OCAMPO vs.

FLORENCIANO
GR no. L-13553 Feb. 23, 1960

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married on April 5, 1938 and begot several children. In
March 1951, Ocampo discovered on several occasions that his wife was having illicit relations with Jose
Arcalas. When he found out, he sent Serafina to Manila to study beauty culture where she stayed for a
year. Again, Ocampo discovered that she was going out with several men aside from Arcalas.

Ocampo expressed his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which Serafina manifested
conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Ocampo then filed a petition
for legal separation on July 5, 1955.

The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed the petition, and upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision stating that there was confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the
adultery and prescription.

"ART. 100. — The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been
no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal
separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition."

"ART. 101. — No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney
shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated."

ISSUE: Whether or not the decree of legal separation should be granted to Ocampo and Serafina.

HELD:
Yes. The Court held that the grant of the decree of legal separation is not based on the confession of
judgment, as the CA identified the statement of Serafina, but was based on the evidence of the adultery
presented by Ocampo independent of the statement of his wife. When the court is informed that
defendant equally desires the separation and admitted the commission of the offense, it should be
doubly careful lest a collusion exists. (The Court of Appeals did not find collusion.)

Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement.

". . . between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be
represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid
defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may
be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce."

Here, the offense of adultery had really taken place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not
have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment
her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal
risk. In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the
guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to
prove it. And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself
collusion.

The Court also do not think Ocampo’s failure to actively search for defendant and take her home (after
the latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with
Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had
discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her
home. Hers was the obligation to return.