G.R. No.
L-15674             October 17, 1921 It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta
CONSOLACION GABETO, in her own right and as guardian
ad litem of her three children, plaintiff-appellee,  thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of
vs.
AGATON ARANETA, defendant-appellant.
It appears in evidence that on August 4, 1918. Basilio Ilano and
Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay, in the City of
Iloilo, with a view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the
same City. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and
started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta,
stepped out into the street, and laying his hands on the reins, stopped
the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself
had called this carromata first. The driver, one Julio Pagnaya, replied
to the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta, and that
he had taken up the two passengers then in the carromata as the first
who had offered employment. At or about the same time Pagnaya
pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of
Agaton Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing,
however, to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the
rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of
the horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out,
which he did, in order to find the bridle. The horse was then pulled
over to near the curb, by one or the other — it makes no difference
which — and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle.
While he was thus engaged, the horse, being free from the control of
the bit, became disturbed and moved forward, in doing which he
pulled one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and
pushed Julio Pagnaya over. After going a few years further the side
of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a
post on the sidewalk, upon which the box came down with a crash
and frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed
up the street.
Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit. Basilio Ilano, had alighted
while the carromata was as yet alongside the sidewalk; but the other,
Proceso Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the
runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the
Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and
in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.
As to the facts above stated the evidence cannot be said to be
materially in conflict; but there is decided conflict upon the point of
the exact relation of the defendant Agaton Araneta, to the runaway.
The evidence for the plaintiff on this point consists chiefly of the
testimony of Julio Pagnaya and of Basilio Ilano. They both say that
while yet in the middle of the street, the defendant jerked the bridle,
which caused the bit to come out of the horse's mouth, and Julio says
that at that juncture the throat latch of the bridle was broken. Be this
as it may, we are of the opinion that the mere fact that the defendant
interfered with the carromata by stopping the horse in the manner
stated would not make him liable for the death of Proceso Gayetano;
because it is admitted by Julio Pagnaya that he afterwards got out of
the carromata and went to the horse's head to fix the bridle. The
evidence is furthermore convincing to the effect that, after Julio
Pagnaya alighted, the horse was conducted to the curb and that an
appreciable interval of time elapsed — same witnesses say several
minutes — before the horse started on his career up the
street. 1awph!l.net
in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that
presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause
the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the
control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with
liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse
thereafter.
Julio Pagnaya testifies to one fact which, if it were fully accredited,
would possibly put a different complexion on the case; for he says
that when the horse was pulled over to the curb, the defendant, by
way of emphasizing his verbal denunciation of Pagnaya, gesticulated
with one of his arms and incidentally brought his hand down on the
horse's nose. This, according to Pagnaya, is what made the horse run
away. There is no other witness who testifies to this; and it is
noteworthy that Basilio Ilano does not mention it. A decided
preponderance of the evidence in our opinion is against it.
The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of
which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken.
Julio Pagnaya had a natural interest in refuting this fact, as well as in
exculpating himself in other respects; and we are of the opinion that
the several witnesses who testified for the defendant gave a more
credible account of the affair than the witnesses for the plaintiff.
According to the witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked
the rein, thereby causing the bit it come out of the horse's mouth; and
they say that Julio, after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and
proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was
slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from
control, started to go away as previously stated.
Upon the whole we are constrained to hold that the defendant is not
legally responsible for the death of Proceso Gayetano; and though
reluctant to interfere with the findings of fact of a trial court when
there is a conflict of testimony, the evidence in this case so clearly
preponderates in favor of the defendant, that we have no recourse but
to reverse the judgment.
The judgment will therefore be reversed, and the defendant will be
absolved from the complaint; and it is so ordered, without express
finding as to costs of either instance. So ordered.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM
CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA
DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and
VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
THE FACTS
1. Spouses Carpitanos filed a case, claiming damages for the
death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos against James
Daniel II and his parents, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Marys Academy.
2. It appears that St. Mary’s Academy conducted an
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996.
3. Part of the he enrollment campaign was the visitation of
schools from where prospective enrollees were studying.
4. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos
was part of the campaigning group.
5. Accordingly, on that day, Sherwin, along with other high
school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan
 Elementary School.
a. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15
years old and a student of the same school.
Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless
manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
b. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the
injuries he sustained from the accident.
6. The lower courts ruled against the petitioner and held them
as liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
The Courts Ruling: We reverse the decision of the CA.
1. The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy
liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles
218 and 219 of the Family Code, pointing out that
petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in
not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the
jeep.
2. Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall
have special parental authority over a minor child while
under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.
a. This special parental authority and responsibility
applies to all authorized activities, whether inside
or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution.
3. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under
custody is a minor, those exercising special parental
authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor while under their supervision, instruction, or
custody.
4. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding
that the act or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.
5. In order that there may be a recovery for an injury,
however, it must be shown that the injury for which
recovery is sought must be:
a. the legitimate consequence of the wrong done;
b. the connection between the negligence; and
c. the injury must be a direct and natural sequence
of events, unbroken by intervening efficient
causes.
d. In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury.
6. In this case, the respondents failed to show that the
negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the
death of the victim.
7. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that
the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence
of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
8. Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to
show that the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving
of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on
Article 219 of the Family Code that those given the
authority and responsibility under the preceding
Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor was unfounded.
9. Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school
allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep.
a. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent
Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and
control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle
and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive
the jeep at the time of the accident.
b. Hence, liability for the accident, whether
caused by the negligence of the minor driver
or mechanical detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
minors parents primarily.
c. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys
Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident.
d. Between the remote cause and the injury, there
intervened the negligence of the minors parents
or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep.
10. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned
by respondent Villanueva was an event over which
petitioner St. Mary’s Academy had no control, and which
was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not
be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
11. Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by
petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident
occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the
vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death
of Sherwin Carpitanos.
CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; SPECIAL
PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER A MINOR CHILD.— Under
Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special
parental authorityover a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, itsadministrators and teachers;
or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.This
special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized
activities,whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity
or institution. Thus, suchauthority and responsibility applies to field
trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupilsand students outside
the school premises whenever authorized by the school or itsteachers
.2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPAL AND SOLIDARY
LIABILITY OF PERSONS EXERCISINGPARENTAL
AUTHORITY. — Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the
person undercustody is a minor, those exercising special parental
authority are principally and solidarilyliable for damages caused by
the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their
supervision, instruction, or custody.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE. — However, for petitioner to
be liable, there must be afinding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of theinjury
caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident
.4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In this
case, the respondents failed to show thatthe negligence of petitioner
was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.Respondents
Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of
theaccident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II, butthe detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep. Further, there was no evidence thatpetitioner
school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of
respondentVivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva,who had possession and control
of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowedJames Daniel
II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. Considering
that thenegligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeepowned by respondent Villanueva was
an event over which petitioner St. Mary's Academyhad no control,
and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may
not beheld liable for the death resulting from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitionerlikewise cannot be held liable
for moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awardedby the trial
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Though incapable of
pecuniarycomputation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of thedefendant's wrongful act or omission. In
this case, the proximate cause of the accidentwas not attributable to
petitioner. For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable forthe
accident, the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to
pay deathindemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted.
Moreover, the grant of attorney'sfees as part of damages is the
exception rather than the rule. The power of the court toaward
attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual,
legal andequitable justification. Thus, the grant of attorney's fees
against the petitioner is likewisedeleted.
5. ID.; DAMAGES; REGISTERED OWNER OF VEHICLE
PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FORINJURIES CAUSED TO THE
PUBLIC OR TO THIRD PERSONS WHILE VEHICLE WAS
BEINGDRIVEN ON THE HIGHWAYS OR STREETS. — We have
held that the registered owner of anyvehicle, even if not used for
public service, would primarily be responsible to the public orto third
persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being
driven on thehighways or streets. Hence, with the overwhelming
evidence presented by petitioner andthe respondent Daniel spouses
that the accident occurred because of the detachment ofthe steering
wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner
of thevehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death
of Sherwin Carpitanos.[G.R. No. 159270. August 22, 2005]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, RODRIGO ARNAIZ, REGINA
LATAGAN, RICARDO GENERALAO and
PAMPANGA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
INC., CORPORATION, respondents.
The Antecedents
Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. (PASUDECO)
transports sugarcane from Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga.
When the Mount Pinatubo eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the
national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang
Maragul via Magalang, Pampanga, it requested permission from the
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks to enter and pass through
the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) via Dau-Sta. Ines from
Mabalacat, and via Angeles from Magalang, and exit at San
Fernando going to its milling factory.[2] The TRB furnished the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) (the
franchisee that operates and maintains the toll facilities in the North
and South Luzon Toll Expressways) with a copy of the said request
for it to comment thereon.[3]
On November 5, 1991, TRB and PASUDECO entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement[4] (MOA), where the latter was allowed
to enter and pass through the NLEX on the following terms and
conditions:
1. PASUDECO trucks should move in convoy;
2. Said trucks will stay on the right lane;
3. A vehicle with blinking lights should be assigned at
the rear end of the convoy with a sign which
should read as follows: Caution: CONVOY
AHEAD!!!;
4. Tollway safety measures should be properly observed;
5. Accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out
of any activity related to this approval shall be the
responsibility of PASUDECO;
6. PASUDECO shall be responsible in towing their
stalled trucks immediately to avoid any
inconvenience to the other motorists;
7. This request will be in force only while the national
bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang
Maragul via Magalang remain impassable.
PASUDECO furnished the PNCC with a copy of the MOA.
[5]
 In a Letter[6] dated October 22, 1992, the PNCC informed
PASUDECO that it interposed no objection to the MOA.
At around 2:30 a.m. on January 23, 1993, Alex Sendin, the
PNCC security supervisor, and his co-employees Eduardo Ducusin
and Vicente Pascual were patrolling Km. 72 going north of the
NLEX. They saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle portion of the
north and southbound lanes of the road.[7] They placed lit cans with
diesel oil in the north and southbound lanes, including lane dividers
with reflectorized markings, to warn motorists of the obstruction.
Sendin, Ducusin and Pascual proceeded to the PASUDECO office,
believing that the pile of sugarcane belonged to it since it was the
only milling company in the area. They requested for a payloader or
grader to clear the area. However, Engineer Oscar Mallari,
PASUDECOs equipment supervisor and transportation
superintendent, told them that no equipment operator was available
as it was still very early.[8]Nonetheless, Mallari told them that he
would send someone to clear the affected area. Thereafter, Sendin
and company went back to Km. 72 and manned the traffic. At around
4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived, and started clearing the
highway of the sugarcane. They stacked the sugarcane at the side of
the road. The men left the area at around 5:40 a.m., leaving a few
flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. As the bulk of the
sugarcanes had been piled and transferred along the roadside, Sendin
thought there was no longer a need to man the traffic. As dawn was
already approaching, Sendin and company removed the lighted cans
and lane dividers.[9] Sendin went to his office in Sta. Rita, Guiguinto,
Bulacan, and made the necessary report.[10]
At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, a certified mechanic
and marketing manager of JETTY Marketing, Inc.,[11] was driving his
two-door Toyota Corolla with plate number FAG 961 along the
NLEX at about 65 kilometers per hour.[12] He was with his sister
Regina Latagan, and his friend Ricardo Generalao; they were on their
way to Baguio to attend their grandmothers first death anniversary.
[13]
 As the vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of
control and turned turtle several times. The accident threw the car
about fifteen paces away from the scattered sugarcane.
Police Investigator Demetrio Arcilla investigated the matter
and saw black and white sugarcanes on the road, on both lanes,
which appeared to be flattened.[14]
On March 4, 1993, Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a
complaint[15] for damages against PASUDECO and PNCC in the
RTC of Manila, Branch 16. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
93-64803. They alleged, inter alia, that through its negligence,
PNCC failed to keep and maintain the NLEX safe for motorists when
it allowed PASUDECO trucks with uncovered and unsecured
sugarcane to pass through it; that PASUDECO negligently spilled
sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed to put up emergency
devices to sufficiently warn approaching motorists of the existence of
such spillage; and that the combined gross negligence of
PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and proximate cause of the
injuries sustained by Latagan and the damage to Arnaizs car. They
prayed, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered for the plaintiffs, ordering the defendants
jointly and severally:
(a) To pay unto plaintiff Rodrigo Arnaiz the sum
of P100,000.00 representing the value of his
car which was totally wrecked;
(b) to pay unto plaintiff Regina Latagan the sum
of P100,000.00 by way of reimbursement for
medical expenses, the sum of P50,000.00 by
way of moral damages, and the sum
of P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
(c) To pay unto plaintiffs Rodrigo Arnaiz and
Ricardo Generalao the sum of P5,000.00 by
way of reimbursement for medical expenses;
and
(d) To pay unto the plaintiffs the sum
of P30,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; plus
the costs of suit.
