resources. In other words, this measure asks how oftenconquest occurs where
the balance of power cannot account forthe outcome,because the winner startswith
no marked resource advantage. It should be clear fromthis that I am not running
togetherthe offense-defense balance and the balance of power.
Goddard and Davis contend thatI use the behavior of states to explain the behavior
of states.10I plead guilty.In fact,the behavior of states oftenexplains the behavior of
states. Europe's continentalpowers reach for hegemony when Europe's offshorebal-
ancers (Britainand the United States) are in an isolationistmood, and are more cautious
when the balancers are active. If that's how the world works, shouldn't we say so? I
don't see a problem.
Davis objects that I define termsin ways that will confineothers'analyses.1"But of
course othersare freeto adopt the definitionthatbest helps them answer theirques-
tions,just as I did. I cannot stop them and would not want to.
7. Finel,"Taking Offenseat Offense-DefenseTheory,"p. 184.

8. Ibid., pp. 184-185.
9. Goddard, "Taking Offenseat Offense-DefenseTheory,"pp. 189-190.
10. Ibid., p. 191; and Davis, "Taking Offenseat Offense-DefenseTheory,"p. 180.
11. Davis, "Taking Offenseat Offense-DefenseTheory,"pp. 179-180. Davis's claim thatI deviate
fromRobertJervis'sdefinitionof the offense-defense balance by includingdiplomacy also seems
questionable.Jervis,like me, does mentiona diplomaticfactor-collectivesecuritysystems-as an
elementthataffectsthe securityof states.Jervis,"Cooperation under theSecurityDilemma," World
Politics,Vol. 30, No. 2 (January1978), pp. 167-214 at 176.

Security23:3 | 200
International
Davis, Finel,and Goddardhave raisedimportant issuesthatdeservefurther

atten-
theorystandsup to theircriticisms.
tion,butoffense-defense
-StephenVanEvera
Cambridge, Massachusetts
CharlesL. GlaserandChaimKaufmann
Reply:
We appreciatetheopportunity to respondto theissues raisedby BernardFineland
Stacie Goddard.We believe thatthereis littlereal disagreement betweenus and
Goddard-she makes a numberof sound arguments, but on some pointsapparent
differencesbetweenher positionand ours resultfromher misunderstanding of our
views.In contrast,we thinkthatFinel'swholesalecondemnation oftheentireoffense-
defenseresearchprogramis at leastpremature, based on failuresto understand both
thepurposesof offense-defense theoryand therequirements fortestingit.Goddard's
and Finel'smostimportant pointsrelateto thestatusof offense-defense theoryas a
structuraltheoryofinternational behavior.Thereforewe addresstheseissuesfirst, and
thenturnto severalseparateissuesraisedby one or theothercorrespondent.
As a structural offense-defense
theory, theoryattempts to predictstates'behaviorby
focusingon theconstraints and opportunities presentedby theirenvironment. Impor-
tantconstraintsincludetheoffense-defense balanceand thedistribution of resources
(power),whileamongthechoicesthatthetheoryseeksto predictare decisionsabout
militarydoctrineand forceposture,as wellas whether to formalliancesand fight wars.
Structuraltheoriesof international politicscan incorporatevariouskindsof con-
someofwhicharestricter
straints, thanothers.Systemstructure,as definedbyKenneth
Waltz,excludespropertiesof units (typicallystates).In Waltz'snarrowdefinition,
structureconsistsonlyofproperties thatemergefromtherelationships oftheunitsto
one anotherand thatno individualstatecan change-international anarchy, forexam-
ple.1Constraintsthatemergefrompurelymaterialfacts,whichcan be properties of
statesbut whichstatescannotchangeor evade, we can call materialstructure; with
limitedexceptions,geography and weatherwouldqualify. Theoriesbasedon thesehard
constraintsare,however,oftennotsatisfying, becausetheymisstoo muchof interest
in mostareasofinternational behavior.
Most structural theoriestherefore employa "softer"definition of structurethat
includesanyconstraints thatstatescannotchangeor evade withinthetimescalesthey
are likelyto considerin planning foreignand defensepolicy.2These may include social
factssuch as a state'sformof government or its level of scientific
achievement at a
giventime.Measurements ofpower,forexample,mustincludenotonlya state'spurely
materialresourcesbutalso thecapacityofthestateapparatusto extract resourcesfrom
1. KennethN. Waltz, TheoryofInternational Politics(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1979).

