Safety Science 47 (2009) 1033–1042

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci

Severity analysis of Indian coal mine accidents – A retrospective study for 100 years
J. Maiti *, Vivek V. Khanzode, P.K. Ray
Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, West Midnapur, West Bengal 721302, India

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: A retrospective study on severity analysis of Indian coal mines accidents for 100 years was done consid-
Received 7 June 2008 ering fatal and serious accidents and the resulting causalities. The impact of recommendations based on
Received in revised form 22 October 2008 safety conferences and committees over the years was studied. An event evaluation algorithm (EEA) was
Accepted 21 November 2008
developed for this purpose. The hazard rate functions and cumulative risk functions for major hazards in
Indian coal mines were developed. The study evaluated the status of safety level as well as the scope of
improvement for Indian coal mines safety.
Keywords:
Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Severity analysis
Hazard rate functions
Cumulative risk profile
Hotelling’s T2
Event evaluation algorithm (EEA)

1. Introduction
For more than a century Indian coal mines have been fulfilling
over 60% of the energy required by the country for her domestic
and industrial uses. This service is associated with both pain and
pleasure. The pleasant part of Indian mining history is its ability
to meet the national demand with increased productivity and
safety through improved research and development, adoption of
technological changes and amendments in mine rules and regula-
tion from time to time. Thus, the safety status of Indian coal mines
has been improved over the years. Yet, the present status is painful
to everyone associated with the industry. This is particularly true
due to high levels of fatality and serious injury rates in Indian coal-
mines. Though the fatality and serious injury rates are showing
decreasing trends, the decrease is not substantial when reviewed
for the last two decades. Further, over the last 100 years, Indian
coal mines have witnessed several changes in their safety and
health measures. These interventions were based on recommenda-
tions of safety conferences aimed at reducing fatality and serious
injuries (DGMS, 2000). However, effectiveness of such interven-
tions is not yet reported.
The key feature of a retrospective study is identifying perfor-
mance measures and evaluating improvement based on these
measures. The most common safety performance measures in
mines are annual numbers and rates of fatal accidents, fatalities,
serious accidents, and serious injuries. A number of studies are
found in literature involving analysis of these performance mea-
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +91 3222 283750; fax: +91 3222 283751.
E-mail address: jmaiti@iem.iitkgp.ernet.in (J. Maiti).
sures for Indian mines. These studies can be grouped in three cat-
egories as: (i) trend plots and preliminary analyses (Chandra et al.,
1987; Chandra and Sinha, 1988; Guha et al., 1997), (ii) company-
wise, cause-wise, and place-wise analyses, (Sharan, 1994;
Bhattacherjee et al., 1997; Goswami and Bandopadhyay, 1997;
Maiti et al., 1997; Majumdar et al., 1997; Goswami, 2000; Das,
2001; Paul and Maiti, 2001), and (iii) elaborative studies of risk fac-
tors for specific mines (Dhar et al., 1997; Ray and Bhattacharjee,
1997; Bhattacherjee et al., 1998, 2000; Maiti and Bhattacharjee,
1999, 2000; Paul and Maiti, 2001, 2007; Maiti, 2005; Paul et al.,
2005). The tools and techniques employed in these studies were
cross-classification tables, correlation and regression analyses, reli-
ability and risk analysis, and multivariate statistical modeling. The
key features of these analyses were hazard classification, identifi-
cation of risk factors and risk estimation. Some studies also as-
sessed scope and level of management control over safety, work
system redesign, technological upgradation, and adoption of safety
engineering principles. The findings of these studies comprised
both qualitative and quantitative evaluation of mine accident situ-
ations. The studies recommended better work place design,
improving organizational effectiveness towards safety, increasing
awareness of hazards and elimination and avoidance of these haz-
ards. The studies in categories (i) and (ii), as stated above were
based on national level data and/or mine specific information,
whereas the category (iii) analyses were based mainly on mine
specific data. Some of these studies pointed out the importance
of engineering and managerial safety measures. However, no at-
tempt was made to evaluate the effect of recommendations based
on safety conferences and committees, rules and regulations, and
circulars at the national level for Indian coal mines.

0925-7535/$ - see front matter Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2008.11.007
1034 J. Maiti et al. / Safety Science 47 (2009) 1033–1042

