1. ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO v.

PEOPLE
GR Nos. 178701 and 178754, Jun 06, 2011
Ponente; Carpio Morales, J.

Facts:

Petitioner Respicio appeals the October 13, 2006 Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
which found him guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and of falsification under
Article 171 of the RPC. Petitioner was the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) when 11 Indian nationals, who were facing criminal charges for drug trafficking,
left the country on the basis of a BID Self-Deportation Order (SDO) No. 94-685 which was signed by
petitioner and then Associate Commissioners Subido and Manuel C. Roxas. The issuance by
petitioner, Subido and Roxas of the Order resulted in the filing before the Sandiganbayan by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor of Information against them charging them of falsification of official
document. Also while in the performance of their official functions as such, did then and there,
willfully and criminally issue BID Self-Deportation Order No. 94-685 authorizing the release of the 11
Indian nationals who were all facing criminal charges for violation of RA 6425, before the RTC of Las
Piñas, Metro Manila. After finding the petitioner guilty by the court for the criminal offense he
committed, he filed motion for reconsideration having been denied and petition for review, imputing
error to the Sandiganbayan's Decision and Resolution.

Issue:
WoN the court’s decision and resolution erred in finding the accused guilty?

Ruling:
No. The Office of the Special Prosecutor counters that it was able to prove all the elements of the
offense under Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 and that of falsification. It asserts that it proved bad faith
on the part of petitioner, as despite inquiring about the status of the Indians who were "presently"
under investigation about the "criminal cases which were under preliminary investigation. The
issuance of the Order required petitioner's intervention on account of his position and that the
statement in the Order that "there is no indication from the records that the eleven Indian nationals
are subject of any written complaints before any government agency" is false because petitioner was
in fact informed that they were under preliminary investigation. The Office thus concludes that
petitioner indubitably made an untruthful statement on the matter.
 2. Malabanan vs Sandiganbayan GR No. 186329 August 2, 2017
Facts:

Petitioners Abusama Alid and Francisco Malabanan were both employees of the Department of
Agriculture. Alid being the Assistant Regional Director of DA- Region XII while Malabanan as Rice
Program Chair of DA office Diliman, Quezon City. Alid made a cash advance for his Air Fare as he was
going to attend a Turnover Ceremony at DA- Central Office. Alid presented his Air Plane ticket and
Certificate of Appearance to justify his Cash Advance. However, During Post Audit, Discrepancies in
the supporting documents were found and investigated. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
Charged Alid and Malabanan before the Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Public Documents. A
Separate suit was filed against Salid for Falsifying a private Document in he which he allegedly
altered the dates indicated on said airplane ticket. The Sandiganbayan acquitted both Salid and
Malabanan on the case regarding Falsification of Public Documents but Convicted Alid on his case
regarding Falsifying of Private Documents. Hence Alid prayed for this present petition in the SC.

Issue:

W/N The Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Petitioner Alid on the basis of violating Art 172 par 2 of
the RPC

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court laid the reasons why Petitioner Alid shouldn’t not be convicted of the Crime
of Falsification of Private Documents under par 2 of the RPC. First was that the information that was
filed against Alid was violation of Art. 171 of the RPC. It is constitutionally protected that the accused
can only be convicted of an offense when it is both charged and proved. It was also ruled that by the
Court that the Sandiganbayan failed to recognise that Petitioner violated Par 1 of Art 172 of the RPC.
There is distinction between Art 171 and 172 of the RPC. It is important to qualify the document that
was allegedly falsified by the accused. In this case the said airplane ticket was a commercial
document in which it qualified under Par 1 of Art 172.
3. Norma Delos Reyes vs People

G.R. No. 186030 March 21, 2012

Facts:

• Norma Delos Reyes was charged with falsification under RPC 172 of a Deed of Succession when she
and the other accused were the only heirs of Rafael Del Prado when in fact, Ma. Corazon Del Prado is
also an heir entitled to inherit.
• Corazon is a daughter of Rafael while Norma is the surviving spouse
• MTC, RTC and the CA found the petitioners as guilty.
• Petitioners invoke the existence and contents of the several documents which they had presented
before the MTC. Filed by Norma, in which documents they claim to have indicated and confirmed
that Corazon is also an heir of the late Rafael. Given these documents, the petitioners insist that they
cannot be charged with falsification for having excluded Corazon as an heir if their decedent.

Issue:
WON the CA erred in affirming the petitioners conviction for falsification.
Held:
CA Decision is affirmed they didn’t err in their decision.
The material document claimed to be falsified in this case is the Deed of Succession dated July 19,
1991.
The first and third elements were committed by the inclusion in the subject deed of the clause that
states, whereas, the parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the first name, is the surviving
spouse and the rest are the children of the decedent. The untruthfulness of said statement is clear
from the several other documents upon which, ironically, the petitioners anchor their defense, such
as the deed of extrajudicial partition dated October 29, 1979, the parties confirmation of subdivision,
deed of exchange and Norma’s petition for guardianship of her then minor children. Specifically
mentioned in these documents is the fact that Corazon is also a daughter, thus an heir of the late
Rafael.
The Petitioners cannot claim for good faith because the documents proved that they knew of the
untruthful character of their statement in the deed of succession.
 4. G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013

CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Carlos Lo Tanenggee was the Branch Manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from 1994 until he
was charged in 1998, five separate Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents. Tanenggee allegedly prepared promissory notes and cashier’s checks, affixed and forged
the signature of Romeo Tan.

RTC found the accused guilty of the crimes charged. Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction
to the CA. The appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. CA affirmed and modified the decision of RTC.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the essential elements of estafa through falsification of commercial documents were
established by the prosecution.

HELD:

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) refers to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee, who
did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private or commercial document. The
elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the
offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of
the RPC;33 and, (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.

All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. Thus, the court finds no reason to
disturb the findings of the RTC which was affirmed by the CA.
 5. Danilo ansaldo v People

Facts: Edna tadeo, Niña ramirez’ niece, introduced to the latter the petitioners to help her because
wanted to subdivide her lot in muntinlupa. The petitioner and his wife introduced themselves as
having direct connections with Land registration authority (lra) and assured ramirez that they could
have her land subdivided. Ramirez entrusted to them her owner’s duplicate copy of transfer
certificate ob the condition that it would be returned after a month, but the petitioners failed to do
return the certificate. Ramirez repeatedly demanded the return of the certificate to no avail.

Later, ramirez found that the land cover by her tct was the subject document in which she appear to
have mortgaged her land to Nora herrera. Ramirez claimed that her signature in the document was a
forgery.

At the time of the mortgage, it were the petitioner and his wife only whom remirez entrusted her
tct.

Issue: WON there is a complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public document at the case.

Held: No. It is undisputed that petitioner committed estafa, he and his wife falsely represented
themselves that they have influence abd capability to cause the subdivision of her land and ramirez
was consequently induced to part with the owner’s copy of her tct on the condition that the same
would be returned after a month. However, the petitioners did not. Their failure to return the said
title despite demand is evidence of deceit that caused damages to ramirez. It was also established
that the said title was eventually mortgaged to a 3rd person without ramirez’ knowledge and
consent.

As to the falsification of public document, there is no doubt that petitioner is a private individual and
it is no also disputed that the deed of mortgage is a public document. However, there is no evidence
to show that the petitioner and his wife falsified the subject deed of nortgage and that the petitioner
had participation in the execution of the mortgage document, as it was shown that he only signed a
document that his wife represented to him without reading. There is no proof at all that he was the
one who signed the deed of mortgage.

Hence, petitioner is only guilty of estafa

 6. G.R.No.139857 September15,2006 LEONILA BATULANONvs.PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES

Ponente:YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:

FACTS:

Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its

Cashier/Manager. She was incharge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of
the cooperative. During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the
release of loans were discovered. Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents were filed against Batulanon. In two different cases, Batulanon falsified a
commercial document. She made an entry that Erlinda Omadlao and Gonafreda Oracion were
granted loans, when in fact said persons were never granted loans, received loans or signed cash or
check vouchers in their name. Also, Batulanon falsified a commercial document, namely individual
deposits and loan ledger of one Ferlyn Arroyo and in another case, one Dennies Batulanon with the
PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the two
persons were granted loans, making it appear that the said persons made a fixed deposit. Batulanon
was found guilty by the Trial Court. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification. The
motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner maybe convicted of estafa thru falsification of commercial document

HELD:

NO. Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of commercial
document, appellant could be convicted of falsification of private document under the well-settled
rule that it is the allegations in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not
the technical name given in the preamble of the information. The subject vouchers are private
document and not commercial documents because they are not documents used by merchants or
businessmen to promote, facilitate or credit transactions nor they are defined and regulated by the
code of Commerce or o the commercial law. If the falsification of a private document is committed
as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be
committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa.
 7. G.R. No. 185493               February 2, 2011

LtC. ROBERTO K. GUILLERGAN (Ret.), Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1987, petitioner Guillergan, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), directed Edna Seclon, Chief Clerk of the Comptroller’s Office, to cause the
preparation of the payrolls of their civilian intelligence agents with supporting time record and
book. The agents’ names were copied and, based on their appointment papers, certified as
correct by Guillergan and then approved by Domingo Rio.

Each time the processing unit returned the payrolls for lack of signatures of the payees,
Guillergan would direct Nemesio Butcon, the Budget and Fiscal Non-Commissioned Officer, to
affix his initial on the "Remarks/Sig" column of the payrolls to complete the requirements and
facilitate the processing of the time record, book, and payrolls.

Also on Guillergan’s instruction, the CIAs’ payrolls in Region 6 for 1987, totaling ₱732,000.00,
were covered by cash advances payable to Captain Roland V. Maclang, Jr., which advances
were issued upon his request as disbursing officer for that purpose. When ready, Guillergan
received the corresponding cash or checks then turned them over to Rio.

Consequently, an Information was filed against them for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a), in
relation to Article 171 of the RPC. While the case was pending, Rio died, prompting the
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case against him.

On June 30, 2008, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment, finding Guillergan guilty of

falsification penalized under Article 172 of the RPC. The court acquitted the other accused on the
ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Guillergan is guilty of falsification of public documents

HELD:

Yes. All of the elements of falsification under Art. 172 (1) are present. The offender is a private
individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position;
Guillergan was the comptroller to the PC/INP Command in Regioin 6.  The Sandiganbayan found
that his work as comptroller did not include the preparation of the appointments and payrolls of
CIAs, nor did he have custody. He committed the offense by causing it to appear that persons
participated in an act or a proceeding when they did not in fact do so participate.  He ordered
Butcon to sign the payrolls as payee to make it appear that persons whose names appeared on
the same had signed the document when they in fact did not. The appointment papers from
which these payrolls were based do not reveal any information about the acceptance of the
appointments by the agents.  It was stated that the appointment papers of the agents "must" be
accompanied by the acceptance of the agents. These papers "should ordinarily" be attached to
the payrolls for proper clearing purposes.
8. LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, petitioner, v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Leovegildo Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon. His office issued 221
permits to transport salvaged forest products found within their municipality, as agreed upon
by the participants of the assembly that he organized. Thereafter, petitioner and his co-
accused were charged for violating Art. 117 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or
Official Function. The Sandiganbayan convicted Ruzol while the co-accused was acquitted.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the authority to issue transport permits with respect to
salvaged forest products lies with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and that such authority had not been devolved to the local government of General
Nakar.

Issue:
W/N petitioner is guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions.

Ruling:

No. Petitioner is not guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions.

Art. 177 of the RPC defined and penalized usurpation of authority or official functions. In
committing usurpation of official functions, any person, under pretense of official position,
shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully
entitled to do so.

In the case, the court ruled that the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the
authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products. Pursuant
to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. The permits to
transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit (WRP)
issued by the DENR. Records failed to show that petitioner made representations or false
pretenses.