2. Appropriatetime scales fordifferenttypes of foreignpolicy decisions may vary.For offense-
defense theory,which is principallyconcernedwith understandingdecisions in peacetime about
planning fordeterrenceor forfightingfuturewars, we thinka relevanttime scale is oftenfrom
several years to ten years, although there could be variations-for example, if a state could be
highlyconfidentthatit would face no threatsfora longer period.

| 201
Correspondence
societyformilitary use. Our measureoftheoffense-defense balanceincludeswhether

thestate-and its adversaries-arenation-states or multinational empires,as well as
manyaspectsof technology.3 Includingcertainunit-levelfactorsdoes not erase the
differencebetweenstructural and nonstructural theories.Whatall structural theories
excludeareexplanations oftheactualdecisionmaking process,includingthepossibility
of flawsof perception and judgment, and information aboutstatepreferences thatis
based on theirunit-level characteristics.
To understandthe impactof constraints, structuraltheories,includingoffense-
defensetheory, mustassumethatstates'policychoicesarebroadlyoptimalor rational;
subjectto theconstraints theyface,statesmakeeffective policychoicesformaximizing
theirinterests.4Theoriesthatdo not assume optimality must includea theoryof
suboptimalstatedecisionmaking. In such theoriesmuchof the explanationof state
behavioris oftenattributed to domesticpoliticalcompetition and/orto flawsin the
decisionmaking process;theimpactof environmental constraints on policychoicesis
weakerand hardertoisolate(althoughthosesameconstraints maystillexerta powerful
influenceon theeventualoutcomesofpolicychoices).
The optimality/rationality assumptionin structural theoriesis usefulin threeways:
itcanprovideguidanceformakingpolicy;itestablishes a baselineagainstwhichstates'
policiescan be comparedto determine whethertheyare flawed;and itcan helpassess
thelikelyimpactofflawedpolicies.Byproviding a baseline,theoptimality assumption
in offense-defensetheoryenablesus to separatemilitary skillfromthebalance.The
balance is measuredassumingthatall countrieshave highlevels of military skill.5
Choicesthatdivergefromthebaselineare suboptimaland indicatelow skill.
Goddardobjectsto our inclusionof an optimality assumptionin offense-defense
theory,arguingthatit leaves us unable to separatemilitary skillfromthe offense-
defensebalance.6The problem,as she sees it, is thatthe optimalstrategycan be
determined only"afterobserving whichstrategies succeedduringa war,"whichmeans
thatwe cannotdeterminethebalanceex ante.We agreethatthebalanceshouldbe
measuredex ante-thisis requiredby thetheory. Goddard'sobjectionis based on an
exaggeration of the standardof optimality requiredforpurposesof the theory. She
apparently takesoptimality tomeantheabsolutebestchoicethestatecouldmakegiven
notjust the(limited)information availableat thetimebut also theinformation that
wouldbe providedby futureactions.Withthisunderstanding ofoptimality, it would
3. Constraintscould include factsthatdecisionmakerstheoreticallycould change,but only at costs

theywould likelyconsider unacceptable. For instance,a multinationalempire could convertitself
into a nation-stateby giving up its imperial territoriesand subjects,but this would likelyviolate
the rulers'sense of the identityof the state,as well as reduce its resources.
4. Except in formalrationalchoice-orientedwork, the assumption is not usually thatactual state
decisionmakingprocesses meet normativestandardsof rationality, but ratherthatdecisionmakers
act "sensibly": given the informationavailable to them,decisionmakersusually make choices that
do not vary much in substance fromthose thatwould be made by purely rationalactors.
5. Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann,"What Is the Offense-DefenseBalance and Can We
Measure It?" International Security,Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82 at 55-56.
6. Stacie E. Goddard, "Taking Offenseat Offense-DefenseTheory,"International Security,
Vol. 23,
No. 3 (Winter1998/99),pp. 193-194.