Plaintiffs pray for other reliefs which the Honorable Court may find
due them in the premises.[16]
In its Answer,[17] PNCC admitted that it was under contract to
manage the North Luzon Expressway, to keep it safe for motorists. It
averred that the mishap was due to the unreasonable speed at which
Arnaizs car was running, causing it to turn turtle when it passed over
some pieces of flattened sugarcane. It claimed that the proximate
cause of the mishap was PASUDECOs gross negligence in spilling
the sugarcane, and its failure to clear and mop up the area
completely. It also alleged that Arnaiz was guilty of contributory
negligence in driving his car at such speed.
The PNCC interposed a compulsory counterclaim[18] against the
plaintiffs and cross-claim[19] against its co-defendant PASUDECO.
PASUDECO adduced evidence that aside from it, there were
other sugarcane mills in the area, like the ARCAM Sugar Central
(formerly known as Pampanga Sugar Mills) and the Central
Azucarrera de Tarlac;[20] it was only through the expressway that a
vehicle could access these three (3) sugar centrals;[21] and
PASUDECO was obligated to clear spillages whether the planters
truck which caused the spillage was bound for PASUDECO,
ARCAM or Central Azucarera.[22]
On rebuttal, PNCC adduced evidence that only planters trucks
with PSD markings were allowed to use the tollway;[23] that all such
trucks would surely enter the PASUDECO compound. Thus, the
truck which spilled sugarcane in January 1993 in Km. 72 was on its
way to the PASUDECO compound.[24]
On November 11, 1994, the RTC rendered its decision[25] in
favor of Latagan, dismissing that of Arnaiz and Generalao for
insufficiency of evidence. The case as against the PNCC was,
likewise, dismissed. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered:
I. ORDERING defendant PASUDECO:
1. To pay plaintiff Regina Latagan:
a. P25,000 = for actual damages
b. P15,000 = for moral damages
c. P10,000 = for attorneys fees
P50,000
2. To pay costs of suit.
II. The case is DISMISSED as to defendant PNCC. No
pronouncement as to costs. Its counterclaim is,
likewise, DISMISSED.
III. The claims for damages of plaintiffs Rodrigo Arnaiz
and Ricardo Generalao are hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.[26]
Both the plaintiffs Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao and
defendant PASUDECO appealed the decision to the CA. Since the
plaintiffs failed to file their brief, the CA dismissed their appeal.[27]
Resolving PASUDECOs appeal, the CA rendered judgment on
April 29, 2003, affirming the RTC decision with modification. The
appellate court ruled that Arnaiz was negligent in driving his car, but
that such negligence was merely contributory to the cause of the
mishap, i.e., PASUDECOs failure to properly supervise its men in
clearing the affected area. Its supervisor, Mallari, admitted that he
was at his house while their men were clearing Km. 72. Thus, the
appellate court held both PASUDECO and PNCC, jointly and
severally, liable to Latagan. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed DECISION is
hereby MODIFIED and judgment is hereby rendered declaring
PASUDECO and PNCC, jointly and solidarily, liable:
1. To pay plaintiff Regina Latagan:
a. P25,000 = for actual damages
b. P15,000 = for moral damages
c. P10,000 = for attorneys fees
2. To pay costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. [28]
The PNCC, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, alleging
that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
MODIFYING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND
MAKING PETITIONER PNCC, JOINTLY AND [SOLIDARILY],
LIABLE WITH PRIVATE RESPONDENT PASUDECO.[29]
The petitioner asserts that the trial court was correct when it
held that PASUDECO should be held liable for the mishap, since it
had assumed such responsibility based on the MOA between it and
the TRB. The petitioner relies on the trial courts finding that only
PASUDECO was given a permit to pass through the route.
The petitioner insists that the respondents failed to prove that it
was negligent in the operation and maintenance of the NLEX. It
maintains that it had done its part in clearing the expressway of
sugarcane piles, and that there were no more piles of sugarcane along
the road when its men left Km. 72; only a few scattered sugarcanes
flattened by the passing motorists were left. Any liability arising
from any mishap related to the spilled sugarcanes should be borne by
PASUDECO, in accordance with the MOA which provides
that accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any
activity related to this approval shall be the responsibility of
PASUDECO.
The petitioner also argues that the respondents should bear the
consequences of their own fault or negligence, and that the proximate
and immediate cause of the mishap in question was respondent
Arnaizs reckless imprudence or gross negligence.
The Court notes that the issues raised in the petition are factual
in nature. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law
may be raised in this Court, and while there are exceptions to the
rule, no such exception is present in this case. On this ground alone,
the petition is destined to fail. The Court, however, has reviewed the
records of the case, and finds that the petition is bereft of merit.
The petitioner is the grantee of a franchise, giving it the right,
privilege and authority to construct, operate and maintain toll
facilities covering the expressways, collectively known as the NLEX.
[30]
 Concomitant thereto is its right to collect toll fees for the use of
the said expressways and its obligation to keep it safe for motorists.
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered
by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some
other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection
of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. [31] Article 2176 of the New
Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which
a prudent and reasonable man would do. [32] It also refers to the
conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the
circumstance justly demand, whereby that other person suffers
injury.[33] The Court declared the test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in Picart v. Smith,[34] viz:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts
the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence
in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing
an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of
another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as
a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the
law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take
precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to
do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed
by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.[35]
In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise
the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists.
The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed
even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground.[36] The
highway was still wet from the juice and sap of the flattened
sugarcanes.[37] The petitioner should have foreseen that the wet
condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing by at
night or in the wee hours of the morning.
The petitioner cannot escape liability under the MOA between
PASUDECO and TRB, since respondent Latagan was not a party
thereto. We agree with the following ruling of the CA:
Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee PNCC, should
be held liable. PNCC, in charge of the maintenance of the
expressway, has been negligent in the performance of its duties. The
obligation of PNCC should not be relegated to, by virtue of a private
agreement, to other parties.
PNCC declared the area free from obstruction since there were
no piles of sugarcane, but evidence shows there were still pieces of
sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists. There must be an
observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the situation demands. There should have been sufficient warning
devices considering that there were scattered sugarcane stalks still
left along the tollway.
