March-April 2020

ISSN: 0193-4120 Page No. 11981 - 11992

Political Corruption and the Role of Public

Prosecutors in Indonesia
1
Priyambudi, 2Barda Nawawi Arief, 3Nyoman Serikat Jaya Putera, 4R.B. Sularto,
5
Henry Dianto Pardamean Sinaga
1
Head of Administration of the South Sulawesi High Prosecutors Office & the Law Doctoral Program at the
Diponegoro University, Semarang, Indonesia
2,3,4
Diponegoro University, Semarang, Indonesia
5
Staff of the Directorate General of Taxes and Awardee of Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education & the Law
Doctoral Program of the Diponegoro University, Semarang, Indonesia.

Article Info Abstract:

Volume 83
Page Number: 11981 - 11992
Publication Issue:
March - April 2020
Article History
Article Received: 24 July 2019
Revised: 12 September 2019
Accepted: 15 February 2020
Publication: 17 April 2020
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
The rise of political corruption in Indonesia, as a matter of fact, is the trend
of increasing cases of handling politics from year to year and the actors
involved have reached the level of chairman and general treasurer in
certain political parties, has been very worried. Mitigation efforts such as
the state budget to finance political costs and investigative breakthroughs
are apparently still inadequate, so this study attempts to answer two main
problems based on normative juridical methods using responsive law
theory and progressive legal models. Two conclusions are generated. First,
the authority of the prosecutor's office in handling political corruption in
Indonesia is inadequate because still limited to handling corruption against
individuals and corporations, not yet touching the responsibilities of
political parties as legal entities. This clearly contradicts Article 27
paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution which has guaranteed equality
before the law principle Second, reconstuction need to be done of the
prosecutor's authority in overcoming political corruption and can touch the
root of the problem (namely patronage of the economy-political) in
Indonesia through strengthening of the pre-prosecution authority of the
prosecutor. It is recommended that an update on the Corruption Crime Act,
which includes vicarious liability arrangements, expansion of the scope of
everyone who can touch the criminal liability of legal entities, including
political parties, and official acts definition. In addition, to ensure
independence, accountability and transparency in the prosecution and pre-
prosecution of political corruption, it is hoped that the reform of the
prosecutor's law will place him as the supremacy of prosecution that is
independent, sovereign and free from legislative and executive
intervention.
Keywords: Political Corruption, Prosecution, Pre-Prosecution,
Discretion.

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I. INTRODUCTION
The rampant cases of political corruption in many
countries, including Indonesia, have been very
worrying, because of the corruption that has
become a threat to economic development,
democratic consolidation, and human dignity [1].
Based on a survey conducted by the Global
Chart 1
Key Public Sector Institutions Seen as Corrupt based on Survey of 2017
In the case of political corruption, Yadav and
Mukherjee (2016) noted globally the existence of
an autocracy that could not be held accountable
effectively and their cronies who held control over
the generation and distribution of rents in enriching
themselves and their groups directly and indirectly
and maintained their political support among the
elite and their constituents [3]. Than, a study on
Transparency International Indonesia (TII) (2017)
revealed that the source of corruption in Indonesia
is the practice of patronage, especially in political
institutions, which is carried out by distributing
material resources in legal or illegal ways to
constituents in patron-client relations, due to the
amount of income and facilities obtained by
politicians formally from the state, will not be
enough to finance the practice of patronage[4],
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Corruption Barometer (2017), police and elected
representatives (such as members of parliament,
members of congress, senators etc.) were the most
corrupt institutions in the world in 2017, which
were then followed by government officials,
business executives and local government officials ,
as the data are presented in Chart 1 below [2].
seems to have confronted the results of the study of
Hummel et al (2019) which measured political
subsidies from 175 countries from 1900-2015
which stated that political financial reforms reduce
corruption by reducing the importance of private
money in politics [5]. The fact of political
corruption in Indonesia can be seen from the
handling of corruption that has been carried out by
the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)
since its establishment in 2004 to 2018 in which of
the total 998 corruption cases, 368 cases involved
members of the House of Representatives (DPR),
Regional House of Representatives (DPRD),
Governors, Regents and Mayors in Indonesia. Even
the corrupt behavior tends to show an increasing
trend from year to year as the statistics are
presented in the following Chart 2 [6].