International
Security23:3 | 202
indeedfollowthatoptimalforceposture,doctrine, cannotbe knownuntil

and strategy
theyare revealedby war outcomes,and thatex ante measurement of the offense-
defensebalancewouldbe impossible.7However,thisis notwhatwe meanbyoptimal-
ity;the standardthatwe employis thatstateschoose optimally"withinreasonable
limitsof analysis"giventhe information
availableto themat the time;to imposea
standardwouldbe unreasonable
stricter fora theoryintendedto predictactualbehav-
ior.8Our standardis thesame optimality/rationality
assumptionthatappearsin most
structuraltheories.9
Based on our understandingof structure,we also rejecttwo of Finel's key points.
First,he argues that"the offense-defense balance is not a structuralvariable. Rather,it
can be influencedby immediatedecisions about deploymentsand employmentstrate-
gies." This is incorrect.The offense-defense balance is a constraint,not a measure of
the effectivenessof actual deployed forcesforeitheroffenseor defense. It answers the
question: How secure can statesbe, assuming thatboth theyand theiropponents make
optimal choices? The offense-defense balance, in combinationwith power, determines
how well a state can do; state decisions in combination with structuralconstraints
determinehow well a state will actuallydo. Suboptimal decisions reduce the state's
militarycapability compared to the best that it could be, but do not influencethe
balance itself.10For example,ifone state deploys nuclear weapons in vulnerablebasing
modes, thenan attacker'sprospectsforsignificantly limitingdamage (and thereforefor
a successful offensiveattack) will be much greaterthan if the state had made better
deploymentdecisions. However, the offense-defense balance forthis example remains
definedby the bestretaliatorycapabilitythat the state could achieve given both sides'
resourcesand available technology.
Second, Finel argues that the offense-defensebalance is not a structuralvariable
because it is an "outgrowth of strategicinteraction,"so that "the optimal choice
depends on the opponent's decisions.""1In response, we would firstlike to point out
thata greatmany militarypolicy decisions,especially at the levels of doctrineand force
posture,are pure optimizationproblemsinvolvingno interaction.BeforeWorld War I,
all armies would have been betteroffdeployingmore machine guns and less cavalry-
regardlessof what anyone else did. Between the two world wars,all navies would have
been betteroffinvestingless in battleships.Finel's observationthatancientarmies used
widely varyingforcecombinationsdoes not imply,as he suggests,that the best force
7. Actually,optimal strategyin Goddard's sense cannot be reliablydeterminedeven aftera war.

Ex post we know thatthe victor'schoices were successful,but not necessarilywhethertheywere
optimal.The victorcould have won despite suboptimalstrategybecause of even worse suboptimal
choices made by the loser. Alternatively, even if the loser's choices were optimal and the victory
was the result of superior power, it is possible that the victorcould have succeeded even more
easily with a betterstrategythatwas not tried.
9. This does mean that when informationthat would affectstates' strategies is unavailable,
decisionmakers'estimatesof the offense-defense balance may differfromtheestimatestheywould
have made had theyhad the additional information.A possible example is the difficulty in 1939
of estimatingwhetheratomic weapons would be developed in time foruse in World War II.
11. BernardI. Finel,"TakingOffenseat Offense-DefenseTheory,"International Security,
Vol. 23, No.
3 (Winter1998/99),pp. 183,184.

| 203
Correspondence
posturegenerally dependson theforcepostureoftheopponent.Nearlyall ofthemost