In this context, the authors believe that some issues that need  Explosion.
to be addressed for improving safety in Indian coal mines are as  Roof and side fall.
follows:  Hazards in-shaft.
 Inundation.
i. Identification of hazards in coal mines.  Mine fire and others.
ii. Evaluation of hazard rate function.
iii. Evaluation of cumulative risk of major hazards in terms of In this paper, these major hazards were evaluated in terms of
major accidents. fatal accidents, fatalities, serious accidents, and serious injuries.
iv. Evaluation of cumulative rate of fatal accidents and fatalities Subsequently, the total effects of all hazards combined in the
and serious accidents and serious injuries thereof. above-mentioned performance terms were evaluated. This was
v. Identification of safety measures and evaluation of their done in two steps: (i) evaluation of hazard rate function and (ii)
effectiveness in reducing fatalities and serious injuries in evaluation of cumulative risk.
Indian coal mines.
3. Evaluation of hazard rate functions
In this article, the authors have attempted to address the above
issues based on 100 years accident and injury data from Indian coal The steps involved in evaluating hazard rate function (based on
mines. A methodology is proposed for evaluation of hazard rate Kumamoto and Henley) are as follows:
function and cumulative risk and an algorithm is developed for
evaluating interventions spread over a period. i. Collect date-wise occurrence of incidents (fatal accidents
and serious accidents) and group the incidents based on haz-
2. Identification of hazards ards causing them.
ii. Calculate time-between-occurrence (TBO) for all incidents
The practice of identifying coal mine hazards in India is based together and for individual hazard groups.
on classification of accident causes provided by Directorate Gen- iii. Fit appropriate probability distribution functions (pdf) to
eral of Mine Safety (DGMS), Ministry of Labour and Employment, TBOs and estimate appropriate parameters.
Government of India. Major categories in DGMS classification of iv. Obtain hazard rate for the particular pdf.
accident causes (DGMS, 2005) are as follows:
The time-between-occurrence (TBO) for incidents is a continu-
 Ground movement. ous variable and can be fitted to one or more continuous distribu-
 Transportation machinery (winding in shaft). tions. The most commonly used model for time between
 Transportation machinery (other than winding in shaft). occurrences of failure is Weibull distribution. The Weibull density
 Machinery other than transportation machinery. function of a continuous random variable (TBO = X) with parame-
 Explosives. ters a and b, is given by (Johnson, 2000)
 Electricity. (
 Dust, gas and other combustible materials. ab  xb1 ea:xb ; x > 0
f ðxÞ ¼ ð1Þ
 Falls (other than fall of ground). 0; elsewhere;
 Other causes.
where a > 0 and b > 0. a is known as scale parameter and b is known
as shape parameter of Weibull distribution.
These categories are further sub-divided into several sub-cate-
Many a times, TBO follows exponential distribution. The Expo-
gories. For example, the category of ground movement includes
nential density function of a continuous random variable (TBO = X),
nine sub-categories, such as fall of roof, fall of side, and fall of over-
with parameter b is given by (Johnson, 2000)
hang. Similarly, the category of dust-gas-and-other-combustible- (
1 x=b
materials includes explosion, fire, influx of gas, and others. b
e ; x>0
f ðxÞ ¼ ð2Þ
DGMS also categorizes accidents into two classes, viz. major 0; elsewhere;
hazards and other hazards. Major hazards are those which, if occur,
result in substantial number of fatalities and/or serious injuries, where b > 0.
unless otherwise precautionary measures are taken well in ad- Both exponential and Weibull distributions were fitted to TBO
vance. Based on the last 100 years experience of disasters in Indian data calculated in step (ii) above. Weibull distribution was found
coal mines, DGMS has identified the following major hazards: fit to the data for all cases. Exponential distribution was also found
fit to the data, except for the cause, explosion. Weibull fits were
considered for evaluating hazard rate functions, as Weibull param-
eters provided more versatility in estimating hazard rates.
Table 1 The data for major accidents for the period of 1901–2005 were
Weibull fits for time between major accidents for all hazards (1901–2005). considered for evaluating hazard rate functions (Source of data:
Variable – TBA due to Scale Shape CI for scale CI for shape Kejriwal, 2002; DGMS, 2005). A ‘major accident’ is defined as an
accident with four or more fatalities (Kejriwal, 2002; DGMS,
All causes 130.96 0.86 113.07 0.78
151.69 0.94 2005). A major accident (with four or more fatalities) is also re-
Explosion 927.78 1.11 690.02 0.87 ferred to as ‘disaster’ in the literature (Kejriwal, 2002). Throughout
1247.5 1.43 the text of this article, the terms ‘major accident’ and ‘disaster’ are
Roof and side fall 219.89 0.83 179.54 0.74 used interchangeably and they refer to an accident with four or
269.3 0.94
In-shaft 1459.8 0.82 815.48 0.58
more fatalities. The details of each major accident in Indian coal
2613.3 1.14 mines are required to be published by statutory provisions. How-
Inundation 837.55 0.62 469.73 0.46 ever, the data for accidents with less than four fatalities are not
1493.6 0.84 readily available in public domain. Hence, it was not possible to
Miscellaneous causes 1528.4 0.97 972.33 0.69
consider the incidents with less than four fatalities in this analysis.
2402.6 1.37
The Weibull fit measures for all major hazards are shown in Table 1.
 J. Maiti et al. / Safety Science 47 (2009) 1033–1042 1035

Indian Coal Mines 1901:2005

Hazard rate functions
0.016

0.014 1. h_total = 0.015 t-0.17

2. h_roof & side fall = 0.0099 t-0.18

0.012
3. h_explosion = 0.0006 t-0.114

0.01 4. h_inundation = 0.0093 t-0.38

Hazard rate

5. h_in-shaft = 0.00214 t-0.18

0.008
6. h_others = 0.0008 t-0.04
Total
0.006

0.004 Roof&SideFall
Inundation Explosion
0.002
In-shaft

0 Misc.
1
47
93
139
185
231
277
323
369
415
461
507
553
599
645
691
737
783
829
875
921
967

No. of days between accidents

Total Roof and Side Fall Explosion Inundation In-shaft Miscelleneous

Fig. 1. Hazard rate functions for all hazards with four or more fatalities.

Fig. 2. Cumulative risk for all hazards with four or more fatalities.
The hazard rate functions for the major hazards are as below.
The risk functions obtained were as follows:
1: h ¼ 0:015 t0:17 ð3Þ
total
1 X 1
2:54x
2: h ¼ 0:0099 t 0:18
ð4Þ 1: F-rateðtotalÞ ¼ 1  ð9Þ
roof &sidefall 12:83 0 x!
0:114
3: h explosion ¼ 0:0006 t ð5Þ 1 X 1
1:43x
0:38 2: F-rateðroof and sidefallÞ ¼ 1  ð10Þ
4: h inundation ¼ 0:0093 t ð6Þ 4:21 0 x!
5: h inshaft ¼ 0:00214 t0:18 ð7Þ 1 X
1
0:381x
0:04
3: F-rateðexplosionÞ ¼ 1  ð11Þ
6: h others ¼ 0:0008 t ð8Þ 1:47 0 x!
1 X 1
0:314x
The hazard rate functions for the major hazard categories are 4: F-rateðinundationÞ ¼ 1  ð12Þ
1:37 0 x!
shown in Fig. 1. The hazard rate functions show almost constant
1 X
1
0:19x
instantaneous failure rate except for explosion. The situation is 5: F-rateðin  shaftÞ ¼ 1  ð13Þ
alarming because no improvement in observed in hazard rates. In 1:21 0 x!
fact, the explosion hazard rate is increasing. The possible reasons 1 X 1
0:219x
for this stagnancy are required to be explored. 6: F-rateðmisc:Þ ¼ 1  ð14Þ
1:25 0 x!

4. Evaluation of cumulative risk of major hazards The probability of occurrence of X or more major accidents (i.e.
accidents with four or more fatalities) is termed as failure rate (F-
The cumulative risk of major hazard is defined here as the prob- rate). The F-rates for each of the major hazard category and for all
ability of exceeding a certain number of occurrence (X) (Kumamoto hazards combined are shown in Fig. 2.
and Henley, 1996). X may be the number of total accidents or the It is seen from Fig. 2 that all hazards combined have a high
number of fatalities. The cumulative risk functions were derived probability of causing one or more major accidents in a year.
for each hazard as well as for all hazards combined. X follows Among the hazard categories, roof and side fall has the highest
Poisson distribution. The Poisson fit measures are shown in Table 2. probability of causing major accident followed by explosion and
inundation. The probability of at least one major accident per year
for all the hazard groups was estimated (Table 3). The maximum
Table 2
possible (p = 0.99) number of accidents per year for each hazard
Poisson fits for number of major accidents per year for all hazards (1901–2005).
categories was also estimated (Table 4).
Variable – no. of acc. due to p CI of p Chi-square p-Value
All causes 2.54 2.24 9.74 0.022
2.85
Explosion 0.38 0.27 0.09 <0.005 Table 3
0.52 Hazard-wise probability of atleast one major accident per year in Indian coal mines.
Roof variates side fall 1.44 1.21 10.8 <0.005
Hazard category Probability of at least one major accident
1.67
In-shaft 0.19 0.12 0.18 <0.005 1. Total (all hazards combined) 0.92
0.29 2. Roof and side fall 0.76
Inundation 0.31 0.22 2.98 <0.005 3. Explosion 0.32
0.44 4. Inundation 0.27
Miscellaneous causes 0.22 0.14 0.8 <0.005 5. In-shaft 0.17
0.33 6. Miscellaneous 0.20
1036 J. Maiti et al. / Safety Science 47 (2009) 1033–1042