The records show, and as admitted by the parties, that Arnaizs car ran
over scattered sugarcanes spilled from a hauler truck.[38]
Moreover, the MOA refers to accidents or damages to the toll
facilities. It does not cover damages to property or injuries caused to
motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the MOA.
PASUDECOs negligence in transporting sugarcanes without
proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing the emergency
warning devices, were two successive negligent acts which were the
direct and proximate cause of Latagans injuries. As such,
PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable. As the Court
held in the vintage case of Sabido v. Custodio:[39]
According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons,
although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it
is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act
alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage
might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor. ...
In Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals,[40] the
Court declared that the liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and
solidary, to wit:
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a
person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient
that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes
other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a
person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for
only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person
charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury
would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is
not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the
concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from
his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the
other concurrent tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an
injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the
injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or
any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it
may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty
owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's
negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not
exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible
for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole
cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is
solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the
concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons, although acting independently, are in combination with the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where
their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third
party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the
resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
Thus, with PASUDECOs and the petitioners successive
negligent acts, they are joint tortfeasors who are solidarily liable for
the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code.[41]
Anent respondent Arnaizs negligence in driving his car, both
the trial court and the CA agreed that it was only contributory, and
considered the same in mitigating the award of damages in his favor
as provided under Article 2179[42] of the New Civil Code.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection.[43] Even the petitioner itself described Arnaizs negligence
as contributory. In its Answer to the complaint filed with the trial
court, the petitioner asserted that the direct and proximate cause of
the accident was the gross negligence of PASUDECO personnel
which resulted in the spillage of sugarcane and the apparent failure of
the PASUDECO workers to clear and mop up the area completely,
coupled with the contributory negligence of Arnaiz in driving his car
at an unreasonable speed.[44] However, the petitioner changed its
theory in the present recourse, and now claims that the proximate and
immediate cause of the mishap in question was the reckless
imprudence or gross negligence of respondent Arnaiz.[45] Such a
change of theory cannot be allowed. When a party adopts a certain
theory in the trial court, he will not be permitted to change his theory
on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the
other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process.[46]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the present
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47699, dated April 29, 2003, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Franchises; Expressways; Concomitant to the grant
of  franchise giving the grantee the right, privilege and authority t
oconstruct, operate and maintain toll facilities, and the right
tocollect toll fees for the use of the expressways, is its obligations
tokeep it safe for the motorists
.—The petitioner is the grantee of afranchise, giving it the right,
privilege and authority to construct,operate and maintain toll
facilities covering the expressways,collectively known as the NLEX.
Concomitant thereto is its rightto collect toll fees for the use of the
said expressways and itsobligation to keep it safe for motorists.
Same; Same; Torts; Quasi- Delicts; Elements
.—There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a)damages suffered by
the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of thedefendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond;and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault ornegligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by theplaintiff. Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code provides: Art. 2176.Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, therebeing fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done.Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractualrelation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and isgoverned by the provisions of this Chapter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Negligence; Test; Words
and Phrases; Negligence is the omission to do something which ar
easonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarilyregulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do;
Thetest for determining whether a person is negligent is: could
a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence i
sattributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonableconsequence of the course actu- ally pursued?
 —Negligence is the omission to do something whicha reasonable
man, guided by those considerations whichordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or thedoing of something which
a prudent and reasonable man woulddo. It also refers to the conduct
which creates undue risk of harmto another, the failure to observe
that degree of care, precautionand vigilance that the circumstance
justly demand, whereby thatother person suffers injury. The Court
declared the test by whichto determine the existence of negligence in
Picart v. Smith,viz.:The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in aparticular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant indoing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
andcaution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
inthe same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The
lawhere in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
theimaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias  of the Roman
law.The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined
byreference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situationbefore him. The law considers what would be
reckless,blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence andprudence and determines liability by that. The test
fordetermining whether a person is negligent in doing an actwhereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this:
could a prudent man, in the position of the personto whom
negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the personinjured as a
reasonable consequence of the course actuall pursued? If so, the law
imposes a duty on the actor to refrain fromthat course or to take
precautions to guard against itsmischievous results, and the failure
to do so constitutesnegligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoringof the admonition born of this provision, is
always necessarybefore negligence can be held to exist.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the concurrent orsuccessive
negligent acts or omission of two or more persons,although acting
independently of each other, are, in combinationthe direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third personand it is
impossible to determine in what proportion eachcontributed to the
injury, either is responsible for the whole injury,even though his act
alone might not have caused the entire injury,or the same damage
might have resulted from the acts of the othertort-feasor
.—PASUDECO’s negligence in transporting sugarcaneswithout
proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing theemergency
warning devices, were two successive negligent acts which were the
directand proximate cause of Latagan’s injuries. As such,
PASUDECOand PNCC are jointly and severally liable. As the Court
held inthe vintage case of
Sabido v. Custodio
: According to the greatweight of authority, where the concurrent or
successive negligentacts or omission of two or more persons,
although actingindependently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct andproximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it
isimpossible to determine in what proportion each contributed tothe
injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even thoughhis act
alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the samedamage
might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor....
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Contributory Negligence;Words
and Phrases; Contributory negligence is conduct on the partof the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm hehas
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he isrequired to
conform for his protection
.—Anent respondent Arnaiz’s negligence in driving his car, both the
trial court and the CA agreed that it was only contributory, and
considered the samein mitigating the award of damages in his favor
as provided
under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code. Contributory negligence 
isconduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legalcause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standardto which he is required to conform for his own protection.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice;
Due Process; Where a party adopts a certain theory in thetrial
court, he will not be permitted to change his theory on
appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the 
other party, but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of
fair play, justice and due process
.—Even the petitioner itself
described Arnaiz’s negligence as contributory. In its Answer to the
complaint filed with the trial court, the petitioner asserted that“the
direct and proximate cause of the accident was the grossnegligence
of PASUDECO personnel which resulted in thespillage of sugarcane
and the apparent failure of the PASUDECOworkers to clear and
mop up the area completely, coupled withthe contributory negligence
of Arnaiz in driving his car at anunreasonable speed.” However, the
petitioner changed its theoryin the present recourse, and now claims
that the proximate andimmediate cause of the mishap in
question was the reckless
imprudence or gross negligence of respondent Arnaiz. Such achange
of theory cannot be allowed. When a party adopts acertain theory in
the trial court, he will not be permitted tochange his theory on
appeal, for to permit him to do so would notonly be unfair to the
other party but it would also be offensive tothe basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process
LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC. vs. GLODEL
BROKERAGE CORPORATION and R&B
INSURANCECORPORATION
G.R. No. 179446 January 10, 2011
FACTS:
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy
No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of  Columbia to insure the shipment
of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On
August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel
"Richard Rey" from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila.