successful ancientarmieswerebased on coresofheavyinfantry, withlesserinvestment
in cavalryand lighttroops.Whenarmieswereorganizedon otherprinciples, thiswas
usuallybecauseoflimitations imposedbysocialsystems orbyterrain, notbythenature
oftheopponent'sarmy.Whenstructural constraintsare strong, notonlydoctrinal but
also somewartimestrategy choicescanbecomenoninteractive. Forexample,at thestart
ofWorldWarI, all Europeanstateswouldhavebeenbetteroffiftheyhad scaleddown
theiroffensive plans,regardlessofwhatotherstatesdid.
Strategicinteractionsdo occur.Whentheydo, whether Finel'spointis validdepends
on exactlywhatwe meanby "interaction." One senseofinteraction would meanthat
each statemustoptimizeitsmilitary doctrinesand strategies notonlysubjectto those
structuralconstraints thatinfluence but also subjectto theknowledgethat
it directly,
theiropponentswill also be attempting to optimizetheirown choicessubjectto the
constraints facingthem.The offense-defense balanceis estimatedassumingthatboth
sides do thebesttheycan,each knowingthattheotherside is also doingthebestit
can.Forexample,a stateattempting to developan effective nucleardamage-limitation
capability againsta particularopponentwould have to takeintoaccountnotonlythe
technical,geographical, and otherlimitson its counterforce but also its
capabilities,
opponent'sbestoptionsforimproving thesurvivabilityofitsstrategicforces.Ifmissile
accuracyis low,theopponentcan deploysurvivableforceswithlittleeffort, and the
balancewill strongly favordefense.If accuracyis highand the opponentlacks the
technology forsurvivablelauncherssuch as mobilemissilesand nuclear-powered
submarines, itwillhave to spendmuchmoreto achievea robustretaliatory capability,
and thebalancewillbe morefavorableto offense. In any case,theresulting measure
of the balance is fullystructurally determined(providedthatstatesdo not make
suboptimal choices).To theextentthateachstaterespondsnotonlydirectly tostructural
factors butalso to theother'sbehavior,it is simplyincorporating additionalstructural
effects mediatedindirectly throughtheirpressureon theopponent.
A secondsenseof"interaction" wouldbe a situationin whichstructural constraints
exertonlya weak influenceon strategychoice,so thateach side has two or more
optionsthatare equallygood froma structural pointof view,and thatare different
enoughfromeachotherthatthebestcounterstrategies againsteacharequitedifferent.
Thussuccessforeach side would dependin largeparton correctly guessingtheother
side's choice,but thereis no way to guess exceptby havingsome insightintothe
opponent's decisionmaking process,orbyluck.In Finel'sterms, thiswouldbe a true"rock-
scissors-paper"situationwherethereis no oneoptimalchoice,whichwouldindeedmean
thattheoffense-defense balancecould notbe measuredexactly, butwould spreadout
intoa band ofuncertainty whosewidthwould reflect theimpacton war outcomesof
differentcombinations ofa state'srightor wrongguessesaboutitsopponent'schoices.
Suchsituations do occurin war,althoughtheyare morecommonat theoperational
and tacticallevels,whereindividualdecisionshave smallereffects on finalwar out-
comesthando choicesat thestrategic and grandstrategic levels.An examplemightbe
Germanattemptsin 1944 to estimatewhetherthe Alliedinvasionof Europewould
come at Normandyor Calais. Variousconstraints effectivelyruled out sites either
further westor east,but thisstilllefttheAllies(and thustheGermans)witha choice
to makebetweenthetworemaining options.Had theGermansguessedcorrectly, the

Security23:3 | 204
International
Allies'1944-45campaignwould have been noticeably moreexpensive,but it is quite