The court also ruled that petitioner is in good faith. The conduct of the public consultation
was not a badge of bad faith, but a sign supporting petitioner’s good intentions to regulate
and monitor the movement of salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of
untoward illegal logging. The presence of PENRO official during the assembly strengthens
the claim of good faith.

Hence, petitioner is innocent for usurpation of official functions and the court ruled in favor of
his acquittal.
9. G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents

Fact:
Petitioner was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu was appointed by
then President Joseph Estrada as a student regent of UP. petitioner discussed with
President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. petitioner, with her
siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of
the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of the OSRFI was the
renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The
source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President. The
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office
of the Ombudsman who after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and
her brother for estafa in the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction over the offense of estafa

Ruling:
Yes. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public
officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa
as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of
those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the
offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
10. MELENCIO GIGANTONI y JAVIER, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents. 
Facts: Melencio Gigantoni, an employee of Black Mountain Mining Inc. and Tetra
Management Corporatio corporation, went to the office of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL)
allegedly to conduct verification of some travels made by Black Mountain's officials. he
falsely represented himself to the PAL legal officer as a PC-CIS agent investigating a
kidnapping case, and requested that he be shown the PAL records particularly the
passenger manifests for Manila-Baguio-Manila flights. PAL general counsel Ricardo Puno,
Jr., and Atty. Boro subsequently learned that Gigantoni was no longer a CIS agent since
June 30, 1980 as he had been dismissed from the service for gross misconduct brought
about by the extortion charges filed against him and his final conviction by the
Sandiganbayan for the said offense.
Issue: W/N Gigantoni is guilty of usurpation of official functions in violation if Article 117 of
RPC.
Held: No
the information charges the accused with the crime of usurpation of authority for "knowingly
and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department
or agency of the Philippine Government." Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official
functions. It has not been shown that the information given by PAL to the accused was
confidential and was given to him only because he was entitled to it as part of the exercise of
his official function. He was not charged in the information for such an offense. In fact, it
appears from the record of the case that the information, which was not claimed to be secret
and confidential, was readily made available to the accused because PAL officials believed
at the time that he was a CIS agent. And this was the only offense with which he was
charged in the information, that he knowingly and falsely represented himself to be a CIS
agent.
11. G.R. NO. 154098 July 27, 2005

JOSE C. MIRANDA, Petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, SEC. JOSE D. LINA, in his capacity as Secretary of the DILG, and
FAUSTINO DY, JR. in his capacity as Governor of the Province of Isabela,
Respondents.

Facts: The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda, then mayor of Santiago City, Isabela,
under preventive suspension for six months for alleged violations of R.A. No. 6713, known as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Subsequently, a Complaint
was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman alleging that Mayor Miranda performed duties of Mayor
despite the continuing effectivity of the preventive suspension. The Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan an Information against Mayor Miranda for violation of Article 177 of the RPC,
penalizing usurpation of authority The Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Mayor Miranda from
office for 90 days. The anti-graft court held that a violation of Article 177 of the RPC involves
fraud. Miranda’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issue: W/N the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions involves "fraud upon
government or public funds or property" found in Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.

Held: YES. The Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 as covering two types
of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the government; and (2) any offense involving public
funds or property.

The court held that the accused’s acts therefore in assuming the duties and function of the
Office of the Mayor despite his suspension from said office constitute fraud upon
government resulting in the chaos or confusion albeit temporary, as the employees would be
in a quandary whom to follow or obey.

12. UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMA IIS vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES II G.R. No. 192565
February 28, 2012
UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Desi Tomas was charged with perjury for making a false narration in a Certificate against
Forum Shopping.  It was alleged that Tomas stated under oath that the Union Bank of the
Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in
another tribunal or agency aside from that which is filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for the collection of sum of money with prayer of writ of replevin filed against
Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.
Tomas filed a motion to quash arguing that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City does
not have jurisdiction over the case as, though it was notarized in Makati, the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was used or submitted before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case at
bar.

HELD:
Yes, the Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction to try and decide the case at bar.

Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she
made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public
in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and
swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the
proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the
crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay
City.

13.  ERIBERTO S. MASANGKAY vs. PP, G.R. No. 164443, June 18, 2010
Facts: Eriberto Masangkay (Eriberto), his common-law wife Magdalena Ricaros
(Magdalena), Cesar Masangkay (Cesar) and his wife Elizabeth Masangkay (Elizabeth), and
Eric Dullano were the incorporators and directors of Megatel Factors, Inc. (MFI) which was
incorporated in June 1990. Eriberto filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) a Petition for the Involuntary Dissolution[6] of MFI for violation of Section 6 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902-A... respondents were MFI, Cesar and Elizabeth.
Elizabeth A. Masangkay prepared or caused to be prepared a Secretary's Certificate...
special meeting of the Board of Directors... contract is indeed simulated and fictitious
because they defrauded minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his
own property without any consideration at all. Records of the MFI revealed that minor child
Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay [or] his alleged guardian Magdalena S. Ricaros never became
a stockholder at any point in time of MFI.
Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a fictitious instrument. As for the charge
that he perjured himself when he stated that the Deed of Exchange was fictitious and
simulated for lack of consideration. Corporate secretary Elizabeth corroborated a statement
and admitted that stock certificates were never issued to Gilberto or any of the stockholders.
The prosecution was able to prove that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place
and that petitioner attended the same as evidenced by his signature in the minutes thereof.
Petitioner was found guilty and prosecution was able to prove that the falsehoods in the
petition for involuntary dissolution were deliberately made. It explained that Eriberto's
signatures on the two allegedly fictitious documents show that he participated in the
execution of the Deed of Exchange and was present in the December 5, 1992 meeting.
Having participated in these two matters, Eriberto knew that these were not simulated and
fictitious, as he claimed in his verified petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI. Thus, he
deliberately lied in his petition.
Issues: Whether the prosecution was able to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Ruling: Prosecution failed to prove the crime of perjury beyond reasonable doubt. For
perjury to exist, (1) there must be a sworn statement that is required by law; (2) it must be
made under oath before a competent officer; (3) the statement contains a deliberate
assertion of falsehood; and (4) the false declaration is with regard to a material matter. It is
the elements of deliberate falsehood and materiality of the false statements to the petition for
involuntary dissolution which are contested.
Prosecution, however, failed to prove the element of deliberate falsehood. The prosecution
has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the falsehood of petitioner's statement
that the December 5, 1992 meeting "did not actually materialize." In other words, the
prosecution has to establish that the said meeting in fact took place and that the directors
were physically present in one place at the same time and conferred with each other.
According to the petitioner's statement in the petition for dissolution, the meeting did not
actually materialize or take place. The two statements are obviously contradictory but the
mere contradiction between the two statements means that one of them is false. It cannot
tell us which of the two statements is actually false. The minutes could be true and the sworn
statement false. But it is equally possible that the minutes are false and the sworn statement
is true, as explained by the petitioner who testified that the minutes were simply brought to
his house for signature, but no meeting actually transpired. Given the alternative
possibilities, it is the prosecution's burden to affirmatively prove beyond reasonable doubt,
that the first statement (the minutes) is the true one, while the other statement (in the petition
for dissolution) is false.The court held that before a conviction for perjury, one cannot be
obtained by the prosecution by merely showing the inconsistent or contradictory statements
of the accused, even if both statements are sworn. The prosecution must additionally prove
which of the two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by evidence
other than the contradictory statement.
Furthermore, the court cannot come into a moral certainty that the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place and
that the petitioner's statement denying the same was a deliberate falsehood. Masangkay is
ACQUITTED of the charge of perjury on the ground of REASONABLE DOUBT.
14. ALFONSO C. CHOA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LENI CHOA
[G.R. No. 142011, March 14, 2003]

FACTS: Alfonso Chan Choa, a Chinese national, filed with the RTC a verified
petition for naturalization on April 25, 1989 but has later on filed a motion to withdraw
such petition which the trial court granted on September 28, 1990.

On August 5, 1992, upon the complaint of Choa’s wife, information was filed with the
MTCC charging Choa with perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code for
his willful and deliberate assertion of falsehoods upon material matters in connection
with his petition for naturalization. Such falsehoods include (a) his wife’s and
children’s residences despite knowing that they left said residence about five years
ago; and (b) his positive averment of the fact that he is of good moral character when
in fact he has been carrying on an immoral and illicit relationship with one Stella
Flores Saludar, a woman not his wife since 1984, and begetting two children with
her.

MTCC ruled that Choa is guilty of perjury. RTC affirmed the MTCC judgment. CA
affirmed the RTC decision with modifications after applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, to suffer three
months of arresto mayor, to one year and eight months of prision correccional.

ISSUE: WON Choa may be convicted of perjury based on the alleged false
statements he stated in his petition for naturalization withdrawn almost two years
prior to the filing of the Information for perjury.

HELD: SC held the petition is unmeritorious.

Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code under which petitioner has been charged and
convicted, provides that the elements of perjury are:

1. The accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a

material matter;

2. The statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer authorized to

receive and administer oath;

3. In that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate

assertion of a falsehood; and

4. The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or

made for a legal purpose.

All these elements are present in the instant case. Petitioner willfully and deliberately
alleged false statements concerning his "residence" and "moral character" in his
petition for naturalization.

On the submission that petitioner could no longer be prosecuted for perjury in view of
the withdrawal of the petition for naturalization containing his false material
statements, the petitioner already committed perjury at the time he filed his petition
for naturalization because he knew all along that he willfully stated material falsities
in his verified petition. The withdrawal only terminated the proceedings for
naturalization and did not extinguish his culpability for perjury he already committed.
Indeed, the fact of withdrawal alone cannot bar the State from prosecuting petitioner,
an alien, who made a mockery not only of the Philippine naturalization law but the
judicial proceedings as well. And the petition for naturalization tainted with material
falsities can be used as evidence of his unlawful act.
15. CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA vs. CORONA, et.al., G.R. No. 132451,
December 17, 1999
Facts:
Garcia filed a petition seeking to declare Section 19 of RA 8479, which sets the time of full
derehulation, unconstitutional. RA 8479 is the new deregulation law enacted by Congress
after the earlier RA 8180 “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes” was declared unconstitutional. R.A. 8180 was struck down as invalid because
three key provisions intended to promote free competition were shown to achieve the
opposite result.
The objective of the petition is to call for the indefinite retention of price controls as “partial
deregulation” contrary to the Sec 19 of RA 8479 which states that the full deregulation of the
Industry shall start five (5) months following the effectivity of the Act.
Issue: WON Sec 19 of RA 8479 is unconstitutional.
Held:
The petition states that it is using the very thoughts and words of the Court in
its Tatad decision. Those thoughts and words, however, were directed against the tariff
differential, the inventory requirement, and predatory pricing, not against deregulation as a
policy and not against the lifting of price controls. The choice of March 1997 as the date of
full deregulation is a judgment of Congress and its judgment call cannot be impugned by this
Court. Petitioner does not expressly challenge deregulation.  The issue, quite simply, is the
timeliness or the wisdom of the date when full deregulation should be effective. In this
regard, what constitutes reasonable time is not for judicial determination
Having decided that deregulation is the policy to follow, Congress and the President have
the duty to set up the proper and effective machinery to ensure that it works.  This is
something which cannot be adjudicated into existence.  This Court is only an umpire of last
resort whenever the Constitution or a law appears to have been violated.  There is no
showing of a constitutional violation in this case.