Table 4 Table 5
Hazard-wise maximum possible (99%) number of major accident per year in Indian Negative binomial fits for four or more fatalities from major accidents (1901–2005).
coal mines.
Variable – fatalities due to p r CI for p CI for r
Hazard category Maximum possible number of major accidents in a
All causes 0.47 0.02 0.35 0.01
year
0.6 0.02
1. Total (all hazards 7 Explosion 0.082 0.007 0.05 0.002
combined) 0.11 0.01
2. Roof and side fall 5 Roof and side fall 0.46 0.06 0.31 0.03
3. Explosion 2 0.62 0.08
4. Inundation 2 In-shaft 0.081 0.08 0.03 0.01
5. In-shaft 2 0.13 0.14
6. Miscellaneous 2 Inundation 0.05 0.007 0.03 0.00
0.07 0.01
Miscellaneous causes 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00
From Table 3, it is seen that in Indian coal mines there is a 92% 0.08 0.04

probability of having at least one major accident per year. There is

a 76% probability of experiencing at least one major roof and side
fall accident in Indian coal mines. This is followed by explosion
(32%) and inundation (27%). Interestingly, Table 4 shows that
under the worst possible situations, a maximum of seven major
accidents per year can occur in Indian coal mines. Hazard-wise
break-up for the maximum possible number of major accidents
per year is as follows: roof and side fall – 5, explosion – 2, inunda-
tion – 2, in-shaft – 2, and miscellaneous – 2.
The probability of having four or more fatalities from major
accidents follows a negative binomial distribution given by (John-
son, 2000)
 
x  1 k xk
f ðx : k; pÞ ¼ pq ;
k1
where x = k, k + 1, k + 2, . . .. , and k P 4.
The parameters of negative binomial fit obtained for the data
are shown in Table 5.
Similar to number of fatal accidents, cumulative risk for four or
more fatalities was estimated for the different hazard categories
accidents other than major accidents. Apart from analyzing major
accidents for last 100 years, the authors analyzed data on these
performance measures (Source of data: Kejriwal, 2002; DGMS,
2005) for a period of 1951–2006. The total number of persons
killed in all accidents and the total number of persons killed in ma-
jor accidents for a period of 1951–2006 were available with the
researchers. The difference between these two numbers indicated
the persons killed in non-major accidents each year (i.e. the acci-
dents with less than four fatalities). This data was also considered
for the analysis. The year-wise frequency data for the five perfor-
mance measures followed negative binomial distribution, as the
variance for each variable was much larger than the mean. The
ð15Þ
negative binomial fits obtained for the data are shown in Table 6.
The cumulative risk function was obtained by subtracting the
values of cumulative distribution function (CDF) from 1. The
Table 6
Negative binomial fits for fatal accidents, fatalities and other variables (1951–2006).

and plotted in Fig. 3. The probability of having at least four fatali- Variable – no of p r CI for p CI for r
ties for total (All hazards combined), roof and side fall, explosion, Fatal accidents 13.88 0.07 8.34 0.05
inundation, in-shaft, and miscellaneous categories is 0.68, 0.43, 19.40 0.10
0.22, 0.14, 0.10, and 0.08, respectively. Fig. 3 also reveals that for Fatalities 7.34 0.03 4.6 0.02
accidents with fatalities from 4 to 18, roof and side fall incidents 10.09 0.04
Serious accidents 3.69 0.002 2.38 0.001
are more likely than other causes. However, for accidents with
5.01 0.003
more than 18 fatalities, explosion is the more likely cause. Serious injuries 3.88 0.002 2.50 0.001
5.26 0.003
5. Evaluation of cumulative risk for important safety Non-disaster incidents 15.20 0.07 9.07 0.05
21.32 0.10
performance measures

As mentioned in Section 1, the annual safety performance mea-

sures for underground coal mines are number of fatal accidents, Pr(X)
fatalities, serious accidents, serious injuries, and number killed in No. of persons injured in serious accidents

Pr(X) 1
0.8

0.7 No.of persons killed in

0.8
Total major accidents
0.6 No.of serious
0.6
accidents
Roof and side fall
0.5

0.4 Explosion No.of persons killed in

0.4
incidents other than disasters
0.3 Inundation
Misc. No.of
0.2 Fatal
0.2 In-shaft
accidents
0.1
0
1 67 133 199 265 331 397 463 529 595 661 727 793 859 925 991
0
Number (X)
0
6
2
8
4
0
6
2
8
76
82
10
16
22
28

46
52
58
64
70

88
94
4

34
40

10
10
11
11
12
13
13
14
14

No. of occurrences (X) Fig. 4. Cumulative risk for number of accidents (1951–2006). NOTE: Pr(X) is the
probability of occurrence of X or less number for each of the five variables shown in
Fig. 3. Cumulative risk of four or more fatalities from major accidents. the figure.
 J. Maiti et al. / Safety Science 47 (2009) 1033–1042 1037

Table 7 4000
Number of fatal and serious accidents, fatalities and serious injuries with 95% and 5% 3500

probability levels in Indian coal mines (1951–2006). 3000

Number
2500
Item Number of occurrences with Number of occurrences with 2000

P0.95 probability 60.05 probability 1500

1000 Serious Accidents
1. Fatal accidents 6101 6258 500 Serious Injury
2. Fatalities 6104 6374 0
3. Fatalities other 6113 6276 51 54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96 99 02 05
than disasters Year
4. Serious accidents 6512 Very high value Serious accidents and Serious Injuries: 1951-2006
5. Serious injuries 6550 Very high value
Fig. 6. Trends of serious accidents and injuries in Indian coal mines (1951–2006).