unlikelythattheoutcomeofthewarwouldhavechangedorthatitslengthwouldhave
beenaffected verymuch.By comparison, strategicand grandstrategic choices,which
can exertlargereffects on war outcomes,are usuallyheavilyconstrained by factors
suchas geography; states'political,social,and materialresourceendowments; and so
forth.Therefore strategicand grandstrategicchoicesare oftenmoresimilarto the
mutualoptimization model discussedabove thantheyare to guessinggames. For
example,in WorldWarlI theAlliescould notdefeatGermanywithoutmovinghuge
amountsofmenand materiel fromtheUnitedStatestoEurope,and theironlypractical
methodwas by sea. The Germans'mostefficient methodofopposingthisflowwas by
submarine.Bothsides' plans took thesefactsinto account,but thiswas a mutual
optimization problem, nota problemofguessingtheother'sintentions. Thus,although
interaction
strategic can createsituations whereourbestmeasureoftheoffense-defense
balancebecomesa band ratherthana point,it is notclearthatthesebands are often
wide.Thisis, however,a worthwhile avenueforempiricalresearch.
Beyondthesepointsthatare closelyconnectedto theconceptofstructure, Goddard
and Finel addresssome additionalimportant points.First,Goddardarguesthatin
adoptinga broad definition of the offense-defense balanceby includingnationalism
and forcesize, we cannotseparatethe balance frompower,because thesefactors
influence power.In fact,nationalismcan affectbothpower and the offense-defense
balance,in different ways.As Goddardnotes,nationalism can augmenta state'spower
by increasing itsabilityto extractresources.However,nationalism also affects
extrac-
tioncapabilitiesdifferentially,
increasing themmorewhenthestateis trying to protect
territorythatis understoodto be partofthenationalhomelandthanwhenit seeksto
taketerritory thatis notpartofthishomeland.Nationalism makesiteasierto translate
aggregatepowerintotheabilityto defendthenationalgroup'shomeland.It makesit
harderto translate powerintotheabilityto conquerterritory thatis perceivedto be
outsidethenationalhomeland.Thisdifferential effectcannotbe incorporated intoour
standardnotionsofpower;rather, itis bestunderstood as a shiftin theoffense-defense
balancein favorofdefense.
Goddardis correctthatforcesize can reflect power,but it shouldalso be included
amongthefactorsthatinfluence thebalance.Somestatessimplylacktheresourcesto
deployforcesofthesize thatwould createan offense-defense balancebestmatchedto
theirgoals.Statesthendo thebesttheycan withtheresourcesavailable,thatis,within
theconstraints imposedby theirpower,whichdetermines thesize oftheirforces.For
example,theimpactofconventional forcesizeon thebalanceresultsfroman interaction
betweenpowerand geography. High force-to-space ratiostendto favordefensemore
thando low force-to-space ratios.As a result,twostateswhosemobilization potential
is relativelylargein relationto lengthof frontwill facea balancemorein favorof
defensethanif both were weaker.For example,even if technology had remained
constant,thebalancebetweenGermanyand Francein 1914 would have been more
favorableto defensethanit was in 1870.Bothstateswere able to mobilizegreater
resources,whichshiftedtheoffense-defense balanceas wellas thebalanceofpower.If
we consideronlypower,we would predictthewrongimpacton theoutcomeofwar.
Althoughfromthe 1870s onwardGermany'spower grew fasterthan France's,its
chancesof conqueringFrancedeclined.We could have lumpedthiseffect underthe

| 205
Correspondence
generalheadingof"geography," butwe consideritimportant enoughin itsown right