16. PEOPLE v. ROMY LIM y MIRANDA G.R. NO. 231989 September 4, 2018
FACTS:  Accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda (Lim) was guilty of violating Sections 11
and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.  Around 8:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, Intelligence Officer
(IO) 1 Orellan and his teammates were at Regional Office X of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and received from a confidential informant (CI) that a certain
"Romy" has been engaged in the sale of prohibited drugs in Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon,
Cagayan de Oro City. They were directed by their Regional Director, Lt. Col. Edwin Layese,
to gather for a buy-bust operation. During the briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IOl
Carin were assigned as the team leader, the arresting officer, and the poseur-buyer,
respectively. When the team arrived in the target area at around 10:00 p.m., IO1 Carin and
the CI alighted from the vehicle near the house of "Romy," while IO1 Orellan and the other
team members positioned themselves in the area to observe. Upon reaching the house, IO1
Carin and the CI encountered Gorres who invited them inside. Lim was sitting on the sofa,
watching TV. When the CI introduced IO1 Carin as a buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres to
get one inside the bedroom. Gorres handed a small medicine box to Lim, who then took one
sachet of shabu and gave it to IO1 Carin. In turn, IO1 Carin paid him with the buy-bust
money of P500. After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin made a signal and the team
immediately rushed to Lim's house. IO1 Orellan declared that they were PDEA agents and
informed Lim and Gorres, of their arrest for selling dangerous drug. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan
conducted a body search on both. The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA
Regional Office, with IO1 Orellan in possession of the seized items. Likewise, he made the
Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items. It was not signed by Lim and Gorres. Also, there
was no signature of an elected public official and the representatives of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the media as witnesses. Pictures of both accused and the evidence
seized were taken. The accused’s version is that Gorres was watching TV when the PDEA
forcibly entered the house, pointed their firearms at him, inflicted injuries and cuffed him
while inquiring where the shabu was and the whereabouts of “Romy”. They found Romy
upstairs, sleeping. Thereafter, the two were brought to the PDEA Regional Office and the
crime laboratory. During the inquest proceedings, Lim, without the aid of counsel, admitted
ownership of the two sachets of shabu because he was afraid that the police would imprison
him. Like Gorres, he was not involved in drugs at the time of his arrest. Unlike him, however,
he was previously arrested by the PDEA agents but was acquitted in the case. On
September 2, 2013, RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of
shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack of sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator. CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision on February 23, 2017.
ISSUE: W/N Romy Lim is guilty of violating RA No. 9165
HELD: No. In a criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which the
trier of fact could reasonably believe that an item still is what the government claims it to be.
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical
inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such
as: (1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2)
their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf;
(3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative
and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being
charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug
operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape. In
this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials arrived
at the crime scene because it was late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for them
to wait at Lim's house. IO2 Orcales similarly declared that the inventory was made in the
PDEA office considering that it was late in the evening and there were no available media
representative and barangay officials despite their effort to contact them. He admitted that
there are times when they do not inform the barangay officials prior to their operation as they
might leak the confidential information.

17. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. NESTOR AÑO Y DEL REMEDIOS, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.

G.R. No. 230070, March 14, 2018

FACTS:
On August 3, 2005, after receiving information about Año's drug activities at Daangbakal, Guitnangbayan II, the
police formed a buy-bust team designating PO2 Ayad as the poseur-buyer, with PO1 Ortilla and PO1 Acuin as
back-ups, and marked two (2) P100.00 bills to be used in the operation. The team headed to the house of Año
and upon seeing Año, PO2 Ayad whispered that he "wants to score" worth P200.00. Año replied that he has
drugs with him and gave PO2 Ayad a transparent plastic sachet, while the latter simultaneously handed the
marked money as payment. As Año placed the money inside his pocket, PO2 Ayad introduced himself as a
policeman, causing Año to flee. Fortunately, PO2 Ayad caught Año and asked him to empty his pockets which
produced the two (2) P100.00 bills. the team marked the confiscated sachet, and completed the inventory.
Brgy. Captain Buenviaje witnessed and signed the Inventory of Seized/Confiscated Items, and photographs
were also taken in the presence of Año, PO2 Ayad, and PO1 Acuin. On the same day, PO2 Ayad delivered the
seized sachet to the Crime Laboratory where it was turned over to Police Inspector Forensic Chemist for
examination. It was confirmed that the seized sachet was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug.

Upon arraignment, Año pleaded not guilty and denied the charges leveled against him. He claimed that on said
date, he was at home celebrating the 4 th birthday of his nephew when suddenly, three police officers forcibly
arrested him and brought him to the police station for inquiry. The following day, he learned that he was being
charged of drug pushing.

The RTC found Año guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Section 5 of RA
9165 with all the elements for the prosecution of sale of dangerous drugs present, noting that the identity of
Año as the seller of the illegal drug was clearly established when he was arrested in flagrante delicto during a
buy-bust operation.

The CA upheld the RTC ruling, it ruled that the apprehending officers duly complied with the chain of custody
rule under Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as PO2 Ayad
testified in detail the links in the chain of custody of the seized drug from the time of its confiscation until its
presentation in court as evidence.

ISSUE: WON Año is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.

HELD:
No. The appeal is meritorious. The Court finds that there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the
seized items from Año which were unfortunately, left unjustified, thereby putting into question their integrity
and evidentiary value.

While the fact of marking and inventory of the seized item was established by the attached Inventory of
Seized/Confiscated Items, the records are glaringly silent as to the presence of the required witnesses, namely,
the representatives from the media and the DOJ. Section 21 (1) of RA 9165, prior to its amendment by RA
10640, as well as its IRR requires the presence of the following witnesses during the conduct of inventory and
photography of the seized items: (a) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (b) any elected public official; and (c) a representative
from the media and the DOJ. In their absence, the prosecution must provide a credible explanation justifying
the non compliance with the rule; otherwise, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 would not apply.

Here, no such explanation was proffered by the prosecution to justify the procedural lapse. It then follows that
there are unjustified gaps in the chain of custody of the items seized from Año, thereby militating against a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which resultantly warrants his acquittal.

18. G.R. No. 223142, January 17, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
ROLANDO SANTOS Y ZARAGOZA, ACCUSSED – APPELLANT
Facts:

Prior to the application of search warrant before the RTC, the RAID-NBI received information from
their confidential informant that there was a group at Tagaytay St., Caloocan City selling drugs and
using minors as runners. Atty. Liwalug interviewed the informant, and along with an NBI team and
the technical staff of Imbestigador, went to the reported area to conduct surveillance that lasted for
two weeks. The informants were able to buy drugs from Santos and to use them inside his house.
Prior to the service of the warrant, the NBI RAID coordinated with the DOJ, barangay officials, and
the media.
On August 21, 2009, Kanapi, Saul, Bomediano, and SI Malaluan, armed with a search warrant,
proceeded to the house of Santos. Saul knocked on the door of Santos’ house but nobody answered so
the NBI team broke open the door. The team proceeded to the second floor, found Santos and showed
him the copy of search warrant. The team waited for the reps from the DOJ and the barangays before
conducting the search. During the conduct of the search in the house, Saul found several used and
unused foil strips, and unused small plastic sachets. Saul also found marijuana leaves when he frisked
Santos.
The RTC found Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 6, Sec. 11, and Sec. 12 of
Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The CA
affirmed the decisions of the lower court on the crime under Sec. 11 and Sec. 12, but reversed and set
aside the decision on the crime under Sec. 6.
Issue:
WON the trial court gravely erred in convicting Santos despite the Prosecution’s failure to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
No, the appeal is without merit. It bears to stress that while an accused in a criminal case is presumed
innocent until proven guilty, the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own strength and not
rely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense. Santos failed to justify his possession of the
marijuana and other confiscated items. Significantly, Dangerous Drugs Reports No. DD-09-47
showed that the examination made on the washing of these items yielded positive results for the
presence of the methamphetamine hydrochloride. The Court firmly holds that the prosecution was
able to fully discharge its burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt its charges against Santos.
Wherefore, the appeal is DENIED. The decisions of the RTC and the Resolutions of the CA are
hereby AFFIRMED.

19. People of the Philippines vs. Mustafa Sali y Alawaddin a.k.a. “Tapang/Pang”
 G.R. No. 236596, January 29, 2020

Facts:
On or about June 21, 2010, in the City of Zamboanga, accused-appellant Mustafa Sali y
Alawaddin, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, transport, distribute or give away to another,
any dangerous drug, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver a small
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance weighing 0.0241 and
0.0155 gram, which when subjected to qualitative examination gave positive result to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu).
The Regional Trial Court (RTC), 9th Judicial Region, Branch 13, Zamboanga City handed a
guilty verdict on Sali for illegal possession and sale of shabu which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (CA) agreeing with findings of the trial court that the prosecution effectively established that
the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs – from the seizure, marking, submission to the
laboratory for testing, and presentation in court – was not compromised.
Lastly, the CA was in the position that even if the police officers did NOT strictly comply with
the requirements of Section 21, Article II of the IRR of R.A 9165, the non-compliance did not affect
the evidentiary weight of the drugs seized from Sali and the chain of custody of evidence in the
present case is shown to be unbroken.
Essentially, Sali maintains his position that there is no moral certainty on the corpus delicti,
lapses in the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. 9165 must be explained in
terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized
must be shown to have been preserved.

Issue:

Whether or not the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 on the observance of
procedures must be strictly complied with, contrary to the position held by the Court of Appeals.

Held:

The non-observance of the procedure mandated by Section 21 of R.A. 9165, as amended, casts
serious doubt if the illegal drugs presented in court are the same illegal drugs seized. It is worthy to
note that the quantities of the illegal drugs seized are only 0.0241 and 0.0155 gram. They are
extremely small amounts which are highly susceptible to planting and tampering. This is the very
reason why strict adherence to Section 21 is a MUST.

There being no justifiable reason in this case for compliance by the law enforcement agents with
Section 21 of R.A 9165, the Supreme Court finds it necessary to ACQUIT Sali for the prosecution’s
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

20. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. R. LORENZ ESGUERRA y BALIBER

 G.R. NO. 243986 January 22,2020

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged before the RTC with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs under Sec.5, Art.II of RA 9165. A buy-bust operation was successfully conducted
against accused-appellant at his residence during which one plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance was recovered from his possession. IO1 Balbada then marked,
inventoried and took photographs of the seized item, which was subsequently brought to the
crime laboratory where after examination, its contents tested positive for 0.0440 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Aggrieved, accused-appellant moved for
reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. Upon appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed the
RTC decision in toto. Hence, this appeal seeking that accused-appellant’s conviction be
overturned.

ISSUE:

WON accused-appellant’s conviction be overturned.

RULING:

In every prosecution for the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Sec.5, Art.II of
RA 9165 the following elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: a) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; b) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment.The court a quo correctly found that accused-appellant committed the crime
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, as records clearly show that he was caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabu to the poseur-buyer, IO1 Balbada, during a legitimate buy-bust
operation conducted by the PDEA. Accordingly, the chain of custody over the seized drug
remained unbroken, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
properly preserved.; hence, accused-appellant’s conviction must stand.
21. PP v. JOCEL B. DE DIOS, G.R. No. 243664, January 22, 2020
Facts:
Members of the Tabaco City Police Station, together with the special informant successfully
implemented a buy-bust operation against accused appellant, wherein the alleged dangerous
substances seized from were immediately taken custody by the Police in the presence of a
media representative, a DOJ representative, and one Barangay official. The seized items were
then brought to the Crime Laboratory where after examination, tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Two informations were filed—Illegal
Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs—where after due hearing on the facts and
merits, the accused was found guilty as charged. In his defense, accused-appellant interposed
that his arrest was staged and motivated by ill-will.
Issue:
Whether the finding of guilt by the court a quo and the affirmation of the same by the Court
of Appeals is correct
Held:
YES. The elements for Illegal Sale of Dangerous drugs are as follows: 1. The identity of the
buyer and the seller 2. The delivery of the thing sold and the payment; while Illegal
possession of Dangerous Drugs has the following elements, to wit: 1. The offender was in
possession of an item/object identified as prohibited drug 2. Such possession was not
authorized by law 3. The accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. The courts a
quo correctly found the accused committed the crime of Illegal Sale, as the records show
that he was caught in flagrante delictp selling shabu to the poseur-buyer, PO3 Codia, during a
buy-bust. Similarly he was correctly found guilty of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs as
he freely and consciously possessed the plastic sachets with shabu inside when he was
arrested. Contrary to his defense that his arrest was staged or merely simulated. In the instant
case, it is glaring from the records that the Police team satisfactorily complied with the chain
of custody requirement as provided under the law; the team immediately took custody of the
seized plastic sachets, and conducted the marking, inventory, and photography of the same in
the presence of a media representative, a DOJ representative, and a Barangay Official as well
as the accused. The poseur-buyer personally delivered all the seized evidence to the Forensic
Chemist for testing.