They arrived on the same date.
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdra
wal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its
warehouses/ plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of
Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes
to Columbia’s warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela
City. The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by
Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by its
employed truck helpers. Six (6) truck loads
of copper cathodes were to be delivered to Balagtas, Bulacan, while t
he other six (6)truck loads were destined for Lawang Bato,
Valenzuela City. The cargoes in six truckloads for Lawang Bato
were duly delivered in Columbia’s warehouses there. Of the six (6)
trucks enroute to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached
the destination. One (1) truck loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces
of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo. Later on, the said
truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but without
the copper cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed with
R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount of
P1,903,335.39 which was paid in the amount of P1,896,789.62 after
investigation and adjustment.
R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against
both Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103040. It
sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the
loss of the subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated "to
the right of the consignee to recover from the party/parties who may
be held legally liable for the loss."
ISSUE
1. Whether or not Loadmasters and Glodel are common
carriers.
2. Whether Loadmasters and Glodel are solidarily liable.
3. Whether there is a Principal-Agent relationship
between Loadmasters and Glodel.
HELD
Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or
air for compensation, offering their services to the public. A common
carrier is distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is
generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself
out to carry goods for the general public.  The distinction is
significant in the sense that the rights and obligations of the parties to
a contract of private carriage are governed principally by their
stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated
from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to
observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case,
as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code.  When the Court
speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care
and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection
observe for securing and preserving their own property or rights.  Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary
This exacting standard imposed on common carriers in a contract of
carriage of goods is intended to tilt the scales in favor of the shipper
who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the goods have been
lodged for shipment. Thus, in case of loss of the goods, the common
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.
This presumption of fault or negligence, however, may be rebutted
by proof that the common carrier has observed extraordinary
diligence over the goods.
With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility,
the Civil Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence
lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the
possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until the
same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.
Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters
and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the
loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code,
“the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
delict is solidary.”
Loadmasters’ claim that it was never privy to the contract entered
into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as
subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual
relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the provisions of
Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which expressly
provide:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody
of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) were
instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As
employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages
caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned
task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to
another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the
employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of
its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its
employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee. In this regard, Loadmasters failed.
diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply
with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the
designated destination. It should have been more prudent in
entrusting the goods to Loadmasters by taking precautionary
measures, such as providing escorts to accompany the trucks in
delivering the cargoes. Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with
Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is unavailing.
At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there exists no principal-
agent relationship between Glodel and Loadmasters, as erroneously
found by the CA. Article 1868 of the Civil Code provides: “By the
contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or
to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter.” The elements of a contract of
agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish
the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in
relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and
not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
Accordingly, there can be no contract of agency between the parties.
Loadmasters never represented Glodel. Neither was it ever
authorized to make such representation. It is a settled rule that the
basis for agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on
behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of his authority
and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally
executed by the principal. On the part of the principal, there must be
an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferable from
his words or actions, while on the part of the agent, there must be an
intention to accept the appointment and act on it. Such mutual intent
is not obtaining in this case.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is
solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the
concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct
and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where
their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third
party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the
resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
PEOPLE v. VILLACORTA G.R. 186412 (September 7, 2011)
proximate cause
FACTS:
Danilo Cruz(Cruz) went to a sari-sari store to buy bread. Out of
nowhere, Orlito Villacorta(Villacorta) appeared and thereafter
stabbed the left part of the body of Cruz with a sharpened bamboo
stick. After that, Villacorta fled.
Cruz was helped by bystanders and he was brought to a nearby
hospital where he was treated as out-patient. He was discharged on
the same day but on February 14, 2002, or 21 days after the stabbing
incident, he returned to the same hospital where he was treated for
severe tetanus. The next day on February 15, 2002, Cruz died. The
medical report states that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to
stab wound.
The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted Villacorta
for murder.
Villacorta that in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz,
he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab
wound he inflicted upon Cruz.  
ISSUE/S: W/N Villacorta should be convicted of murder. (NO)
Ruling:
No. Only slight physical injuries.
The SC agreed to the contention of Villacorta. The proximate cause
of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as:
“that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.”
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural,
and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the
proof that the accused caused the victim’s death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, however, there was an efficient intervening cause which
appeared between the time of the stabbing and the time of the death
of Cruz. The SC took into consideration the fact that severe tetanus
(the kind of tetanus which causes immediate death) has an
incubation period of 14 days or less. In this case, the stabbing made
by Villacorta could not have caused the tetanus infection as 22 days
already lapsed from the time of the stabbing until the date of
death of Cruz. Something else caused the tetanus other than the
stabbing – in short, Cruz acquired the tetanus 14 days or less before
February 15, 2003 and not on the date of stabbing.
The medical findings, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening
cause later or between the time Cruz was wounded to the time of
his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime. As such, Villacorta is only guilty of slight physical injuries.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ORLANDO ACURAM, accused-appellant.
On September 30, 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benber
Apepe charged appellant with the crime of murder, allegedly
committed as follows: Sjcj
"On June 29, 1991, at about 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, at Poblacion, El Salvador, Misamis
Oriental, which is within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill and treachery did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with the
use of his armalite rifle, shoot at one
Orlando[1] Manabat who was just standing on the
highway waiting for a ride towards home, thus,
hitting and wounding the latter on the right leg or
thigh, which caused his death the following day.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 248,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.[2]
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of
not guilty to the charge.[3] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Subsequently, the trial court rendered judgment, disposing as
follows: Scjj
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
facts, convincingly proved by the prosecution,
the accused, ORLANDO ACURAM, is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery, and
is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased ROLANDO
MANABAT the jurisprudential sum of fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED."[4]
The records disclose that on June 29, 1991, at around seven o'clock prosecution, the court found appellant guilty as charged. Insisting on
in the evening, Rolando Manabat, Oscar Manabat, Bartolome Nabe, his innocence, appellant readily filed his notice of appeal. [10] In his
and Peterson Valendres, after the day's work, proceeded to the brief, appellant raises the following errors allegedly committed by
market in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, to buy fish. Since no fish the trial court: Edpmis
was available at that time, they decided to head for home instead.
