Dacula, Mark David

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA vs. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN and P/SUPT. WILLIAM

O. FANG
G.R. No. 193636 (24 July 2012)
Facts:
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative
Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged
Existence of Private Armies in the Country." The body, which was later on referred to as the
Zeñarosa Commission, was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in
the country.

Marynette R. Gamboa, Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, alleged that the Philippine
National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations
against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group
(PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the
Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was
violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the Ilocos Norte Police
Provincial Office.

RTC Branch 13 dismissed the Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through
substantial evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and that they
forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.

Issue:
WON Gamboa should be granted the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data

Ruling:
No, the petition of Gamboa must be denied.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide
a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It must be emphasized
that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right
to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her
supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard,
respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation
to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the
presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. The state interest of dismantling PAGs
far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection
and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
Therefore, the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data must be denied.
 Dacula, Mark David
FELIPE NAVARRO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
313 SCRA 153 (1999)
Facts:

On February 4, 1990, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, two local media men,
Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique Lingan, went to the Lucena police headquarters to report an
alleged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the city. At the station, a heated
confrontation happened between the victim Enrique Lingan and accused policeman Felipe
Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters. Navarro boxed Lingan in the head
with the butt of a gun and thereafter the latter fell to the ground. The banging of his head against
the concrete pavement caused him to suffer cerebral concussion and shock which directly caused
his death.

The exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made
by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial,
Stanley Jalbuena, the other media man, testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony
was a voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police station between the
accused police officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the
knowledge of the two.

Issues:
WON the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which prohibits
wiretapping

Ruling:
Yes, the tape containing the voice recording of the heated argument is admissible in
evidence pursuant to RA 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication, And Other Purposes”.

Section 1 of RA 4200 states that, “it shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as dictaphone or
dictagraph of dectectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described”.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private

communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its
tape recording is not prohibited.

A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally

recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded; and (3)
that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant
case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in the
court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and
Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the
prosecution.
 Dacula, Mark David
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ESTER S.
GARCIA
248 SCRA 590 (September 28, 1995)
Facts:
A civil case was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court (RTC) alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a
manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy.” In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought damages.

The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging
that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200 entitled “An Act to
Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication,
And Other Purposes”. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later
on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200 and
that the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person
other than a participant to the communication . The Court of Appeals declared the RTC’s
decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, hence this Petition
for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:
WON RA 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation

Ruling:
Yes, RA 4200 applies to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation.

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 states that, “It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.”

The aforementioned provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person,
not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized
to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication
who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.
 Dacula, Mark David
CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN
G.R. No. 107383 (February 20, 1996)

Facts:
On March 26, 1982, petitioner Cecilia Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband Alfredo
Martin, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which Mrs. Zulueta had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought an action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against his wife before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X). The RTC granted the
petition and ordered Mrs. Zulueta to return documents and papers taken by her from his
husband’s clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
WON the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence

Ruling:
No, the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any tell-tale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.