cumulative risk curves for the performance measures are shown in

Fig. 4. The salient observations obtained from the curves in Fig. 4
are summarized in Table 7. From Table 7, it is seen that the annual
minimum number (with probability more than 0.95) of fatal acci-
dents, fatalities, and fatalities other than major accidents are 101,
104, 113, 512, and 550, respectively. On the other hand, the annual
maximum number (with probability less than 0.05) of fatal acci-
dents, fatalities, and fatalities other than major accidents, are
258, 374, and 276, respectively. It is observed that the numbers
are very high for serious accidents and serious injuries. The num-
bers also reveal that around 100 numbers of fatal accidents may
occur every year in Indian coal mines, causing an almost equal
number of fatalities. This is still a grave situation, far from any sig-
nificant breakthrough in reducing number of fatalities.
6. Evaluation of effectiveness of safety actions and measures
Activities in Indian mines are governed by several rules and reg-
ulations such as mines act 1952, coal mine regulation (CMR) 1957,
and circulars issued by DGMS from time to time. These rules and
regulations are transformed/amended based on recommendations
from safety conferences and committees appointed by Govern-
ment of India from time to time. Sine India gained independence
in 1947, nine safety conferences were held by DGMS. The first con-
ference was held in 1958 which was an aftermath of Chinakuri
explosion in the same year. The agendas and recommendations
of the nine safety conferences held from 1958 to 2000 are given
in Table 8.
The first three conferences were held immediately after some
disastrous event in mines. However, the later conferences were
proactive in nature and held without occurrence of any such event.
The principal objective of later conferences was to frame, modify or
amend rules and regulations and safety practices in mines. In this
study, the years when the conferences were held were taken as
milestones for safety improvement and the effects of these confer-
ences on subsequent periods were evaluated. It was presumed that
the mines implemented safety measures based on the recommen-
dations of each conference, and that the interventions improved
the safety performance measures in subsequent periods. To exam-
ine this assumption, Fig. 5 (number of fatal accidents and fatalities)
and Fig. 6 (number of serious accidents and serious injuries) were
required to be studied. It is observed from Fig. 5 that the number of
th nd rd th th th th
700 1 conf 2 conf 3 conf 4 and 5 6 and 7
conf conf
600
500
Number
fatal accidents and fatalities reduced over the years. A few spikes of
fatalities represent disastrous accidents involving a large number
of persons killed in single incident. There is a decreasing trend in
both fatal accidents and fatalities. Similarly, the plots for serious
accidents and serious injuries show decreasing trend (Fig. 6). How-
ever, it was worthwhile to evaluate significance of periodic differ-
ences in the absolute values of these performance measures. For
this purpose, the periods for evaluation were defined with refer-
ence to the years of the conferences.
Eight periods were defined from 1951 to 2006 as shown in Ta-
ble 9. Periods 4 and 6 encompass two conferences each. Both 3rd
and 4th conference are considered together in period 4, due to
the fact that the 4th conference conducted in 1978 was aborted
and ended with recommendations of very superficial nature. Sim-
ilarly, 6th and 7th conferences were clubbed together in period 6 to
neutralize the effect of short span of difference between their
occurrence (1986 and 1988, respectively).
6.1. Method of evaluation
The annual performance measures were compared pair-wise to
estimate significant differences between periods 1–8. A signifi-
cance difference in the number of fatal accidents, fatalities, serious
accidents or serious injuries over any two periods reflects a differ-
ence in performance of the safety system. Such observations can be
assumed to belong to different populations and the intervention
event between them, i.e. the safety conferences, may explain a part
of the observed differences. For example, if the recommendations
made by the first conference were implemented effectively, then
the safety performance measures between periods P1 and P2 would
differ significantly.
The four variables considered follow Poisson distribution as
they are discrete in nature. Normal approximation to Poisson dis-
tribution for the variables is made. To satisfy the assumptions of
normality, the histogram and probability plots for the variables
considered were constructed. It was found that the variables follow
normal distribution for the 55 year data considered for analysis.
The computational mathematics for estimating mean differ-
ences between two populations with multiple occurrences in-
volves calculation of Hotelling T2 statistic, which follows v2
distribution:
Let X ¼ ½X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 ; X 4 ; 0 ð16Þ
th th
8 conf 9 conf
denotes the variable vector involving four variables, where X1 – rep-
resents number of fatal accidents in a year, X2 – represents number

400 of fatalities in a year, X3 – represents number of serious accidents in

300
200 a year, and X4 – represents number of serious injuries in a year.
100 Then
0 h i0
51 54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96 99 02 05 ðiÞ ðiÞ ðiÞ ðiÞ
Year
X ðiÞ ¼ X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 ; X 4 ; ð17Þ
No. of Acc. Fatalitie
and
Fatal Accidents and Fatalities : 1951-2006 h i0
ðjÞ ðjÞ ðjÞ ðjÞ
X ðjÞ ¼ X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 ; X 4 ; ð18Þ
Fig. 5. Trends of fatal accidents and fatalities in Indian coal mines (1951–2006).
1038 J. Maiti et al. / Safety Science 47 (2009) 1033–1042

Table 8
Recommendations in safety conferences (adapted from Kejriwal, 2002).

Conf. no. and year Recommendationsa

1. Chinakuri explosion 1958 Free hand to manager
Employment of safety officer
Separate supervisory staffs related to safety aspects such as ventilation, stowing, and shot-firing
Inundation and explosion hazards elimination enhanced
Setting up of safety committee at every large mines
2. Dhori explosion 1966 Setting up of coordination committee between central and state Government
Emphasis on use of improved safety devices to reduce explosions
Mines act and regulations to be translated into Hindi
Implementation of suggestion scheme
3. Jetpur explosion 1973 Nationalization of all coal mines
Rules and regulations for ensuring safety and rehabilitation of persons, new constructions in mining areas
Compensation to disabled operators
Regulations for open cast mines
4. No major accident 1978 The programme ended in a dispute note
Internal safety organization to be developed for each mine
Zero accident potential
5. -DO- 1980 Well-defined safety policy for mining companies
Tripertite meetings comprising management, workers’ representatives and DGMS at intervals less than 6 months
Minewise and Causewise analysis of fatal and serious accidents
Safety campaign based on above analysis
Adoption of improved technology
Added responsibility to internal safety organization
Focus on prevention of roof and side fall accidents and prevention of fatigue
Accuracy of mine plans
6. -DO- 1986 Support plan for effective prevention of roof and side falls
Accidents due to dumpers and trucks in open cast mines
Health of mine workers with respect to air-borne dust
7. -DO- 1988 Safety in open cast mines:
(a) Code of traffic rules for HEMM
(b) Code of practice for workers
(c) More responsibility on companies
Creation of occupational health services in mining industry
8. -DO- 1993 Prevention of roof fall accidents:
(a) Classification of roofs based on RMR as suggested by Paul committee
(b) Introduction of steel support for at least one-fifth of the development district in a year.
(c) Amendments to CMR regarding mine support
Safety education and worker participation
Medical surveillance for dust and noise related health problems
9. -DO- 2000 Prevention of disasters from inundation and fire
Risk management as a tool
Quality control for improving safety
Effective communication system between DGMS and mines
a
In 1990, Paul committee was instituted to look after roof and side fall accidents for their reduction.