They went to the national highway, stood at the right side facing east "I
towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City and waited for a ride
there. They flagged down an approaching passenger jeepney which, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
however, swerved dangerously towards them. At this juncture, CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED
Rolando Manabat shouted at the jeep "Pesteng yawa-a kamo, APPELLANT TOOK FLIGHT OR ESCAPED
Manligis man kamo " (You devils, why did you try to run over us?). AFTER THE NIGHT OF THE INCIDENT OR
A passenger inside the jeepney shouted back, "Noano man diay, isog IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
mo?" (Why? Are you brave?). Immediately thereafter, two gunshots MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
rang out in the air, accompanied by sparks coming from the front VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
right side of the jeepney. Then Rolando shouted, "Agay. I was shot."
The vehicle did not stop but instead speeded towards the direction of
II
Cagayan de Oro City. Wounded on the right knee, Rolando was
brought by his companions to the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center.
Later on, they were informed that Rolando needed blood transfusion THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING
and so they transferred him at around 11:25 P.M. to the Northern THAT THE KILLING WAS ATTENDED BY
Mindanao Regional Hospital in the same city. Jjsc THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY, GRANTING ARGUENDO
THAT THE ACCUSED APPELLANT IS
Upon arrival at the hospital, Rolando was examined by Dr. Ismael
GUILTY.
Naypa, Jr. The doctor found the victim's blood pressure to be just
forty over zero (40/0) and the victim's right leg was heavily
bandaged. He decided to operate on the victim when the latter's III
blood pressure stabilized. At about 5:00 A.M. the following day, the
victim underwent surgery. Unfortunately, the victim died at around THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
11:00 A.M. Dr. Naypa later testified that the cause of Rolando's THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS THE
death was "secondary to huddle respiratory syndrome secondary to PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED,
blood loss, secondary to gunshot wounds", or briefly, massive loss of DESPITE THE FACT THAT ACCUSED WAS
blood due to gunshot wound. He stated that under normal NOT PROPERLY AND CONCLUSIVELY
circumstances, the wound would not necessarily cause death but in IDENTIFIED, AND THE ALLEGED WEAPON
this case where the wound transected the major part of the leg, the NOT POSITIVELY TESTED.
wound was fatal. He clarified that the victim sustained only one
gunshot wound which entered at the front portion of the right knee IV
and exited at the back of the right knee, causing two wounds.[5]
THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
The El Salvador police conducted investigation on the incident. It ERRED IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE
was discovered that appellant Orlando Acuram, a policeman assigned POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE OF THE
with the 421st PNP Company based at San Martin, Villanueva, ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THAT IS, THE
Misamis Oriental, was among the passengers of the errant jeepney. EXISTENCE OF EFFICIENT INTERVENING
He was seated at the front, right side of the jeepney and was the only CAUSE, WHICH IS THE PROXIMATE
one among its passengers who was carrying a firearm. Pending CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM."[11]
investigation, he was restricted to the camp effective July 1, 1991,
upon orders of his commanding officer, Major Rodolfo De La Piedra. We shall take up in seriatim the challenges posed by appellant to the
[6]
 Appellant was later surrendered by his commanding officer to the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution. We
custody of the court on the basis of the warrant of arrest issued by shall also consider the weight and credibility of his defense.
MCTC Judge Evelyn Nery.[7] On motion by the prosecution and
without objection from the defense, the trial court suspended
To begin with, while appellant denies that he fled and hid after the
appellant from the service and ordered his detention at the provincial
shooting incident, we find that his behavior proves otherwise.
jail.[8]
Appellant admits that he was at the scene of the crime at the time the
shooting happened. Considering that he is a law enforcement officer,
During the trial, appellant admitted that he was on board the the unusual incident should have at least elicited his curiosity and he
mentioned jeepney and had a gun at that time but denied firing it. He should have inquired about it. However, he chose to ignore the
claimed that it was impossible for him to fire his rifle during that incident and go his way.[12] That a policeman could display such
time since he was sitting at the front seat of the jeepney, sandwiched indifference to a crime committed in his presence is highly
between the driver and the latter's father-in-law. Moreover, he said incredible. While it was true that he reported for duty the day after
that the rifle was locked and wrapped by his jacket and its barrel was the incident, the following day, he was ordered by his commanding
even pointed towards the driver.[9] officer restricted within the camp pending investigation of the case.
By this time, appellant must have learned that his commanding
The trial court found the version of the defense weak, self-serving officer had received a radio message and that he was already a
and unreliable. On the basis of the evidence presented by the
suspect. As the trial court noted, no superior officer will hold back
from any of his men involved, such a grave charge. Despite these,
appellant did not present himself before the police in El Salvador,
Misamis Oriental. Instead, he was conveniently nowhere to be
found. Misoedp
Thus, appellant's first contention that he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, in our view, is quite untenable.
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of
the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to
the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes
to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his
search and capture.[13] In this case, it was appellant's commanding
officer who surrendered him to the custody of the court. Being
restrained by one's superiors to stay within the camp without
submitting to the investigating authorities concerned, is not
tantamount to voluntary surrender as contemplated by law. The trial
court is correct in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender in appellant's favor. Misedp
On his second assignment of error, however, we find convincing
merit. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that
the killing was qualified by treachery. On this point, we agree. For
treachery to be considered an aggravating circumstance, there must
be proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to
facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.[14] In
this case, the shooting was done at the spur of the moment. As
observed by the trial court, the victim had shouted damning curses at
the driver and the passengers of the jeepney. The shooting was on
instantaneous response to the cursing, as appellant correctly claimed.
[15]
 Treachery cannot be appreciated where the accused shot the
victim as a result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a
deliberate act of the will.[16]
Thirdly, appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that he
was the perpetrator of the crime. He claims he was not conclusively
identified and the alleged fatal weapon was not positively tested.
True, prosecution witnesses did not positively identify appellant as
the one who fired the gun at the victim. Nevertheless, direct evidence
of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix where the trial
court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. [17] It is settled
that conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided
that the following requisites must concur: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[18] Circumstantial
evidence could be of similar weight and probative value as direct
evidence. From direct evidence of a minor fact or facts, by a chain of
circumstances the mind is led intuitively, or by a conscious process
of reasoning, towards a conviction that from said fact or facts some
other facts may be validly inferred.[19] No greater degree of certainty
is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct.
