Expanding the ABCs of RET

Albert Ellis
The original ABCs of rational-emotive therapy (RET)--where A stands for the Activating events in
people's lives, B for their Beliefs about these events, and C for the emotional and behavioral
Consequences or Concomitants of their Beliefs--have proved very popular and therapeutically
useful since RET was created in 1955. These ABCs have been expanded over the years by Ellis and
other writers on RET.This article presents an up-to-date and more detailed expansion of the ABCs,
with special emphasis on expanding the more common rational Beliefs (rBs) and irrational Beliefs
(iBs)

History of the ABCs of RET Definitions of the ABCs of RET

The ABCs of RET go back to its very begin-
nings in 1955, and I continually used them with
my early rational-emotive therapy clients (Ellis,
1962). When the Institute for Rational-Emotive
Therapy in New York founded its psychological
clinic in 1968, cognitive homework forms were
printed for its clients, and they added D and E to
the original ABCs (Ellis, 1968). As explained in
Chapter 3 of Humanistic Psychotherapy: The
Rational-Emotive Approach (Ellis, 1973), A
stands for Activating events, Activating experi-
ences, Activities, or Agents that people disturb
themselves about. B stands for rational Beliefs
or realistic Beliefs about the Activating events
that tend to lead to a C, appropriate Conse-
quences or Concomitants. IB stands for irratio-
nal Beliefs about the Activating events and
tends to lead to iC, inappropriate Conse-
quences or Concomitants (especially emotional
disturbances and dysfunctional behaviors). D
stands for Disputing irrational Beliefs--Detect-
ing them, Discriminating them from rational
Beliefs, and Debating them (Phadke, 1982). E
stands for Effective rational Beliefs to replace
people's irrational Beliefs and also for Effective
appropriate emotions and Effective functional
behaviors to replace their disturbed emotions
and dysfunctional behaviors.
The ABCs and the DEs have served RET very
well over the last three decades and have been
copied in hundreds of books and articles and
used with many thousands of clients. In their
original form, however, they are oversimplified
and omit salient information about human dis-
turbance and its treatment. Several RET writers
have tried to expand them, with some degree of
success (Dryden, 1984; Wessler & Wessler,
1980). Here I shall try to give my own version of
how I think they can be usefully expanded.
Albert Ellis, Ph.D., is executive director of the Institute for
Rational-Emotive Therapy, 45 East 65th Street, New
York, NY 10021.
Let me start with some definitions involved in
the RET outlook on human personality and
behavior and particularly in its view of emotional
disturbance. RET holds that humans are pur-
poseful, or goal-seeking, creatures (Adler, 1927,
1929; Ellis, 1973) and that they bring to A
(Activating events or Activating experiences)
general and specific goals (G). Almost always,
their basic Goals are (1) to stay alive and (2) to
be reasonably happy and free from pain while
alive. Their main subgoals as they strive for
happiness include: to be happy (a) when alone,
(b) when associating with other people, (c) when
engaging in intimate relationships with others,
(d) when earning a living, and (e) when engag-
ing in recreational activities (e.g., sports, study,
art, music, drama, etc.).
Rational Beliefs (rBs) in RET mean those
cognitions, ideas, and philosophies that aid and
abet people's fulfilling their basic, or most
important, Goals.
Irrational Beliefs (iBs) are those cognitions,
ideas, and philosophies that sabotage and
block people's fulfilling their basic, or most
important, Goals.
Nonevaluative observations, descriptions,
and cool cognitions are people's observations
of what is going on in the world and in their own
thoughts, feelings, and actions.
Evaluative assessments, inferences, expec-
tations, and conclusions are people's evalua-
tions of what is going on in the world. These
may be either:
(1) Warm evaluations--involved with people's
desires, wishes, and preferences.
(2) Hot evaluations--involved with people's
absolutistic demands, commands, musts, and
necessities.