22. PEOPLE vs. JOSEPH S. AMAGO and CERILO VENDIOLA, JR, GR NO. 227739,
January 15, 2020, PERALTA, C.J.
Facts:
Accused-Appellants were charged with illegal transportation of dangerous drugs, specifically,
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. On September 5, 2013, PO2 Larena was on
duty together with Piñero, a civilian contractual employee, they were ordered to join in the
conduct in a police checkpoint. They noticed the accused, before reaching the checkpoint
sign, the driver of the motorcycle appeared to be rattled and he abruptly executed a U-turn.
The action of the accused led the police officer to believe that they have committed a traffic
violation or were transporting/delivering something illegal. Later on, upon checking the
accused, they confiscated a handgun. The utility box was also searched and eventually, it was
found out that the utility box contained (1) one peppermint gum container with six (6)
elongated heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline granules. From
his training and experience, PO2 Larena was able to conclude that the sachets contained
shabu. The accused argued that there was no proof of delivery of the drugs to another person.
The trial court found the 2 accused guilty of crime charged against them for the sale, trade,
delivery, administration, dispensation, distribution and transportation of shabu. On appeal,
the CA affirmed RTC judgment.

Issue:
WON the court erred in convicting the accused-appellants despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime charged

Ruling:
No. "Transport" as used under Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002 means to carry or
convey from one place to another. Since the crime is malum prohitum, the only thing to
prove is the movement of the illegal drugs from one place to another. Proving the delivery to
another person is not necessary. The records show that prosecution has successfully proven
such fact.
23. PP v. DIVINAGRACIA, G.R. No. 240230, November 28, 2019
Facts:
A confidential informant tipped to Police Officer Plopinio that one, Divinagracia, was selling
Marijuana in Paranaque City. In response to the information, a buy-bust team was formed
where PO3 Plopinio acted as poseur-buyer. On the hour of the buy-bust, Plopinio together
with the informant approached Divinagracia and company, Sy, to pretend-buy Marijuana.
Plopinio handed the marked money and Sy upon order of Divinagracia handed the sachet
containing the prohibited drug to PO3 Plopinio. Upon consummation of the sale, Plopinio
reversed his cap to signal his teammates. Thereafter Plopinio announced his authority as a
policeman and arrested Divinagracia while Police Officer Burgos arrested Sy. Divinagracia
surrendered the marked money while Sy surrenderd a glasspipe suspected of containing
Marijuana. The seized items were inventoried and photographed in the presence of only a
Barangay Official. The seized items tested positive of Marijuana after having been delivered
to the crime lab for testing. The accused were acquitted of the charge of Illegal Possession of
Paraphernalia while convicted of Illegal Sale by the RTC, albeit failure of the buy-bust team
to procure a media representative and a DOJ representative as witnesses to the inventory and
documentation of the evidences obtained.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Illegal Sale.
Held:
NO. Clearly, the three-witness rule under the law was not strictly complied with although as
contended by the prosecution, the chain of custody was faithfully conformed with and that
the identity and evidentiary value f the corpus delicti were preserved. The law enumerates the
following stringent grounds for the deviation from the aforesaid requirement, namely: 1.
Justifiable ground must be shown to exist warranting a departure from the rule on strict
compliance and 2. The apprehending team must prove that the integrity of the seized items
had been properly preserved. This means that the procedural lapses must be identified and
that sufficient explanation must be made why those lapses were incurred. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to do so. In fact it did not profer any substantial explanation as to why a
representative from the media and DOJ were not present at the time of seizure, inventory, and
photographing of the illicit items. Therefore, any and all evidence tending to establish the
chain of custody were deemed immaterial. Even the identity of the seized evidence became
ambiguous and unreliable, unworthy of belief. The accused-appellants’ acquittal is perforce
in order.
24. PP v. JOEFFREY MACASPAC, G.R. No. 246165, November 28, 2019
Facts:
Acting on the tipped information by a confidential informant, the buy-bust team led by
Agent Otic (in coordination with the Pasay City Police, PDEA, and SM MOA Security
Personnel) proceeded to SM Mall of Asia. At around 5:00 PM, the MOA Security Personnel
informed Agent Otic and company that a Hyundai Accent was parked outside the
Hypermarket, with three persons onboard, identified as, Cuenca, the driver and appellants
Macaspac and Marcelo. Appellants alighted from the vehicle and walked towards the
counter where they claimed a plastic bag with a box labeled ‘Zest-O’. Upon returning to the
vehicle, the team closed in and blocked the vehicle where the driver had two times
attempted to run over the team. The officers were then forced to shoot. Those onboard got
injured, brought to the hospital, and the driver later on died. Meanwhile, the team seized
from the vehicle a Zest-O box containing a plastic pack with crystalline substance. It was
inventoried, marked, and documented in the presence of a media representative and a
Barangay Kagawad. The seized item was delivered by Agent Otic to the NBI Forensic Division
where it tested positive of 552 g of shabu. Appellants on the other hand aver that they were
only at SM MOA to meet with Cuenca, an interested car buyer. The arrest was staged and
false. The appellants were sentenced before the RTC for Transporting a Prohibited Drug
punished under R.A. No. 9165. The CA affirmed lower court’s pronouncement.
Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals err when it affirmed appellant’s conviction for illegal transporting
of dangerous drugs?
Held:
The appellants claim there was no transporting of illegal drugs to speak of since they were
not able to actually leave the premises of the SM MOA. This argument fails. True, appellants
were not able to completely leave the SM premises because in fine, their car was blocked by
the team but the fact remains—they had already moved the drugs from the Hypermarket
into the car and had actually started driving away with it. The essential element of moving
the drugs from one place to another was already accomplished, no matter how far or near
the same had gone from their place of origin. As the Court noted, there is no definitive
moment when an offender transports a prohibited drug. Finally, there was indeed
substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule. There was justifiable ground why the
inventory and photograph of the seized item were not made in the presence of the two
appellants as both of them were hospitalized. In any case, the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item were preserved from the time it was seized until it was presented in
Court.
25. G.R. No. 200396

MARTIN VILLAMOR y TAYSON, and VICTOR BONAOBRA y GIANAN, Petitioners

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondents

Facts; Police officers received an information from unknown person which caused the arrest of
petioners villamor who later convicted under 3(c) of RA 9287 for acting as a collector of bets of the
illegal game called lotteng and banaobra convicted under 3(d) of the same law for being a controller
and supervisor of the said game. The petition was filed contesting the validity of their arrest
considering the fact that such arrest was not by virtue of warrant.

Issue; WON the conviction of villamor as a collector and banaobra as a controller should be upheld;

Decision; The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures
was violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid
warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a
valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the
police officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of
the said right. In view of section 5 (a) rule 113 of rules of court the inflagrante delicto arrest cannot be
sustained since the prosecution established that the officers were positioned 15 to 20 meters of the
crime scene and it is difficult to prove meritorious for reason that compound was surrounded with
French therefore it could impossible to foresee.
26. YUN KWAN BYUNG VS. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION

G.R. NO. 163553 December 11,2009

FACTS

Philippine Amusement And Gaming Corporation aims to invite patrons from

foreign countries to play at the dollar pit of designated PAGCOR operated casinos
under specified terms and condition in accordance with industry practice. Petitioner,
a korean national, alleges that he came to the Philippines four times to play for high
stakes at the Casino Filipino; that in the course of games, he was able to win a
gambling chips worth of US$2.1 million. When he presented the gambling chips to
the PAGCOR employee they refuse to him.

PAGCOR believes that petitioner was brought into the Philippines by ABS
Corporation. The petitioner is a junket player who played in the dollar pit exclusively
leased by ABS Corporation for its junket players. PAGCOR alleges that it provides
ABS Corporation with distinct chips. ABS Corporation distributed the chips to each of
the junket players and at the end of the game the junket players will return the chips
to the ABS Coporation. Only the ABS Corporation would make an accounting of
these chips to PAGCOR casino tresury.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in the holding that PAGCOR is not liable to petitioner,
disregarding the doctrine of implied agency, or agency by estoppels.

RULING
Petitioner claims that there is an implied agency.Then again, petitioner claims that
even assuming that no actual agency existed between PAGCOR and ABS
Corporation, there is still an agency by estoppel based on the acts and conduct of
PAGCOR showing apparent authority in favor of ABS Corporation. Petitioners
argument is clearly misplaced. Under article 1869 of the civil code the basis for
agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on
matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as
if they were personally executed by the principal. On the part of the principal, there
must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferable from his
words or actions, while on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to accept
the appointment and act on it.Absent such mutual intent, there is generally no
agency.
There is no implied agency in this case because PAGCOR did not hold out to the
public as the principal of ABS Corporation. PAGCOR actions did not mislead the
public into believing that an agency can be implied from the arrangement with the
junket operators, nor did it hold out ABS Corporation with any apparent authority to
represent it in any capacity. The Junket Agreement was merely a contract of lease of
facilities and services.
27.
28. RAMON T. ARDOSA, vs. JUDGE LOLITA O. GAL-LANG
A.M. No. RTJ-97-1385 January 8, 1998

Facts:
In a Criminal Case before Judge Gal-Lang, the accused filed a motion for reinvestigation
andprayed that issuance of the warrant of arrest be held in abeyance. Upon learning that
the warrant hadalready been issued on that day, the accused filed a Motion to Recall the
Warrant of Arrest. Since theprosecutor and complainant were present and had been
furnished a copy of the motion, the judgedecided to hear the motion on the same day it was
filed.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge committed an abuse of discretion in hearing the motion
of the accused on the same day the motion was filed?

Held:
Yes, respondent judge committed an abuse of discretion in hearing the motion of the
accused onthe same day the motion was filed. Rules 15, §4 of the former Rules of Court
provides that notice of amotion shall be served by the applicant to all parties concerned at
least three (3) days before thehearing. The court, however, for good cause may hear a
motion on shorter notice. In this case,respondent judge defends her decision to hear the
motion of the accused for the recall of the warrantof arrest on the same day it was filed on
the ground that anyway the public prosecutor was present.The only excuse for dispensing
with it is if the matter to be heard is urgent."