In either case, what is required is that there be proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused
committed the crime.[20]
As noted by the trial court and the Solicitor General, the evidence for
the prosecution is replete with details, duly proven by the prosecution
and to some extent by admissions of the defense, enough to sustain
the guilt of appellant. These are: (1) The appellant was a former
member of the Philippine Constabulary and, during the incident, was
a member of the Philippine National Police. He was skilled in
handling firearms. (2) The appellant was issued a firearm (armalite
rifle) by his command, which he was then carrying with him before,
during and after the incident. (3) At the particular date, time and
place of the incident, appellant was carrying his duly issued armalite
rifle inside the jeepney from where the gunfire came from. (4) The
appellant was sitting on the extreme front-right-side of the jeepney
where the sparks of the gunbursts were seen and heard by the
witnesses. (5) There were no other persons with a rifle inside the
jeepney except the appellant. (6) The empty shells of an armalite
rifle were recovered at the place where the fatal shooting occurred.
(7) The appellant did not go forward to the authorities to present
himself until after a warrant of arrest was issued and, in fact, until his
actual arrest.[21]
The aforecited circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken
chain leading to a reasonable conclusion that appellant, to the
exclusion of others, was responsible for the victim's death. They
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the
perpetrator of the offense. It is the height of desperation on
appellant's part to insist that there should be an eyewitness to the
precise moment the shot was fired considering the sudden and
completely unexpected shooting of the victim.[22] Here, circumstantial
evidence suffices. Edp
Appellant's insistence on his innocence in view of the absence of
paraffin and ballistic tests, in our view, is far from convincing.
Suffice it to state that even negative findings of the paraffin test do
not conclusively show that a person did not fire a gun. The absence
of nitrates could be explained if a person discharged a firearm with
gloves on, or if he thoroughly washed his hands thereafter.[23]
Lastly, in his attempt to exculpate himself, appellant blames the
death of the victim on the lack of prompt and proper medical
attention given. He insists that the delay in giving proper medical
attendance to the victim constitutes an efficient intervening cause
which exempts him from criminal responsibility. This assertion is
disingenuous, to say the least. Appellant never introduced proof to
support his allegation that the attending doctors in this case were
negligent in treating the victim. On the contrary, Dr. Ismael Naypa,
Jr., testified that the attending doctor at the Cagayan de Oro Medical
Center tried his best in treating the victim by applying bandage on
the injured leg to prevent hemorrhage. He added that the victim was
immediately given blood transfusion at the Northern Mindanao
Regional Hospital when the doctor found out that the victim had a
very low blood pressure. Thereafter, the victim's blood pressure
stabilized. Then, the doctor operated the victim as the main blood
vessel of the victim's right leg was cut, thereby causing massive loss
of blood. The surgery was finished in three hours. Unfortunately, the
victim died hours later. We cannot hold the attending doctors liable
for the death of the victim. The perceived delay in giving medical
treatment to the victim does not break at all the causal connection
between the wrongful act of the appellant and the injuries sustained
by the victim. It does not constitute efficient intervening cause. The
proximate cause of the death of the deceased is the shooting by the
appellant. It is settled that anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for
all the consequences of his criminal act such as death that supervenes
in consequence of the injuries. The fact that the injured did not
receive proper medical attendance would not affect appellant's
criminal responsibility. The rule is founded on the practical policy of
closing to the wrongdoer a convenient avenue of escape from the just
consequences of his wrongful act. If the rule were otherwise, many
criminals could avoid just accounting for their acts by merely
establishing a doubt as to the immediate cause of death.[24]
To conclude, since the qualifying circumstance was not proved in
this case, the crime committed is only homicide, not murder. Under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for
homicide is only reclusion temporal. As there is neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance found by the trial court or shown after a
review of the records, the penalty in this case shall be fixed in its
medium period of reclusion temporal, which ranges from a minimum
of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4
months. Further applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
imposable penalty shall be within the range of prision mayoras a
minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the
maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to
12 years. The span of reclusion temporal, medium, is from 14 years,
8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Edpsc
WHEREFORE, the assailed DECISION of the Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 91-1161,
is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Orlando Acuram is hereby found
GUILTY of HOMICIDE and sentenced to suffer a prison term of 10
years of the medium period of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15
years and 10 months and 1 day of the medium period of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rolando Manabat in the amount
of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-15688             November 19, 1921
REMIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,  Luna, and Perfecta Losantas are therefore entitled to recover upon
vs.
THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
The facts as appearing from the agreed statement, in relation with the
complaint, are to the effect that the defendant Railroad Company
operates a line through the district of Daraga in the municipality of
Albay; that on January 29, 1918, as one of its trains passed over said
line, a great quantity of sparks were emitted from the smokestack of
the locomotive, and fire was thereby communicated to four houses
nearby belonging to the four plaintiffs respectively, and the same
were entirely consumed. All of these houses were of light
construction with the exception of the house of Remigio Rodrigueza,
which was of strong materials, though the roof was covered with nipa
and cogon. The fire occurred immediately after the passage of the
train, and a strong wind was blowing at the time. It does not appear
either in the complaint or in the agreed statement whose house
caught fire first, though it is stated in the appellant's brief that the fire
was first communicated to the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, from
whence it spread to the others.
In the fourth paragraph of the complaint — which is admitted to be
true — it is alleged that the defendant Railroad Company was
conspicuously negligent in relation to the origin of said fire, in the
following respects, namely, first, in failing to exercise proper
supervision over the employees in charge of the locomotive;
secondly, in allowing the locomotive which emitted these sparks to
be operated without having the smokestack protected by some device
for arresting sparks; thirdly, in using in its locomotive upon this
occasion Bataan coal, a fuel of known inferior quality which, upon
combustion, produces sparks in great quantity.
The sole ground upon which the defense is rested is that the house of
Remigio Rodrigueza stood partly within the limits of the land owned
by the defendant company, though exactly how far away from the
company's track does not appear. It further appears that, after the
railroad track was laid, the company notified Rodrigueza to get his
house off the land of the company and to remove it from its exposed
position. Rodrigueza did not comply with this suggestion, though he
promised to put an iron roof on his house, which he never did.
Instead, he changed the materials of the main roof to nipa, leaving
the kitchen and media-aguas covered with cogon. Upon this fact it is
contended for the defense that there was contributory negligence on
the part of Remigio Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the
premises of the Railroad Company, and that for this reason the
company is not liable. This position is in our opinion untenable for
the reasons which we shall proceed to state.