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Chart 2
Corrupt Behavior Tends
The occurrence of political corruption is already a
public secret, but until now it has not been handled
well by law enforcers, even though anti-corruption
reformers have tried to fight for the reduction of
corruption through restrictions on discretion,
increased control over political officials, and
restrictions on the power of officials. Political
corruption seems to justify the standard which
states that the perpetrators commit corruption when
they have great discretion and opportunity in their
actions, little accountability, and considerable
monopoly power [7], as the meaning of political
corruption is in line with Philp (1997) who states:
“political corruption involves substituting rule in
the interests of an individual or group for those
publicly endorsed practices which effect an ordered
resolution to conflicting individual or group
interests” [8].
This long and complex phenomenon of political
corruption shows that the abuse of public power for
personal and political gain has occurred in several
countries, and added to its very closed nature,
which increasingly makes measuring corruption
difficult[9]. The case in Italy, which was a struggle
of a small group of judges and public prosecutors in
Italy during the years 1990-2000 in the fight against
corruption, had attracted a lot of international
attention, because it has tried more than 4000
charges against politicians, including former prime
minister, Silvio Berlusconi , while in office in 1994
[10]. Cases of corruption to individual board
members in Indonesia, for example Central Jakarta
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District Court Decision Number 50 / Pid. SUS /
TPK / 2016 / PN. JKT.PST / 2016 which has
convicted a person who is the principal director of
PT. APL, who had bribed one of the members of
the DPRD. Even political corruption has involved
high-ranking officials in certain political parties, as
Mietzner (2015) states that a breakthrough
investigation seems to have done little to mitigate
the quantity and quality of political corruption in
Indonesia, on the contrary: “Indonesia has
witnessed an ever-growing number of political
corruption cases since the mid-2000s, involving the
highest echelons of party politics. In 2011, the
treasurer of then president Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat,
PD), Mohammad Nazaruddin, was arrested for his
involvement in corrupted state projects worth a
total of Rp 6 trillion ($600 million). In 2013, the
president of the Islamic Prosperous Justice Party
(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), Luthfi Hasan
Ishaaq, was put on trial for accepting bribes in
exchange for beef import quotas given out by the
Ministry of Agriculture, which his party
controlled.” [11]
Even in other countries, such as Belgium, Britain,
Japan, Russia, and Spain, allegations that
corruption plays a more central role in politics can
be seen from the participation of industrial
countries in much corruption in developing
countries through bribery (both directly or
indirectly) in "international business transactions"
[12]. The rise of the phenomenon of political
11983

corruption according to Porta (2004), cannot be
separated from some characteristics of political
parties and party systems that seem to make
political corruption systemic, such as political costs,
party cartels, organizational fragmentation,
occupational public administration, weak
competition between the government and the
opposition, and the like [13], which ultimately
creates a vicious cycle of economic and social costs
which leads to a parallel growth of corruption,
creates inefficiency, builds clientelism and (under
certain conditions) provides political protection
against organized corruption [14].
Considering the practice of political corruption that
is rooted in political patronage that is still rife and
the direction of policy in the field of law which
must be based on at least four interrelated
conceptions namely "rule of law", "human rights",
"right to security and a sense of justice" , and "to all
citizens" where the interrelation lies in the
recognition of the Indonesian state as a rule of law
on the principles of human rights and the
importance of respecting and protecting
fundamental human rights through guarantees of
equality or protection of the right to be free from
acts of discrimination in any form [15], it is
necessary to eradicate political corruption strategies
through increased capacity to prosecute corrupt
politicians [16] which is the role of the prosecutor's
office as a government institution that holds the
supremacy of public prosecutors, and other
authorities in Indonesia based on Article 2
paragraph (1) of the Republic of Indonesia Law No.