Considering the foregoing, as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator, the
Court finds respondent judge GUILTY of misconduct and hereby REPRIMANDS her, with
warning that repetition of the same conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.
The complaint against respondent clerk of court is dismissed for lack of merit.
29. Crim Timoteo Garcia vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 155574 November 20, 2006

Facts:
Garcia and Nabo , being then public officers of the LTO, borrow units Asian Automotive
Center’s Service Vehicle knowing that said corporation regularly transacts with the
accused’s LTO Office for the registration of its motor vehicles, in the reporting of its engine
and chassis numbers as well as the submission of its vehicle dealer’s report and other similar
transactions which require the prior approval and/or intervention of the said accused
Regional Director and employee. Ma. Lourdes Miranda, the complainant, whose child was
run over an killed in a vehicular accident; the driver of the ill-fated motor vehicle was
accused Nabo, subordinate of Garcia. Miranda successfully traced the said vehicle and
eventually discovered the existence of numerous delivery receipts in the files and
possession of the Company own by certain Aurora Chiong; and that said discovery led to the
institution of the subject criminal cases against herein accused. Mrs Chiong recounted that
accused Garcia has a farm, and he would need a vehicle to transport water thereto. For this
purpose, he would, on a weekly basis, borrow from the Company a motor vehicle, either by
asking from her directly through telephone calls or through Yungao, her Liaison Officer.
Every time accused Garcia would borrow a motor vehicle, the Company would issue a
delivery receipt for such purpose, which has to be signed by the person whom accused
Garcia would send to pick up the motor vehicle. Yungao testified that the names and
signatures of the persons who actually received the Company’s vehicles were reflected on
the faces of the delivery receipts. The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed decision
convicting petitioner of fifty-six counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner be convicted of any other crime charged in the informations?

Held:
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes
the following acts: (1) by agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift or present an act constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duties; (2) by accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of
an act which does not constitute a crime, in connection with the performance of his official
duty; or (3) by agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from doing something which is his official
duty to do, in consideration of any gift or promise. In the case under consideration, there is
utter lack of evidence adduced by the prosecution showing that petitioner committed any of
the three acts constituting direct bribery. The two prosecution witnesses did not mention
anything about petitioner asking for something in exchange for his performance of, or
abstaining to perform, an act in connection with his official duty. In fact, Atty. Aurora
Chiong, Vice-President and General Manager of the Company, testified that the Company
complied with all the requirements of the LTO without asking for any intervention from
petitioner or from anybody else from said office. From the evidence on record, petitioner
cannot likewise be convicted of Direct Bribery. Indirect bribery is committed by a public
officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. The essential ingredient
of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public
officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. The alleged
borrowing of a vehicle by petitioner from the Company can be considered as the gift in
contemplation of the law. To prove that petitioner borrowed a vehicle from the Company
for 56 times, the prosecution adduced in evidence 56 delivery receipts allegedly signed by
petitioner’s representative whom the latter would send to pick up the vehicle. We, however,
find that the delivery receipts do not sufficiently prove that petitioner received the vehicles
considering that his signatures do not appear therein. In addition, the prosecution failed to
establish that it was petitioner’s representatives who picked up the vehicles. If the identity
of the person who allegedly picked up the vehicle on behalf of the petitioner is uncertain,
there can also be no certainty that it was petitioner who received the vehicles in the end.
30. NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION VS. JUDGE LUISITO T. ADAOAG

MJT – 03 – 1503

FACTS:

Desiree A. Legario filed a complaint and sought the help of the NBI executing a Sinumpaang
Salaysay that she was arrested on May 9, 203 issued by respondent Judge Luisito Adaoag for
violation of BP 22. She stated that the respondent together with the arresting officer accepted bribes
for her release thru bail. The respondent asked Legario to prepare P20,000.00 for the dismissal of
her case. Legario together with the NBI and a TV network set up an entrapment operation on June
11, 2003, Legario accompanied by an agent handed over the respondent marked money to which
the latter received and pocketed. Upon signal, NBI operatives nabbed him. With the case still
pending and the respondent serving suspension, he issued a warrant of arrest on October 22, 2003.
Respondent Judge denied receiving money, talking and extorting any amount from Legario.
Respondent also claimed that the issuance of warrant of arrest was in good faith believing that his
suspension is lifted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is guilty of bribery and issuing a warrant of arrest while in
suspension.

HELD:

Yes, there is substantial evidence showing that the respondent Judge is guilty of serious
misconduct for committing acts constituting to bribery, in soliciting and receiving money from
Legario. The intention to accept the bribe was clearly established by act of pocketing and traces of
fluorescent powder. The Judge tainted the image of the judiciary. Under rule 140 of the rules of
court the offense is considered a serious charge and punishable under section 11. He also violated
his suspension order considering that the evidence against him is Prima Facie.
31.
Disclaimer: ‘yong mga naka-red, pwedeng di na ilagay.
32. ROLANDO L. BALDERAMA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES  G.R. Nos. 147578-
85, January 28, 2008
Criminal Case:Direct Bribery 
Facts:
            Rolando L. Balderama was employed with the Land Transportation Commission (LTO)
assigned to the Field Enforcement Division, Law Enforcement Services.  Juan S. Armamento,
respondent, operates a taxi business with a fleet of ten (10) taxi units.
          Acting on complaints that taxi drivers in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport discriminate
against passengers and would transport them to their destinations only on a “contract” basis, the LTO
created a team to look into the veracity of the complaints. 
The team flagged down for inspection an “SJ Taxi” owned by respondent.  The team impounded the
taxi on the ground that its meter was defective.  However, upon inspection and testing by the LTO
Inspection Division, the results showed that contrary to the report of the team, the meter waiting time
mechanism of the vehicle was not defective and was functioning normally. The vehicle was released
to respondent.
Respondent, feeling aggrieved of the malicious impounding of his vehicle, filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a complaint for bribery and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
as amended, against herein petitioner.   He alleged that prior to the impounding of his taxi, the four
LTO officers had been collecting “protection money” from him.

Issue: 
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of direct bribery

Ruling:

YES. The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code contains the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in
consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from
doing something which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of
his functions as a public officer.
The Sandiganbayan found the above elements of direct bribery present.  It was duly established that
the accused demanded and received P300.00 as “protection money” from respondent on several
dates. As against the prosecution’s evidence, all that the accused could proffer was alibi and denial,
the weakest of defenses.
To hold a person liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the concurrence of the following
elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution: (1) that the accused is a
public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the said public
officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to
his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the
government or a private party; and (4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The Sandiganbayan found that petitioners and
Lubrica participated directly in the malicious apprehension and impounding of the taxi unit of
respondent, causing him undue injury.
Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before this Court are binding and
conclusive in the absence of a showing that they come under the established exceptions, among them:
1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; and, 6) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are
premised on the absence of evidence on record.   We found none of these exceptions in the present
cases.

33. G.R. No. 185224               July 29, 2015

AMELIA CARMELA CONSTANTINO ZOLETA, Petitioner, 
vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [FOURTH DIVISION] and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS:
This is to resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Amelia Carmela Constantino
Zoleta assailing the November 5, 2008 decision of the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) in Criminal
Case No. 28326.
The case stemmed from an anonymous complaint filed against the petitioner, Mary Ann Gadian, and
Sheryll Desiree Tangan before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman) for
participating in the scheme of questionable grants and donations to fictitious entities using provincial
funds. As a result of this complaint, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit in
Sarangani Province. Among the irregularities discovered by the Special Audit Team was a P20,000.00
financial assistance given to Women in Progress (WIP), a cooperative whose members were mostly
government personnel or relatives of the officials of Sarangani Province.
The COA Special Audit Team submitted its report to the Ombudsman which, in turn, conducted a
preliminary investigation. Thereafter, the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
charged the petitioner, Vice-Governor Felipe Constantino, Violeta Bahilidad, Maria Camanay, and
Teodorico Diaz with malversation of public funds by falsification of public documents defined and
penalized under Article 217 in relation to Article 171(2) and Article48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, before the Sandiganbayan in an Information which reads: That on January 24, 2002 or prior
or subsequent thereto in Sarangani, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Felipe Katu Constantino, a high-ranking public officer, being the Vice-Governor of the
Province of Sarangani, Maria D. Camanay, Provincial Accountant, Teodorico F. Diaz, Provincial
Board Member, Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta, Executive Assistant III, all accountable public officials of
the Provincial Government of Sarangani, by reason of the duties of their office, conspiring and
confederating with Violita Bahilidad, private individual, the public officers, while committing the
offense in relation to office, taking advantage of their respective positions, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, convert and misappropriate the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in public funds under their custody, and for which they are
accountable, by falsifying or causing to be falsified the corresponding Disbursement Voucher No.
101-2002-01-822 and its supporting documents, making it appear that financial assistance had been
sought by Women In Progress, Malungon, Sarangani, represented by its President, Amelia Carmela C.
Zoleta, when in truth and in fact, the accused knew fully well that no financial assistance had been
requested by the said group and her association, nor did Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta and her association
receive the aforementioned amount, thereby facilitating the release of the above-mentioned public
funds in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00)through encashment by the
accused at Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 36481 dated January 24, 2002 issued in the
name of the Violeta Bahilidad, which amount they subsequently misappropriated to their personal use
and benefit and despite demand, the said accused failed to return the said amount to the damage and
prejudice of the government and the public interest of the aforesaid sum.

ISSUE:

WON the totality of evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to overcome the
petitioner’s presumption of innocence in the complex crime of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents.

RULING:
In the present petition, the petitioner alleges that the presented evidence were insufficient to support a
conviction. At any rate, the SC hold that the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted the petitioner of the
complex crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents.
Malversation may be committed by appropriating public funds or property; by taking or
misappropriating the same; by consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, by permitting any
other person to take such public funds or property; or by being otherwise guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
The elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, are the following: (a) that the offender be a public officer; (b) that he had custody or control
of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) that those funds or property were public
funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated
or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. All these
elements have been established by the prosecution.
First, it is undisputed that all the accused, except Bahilidad, are all public officers. A public officer is
defined in the Revised Penal Code as "any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular
election, or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions
in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its
branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class.
Constantino was the Vice-Governor of Sarangani Province, while the petitioner, Camanay, and Diaz
were occupying the positions of Executive Assistant (at the Office of the Vice-Governor), Provincial
Accountant, and Provincial Board Member, respectively.
Second, the funds misappropriated are public in character, as they were funds belonging to the
Province of Sarangani.
Third, Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay were accountable public officers. Under the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, an accountable public officer is a public officer who,
by reason of his office, is accountable for public funds or property. The Local Government Code
expanded this definition with regard to local government officials. Section 340 of the LGC reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the SC denied the petition and affirmed the
November 5, 2008 decision of the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) in Criminal Case No. 28326 with
the MODIFICATION that the maximum term of the penalty imposed on the petitioner be increased
from sixteen ( 16) years, five ( 5) months, and eleven (11) days to eighteen (18) years, two (2) months
and twenty one (21) days of reclusion temporal.
34. Major Joel G. Cantos, Petitioner VS People of the Philippines, Respondent
FACTS:
Major Joel G. Cantos is a Commanding Officer of the 22 nd Finance Service Center in the
Presidential Security Group, Malacanang Park in Manila. On December 21, 2000, he took and
misappropriated the amount of P3, 270,000.00 from public funds, by reason of his position in the
Office and for his personal interest.
Meanwhile, Major Eligio T. Balao, a Disbursing Officer at the 22 nd FSU who acted as a
witness, revealed that Major Cantos called him at around 12 noon to his office and notified him about
the missing Special Duty Allowance for December and other Maintenance Operating Expenses under
his supervision all amounting to P3 Million pesos. Balao was taken aback by what he had just found
out about the said money.
When he asked Major Cantos where he kept it and asked why he did not keep the money in a
safety vault, there was no response from Cantos. Balao further narrated that he was instructed by
Major Cantos to get a screw driver to unscrew the safety vault and make it appear that the money was
stolen from the vault. Instructions on getting the combination number of the vault from a certain
Major Mendoza in Taguig were also given to Balao but he was not able to find Mendoza. When Balao
went back to the office, Col. Espinelli tried to make him disclose that he took the money.
On the part of Major Cantos, he mentioned that he was informed by Major Mendoza that the
safety vault where he wished to keep the money was defective and so he kept the money in a duffel
bag in a steel cabinet. At that time, he had the keys to the steel cabinet. The next day, he narrated that
the duffel bag with the money was gone. At first, they wanted to make it appear that the money was
stolen by unscrewing the vault. But, Cantos later informed Gen. Diaz about the lost money and was
advised to relay the incident to Col. Espinelli to which Espinelli made an investigation.
It showed that all the elements of the crime of malversation of public funds were found. He
was public officer and had complete supervision and control of the funds and he failed to explain
adequately what had happened to the funds.
ISSUE:
Did the Sandiganbayan make a mistake in finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of malversation of public funds?
HELD/RULING:
No. Petitioner Cantos failed to explain satisfactorily the missing money amounting to P3
Million and restitute the amount upon demand. The reasons he gave – the funds being stolen and
forcibly taken -- were not well-supported by evidence. There was no trace of the steel cabinet where
he placed the money being opened by force and it was only Cantos who had the keys to the said steel
cabinet.
His explanation was insufficient and did not overcome the presumption that he had put the
missing funds to personal use. Even if no direct evidence of misappropriation exists, it was mentioned
that the only required element is that there is shortage in the officer’s account which has not been able
to be explained adequately.
The petition was DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in convicting Major Joel G.
Cantos of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds was AFFIRMED and UPHELD. There were
costs against the petitioner.
35. LEGRAMA V SANDIGANBAYAN GR 178626