denote the four variables for periods i and j, where i, It is expected that there is a change in underlying population
j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , k, k = no. of periods and i < j. covariance structure due to the decreasing trend values of each
Following Johnson and Wichern (2002), the hypothesis to be accident-related variable under consideration. Therefore, the
tested for the given situation is pooled covariance is calculated under unequal covariance consid-
eration, and is given by the following formula:
H0 : X ðiÞ ¼ X ðjÞ ð19Þ
 0  
where X ¼ X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 ; X 4 ; , and 1 1
S¼ Si þ Sj ð22Þ
ni nj
H1 : X ðiÞ > X ðjÞ ð20Þ
Under the null hypothesis (H0) the statistic where Si – covariance matrix for ith population, Sj – covariance ma-
2 ðiÞ ðjÞ 0 1 ðiÞ ðjÞ
trix for jth population ni – number of observations for ith popula-
T ¼ ðX  X Þ S ðX X Þ ð21Þ tion, and nj – number of observations for jth population.
follows v distribution, where S – pooled covariance matrix and
2 The null hypothesis H0 will be rejected if computed T2 value ex-
p
p – number of variables. ceeds tabulated v2p (a) for a given significant level (a).
If H0 is rejected, it indicates a significant effect of the recom-
Table 9 mendations of the corresponding conference on subsequent period
Periods for evaluation of conference effects. j. The next immediate query is to assess which of the four variables
Period From To Remarks under consideration is responsible for causing this significant dif-
ference. In order to establish this, the 100(1  a)% simultaneous
P1 1951 1958 Pre-first conference period, 1958: year of 1st conf.
P2 1958 1966 1966: year of 2nd conf. confidence intervals were used for all linear combinations of pop-
P3 1966 1973 1973: year of 3rd conf. ulation mean differences between the variables under consider-
P4 1973 1980 1978: year of 4th conf., 1980: year of 5th conf. ation (Johnson and Wichern, 2002).
P5 1980 1986 1986: year of 6th conf.
The simultaneous linear combinations are given by
P6 1986 1993 1988: year of 7th conf., 1993: year of 8th conf.
P7 1993 2000 2000: year of 9th conf. qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffipffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
P8 2000 2006 Post-ninth conf. period a0 ðxðiÞ  xðjÞ Þ  x2p ðaÞ a0 sa ð23Þ
 J. Maiti et al. / Safety Science 47 (2009) 1033–1042 1039

where ‘a’ is a vector comprising 1 s and 0 s which indicate inclusion m2 þ m3 þ    þ mn . As in the previous step, the vector will be
or exclusion of corresponding variables in a given linear combina- replaced by a corresponding concatenated matrix in a multivar-
tion, respectively. iate case.
4. In each of the above steps, two-population mean difference test
6.2. Event evaluation algorithm (EEA) for data analysis will be carried out by calculating Hotelling T2 statistic as dis-
cussed in the Section 6.1.
The method to evaluate the effects of the conference-based rec- 5. If the null hypothesis stating ‘‘no significant difference” is
ommendations on subsequent periods takes into account linear rejected, the simultaneous variable combinations will be tested
combinations of individual values of variables in adjacent and for evaluating the influence of each variable and their specific
overlapping periods. This method successfully tests the effects of linear combinations, over the observed significant mean differ-
each of the conference-based recommendations for reduction of ence. This will also be carried out in accordance with the discus-
accidents/injuries in the subsequent periods. A heuristic algorithm sion in Section 6.1.
(EEA) was developed by the authors for carrying out this particular
test. The EEA contains following steps. The data was analyzed by using this algorithm. A MATLABÒ
Let there be n periods, P1, P2, . . . , Pn. Period P1 may have m1 num- application code was developed for this purpose. Eight periods as
ber of observations, period P2 may have m2 number of observa- defined in Table 9, were used for the analysis. The events were
tions, and period Pn may have mn number of observations. Also, the conferences as enlisted in Table 8, with the first conference
let an event happen at the end of each period, except Pn. Let these held in the year 1958 and the ninth conference held in the year
events be E1, E2, . . . , En1. This makes the period P1 the pre-first 2000. Four variables viz. number of fatal accidents, fatalities, seri-
event period (pre-E1), and the period Pn the post-last event period ous accidents, and serious injuries were considered for analysis. Six
(post-En1). linear combinations were used in the analysis as follows:
We are interested in assessing the effect of each event over all
the subsequent periods: 1. Variable ‘fatal accidents’ present, all others absent.
2. Variable ‘fatalities’ present, all others absent.
1. To assess the effect of E1 on P2, compare directly P1 and P2, 3. Variable ‘serious accidents’ present, all others absent.
which contain m1 and m2 observations, respectively. This is 4. Variable ‘serious injuries’ present, all others absent.
the first part of the analysis. The mean differences ðX ðiÞ  X ðjÞ Þ 5. Variables ‘fatal accidents’ and ‘fatalities’ present, others absent.
amongst all the periods will be tested in order to find out 6. Variables ‘serious accidents’ and ‘serious injuries’ present, oth-
whether there are any significant differences in mean ers absent.
responses, of any period i with all subsequent periods j. This
approach does not delineate the effect of individual conferences These linear combinations helped in further pinpointing the
rather it tells whether there are differences in X irrespective of specific reasons for any significant mean difference observed. It
finding out which of the events have made the difference, if any. was expected that if linear combination no. 1 and 2 appeared sig-
It is expected that the differences, if any, are purely due to the nificant in the analysis, combination no. 5 would also appear sig-
events that occur at the end of each period. In total, nc2 differ- nificant. Similarly, if linear combination nos. 3 and 4 appeared
ences are required to be tested, if there are n numbers of time significant in the analysis, combination no. 6 would also appear
periods defined for the purpose of analysis. significant.
2. Next, to assess the effect of E1 on P3, compare two vectors cor-
responding to P1 + P2 versus P2 + P3. The first vector will contain 6.3. Results
m1 + m2 number of observations, while the second vector will
contain m2 + m3 number of observations. This will be applicable The analysis showed encouraging results, which are presented
for a univariate case. In case of multiple variables like the pres- in Tables 10 and 11.
ent situation, the vector will be replaced be a corresponding
Table 11
concatenated matrix.
Effect of safety measures based on conferences on reducing fatalities and serious
3. Similarly, in order to assess the effect of E1 on Pn, vectors corre- injuries in coal mines.
sponding to P 1 þ P 2 þ    þ Pn1 and P 2 þ P 3 þ    þ Pn will be
Periods Effects of conferences (Ci’s) on subsequent periods
considered. The number of observations in each of these
vectors will, respectively be: m1 þ m2 þ cldots þ mn1 and C1 C2 C3 C4 + C5 C6 + C7 C8 C9
P2 Hotelling 4.53 – – – – – –
T2
Table 10 p-Value 0.34 – – – – – –
Two-population mean difference test for periods between conferences (significant P3 Hotelling 7.34 33.38 – – – – –
values shown in bold type). T2
p-Value 0.119 0.00 – – – – –
Period P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
P4 Hotelling 4.18 9.20 8.79 – – – –
P2 Hotelling T2 4.53 – – – – – – T2
p-Value 0.34 – – – – – – p-Value 0.383 0.056 0.075 – – – –
2
P3 Hotelling T – 33.38 – – – – – P5 Hotelling 5.98 10.99 4.45 44.34 – – –
p-Value – 0.00 – – – – – T2
P4 Hotelling T2 – – 8.79 – – – – p-Value 0.201 0.027 0.349 0.00 – – –
p-Value – – 0.075 – – – – P6 Hotelling 6.16 12.00 7.24 17.71 90.89 – –
P5 Hotelling T2 – – – 44.34 – – – T2
p-Value – – – 0.00 – – – p-Value 0.188 0.017 0.124 0.001 0.00 – –
P6 Hotelling T2 – – – – 90.89 – – P7 Hotelling 5.98 9.35 7.57 13.47 20.63 100.96 –
p-Value – – – – 0.00 – – T2
P7 Hotelling T2 – – – – – 100.96 – p-Value 0.201 0.053 0.109 0.009 0.00 0.00 –
p-Value – – – – – 0.00 – P8 Hotelling 6.16 6.70 7.73 10.69 9.99 17.65 74.68
P8 Hotelling T2 – – – – – – 74.68 T2
p-Value – – – – – – 0.00 p-Value 0.188 0.153 0.102 0.030 0.040 0.001 0.00
1040 J. Maiti et al. / Safety Science 47 (2009) 1033–1042