20
Activating Events or Activators (A) of Cogni-
tive, Emotional, and Behavioral Conse-
quences (C)
The RET theory of personality and personal-
ity disturbances begins with people trying to
fulfill their Goals (Gs) in some kind of environ+
ment and encountering a set of Activating
events or Activators (As) that tend to help them
achieve or block these Goals. The As they
encounter are normally present or current
events or their own thoughts, feelings, or be-
haviors; but they may be imbedded in memories
or thoughts (conscious or unconscious) about
past experiences. People are prone to seek out
and respond to these As because of (a) their
biological or genetic predispositions; (to) their
constitutional history; (c) their prior interper-
sonal and social learning; and (d) their innately
predisposed and acquired habit patterns (Ellis,
1976, 1979).
As (Activating events) virtually never exist in a
pure or monolithic state; they almost always
interact with and partly include Bs and Cs.
People bring themselves (their goals, thoughts,
desires, and physiological propensities) to As.
To some degree, therefore, they are these
Activating events, and the As (their environ-
ments) are them. They can only think, emote,
and behave in a material milieu--as Heidegger
(1962) notes, they can only have their being-in-
the-world; and they almost always exist in and
relate to a social context--live with and relate to
other humans. They are never, therefore, pure
individuals but are world-centered and social
creatures.
Beliefs (Bs) About Activating Events (As)
According to RET theory, people have almost
innumerable Beliefs (Bs)--cognitions, thoughts,
or ideas--about their Activating events (As);
and these Bs importantly and directly tend to
exert strong influences on their cognitive, emo-
tional, and behavioral Consequences (Cs). Al-
though As often seem to directly "cause" or
contribute to Cs, this is rarely true, because Bs
normally serve as important mediators between
As and Cs and therefore more directly "cause"
or "create" Cs (Bard, 1980; Beck, 1976; Ellis,
1957, 1958, 1962; Goldfried & Davison, 1976;
Grieger & Boyd, 1980; Grieger & Grieger, 1982;
Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Mahoney, 1974; Mei-
chenbaum, 1977; Raimy, 1975; Walen, Di-
Giuseppe, & Wessler, 1980; Wessler & Wessler,
1980). People largely bring their Beliefs to A;
and they prejudicially view or experience As in
the light of these biased Beliefs (expecta-
tions, evaluations) and also in the light of their
emotional Consequences (Cs) (desires, prefer-
ences, wishes, motivations, tastes, distur-
bances). Therefore, humans virtually never
experience A without B and C; but they also
rarely experience B and C without A.
Bs take many different forms because people
have many kinds of cognitions. In RET, how-
ever, we are mainly interested in their rational
Beliefs (rBs), which we hypothesize lead to their
self-helping behaviors, and in their irrational
Beliefs (iBs), which we theorize lead to their
self-defeating (and societal-defeating) behav-
iors. We can list some of the main (but not only)
kinds of Bs as follows:
(1) Nonevaluative observations, descriptions,
and perceptions (cool cognitions). Example: "1
see people are laughing:'
(2) Positive preferential evaluations, infer-
ences, and attributions (warm cognitions). Ex-
amples: "Because I prefer people to like me and
they are l a u g h i n g -
(a) "1 see they are laughing with me."
(b) "1 see they think I am funny."
(c) "1 see that they like me:'
(d) "1 like their laughing with me:'
(e) "Their liking me has real advantages,
which I love:'
(3) Negative preferential evaluations, infer-
ences, and attributions (warm cognitions). Ex-
amples: "Because I prefer people not to dislike
me and they are laughing--
(a)"l see they are laughing at me."
(b)"l see they think I am stupid:'
(c) "1 see that they don't like me."
(d)"l dislike their laughing at me."
(e) "Their disliking me has real disadvan-
tages, which I abhor."
(4) Positive absolutistic evaluations, infer-
ences, and attributions (hot cognitions; irratio-
nal Beliefs). Examples: "Because people are
laughing with me and presumably like me and
because I must act competently and must win
their approval--
(a)"l am a great, noble person!" (over-
generalization)
(b)"My life will be completely wonderfult"
(overgenera/ization)
(c)"The world is a totally marvelous
place!" (overgenera/ization)
(d) "1 am certain they will always laugh with
me, and I will therefore always be a
great person!" (certainty)
(e) ,'1 deserve to have only fine and wonder-
ful things happen to me!" (deserving-
ness and deification)
(f) "1 deserve to go to heaven and be
beatified forever!" (deservingness and
extreme deification)
(5) Negative absolutistic evaluations, infer-
ences, and attributions (hot cognitions; irratio-
nal Beliefs). Examples: "Because people are
laughing at me and presumably dislike me and
because I must act competently and must win
their approval--
21
 (a) "1 am an incompetent, rotten personl"
(overgeneralization)
(b)"My life will be completely miserable!"