FACTS:
Office of the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA), Zambales directed an
Audit Team to conduct an examination of the cash and account of petitioner Cecilia Legrama, the
Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales.
The COA prepared a Special Cash Examination Report on the Cash and Accounts of
petitioner which contained the findings that petitioners cash accountability has a shortage in the
amount of P1,152,900.75. From the total amount of the shortage, petitioner was able to restitute the
initial amount of P60,000.00.
Consequently, petitioner and Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida), the Municipal Mayor were
charged in an Informationwith the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. Both petitioner and
Lonzanida voluntarily surrendered and posted their respective cash bonds.
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision acquitting Lonzanida (lack of proof that is conspired with
petitioner). However, the tribunal concluded that petitioner malversed the total amount
of P1,131,595.05 and found her guilty of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
The amount involved in the instant case is more than Php22,000.00. Hence, pursuant to the
provisions of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
Considering the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of two mitigating
circumstances, viz., accused Legramas voluntary surrender and partial restitution of the amount
involved in the instant case, and being entitled to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
she is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Further, she is ordered to pay the amount of Php299,204.65, representing the balance of her
incurred shortage after deducting therein the restituted amount of Php832,390.40 and the Php200.00
covered by an Official Receipt dated August 18, 1996 issued in the name of the Municipality of San
Antonio (Exhibit 22). She is also ordered to pay a fine equal to the amount malversed which is
Php1,131,595.05 and likewise suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and to pay costs.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Malversation of Public funds?

HELD:

Petitioner is guilty of Malversation

Undoubtedly, all the elements of the crime are present in the case at bar. First, it is undisputed that
petitioner was the municipal treasurer at the time material to this case. Second, it is the inherent
function of petitioner, being the municipal treasurer, to take custody of and exercise proper
management of the local governments funds. Third, the parties have stipulated during the pre-trial of
the case that petitioner received the subject amount as public funds and that petitioner is accountable
for the same. Fourth, petitioner failed to rebut the prima facie presumption that she has put such
missing funds to her personal use.
Verily, in the crime of malversation of public funds, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that
the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he failed to account for the said funds
upon demand without offering sufficient explanation why there was a shortage. In fine, petitioners
failure to present competent and credible evidence that would exculpate her and rebut the prima
facie presumption of malversation clearly warranted a verdict of conviction.
36. OSCAR P. PARUNGAO, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 96025. May 15, 1991

FACTS: The petitioner, Oscar Parungao, a public officer, was charged of malversation of public
funds for allegedly appropriating to his personal use the amount of Php185, 250.00 for the
construction of the Jalung road in Porac, Pampanga. Parungao admitted that he received the said
amount, but was disbursed for the materials to be used, and the rest was used to pay, upon the
insistence of the municipal mayor of Porac, for the labor of the different barangays in the
municipality. Sandiganbayan acquitted him but convicted him for the crime of illegal use of public
funds (Art.220). Hence, this appeal. Parungao claims that he cannot be convicted of a crime different
and distinct from that charged in the information.

ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him for on the violation of Art.220.

HELD: The accused has the constitutional right that he can only be convicted of the crime with which
he is charged, unless they have both have the same essential elements which are alleged in the
information. Whereas, the elements of the crime of malversation of public funds and illegal use of
public funds are distinct. Hence, the petition was granted. The decision of Sandiganbayan was
reversed. And Oscar Parungao was acquitted.
37. G.R. No. 162489               June 17, 2015
BERNARDO U. MESINA, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Under review is the decision promulgated on July 24, 2003, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed with modification the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120, in
Caloocan City convicting the petitioner of malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
On July 9, 1998, an information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner with qualified theft.
Upon his motion, he was granted a reinvestigation. On September 17, 1998, after the reinvestigation,
an amended information was filed charging him instead with malversation of public funds, the
amended information alleging thusly:
That on or about the 6th day of July 1998, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said above-named accused, being then an employee of [the] City
Treasurer's Office, Caloocan City, and acting as Cashier of said office, and as such was accountable
for the public funds collected and received by him (sic) reason of his position, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and embezzled and convert to his
0~11personal use and benefit said funds in the sum of ₱167,876.90, to the damage and prejudice of
the City Government of Caloocan in the aforementioned amount of ₱167,876.90.
Issues:
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming with modification the conviction of petitioner
accused-appellant of the crime of malversation.
Ruling of the Court:
The appeal has no merit.
The crime of malversation of public funds charged herein is defined and penalized under Article 217
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as follows:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property. - Presumption of malversation. - Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or
shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property shall
suffer:
xxxx
The crime of malversation of public funds has the following elements, to wit: (a) that the offender is a
public officer; (b) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office; (c) that the funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and
(d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 24, 2003 finding petitioner
BERNARDO U. MESINA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds subject to
the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and one day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 18 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and pay a fine of ₱37,876.98; and (b) he shall further pay to the City of Caloocan the
amount of ₱37,876.98, plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum, reckoned from the finality of
this decision until the amount is fully paid.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
38. G.R. No. 158413               February 8, 2012
CELSO M. MANUEL, EVANGELISTA A. MERU, FLORANTE A. MIANO, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), MELCHOR M. MALLARE and
ELIZABETH GOSUDAN, Respondents.
Facts:
(You may or may not add this) In the earlier petition, G.R. No. 158413, the petitioners, Celso M.
Manuel, Evangelista A. Meru and Florante A. Miano (petitioners), question the May 20, 2002
Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan granting the Motion to Re-open Proceedings filed by the accused
after their conviction in the September 17, 2001 Decision2 of the said tribunal.
In G.R. No. 161133, the petitioners are the accused assailing the (1) September 17, 2001 Decision of
the Sandiganbayan finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged; (2) the July 21,
2003 Resolution3 affirming the conviction after reception of additional evidence in the re-opened
proceedings; and (3) the November 13, 2003 Resolution4 denying their motion for reconsideration.
That on or about 17 August 1998, and for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of Infanta,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
Melchor M. Mallare, being the Mayor of the said Municipality, and Elizabeth M. Gosudan, being the
Treasurer of the said Municipality and an accountable officer of public funds of said municipality by
reason of the duties of her office, while in the performance and taking advantage of their official and
administrative functions, conspiring and confederating with or mutually helping each other, with
grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take
or misappropriate, or permit any other person to take wholly or partially, public funds in the custody
of the accused Municipal Treasurer Gosudan amounting to PESOS: ONE MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVEN AND 40/100 (₱
1,487,107.40), when said accused disbursed, or authorized, allowed, consented or tolerated the
disbursement, of public funds in the amounts of: (1) ₱ 995,686.09 for unlawful personal loans to
several municipal officials and employees including themselves; (2) ₱ 291,421.31 for payments
without the requisite appropriation; and (3) ₱ 200,000 for withdrawals recorded as cash disbursement,
said disbursement being in violation of the Constitution, law, rules and regulation, to the damage and
prejudice of the Government and public interest.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not accused Municipal Treasurer Elizabeth M. Gosudan committed the
crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
(2) Whether or not accused Municipal Mayor Melchor M. Mallare has conspired with his co-accused
Municipal Treasurer Gosudan in the commission of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
HELD: On the first element, as borne by the record of this case, and as specifically stipulated by the
parties per the Pre-Trial Order, dated 7 February 2000, the accused Melchor M. Mallare and Elizabeth
M. Gosudan are public officers at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, the former being
the Municipal Mayor and the latter the Municipal Treasurer of Infanta, Pangasinan. On the second and
third elements, as Municipal Treasurer, accused Gosudan had the duty to have custody and the
obligation to exercise proper management of the municipal funds of Infanta, Pangasinan, and accused,
Mallare, as the local chief executive, is responsible for the supervision of all government funds and
property pertaining to his agency, the Municipality of Infanta, Pangasinan.
Anent the fourth element, the record is replete with evidence showing that accused Treasurer Gosudan
herself admitted that she gave the "missing" amount to several municipal officials and employees.
1. Gosudan’s acts of allowing other persons to borrow municipal funds constituted solid proof of
malversation.
2. In the case of Mallare, his act of getting or accepting the subject loan for himself in the
amount of ₱ 300,998.59 from Gosudan amounted to a conspiracy with the latter in the
commission of the crime of malversation. 
39. G.R. No. 175074  August 31, 2011
 Jesus Torres, Petitioner vs. People of the Philippines, respondent
FACTS: 
Jesus U. Torres, former Principal of Viga Rural Development High School (VRDHS) was
charged with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Upon
his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.  Consequently, trial on the merits
ensued.
On April 26, 1994, he directed Edmundo Lazado, the school’s collection and disbursing
officer, to prepare the checks representing the teachers’ and employees’ salaries, salary deferentials,
additional compensation allowance (ACA) and personal emergency relief allowance (PERA) for the
months of January to March, 1994. Lazado prepared three (3) checks in the total amount of 196,
654.54 all dated April 26, 1994.
Thepetitioner and Amador Borre, Head Teacher III, signed the three (3) checks.
Upon the instruction of the petitioner, Lazado endorsed the checks and handed them to the ac
cused. It wasthe custom in the school for Lazado to endorse the checks representing the teachers’ sala
ries and for
the accused to encash them at PNB, Virac Branch and deliver the cash to Lazado for distribution to th
e teachers.
Following day, the accused encashed the three (3) checks at PNB, Virac Branch but he never 
returned to the school to deliver the money to Lazado.
Petitioner admitted that he encashed the subject checks at PNB, Virac Branch in the morning 
of April 27, 1994 but instead of going back to the school, he proceeded to the airport and availed of
the flight to Manila to seek medical attention for his chest pain. Two days after, around 4:30 in the
morning of April 29, 1994, while he and his nephew were on the road waiting for a ride, three armed
men held them up and took his bag containing his personal effects and the proceeds of the subject
checks. He reported the incident to the police authorities but he failed to recover the money.
RTC rendered a Decision convicting petitioner of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds a
fter findingthat the prosecution has established all the elements of the offense charged.
On September 8, 2005, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal, the decision of the RTC before the CA.
On February 10, 2006, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion acknowledging that he file
d the appealbefore the wrong tribunal. Petitioner eventually prayed, among other things, that the case 
be referred to the Sandiganbayan for appropriate action.
On June 29, 2006, SG prayed that the appeal be dismissed outright, since transmittal to the pr
oper court, in cases of erroneous modes of appeal, are proscribed.
On September 6, 2006, CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, the petition.
Petitioner maintains that he inadvertently filed the notice of appeal before the CA instead of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner implores that the Court exercise its sound discretion and prerogative to rela
x compliance to sound procedural rules and to decide the case on the merits, considering that from the
beginning, he has been candid and straightforward about the fact that the case was wrongfully filed wi
th the CA instead of the Sandiganbayan
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, the petition.
Petitioner maintains that he inadvertently filed the notice of appeal before the CA instead of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner implores that the Court exercise its sound discretion and prerogative to rela
x compliance to sound procedural rules and to decide the case on the merits, considering that from the
beginning, he has been candid and straightforward about the fact that the case was wrongfully filed wi
th the CA instead of the Sandiganbayan
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of the crime of malversation of public funds

HELD:
 Yes. An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, is one who has custody or control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office.[21]  The nature of the duties of the public officer or... employee, the fact that as part of his
duties he received public money for which he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the
factor which determines whether or not malversation is committed by the accused public officer or
employee.  Hence, a school... principal of a public high school, such as petitioner, may be held guilty
of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same.
Petitioner also posits that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the Information
without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the accusations against him.  He maintains
that the Information clearly charged him with intentional malversation and not malversation through
negligence, which was the actual nature of malversation for which he was convicted by the trial
court.  This too lacks merit.
More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through
deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even
when the Information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence
may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves the mode of commission of the offense.
40.
41. Ysidoro vs. People of the PHG.R NO. 192330 NOV 14, 2012

FACTS:.