In the first place, it will be noted that the fact suggested as
constituting a defense to this action could not in any view of the case
operate as a bar to recovery by the three plaintiffs other than Remigio
Rodrigueza, even assuming that the fire was first communicated to
his house; for said three plaintiffs are in nowise implicated in the act
which supposedly constitutes the defense. In this connection it will
be observed that the right of action of each of these plaintiffs is
totally distinct from that of his co-plaintiff, so much so that each
might have sued separately, and the defendant if it had seen fit to do
so, might in this case have demurred successfully to the complaint
for misjoinder of parties plaintiff. The fact that the several rights of
action of the different plaintiffs arose simultaneously out of one act
of the defendant is not sufficient of itself to require, or even permit,
the joinder of such parties as coplaintiffs in a single action (30 Cyc.,
114) if objection had been made thereto. Domingo Gonzaga, Cristina
the admitted fact that this fire originated in the negligent acts of the
defendant; and the circumstance that the fire may have been
communicated to their houses through the house of Remegio
Rodrigueza, instead of having been directly communicated from the
locomotive, is immaterial. (See 38 Am. Dec., 64, 77; 1 11 R. C. L.,
968-971; Kansas City, etc. Railroad Co. vs. Blaker, 64 L. R. A., 81
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. vs. Hope, 80 Pa. St., 373; 21 Am. Rep.
100.)
With respect to the case of Remegio Rodrigueza it is to be inferred
that his house stood upon this ground before the Railroad Company
laid its line over this course; and at any rate there is no proof that this
plaintiff had unlawfully intruded upon the railroad's property in the
act of building his house. What really occurred undoubtedly is that
the company, upon making this extension, had acquired the land
only, leaving the owner of the house free to remove it. Hence he
cannot be considered to have been a trespasser in the beginning.
Rather, he was there at the sufferance of the defendant company, and
so long as his house remained in this exposed position, he
undoubtedly assumed the risk of any loss that might have resulted
from fires occasioned by the defendant's locomotives if operated and
managed with ordinary care. But he cannot be held to have assumed
the risk of any damage that might result from the unlawful
negligence acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate and
defend himself against the possible negligence of another. Rather he
has a right to assume that the other will use the care of the ordinary
prudent man. (Philadelphia and Reading Railroad
Co. vs. Hendrickson, 80 Pa. St., 182; 21 Am. Rep., 97.)
In the situation now under consideration the proximate and only
cause of the damage that occurred was the negligent act of the
defendant in causing this fire. The circumstance that Remigio
Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the defendant
company and therefore in dangerous proximity to passing
locomotives was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made
the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed to him
as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because,
first, that condition was not created by himself; secondly, because his
house remained on this ground by the toleration, and therefore with
the consent of the Railroad Company; and thirdly, because even
supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not
justify the defendant in negligently destroying it. (Grand Trunk
Railway of Canada vs. Richardson, 91 U. S., 454; 23 L. ed., 356;
Norfolk etc. Ry. Co. vs. Perrow, 101 Va., 345, 350.)lawphil.net
The circumstance that the defendant company, upon planting its line
near Remigio Rodrigueza's house, had requested or directed him to
remove it, did not convert his occupancy into a trespass, or impose
upon him any additional responsibility over and above what the law
itself imposes in such situation. In this connection it must be
remembered that the company could at any time have removed said
house in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, but it elected
not to do so.
Questions similar to that now before us have been under the
consideration of American courts many times, and their decisions are
found to be uniformly favorable to recovery where the property
destroyed has been placed in whole or in part on the right of way of
the railroad company with its express or implied consent. (L. R.
Martin Timber Co. vs.Great Northern Railway Co., 123 Minn., 423;
Ann. Cas., 1915A, p. 496, note; Burroughs vs. Housatonic R.R. Co.,
15 Conn., 124; 38 Am. Dec., 64; 74; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Patterson,
105 Va. 6; 8 Ann. Cas., 44.) And the case for the plaintiff is
apparently stronger where the company constructs its line in
proximity to a house already built and fails to condemn it and remove
it from its right of way.
the case were referred to Mr. Hizon, as a court appointed
Commissioner. PBA moved for the demolition of the building, but
was opposed. PBA eventually paid for the demolition after the
building suffered more damages in 1970 due to previous earthquakes.
The Commissioner found that there were deviations in the
specifications and plans, as well as defects in the construction of the
building.
ISSUE: Whether or not an act of God (fortuitous event) exempts
from liability parties who would otherwise be due to negligence?
HELD: Art. 1174 of the NCC, states that no person shall be
responsible for events, which could not be foreseen. But to be
exempt from liability due to an act of God, the following must occur:
1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the debtor 2)
event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable 3) event must be such
that it would render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the
obligation 4) debtor must be free from any participation or
aggravation of the industry to the creditor. Although the general rule
for fortuitous events stated in Article 1174 of the Civil Code exempts
liability when there is an Act of God, thus if in the concurrence of
such event there be fraud, negligence, delay in the performance of
the obligation, the obligor cannot escape liability therefore there can
be an action for recovery of damages. The negligence of the
defendant was shown when and proved that there was an alteration of
the plans and specification that had been so stipulated among them.
Therefore, therefore there should be no question that NAKPIL and
UNITED are liable for damages because of the collapse of the
building. One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot
escape liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof,
although the act of a third person, or an act of God for which he is
not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.

From what has been said it is apparent that the judgment appealed
from is in all respect in conformity with the law, and the same is
accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

JUAN F. NAKPIL & SONS, and JUAN F. NAKPIL vs. THE

COURT OF APPEALS, UNITED CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC., JUAN J. CARLOS, and the PHILIPPINE
BAR ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. L-47851
October 3, 1986

FACTS:

Private respondents – Philippine Bar Association (PBA) – a non-

profit organization formed under the corporation law decided to put
up a building in Intramuros, Manila. Hired to plan the specifications
of the building were Juan Nakpil & Sons, while United Construction
was hired to construct it. The proposal was approved by the Board of
Directors and signed by the President, Ramon Ozaeta. The building
was completed in 1966. In 1968, there was an unusually strong
earthquake which caused the building heavy damage, which led the
building to tilt forward, leading the tenants to vacate the premises.
United Construction took remedial measures to sustain the building.
PBA filed a suit for damages against United Construction, but United
Construction subsequently filed a suit against Nakpil and Sons,
alleging defects in the plans and specifications.Technical Issues in