(overgenera/ization)
(c) "The world is a totally crummy place/"
(overgeneralization)
(d) "1 am certain they will always laugh at
me, and I will therefore always be a
rotten personl" (certainty)
(e) "1 deserve to have only bad and grim
things happen to meY' (deservingness
and damnation)
(f) "1 deserve to roast in hell for eternity!"
(deservingness and extreme damnation)
(6) Common cognitive derivatives of negative
absolutistic evaluations (additional hot cogni-
tions and irrational Beliefs). Disturbed ideas:
"Because I must act competently and must win
people's approval, and because their laughing
at me shows I have acted incompetently and/or
have lost their approval-
(a) "This is awful, horrible, and terrible/"
(awfulizing, catastrophizing)
(b) "1 can't bear it, can't stand it/" (I-can't-
stand-it-itis, discomfort anxie~ low frus-
tration tolerance)
(c) "1 am a thoroughly incompetent inferior
and worthless person!" (self-downing,
feelings of inadequacy)
(d) "1 can't change and become competent
and lovable!" (hopelessness)
(e)"l deserve misery and punishment and
will continue to bring it on myselfi"
(damnation)
(7) Other common cognitive derivatives of
negative absolutistic evaluations (additional ir-
rational Beliefs). Logical errors and unrealistic
inferences: "Because I must act competently
and must win people's approval, and because
their laughing at me shows that I have acted
incompetently and/or have lost their approval--
(a)"l will always act incompetently and
have significant people disapprove of
me:' (overgenera/ization)
(b) "I'm a total failure and completely unlov-
able:' (overgeneralization; all-or-nothing
thinking)
(c) "They know that I am no good and will
always be incompetent:' (non sequitur;
jumping to conclusions; mind reading)
(d) "They will keep laughing at me and will
always despise me." (non sequitur;
jumping to conclusions; fortune telling)
(e) "They only despise me and see nothing
good in me." (focusing on the negative;
overgeneralization)
(f) "When they laugh with me and see me
favorably that is because they are in a
good mood and do not see that I am
fooling them:' (disqualifying the posi~ve;
non sequitur)
(g) "Their laughing at me and disliking me
22
will make me lose my job and lose all my
friends:' (catastrophizing; magnification)
(h) "When I act well and get them to laugh
with me, that only shows that I can
occasionally do well; but that is unim-
portant compared with my great faults
and stupidities:' (minimization; focusing
on the negative)
(i) "1 strongly feel that I am despicable and
unlovable; and because my feeling is so
strong and consistent, this proves that I
really am despicable and unlovable."
(emotional reasoning; circular reasoning;
non sequitur)
(j) "1 am a loser and a failure." (labeling;
overgeneralization)
(k) "They could only be laughing because
of some foolish thing I have done and
could not possibly be laughing for any
other reason:' (personalizing; non sequi-
tur; overgeneralization)
(I) "When I somehow get them to stop
laughing at me or to laugh with me and
like me, I am really a phony who is
acting better than I am and will soon fall
on my face and show them what a
despicable phony I am." (phonyism; all-
or-nothing thinking; overgeneralization)
People can learn absolutistic evaluations,
inferences, and conclusions (hot cognitions and
irrational Beliefs) from their parents, teachers,
and others--for example, "1 must have good
luck, but now that I have broken this mirror, fate
will bring me bad luck and that will be terrible!"