16 of 2004 concerning the Republic of the Public
Prosecutor's Office Indonesia (Attorney Act). So, to
answer the existing problems, two main problem
formulations are proposed. The first is how to
regulate the authority of the prosecutor's office in
handling political corruption in Indonesia. Second,
how to renew the law on the authority of the public
prosecution and other authorities of the prosecutor's
office in overcoming political corruption in
Indonesia.
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II. METHOD
This paper is a normative juridical study using the
doctrinal method by examining library materials
that can be used to answer the problem formulation.
Literature or secondary data in this study consists of
primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials
which are based on an inventory of applicable laws,
in concreto law, and legal principles [17] related to
the role of public prosecution in tackling political
corruption in Indonesia. Primary legal materials are
binding legal materials in the form of legislation
relating to criminal law, criminal procedural law,
corruption law, and prosecutors' regulations.
Secondary legal materials used include draft laws,
textbooks, opinions of legal experts, articles,
seminar results, proceedings, and research results in
the field of law. And, the tertiary legal material
used consists of materials which strengthen the use
of primary and secondary legal materials, such as a
legal dictionary, language dictionary, encyclopedia,
and other tertiary legal materials. Primary,
secondary, and tertiary legal materials will be
examined, described, analyzed, and discussed
legally qualitatively based on legislation that does
not conflict with other laws, taking into account the
hierarchy of legislation [18] to further draw a
conclusion that can produce constructive
suggestions [19].
The existence of the doctrinal method in this study
will lead this study to not only focus on the
problems of positive law enforcement and non-
compliance but also concerns the specific
characteristics of the doctrinal law itself, whose
existence is in a priori way of thinking, which relies
heavily on the power of values and teachings [20].
This a priori way of thinking must be in line with
the theory of legal justice proposed by Kelsen
which states that the entire legal system has a
pyramidal structure, wherein in the legal hierarchy,
a legal provision must be sourced from a higher
provision [21], where in the legal context in
Indonesia, the legal classification in this study
refers to Article 7 of Law no. 12 of 2011
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concerning the Formation of Legislation which has
the highest to lowest hierarchy includes the 1945
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the
Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly,
Laws / Government Regulations Substituting Laws,
Government Regulations, Presidential Regulations,
Provincial Regional Regulations, and Regency /
City Regional Regulations , and other types of
statutory regulations whose existence are
recognized and have binding legal force insofar as
they are ordered by the higher statutory regulations
[22].
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
3.1 Regulation of the prosecutor's authority in
political corruption in Indonesia
Article 2 of the Prosecutor's Office Law has
confirmed the position of the Prosecutor's Office or
Public Prosecutor who is under the Indonesian
Prosecutor's Office as one and inseparable in terms
of implementing state power in the field of
prosecution and other authorities based on an
independent law. The matter of the prosecutor's
office or the public prosecutor under the Indonesian
Attorney's Office can be further distinguished
through the understanding in Article 1 number 6
letter a of the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP)
and Article 1 number 1 of the Prosecutor's Law
which has confirmed that the Prosecutor is an
official authorized by law to act as public
prosecutors and implement court decisions that
have permanent legal force. The definition of a
Public Prosecutor is a prosecutor authorized by the
Law to conduct prosecutions and implement judges
as formulated in Article 1 number 6 letter b of the
Criminal Procedure Code, Article 13 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, and Article 1 number 2
of the Prosecutor's Law. In addition to the
prosecution authority, there are other Attorney
General's duties and authorities as regulated in
Article 30 of the Prosecutor's Law that is written:
"(1) In the criminal field, the prosecutor's office has
the following duties and authorities: a. prosecute;
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b. implement the determination of judges and court
decisions that have permanent legal force; c.
supervise the implementation of conditional
criminal rulings, oversight criminal decisions, and
conditional release decisions; d. investigating
certain criminal acts based on the law; e. complete
certain case files and to do so can carry out
additional examination before it is submitted to the
court which in its implementation is coordinated
with the investigator. (2) In the field of civil and
state administration, the attorney with special
powers can act both inside and outside the court for
and on behalf of the state or government. (3) In the
field of public order and peace, the prosecutor's
office organizes the following activities: a.
increasing public legal awareness; b. securing law
enforcement policies; c. supervision of the
circulation of printed matter; d. monitoring the flow
of trust that can endanger the community and the
state; e. prevention of abuse and / or blasphemy of
religion; f. research and development of criminal
law and statistics."