to mentionseparately.12
A mainthemeofFinel'sletteris thattheoffense-defense balancecannotbe measured:
thefactorsthatinfluence thebalancecannotbe reliablycoded,and theresultsof war
games are not reproducible. We agree withFinel thatwhetherthe balance can be
measuredis centralto theutility ofthetheory. In ourarticlewe explain,first, whythe
toolsof military net assessmentare well matchedto measuringthebalance.13 Also,
althoughwe offerreasonsforoptimism, we stressthatour articledoes notsettlethe
questionof how closelythebalancecan be measured.In fact,thearticleconcludesby
callingforresearchinto whethernet assessmenthas been feasiblein the past and
whethernet assessmenttechniquescan be further improved.Second,our articleex-
plainshow offense-defense theorycan oftenmakeusefulpredictions even whennet
assessmentis difficult and therefore substantialuncertainty about the value of the
balanceexists.ThusFinel'scriticism wouldbe tellingonlyifreliablenetassessment can
neverbe done.To acceptFinel'spessimismwould mean,forexample,thatduringthe
Cold Warwe did notand could nothave had any real idea of Sovietprospectsfora
successfuloffensive on thecentralfront, and thattheGermanmilitary beforeWorld
WarI lackedtheanalyticresourcestodetecttheflawsand uncertainties intheSchlieffen
Plan. If Finelholds theseviews,he could have contributed to thedebateby spelling
out whywe shouldacceptthem.
Finelalso objectsto ourversionofoffense-defense theorybecausehe saysitwrongly
treatsseizureofterritory as theprincipalmethodofvictory in war.Thiswouldindeed
be a mistake, and wouldskewnetassessments and thusestimates oftheoffense-defense
balance-butthisis notourposition.Finelhas simplymisreadus,confusing themeasure
of successwiththemeansforachievingsuccess.For purposesof thetheory, we treat
changesin politicalcontrolofterritory as themeasureofsuccessin waroutcomes(i.e.,
we use thestandardClausewitziandefinition). A militaryoffensive shouldbe consid-
ereda successif,at theend ofthewar,politicalcontrolhas changedto theadvantage
oftheattacker-either becausetheattacker has gainedfullorpartialcontrolofterritory
it did not controlbefore,or because it has underminedan opponent'scontrolof
The twomostimportant
territory.14 meansofachievingmilitary victory are (1) destruc-
tionof enemyforcesor mobilizationpotential,undermining theirabilityto contest
territorialcontrol;and (2) crediblethreatsofsuchseverepunishment thattheopponent
wouldratherconcedetheterritory thancontinuetheconflict.15 It is true,however,that
12. Concern over nuclear proliferationillustratesa similar interactionbetween power and the
offense-defense balance. Opponents of proliferationargue thatnew nuclear states will be unable
to build the large forcesrequired to provide adequate retaliatorycapabilities;as a result,although
nuclear weapons provided the superpowers with highlyeffectivedeterrentcapabilities,theywill
not do the same for small countries with limited resources. In other words, according to this
argument,the offense-defensebalance for these less powerful countries is more favorable to
offensethan it was forthe superpowers because these weaker countrieswill have smaller forces.
13. Glaser and Kaufmann,"What Is the Offense-DefenseBalance?" pp. 74-78.
14. Ibid., pp. 54-55.
15. There is some evidence that,at least in conventionalconflicts,punishmentis less likelyto be
decisive than is destructionof forces.RobertA. Pape, Bombingto Win:Air Powerand Coercionin
War(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1996).

International
Security23:3 | 206
who controls certainterritories

duringa warcan sometimes affect
victory to theextent
thattheterritory can be used to mobilizeadditionalcapabilities withwhichto pursue
one or bothof theseapproaches.16Thus theoffense-defense balance,whichis defined
as thecostofthemeansofvictory relativeto thecostofthemeansofdenyingvictory,
reflectstheimpactofterritory onlywhenit influences war outcomes.
Finally,Finelarguesthateven if the offense-defense balancecould be adequately
specifiedand measured,thecostin termsof complexity would outweightheinsights
thatoffense-defense theorycan provide.We agreethatmeasuringtheoffense-defense
balanceis complex.Nevertheless, threepointssuggestthatFinelis againtoo negative.
First,as we argueinourarticle, keyvariablesinotherstructural theoriesofinternational
relations,suchas powerinbalance-of-power theory,
also becomedifficultto operation-
alize if we takethetaskseriously. This is simplya generalproblemin international
relationstheory. Second,as we discussin ourarticle,in cases wherecomplexity makes
completenetassessmentintractable, analystscan oftensimplify theirtaskwhilepre-
servingreasonableconfidence in theirestimate ofthebalance.One possibility is tofocus
on particular theatersor campaignsthatare expectedto have a decisiveimpacton the
overallwar outcome.For example,in the 1980s,net assessmentsof a conventional
WorldWarIII in Europeconcentrated on estimating theprospectsof successof the
WarsawPact'sinitialoffensive intoWestern Europe.GivenNATO'smuchlargermobi-
lizationpotentialand controlof theoceans,theWarsawPactcould nothope to wina
wariftheinitialoffensive was notsuccessful.17Third,and perhapsmostimportant, the
predictions madeby offense- defensetheoryoftendivergesignificantly fromstandard
power-basedstructural theories,whichmeansthatiftheoffense-defense balancecan
be measured,thepayoffis likelyto be worththeeffort.
In closing,we continueto believethatourarticlehas placedoffense-defense theory
on a firmer foundation. Further researchis warranted,becauseoffense-defense theorists
have establishedpowerfuldeductiveargumentsshowingthatpower alone is in-
sufficient to explainstatedecisionsaboutmilitary forces,strategy,and war,and that
offense-defense variablesshouldinfluencethesedecisions.It is too earlyto rendera
verdictfromempiricaltestingof offense-defense theory, whichis stillin its infancy.
Further testingis thekey.
-CharlesL. Glaser
Chicago,Illinois
-Chaim Kaufmann
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania
16. See our discussion of cumulativityof resources:Glaser and Kaufmann,"What Is the Offense-
Defense Balance?" pp. 67-68.
17. We discuss othertypes of simplificationsin our article;see ibid., p. 61.