Table 10 shows the significant mean differences between a par- diminished from period P7 onwards, as effects of conference-2 on
ticular period and only its immediate successive period. Thus one further periods (P7 and P8) were not found significant from the
can obtain effect of C1 on P2 separately, effect of C2 on P3 separately, available data. Conference-5 had immediate effect on period P6,
and so on, from Table 10. and on subsequent periods, P7 and P8. Similar findings were ob-
Table 10 shows that there are significant reductions in accident/ served for conferences-6 and 7 combined, and conference-8.
injury occurrences over the periods expect between periods P1 and Once the significant effects were established, linear combina-
P2, and between periods P3 and P4. Almost in all cases, the four vari- tions of the variables were tested for individual contribution, and
ables under consideration are showing significant mean reduction. the results are presented in Tables 12–14 below. These results in-
This is due to the fact that the decreasing trend in the individual clude only those effects, which are present at first place in Table 11.
values is continued over periods. Therefore, if mean vector of per- Apart from identifying conferences with significant contribution in
iod P3 is significantly lower than that of P1, then definitely it is ex- reduction of accident/injury in Indian coal mines, the study also
pected that the mean vectors of all subsequent periods are established significant performance measures (X) for the confer-
significantly lower than that of P1. The significant mean differences ence, with significant contribution.
in Table 10 can be attributed to the implementation of recommen- Table 12 shows the effect of 2nd conference of periods P5 and P6.
dations of conferences, subsequently amended rules and regula- Significant reduction occurred in P5 and P6 for serious accidents,
tions, and circulars issued. serious injuries and a combination of the two. No significant reduc-
On the other hand, Table 11 shows effect of each conference on tion occurred for fatal accidents and fatalities. Interestingly 2nd
all the subsequent periods. e.g. effect of C1 on each of the periods conference was held in 1966 immediately after Dhori explosion
P2–P8, effect of C2 on each of the periods P3–P8 and so on. A close killing 268 persons, and the main objective of the conference was
inspection of the significance values in Table 11 reveals some inter- to prevent explosion in mines. Subsequently, several safety prac-
esting results. tices such as provision of safety lamps, gas surveys and clearance
It may be observed that, conference-1 and conferences-3 and 4 of coal dust were adhered to. These initiatives substantially re-
combined; could produce no significant effect on accident/injury duced serious accident and injury rates. No differences in fatal
reduction in subsequent periods. But conference-2, conference-5, accident and fatality rates might be due to increase in fatal acci-
conferences-6 and 7 combined, and conference-8 had significant dents from other major causes during the same period. A closer
influences in reducing accident/injury figures in the subsequent investigation of the cause-wise data reveals the fact. Similar find-
periods. Though conference-2 had no immediate effect (effect on ing were observed for the effect of 5th conference on periods 6,
the next period, P3), it has affected periods P5 and P6 (2-period 7, and 8, as shown in Table 13.
lag and 3-period lag, respectively). The effect of conference-2 Another observation is that although 5th conference produced a
significant effect of P8, no individual linear combination of perfor-
Table 12 mance measuring variable was found significant for the same per-
Effect of 2nd conference on periods P5 and P6. iod. This is due to the fact that the corresponding p-value (ref.
Performance P5 P6 Table 11) is 0.030, which is on quite higher side, indicating a weak-
measures
Confidence Mean Confidence Mean
er significance. The confidence interval for the variable ‘fatal acci-
interval diff. interval diff. dents’ is very close to exclude zero value, and this variable could
Fatal accidents 13.06 33.96 10.45 8.99 32.65 11.83
have been marginally significant, if the p-value were slightly
Serious accidents 29.89 994.38 512.13 16.76 978.50 497.63 stronger.
No killed 79.66 126.11 23.23 55.91 107.62 25.85 Table 14 shows the effect of 6th and 7th conferences combined
No injuries 27.25 1000.00 513.64 10.86 983.03 496.94 on periods P7 and P8. The effects were realized both in terms of
Fatal + killed 82.13 149.49 56.78 132.15
reduction of fatal and serious accidents and number of persons in-
Serious + injuries 57.26 1994.30 27.71 1961.40
jured on period P7. No significant improvement was observed in

Table 13
Effect of 5th conference on periods P6, P7, and P8.

Performance measures P6 P7 P8
Confidence interval Mean diff. Confidence interval Mean diff. Confidence interval Mean diff
Fatal accidents 8.46 40.77 16.15 2.52 38.12 17.80 1.16 47.98 23.41
Serious accidents 140.87 974.67 557.77 56.41 801.69 429.05 47.16 612.77 282.80
No killed 55.22 172.60 58.69 40.79 116.29 37.75 22.01 103.07 40.53
No injuries 139.65 994.66 567.15 58.71 816.89 437.80 41.46 630.52 294.53
Fatal + killed 57.10 206.80 37.78 148.88 16.67 144.54
Serious + injuries 280.72 1969.10 115.27 1618.40 88.49 1243.20

Table 14
Effect of 6th and 7th conferences (combined) on periods P7 and P8.