Prosecution as formulated in Article 7 of the
Criminal Procedure Code is an act of the Public
Prosecutor to submit a criminal case to the
competent district court in the matter and in the
manner stipulated in this law, with a request to be
examined and decided by a judge in a court session.
Other provisions relating to the prosecution are
Article 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code on Pre-
prosecution is a stage assessed by the public
prosecutor for the results of an incomplete
investigation, the Prosecutor immediately returns
the case file to the investigator accompanied by
instructions to be completed. Further explanation
regarding the prosecution can also be seen in the
explanation of Article 30 paragraph 1 letter (a) of
the Prosecutor's Law which confirms that in
conducting prosecutions, prosecutors can conduct
pre-prosecution, where the prosecution is an act of
the prosecutor to monitor the progress of the
investigation after receiving notification of the start
of the investigation from the investigator, and it is
the prosecutor's instructions to be completed by the
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investigator so that through this case it can be accordance with their authority are as stipulated in
determined whether the file can be delegated or not the Lex Specialist of the Corruption Act, the
to the prosecution stage. The authority of a public responsibility of which is for "everyone", namely
prosecution is the authority to proceed with the individuals or corporations, who unlawfully commit
prosecution or not on a case that is received through acts of enrichment themselves or another person, or
a stage known as pre-prosecution (before a corporation or for the purpose of benefiting
prosecuting) through rearranging the situation to its oneself or another person or a corporation, misusing
previous position, known as reposition. the authority, opportunity or means available to him
because of his position or position, which could be
In addition to the duties and authorities of the
detrimental to the country's finances or the
Prosecutor's Office in Article 30 of the Prosecutor's
country's economy. Of course, for the context of
Law, Article 32 of the Prosecutor's Law also
political corruption, each person's description
emphasizes that the prosecutor's office can be
shows that the Anti-Corruption Act has not fully
delegated with other duties and authorities based on
applied the principle of equality before the law to
the law. The Attorney's authority and other duties
illegal acts on every legal subject without
include the prosecutor's authority as an investigator
exception, as Sinaga et al (2019) have asserted
in certain criminal acts, such as corruption and
illegal acts as the actions of every person “is not
gross human rights violations. The authority of the
only limited to acts that violate the law but also acts
Prosecutor's Office as an investigator of criminal
that violate moral, propriety, thoroughness and
acts of corruption pursuant to Article 284 paragraph
caution that should be owned by any one in social
(2) of the Transitional Provisions stating "Within
life” [23] and bearing in mind that each person has
two years after this law is enacted, the provisions of
not reached a political party as a legal entity (which
this law shall apply, with temporary exceptions
of course is legal standing, a legal entity is very
regarding the specific provisions of criminal
different from a corporation). In the case of the
proceedings. as stated in certain laws, until there is
principle of equality before the law, Article 27
a change and or is declared no longer valid". Based
Paragraph (1) The Fourth Amendment to the 1945
on this article, the Attorney General's authority to
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (1945
investigate certain criminal acts such as those
Constitution) has guaranteed that "All citizens are
contained in the Het Herziene Inlandch Regulation
equal in law and government and are obliged to
(HIR) Staatsblad Year of 1941 Number 44 is still
uphold the law and government without exception".