The MIT Press

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The MIT Press

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

JamesW Davis, Jr.,is AssistantProfessor Politicsat Ludzvig-Maximnilians-Universitat

BernardI. Finel is AssociateDirectorof theNationalSecurityStudiesProgramand VisitingAssistant

and DeputyDean in theIrvingB. HarrisGraduateSchoolofPublicPolicy

Ititeriatioinal Secur)ity, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 179-206

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

alizationof theoffense-defense balancehas been thesubjectof considerabledebate,4

4. See, forexample, JackS. Levy,"The Offense/DefenseBalance of MilitaryTechnology:A Theo-

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

Iftwodimensions areat work-one objectiveand one perceptual-then logicallywe

7. See James D. Fearon, "Counterfactualsand Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," World

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

promoting an unorthodox understanding of hardtestswhenhe writes:"Alternative

Science,Vol. 7, StrategiesofInqluiry(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1975), esp. pp. 118-120; and

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

Theoffense-defense balanceis nota structural Ratheritcan be influenced

2. Cf. Glaser and Kaufmann,"What Is the Offense-DefenseBalance?" p. 55.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

basis fora tacticalbattlesystem. The blitzkrieg doctrinewas a complexmeldingof

This lastpointaboutthesuccessof war plansraisesa secondproblemwithboththe

8. ArcherJones,The Art of War in the WesternWorld(New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1987),

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

notsynonymous withvictory.Indeed,seizingand holdingterritory is neither necessary

TheImnplication TheProblemofPost Hoc Justifications

Althoughone mightarguethattheoffense-defense balanceis worthexaminingon its

12. JohnKeegan, A Historyof Warfare (New York:AlfredA. Knopf,1993), pp. 23-60.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

In his article,Van Everacitesmilitary factors,geography, socialand politicalorder,

16. Van Evera, "Offense,Defense, and the Causes of War,"pp. 16-22.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

systemsthatenhancemobility-helpthedefense.23 The othervariablescitedby Van

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

balancefora giventypological space. Thisresultwould thenneed to be validatedby

Offense-defense theoryis methodolog.ically flawedand conceptuallymuddled.Al-

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

So whatcan be done?Can offense-defense theorybe saved?Theshortansweris,no.

To the Editors (Stacie E. Goddard writes):

StephenVan Evera'sand CharlesGlaserand ChaimKaufmann's recentcontributions

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

In "Offense, Defense,and theCauses ofWar,"Van Everaarguesthat"war is farmore

3. Van Evera, "Offense,Defense, and the Causes of War,"p. 5.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

distinguish theoffense-defense balancefromthebalanceofpower,VanEveraneedsto

7. Van Evera, "Offense,Defense, and the Causes of War,"p. 7.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

ThatFrancecoulddeploya massarmytellsus a lotaboutthepowerofthecentralized

14. Glaser and Kaufmann,"What Is the Offense-DefenseBalance?" p. 45.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

18. Ibid., p. 46.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

Althoughthisconclusionmayseembizarre,I have troubleseeinghow Glaserand

Althoughoffense-defense theoryis riddledwithmethodological problems,the hy-

21. Glaser and Kaufmann,"What Is the Offense-DefenseBalance?" p. 73.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

Moreover,thisconceptualization allows thattheoffense-defense

JamesDavis, BernardFinel,and StacieGoddardraise a numberof questionsabout

1. Bernard I. Finel, "Taking Offense at Offense-DefenseTheory,"InternationalSecurity,Vol. 23,

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM

repeatedfailedoffensives of 1914-17demonstrated. Theywereeventuallyovercome:

2. A good survey of the historyof the interactionof militarytechnology,geography,and the

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:04:35 PM