Performance measures P7 P8
Confidence interval Mean diff. Confidence interval Mean diff.
Fatal accidents 0.01 30.94 15.47 0.25 47.15 23.45
Serious accidents 60.13 396.58 228.35 69.13 281.03 105.95
No killed 19.37 38.36 9.49 9.21 54.71 22.75
No injuries 59.48 395.39 227.43 63.98 288.08 112.05
Fatal + killed 15.97 65.90 5.91 98.31
Serious + injuries 120.16 791.41 132.71 568.71
 J. Maiti et al. / Safety Science 47 (2009) 1033–1042 1041

Table 15 7.1. Major hazard evaluation

Effect of 8th conference on period P8.

Performance measures P8 It was observed from the study that almost all major hazards
Confidence interval Mean diff. have constant failure rates. This indicates need of fresh inputs for
hazard mitigation purpose. The increasing trend of failure rate
Fatal accidents 5.93 57.74 31.84
Serious accidents 130.87 204.78 36.96
for explosion requires careful investigation. The probability of
No killed 19.67 69.45 24.89 occurrence of at-least one major accident is quite high (0.92) pos-
No injuries 117.78 220.45 51.34 ing no complacency from the mine management and authority
Fatal + killed 9.59 123.04 regarding effective control. Roof and side fall incident is still a lead-
Serious + injuries 248.13 424.71
ing cause of accidents regardless several major attempts such as
Paul committee recommendations (1990). The findings that a ma-
Table 16 jor accident can occur in Indian coal mines at any time are alarm-
Effect of 9th conference on period P8. ing. Effective surveillance system should be installed in mines for
capturing the characteristics of major hazards. The system should
Performance measures P8
be integrated properly with the organization’s information sys-
Confidence interval Mean diff.
tems. The findings of surveillance should be made available to
Fatal accidents 26.60 66.16 46.38 appropriate authorities for immediate actions.
Serious accidents 404.85 153.33 125.76
No killed 0.21 110.13 55.17
No injuries 385.07 179.45 102.81
7.2. Cumulative risk of fatal and serious accidents and resulting
Fatal + killed 31.49 171.61 causalities
Serious + injuries 789.56 332.42
The study revealed that under the present safety conditions,
occurrence of 100 fatal accidents and more than 100 fatalities in
Table 17 a year is inevitable in Indian coal mines. There is also a high prob-
Summary including time lag. ability of occurrence of 550 serious injuries every year. The costs of
Conference no. Significant effect in reducing Time lag such mishaps are huge. As per DGMS standards, 6000 man-days
2 Serious accidents and serious injuries 14 years are considered to be lost for each fatal case and 4500 man-days
4&5 Serious accidents and serious injuries 6 years for each serious injury case (Kejriwal, 2002). This results into an
6&7 Serious accidents and serious injuries 7 years (for C6) annual loss of 847,500 man-days per year in Indian coal mines.
8 Fatal accidents 7 years But this is only the tip of an iceberg. The number will be manifold
9 Fatal accidents and fatalities Nil
if reportable and minor injuries are considered. Adopting techno-
logical upgradation and instituting engineering and managerial
control measures effectively can partially reduce loss. The cost of
individual performance measures for period P8. However, there these implementations may be negligible when compared with
was a significant overall mean difference. Table 11 explains the overall savings due to reduction in fatal and serious accidents.
reason for the relatively weaker p-value (0.040). However, the
number of fatal accidents and serious injuries were significantly 7.3. Effects of safety actions and measures
less with probability level marginally higher then 0.05. This was
observed from the confidence intervals for these two measures, The impact of safety-conference-based recommendations as re-
which were very close to zero, and would have excluded zero in vealed in this study is worth mentioning. Out of the nine confer-
case of a slightly stronger overall p-value. ences held so far, the outcome of the conferences-2–7 helped in
Finally, the effect of 8th and 9th conferences on the period P8 reducing serious accidents and serious injuries. No significant
in terms of reduction in fatal accidents is shown in Tables 15 and reduction in fatal accidents and fatalities was experienced as a re-
16. This is the only case where the variable ‘fatal accidents’ is sult of the conference-based recommendations. The first few con-
strongly significant among individual performance measures. It ferences were held immediately after major disasters such as
may be concluded from this observation that the recommenda- Chinakuri explosion (1958), Dhori explosion (1965), and Jeetpur
tions of 8th and 9th conferences have brought about a significant explosion (1973). The recommendations were therefore geared to-
reduction in the number fatal accidents, while previous confer- wards eliminating the specific hazards from mines. However, haz-
ences were not successful in achieving this objective. There are ard events like explosion are rare in mines. Therefore the measures
reductions in fatal accidents and fatalities over years, but the rate of removing them did not result in major reduction in fatal acci-
of reduction is not significant statistically. However, there are sig- dents. Fatal accidents due to other hazards continued to occur
nificant reductions in serious accidents and serious injuries over a and resulted into stagnant fatality levels. On the other hand, the
period of time. encouraging fact was that the serious accidents and injuries were
Table 17 summarizes the results discussed so far, including the reduced significantly. The measures leading to these reductions
time lag. There was a time lag of 14 years to realize the effects of can be implemented across all Indian coal mines.
2nd conference, This time lag may be attributed to ineffective com- The conferences-8 and 9 were followed by reduction in fatal
munication channels and sluggishness of the administrative and accidents and fatalities. This was mainly because of reduction of
industrial systems. Although the time lag has reduced, still it is roof and side fall accidents, a leading cause of fatalities in Indian
around 6–7 years. This time lag may be a matter of concern for pol- coal mines. The Paul committee recommendations for drawing
icy makers and designers of safety systems in Indian coal mines. up proper roof and side support plans contributed significantly.
However serious injuries did not reduce significantly. In fact seri-
7. Implications for management control ous injury cases increased in succeeding years, but the increase
was not statistically significant. So, it is possible that some poten-
The findings of this study will help Indian coal mine manage- tially fatal cases might have transformed into serious injury cases.
ments in several ways to institute controls for safety improvement. However, the hazard of roof and side fall does not cease to exist in
These are described in the following paragraphs: Indian coal mines. This establishes the fact that breakthrough
1042 J. Maiti et al. / Safety Science 47 (2009) 1033–1042
efforts are needed achieve significant reduction in fatalities in In-
dian coal mines. It may be difficult to achieve this objective within
the purview of existing systems. Therefore, a fresh outlook towards
safety system design and control is essential.
Another significant implication of this study is identification of