considered valid until now and this is further
Then, Samekto (2005) has explained that equality
strengthened by the recognition of the Act that was
before the law principal as a principle with its legal
issued later, namely on UU no. 19 of 2019
doctrine which is neutral, impartial, impersonal,
concerning the Second Amendment to Law No. 30
objective, and irrefutable [24]. Further explanation
of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication
about equality as the political ideals of a country is
Commission (KPK Law), Law No. 31 of 1999 in
also outlined by Dworkin (1985) on two different
conjunction with Law No. 20 of 2001 concerning
principles, namely the principle which requires that
the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption
the government must be responsible for treating all
(Corruption Act).
equals, that is, those who are entitled to the same
Specifically within the scope of law enforcement care and respect , and the government must treat all
against corruption that occurred in Indonesia, the citizens equally, and the principle which requires
Prosecutor has the authority to carry out that the government treats all those responsible
investigations, pre-prosecution and prosecution. equitably based on the distribution of available
Matters relating to criminal acts of corruption that resources [25].
must be handled by the Prosecutor's Office in

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The urgency of equality that must be applied by the
public prosecutor in dealing with political
corruption in Indonesia not only looks at the output
alone, but also must reach the outcome of
inequality that occurs in overcoming political
corruption, as Llloyd, Carolan, and Kosandi have
warned of its negative impacts. Lloyd (1965),
reminded that the inequality of authority, including
welfare and honor or dignity, that occurs in a
society will cause coercion and conflict that can
occur between groups of honor and between
respected and certain communities [26].
Meanwhile, Carolan (2009), reminded that the
emergence of failure to fulfill functions in forming
a sense and responsiveness correctly will cause a
loss of public trust, so an institution must perform a
critical role in forming a sense, responsive to taste,
and must explore how public institutions strengthen
legitimacy the state constitution as an authoritative
statement of public trust [27]. Then, Kosandi
(2015), reminded the need to anticipate changes
that are always experienced by an institution within
a certain period due to the existence of
asymmetrical power, as the direct quote emphasizes
that:“If at any time asymmetric power relations
occur between groups, then an institution is formed
to regulate new patterns of power relations that are
also asymmetrical, then the institution will also be
questioned because it produces an asymmetrical
pattern of power relations” [28].
3.2 Legal renewal of the power of public
prosecution and other authorities in
overcoming political corruption in Indonesia
Porta (2004), has warned that the vicious circle
associated with the active role of political parties in
the development of corruption is in fact not only in
petty corruption, but has reached in "systemic
corruption," where forbidden things are the norm
and corruption becomes very common and
institutionalized, so those who behave illegally are
rewarded and those who obey and receive the law
bear the punishment [13]. The circle of political
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corruption that has been happening in Indonesia
should be understood as a collective act, the
occurrence of corruption that has harmed the
country's finances or economy which is not only
done by one person. This means that the
formulation of the norms of corruption against
"everyone" is in the level of application of the law
in investigations, pre-prosecutions, and
prosecutions that are the authority of the Prosecutor
to be too textual, normative, rigid, and positivistic.
Therefore, renewal of the prosecutor's authority is
needed through legal reconstruction, which reflects
an action in order to rebuild, re-create, or
reorganize the existing authority arrangements to be
more ideal, which prioritizes outputs and outcomes
in its efforts to overcome illegal acts that are
detrimental to finance or the national economy [29].