But they probably learn these irrational Beliefs
easily, and they rigidly retain them because they
are born with a strong tendency to think irratio-
nally. More important, people often learn family
and cultural rational standards--for example,
"It is preferable for me to treat others consider-
ately"--and then overgeneralize, exaggerate,
and turn these into irrational Beliefs--for exam-
ple, "Because it is preferable for me to treat
others considerately I have to do so at all times
or else I am a totally unlovable, worthless
person/" Even if all humans were reared utterly
rationally, RET hypothesizes that virtually all of
them would often take their learned standards
and rational preferences and irrationally esca-
late them into absolutistic demands on them-
selves, on others, and on the universe in which
they live (Dryden, 1984; Ellis, 1958, 1962, 1971,
1973, 1976, in press; Ellis & Grieger, 1977; Ellis
& Whitely, 1979).
Consequences (Cs) of Activating Events (As)
and Beliefs (Bs) About As
Cs (cognitive, affective, and behavioral Con-
sequences) follow from the interaction of As and
Bs. We can say, mathematically, that A x B ---
C; but this formula may actually be too simple
and we may require a more complex one to ex-
press the relationship adequately. C is almost
always significantly affected or influenced but
not exactly "caused" by A--because humans
naturally to some degree react to stimuli in their
environments. Moreover, when A is powerful
(e.g., a set of starvation conditions or an earth-
quake) it tends to affect C profoundly.
When C consists of emotional disturbance
(e.g., severe feelings of anxiety, depression,
hostility, self-deprecation, and self-pity), B usu-
ally (not always) mainly or more directly creates
or "causes" C. Even emotional disturbance,
however, may at times stem from powerful As--
for example, from environmental disasters such
as floods or wars. Emotional disturbance may
also follow from factors in the organism--for ex-
ample, hormonal or disease factors--that are
somewhat independent of yet may actually
"cause" Consequences (Cs).
When strong or unusual As significantly con-
tribute to or "cause" Cs, or when physiological
factors "create" Cs, they are usually accompa-
nied by contributory Bs, too. Thus, if people are
caught in an earthquake or if they experience
powerful hormonal changes and they "there-
fore" become depressed, their As and their
physiological processes probably are strongly
influencing them to create irrational Beliefs
(iBs), such as, "This earthquake shouldn't have
occurred! Isn't it awful/I can't stand it." These
iBs, in turn, add to or help create their feelings
of depression at C.
Cs (thoughts, feelings, and behavioral Conse-
quences) that result from As and Bs are virtually
never pure or monolithic but also partially in-
clude and inevitably interact with A and B. Thus,
if A is an obnoxious event (e.g., a job refusal)
and B is, first, a rational Belief (e.g., "1 hope I
don't get rejected for this job") as well as, sec-
ond, an irrational Belief (e.g., "1 must have this
job! I'm no good if I don't get it"), C tends to be,
first, healthy feelings of frustration and disap-
pointment and, second, unhealthy feelings of
severe anxiety, inadequacy, and depression.
So A x B = C. But people also bring feelings
(as well as hopes, goals, and purposes) to A.
They wouldn't apply for a job unless they de-
sired or favorably evaluated it. Their A therefore
partially includes their C. The two, from the be-
ginning, are related rather than completely dis-
parate.
At the same time, people's Beliefs (Bs) also
partly or intrinsically relate to and include their
As and their Cs. Thus, if they tell themselves, at
B, "1 want to get a good job;' they partly create
the Activating event at A (going for a job inter-
view), and they partly create their emotional and
behavioral Consequence at C (feeling disap-
pointed or depressed when they encounter a
job rejection). Without their evaluating a job as
good they would not try for it nor have any par-
ticular feeling about being rejected.
A, B, and C, then, are all closely related and
none of them tends to exist without the other
two. Another way of stating this is to say--as
some psychologists, have recently clearly
stated--that environments only exist for hu-
mans (and are quite different for certain other
animals) and humans only exist in certain kinds
of environments (e.g., where temperatures are
not too hot or too cold) and are part of their
environment. Similarly, individuals usually exist
in a society (rarely as hermits) and societies are
only composed of humans (and are quite differ-
ent when composed, say, of ants or birds). As
the systems theory devotees point out, individ-
ual family members exist in a family system and
change as this system changes. But RET also
points out that the family system is composed of
individuals and may considerably change as
one or more of the individual family members
change. In all these instances interaction is a
key, probably an essential, concept for under-
standing and effectively helping people to
change.