The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 of violation of illegal use of public property (technical
malversation) under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated
a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials for the indigent
calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes. Lolita Garcia, the CSAP Officer-in-Charge
sought the help of Cristina Polinio, an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality’s
Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia
that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already
distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Polonio and Garcia went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to ask
for his approval. Petitioner approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice
and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP. On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed a complaint against Ysidoro for committing
technical malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries. In
his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also meant for the poor
of the municipality was valid since they came from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity Fund.
Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the municipality’s poor CSAP beneficiaries were also
in urgent need of food. On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of technical malversation. But, since his action caused no damage or embarrassment
to public service, it only fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied. The Sandiganbayan held
that Ysidoro applied public property to a public purpose other than that for which it has been
appropriated by law or ordinance. On May 12, 2010 the Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro’s motion for
reconsideration. On June 8, 2010 Ysidoro appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to thisCourt.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.

RULING:
 No, good faith is not a valid defense for technical malversation. Petitioner insists that he acted in
good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not from
him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the accounting
42. G.R. No. 156427 January 20, 2006
AMANDO TETANGCO, Petitioner vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN and MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., Respondents.

FACTS:
• This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the order dated April 16, 2002, of public
respondent Ombudsman in OMB-CC-02-0151-C which dismissed the Complaint of petitioner
Amando Tetangco against private respondent Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., for violation of Article 2202
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
March 8, 2002, Amadeo Tetangco filed his Complaint before the Ombudsman alleging that on
January 26, 2001, private respondent Mayor Atienza gave P3,000 cash financial assistance to the
chairman and P1,000 to each tanod of Barangay 105, Zone 8, District I.
Allegedly, on March 5, 2001, Mayor Atienza refunded P20,000 or the total amount of the financial
assistance from the City of Manila when such disbursement was not justified as a lawful expense. In
his Counter-Affidavit, Mayor Atienza denied the allegations and sought the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for forum-shopping. He asserted that it was the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), not the Ombudsman that has jurisdiction over the case and the same case had
previously been filed before the COMELEC. Furthermore, the Complaint had no verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping.
The mayor maintained that the expenses were legal and justified, the same being supported by
disbursement vouchers, and these had passed prior audit and accounting. The Investigating Officer
recommended the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of evidence and merit. The Ombudsman
adopted his recommendation. The Office of the Ombudsman, through its Over-all Deputy
Ombudsman, likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, a petition before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
Complaint?

HELD:
No. After considering the submissions of the parties, the Supreme Court found that the petition lacks
merit. No grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found no evidence to prove probable cause. Probable cause signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
The Complaint charges Mayor Atienza with illegal use of public funds. On this matter, Art. 220 of the
Revised Penal Code provides: “Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. – Any public officer
who shall apply any public fund or property under his administration to any public use other than that
for which such fund or property were appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from one-half to the total of the sum
misapplied, if by reason of such misapplication, any damages or embarrassment shall have resulted to
the public service. In either case, the offender shall also suffer the penalty of temporary special
disqualification.
“The elements of the offense, also known as technical malversation, are: (1) the offender is an
accountable public officer; (2) he applies public funds or property under his administration to some
public use; and (3) the public use for which the public funds or property were applied is different from
the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.” It is clear that for
technical malversation to exist, it is necessary that public funds or properties had been diverted to any
public use other than that provided for by law or ordinance. To constitute the crime, there must be a
diversion of the funds from the purpose for which they had been originally appropriated by law or
ordinance. Patently, the third element is not present in this case.
In this case, the action taken by the Ombudsman cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic. Here, the Complaint merely alleged that the disbursement for financial
assistance was neither authorized by law nor justified as a lawful expense. Complainant did not cite
any law or ordinance that provided for an original appropriation of the amount used for the financial
assistance cited and that it was diverted from the appropriation it was intended for. WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
43. GARCIA, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 197567, November 19, 2014

FACTS:
Former Provincial Governor Leonardo B. Roman, during his term, entered into a
contract with V.F. Construction for the construction of a mini-theater. Roman signed issued a
Certificate stating that the project was 100% completed. Notwithstanding the various
documents attesting to the project’s supposed completion, as well as the disbursement of
funds in payment therefore, Provincial Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Roman’s successor–
authorized the inspection of the project and discovered that the construction remained
unfinished.

Garcia filed Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents

and violation of “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” against the respondents.

The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict De Pano, Rodriguez, Jimenez, and
Capistrano for the crime of Falsification of Public Documents by making it appear through
the aforesaid Certification and Accomplishment Report that the project had already been
completed when the same was only partially constructed. The Ombudsman held that their
report was necessary for the issuance of a certification for the disbursement of funds therefor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents committed a Malversation of Public Funds through
Falsification of Public Documents.

RULING:
NO. While Garcia insists upon the sufficiency of his evidence to indict respondents
for Technical Malversation, the Court cannot pass upon this issue, considering that the
Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Ombudsman originally charged respondents not with
Technical Malversation under Article 220 of the RPC, but with Malversation of Public Funds
through Falsification of Public Documents, defined and penalized under Article 217, in
relation to Article 171 of the RPC, a complex crime.
The charge of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents, the Court observes that there lies no evidence which would give a prima
facie indication that the funds disbursed for the project were misappropriated for any
personal use. The CoA Memo shows that the Province’s funds were used for a public
purpose, i.e., the mini-theater project, albeit without any allotment issued therefor. Garcia
also fails to convince the Court that the Province’s funds were diverted to some personal
purpose. Failing in which, the Court cannot pronounce that the Ombudsman committed a
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing such charge.
44. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS NELLIE R. APOLONIO,
G.R. NO. 165132, MARCH 7, 2012

FACTS: Prior to the date of the workshop, the participants or employees approached
respondent Nellie R. Apolonio (Executive Officer of the National Book Development Board)
to ask whether a part of their allowance, instead of spending the entire amount on the
seminar, could be given to them as cash. Concluding the proposal to be legally sound and in
the spirit of the yuletide season, Dr. Apolonio approved the request. Thus, after the end of the
workshop, SM gift cheques were distributed to the participants in lieu of a portion of their
approved allowance.

GIO Calderon found the following:

1. That the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonestly, in addition to
the charge of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service for the
unauthorized purchase and disbursement of the gift cheques.
2. That the respondent abused her authority as the Executive Director of the NBDB
and disregarded the authority of the Board when she allowed the conversion of the
cash advance, which was solely intended for the workshop, for the purchase of the
gift cheques.
3. That the respondent’s act is a criminal act of technical malversation.

Acting Ombudsman approved the findings of GIO Calderon and imposed the penalty
of removal against the respondent.

CA reversed such ruling contending that Ombudsman does not have the power to
impose penalty and respondent is not guilty of the crime charged but found guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Dr. Apolonia committed a criminal act of technical
malversation (No)

RULING: In Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that in the absence of a law or

ordinance appropriating the public fund allegedly technically malversed for another public
purpose, an accused did not commit technical malversation as set out in Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code. In that case, the Court acquitted Oscar P. Parungao (then a municipal
treasurer) of the charges of technical malversation even though he used funds allotted (by a
Department of Environment and Natural Resources circular) for the construction of a road
project and re-allocated it to the labor payroll of different barangays in the municipality. The
Court held that since the budget for the construction of the road was not appropriated by a
law or by an ordinance for that specified public purpose, the re-allocation of the budget for
use as payroll was not technical malversation.
 
Similarly, in this case, the budget allocation for the workshop was neither appropriated
by law nor by ordinance since DBM National Budget Circular No. 442 is not a law or an
ordinance. Even if it had been, however, it must be noted that DBM National Budget Circular
No. 442 only prescribed the amounts to be used for any workshop, conference or seminar. It
did not appropriate the specific amounts to be used in the event in question.
 
Therefore, when Dr. Apolonio approved the purchase of the gift cheques using a
portion of the workshops budget, her act did not amount to technical malversation.
45-46. (Pls note that pareho lang ang 45 and 46)

ALFREDO RODILLAS Y BONDOC vs.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-58652 May 20, 1988

FACTS: On March 27 1980 in the City of Caloocan, the accused, being then a policeman
duly appointed and qualified as such, hence a public officer, specially charged with the duty
of keeping under his custody and vigilance and of conducting and delivery from the City Jail,
Caloocan City to the Court of First Instance, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and return, one
Zenaida Sacris Andres, a detention prisoner being tried for violation of Section 4, R.A. No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under Crim. Case No. C-12888,
did then and there with great carelessness and unjustifiable negligence, allow and permit said
Zenaida Sacris Andres to have snacks and enter the comfort room at the second floor of the
Genato Building, Rizal Avenue, Caloocan City after the hearing of said case, without first
ascertaining for himself whether said comfort room is safe and without any egress by which
the said detention prisoner could escape, thereby enabling said Zenaida Sacris Andres, to run
away and escape thru the window inside the comfort room, as in fact she did run away and
escape from the custody of said accused.

ISSUES:

I. WHETHER PETITIONER'S CONVICTION BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN

BASED ONLY ON HIS ADMISSIONS WITHOUT THE PROSECUTION
HAVING PRESENTED EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS NEGLIGENCE WILL
LIE.
II. WHETHER THE ACTS OF PETITIONER COULD BE QUALIFIED AS
DEFINITE LAXITY AMOUNTING TO DELIBERATE NON-PERFORMANCE
OF DUTY TO SUSTAIN HIS CONVICTION.

RULING:

Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that "the act, declaration, or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. The admissions and declarations
in open court of a person charged with a crime are admissible against him. (See U.S. v. Ching
Po, 23 Phil. 578).
The records show that the elements of the crime for which the petitioner was convicted are
present. Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code states:

ART. 224. Evasion through negligence. If the evasion of the prisoner shall
have taken place through the negligence of the officer charged with the
conveyance or custody of the escaping prisoner, said officer shall suffer the
penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correctional in its
minimum period and temporary special disqualification.

The elements of the crime under the abovementioned article are:

a) that the offender is a public officer;

b) that he is charged with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either detention prisoner
or prisoner by final judgment; and

c) that such prisoner escapes through his negligence

There is no question that the petitioner is a public officer. Neither is there any dispute as to
the fact that he was charged with the custody of a prisoner who was being tried for a violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The only disputed issue is the petitioner's negligence resulting in the escape of detention
prisoner Zenaida Andres. The negligence referred to in the Revised Penal Code is such
definite laxity as all but amounts to a deliberate non-performance of duty on the part of the
guard (Id., p. 408).