The renewal of the attorney's authority in handling
political corruption that goes beyond positivism is
in line with the responsive legal thinking put
forward by Nonet and Selznick and the progressive
legal model put forward by Rahardjo. Nonet and
Selznick (2010), based their thoughts on two main
doctrines. First, law must be functional, pragmatic,
purposeful, and rational. Second, competence must
become a benchmark for evaluating all practices
that cause the inadequacy of the law as a means of
change and as a means to realize substantive justice
[30]. Then, Progressive Law offers a better and
healthier way of law, which is able to provide
avenues for liberation from formal law [31]. The
implementation of a progressive legal model in
supporting the reconstruction of the prosecutor's
authority in overcoming political corruption in
Indonesia can be done through exploring the eight
points of progressive legal thoughts, as quoted
directly from Atmasasmita (2010), as follows: “The
law rejects the opinion that order only works
through statehood; 2) Progressive law is aimed at
protecting people towards the ideal of law; 3) The
law rejects the status quo, and does not want to
make the law as a technology that has no
conscience, but rather a moral institution; 4) Law
is an institution that aims to bring people to a just,
11987

prosperous life and make people happy; 5)
Progressive law is, "law in favor of the people" and
"law in favor of justice"; 6) The basic assumption
of progressive law is that law is for humans, not
vice versa. In this regard, the law does not exist for
itself, but for something broader and bigger. So
whenever there is a problem in and with the law,
the law is reviewed and corrected and non-humans
are forced to be included in the legal system; 7)
Law is not an absolute and final institution but
rather depends on how humans see and use it. Man
is the decider; 8) Law is always in the process of
continuing to be (law as a process, law in the
making).” [32]
The use of responsive legal theory and progressive
legal models in reconstructing the authority of the
prosecutor's office in tackling political corruption in
Indonesia is expected to overcome matters relating
to how to distinguish between corruption and
incompetence, and how deep the recognition of
views that state that political corruption may be
functional [8]. Reconstruction of the attorney
authority in the context of responsive legal theory
and progressive legal models, as well as reflecting
the position of the prosecutor's office as part of the
integrated criminal justice system (ICJS) with other
law enforcement agencies. The ICJS which
symbolizes as one of the instruments of social
control is described by Siegel (2011) through each
of the interrelationship of the Criminal Justice
System and the Criminal Justice Process whose
scope is: 1) the investigator who has the process of
making contact, investigation, detention, custody,
and confiscation; 2) prosecutors who have a
business process to prosecute and execute judges'
decisions, and 3) the judge has a process for
adjudication, disposition, conviction, and
postconviction remedies [33]. Of course, the
position of the prosecutor in the ICJS shows the
fulfillment of the principle of checks and balances,
which is a system that oversees each other equally
is a counterpart of the trias politica system needed
in a human-related constitutional system. As an
organizer of a state that has a tendency to expand,
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extend, and abuse power by ignoring the rights of
the people [34], which must be carried out
accountably and independently of the branches of
legislative and executive power, bearing in mind
that the prosecutor's office ensures that judicial
power does not abuse its public office which is also
independent [35]. The reconstruction of the
attorney's authority in distinguishing corruption
from incompetence and views on political
corruption may be functional can be done with
things, such as:
1. Applying vicarious liability to political parties
that overshadow the state politicians who are
proven to be corrupt, as the model of
accountability has been formulated in Article
39 paragraph (2) of the Draft Criminal Code
Book (KUHP) which confirms that in the case
determined by the Act, everyone can be held
accountable for crimes committed by others.
Adequate implementation of vicarious liability
in overcoming political corruption in
Indonesia, in addition to being applied in
several countries, such as the United Kingdom
and the United States, as the meaning of
liability has extended to the concept of
"everyone's" legal obligations which are
deemed legally competent for any legal
violations that occur, bearing in mind the
consequences arising not only for those who
commit direct violations but enough for
everyone who is legally related to the violation
of the law [36]. Several experts have also
explained the matter of vicarious liability.
Jones (2013), asserted that vicarious liability is
an act of taking responsibility for an offense
committed by another person, which arises
because of a special relationship between the
parties [37]. Chen (2017), explains that the
liability is the liability of the party that receives
direct financial benefits for an offense
committed by another party because it is
related to supervision and control imposed on
the responsible party, so with accountability -
the answer, the responsible party is
11988

increasingly increasing prudence in selecting,
supervising, supervising, and monitoring the
parties who work on it [38]. Some literature
that has explained the vicarious liability shows
that the reconstruction of the prosecutor's
authority, for example, through the application
of this responsibility can handle the
fundamental problem of political corruption,
namely political-economic patronage [4] and
view of Ceva's argument (2018) which
confirms that the concept of political
corruption (as a publicly entrusted use of
power that cannot be accounted for) illustrates
the manifestations of individuals and
institutions that have influenced democratic
societies, so that the corruption of public
officials and their institutions has the same root
in creating injustice politics [39]. That is, it is
important to apply vicarious liability in the
event of a political corrupt given that the
corrupt behavior of public officials should not
only be considered a violation of personal
morality but in inherently politically salient
terms, as Ceva and Ferretti's (2017) question of
“Is the corrupt behaviour of public officials a
politically relevant kind of wrong only when it
causes the malfunctioning of institutions?” [40]
must be homework for prosecutors as
prosecutors in prosecution in Indonesia.