Similarly with cognition, emotion, and behav-
ior. Thinking--as I pointed out in 1956 (Ellis,
1958, 1962) importantly includes feeling and
behaving. We largely think because we desire
(a feeling) to survive (a behavior) and to be
happy (a feeling). Emoting significantly includes
thinking and behaving. We desire because we
evaluate something as "good" or "beneficial"
and, as we desire it, we move toward rather
than away from it (act on it). Behaving to some
degree usually involves thinking and emoting.
We perform an act because we think it is advisa-
ble for us to do it and because we concomitantly
feel like doing it. Occasionally, as certain mysti-
cal-minded people claim, there may be 100%
pure thoughts, emotions, or behaviors, which
have no admixture of the other two processes. If
so, they seem to be exceptionally rare. Even
when they occasionally appear to occur--as
when a person is tapped below the knee and
gives a knee-jerk response without any appar-
ent concomitant thought or feeling--the original
response (the knee jerk) seems to be immedi-
ately followed by a thought ("Look at that! My
knee jerkedV') and a feeling ("Isn't that nice
that my nerves function wellt"). So pure cogni-
tions, emotions, and behaviors may exist, but
rarely during normal waking (or conscious)
states; and even when they do they are quickly
followed by related cognitive-affective-behav-
ioral states (Schwartz, 1982).
Humans uniquely are involved in cognitive
processes, and these often instigate, change,
and combine with their emotive and behaviora,
reactions. When people feel and behave, they
almost always have some thoughts about their
feelings and actions; and these thoughts lead
them to have other feelings and behaviors.
Thus, when they feel sad about, say, the loss of
a loved one, they usually see or observe that
23
they are sad, evaluate this feeling in some way
(e.g., "Isn't it good that I am sad--this proves
how much I really loved this person" or "Isn't it
bad that I am sad--this shows that I am letting
myself be too deeply affected").
When people feel emotionally disturbed at
C--that is, seriously anxious, depressed, self-
downing, or hostile--they quite frequently view
their symptoms absolutistically and awfulizingly
and irrationally conclude, "1 should not, must
not, be depressed. It's awful to feel this wayl I
can't stand it. What a fool I am for giving in to
this feeling!" They then develop a secondary
symptom--depression about their depression
or anxiety about their anxiety--which may be
more severe and more incapacitating than their
primary symptom and which may actually pre-
vent them from understanding and working
against their primary disturbance. RET as-
s u m e s - o n theoretical grounds--that people
often use their cognitive processes in this self-
defeating manner because this is the way they
naturally, easily tend to think, and RET routinely
looks for secondary symptoms and treats them
prior to or along with dealing with clients' pri-
mary symptoms. The observable fact that peo-
ple tend to spy on themselves and condemn
themselves when they have primary symptoms,
and thereby frequently develop crippling see-
ondary symptoms, tends to support the RET hy-
pothesis that cognition is enormously important
in the development of neurotic feelings and
behavior and that efficient psychotherapy had
better usually include considerable rational-
emotive methodology.
When people develop secondary symp-
t o m s - f o r example, feel very anxious about
their anxiety, as agoraphobics tend to do--their
secondary feelings strongly influence their cog-
nitions and behaviors. Thus, they feel so
strongly that they tend to conclude, "It really is
awful that I am panicked about open spaces!"
and they tend to behave more self-defeatingly
than ever (e.g., they withdraw all the more from
open spaces). This again tends to demonstrate
that A (Activating events), B (Beliefs), and C
(cognitive, emotive and behavioral Conse-
quences) are interactive--that thoughts signifi-
cantly affect feelings and behaviors, that
emotions significantly affect thoughts and be-
haviors, and that behaviors significantly affect
thoughts and feelings.
In RET, we are mainly concerned with peo-
ple's "emotional" disturbances--both primary
and secondary. But the ABC theory is also a
personality theory that shows how people
largely create their own "normal:' or healthy
(positive and negative), feelings and how they
can change them if they wish to work at doing
so. I hope that the formulations in this paper will
add to the ABC theory and make it more com-
plex and more useful.
24
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