recommendations of the conferences requiring specific attention.
These recommendations are taken from the conferences that
showed significant contribution in reducing accidents/injuries in
succeeding periods. Based on Table 8, the recommendations are:
 Communication and coordination between all parties involved.
 Use of statistical analysis.
 Systematic support plan.
 Use of quality management principles in safety improvement.
8. Limitations and Future Investigation
The study, although exhaustive and intensive, has certain limi-
tations and as such provides scope for future investigation. These
limitations are stated below:
 Cause-wise hazard rate functions and cause-wise cumulative
risk functions were developed considering only major accidents
involving four or more fatalities. Incidents resulting in three or
less fatalities, serious injuries, reportable injuries, and near-miss
incidents should be considered for calculation of hazard rate
function and cumulative risk function. Indian coal mine author-
ities should take initiative to collect, store, and maintain such
data, and the database should be made readily available to
research community.
 The periods considered in this study are based on safety confer-
ences held from time to time. Apart from such conferences, sev-
eral safety initiatives and measures have been taken at the
organization level in coal mines. These interventions must have
affected safety outcomes. However the effects of such interven-
tions could not be studied due to non-availability of information.
Though the periods were conference-based, the effects were not
solely caused by conference recommendations. The effects were
collective result of all measures taken by mine management. The
EEA developed in this study can be used to evaluate effective-
ness of such combined intervention measures, if data are made
available.
 The extent of implementation was not known on case-to-case
basis. A comprehensive surveillance system should be installed
by the mine managements for reviewing the implementation
status of intervention measures.
 Finally, an effective review system can be put in place and made
available to the decision making bodies for effective online mon-
itoring and control of coal mine accidents.
Acknowledgements
The authors are thankful to all the agencies that provided data
for this research work. The authors are thankful to the Department
of Science and Technology (DST), Government of India, New Delhi
for providing financial assistance to this research and the reviewers
for their valuable suggestions.
References
Bhattacherjee, A., Mukherjee, N., Misra, R.B., Ghosh, A., Maiti, J., 1997. Design of
Safety System for Jamadoba Group of Collieries. A Consultancy Project Report,
Department of Mining Engineering and Electrical Engineering, Indian Institute
of Technology, Kharagpur, 134 pp.
Bhattacherjee, A., Ray, S.C., Mukhopadhyay, S.K., 1998. An Investigation of Accident
Prone Mines for Improving Skill and Safety Consciousness Through Training. A
Sponsored Project Report, Department of Mining Engineering, vol. 1. IIT
Kharagpur.
Bhattacherjee, A., Ray, S.C., Mukhopadhyay, S.K., Saran, M.B., Ghosh, A.K., 2000. An
Investigation into personal and impersonal variates in coal mine accidents. In:
Proceedings of the International Conference on Technology Management for
Mining, Processing and Environment, 1–3rd December, IIT, Kharagpur, 297 pp.
Chandra, D., Sinha, A., 1988. An analytical review of fatal accidents in Indian coal
mines. Transaction Journal of Mining, Geological and Metallurgical Institute of
India 85 (2), 71–90.
Chandra, D., Srivastava, G.P., Ash, S., 1987. An analysis of coal mining hazards in
India. Transaction Journal of Mining, Geological and Metallurgical Institute of
India 84 (1), 55–75.
Das, S.K., 2001. Safety in the underground haulage system and face equipment.
Mining Engineers’ Journal 2 (7), 17–29.
DGMS 2000. Recommendations of the Ninth Conference on Safety in Mines.
Directorate General of Mines Safety, Ministry of Labour and Employment,
Government of India.
DGMS 2005. DGMS Annual Report-2005, Directorate General of Mines Safety,
Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India.
Dhar, B.B., Singh, A.P., Ratan, S., 1997. Socio-psychological correlation of coal
mine accidents. In: Proceedings of the 27th International Conference of
Safety in Mines Research Institutes, New Delhi, February 20–22, vol. 2, pp.
1239–1252.
Goswami, K.B., 2000. Safety – A System Approach. Presented at the First Ordinary
General Meeting of the Mining, March 13. Geological and Metallurgical Institute
of India, Calcutta. 7 pp.
Goswami, K.B., Bandopadhyay, T., 1997. Mine safety in coal India limited. In:
Proceedings of the 27th International Conference of Safety in Mines Research
Institutes, New Delhi, February 20–22, 1997, vol. 1, pp. 51–62.
Guha, R., Sibal, S.J., Mahajan, V., 1997 Management of safety in Indian mines: need
for a paradigm shift. In: Proceedings of the 27th International Conference of
Safety in Mines Research Institutes, New Delhi, February 20–22, 1997, vol. 1, pp.
143–153.
Johnson, R.A., 2000. Miller & Freund’s Probability and Statistics for Engineers, sixth
ed. Prentice Hall of India, New Delhi.
Johnson, R.A., Wichern, D.W., 2002. Applied Multivariate Statistical Analysis, fiveth
ed. Pearson Education, India.
Kejriwal, B.K., 2002. Safety in Mines. Lovely Prakashan, Dhanbad. 394 pp.
Kumamoto, H., Henley, E., 1996. Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Management for
Engineers and Scientists, second ed. IEEE Press, New York.
Maiti, J., 2005. Risk assessment and safety evaluation of mining system. Journal of
the Institution of Engineers 85, 33–41.
Maiti, J., Bhattacharjee, A., 1999. Evaluation of risk of occupational injuries among
underground coal mine workers through multinomial logit analysis. Journal of
Safety Research, Elsevier Science 30 (2), 93–101.
Maiti, J., Bhattacharjee, A., 2000. A causal model for evaluation of mine safety.
Transaction of the Institute of Mining and Metallurgy (Section A – Mining
Technology) 109, A55–A59.
Maiti, J., Bhattacherjee, A., Ray, S.C., 1997. Safety performance analysis of coal mines
– a necessity for survival. In: Proceedings of the National Conference on Mining
Engineering – Survival Codes for the Future, Department of Mining Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, 19–20 December, pp. 255-265.
Majumdar, T.K., Bhattacherjee, B., Mahajan, V., 1997. Indian mines safety –
problems and challenges. In: Proceedings of the 27th International
Conference of Safety in Mines Research Institutes, New Delhi, February 20–
22, vol. 1, pp. 27–42.
Paul, P.S., Maiti, J., 2001. Mine accident data analysis (MADA) for identifying
countermeasures towards better safety performance. The Indian Mining &
Engineering Journal 40 (12), 47–53.
Paul, P.S., Maiti, J., 2007. The role of behavioral factors on safety management in
underground mines. Safety Science 45, 449–471.
Paul, P.S., Maiti, J., Dasgupta, Sajal, Forjuoh, S.N., 2005. An epidemiological study of
injury in mines: implication for safety promotion. International Journal of
Injury Control and Safety Promotion 12 (3), 157–165.
Ray, S.C., Bhattacharjee, A.B., 1997. The effect of human behaviour on mine safety.
In: Proceeding of the 27th International Conference of Safety in Mines Research
Institute, 20–22 February, New Delhi, pp. 133–142.
Sharan, B.K., 1994. Mine safety in India – a synoptic view. Journal of Mines Metals
and Fuels XLII (11 and 12), 263–267.