2. Expanding the scope of the meaning of the
corporation, which in the element of
"everyone" identified with individuals and
corporations, becomes a legal entity so that it
can touch political parties. This is expected to
be able to renew the meaning of a corporation
as a legal entity, which so far has only handled
criminal acts for corporations as stipulated in
Supreme Court Regulation (PERMA) No. 13
of 2016, which should touch other legal entities
including political parties as legal subjects.
3. Expansion of bribery arrangements that have so
far triggered political corruption. As in the
United States Code (U.S.C) which confirms
that individual public officials are considered
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to have committed a crime if the official
“corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts,
or agrees to receive or accept anything of
value personally ... in return for being
influenced in the performance of any official
act ..” as formulated in 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (2)
(A), and it is further emphasized that what is
meant by official acts is "any decision or action
on any question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy, which may at any
time be pending, or which may by law be
brought before any public official, in such
official's official capacity, or in such official's
place of trust or profit" as formulated in 18
U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) [41].
Obviously, the reconstruction of the prosecutor's
authority which is expected to be able to present
laws that are truly in favor of justice and public
benefit is carried out through pre-prosecution,
which is a stage owned by the public prosecutor to
conduct a study of the results of a political
corruption investigation accompanied by
instructions from the public prosecutor so that the
investigator is able to explore justice (substantive)
and truth, especially in terms of criminal
responsibility of corruption, so that the resulting
case file provides an output as well as a good
outcome. This is in line with the discretion
mandated by Article 8 paragraph (2) and paragraph
(3) of the Prosecutor's Law which explicitly states
that prosecutors in conducting prosecutions must do
so for justice and truth, which is based on the
Almighty God, by always observing the norms
religion, politeness, decency, and are obliged to
explore and uphold the values of humanity that live
in society, and always maintain the honor and
dignity of his profession. Justification of discretion
based on "for the sake of justice and truth based on
the Almighty God " is also a control to curb the
abuse of power and means to ensure that
prosecutors have worked independently,
accountably [42], and are value oriented (which
prioritizes attitudes of courage and integrity) in
exercising its authority to deal with political
11989

corruption which outputs formal justice and results
in substantive justice and truth.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper produces two main conclusions. First,
the authority of the prosecutor's office in handling
political corruption in Indonesia is still limited to
handling corruption against individuals and
corporations, not yet touching the responsibilities of
political parties as legal entities. This clearly
contradicts the constitution which applies the
principle of equality before the law to every
Indonesian citizen. Second, the legal reform of the
prosecution authority and other prosecutors'
authority in overcoming political corruption in
Indonesia can be done through the reconstruction of
the pre-prosecution authority of the prosecutor
whose discretion is still based on "for justice and
truth based on the Almighty God", so that the
handling of political corruption is still massive can
touch the root of the problem, namely political-
economic patronage. In order for the legal standing
of pre-prosecution prosecution discretion to provide
good outputs and outcomes in handling political
corruption, it is proposed that the district attorney's
office be independent and independent of
legislative and executive power, vicarious liability
arrangements, broadening the scope of everyone
(who can touch the criminal liability of legal
entities, including political parties, not merely
corporate criminal liability), and limiting illegal
acts of public officials through strict regulation of
official acts as exemplified in 18 U.S.C.§
201(b)(2)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3).
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