It is evident from the records that the petitioner acted negligently and beyond the scope of his
authority when he permitted his charge to create the situation which led to her escape. The
petitioner contends that human considerations compelled him to grant Zenaida Andres
requests to take lunch and to go to the comfort room to relieve herself.

As a police officer who was charged with the duty to return the prisoner directly to jail, the
deviation from his duty was clearly a violation of the regulations.
In the first place, it was improper for the petitioner to take lunch with the prisoner and her
family when he was supposed to bring his charge to the jail. He even allowed the prisoner
and her husband to talk to each other at the request of a co-officer.

It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary precautions
to assure the absence of any means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions will
make his act one of definite laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate non-performance of
duty. His tolerance of arrangements whereby the prisoner and her companions could plan and
make good her escape should have aroused the suspicion of a person of ordinary prudence.

the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan is

AFFIRMED.
47: ATTY. GENEROSO LEGASPI, JR. VS. ATTY. J. ROGELIO T. MONTERO III,
CLERK OF COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, SAN JOSE DEL
MONTE CITY, BULACAN
A.M. NO. P-05-1986, APRIL 15, 2005

FACTS: A complaint was filed by Atty. Generoso Legaspi Jr. charging Atty. J. Rogelio T.
Montero III, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), San Jose del Monte
City, Bulacan, with grave misconduct and infidelity in the custody of documents. The
complainant alleged that one Rizalina Sasamori procured his services as counsel in a criminal
case wherein the trial court required the submission of counter-affidavits. The complainant
complied with such order. However, one Atty. Rogelio Montero, Sr., the respondent's father
appeared and manifested that he was Ms. Sasamori’s new counsel. The complainant called
the attention of the court that such was not proper and that Atty. Rogelio’s appearance was
unethical. Thereafter, the counter-affidavits and other pleadings submitted by the complainant
disappeared under mysterious circumstances and noted that it was the respondent, Atty. J.
Montero III who was the custodian of such documents. He contended that the respondent
should be held administratively liable for the mysterious disappearance thereof. The
respondent denied the allegations and claimed that the documents were intact and available
from the court files. The Executive Judge found the respondent failed to perform his
obligation. Respondent admitted during the investigation that he is aware that the
said Sinumpaang Kontra Salaysay filed by complainant is still part of the court files and that
he separated said document from the case folder and kept it inside his cabinet.
ISSUE: WON the respondent was remiss in his duty as branch clerk of court
RULING: Yes. Under the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, the branch clerk of court
as the administrative officer of the court, among others, controls and supervises the
safekeeping of court records. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court
specifically mandates the clerk of court to "safely keep all records, papers, files, exhibits and
public property committed to his charge." As custodian of the records of the court, it is the
duty of the clerk of court to ensure not only that the same are safely kept in his or her
possession, but also those they will be readily available upon the request of the parties or
order of the court. The respondent does not have the right nor the authority to remove such
documents from the record and to exclude it from the case folder, thus showing that he
indeed was remiss in his duty as clerk of court. But since no ill motive can be attributed to the
respondent and the records of the case were eventually found, respondent was only held
guilty of simple neglect of duty.
48: RODRIGO Q. TUGOT VS. JUDGE MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES
A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1332, FEBRUARY 16, 2004

FACTS: Rodrigo Q. Tugot charged Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores with gross ignorance of the
law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, infidelity in the custody of public
records/documents, and violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, relative to Civil
Case No. R-35137 entitled ‘Rodrigo Tugot, et al. vs. Fely Lausa, et al.’ for Ejectment.

The civil case, which was dismissed by the respondent judge was allegedly without any
factual and legal basis, and prepared not by the respondent judge but by the respondent Clerk
of Court. The plaintiffs’ notice of appeal was not attached to the records of the case
transmitted to the appellate court. They were informed that the notice of appeal together with
the other documents were lost so they were advised to file another notice of appeal and to pay
another filing fee.

Respondent judge denied the complainant’s charges and averred that the subject judgment
was based on applicable laws and evidence presented during trial. He himself prepared the
decision and not the respondent Clerk of Court since the latter was on leave of absence.
Respondent judge further averred that the notice of appeal was only misplaced and not lost.

Complainant rebutted the allegations in the comment of the respondent judge. Complainant
added that the respondent judge waited for about 900 days for the defendants to submit their
pre-trial brief, and the preliminary conference was conducted in violation of the requirements
of the Rules on Summary Procedure. In deciding the case in favor of the defendants, the
respondent judge manifested ignorance of the law and bias resulting in their prejudice.
Complainant contended that one of the defendants did not file an answer while the other
answers were unsworn to and unverified and therefore should have been considered as mere
scraps of paper. The position papers of the defendants were submitted beyond the period
provided for by the rules but the respondent judge accepted the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of the charges made against him.

RULING: In the present case, respondent judge failed to demonstrate the required
competence in administering an ejectment case. It must be noted that unlawful detainer and
forcible entry cases are covered by summary procedure because they involve the disturbance
of the social order which must be restored as promptly as possible. Accordingly,
technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully avoided. He failed to observe the
period within which to conduct the preliminary conference which, according to Section 8 of
Rule 70, shall be held "not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed." In the
present case, the preliminary conference was conducted more than two years after the filing
of the last answer. The present respondent has failed to abide by the provisions of the Rule on
Summary Procedure. He thus becomes administratively liable under Rule 140 Section 9,
which sanctions violations of Supreme Court Rules.

Respondent judge should also be sanctioned for misplacing complainant’s Notice of Appeal.
As administrative officers of the courts, judges should adopt a system of records
management, so that files are kept intact despite the temporary absence of the person
primarily responsible for their custody. In this case, the misplacement of the Notice of Appeal
indicates gross negligence. Respondent should have been more prudent in determining the
cause of its temporary loss, which caused unnecessary inconvenience to complainant, whose
right to appeal was affected.

Respondent judge belatedly filed his comment on complainant’s Reply, without offering any
explanation for his failure to comply on time. The Court directed him to submit the comment
within 10 days from receipt of the resolution. It took him almost two years to comply. A
resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request. It should be
complied with promptly and completely. The failure of respondent to comply accordingly
betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in his character, but also disrespect for the Court’s
lawful order and directive.

Considering that he has already retired from service, suspension is no longer a feasible
penalty. Being guilty of negligence and violation of a Supreme Court Rule and directive, he
was fined, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
49. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENIGNO PEREZ and ERNESTO
ARAMBULO
G.R. NO. L-44188 JANUARY 27, 1981

FACTS: The defendants, prisoners of the New Bilibid Prison, suddenly attacked and stabbed
to death with improvised deadly weapons another prisoner, the deceased. After investigation
by the authorities the defendants executed their voluntary extrajudicial confessions.
Information for Murder was filed against the appellants. Upon arraignment, both appellants
pleaded guilty but during the trial after the prosecution presented its evidence, they
repudiated their extrajudicial confessions and their plea of guilt, denying their participation in
the crime, and claiming that their extrajudicial confessions were extracted from them by force
and intimidation. Despite the claim of the defendants, the trial court found them guilty as
charged and sentenced them to death.

ISSUE: WON the defendant-prisoners were maltreated by the investigators

RULING: The Elements of Article 235. Maltreatment of Prisoners are:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he was under his charge a prisoner or a detention prisoner.
3. That he maltreats such prisoner in either of the following manners:
a. By overdoing himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner or detention
prisoner under his charge either-
1. By the imposition of punishments not authorized by the regulations, or
2. By inflicting such punishments (those authorized) in a cruel and humiliating
manner, or
b. By maltreating such prisoner to extort a confession or to obtain some information
from the prisoners.

The first two elements of Article 235 have been met. However, the 3rd element has been
unfounded. The court did not give credence to the claim of the defense that the extrajudicial
statements and confessions of the defendants were extracted by force and maltreatment for
the reason that they never questioned the legality and validity of said statements nor the
voluntariness of their execution when they pleaded guilty to the charge against them. The
extrajudicial confessions of both accused contained details which could not have been known
by the investigators were they not provided by both accused voluntarily. The investigators of
the defendants did not possess any proven motive or grudge against the accused in falsely
imputing to them the commission of the crime charged as narrated in their confessions. The
investigators were merely disinterested persons. The alleged threat, force and maltreatment
utilized to extract the confessions from the accused are general in nature, bereft of details,
and therefore cannot inspire confidence in its credibility. Both the accused never complained
to the prison officials about the alleged maltreatment when they could have done so. They did
not report to before whom the statements of the accused were sworn to. Their confessions are
admissible against them for the clear preponderance of evidence indicates voluntariness in
their execution. There is no question that a plea of guilty constitutes an admission of the
crime and all the attendant circumstances alleged in the information.
The SC affirmed the decision of the trial court thereby sentencing the defendants to suffer the
death penalty.

*****Additional:
In their separate opinions, Teehankee votes for the imposition of reclusion perpetua in view
of the contributory role of the sub-human conditions and "incredible overcrowding of prison
cells" that lead inevitably to the formation of rival gangs and wolfpacks and confine prisoners
"under circumstances that strangle all sense of decency (and) reduce convicts to the level of
animals," and tempering justice with mercy and in the hope that accused-appellants are not
beyond rehabilitation with the proper care and concern of the State.
50. G.R. No. 89223, May 27, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS. AURELIO BANDULA Y LOPEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS: On January 27, 1986, at around ten o'clock in the evening, six (6) armed men barged
into the compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental. The armed men
were identified by Security Guard Antonio Salva of the plantation as Aurelio Bandula,
Teofilo Dionanao, Victoriano Ejan and Pantaleon Sedigo while the two others who wore
masks were simply referred to as "Boy Tall" and "Boy Short." At gunpoint, the two (2)
masked men held Salva who was manning his post, disarmed him of his shotgun and tied his
hands behind his back. They then went up the house of Leoncio Pastrano, Chief of Security
and General Foreman of the plantation, hog-tied him, and divested him of his driver's license,
goggles, wristwatch and .38 cal. snubnose revolver. From there, the six (6) armed men with
Salva and Pastrano in tow proceeded to the house of Atty. Juanito Garay, Manager of the
Polo Coconut Plantation. Accused Dionanao, Ejan and Sedigo stayed downstairs while
accused Bandula and the two masked men with Salva and Pastrano went up the house of
Atty. Garay. After forcing their way into the house, the masked men and Bandula ransacked
the place and took with them money and other valuables. Thereafter, the hooded men who
were bringing with them Atty. Garay locked Pastrano inside his house together with Salva. A
few minutes later, Pastrano and Salva heard gunshots coming from the direction of the gate of
the compound. After succeeding in untying themselves, Pastrano and Salva went to report the
matter to the police. On their way, they found outside the gate the lifeless body of Atty.
Garay. The accused were mauled and violence was used against them upon locking them up
at the Municipal Hall.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was maltreatment of the accused/prisoners.

RULING: From the records, it can be gleaned that when accused-appellant Bandula and
accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel
present.
What is most upsetting however is the allegation of the four (4) accused that they were
mauled into owning the crime. The Court is greatly disturbed with the way the accused were
treated or maltreated. In fine, the Court cannot accept the extrajudicial confessions of the
accused and use the same against them or any of them. Where there is doubt as to their
voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
With the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused-appellant Bandula beyond
reasonable doubt, acquittal should follow as a matter of course. it is unfortunate that the
investigators who are sworn to do justice to all appear to have toyed with the fundamental
rights of the accused. Men in uniform do not have blanket authority to arrest anybody they
take fancy on, rough him up and put words into his mouth. There is a living Constitution
which safeguards the rights of an accused, a penal law which punishes maltreatment of
prisoners and a statute which penalizes the failure to inform and accord the accused his
constitutional rights.